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Liberalism and World Politics Author(s): Michael W. Doyle Source: The American Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (Dec., 1986), pp. 1151-1169 Published by: American Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1960861 . Accessed: 15/10/2011 20:37

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http://www.jstor.org LIBERALISMAND WORLDPOLITICS MICHAEL W. DOYLE Johns Hopkins University

Building on a growing literaturein internationalpolitical science, I reexamine the traditional liberal claim that governments founded on a respect for individualliberty exercise "restraint" and "peacefulintentions" in theirforeign policy. I look at three distinct theoreticaltraditions of ,attributable to three theorists: Schumpeter,a democratic capitalist whose explanation of liberal pacifism we often invoke; Machiavelli, a classical republicanwhose glory is an imperialismwe often practice;and Kant, a liberalrepublican whose theory of internationalismbest accounts for what we are. Despite the contradictionsof liberalpacifism and liberalimperialism, I find, with Kant and other democraticrepublicans, that liberalismdoes leave a coherent legacy on foreignaffairs. Liberal states are different.They are indeedpeaceful. They are also prone to make war. Liberalstates have createda separatepeace, as Kant argued they would, and have also discoveredliberal reasonsfor aggression,as he feared they might. I conclude by arguing that the differences among liberal pacifism, liberal imperialism,and Kant'sinternationalism are not arbitrary.They are rooted in differing conceptionsof the citizen and the state.

Promoting elect theirgovernments, wars become im- will produce peace, we have often been possible. Furthermore,citizens appreciate told. In a speech before the BritishParlia- that the benefits of trade can be enjoyed ment in June of 1982, PresidentReagan only under.conditions of peace. Thus the proclaimedthat governmentsfounded on very existenceof liberalstates, such as the a respect for individual exercise U.S., Japan, and our European allies, "restraint"and "peaceful intentions" in makes for peace. theirforeign policy. He then announceda Buildingon a growing literaturein in- "crusadefor freedom"and a "campaign ternationalpolitical science, I reexamine for democratic development" (Reagan, the liberal claim President Reagan re- June9, 1982). iterated for us. I look at three distinct In making these claims the president theoretical traditions of liberalism, at- joined a long list of liberal theorists (and tributableto three theorists:Schumpeter, propagandists)and echoed an old argu- a brilliant explicator of the liberal ment: the aggressive instincts of pacifism the president invoked; Machia- authoritarianleaders and totalitarianrul- velli, a classicalrepublican whose glory is ing parties make for war. Liberalstates, an imperialism we often practice; and founded on such individual as Kant. , free speech and Despite the contradictions of liberal other civil ,, and pacifism and liberal imperialism,I find, elected representationare fundamentally with Kant and other liberal republicans, against war this argumentasserts. When that liberalism does leave a coherent the citizens who bear the burdensof war legacy on foreignaffairs. Liberal states are

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW VOL. 80 NO. 4 DECEMBER, 1986 American Political Science Review Vol. 80 different. They are indeed peaceful, yet (Schumpeter,1955, p. 6). Excludingim- they are also prone to make war, as the perialisms that were mere "catchwords" U.S. and our "freedomfighters" are now and those that were "object-ful"(e.g., doing, not so covertly, againstNicaragua. defensiveimperialism), he tracesthe roots Liberal states have created a separate of objectlessimperialism to threesources, peace, as Kant argued they would, and each an atavism. Modern imperialism, have also discovered liberal reasons for according to Schumpeter,resulted from aggression,as he fearedthey might. I con- the combinedimpact of a "warmachine," clude by arguing that the differences warlike instincts, and export among liberal pacifism, liberal im- monopolism. perialism, and Kant's liberal interna- Once necessary, the war machinelater tionalism are not arbitrarybut rooted in developeda life of its own and took con- differing conceptions of the citizen and trol of a state's : "Created the state. by the wars that requiredit, the machine now created the wars it required" LiberalPacifism (Schumpeter, 1955, p. 25). Thus, Schumpetertells us that the army of an- There is no canonical description of cient Egypt, created to drive the Hyksos liberalism. What we tend to call liberal out of Egypt, took over the state and pur- resemblesa family portrait of principles sued militaristic imperialism. Like the and institutions, recognizableby certain later armies of the courts of absolutist characteristics-for example, individual Europe, it fought wars for the sake of freedom, political participation, private glory and booty, for the sake of warriors property, and equality of opportunity- and monarchs-wars gratia warriors. that most liberal states share, although A warlike disposition, elsewherecalled none has perfected them all. Joseph "instinctual elements of bloody Schumpeterclearly fits within this family primitivism,"is the naturalideology of a when he considers the internationalef- war machine.It also exists independently; fects of capitalismand democracy. the Persians,says Schumpeter(1955, pp. Schumpeter's "Sociology of Im- 25-32), were a warrior nation from the perialisms,"published in 1919, made a outset. coherent and sustained argument con- Under modern , export cerning the pacifying (in the sense of monopolists, the third source of modem nonaggressive) effects of liberal institu- imperialism,push for imperialistexpan- tions and principles (Schumpeter,1955; sion as a way to expand their closed see also Doyle, 1986, pp. 155-59). Unlike markets. The absolute monarchieswere some of the earlier liberal theorists who the last clear-cut imperialisms. focused on a single feature such as trade Nineteenth-centuryimperialisms merely (,1949, vol. 1, bk. 20, chap. representthe vestiges of the imperialisms 1) or failed to examine critically the created by Louis XIV and Catherinethe arguments they were advancing, Great. Thus, the export monopolists are Schumpeter saw the interaction of an atavism of the absolute monarchies, capitalismand democracyas the founda- for they depend completelyon the tariffs tion of liberalpacifism, and he tested his imposed by the monarchs and their arguments in a sociology of historical militaristic successors for revenue imperialisms. (Schumpeter,1955, p. 82-83). Without He definesimperialism as "anobjectless tariffs, monopolies would be eliminated disposition on the part of a state by foreign competition. to unlimited forcible expansion" Modem (nineteenth century) imperi-

