ENTROPY-BASED WARFARE a Unified Theory for Modeling the Revolution in Military Affairs

ENTROPY-BASED WARFARE A Unified Theory for Modeling the Revolution in Military Affairs

h Mark Herman Booz-Allen & Hamilton Inc.

July 1997 Introduction There is a hypothesis, first proposed by the Soviets in the late 70's, that the new generation of precision weapons coupled with new sensor and information architectures will generate a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). 1 This vision of future warfare has been explored for over a decade by a small group of analysts and is now partially embodied in the U.S. JV 2010 (Joint Vision 2010).2 This view holds that the period of the '90's and the early 21st century will be analogous to the interwar years of the 20's and 30's when the Blitzkrieg and carrier warfare were first developed. Within this analogy, it is estimated that the world is in the equivalent of the early 20's with almost two more decades of developmental thought before some more stable military regime is established. 3 The use of precision strike weapons, nascent information warfare capabilities, and advanced collection systems used during the Gulf War are touted as evidence of the analogy's validity.

As the RMA concept develops, the international defense community has had to grapple with understanding the impact of advanced warfare concepts, such as information warfare, and with the broader advantages conferred by high levels of situation awareness on the battlefield. Inadequate understanding of warfare dynamics beyond the current attrition-based paradigm has, to date, constrained understanding of the RMA.

Virtually all models4 currently used by the U.S. Department of Defense are fundamentally attrition-based. 5 When used in an analytical roles, these models often provide quantitative results that support one recommendation over another.

1 The Economist, "The Future of Warfare, The Economist (August 3, 1997), from Website http://www.economist.com/issue/08-03-97/id4s63.html,p. 1. 2 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Toint Vision 2010.(Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1996), p. 19. 3 AndrewMarshall quotefrom The Economist, "TheFuture of Warfare, The Economist (August 3, 1997),from Website http://www.economist.com/issue/08-03-97/sfoBl3.html,p. 1. 4 Forpurposes of this paper theterm model is used to encompass, models, simulations, and wargames.

© 1997, Booz-Allen& Hamilton Inc. Pagel These attrition-based models, however, do not account for many of the important factors that impact conflict outcome, such as command. The few models that attempt to quantify C4ISR6 lack an analytic construct that goes beyond attrition, resulting in basic effects that are usually measured as increases in the rate and efficiency of attrition. When relying on models that quantify only part of the conflict equation, decision makers have had to fill in the blanks based on qualitative judgment alone.

The analytic construct behind simulations influences the types of forces built and the types of wars that are fought with those forces. During the Cold War, attrition- based simulations strongly influenced the acquisition of large attrition-oriented forces. In the Post Cold War era, both the U.S. and international defense communities need to reduce military establishments and focus resources on more productive investments. While continued reliance on an attrition-based paradigm in a Post Cold War era is likely to perpetuate the rationale for large military forces, a more robust analytic construct can illuminate a more efficient and effective way of conducting warfare with smaller, more agile forces. Fundamental to such a paradigm shift is an understanding of the broader dynamics of warfare and how new technologies and techniques impact future warfare. This paper proposes a new analytic paradigm of warfare, articulating some of its implications for the emerging RMA.

This new modeling paradigm is predicated on the historical view that warfare can be directed against the cohesion of enemy units or states rather than exclusively against the physical components that comprise those entities. Thus, for example, destruction of an armored unit's ability to maintain situation awareness, coordinate actions, and apply its will can destroy that unit's effectiveness at least as certainly as

5 Andrew Marshall (Director of the Office of the Secretary of Defensefor Net Assessment), interviewed by Mark Herman at OSD/NA (Pentagon 3A930), notes, Washington DC, USA, February 20, 1996. 6 Command, Control, Communications,Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance,and Reconnaissance

© 1997, Booz-Allen& Hamilton Inc. Page2 elimination of the unit's systems through firepower. Such great captains as Genghis Khan and Alexander the Great practiced this style of warfare to generate decisive one-sided outcomes. For example, in two of Alexander's most famous battles (Issus and Gaugamela), his direct threat to the opposing commander (Darius III) caused the collapse of the Persian army's cohesion before the majority of the force had engaged in combat. 7 The resultant Persian collapse gave Alexander's numerically inferior forces domination over the Middle East and Southwest Asia.

In the context of this paradigm, the goal of forces is to disorder the enemy while maintaining their own cohesion. Certainly the destruction of an enemy force can accomplish this, but there are other dimensions that can now produce the same impact. The author enlists a physics metric, entropy8, to describe the state of disorder imposed on a military system at a given moment. Broadly, this metric is based on the fact that military forces are trained — and required — to act in a cohesive and organized manner. In conflict, a military force is subject to various pressures that create disorganization. In this paradigm, a military unit that has been whose entropy has risen to the maximum level is no more than a mob. The mechanism by which enemy disorganization and ineffectiveness are measured is entropy. The organized application of the entropy metric is the foundation of entropy-based warfare.

