The Liberal International Order As a Gramscian Hegemony: a Critical and Exploratory Thought Piece Jaya Scott Western University

Liberated Arts: A Journal for Undergraduate Research

Volume 8, Issue 1 Article 8

2021

The Liberal International Order as a Gramscian Hegemony: A Critical and Exploratory Thought Piece Jaya Scott Western University

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Recommended Citation Scott, Jaya (2021) “The Liberal International Order as a Gramscian Hegemony: A Critical and Exploratory Thought Piece,” Liberated Arts: a journal for undergraduate research: Vol. 8: Iss. 1, Article 8.

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The Liberal International Order as a Gramscian Hegemony: A Critical and Exploratory Thought Piece1 Jaya Scott, BA(Hons.), The University of Western Ontario

Abstract: This thought piece considers how Gramsci’s theory of hegemony explains the nature and crisis of the liberal international order. Without adopting a neo-Gramscian approach, this essay uses Gramscian concepts, applied and translated into international theory by Robert Cox, to synthesize and go beyond ‘problem-solving’ (realist, liberalist, and constructivist) IR theories that do not go ‘deep’ enough in their understanding of hegemony nor its failings. This essay will first situate Gramsci’s theory within the discipline of international relations and consider how his idea of hegemony can reconcile liberal internationalist and realist understandings of the LIO as well as go beyond them. Engaging with the Gramscian concepts of an historic bloc and transformismo, it will then examine how a multidimensional understanding of hegemony sheds light on both the rise and decline of a world order. Finally, the argument applies key insights into the nature of liberal hegemony to the challenge posed by climate change to international cooperation. Understanding the LIO as both coercive and consensual, and as a hegemony of both states and social classes, goes beyond disparate frameworks and provides new insights for further exploration.

Keywords: liberal international order; Gramsci; hegemony; world order; Marxism; international relations

1. Introduction: thinking on Gramsci

Gramsci’s theory of hegemony provides a nuanced understanding of the hegemonic nature of the liberal international order (LIO). This essay explores the theory’s explanatory potential and contemplates what it means at a moment when international order is shifting and confronted with crisis. To define Gramsci’s hegemony, Robert Cox points to two ideas which combine to form the concept. First, Gramsci considers hegemony within social relations: that of the workers in the Soviet state, and the hegemony of the bourgeoisie elsewhere.2 Bourgeois power and control of the state broadly conceived placate the demands of subordinate classes such that capitalism is acceptable to them. Second, Gramsci incorporates Machiavelli’s idea of power as a “necessary combination of consent and coercion.”3 While consent to hegemonic power is primary, coercion underwrites consent. Cox highlights that in this formulation, power and hegemony are relevant to relations between social classes and (through the states they dominate), to the interaction between social classes writ large across the globe.4 Therefore, hegemony among states and social classes are one and the same: subordinate states and classes are appeased (and thus consent to the hegemon), while coercive power is latent.

1 The author would like to thank Professor Dan Bousfield for his help in shaping this paper.

2. Robert Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method," In Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations, ed S. Gill (1993), 51.

3. Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations," 52.

4. Cox, 52.

By blending literature review and thought piece, this argument juxtaposes mainstream international relations evaluations and Gramscian insights to reveal the nature of the LIO. The American-led liberal world order extends its power not only through military might and international institutions, but as a multi-dimensional hegemonic historic bloc. The visible threats it faces are therefore commensurate manifestations of a multi-dimensional crisis – the LIO’s decline is in fact the order dying from within. Finally, it becomes clear that as IR attempts to reckon with climate change, it must also reckon with global capitalism embedded in the LIO. Without adopting a neo- Gramscian approach, this essay uses Gramscian concepts, applied and translated into international theory by Cox, to synthesize and go beyond ‘problem-solving’ (realist, liberalist, and constructivist) IR theories that do not go ‘deep’ enough in their understanding of hegemony nor its failings.