1152 1986 Liberalismand World Politics alism, therefore,rests on an atavisticwar Schumpeter's explanation for liberal machine, militaristic attitudes left over pacifism is quite simple: Only war profi- from the days of monarchicalwars, and teers and military aristocratsgain from export monopolism, which is nothing wars. No democracy would pursue a more than the economic residue of minority interest and tolerate the high monarchicalfinance. In the modern era, costs of imperialism. When imperialistsgratify their private interests. prevails, "no class" gains from forcible From the national perspective, their im- expansionbecause perialisticwars are objectless. Schumpeter's theme now emerges. foreign raw materials and food stuffs are as accessibleto each nation as thoughthey were in Capitalismand democracyare forces for its own territory.Where the culturalbackward- peace. Indeed, they are antitheticalto im- ness of a region makes normal economic inter- perialism. For Schumpeter, the further course dependent on colonization it does not development of capitalism and democ- matter, assuming free trade, which of the "civilized"nations undertakes the task of coloni- racy means that imperialismwill inev- zation. (Schumpeter,1955, pp. 75-76) itably disappear. He maintains that capitalismproduces an unwarlikedisposi- Schumpeter'sarguments are difficultto tion; its populace is "democratized,in- evaluate. In partial tests of quasi- dividualized, rationalized"(Schumpeter, Schumpeterian propositions, Michael 1955, p. 68). The people's energies are Haas (1974, pp. 464-65) discovered a daily absorbed in production. The cluster that associates democracy, disciplines of industry and the market development, and sustained moderniza- train people in "economic rationalism"; tion with peaceful conditions. However, the instability of industrial life M. Small and J. D. Singer (1976) have necessitates calculation. Capitalism also discovered that there is no clearly "individualizes"; "subjective oppor- negative correlationbetween democracy tunities"replace the "immutablefactors" and war in the period 1816-1965-the of traditional, hierarchicalsociety. Ra- period that would be central to tional individuals demand democratic Schumpeter's argument (see also governance. Wilkenfeld,1968, Wright, 1942, p. 841). Democratic capitalismleads to peace. Later in his career, in Capitalism, As evidence, Schumpeter claims that , and Democracy, Schumpeter, throughout the capitalist world an op- (1950, pp. 127-28) acknowledged that position has arisen to "war, expansion, "almost purely bourgeois common- cabinet "; that contemporary wealths were often aggressive when it capitalism is associated with peace par- seemed to pay-like the Athenian or the ties; and that the industrial worker of Venetian commonwealths."Yet he stuck capitalismis "vigorouslyanti-imperialist." to his pacifistic guns, restating the view In addition, he points out that the capital- that capitalist democracy "steadily tells ist world has developedmeans of prevent- ... against the use of military force and ing war, such as the HagueCourt and that for peacefularrangements, even when the the least feudal, most capitalistsociety- balance of pecuniaryadvantage is clearly the -has demonstratedthe on the side of war which, under modem least imperialistictendencies (Schumpeter circumstances,is not in generalvery like- 1955, pp. 95-96). An exampleof the lack ly" (Schumpeter,1950, p. 128).1A recent of imperialistic tendencies in the U.S., study by R. J. Rummel (1983) of "liber- Schumpeter thought, was our leaving tarianism"and internationalviolence is over half of Mexico unconqueredin the the closest test Schumpeterianpacifism war of 1846-48. has received. "Free"states (those enjoying

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political and ) were that ruling makes no difference.He also shown to have considerablyless conflict presumesthat no one is preparedto take at or above the level of economic sanc- those measures(such as stirringup foreign tions than "nonfree" states. The free quarrels to preserve a domestic ruling states, the partly free states (includingthe coalition) that enhance one's political democratic socialist countries such as power, despite deterimental effects on Sweden), and the nonfree states ac- mass welfare. Third, like domestic counted for 24%, 26%, and 61 %, respec- politics, world politics are homogenized. tively, of the international violence Materially monistic and democratically during the period examined. capitalist, all states evolve toward free These effects are impressive but not trade and liberty together. Countriesdif- conclusive for the Schumpeterianthesis. ferently constituted seem to disappear The data are limited, in this test, to the from Schumpeter'sanalysis. "Civilized" period 1976 to 1980. It includes, for ex- nations govern "culturally backward" ample, the Russo-AfghanWar, the Viet- regions. These assumptions are not shared namese invasion of Cambodia, China's by Machiavelli'stheory of liberalism. invasion of Vietnam, and Tanzania'sin- vasion of Ugandabut just missesthe U.S., quasi-covert intervention in Angola Liberal Imperialism (1975) and our not so covert war against Nicaragua (1981-). More importantly, it Machiavelli argues, not only that excludes the cold war period, with its republicsare not pacifistic, but that they numerous interventions, and the long are the best form of state for imperial history of colonial wars (the Boer War, expansion. Establishinga republicfit for the Spanish-AmericanWar, the Mexican imperialexpansion is, moreover, the best Intervention, etc.) that marked the way to guaranteethe survival of a state. history of liberal, including democratic Machiavelli's republic is a classical capitalist, states (Doyle, 1983b; Chan, mixed republic. It is not a democracy- 1984; Weede, 1984). which he thought would quickly degen- The discrepancy between the warlike erate into a tyranny-but is characterized history of liberal states and Schumpeter's by social equality, popular liberty, and pacifisticexpectations highlights three ex- political participation(Machiavelli, 1950, treme assumptions. First, his "material- bk. 1, chap. 2, p. 112; see also Huliung, istic monism" leaves little room for 1983, chap. 2; Mansfield, 1970; Pocock, noneconomic objectives, whether es- 1975, pp. 198-99; Skinner,1981, chap. 3). poused by states or individuals. Neither The consuls serve as "kings,"the senateas glory, nor prestige, nor ideological an aristocracymanaging the state, and the justification,nor the pure power of ruling people in the assembly as the source of shapes policy. These nonmaterial goals strength. leave little room for positive-sum gains, Liberty results from "disunion"-the such as the comparative advantages of competition and necessity for com- trade. Second, and relatedly, the same is promise required by the division of true for his states. The political life of powers among senate, consuls, and individualsseems to have been homogen- tribunes (the last representingthe com- ized at the same time as the individuals mon people). Libertyalso resultsfrom the were "rationalized, individualized, and popular veto. The powerful few threaten democratized."Citizens-capitalists and the rest with tyranny, Machiavelli says, workers, rural and urban-seek material because they seek to dominate. The mass welfare. Schumpeter seems to presume demands not to be dominated, and their

