The Liberal International Order As a Gramscian Hegemony: a Critical and Exploratory Thought Piece Jaya Scott Western University

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The Liberal International Order As a Gramscian Hegemony: a Critical and Exploratory Thought Piece Jaya Scott Western University Liberated Arts: A Journal for Undergraduate Research Volume 8, Issue 1 Article 8 2021 The Liberal International Order as a Gramscian Hegemony: A Critical and Exploratory Thought Piece Jaya Scott Western University Follow this and additional works at: https://ojs.lib.uwo.ca/index.php/lajur Recommended Citation Scott, Jaya (2021) “The Liberal International Order as a Gramscian Hegemony: A Critical and Exploratory Thought Piece,” Liberated Arts: a journal for undergraduate research: Vol. 8: Iss. 1, Article 8. Liberated Arts is an open access journal, which means that its content is freely available without charge to readers and their institutions. All content published by Liberated Arts is licensed under the Creative Commons License, Attribution-NonCommercial- NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Readers are allowed to read, download, copy, distribute, print, search, or link to the full texts of the articles in this journal without seeking prior permission from Liberated Arts or the authors. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Liberal International Order as a Gramscian Hegemony: A Critical and Exploratory Thought Piece1 Jaya Scott, BA(Hons.), The University of Western Ontario Abstract: This thought piece considers how Gramsci’s theory of hegemony explains the nature and crisis of the liberal international order. Without adopting a neo-Gramscian approach, this essay uses Gramscian concepts, applied and translated into international theory by Robert Cox, to synthesize and go beyond ‘problem-solving’ (realist, liberalist, and constructivist) IR theories that do not go ‘deep’ enough in their understanding of hegemony nor its failings. This essay will first situate Gramsci’s theory within the discipline of international relations and consider how his idea of hegemony can reconcile liberal internationalist and realist understandings of the LIO as well as go beyond them. Engaging with the Gramscian concepts of an historic bloc and transformismo, it will then examine how a multidimensional understanding of hegemony sheds light on both the rise and decline of a world order. Finally, the argument applies key insights into the nature of liberal hegemony to the challenge posed by climate change to international cooperation. Understanding the LIO as both coercive and consensual, and as a hegemony of both states and social classes, goes beyond disparate frameworks and provides new insights for further exploration. Keywords: liberal international order; Gramsci; hegemony; world order; Marxism; international relations 1. Introduction: thinking on Gramsci Gramsci’s theory of hegemony provides a nuanced understanding of the hegemonic nature of the liberal international order (LIO). This essay explores the theory’s explanatory potential and contemplates what it means at a moment when international order is shifting and confronted with crisis. To define Gramsci’s hegemony, Robert Cox points to two ideas which combine to form the concept. First, Gramsci considers hegemony within social relations: that of the workers in the Soviet state, and the hegemony of the bourgeoisie elsewhere.2 Bourgeois power and control of the state broadly conceived placate the demands of subordinate classes such that capitalism is acceptable to them. Second, Gramsci incorporates Machiavelli’s idea of power as a “necessary combination of consent and coercion.”3 While consent to hegemonic power is primary, coercion underwrites consent. Cox highlights that in this formulation, power and hegemony are relevant to relations between social classes and (through the states they dominate), to the interaction between social classes writ large across the globe.4 Therefore, hegemony among states and social classes are one and the same: subordinate states and classes are appeased (and thus consent to the hegemon), while coercive power is latent. 1 The author would like to thank Professor Dan Bousfield for his help in shaping this paper. 2. Robert Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method," In Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations, ed S. Gill (1993), 51. 3. Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations," 52. 4. Cox, 52. 