2. Gramscian insights: synthesis and beyond

The combined political-theoretical and historical nature of Gramsci’s theory is integral to its illustrative function. Placing “International Relations Theory in Perspective,” Donald Puchala emphasizes that abstraction is valuable in international relations as it considers and analyzes the “unobservable wholes” of global phenomena.5 For Puchala, theories allow us to see the whole – they paint “bold stroked, broad brushed pictures of social reality… telling us that the real world is like their pictures.”6 However, Gramsci engages in abstract theorization in tandem with historicism. Gramsci developed his theories reflecting on history as well as his contemporary experience in fascist Italy.7 P. Schroeder parses the difference between historical and political science work on international relations: while political scientists “attempt to explain classes of phenomena,” historians “propose to explain particular instances of these same classes of phenomena.”8 Yet, Schroeder posits that parsimony is important to the historian as well as to the political scientist – it is the explanation of events that points to meaning, the crux of the argument, the judgement and conclusion.9 Puchala and Schroeder’s points come together in Gramsci’s work. Cox notes that “a concept, in Gramsci’s thought, is loose and elastic and attains precision only when brought into contact with a particular situation which it helps to explain.”10 Gramsci’s approach both theorizes “wholes,” and historically considers an instance of a phenomena – to make a parsimonious insight.

One-dimensional concepts of hegemony as only coercive or only consensual do not adequately capture how the LIO operates as both. Liberals and Realists offer opposing explanations of why the (primarily American) great-power hegemony founded at the end of WWII endures. 11

5. Donald J. Puchala, "Chapter 2 International Relations Theory in Perspective," In Theory and History in International Relations (Routledge, 2013), 23.

6. Puchala, 24.

7. Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations," 50.

8. P. Schroeder, "International History: Why Historians do it differently than Political Scientists," In Systems, Stability and Statecraft: Essays on the International History of Modern Europe, ed D. Wetzel, R. Jervis, & J.S. Levy (Houndmills, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 288.

9. Schroeder, 287.

10. Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations," 50.

11. Mark Mazower, Governing the World: the History of an Idea (New York: The Penguin Press, 2012), 211.

John Mearsheimer, articulating the realist point of view, describes states as locked in constant security competition as they aim to acquire greater military power than rivals and to ultimately be predominant – “the hegemon in the system.”12 Hegemony is therefore supremacy in offensive and defensive power.13 For the realist, the pre-eminence of the United States and the order it underwrites rests on coercive dominance. In contrast, the liberal view sees the LIO as consensual; the order is easy to join and cooperation with it is largely beneficial.14 For Joseph Nye, interdependence has made the LIO “open” and a “rules-based order,” now so universally supported that it can survive without the United States as its leader.15 The liberal focus is on the LIO as a benevolent hegemony, one that states consent – and want – to join. Gramsci’s concept of hegemony (defined above) allows for a reconciliation and synthesis between the two, and therefore a more nuanced explanation of the LIO. The order has both consensual and coercive power. The hegemony is both “hard to overturn and easy to join.”16

Gramsci’s theory also goes beyond synthesizing insights from liberalism and realism to provide a multidimensional understanding of hegemony. Gramsci’s idea of the historic bloc encapsulates society as a solid structure.17 Cox highlights that the historic bloc is more than the sum of its parts: “interacting elements create a larger unity...” the “political, ethical, and ideological spheres” are in “juxtaposition and reciprocal relationships.”18 These spheres are inextricably intertwined as well as irreducible. In the historical bloc, material conditions (social relations, means of production), shape politics, and superstructures (ideology, political representation and organization), shape production and class politics.19 The historical bloc is not only a set of spheres bound together in a society. A fully-formed historic bloc must be dominated by a social class which controls material conditions as well as politics and ideology – the hegemonic class prevails over the state political apparatus, social relations, and economy.20 Cox scales up what Gramsci analyzed on the level of states to the international level, and indeed an international historical bloc is an extension of a national one. Applying Gramsci’s insights to the LIO reveals that its status as a historic bloc is rooted in capitalist bourgeois hegemony exerted over the economy, social relations, and political ideology within the American state and writ large across the globe.

3. World hegemony of the LIO

12. John Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 (1994): 12. 13. Mearsheimer, 12.

14. Joseph Nye Jr., "The Rise and Fall of American Hegemony from Wilson to Trump," International Affairs 95, no. 1 (2019): 71.

15. Nye, 72.

16. G. John Ikenberry, "The Rise of China and the Future of the West," Foreign Affairs 87, no. 1 (2008).

17. Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations," 56.

18. Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations," 56.

19. Cox, 65.

20. Cox, 56.

Gramsci, then, provides a theoretical lens that opens the door for a nuanced understanding of how American hegemony took shape and entrenched itself as the world order. Coercion and consent were supersized not only in terms of military might (impossible to overturn) and international institutions (easy to join), but also took place within economics and social relations. Each dimension is entangled with liberal ideology. Nye underlines that liberal political values – including human rights and democracy – are embedded in the UN Charter.21 John Ikenberry, describing what makes the LIO distinctly liberal, argues that its rules and institutions are “rooted in... and reinforced by... democracy and capitalism.”22 Ikenberry even notes the “coalition-based” nature of the order – in which fellow Western, capitalist states are “stakeholders... arrayed around the United States.”23 Rather than separate, the values it purports are enmeshed in other parts of the LIO: NATO self-describes itself as more than a military alliance, “NATO’s essential mission will remain the same: to ensure that the Alliance remains an unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security and shared values.”24 At the same time, Doug Stokes points to the liberal aspects of the global economy: “free markets, deregulated forms of capitalism and the rolling back of state interference.”25 Ikenberry, Nye, and Stokes posit that LIO has the potential to survive as an open, rules-based order without American hegemony. However, this view erases how liberal ideology is bound up in the institutions, security structures, and economics which constitute the LIO.

A Gramscian understanding of hegemony illuminates the deeper dimensions of the development of world hegemony – including how the American historic bloc went global through processes of assimilation and co-option. The process of what Gramsci terms ‘trasformismo’ operates both by building consent and by exercising coercion among external challengers, allowing the hegemonic class to assimilate and absorb. Trasformismo works through co-option: in places where bourgeoisie hegemony is not yet complete or counter-hegemonic ideas resist it, elites are absorbed into the hegemonic class and challenging ideas are made “consistent with hegemonic doctrine.”26 Inderjeet Parmar explores the co-option of elites in subaltern states, arguing that liberal internationalism’s expansion is not benign. Rather, “Great Powers… build alliances with their elite foreign counterparts where they already hold power, or by extension, where such a nascent elite might be fostered.”27 Parmar sees the international web between elites as a kind of “ultra imperialism.”28 B.S. Chimni highlights the application of trasformismo to the operation of international

21. Nye, "The Rise and Fall of American Hegemony," 71.

22. Ikenberry, "The Rise of China”.

23. Ikenberry.

24. "Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." Adopted by Heads of State and Government, Lisbon, 19-20 November (2010): 5.

25. Doug Stokes, "Trump, American Hegemony and the Future of the Liberal International Order." International Affairs 94, no. 1 (2018): 135.

26. Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations," 63.

27. Inderjeet Parmar, "The US-led Liberal Order: Imperialism by Another Name?" International Affairs 94, no. 1 (2018): 161.

28. Parmar, 161.

organizations (IOs), to posit that IOs are sites of power and dominance.29 The extent to which they serve subaltern groups and classes functions only to support the conditions for the spread of capitalism and the hegemony of the bourgeoisie.30 Gramsci’s idea of trasformismo accounts for how liberal hegemony has spread into the periphery, where social relations may not be consistent with those at the core. The hegemon constructs consent as it expands outwards; recruiting and partnering with elites and absorbing counter-hegemonic ideas.

4. Decline: organic crisis and interregnum

Gramsci’s concept of hegemony also illuminates causes of the current decline of the LIO. While there is certainly a consensus in international relations scholarship that the LIO is in crisis, there is disagreement over the nature of this crisis. Jelena Cupać attributes rising criticism to the advancement of credible narratives which “portray[] th[e] order as the main source of people’s grievances.”31 Cupać argues that the LIO’s failings are not substantive, but communicative – its leaders fail to present a narrative that expresses the benefits it has brought to people throughout the world.32 Yet, this view ignores that the system has created ‘losers.’ Stokes posits that underlying economic conditions are behind the rise in contestation. In the United States (where 12% of the population is among the global top 1 percent), the bottom 90% of the population’s wages have stagnated.33 The domestic effect drives declining support for the LIO among the American working class, crystallizing in the election of Donald Trump.34 However, just as Gramsci posits that the hegemony of an historic bloc is multidimensional, serious challenges to and decline of that bloc are congruent: outgrowths of social, economic, and political turmoil intertwined.