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veto thus preserves the liberties of the either case, we want more for ourselves state (Machiavelli,1950, bk. 1, chap. 5, p. and our states than just materialwelfare 122). However, since the people and the (materialistic monism). Because other rulershave differentsocial characters,the states with similar aims thereby threaten people need to be "managed"by the few us, we prepare ourselves for expansion. to avoid having their recklessnessover- Becauseour fellow citizens threatenus if turn or their fecklessness undermine we do not allow them either to satisfy the ability of the state to expand their ambition or to releasetheir political (Machiavelli,1950, bk. 1, chap. 53, pp. energies through imperialexpansion, we 249-50). Thus the senate and the consuls expand. plan expansion, consult oracles, and There is considerable historical employ religion to manage the resources evidence for liberal imperialism. that the energy of the people supplies. Machiavelli's (Polybius's) Rome and Strength,and then imperialexpansion, Thucydides' Athens both were imperial results from the way liberty encourages republics in the Machiavellian sense increasedpopulation and property,which (Thucydides,1954, bk. 6). The historical grow when the citizens know their lives recordof numerousU.S. interventionsin and goods are secure from arbitrary the postwarperiod supports Machiavelli's seizure. Free citizens equip large armies argument (Aron, 1973, chaps. 3-4; and provide soldierswho fight for public Barnet, 1968, chap. 11), but the current glory and the commongood becausethese record of liberal pacifism, weak as it is, are, in fact, theirown (Machiavelli,1950, calls some of his insightsinto question.To bk. 2, chap. 2, pp. 287-90). If you seek the extent that the modern populace ac- the honor of having your state expand, tually controls (and thus unbalances)the Machiavelliadvises, you should organize mixed republic, its diffidence may out- it as a free and popular republic like weigh elite ("senatorial")aggressiveness. Rome, rather than as an aristocratic We can conclude either that (1) liberal republiclike Spartaor Venice. Expansion pacifism has at least taken over with the thus calls for a free republic. further development of capitalist "Necessity"-political survival-calls democracy, as Schumpeterpredicted it for expansion. If a stable aristocratic would or that (2) the mixed record of republic is forced by foreign conflict "to liberalism-pacifism and imperialism- extend her territory, in such a case we indicates that some liberal states are shall see her foundations give way and Schumpeteriandemocracies while others herselfquickly brought to ruin";if, on the are Machiavellian republics. Before we other hand, domestic security prevails, accept either conclusion, however, we "thecontinued tranquility would enervate must considera third apparentregularity her, or provoke internal dimensions, of modernworld politics. which together, or either of them separately, will apt to prove her ruin" (Machiavelli, 1950, bk. 1, chap. 6, p. LiberalInternationalism 129). Machiavelli thereforebelieves it is necessary to take the constitution of Modern liberalismcarries with it two Rome, rather than that of Sparta or legacies. They do not affect liberal states Venice, as our model. separately,according to whetherthey are Hence, this belief leads to liberal im- pacifistic or imperialistic, but simul- perialism. We are lovers of glory, taneously. Machiavelli announces. We seek to rule The first of these legaciesis the pacifica- or, at least, to avoid being oppressed.In tion of foreign relations among liberal

1155 American Political Science Review Vol. 80 states.2During the nineteenthcentury, the to the quarrels with our allies that be- United States and Great Britain engaged deviled the Carter and Reagan adminis- in nearly continual strife; however, after trations. It also offers the promise of a the Reform Act of 1832 defined actual continuing peace among liberal states, representationas the formal source of the and as the number of liberal states in- sovereignty of the British parliament, creases, it announces the possibility of Britain and the United States negotiated global peace this side of the grave or their disputes. They negotiated despite, world conquest. for example,British grievances during the Of course, the probability of the out- Civil War againstthe North'sblockade of break of war in any given year between the South, with which Britain had close any two given states is low. The occur- economic ties. Despite severe Anglo- rence of a war between any two adjacent Frenchcolonial rivalry, liberalFrance and states, considered over a long period of liberal Britain formed an entente against time, would be more probable. The ap- illiberal Germany before World War I. parent absence of war between liberal And from 1914 to 1915, Italy, the liberal states, whether adjacent or not, for member of the Triple Alliance with Ger- almost 200 years thus may have sig- many and Austria, chose not to fulfill its nificance. Similarclaims cannot be made obligations under that treaty to support for feudal, fascist, communist, au- its allies. Instead, Italy joined in an alli- thoritarian,or totalitarianforms of rule ance with Britainand France,which pre- (Doyle, 1983a, pp. 222), nor for plural- vented it from having to fight other liberal istic or merely similar societies. More states and then declaredwar on Germany significantperhaps is that when states are and Austria. Despite generations of forced to decide on which side of an im- Anglo-American tension and Britain's pendingworld war they will fight, liberal wartime restrictions on American trade states all wind up on the same side de- with Germany, the United States leaned spite the complexityof the paths that take toward Britain and Francefrom 1914 to them there. These characteristicsdo not 1917 before enteringWorld War I on their prove that the peace among liberals is side. statisticallysignificant nor that liberalism Beginningin the eighteenthcentury and is the sole valid explanation for the slowly growing since then, a zone of peace.3They do suggest that we consider peace, which Kant called the "pacific the possibility that liberals have indeed federation"or "pacificunion," has begun established a separate peace-but only to be establishedamong liberal societies. among themselves. More than 40 liberalstates currentlymake Liberalismalso carrieswith it a second up the union. Most are in Europe and legacy: international "imprudence" ,but they can be found on (Hume, 1963, pp. 346-47). Peaceful every continent, as Appendix1 indicates. restraintonly seems to work in liberals' Here the predictionsof liberal pacifists relationswith other liberals.Liberal states (and President Reagan) are borne out: have fought numerous wars with non- liberal states do exercise peaceful liberal states. (For a list of international restraint, and a separate peace exists wars since 1816 see Appendix2.) among them. This separate peace pro- Many of these wars have been defen- vides a solid foundation for the United sive and thus prudent by necessity. States' crucial alliances with the liberal Liberal states have been attacked and powers, e.g., the North Atlantic Treaty threatened by nonliberal states that do Organizationand our Japanesealliance. not exercise any special restraintin their This foundationappears to be impervious dealings with the liberal states.