The inaccuracy of attrition metrics in measuring conflict should raise questions throughout the Department of Defense about the validity of these models and about the limitations inherent in force-on-force paradigms. Department of Defense analytic model runs prior to the Gulf War almost universally predicted an attrition- oriented outcome involving large numbers of Coalition force casualties, which thankfully never materialized. This paper articulates an alternate model of warfare, based on the entropy metric, that demonstrates the commonality of different styles

7 Arrian, The Campaigns of Alexander,translated by Aubrey De Selincourt and J.R. Hamilton, (Middlesex:Penguin Books., 1976),pp. 119-120and 168-170. 8 Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary defines Entropy as the steady degradation or disorganization of a system or society.

© 1997, Booz-Allen & HamiltonInc. Page 3 of warfare across the conflict spectrum. The thesis of this paper is thatfuture warfare cannot be adequately modeled using attrition as the primary measure of effectiveness. This thesis will be tested against dissimilar historical cases as a proof of its efficacy.

To relate the theory to a more inclusive set of conflict measures of effectiveness, this paper will be broken into three sections. The first section will deal with those factors cited by classic theorists and military historians as key to the dynamics that drive combat outcome. The second section will take these key factors and articulate a model of combat to illustrate how these factors operate across three styles of warfare (guerrilla, mobile, and conventional). The third section will examine some key concepts emerging from the RMA and how they can be modeled.

Dynamics of Combat: Theory and History Warfare has three unchanging physical factors: force, space, and time.9 Commanders have manipulated these physical factors since the dawn of warfare. These factors are subsumed within the human enterprise of warfare, which extends beyond the physical factors to include such elusive qualities as morale, troop quality, and leadership.

Traditionally, force is the measure of the physical dimensions of an army, combat unit, or a society (e.g., economic force). It is the most easily quantifiable measure, since it basically counts objects, such as tanks, and categorizes them to produce various statistics that can be used for a variety of purposes.

Space is the measure of movement and control. How fast is the army moving? How much territory does one side control? Subtler measures are also possible. One of Napoleon's great strengths was his ability to coordinate the movement of his

9 Carl Yon Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press., 1976),pp. 204-205.Clausewitz spoke in terms of forces in

© 1997, Booz-Allen & Hamilton Inc. Page 4 various corps components and have them mass upon the battlefield in a manner that gave him both force and spatial advantages (e.g., flank attack) over opponents. Napoleon's operations in support of his siege of Mantua during his Italian campaign demonstrate his ability to use the spatial advantage of the central position to repeatedly defeat numerically superior Austrian armies. 10

Time has traditionally been the hardest factor to quantify. Clearly time is measurable, but its impact on warfare is poorly understood. Great commanders have always understood the value of time. Caesar crossed the Rubicon with only the XIII legion because the political nature of the conflict rendered time, not force, as the key to the conquest of Italy. 11 It is in the temporal dimension that advanced RMA concepts hold their greatest promise, and it is this area that is least amenable to attrition-based measurements.

Not surprisingly, armed strength is most commonly measured on the basis of force. Force — particularly when massive — is easily quantifiable, can be validated tactically, and lends itself to analysis using such straightforward metrics as attrition. Attrition is a measure of physical destruction. Since attrition effects can be explicitly measured by counting methods and statistics, it has become the basic metric of military success. Thus, theaters of warfare with high force densities can be reasonably represented using attrition and force ratios, as exemplified by the Cold War European front where NATO and Warsaw Pact forces stood in stalemate positions on the inter-German border. The military balance was the metric of the Cold War whereby numerical measures of platform strength (e.g., tanks, artillery, ships, planes) defined international stability.

space that are unified in time. 10 David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon. (New York: MacMillan Company, 1966), pp. 88-121 11 Julius Caesar, The Civil War, translated by Jane Gardner, (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1982), pp. 41- -43.

© 1997,Booz-Allen& HamiltonInc. Page 5 When, however, a model or simulation emphasizes force to the detriment of warfare's other dimensions — particularly as force densities diminish from conventional to the low intensity conflict end of the spectrum — it fails to account sufficiently for such other factors as friction, cohesion, and moral factors, which classical writers, military professionals, and students of military history have acknowledged as important features of warfare. 12 Clausewitz wrote, "If the theory of war did no more than remind us of these elements, demonstrating the need to reckon with and give full value to moral qualities, it would expand its horizon, and simply by establishing this point of view would condemn in advance anyone who sought to base an analysis on material factors alone." 13 Sun Tzu, the ancient Chinese military theorist, made similar points in his chapter on estimates where force size is not a primary factor, but a secondary "element" in assessing relative strengths. 14

Precisely by over-emphasizing one element of warfare — force — over all other considerations, forces were built during the Cold War which were fundamentally inflexible and inappropriate for many military situations at the lower ends of the conflict spectrum and against RMA style forces. In a Post Cold War world that puts a premium on flexible military forces, maintenance of the attrition metric is almost guaranteed to stunt the development of new military concepts and technologies.