Understanding current contestation of the LIO as an organic crisis explains visible events as part of an ongoing, protracted decline. Gramsci distinguishes between ‘conjunctural’ and ‘organic’ crises. While conjunctural crises occur regularly, on a “surface level” – and can be fixed so that the hegemon remains unperturbed, organic crises challenge the order of social relations and therefore threaten the hegemonic class.35 Organic crises are deep-rooted and long-running, and emerge as a crisis of authority – “the old order loses its legitimacy,” and there can be no “resolve[] within the old framework.”36 Jonathan Pass highlights some of the forces coalescing in the current crisis: not mere

29. B. S. Chimni, "International Organizations, 1945-Present," In The Oxford Handbook of International Organizations, ed Jacob Katz Cogan, Ian Hurd, & Ian Johnstone (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 123.

30. Chimni, 124.

31. Jelena Cupać, "Narratives, Emotions, and the Contestations of the Liberal Order," E-International Relations. May 16, (2019).

32. Cupać.

33. Stokes, "Trump, American Hegemony, and the Future of the LIO," 146.

34. Stokes, 146.

35. Milan Babic, "Let's talk about the interregnum: Gramsci and the crisis of the liberal world order," International Affairs 96, no. 3 (2020): 772.

36. Babic, 772.

income inequality, but the “massive wealth redistribution away from the lower-middle and working classes towards the rich” that has occurred under neoliberalism; the disillusionment of the American white working class with trickle-down economics and the Democrats, which drove them to find a demagogue in Donald Trump; and the divisions based on identity, xenophobia, and ultra- nationalism which the media sowed to bolster Trump’s popularity and drive his election.37 The holistic rejection of neoliberal economics, the elite governing class, and liberal ideology that comprise the LIO is crystallizing as an organic crisis. Milan Babic points out that although the rise of populism is not a development of class consciousness or a revolution-in-the making, it does represent a very real alienation from the LIO among working classes worldwide – a crisis of authority. Their discontent drives the election of political leaders who represent and reflect this anger at world fora, though these leaders’ policies may in fact go against working-class interests.38 Gramsci shows us how the liberal world order is dying from within.

Gramsci’s historical theory also provides a useful framework to understand the current period of protracted decline – an ‘interregnum’ where ‘morbid symptoms’ manifest, but a new hegemon has not yet emerged. Babic quotes Gramsci’s seminal statement: “’the crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.’”39 Morbidities literally represent the death of the current order because while “they cannot be managed... at the same time [they] do not represent a viable alternative for the future.”40 In the absence of a revolution or a new historic bloc becoming the hegemon, the world enters an ‘interregnum’ period. Morbid symptoms of the decline of the LIO include the 2008 sub-prime mortgage meltdown, Brexit, the election of Donald Trump, American military failures in the middle east, and a global shift away from international financial institutions including the World Trade Organization and towards bilateral agreements, isolation, and neo- mercantilism.41 These morbidities are expressions of the fraying economic, social, and political orders – an holistic decline of American hegemony. Although China constitutes a rising historic bloc, it has only established economic dominance, and not yet built the political or military power which would allow it to become a world hegemon.42 Mainstream IR theory struggles to explain the decline of the LIO without proposing either its redemption or replacement. Bringing Gramscian hegemony theory into contact with history, as Gramsci intended, paves the way for understanding the current period of interregnum.

5. Comprehending the climate catastrophe

Gramsci’s theory of hegemony is not only useful for analyzing the current world order, it can also provide an understanding of the LIO’s potential – or inability – to deal with climate change.

37. Jonathan Pass, American Hegemony In The 21st Century: A Neo Neo-Gramscian Perspective (New York: Routledge, 2019), 155-58.