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Authoritarianrulers both stimulate and of peacefulrivalry among capitalists,but respond to an internationalpolitical en- only liberal capitalists maintain peace. vironment in which conflicts of prestige, Leninists expect liberal capitalists to be interest,and purefear of what otherstates aggressive toward nonliberal states, but might do all lead states toward war. War they also (and especially)expect them to and conquesthave thus characterizedthe be imperialistic toward fellow liberal careersof many authoritarianrulers and capitalists. ruling parties, from Louis XIV and Kant's theory of liberal interna- Napoleon to Mussolini'sfascists, Hitler's tionalism helps us understandthese two Nazis, and Stalin'scommunists. legacies. The importance of Immanuel Yet we cannot simplyblame warfareon Kant as a theorist of internationalethics the authoritarians or totalitarians, as has been well appreciated (Armstrong, many of our more enthusiasticpoliticians 1931; Friedrich,1948; Gallie, 1978, chap. would have us do.4 Most wars arise out of 1; Galston, 1975; Hassner,1972; Hinsley, calculations and miscalculations of in- 1967, chap. 4; Hoffmann,-1965; Waltz, terest, misunderstandings, and mutual 1962; Williams, 1983), but Kant also has suspicions, such as those that char- an importantanalytical theory of interna- acterized the origins of World War I. tional politics. PerpetualPeace, writtenin However, aggressionby the 1795 (Kant, 1970, pp. 93-130), helps us has also characterizeda large number of understandthe interactivenature of inter- wars. Both Franceand Britainfought ex- national relations. Kant tries to teach us pansionist colonial wars throughout the methodologically that we can study nineteenth century. The United States neitherthe systemicrelations of states nor fought a similar war with Mexico from the varietiesof state behaviorin isolation 1846 to 1848, waged a war of annihilation from each other. Substantively,he antic- against the American Indians, and in- ipates for us the ever-wideningpacifica- tervened militarily against sovereign tion of a liberal pacific union, explains states many times before and after World this pacification, and at the same time War II. Liberal states invade weak suggestswhy liberalstates are not pacific nonliberal states and display striking in their relations with nonliberal states. distrust in dealings with powerful Kant argues that perpetualpeace will be nonliberalstates (Doyle, 1983b). guaranteedby the ever-wideningaccept- Neither realist (statist) nor Marxist ance of three"definitive articles" of peace. theory accounts well for these two When all nations have accepted the legacies. While they can account for definitive articles in a metaphorical aspects of certainperiods of international "treaty"of perpetualpeace he asks them stability (Aron, 1968, pp. 151-54; to sign, perpetual peace will have been Russett, 1985), neither the logic of the established. balance of power nor the logic of interna- The FirstDefinitive Article requiresthe tional explains the separate civil constitution of the state to be peace maintainedfor more than 150 years republican.By republicanKant means a among states sharingone particularform political society that has solved the prob- of governance-liberal principlesand in- lem of combining moral autonomy, in- stitutions. Balance-of-powertheory ex- dividualism, and social order. A private pects-indeed is premisedupon-flexible property and market-orientedeconomy arrangementsof geostrategicrivalry that partially addressed that dilemma in the include preventivewar. Hegemonieswax private sphere. The public, or political, and wane, but the liberal peace holds. sphere was more troubling. His answer Marxist"ultra-imperialists" expect a form was a republic that preserved juridical

1157 American Political Science Review Vol. 80 freedom-the legal equality of citizens as spreadfurther and furtherby a seriesof alliances subjects-on the basis of a representative of this kind. (Kant,PP p. 104) governmentwith a separationof powers. The pacific union is not a single peace Juridicalfreedom is preservedbecause the treaty ending one war, a world state, nor morally autonomous individual is by a state of nations. Kant finds the first in- means of representationa self-legislator sufficient. The second and third are im- making laws that apply to all citizens possible or potentially tyrannical. Na- equally, including himself or herself. tional sovereignty precludes reliable Tyranny is avoided because the in- subservienceto a state of nations;a world dividual is subjectto laws he or she does state destroys the civic freedomon which not also administer (Kant, PP, pp. 99- the developmentof humancapacities rests 102; Riley, 1985, chap. 5).5 (Kant, UH, p. 50). Although Kant ob- Liberal republics will progressively liquely refers to various classical establish peace among themselves by interstate confederations and modem means of the pacific federation,or union diplomatic congresses, he develops no (foedus pacificum), described in Kant's systematicorganizational embodiment of Second Definitive Article. The pacific this treaty and presumablydoes not find union will establishpeace within a federa- institutionalization necessary (Riley, tion of free states and securely maintain 1983, chap. 5; Schwarz, 1962, p. 77). He the rightsof each state. The world will not appears to have in mind a mutual non- have achieved the "perpetualpeace" that aggression pact, perhaps a collective providesthe ultimateguarantor of repub- securityagreement, and the cosmopolitan lican freedomuntil "a late stage and after law set forth in the Third Definitive many unsuccessfulattempts" (Kant, UH, Article.7 p. 47). At that time, all nations will have The ThirdDefinitive Article establishes learnedthe lessons of peace throughright a cosmopolitanlaw to operatein conjunc- conceptions of the appropriateconstitu- tion with the pacific union. The cosmo- tion, great and sad experience,and good politan law "shallbe limitedto conditions will. Only then will individuals enjoy of universalhospitality." In this Kantcalls perfect republican rights or the full for the recognitionof the "rightof a for- guaranteeof a global and just peace. In eigner not to be treated with hostility the meantime, the "pacificfederation" of when he arrives on someone else's terri- liberalrepublics-"an enduringand grad- tory."This "doesnot extendbeyond those ually expandingfederation likely to pre- conditions which make it possible for vent war"-brings within it more and them [foreigners]to attemptto enter into more republics-despite republican col- relations [commerce]with the native in- lapses, backsliding,and disastrouswars- habitants"(Kant, PP, p. 106). Hospitality creatingan ever-expandingseparate peace does not require extending to foreigners (Kant,PP, p. 105).6 Kantemphasizes that either the right to citizenshipor the right to settlement, unless the foreign visitors it can be shown that this idea of federalism, ex- would perish if they were expelled. For- tending gradually to encompass all states and eign conquest and plunder also find no thus leading to perpetual peace, is practicable and has objective reality. For if by good fortune justificationunder this right. Hospitality one powerful and enlightened nation can form a does appearto include the right of access republic (which is by nature inclined to seek and the obligation of maintaining the peace), this will provide a focal point for federal opportunity for citizens to exchange association among other states. These will join goods and ideas without imposing the up with the first one, thus securing the freedom of each state in accordance with the idea of inter- obligation to trade (a voluntary act in all national right, and the whole will gradually cases under liberal constitutions).