One factor that is consistently identified as key to military strength is the notion of unit cohesion, sometimes expressed as esprit de corps, morale, moral influence, training, or discipline. 15 Most anecdotal descriptions of units performing above and beyond expectations, in the face of overwhelming odds, can be attributed to this factor. Within the analysis community, very few models capture this term. (The Joint Staff's Theater Analysis Model (TAM), although it explicitly quantifies

12 Clausewitz,p. 119. 13 Clausewitz,p. 184. 14 SunTzu, The Art of War (Sammuel B. Griffith translation), Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 63. 15 Wm Darryl Henderson, Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat. (Washington DC:

© 1997, Booz-Allen& Hamilton Inc. Page 6 cohesion as a mathematical term in determining unit capability, 16 omits the Clausewitzian concept of friction.) Friction, in its classical articulation, appears to be absent from all models of unit behavior currently in U.S. Department of Defense usage.17

Numerous attempts have been made to incorporate the notion of Clausewitzian friction into models, but these efforts have ultimately derived from weapons performance and firepower data. RAND's Strategy Assessment System (RSAS) has an explicit expression for friction, but it is fundamentally derived from firepower interactions, such as air power effects on ground forces. 18 Other approaches attempt to build hierarchical constructs which base the behavior of less detailed models on the output of more detailed models. 19 The problem with the latter approach is that the less detailed, higher level models are calibrated by detailed attrition models; thus, the detail being added to the higher level model is simply more specific weapons performance data with inter-visibility calculations added. Alternate approaches attempt to factor in some of the soft factors of intelligence through the development of targeting data within the command control system. 20 The shortcoming of this approach is that it limits the use of intelligence almost exclusively to the purpose of more accurately applying weapons against targets.

Clausewitz described friction as the factor which "...combines to lower the general level of performance, so that one always falls far short of the intended goal."21 Friction occurs at all times and, within the American cultural experience, it might

National Defense University Press, 1985), p. 2. 16 Booz"Allen & Hamilton, Inc., Theater Analysis Model,(Tysons Corner, Booz*Allen & Hamilton Inc., 1981), p. 43. 17 Marshall, February 20, 1996. 18 Paul K. Davis. Modeling Of Soft Factors In The RAND Strategy Assessment System (RSAS) No. 7538. (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1989), pp. 12-15. 19 Paul K. Davis, An Introduction to Variable-Resolution Modeling and Cross-Resolution Model (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1993), pp. 15-17. 20 Steven C. Bankes, Methodological Considerations in Using Simulation to Assess the Combat Value of Intelligence and Electronic Warfare. (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1991), p. 16. 21 Clausewitz,p. 119.

Connection, be equated with "Murphy's Law," whereby things just seem to go awry. Clausewitz acknowledged that a leader with an "iron will"22 could overcome the effects of friction, but only at a cost in reduced unit cohesion. It is from this perspective that this author sees friction as a key element in the cohesion dynamic.

One concludes from reading Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Caesar23, and Napoleon24 that key soft factors can be aggregated into the broad term of unit cohesion. Cohesion, in this context, is a metric of efficiency whereby a unit with perfect cohesion carries out military tasks to the full limit of its size and capabilities. 25 Conversely, a unit with poor cohesion is capable of performing well below its theoretical potential efficiency. Cohesion is affected by two key variables: friction and disruption. Friction lowers unit cohesion based on the unit's own activities. As a unit moves, things break, soldiers tire, and people meander. Disruption lowers unit cohesion based on enemy activities. Herein lies the value of psychological operations, surprise attacks, and — in today's lexicon — information warfare. The RAND RSAS model's friction variable more appropriately fits within this category of disruption.

One can imagine a mathematical model in which unit behavior is a function of its cohesion and its physical capabilities (lethality). Between forces of equal cohesion, physical strength should prevail, but even momentary inequalities in cohesion can severely unbalance an otherwise equal contest.

Alternate Model of Warfare The macro expression for describing the combined effect of friction, disruption, and lethality on unit behavior is suggested by a term used in a RAND paper on

22 Clausewitz,p. 119. 23 Julius Caesar,The Civil War (translatedby Jane F. Gardner), (Middlesex,Penguin Publishing, 1976), p. 153. 24 Napoleon Bonaparte, The Military Maxims of Napoleon (translated by LtGen Sir George C. D'Aquilar C.8., edited by David Chandler), (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co.), p. 75. 25 Henderson, p. 18.

© 1997, Booz-Allen& HamiltonInc. Page 8 Information Warfare — entropy.26 Genghis Khan is one of many famous commanders who have practiced styles of warfare that have de-emphasized attrition.27 Such a style has been called by many names, including maneuver warfare, but for purposes of this paper it will be called "entropy-based warfare." For purposes of this paper, the collective expression of a unit's cohesion and current capabilities is measured by its entropy level. As a unit's entropy rises, its overall capability decreases. Conversely, a unit with low entropy can realize its full physical potential.

The concept is based on the fact that a military force must maintain certain cohesive properties based on its orderly construction and operation. As a force loses cohesion, its entropy level increases until, at maximum entropy, the unit becomes a mob of individuals who are incapable of coordinating combat potential. The object of war has always been to bend an enemy to one's will, and a means to that end has been to defeat the enemy's ability to resist. Attrition can be an effective means to this goal, but it is important to recognize that other methods have been used to achieve the collapse of military forces.

