C O R P O R A T I O N Toward Operational Art in Special Warfare Dan Madden, Dick Hoffmann, Michael Johnson, Fred T. Krawchuk, Bruce R. Nardulli, John E. Peters, Linda Robinson, Abby Doll For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/rr779 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data ISBN: 978-0-8330-8763-8 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2016 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.html. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface This report demonstrates the need for a strategic and operational approach to securing U.S. interests called special warfare. The United States requires new approaches for exerting influence, filling the miss- ing middle between the limitations of distant-strike options presented by armed unmanned aerial systems and Tomahawk missiles and the costly, indefinite commitment of conventional forces. Special warfare is an Army Special Operations Forces doctrinal term meaning the “execution of activities that involve a combination of lethal and nonlethal actions taken by a specially trained and edu- cated force that has a deep understanding of cultures and foreign lan- guage, proficiency in small-unit tactics, and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in a permissive, uncer- tain, or hostile environment.” It includes “special operations forces conducting combinations of unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, and/or counterinsurgency through and with indigenous forces or personnel.”1 The report has four aims: (1) to adapt conventional operational art to the unique characteristics of special warfare, (2) to identify the strategic advantages and risks associated with special warfare, (3) to explore how special warfare campaigns could be used to address chal- lenges identified in strategic guidance, and (4) to provide guidance to military and civilian leaders and planners in designing and executing these campaigns. 1 Headquarters, U.S. Department of the Army, Special Operations, Army Doctrine Publica- tion 3-05, Washington, D.C., August 2012c, p. 9. iii iv Toward Operational Art in Special Warfare The second volume of this report,Toward Operational Art in Spe- cial Warfare: Appendixes (available online at www.rand.org/t/RR779), offers additional context to supplement the discussions presented here. Appendix A in that volume provides a brief overview of the evolution of operational art. Appendix B summarizes the literature on develop- ing consensus among groups or individuals with disparate goals and approaches and explains how this could be used in special warfare planning. Appendix C reviews the resources and authorities for spe- cial warfare. Appendix D provides additional details on our data set of special warfare campaigns conducted by the United States since World War II. Appendix E presents notional special warfare campaigns that could be used to train special warfare campaign planners and assist the U.S. Department of Defense in identifying capability requirements for special warfare campaigns. Appendix F explores in greater depth the special operations activity “preparation of the environment.” Finally, Appendix G offers a detailed discussion of the recommendations pre- sented in Chapter Six of this report. This research was sponsored by LTG Charles T. Cleveland, then commanding general of U.S. Army Special Operations Command, and conducted within the RAND Arroyo Center’s Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program. RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the United States Army. The Project Unique Identification Code (PUIC) for the project that produced this document is RAN136470. Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Figures and Tables ...............................................................vii Summary .......................................................................... ix Acknowledgments ............................................................. xxv Abbreviations ..................................................................xxvii CHAPTER ONE Introduction ....................................................................... 1 Purpose and Motivation ........................................................... 1 Method and Organization of This Report ...................................... 7 CHAPTER TWO Understanding Special Warfare ................................................ 9 Defining Special Warfare and Operational Art ................................ 9 Selected Special Warfare Choices ...............................................15 Characteristics of Special Warfare ..............................................21 Advantages and Risks of Special Warfare ..................................... 28 CHAPTER THREE Operational Art in Special Warfare ..........................................33 Defining Operational Art ....................................................... 34 Origins of Operational Art ..................................................... 38 From Classic Operational Art to Special Warfare .............................41 Elements of Operational Design and Special Warfare ....................... 44 Special Warfare Operational Art ................................................61 v vi Toward Operational Art in Special Warfare CHAPTER FOUR Organizing and Planning Constructs for Special Warfare ..............67 Understanding (and Influencing) Guidance, Objectives, and Constraints ...................................................................67 Collaborative Planning for Unified Action ....................................72 Organizing for Unified Action ..................................................75 Campaign Continuity and Knowledge Management ....................... 80 Assessments in Special Warfare..................................................81 Resources and Authorities for Special Warfare ............................... 87 CHAPTER FIVE Applications of Special Warfare Operational Art .........................95 Foreign Internal Defense: El Salvador, 1979–1992 .......................... 97 Unconventional Warfare: Afghanistan, 1980s ............................... 111 Notional Scenario: Transition from Unconventional Warfare to Foreign Internal Defense .................................................. 124 CHAPTER SIX Conclusions and Recommendations ....................................... 141 Recommendations .............................................................. 142 References ....................................................................... 149 Figures and Tables Figures 1.1. SOF Core Operations and Capabilities ............................ 6 2.1. Local Partners and Special Warfare Campaigns .................15 3.1. Anaconda Operational Design in Iraq ............................41 3.2. Elements of Operational Design and Their Role .................45 3.3. Joint Operational Art ................................................62 4.1. JSPS Strategic Planning Battle Rhythm ......................... 68 4.2. Adaptive Planning Review and Approval Process ...............69 5.1. Special Warfare Operational Art in El Salvador ............... 109 5.2. Special Warfare Operational Art in Afghanistan, 1980s ...... 123 5.3. Special Warfare Operational Art in a Notional Scenario ..... 138 Tables 2.1. Selected Special Warfare Sponsor Choices ........................16 2.2. Illustrative Special Warfare Partner Choices .....................18 vii Summary In the face of adversaries exploiting regional social cleavages through the use of special operations forces (SOF) and intelligence services, coupled with a dwindling appetite for intervention, the United States needs to employ a more sophisticated form of special warfare to secure its interests.1 Special warfare campaigns stabilize a friendly state or destabilize a hostile regime by operating “through and with” local state or nonstate partners, rather than through unilateral U.S. action. SOF are the primary U.S. military forces employed, but successful cam- paigns depend on a broad suite of joint and U.S. government capa- bilities. Special warfare has particular relevance to the current global security environment as policymakers seek options short of large-scale intervention to manage (or assist in managing) challenges both acute (e.g., Syrian civil war, Ukraine crisis) and chronic (e.g., insurgency in the Philippines). Special warfare