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Perpetual peace, for Kant, is an epi- we now come to the essential question regarding stemology, a condition for ethical action, the prospect of perpetual peace. What does and, most importantly,an explanationof nature do in relation to the end which man's own how the "mechanicalprocess of nature reason prescribes to him as a duty, i.e. how does nature help to promote his moral purpose? And visibly exhibitsthe purposiveplan of pro- how does nature guarantee that what man ought ducingconcord among men, even against to do by the laws of his freedom (but does not their will and indeed by means of their do) will in fact be done through nature's compul- very discord" (Kant, PP, p. 108; UH, pp. sion, without prejudice to the free agency of an man? . . . This does not mean that nature im- 44-45). Understandinghistory requires poses on us a duty to do it, for duties can only be epistemologicalfoundation, for without a imposed by practical reason. On the contrary, teleology, such as the promise of per- nature does it herself, whether we are willing or petual peace, the complexity of history not: facta volentem ducunt, nolentem tradunt. would overwhelm human understanding (PP, p. 112) (Kant, UH, pp. 51-53). Perpetualpeace, The guaranteethus rests, Kantargues, not however, is not merely a heuristicdevice on the probablebehavior of moralangels, with which to interpret history. It is but on that of "devils, so long as they guaranteed, Kant explains in the "First possess understanding"(PP, p. 112). In Addition" to Perpetual Peace ("On the explainingthe sourcesof each of the three Guaranteeof PerpetualPeace"), to result definitive articles of the perpetualpeace, from men fulfilling their ethical duty or, Kant then tells us how we (as free and in- failing that, from a hiddenplan.8 Peace is telligent devils) could be motivated by an ethical duty because it is only under fear, force, and calculated advantage to conditionsof peace that all men can treat undertakea course of action whose out- each other as ends, ratherthan means to come we could reasonably anticipate to an end (Kant, UH, p. 50; Murphy, 1970, be perpetualpeace. Yet while it is possible chap. 3). In orderfor this duty to be prac- to conceive of the Kantianroad to peace tical, Kant needs, of course, to show that in these terms, Kant himself recognizes peace is in fact possible. The widespread and argues that social evolution also sentiment of approbation that he saw makes the conditions of moral behavior arousedby the early successof the French less onerous and hence more likely (CF, revolutionariesshowed him that we can pp. 187-89; Kelly, 1969, pp. 106-13). In indeed be moved by ethical sentiments tracing the effects of both political and with a cosmopolitanreach (Kant, CF, pp. moral development,he builds an account 181-82; Yovel, 1980, pp. 153-54). This of why liberal states do maintain peace does not mean, however, that perpetual among themselvesand of how it will (by peace is certain("prophesiable"). Even the implication, has) come about that the scientificallyregular course of the planets pacific union will expand. He also ex- could be changed by a wayward comet plains how these republicswould engage striking them out of orbit. Human in wars with nonrepublicsand therefore freedom requiresthat we allow for much sufferthe "sadexperience" of wars that an greaterreversals in the course of history. ethical policy might have avoided. We must, in fact, anticipatethe possibility The first source of the three definitive of backsliding and destructive wars- articles derives from a political evolu- though these will serve to educatenations tion-from a constitutionallaw. Nature to the importanceof peace (Kant, UH, pp. (providence)has seen to it that humanbe- 47-48). ings can live in all the regionswhere they In the end, however, our guaranteeof have been drivento settle by wars. (Kant, perpetualpeace does not rest on ethical who once taught geography, reports on conduct. As Kant emphasizes, the Lapps,the Samoyeds, the Pescheras.)

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"Asocial sociability"draws men together threat of new wars. But under a constitution to fulfill needs for security and material where the subject is not a citizen, and which is therefore not republican, it is the simplest thing welfare as it drives them into conflicts in the world to go to war. For the head of state is over the distributionand control of social not a fellow citizen, but the owner of the state, products (Kant, UH, p. 44-45; PP, pp. and war will not force him to make the slightest 110-11). This violent natural evolution sacrifice so far as his banquets, hunts, pleasure palaces and court festivals are concerned. He can tends towards the liberal peace because thus decide on war, without any significant "asocial sociability" inevitably leads reason, as a kind of amusement, and uncon- toward republicangovernments, and re- cernedly leave it to the diplomatic corps (who are publicangovernments are a source of the always ready for such pruposes) to justify the liberal peace. war for the sake of propriety. (Kant, PP, p. 100) Republicanrepresentation and separa- Yet these domestic republican restraints tion of powers are producedbecause they do not end war. If they did, liberal states are the means by which the state is would not be warlike, which is far from "organizedwell" to preparefor and meet the case. They do introduce republican foreign threats(by unity) and to tame the caution-Kant's "hesitation"-in place of ambitions of selfish and aggressive in- monarchical caprice. Liberal wars are dividuals (by authority derived from only fought for popular, liberalpurposes. representation,by general laws, and by The historicalliberal legacy is laden with nondespotic administration)(Kant, PP, popularwars fought to promotefreedom, pp. 112-13). States that are not organized to protect privateproperty, or to support in this fashion fail. Monarchs thus en- liberal allies against nonliberal enemies. courage commerce and private property Kant'sposition is ambiguous.He regards in orderto increasenational wealth. They these wars as unjustand warns liberalsof cede rights of representationto their sub- their susceptibilityto them (Kant, PP, p. jects in order to strengthentheir political 106). At the same time, Kant argues that support or to obtain willing grants of tax each nation "can and ought to" demand revenue (Hassner,1972, pp. 583-86). that its neighboringnations enter into the Kant shows how republics,once estab- pacific union of liberalstates (PP, p. 102). lished, lead to peaceful relations. he Thus to see how the pacific union re- arguesthat once the aggressiveinterests of moves the occasion of wars among liberal absolutist monarchiesare tamed and the states and not wars between liberal and habit of respect for individual rights nonliberal states, we need to shift our engrained by republican government, attentionfrom constitutionallaw to inter- wars would appear as the disaster to the national law, Kant'ssecond source. people's welfare that he and the other Complementing the constitutional liberals thought them to be. The funda- guarantee of caution, international law mental reason is this: adds a second source for the definitive If, as is inevitabilitythe case underthis constitu- articles: a guarantee of respect. The tion, the consent of the citizens is requiredto separation of nations that asocial socia- decidewhether or not war shouldbe declared,it bility encourages is reinforced by the is very naturalthat they will have a greathesita- development of separate languages and tion in embarkingon so dangerousan enterprise. For this would meancalling down on themselves religions.These furtherguarantee a world all the miseriesof war, such as doing the fighting of separatestates-an essential condition themselves,supplying the costs of the war from needed to avoid a "global, soul-less their own resources,painfully making good the despotism."Yet, at the same time, they ensuing devastation,and, as the crowningevil, having to take upon themselves a burden of also morally integrate liberal states: "as debts which will embitterpeace itself and which culture grows and men gradually move can neverbe paid off on accountof the constant ,towards greater agreement over their-