The non-attrition factors which directly affect combat outcome are often poorly understood, and danger arises when resource and strategy decisions are based on analysis which excludes these misunderstood factors. During the Vietnam War, for example, U.S. policy makers used a mental model of attrition warfare which the New York Times called the "meat grinder." The model's basic metric — reduction in enemy activity — led analysts to conclude that superior sized U.S. forces would deter the North Vietnamese from continuing to escalate their force commitments

26 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Power, and Grand Strategy (unpublished), (Santa Monica: RAND, July 1995),p. 19. 27 James Chambers,The Devil's Horsemen. (New York: Morrison and Gibbs, Ltd, 1979),p. 63.

Information, and convince them that they could not prevail. In fact, high U.S. force levels produced the opposite effect. 28

According to traditional metrics of conventional warfare — such as force ratio, territory held, and relative casualties — the U.S. won in Vietnam. In reality, U.S. morale (both army and societal), despite superior U.S. firepower, was near the breaking point. Such discrepancies between theory and reality lead one to question whether or not the U.S. model of conflict is valid.

Mao Tse Tung articulated a spectrum of conflict that spanned three phases. 29 At the low end of the spectrum, guerrilla operations are characterized by the preponderant use of irregular forces. This level of warfare today is broadly defined as Low Intensity Conflict (LIC). Mao's characterization of conventional warfare as the high end of the conflict spectrum is well illustrated by the 1990-91 Gulf War. The middle of the spectrum is the domain of mobile warfare, which emphasizes non-linear operations with a mixture of regular and irregular forces. It is noteworthy that the dynamics of conflict are constant across the Maoist operational spectrum of guerrilla, mobile, and conventional combat.

Efforts to exploit this commonality in simulation modeling have failed to date, largely due to the customary selection of attrition as the basic metric. The difficulty with the attrition metric is that it fails to address command and control, information superiority, and organizational advantages. Historical cases on the limitation of viewing warfare through attrition abound, but Midway and France 1940 are prime examples. One is struck by the impossibility of explaining the outcomes of these campaigns without considering the broader dynamics of warfare.

28 Jeffrey S. Milstein, Dynamics of the Vietnam War: A Quantitative Analysis and Predictive Computer Simulation, (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1974), p. 49. 29 Mao was discussingguerrilla war andnot explicitly describinga spectrum of conflict. The author feels justified in taking this liberty by the fact that although Mao's perspective was that of an insurgent

© 1997, Booz-Allen & Hamilton Inc. Page 10 At Midway, U.S. information superiority resulted in the destruction of the Japanese center of gravity, their aircraft carriers and naval air crews. During the France 1940 campaign, German command and control advantages, coupled with organizational advantages (e.g., the panzer division and armored corps), belied the predictable force-on-force outcome based on French numerical armored superiority. At the lower end of the conflict spectrum, the inability of attrition-based methodologies to demonstrate the advantages of maneuver, deception, and psychological operations reduce the force-on-force paradigm to a tertiary consideration.

Characterisially, guerrilla operations tend to emphasize unconventional tactics and small combat encounters. Yet the impact of the ambush, the rear area attack, and psychological operations can reduce an opponent's strength as dramatically as a well placed precision munition. Harassment tactics disrupt an enemy force, even where destruction of physical capabilities may be minimal. In guerrilla warfare, if the populace supports the insurgents, intelligence on guerrilla movements is hard to obtain. As counter-insurgency (COIN) forces move about in classic search and destroy missions, they incur greater friction than normal due to the hostile populace and the uncertainty amongst combat leaders. In such an environment, even small guerrilla strikes can have great disruptive effects on COIN forces. COIN forces subjected repeatedly to such effects begin to respect and then fear the enemy, further increasing the disruptive effects of the guerrilla strategy. Such COIN forces experience an increase in their entropy level.

Well-trained, disciplined, capably led troops are less susceptible to the paralyzing effects of entropy-based warfare. Such units move and function efficiently, thereby minimizing self-inflicted friction, and good leadership minimizes the effects of disruptive setbacks. Alert and ready, such units can minimize their susceptibility to surprise attacks. Through discipline and adherence to stringent rules of engagement, against the Japanese, the three phases of his Guerrilla warfareparadigm do describe the spectrum of conflict from very low to high intensity warfare.

units can avoid antagonizing the populace by maintaining the legitimacy of the government and the cause that they represent. 30 With patience and perseverance, such forces can exploit their superior combat capabilities to inflict attrition on guerrilla forces. This has been a formula for success in the past and will likely continue to be so for the foreseeable future.

The following Venn diagram illustrates the relationships among the various factors just discussed. The three rings of the diagram represent the key factors that contribute to a unit entropy. Friction comprises those activities the unit performs that increases its entropy level. Disruption includes those activities that the enemy conducts to increase a unit's entropy level. Lethality is the firepower a unit has to directly reduce the enemy forces through physical contact.

Diagrammatic Representation of Entropy-Based Warfare

Where these factors intersect, more severe entropy effects are possible. The intersection of Lethality and Disruption is the effect that destruction of a critical node has on the overall performance of the unit. This would be the destruction of a

30 Manwaring,p. 23.

© 1997,Booz-Allen& Hamilton Inc. Page 12 unit's command staff or a surprise night attack where attrition effects are magnified by other factors. The intersection of Lethality and Friction is the physical loss of equipment or personnel, due to breakdown or mines, which prevents a unit from achieving its desired tempo of operations. The intersection of Disruption and Friction is the use of psychological warfare and other information warfare techniques to both reduce a unit's efficiency and cause unit paralysis. The central intersection, where all three factors are coordinated, is a more extreme expression of the previous three examples.