38. Babic, "Let's talk about the interregnum," 783.

39. Babic, 773.

40. Babic, 773. 41. Babic, "Let's talk about the interregnum," 781.

42. Pass, American Hegemony, 248.

Mainstream international relations has not yet adapted to consider what anthropogenic global warming entails for global order. As Clive Hamilton notes, the onset of the Anthropocene is “a rupture in the functioning of the Earth System as a whole, so much so that the Earth has now entered a new geological epoch.” 43 Anthony Burke et al. recognize that unchecked climate change would be catastrophic for life on Earth.44 They call for a new “Planet Politics,” and a questioning of capitalism, modernity, and oppression.45 Yet though Burke et al. call for a politics that liberates subaltern classes and races and that includes the Earth and its ecosystems as entities endowed with rights and political voice, their model keeps international liberal hegemony in place – and strengthens it. David Chandler et al. are correct to criticize the approach as “managerialism.”46 More than a “top-down coercive approach,”47 an ‘Earth Systems Council’ and a ‘Coal Convention’ are models under which the LIO and its capitalist bourgeois hegemony is entrenched, and therefore the suppression of subordinate groups would continue.

A Gramscian understanding of hegemony reveals that capitalism is inextricable from the American-led LIO and its institutions. Ideological hegemony cannot be separated from the material power and means of production embedded within it, and therefore a vision in which the institutions remain and the economic structures change is impossible. US supremacy is based on an iterative “endless accumulation” of both capital and global power.48 Before 2008, the US accumulated power and capital as the “global consumer of last resort” – its capitalist economic model was predicated on absorbing the world’s export-led growth through unlimited demand.49 Even as China becomes the new centre of endless growth through endless consumption, it replicates the American “capital accumulation model and polarized society with[in] a nominal communist state.”50 But infinite growth and consumption are fundamentally at odds with a finite planet. Eve Croeser argues that leaving the biosphere out of analyses of world order elides the irreconcilable difference between the global economy and the reality of what the earth can sustain.51 In this context, the Gramscian theory of hegemony yields the insight that the LIO – and any hegemony tied to capitalism – will be unable to make its economic structure congruent with the reality of the earth system. However, Gramsci also

43. Eve Croeser, Ecosocialism and Climate Justice: An Ecological Neo-Gramscian Analysis (Abingdon: Routledge, 2021), 17. Original emphasis.

44. Anthony Burke, Stefanie Fishel, Audra Mitchell, Simon Dalby, and Daniel J. Levine. "Planet Politics: A Manifesto from the End of IR," Millennium: Journal of International Studies 44, no. 3 (2016): 508.

45. Burke, et al., 500.

46. David Chandler, Erika Cudworth, and Stephen Hobden. "Anthropocene, Capitalocene, and Liberal Cosmopolitan IR: A Response to Burke et al.'s 'Planet Politics'," Millennium: Journal of International Studies 46, no. 2 (2018): 190.

47. Chandler et al., 190.

48. Pass, American Hegemony, 245.

49. Pass, 155.

50. Pass, American Hegemony, 249. Emphasis altered.

51. Croeser, Ecosocialism and Climate Justice, 31.

provides a suggestion for revolutionary praxis: re-imagining social, economic, and political orders – the world order in its totality – is necessary.

6. Conclusion: a dual interrogation

Bringing Gramsci’s idea of hegemony “into contact with” the liberal international order gives nuanced insight into the hegemonic nature of the LIO. Gramsci’s theory allows us to examine the consensual and coercive power that underwrites American capitalism; reveals the multidimensional nature of liberal hegemony, its spread and maintenance; and explains its current protracted decline as an organic crisis and interregnum. Most importantly, Gramscian hegemony illuminates that capitalism is inextricably intertwined in the American-led order, and that therefore the LIO cannot adequately respond to the existential threat of climate change. If, as Burke et al. acknowledge, “this moment [our last chance to stop catastrophic climate change] must be taken to interrogate capitalism,”52 we must also interrogate the hegemony of the liberal international order.

JAYA SCOTT Graduated from the University of Western Ontario with a Bachelor of Arts, Honours Specialization in International Relations (Scholar’s Electives Program). She received the Gold Medal in the IR program, awarded to the student with the highest four-year average. She currently works in food sustainability with the Capital Region Food and Agriculture Initiatives Roundtable and will be attending the Peter A. Allard School of Law at the University of British Columbia beginning in the Fall of 2021.

52. Burke, et al. "Planet Politics," 514.

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