1160 1986 Liberalism and World Politics principles, they lead to mutual under- cooperative international division of standing and peace" (Kant, PP, p. 114). labor and free trade according to com- As republicsemerge (the first source)and parativeadvantage. Each economy is said as cultureprogresses, an understandingof to be better off than it would have been the legitimaterights of all citizens and of under autarky; each thus acquiresan in- all republics comes into play; and this, centive to avoid policies that would lead now that caution characterizespolicy, the other to break these economic ties. sets up the moral foundations for the Becausekeeping open marketsrests upon liberal peace. Correspondingly,interna- the assumptionthat the next set of trans- tional law highlights the importance of actions will also be determinedby prices Kantian publicity. Domestically, pub- rather than coercion, a sense of mutual licity helps ensure that the officials of security is vital to avoid security- republics act according to the principles motivatedsearches for economicautarky. they profess to hold just and accordingto Thus, avoiding a challenge to another the interestsof the electors they claim to liberal state's security or even enhancing represent.Internationally, free speechand each other'ssecurity by means of alliance the effective communicationof accurate naturally follows economic interde- conceptionsof the political life of foreign pendence. peoples is essential to establishing and A further cosmopolitan source of lib- preserving the understandingon which eral peace is the international market's the guaranteeof respectdepends. Domes- removal of difficult decisions of produc- tically just republics, which rest on con- tion and distribution from the direct sent, then presumeforeign republicsalso sphereof state policy. A foreignstate thus to be consensual, just, and therefore does not appear directly responsiblefor deservingof accommodation.The experi- these outcomes, and states can standaside ence of cooperation helps engender fur- from, and to some degree above, these ther cooperativebehavior when the con- contentiousmarket rivalries and be ready sequences of state policy are unclear but to step in to resolve crises. The inter- (potentially) mutually beneficial. At the dependenceof commerceand the interna- same time, liberal states assume that tional contacts of state officials help nonliberal states, which do not rest on create crosscuttingtransnational ties that free consent, are not just. Because serve as lobbies for mutual accommoda- nonliberal governmentsare in a state of tion. According to modern liberal aggression with their own people, their scholars, international financiers and foreign relations become for liberal transnationaland transgovernmentalor- governments deeply suspect. In short, ganizations create interests in favor of fellow liberalsbenefit from a presumption accommodation.Moreover, their variety of amity; nonliberals suffer from a has ensured that no single conflict sours presumption of enmity. Both presump- an entire relationship by setting off a tions may be accurate; each, however, spiral of reciprocatedretaliation (Brzezin- may also be self-confirming. ski and Huntington, 1963, chap. 9; Keo- Lastly, cosmopolitanlaw adds material hane and Nye, 1977, chap. 7; Neustadt, incentives to moral commitments. The 1970; Polanyi, 1944, chaps. 1-2). Con- cosmopolitanright to hospitality permits versely, a sense of suspicion, such as that the "spiritof commerce"sooner or laterto characterizingrelations between liberal take hold of every nation, thus impelling and nonliberalgovernments, can lead to states to promotepeace and to try to avert restrictionson the range of contacts be- war. Liberaleconomic theory holds that tween societies, and this can increasethe these cosmopolitan ties derive from a prospect that a single conflict will deter-

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mine an entire relationship. Kant'scitizens, too, are diversein their No single constitutional,international, goals and individualizedand rationalized, or cosmopolitansource is alone sufficient, but most importantly,they are capableof but together (and only together) they appreciatingthe moral equality of all in- plausibly connect the characteristicsof dividualsand of treatingother individuals liberal polities and economies with sus- as ends ratherthan as means. The Kantian tainedliberal peace. Alliancesfounded on state thus is governed publicly according mutual strategic interest among liberal to law, as a republic. Kant's is the state and nonliberal states have been broken; that solves the problem of governing in- economic ties between liberal and non- dividualizedequals, whether they are the liberal states have proven fragile;but the "rationaldevils" he says we often find political bonds of liberalrights and inter- ourselves to be or the ethical agents we ests have proven a remarkablyfirm foun- can and should become. Republicstell us dation for mutual nonaggression. A that separatepeace exists among liberalstates. in order to organizea group of rationalbeings In theirrelations with nonliberalstates, who togetherrequire universal laws for theirsur- however, liberal states have not escaped vival, but of whom each separateindividual is from the insecuritycaused by anarchy in secretly inclined to exempt himself from them, the world political system consideredas a the constitution must be so designed so that, althoughthe citizensare opposedto one another whole. Moreover, the very constitutional in their private attitudes, these opposing views restraint, international respect for in- may inhibit one anotherin such a way that the dividual rights, and shared commercial publicconduct of the citizenswill be the same as intereststhat establishgrounds for peace if they did not have such evil attitudes. (Kant, among liberalstates establishgrounds for PP, p. 113) additional conflict in relations between Unlike Machiavelli's republics, Kant's liberal and nonliberalsocieties. republicsare capable of achieving peace among themselves because they exercise Conclusion democraticcaution and are capableof ap- preciating the international rights of Kant's , foreign republics. These international Machiavelli's liberal imperialism, and rights of republics derive from the Schumpeter'sliberal pacifism rest on fun- representation of foreign individuals, damentally differentviews of the nature who are our moral equals. Unlike Schum- of the human being, the state, and inter- peter's capitalist democracies, Kant's national relations.9Schumpeter's humans republics-including our own-remain in are rationalized, individualized, and a state of war with nonrepublics.Liberal democratized. They are also homoge- republicssee themselvesas threatenedby nized, pursuingmaterial interests "monis- aggressionfrom nonrepublicsthat are not tically." Because their material interests constrained by representation. Even lie in peaceful trade, they and the demo- though wars often cost more than the cratic state that these fellow citizens con- economic return they generate, liberal trol are pacifistic. Machiavelli'scitizens republicsalso are preparedto protect and are splendidly diverse in their goals but promote-sometimes forcibly-democ- fundamentallyunequal in them as well, racy, private property, and the rights of seeking to rule or fearing being domi- individuals overseas against nonrepub- nated. Extendingthe rule of the dominant lics, which, because they do not authen- elite or avoiding the political collapse of tically representthe rights of individuals, their state, each calls for imperial have no rights to noninterference.These expansion. wars may liberate oppressed individuals