An example of the entropy-based warfare concept is supplied by General Greene's mobile warfare campaign during the American Revolution. The American Revolution had been underway for more than five years when General Gates was smashed by Cornwallis at Camden on August 16, 1780. This victory briefly allowed the British forces to successfully pursue their pacification of the populace through their support for the Tory population by deploying forces in a series of strongpoints, such as Ninety-six, and mobile columns of Tory and British regulars. Despite key British setbacks at King's Mountain and the continued viability of the various Partisan bands,31 by all metrics of the time the Revolutionary forces were on the operational and tactical defense.

With the assignment of General Greene, the Americans adopted a mobile warfare style which had been evolving since the beginning of the war.32 The basic precepts were to avoid direct contact with larger British forces while threatening multiple points through the maneuver of the regular forces. These operations were intended to animate the partisan bands under Marion, Sumter, and Pickens.33 The maneuvers were not designed to concentrate American forces, but to disperse and

31 John S. Pancake, This Destructive War: The British Campaign in the Carolinas. 1780-1782. (Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1985), p. 123. 32JohnMorgan Dederer, Making Bricks Without Straw: National Green's Southern Campaign and Mao Tse-Tung's Mobile War, (Kansas: Sunflower University Press, 1983), pp. 13-14. 33 Christopher Ward, The War of the Revolution Vol. 11. (New York: The MacMillan Company,

© 1997, Booz-Allen & Hamilton Inc. Page 13 disrupt the operations of British forces. 34 The more the British forces were dispersed^ the more vulnerable they would be to Partisan forces who were able to achieve favorable conditions for harassment operations. The more the American regulars dispersed, the stronger they became due to the increased numbers of militia that became available by their presence. The overall impact of these collective operations was to disorganize and demoralize the British forces while creating conditions favorable for the continuation of the Revolution at the grass roots level.35

In this case, the impact of mobile warfare is discernible through the Entropy-Based Warfare Model. British losses, with the exception of Cowpens and Guilford Court House, were negligible as compared to medical casualties;36 consequently, attrition methodologies cannot explain the impact of mobile warfare on the British defeat. The impact of the Partisan operations supported by mobile Regular forces was to reduce British force cohesion overall, particularly among the Tory auxiliaries. As a result of these operations, the British gave up the Carolinas without Greene winning a single victory.37 (It should be remembered that mobile warfare operations were not solely the province of the American forces. The British employed several COIN units, such as the Queen's Rangers, who achieved similar results when they surprised superior sized forces. 38 )

In this example, the mobile forces caused disruption by forcing enemy reactions to their maneuvers. The rapid British counter maneuvers, lacking time for extensive planning, resulted in amplified friction effects as the forces pursued into regions that were not pre-stocked with logistics, straining lines of communication to the

1952), p.750. 34 Pancake, p. 130. 35 Pancake, p. 131. 36Ward, p. 836 37 William P. Cumming and HushRankin, The Fate of a Nation: The American Revolution through contemporary eyes. (London: Phaidon Press Ltd, 1975), p. 311. 38 LtCol Simcoe, A Tournal of the Operations of the Queen's Rangers, From the End of the Year 1777 to the Conclusion of theLate American War. (Exeter: Printed by the Author, 1787), pp. 24- -26.

© 1997, Booz-Allen& HamiltonInc. Page 14 breaking point. The British need to disperse their forces created doctrinal and unit disruption for British forces trained to fight in large linear masses. After each British victory, their forces were further concentrated, conceding more territory to the Americans.39

American partisan forces launched vicious surprise attacks into this environment, killing isolated detachments and raising the overall state of alert for unaffected forces. The need for constant vigilance stretched British forces to their limits, even when no direct threat was present. In the end, the British military machine's entropy state had risen so high that Cornwallis removed his forces from the region, conceding the ground and the populace to the American forces.

This historical example demonstrates the interaction of the three axes of entropy- based warfare. In this campaign General Greene manipulated force, space, and time factors to raise the entropy level of the British forces to achieve his military objectives. In the near future it appears that these factors, combined with technological and organizational advances, offer new opportunities to exploit entropy-based warfare concepts.

Modeling the RMA Characteristically, revolutions in military affairs usually occur in directresponse to a known military system. Hence, carrier aviation evolved to destroy the battleship, and it can be argued that if the Cold War had gone hot, submarines would have replaced surface combatants as the dominant capital ship. The post-Cold War military system is based on conventional high performance platforms, such as the tank, large surface combatant, and the tactical fighter. The evolving RMA emphasizes computer information networks coupled with advanced munitions.

39Cumming,p.3oB.

© 1997, Booz-AUen& Hamilton Inc. Page 15 In theory, a force based on an interconnected architecture will utilize its advanced information assets to understand, locate, and target vital enemy capabilities. Through application of advanced long range munitions and information warfare techniques, an enemy force can then be dismembered by coalescing military force on very coordinated timelines from spatially dispersed locations. The impact on the platform-based force is that it will find itself disconnected, unsupported, and unable to mass its platforms. In this construct, the platform-based force is defeated before it can effectively respond, because it masses force much more slowly than the munitions-based force. Hence, it is in the superior manipulation of the time dimension that the munitions-based force finds its major war winning advantage.

