Effects Based Operations: Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace
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Information Age Transformation Series Effects Based Operations Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis, and War Edward A. Smith Table of Contents Acknowledgments . .vii Preface . .ix Executive Summary . .xiii Introduction . .xxi Chapter 1. Why Effects-Based Operations? Military Operations in a New Security Environment . .1 Chapter 2. Network-Centric Operations: The Starting Point . .59 Chapter 3. What Are Effects-Based Operations? . .103 Chapter 4. Shaping Behavior: Operations in the Cognitive Domain . .157 Chapter 5. The Rules of the Game: Putting Effects- Based Operations into a Real-World Context . .193 Chapter 6. The Challenge of Complexity . .231 Chapter 7. From Dealing with Complexity To Exploiting It . .295 Chapter 8. Dynamic Effects-Based Operations: The Challenge of Effects Assessment and Feedback . .353 Chapter 9. Effects Beyond Combat: Deterrence and Reassurance . .409 Chapter 10. Putting the Pieces Together: An Operational Example . .445 i Chapter 11. Network-Centric Contributions to Effects-Based Operations: Options, Agility, Coordination, and Knowledge Mobilization . .501 Bibliography . .547 About the Author . .557 Catalog of CCRP Publications . .CAT-1 ii List of Figures Figure 1. Forward Defense . .8 Figure 2. Symmetry of Means and Will = Symmetric Warfare . .30 Figure 3. Asymmetry of Means and Will . .33 Figure 4. Asymmetric Conflict . .34 Figure 5. Probability Equation . .39 Figure 6. Comparing the Two Approaches . .43 Figure 7. Self-Synchronization and Speed of Command . .78 Figure 8. The OODA Cycle . .80 Figure 9. Speed of Command . .82 Figure 10. Synchronizing OODA Cycles to Mass Effects . .86 Figure 11. Coordinated Attack…Then What? . .88 Figure 12. Coalition Operations: International Self-Synchronization . .89 Figure 13. OODA Cycle . .118 Figure 14. Interaction Between OODA Cycles . .119 Figure 15. Battle of Midway (June 1942) . .121 Figure 16. How? Out of Phase . .125 Figure 17. Compression of Time . .128 Figure 18. Multiple Overlapping Cycles . .129 Figure 19. How? Time Compression + Multiplying Cycles . .131 Figure 20. Result: Lock Out . .132 Figure 21. Defining the Edge of Chaos . .136 Figure 22. Defining the Edge of Chaos . .138 iii Figure 23. Operations on the Edge of Chaos . .140 Figure 24. Battle of Trafalgar (1805) . .142 Figure 25. Intersecting Edges of Chaos . .147 Figure 26. Edge of Chaos – Three Axes . .149 Figure 27. Three Domains of Conflict . .161 Figure 28. Operations in the Physical Domain . .162 Figure 29. Operations in the Information Domain . .165 Figure 30. Operations in the Information Domain . .168 Figure 31. Operations in the Cognitive Domain . .175 Figure 32. Sensemaking and Decisionmaking . .178 Figure 33. Reactions in the Physical Domain . .180 Figure 34. Action-Reaction Cycle . .183 Figure 35. The Middle East . .197 Figure 36. Basic Building Block: Action-Reaction Cycle . .207 Figure 37. Action-Reaction Cycle . .224 Figure 38. From Action to Observer . .235 Figure 39. Observable Attributes of Physical Actions . .236 Figure 40. Kinds of Effects . .257 Figure 41. Combining Effects . .268 Figure 42. Tactical Level Balance of Effects . .269 Figure 43. Operational Level Balance of Effects . .270 Figure 44. Military-Strategic Level Balance of Effects . .271 Figure 45. Geo-Strategic Level Balance of Effects . .273 Figure 46. From Actions to Effects . .276 Figure 47. Unity of Effect . .283 Figure 48. Relative Weight of Effort . .285 Figure 49. Different Actions, Different Timelines . .286 iv Figure 50. Coordination Requirements: Planned vs. Self-Synchronization . .288 Figure 51. Creation of Overall Effect . .299 Figure 52. Effects Cascades: Physical Action to Direct Physical Effect . .313 Figure 53. Effects Cascades: First Cascade of Indirect Effects . .313 Figure 54. Effects Cascades: Second Cascade of Indirect Physical Effects . .313 Figure 55. Effects Cascades: Cascade of Indirect Psychological Effects . .315 Figure 56. Effects Cascades: Derivative Cascades of Indirect Psychological Effects . .317 Figure 57. Effects Cascades: Bounding Complexity by Pruning . .325 Figure 58. Effects Cascades: Pruning Psychological Effects . .329 Figure 59. Effects Nesting . .333 Figure 60. Effects Nesting: Multiple Overlapping Nests . .335 Figure 61. Coalition Nesting . .339 Figure 62. The Cognitive Cycle . .387 Figure 63. What is Observable? . .389 Figure 64. How Do We Observe? . .394 Figure 65. Deterrence, Reassurance, and the Cognitive Process . .417 Figure 66. Libyan Crisis (1986) . .449 Figure 67. Nesting: Tactical Level . .456 Figure 68. Attain Document I and II (Libya 1986) . .459 Figure 69. Nesting: Operational Level . .461 Figure 70. Nesting: Military-Strategic Level . .471 v Figure 71. Different Actions, Different Timelines . .477 Figure 72. Effects Nesting . .479 Figure 73. Freedom of Navigation Operations (Libya 1987) . .507 Figure 74. Shared Situational Awareness . .510 Figure 75. Communities of Expertise: Libya (1986-7) . .518 Figure 76. “Context” in the Cognitive Domain . .523 vi Acknowledgments In writing this book, I was privileged to be able to draw