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overseas; they also can generate enor- troducingsteadier strategic calculations of mous suffering. the national interest in the long run and Preserving the legacy of the liberal more flexible responsesto changesin the peace without succumbingto the legacy internationalpolitical environment.Con- of liberalimprudence is both a moral and straining the indiscriminatemeddling of a strategicchallenge. The bipolarstability our foreign interventions calls for a of the internationalsystem, and the near deeper appreciationof the "particularism certainty of mutual devastationresulting of history, culture, and membership" from a nuclear war between the super- (Walzer, 1983, p. 5), but both the im- powers, have created a "crystal ball provementin strategy and the constraint effect" that has helped to constrain the on interventionseem, in turn, to require tendency toward miscalculation present an executivefreed from the restraintsof a at the outbreak of so many wars in the representativelegislature in the manage- past (Carnesale,Doty, Hoffmann, Hun- ment of foreign policy and a political tington, Nye, and Sagan, 1983, p. 44; culture indifferentto the universalrights Waltz, 1964). However, this "nuclear of individuals.These conditions, in their peace"appears to be limited to the super- turn, could break the chain of constitu- powers. It has not curbed military inter- tional guarantees, the respect for rep- ventions in the ThirdWorld. Moreover,it resentativegovernment, and the web of is subjectto a desperatetechnological race transnationalcontact that have sustained designedto overcome its constraintsand the pacific union of liberal states. to crisesthat have pushedeven the super- Perpetualpeace, Kant says, is the end powers to the brink of war. We must still point of the hard journey his republics reckon with the war fevers and moods of will take. The promiseof perpetualpeace, appeasementthat have almost alternately the violent lessons of war, and the ex- swept liberal democracies. perienceof a partialpeace are proof of the Yet restraining liberal imprudence, need for and the possibility of world whetheraggressive or passive, may not be peace. They are also the grounds for possible without threatening liberal moral citizens and statesmen to assume pacification. Improving the strategic the duty of strivingfor peace. acumen of our foreignpolicy calls for in-

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Appendix 1. Liberal Regimes and the Pacific Union, 1700-1982

Period Period Period 18th Century 1900-1945(cont.) 1945- (cont.) Swiss Cantonsa Italy, -1922 , -1948; 1953- FrenchRepublic, 1790-1795 Belgium,-1940 Iceland,1944- UnitedStates,a 1776- Netherlands,-1940 France,1945- Total = 3 Argentina,-1943 Denmark,1945 France,-1940 Norway, 1945 1800-1850 Chile, -1924, 1932- Austria,1945- Swiss Confederation Australia,1901 Brazil,1945-1954; 1955-1964 United States Norway, 1905-1940 Belgium,1946- France,1830-1849 New Zealand,1907- Luxemburg,1946- Belgium,1830- Colombia,1910-1949 Netherlands,1946- Great Britain,1832- Denmark,1914-1940 Italy, 1946- Netherlands,1848- Poland, 1917-1935 Philippines,1946-1972 Piedmont,1848- Latvia, 1922-1934 India, 1947-1975, 1977- Denmark,1849- Germany,1918-1932 Sri Lanka,1948-1961; 1963-1971; Total = 8 Austria,1918-1934 1978- Estonia,1919-1934 Ecuador,1948-1963; 1979- 1850-1900 Finland,1919- Israel,1949- Switzerland Uruguay,1919- West Germany,1949- United States Costa Rica, 1919- Greece,1950-1967; 1975- Belgium Czechoslovakia,1920-1939 Peru, 1950-1962;1963-1968; 1980- GreatBritain Ireland,1920- El Salvador,1950-1961 Netherlands Mexico, 1928- Turkey, 1950-1960;1966-1971 Piedmont,-1861 Lebanon,1944- Japan,1951- Italy, 1861- Total = 29 Bolivia, 1956-1969;1982- Denmark,-1866 Colombia, 1958- Sweden, 1864- 1945- Venezuela,1959- Greece,1864- Switzerland Nigeria, 1961-1964;1979-1984 Canada,1867- United States Jamaica,1962- France,1871- GreatBritain Trinidadand Tobago, 1962- Argentina,1880- Sweden Senegal,1963- Chile, 1891- Canada Malaysia,1963- Total = 13 Australia Botswana,1966- New Zealand Singapore,1965- 1900-1945 Finland Portugal,1976- Switzerland Ireland Spain, 1978- United States Mexico DominicanRepublic, 1978- GreatBritain Uruguay,-1973 Honduras,1981- Sweden Chile, -1973 PapuaNew Guinea,1982- Canada Lebanon,-1975 Total = 50 Greece, -1911; 1928-1936

Note: I have drawn up this approximatelist of "LiberalRegimes" according to the four institutionsKant describedas essential:market and privateproperty economies; polities that are externallysovereign; citizens who possess juridicalrights; and "republican"(whether republican or parliamentarymonarchy), representa- tive government.This latterincludes the requirementthat the legislativebranch have an effectiverole in public policy and be formallyand competitively(either inter- or intra-party)elected. Furthermore, I have takeninto account whether male suffrageis wide (i.e., 30%) or, as Kant (MM, p. 139) would have had it, open by "achievement"to inhabitantsof the national or metropolitanterritory (e.g., to poll-tax payers or house- holders).This list of liberalregimes is thus more inclusivethan a list of democraticregimes, or polyarchies (Powell, 1982, p. 5). Other conditionstaken into account here are that female suffrageis grantedwithin a generationof its being demandedby an extensivefemale suffrage movement and that representativegovern- ment is internallysovereign (e.g., including,and especiallyover militaryand foreignaffairs) as well as stable (in existencefor at least threeyears). Sources for thesedata are Banksand Overstreet(1983), Gastil (1985), The EuropaYearbook, 1985 (1985), Langer(1968), U.K. Foreignand CommonwealthOffice (1980), and U.S.

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Department of State (1981). Finally, these lists exclude ancient and medieval "republics," since none appears to fit Kant's commitment to liberal (Holmes, 1979). aThere are domestic variations within these liberal regimes: Switzerland was liberal only in certain cantons; the United States was liberal only north of the Mason-Dixon line until 1865, when it became liberal throughout. bSelected list, excludes liberal regimes with populations less than one million. These include all states categorized as "free"by Gastil and those "partly free" (four-fifths or more free) states with a more pronounced capitalist orientation.