As new concepts associated with the network-centric RMA evolve, some key features have developed. The first key feature is that the RMA is information driven and has a high reliance on distributed interactive computer networks. These networks define the new RMA military units just as hierarchical command structures defined the platform-based force of the Cold War era. It is believed that this shared view of the battlespace, enhanced by advanced simulation capabilities, will impart significant time advantages over less aware opponents.

Another key aspect of the RMA is its use of precision munitions as the primary mechanism of destruction. These precision munitions are enabled by the information networks that feed coordinates and terminal guidance instructions to give these weapons their lethality. In the past, when a weapon's footprint was only a small fraction of the geo-location error of the target, massive numbers of munitions were necessary to account for the error. The Allied strategic bombing campaign in World War II is a good example of this principle. With the advent of the RMA, the geo-location error of the target and the weapon footprint now stand in relatively equal proportions to each other. If a target's position is known, it is almost always hit with one weapon. With timely, updated information, the high probability that the target is still at its last sighted location gives teeth to the phrase "one shot, one

© 1997,Booz-Allen & Hamilton Inc. Page 16 kill." It is the coupling of these two features (information driven networks and precision munitions) that allows for an information advantage to be translated into a step function increase in lethality over a platform based force. This concept has been called "network-centric" warfare.40

In network-centric warfare, networked computers and databases are manipulated to create a real-time picture of the battlefield which links all echelons of command through the commander's intent. Force interactions generate effects that are synchronized in time to produce high order effects upon the enemy. These high order effects are captured by the entropy-based warfareparadigm. As enemy forces lose their cohesive qualities, they are struck with overwhelming force to effect their final dispersal and surrender. Attrition measures alone do not capture the intent of this style of conflict. This form of high intensity conflict should change the character of the upper end of the conflict spectrum by displacing the platform-based warfare of World War II and the Cold War with the munitions-based, network-centric warfare of the post Cold War era.

The information-driven aspect of the RMA also translates into another concept: dominant maneuver. This is an old notion now reborn. To maneuver against an enemy's center of gravity was the hallmark of Napoleonic warfare. In that period, a pre-revolutionary army's line of communication was its center of gravity. Any threat to it was assured to garner a predictable enemyreaction. Napoleon's use of initiative allowed him to maneuver against the enemy's line of communication, reducing the opponents options to a small set of predictable alternatives, each with a prearranged contingency already in place. Dominant maneuver is the new term for this old concept. Dominant maneuver utilizes information superiority to locate enemy weaknesses and rapidly maneuvers forces, such as airmobile forces, against a

40 VADM Art Cebrowski, (N6), interviewedby Mark Herman and Dan March atJ6, Pentagon, Washington DC, USA, March 7, 1997.

It should be obvious that the center of gravity for the RMA force is its information and their supporting networks. An RMA force without its information superiority loses its key advantages in time and force. Without information superiority, a network-centric force begins to lose leverage to a platform-based force. The need to maintain information superiority results in the re-vitalization of another old concept: information warfare. Sun Tzu, in his chapter on Employment of Secret Agents, covers many of the key information warfare concepts. The new technological angle is that the distributed and extensive nature of the networks has created a new medium in cyberspace. Much as combat occurs on land, at sea, and in the air, cyberspace is the new arena for information combat. If the RMA force is unable to protect its networks from the full range of enemy responses, it could find itself vulnerable to older, less efficient, more robust systems.

Although information warfare, first mentioned in Sun Tzu, has existed throughout history, the emphasis of the emerging RMA on interconnected information systems offers this form of conflict greater direct leverage than has been possible in the past. Throughout history, all military forces have gathered intelligence, decided on courses of action, communicated decisions, and implemented those decisions. In the nineteenth century, the telegraph began to augment the communications regime, to be followed by radio. In the twentieth century, intelligence gathering was altered first by the airplane and then the satellite. With the advent of computer networks, the way in which decisions are made and information is manipulated and passed has been significantly altered as machines perform many of the functions once performed solely by humans. This augmentation of human oversight has created new opportunities for information warfare to be waged on timelines beyond human perception across global spatial dimensions. Hardware and software performance becomes a significant set of variables whose impact is not yet well understood. It

© 1997, Booz-AUen & HamiltonInc. Page 18 may be that the nation who first understands this dimension of the emerging RMA will gain an advantage similar to that enjoyed by the Germans during their France campaign in 1940.

Part and parcel with information warfare is the achievement of information superiority. A reasonable prediction of future enemy actions is enabled by accurate "situation awareness," as defined in its broadest sense. Such awareness entails not only accurate knowledge of enemy locations and order of battle, but an appreciation of the state, location, and cohesion of both enemy and friendly forces and societies. Situation awareness transcends simple force localization to encompass and understanding what such forces are capable of accomplishing — both in terms of systems and the cohesion of the units possessing them. Situation awareness is the glue that links the known past with the unknown future. This information superiority is a cornerstone of JV 2010, a principle upon which all other ramifications will rely.