1 By blending literature review and thought piece, this argument juxtaposes mainstream international relations evaluations and Gramscian insights to reveal the nature of the LIO. The American-led liberal world order extends its power not only through military might and international institutions, but as a multi-dimensional hegemonic historic bloc. The visible threats it faces are therefore commensurate manifestations of a multi-dimensional crisis – the LIO’s decline is in fact the order dying from within. Finally, it becomes clear that as IR attempts to reckon with climate change, it must also reckon with global capitalism embedded in the LIO. Without adopting a neo- Gramscian approach, this essay uses Gramscian concepts, applied and translated into international theory by Cox, to synthesize and go beyond ‘problem-solving’ (realist, liberalist, and constructivist) IR theories that do not go ‘deep’ enough in their understanding of hegemony nor its failings. 2. Gramscian insights: synthesis and beyond The combined political-theoretical and historical nature of Gramsci’s theory is integral to its illustrative function. Placing “International Relations Theory in Perspective,” Donald Puchala emphasizes that abstraction is valuable in international relations as it considers and analyzes the “unobservable wholes” of global phenomena.5 For Puchala, theories allow us to see the whole – they paint “bold stroked, broad brushed pictures of social reality… telling us that the real world is like their pictures.”6 However, Gramsci engages in abstract theorization in tandem with historicism. Gramsci developed his theories reflecting on history as well as his contemporary experience in fascist Italy.7 P. Schroeder parses the difference between historical and political science work on international relations: while political scientists “attempt to explain classes of phenomena,” historians “propose to explain particular instances of these same classes of phenomena.”8 Yet, Schroeder posits that parsimony is important to the historian as well as to the political scientist – it is the explanation of events that points to meaning, the crux of the argument, the judgement and conclusion.9 Puchala and Schroeder’s points come together in Gramsci’s work. Cox notes that “a concept, in Gramsci’s thought, is loose and elastic and attains precision only when brought into contact with a particular situation which it helps to explain.”10 Gramsci’s approach both theorizes “wholes,” and historically considers an instance of a phenomena – to make a parsimonious insight. One-dimensional concepts of hegemony as only coercive or only consensual do not adequately capture how the LIO operates as both. Liberals and Realists offer opposing explanations of why the (primarily American) great-power hegemony founded at the end of WWII endures. 11 5. Donald J. Puchala, "Chapter 2 International Relations Theory in Perspective," In Theory and History in International Relations (Routledge, 2013), 23. 6. Puchala, 24. 7. Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations," 50. 8. P. Schroeder, "International History: Why Historians do it differently than Political Scientists," In Systems, Stability and Statecraft: Essays on the International History of Modern Europe, ed D. Wetzel, R. Jervis, & J.S. Levy (Houndmills, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 288. 9. Schroeder, 287. 10. Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations," 50. 11. Mark Mazower, Governing the World: the History of an Idea (New York: The Penguin Press, 2012), 211. 2 John Mearsheimer, articulating the realist point of view, describes states as locked in constant security competition as they aim to acquire greater military power than rivals and to ultimately be predominant – “the hegemon in the system.”12 Hegemony is therefore supremacy in offensive and defensive power.13 For the realist, the pre-eminence of the United States and the order it underwrites rests on coercive dominance. In contrast, the liberal view sees the LIO as consensual; the order is easy to join and cooperation with it is largely beneficial.14 For Joseph Nye, interdependence has made the LIO “open” and a “rules-based order,” now so universally supported that it can survive without the United States as its leader.15 The liberal focus is on the LIO as a benevolent hegemony, one that states consent – and want – to join. Gramsci’s concept of hegemony (defined above) allows for a reconciliation and synthesis between the two, and therefore a more nuanced explanation of the LIO. The order has both consensual and coercive power. The hegemony is both “hard to overturn and easy to join.”16 Gramsci’s theory also goes beyond synthesizing insights from liberalism and realism to provide a multidimensional understanding of hegemony. Gramsci’s idea of the historic bloc encapsulates society as a solid structure.17 Cox highlights that the historic bloc is more than the sum of its parts: “interacting elements create a larger unity...” the “political, ethical, and ideological spheres” are in “juxtaposition and reciprocal relationships.”18 These spheres are inextricably intertwined as well as irreducible. In the historical bloc, material conditions (social relations, means of production), shape politics, and superstructures (ideology, political representation and organization), shape production and class
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