upon the work of the Information Superiority Working Group (ISWG) sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, upon the “Sensemaking Workshop” sponsored by the ISWG and the American Institute for Aeronautics and Astronautics, and the “Effects-Based Operations Workshop” of January 2002, in all of which I participated. The ideas presented also draw upon my own lessons learned from directing an extended series of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) Wargames conducted under the auspices of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Office of Net Assessment between 1995 and 1998. Similarly, these ideas draw upon lessons learned from participating in the effects-based operations play in the Navy’s Global Wargames of 1999, 2000, and 2001. I wish to express my special gratitude to Dr. David Alberts of the Office of the Secretary Defense (C3I) who suggested the book and then provided continued encouragement during its writing, and to Vice Admiral (ret) Arthur Cebrowski, U.S. Navy, who both instigated my initial effects-based studies during his tenure as President of the U.S. Naval War College and then encouraged me to proceed with the book when he assumed duties as Director of Force Transformation. I am and will always be grateful to Mr. John Garstka, Director of Concepts in the Office of Force Transformation, to Dr. David Signori of Rand Corporation, to Dr. Mark Mandeles, vii President of the de Bloch Group, and Mr. John Robusto, Director of Network Centric Warfare at the Naval Air Warfare Command who volunteered to read this work and who provided valuable insights and suggestions. Similarly, thanks are due to Dr. Richard Hayes, editor Joseph Lewis, graphic artist Bernard Pineau, and researchers Eric Cochrane and Brian Davis of Evidence Based Research, who lent discipline to my meanderings and put the work in a readable form. Special thanks are also due to Dr. Gordon Smith and my colleagues at Boeing’s Washington Studies and Analysis office, who not only encouraged me to proceed with the writing but also assumed part of my workload to enable me to do so. Finally, I owe a particular thanks to my wife, Marie-France, who endured my “middle-of-the- night-inspirations-that-simply-have-to-be-written- down-right-now” and a home office that was for many months littered with books and papers. However, all views expressed herein are the author’s own and do not reflect either upon these sources or upon the Boeing Company. viii Preface t is fitting that this, the third book in our Information IAge Transformation Series, be about effects-based operations (EBO). The first book in the series, Information Age Transformation, takes the view that DoD transformation is, in essence, about becoming an Information Age organization. The second book in the series deals with experimentation and argues that we need to modify, if not replace our somewhat linear requirements, doctrine development, and test and evaluation processes. This third book speaks directly to what we are trying to accomplish on the "fields of battle" and argues for changes in the way we decide what effects we want to achieve and what means we will use to achieve them. Adaptation to the Information Age will require changes in the following four dimensions: mission space (what the military will be called upon to do), environment (the conditions, constraints, and values that govern military operations), concepts (the military business model or the way we do what we do), and the business side of the DoD (the way the organization supports value creation). EBO is about the first two of these four dimensions while Network Centric Warfare (NCW) addresses the last two. Hence, EBO and NCW form a synergistic treatment of military transformation. They deal with the why, what, how, and support of military operations. Both EBO and NCW are, at their core, very simple ideas. Yet EBO, like NCW, often seems to be ix mischaracterized and misunderstood, much to the chagrin of its proponents. One theory that seeks to explain this notes that in the Cold War era, views of national security and the role of the military became narrowly focused. A military was to deter aggression and, if necessary, fight and win our nation's wars. Wars were implicitly defined as conflicts among coalitions of professional militaries. In many ways, Industrial Age warfare was very symmetric: air to air, tank to tank, submarine to submarine. Warfare and anti-warfare. Loss exchange ratios and FEBA movement made sense in this context. In other words, measures of attrition and territory, both directly related to military actions, made sense. Put another way, the means had merged with the effects. Fast forward to now. The mission space and the environment in which we operate have changed significantly. No longer are the missions we are called upon to participate in purely or even predominantly military. The effects sought in many missions require a balance of military and non- military means to achieve. Thus, the tight coupling that once existed between means and effects exists no longer. But despite this reality, the former tight coupling between means and effects continues to permeate mindsets, processes, and measures.