An important factor in information superiority is the use of space as the location for many components of the advanced intelligence gathering and communication systems that support the distributed information networks. The implications of this are the almost certainty that space, in any large conflict, will be the scene of information warfare attacks. Since one of the simplest means for attacking these systems would be with various forms of lethal munitions, the weaponization of space will likely be a hallmark of 21st century warfare.

In summation, the RMA in its current conceptualization is enabled and relies on information driven computer networks. The information networks confer information superiority. Information superiority places strong emphasis on precision strike, dominant maneuver, information warfare, and space conflict. These concepts are the key features of the RMA.

© 1997,Booz-AUen & HamiltonInc. Page 19 This construct suggests that the ability to quickly coalesce effects in time, as opposed to space, may be one of the most critical advantages of the emerging RMA. A platform-based force moves at the pace of the platforms. Air platforms can move at mach speeds, but the land and naval platforms move at rates measured in the 10s of kilometers per hour. The network-centric RMA force moves at the speed of the munitions. Effectively, all munitions move at mach speeds whether they are glide bombs carried on air platforms or self propelled missiles. In order for this force to be efficient it must acquire, interpret, and act on information at rates commensurate with the tempo of its munitions.

When effects are coalesced in time, well within the opponents ability to react, the ability to concentrate the forces lethality against the enemy's critical functions can result in sudden surges in enemy entropy. The vital functions lost to precision strike are often those capabilities that could otherwise re-impose order upon the unit, such as senior non-commissioned officers and command elements. The double effect of losing vital functions and the ability for the unit to heal itself can lead to rapid increases in enemy entropy and loss of the capability to resist.

The RMA force is not without its requirement for platforms to conduct maneuvers. However, the choices are broadened because light airmobile forces supported by precision strike can move at 100s of kilometers per hour as contrasted by the armor heavy forces of the Cold War. The traditional drawback of such forces is their vulnerability to enemy armor forces and anti-air capabilities. Information superiority and the ability to move comfortably within the enemy's reaction capability allows light forces to substitute maneuver agility for the protective qualities of armor. When heavy enemy forces react to the maneuver, the information dominant force uses its precision strike to defeat those forces. As a result, the RMA force can mass effects in time more quickly than heavy Cold War armor forces can mass spatially.

© 1997, Booz-Allen& Hamilton Inc. Page 20 NATO air operations in Bosnia are illustrative of the ability of light forces supported by precision munitions to overcome more heavily armed ground forces. The Italian military described the operational impact of NATO air power in Bosnia as the decisive catalyst in bringing the parties to the peace table. According to Italian sources, the Serbs fielded approximately 80,000 troops with heavy weapons against a poorly equipped army of some 280,000 Muslims. NATO air power was able to disrupt Serbian operations by targeting and destroying their fragile Command and Control system and then causing Serbian leaders to dig in their heavy forces, for fear that they would be targeted by NATO air strikes. With the main Serbian force advantages neutralized, the larger, more lightly armed Muslim army began to make headway on the ground. This convinced the Serbians that the conflict, for the time being, had to come to a halt.41 It was the imposition of massive disruption that raised the Serbian military's entropy level, making them vulnerable to a weaker Muslim force.

When modeling forces or societies in this analytic paradigm, one is forced to conclude that critical factors in the RMA equation include an understanding of the impact of information content, synchronization of the databases that share that information across networks, and the knowledge advantage of one side over another. If a measure of the inconsistencies in information content held by one side between its component parts were viewed as reducing the barrier to entropy increase, then one can visualize how small differences in synchronization could measurably affect a force's performance. Clearlyforces that move at 10s of kilometers per hour are less sensitive to small perturbations in synchronization, but forces moving at the speed of mach have less tolerance for error. If the opponent could disturb the situation with information warfare attacks on the network's time keeping functions, the precision timing that an RMA force requires could be

41 General Cucchi (Director of Ce.Mi.S.S., CASD), interviewedby Mark Herman at CASD, Rome, Italy, October 16-18, 1995.

significantly thrown off with commensurate impacts on force efficiency and performance.

In network-centric warfare, the information network is the center of gravity. In conflict situations, portions of the network will be damaged or destroyed due to enemy action. It is the ability of the network to re-route, repair, or bring on additional nodes that will determine its robustness. If network performance is significantly impacted for part or all of the force, then information superiority, maneuver agility, and precision strike capabilities should suffer similar impacts. This loss of cohesion and its corollary rise in entropy could see the RMA force incapacitated while sustaining only very low attrition.

Viewing the RMA from this perspective, one is struck by the advantages conferred by force efficiency and the potential fragility of the force if its underlying requirements for information are not met. However, when the RMA force's information requirements are met, the platform-based force is outclassed in the key dimensions of force, space, and time. The use of attrition as the primary measure of effectiveness obscures more than it enables analyses of advanced RMA force concepts. Consequently, attrition is a woefully inadequate paradigm for evaluating future warfare.

The entropy-based warfare paradigm captures these neglected aspects of conflict and allows other dimensions of the warfare equation to impact a model's computational space. Whereas attrition-based models place the majority of their emphasis on quantity, the Entropy-Based Warfare Model creates a more balanced view of conflict, by emphasizing both the physical impacts of attrition and the asymmetrical effects attrition, friction, and disruption have upon the unit or society as a whole.

Conclusion

© 1997, Booz-Allen& Hamilton Inc. Page 22 The Entropy-Based Warfare Model uses an alternate, more encompassing metric for combat effectiveness. What should also be evident is that attrition metrics are totally inadequate to describe the key dynamics of operational level interactions. The Entropy-Based Warfare Model should fill this analytic void. Guerrilla, mobile, and conventional warfare all utilize the same factors of lethality, friction, and disruption, but with different emphasis depending on the strategic factors, relative strength, and character of the forces engaged. When conflict is described in the terms of friction, disruption, and lethality, the common threads that tie guerrilla, mobile, and conventional warfare together become more visible and illuminate where the Revolution in Military Affairs may be going.

The importance of this concept, and its attendant model, far exceeds the academic arena. Decision makers weigh options when conceiving, buying, and deploying forces. If the conflict model used is deficient, it stands to reason that the decisions will also be deficient. The ability to measure in a consistent manner all dimensions of warfare enable alternative concepts to evolve and gain a fairer hearing in the decision process. For example, the entropy-based warfare paradigm, through its more robust metrics, could influence decisions to field smaller more capable forces that rely on a plethora of methods to achieve successful conflict outcomes in the support of national objectives. The goal at the end of the day is to improve and clarify the decision maker's options. Enhanced conflict models based on a more accurate understanding of the factors that have historically driven conflict outcome should lead to better decisions and improved results.

Bibliography

Arquilla , John and David Ronfeldt. Information,Power, and Grand Strate (unpublished). Santa Monica: RAND, July 1995.

Arrian, The Campaigns of Alexander, translated by Aubrey De Selincourt and J.R. Hamilton. Middlesex: Penguin Books., 1976.

Bankes, Steven C. Methodological Considerations in Using Simulation to Assess the Combat Value of Intelligence and Electronic Warfare. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1991.

Bonaparte, Napoleon. The Military Maxims of Napoleon (translated by LtGen Sir George C. D'Aquilar C.8., edited by David Chandler).New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., 1992.

Booz* Allen & Hamilton, Inc. Theater Analysis Model. Tysons Comer: Booz "Allen & Hamilton Inc., 1981.

Booz*Allen & Hamilton Inc. Regional Development Simulation System. Tysons Corner: Booz "Allen & Hamilton Inc., 1988.

Caesar, Julius. The Civil War (translated by Jane F. Gardner). Middlesex: Penguin Publishing, 1982.

Chambers, James. The Devil's Horsemen. New York: Morrison and Gibbs, Ltd, 1979.

Chandler, David. The Campaigns of Napoleon. New York: MacMillan Company, 1966.

Cucchi, General (Director of Ce.Mi.S.S., CASD), interviewed by Mark Herman at CASD, Rome, Italy, October 16-18, 1995.

Cumming, William P. and Hush Rankin. The Fate of a Nation: The American Revolution through contemporary eyes. London: Phaidon Press Ltd, 1975.

Davis, Paul K. Modeling Of Soft Factors In The RAND Strategy Assessment System (RSAS) No. 7538. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1989.

Davis, PaulK. An Introduction to Variable-Resolution Modeling and Cross- Resolution Model Connection. Santa Monica, RAND Corporation, 1993.

Dederer, John Morgan. Making Bricks Without Straw: Nathaniel Green's Southern Campaign and Mao Tse-Tung's Mobile War. Kansas: Sunflower University Press, 1983.

Dodge, Theodore Ayrault. Alexander vol. IT. London: Greenhill Books, 1993 (based on reprint of 1890 edition).

Friel, John. Military Modeling (edited by Wayne Hughes). Washington: Military Operations Research Society, 1984.

Hallion, Richard P. Strike from the Sky: The History of Battlefield Air Attack. 1911- -1945. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989.

Henderson, Wm Darryl. Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat. Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1985.

Manwaring, Max G. Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a New Paradigm of Low Intensit Combat. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991.

Marshall, Andrew (Director of the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Net Assessment), interviewed by Mark Herman at OSD/NA (Pentagon 3A930), Washington DC, USA, February 20, 1996.

Mellenthin, General Yon. Generals Balck and Yon Melienthin on Tactics: Implications for NATO Military Doctrine. McLean: The BDM Corporation, December 19, 1980.

Milstein, Jeffrey S. Dynamics of the Vietnam War: A Quantitative Analysis and Predictive Computer Simulation. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1974.

Pancake, John S. This Destructive War: The British Campaign in the Carolinas 1780-1782. Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1985.

Simcoe, LtCol. A Tournal of the Operations of the Queen's Rangers. From the End of the Year 1777 to the Conclusion of the Late American War. Exeter: Printed by the Author, 1787.

Sloan, Stephen. Low Intensity Conflict: Old Threats in a New World (edited by Edwin G. Corr and Stephen Sloan). Boulder: Westview Press, 1992.

Tse-Tung, Mao. Mao Tse-Tung on Guerrilla Warfare (translated by Samuel B. Griffith). New York: Praeger Publishers, 1961.

Tzu, Sun. The Art of War (Sammuel B. Griffith translation). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963.

Ward, Christopher. The War of the Revolution Vol. 11. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1952.