Appendix2. InternationalWars Listed Chronologically

British-Maharattan(1817-1818) Pacific(1879-1883) Greek(1821-1828) British-Zulu(1879) Franco-Spanish(1823) Franco-Indochinese(1882-1884) FirstAnglo-Burmese (1823-1826) Mahdist(1882-1885) Javanese(1825-1830) Sino-French(1884-1885) Russo-Persian(1826-1828) CentralAmerican (1885) Russo-Turkish(1828-1829) Serbo-Bulgarian(1885) FirstPolish (1831) Sino-Japanese(1894-1895) FirstSyrian (1831-1832) Franco-Madagascan(1894-1895) Texas (1835-1836) Cuban(1895-1898) FirstBritish-Afghan (1838-1842) Italo-Ethipian(1895-1896) SecondSyrian (1839-1940) FirstPhilippine (1896-1898) Franco-Algerian(1839-1847) Greco-Turkish(1897) Peruvian-Bolivian(1841) Spanish-American(1898) FirstBritish-Sikh (1845-1846) Second Phlippine(1899-1902) Mexican-American(1846-1848) Boer (1899-1902) Austro-Sardinian(1848-1849) BoxerRebellion (1900) FirstSchleswig-Holstein (1848-1849) Ilinden(1903) Hungarian(1848-1849) Russo-Japanese(1904-1905) Second British-Sikh(1848-1849) CentralAmerican (1906) RomanRepublic (1849) CentralAmerican (1907) La Plata (1851-1852) Spanish-Moroccan(1909-1910) FirstTurco-Montenegran (1852-1853) Italo-Turkish(1911-1912) Crimean(1853-1856) FirstBalkan (1912-1913) Anglo-Persian(1856-1857) Second Balkan(1913) Sepoy (1857-1859) WorldWar I (1914-1918) SecondTurco-Montenegran (1858-1859) RussianNationalities (1917-1921) ItalianUnification (1859) Russo-Polish(1919-1920) Spanish-Moroccan(1859-1860) Hungarian-Allies(1919) Italo-Roman(1860) Greco-Turkish(1919-1922) Italo-Sicilian(1860-1861) Riffian(1921-1926) Franco-Mexican(1862-1867) Druze (1925-1927) Ecuadorian-Colombian(1863) Sino-Soviet(1929) Second Polish (1863-1864) Manchurian(1931-1933) Spanish-SantoDominican (1863-1865) Chaco (1932-1935) Second Schleswig-Holstein(1864) Italo-Ethiopian(1935-1936) Lopez(1864-1870) Sino-Japanese(1937-1941) Spanish-Chilean(1865-1866) Russo-Hungarian(1956) Seven Weeks (1866) Sinai (1956) Ten Years(1868-1878) Tibetan(1956-1959) Franco-Prussian(1870-1871) Sino-Indian(1962) Dutch-Achinese(1873-1878) Vietnamese(1965-1975) Balkan(1875-1877) SecondKashmir (1965) Russo-Turkish(1877-1878) Six Day (1967) Bosnian(1878) Israeli-Egyptian(1969-1970) Second British-Afghan(1878-1880) Football(1969)

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Changkufeng(1938) Bangladesh(1971) Nomohan (1939) Philippine-MNLF(1972-) World War II (1939-1945) Yom Kippur (1973) Russo-Finnish(1939-1940) Turco-Cypriot(1974) Franco-Thai(1940-1941) Ethiopian-Eritrean(1974-) Indonesian(1945-1946) Vietnamese-Cambodian(1975-) Indochinese (1945-1954) Timor (1975-) Madagascan (1947-1948) Saharan (1975-) First Kashmir (1947-1949) Ogaden (1976-) Palestine (1948-1949) Ugandan-Tanzanian (1978-1979) Hyderabad(1948) Sino-Vietnamese(1979) Korean (1950-1953) Russo-Afghan (1979-) Algerian (1954-1962) Iran-Iraqi (1980-)

Note: This tableis takenfrom Melvin Small and J. David Singer(1982, pp. 79-80). This is a partiallist of inter- nationalwars foughtbetween 1816 and 1980. In AppendicesA and B, Smalland Singeridentify a total of 575 wars duringthis period, but approximately159 of them appearto be largelydomestic, or civil wars. This list excludescovert interventions,some of which have been directedby liberalregimes against other liberalregimes-for example,the UnitedStates' effort to destabilizethe Chileanelection and Allende'sgovern- ment. Nonetheless,it is significantthat such interventionsare not pursuedpublicly as acknowledgedpolicy. The covert destabilizationcampaign against Chile is recountedby the Senate Select Committeeto Study GovernmentalOperations with Respectto IntelligenceActivities (1975, CovertAction in Chile, 1963-73). Followingthe argumentof this article,this list also excludescivil wars. Civil wars differfrom international wars, not in the ferocity of combat, but in the issues that engenderthem. Two nations that could abide one anotheras independentneighbors separated by a bordermight well be the fiercestof enemiesif forcedto live togetherin one state, jointly decidinghow to raiseand spendtaxes, choose leaders,and legislatefundamental questionsof value. Notwithstandingthese differences,no civil wars that I recallupset the argumentof liberal pacification.

Notes

I would like to thank Marshall Cohen, Amy Gut- foreign relations) the empirical tendency of democ- mann, Ferdinand Hermens, Bonnie Honig, Paschalis racies to maintain peace among themselves, and he Kitromilides, Klaus Knorr, Diana Meyers, Kenneth made this the foundation of his proposal for a (non- Oye, Jerome Schneewind, and Richard Ullman for Kantian) federal union of the 15 leading democracies their helpful suggestions. One version of this paper of the 1930s. In a very interesting book, Ferdinand was presented at the American Section of the Inter- Hermens (1944) explored some of the policy implica- national Society for Social and Legal Philosophy, tions of Streit's analysis. D. V. Babst (1972, pp. Notre Dame, Indiana, November 2-4, 1984, and will 55-58) performed a quantitative study of this appear in Realism and Morality, edited by Kenneth phenomenon of "democratic peace," and R. J. Kipnis and Diana Meyers. Another version was pre- Rummel (1983) did a similar study of "libertarian- sented on March 19, 1986, to the Avoiding Nuclear ism" (in the sense of laissez faire) focusing on the War Project, Center for Science and International postwar period that drew on an unpublished study Affairs, The John F. Kennedy School of Govern- (Project No. 48) noted in Appendix 1 of his Under- ment, . This essay draws on standing Conflict and War (1979, p. 386). I use the research assisted by a MacArthur Fellowship in term liberal in a wider, Kantian sense in my discus- awarded by the Social Science sion of this issue (Doyle, 1983a). In that essay, I Research Council. survey the period from 1790 to the present and find 1. He notes that testing this proposition is likely no war among liberal states. to be very difficult, requiring "detailed historical 3. Babst (1972) did make a preliminary test of the analysis." However, the bourgeois attitude toward significance of the distribution of alliance partners in the military, the spirit and manner by which bour- World War I. He found that the possibility that the geois societies wage war, and the readiness with actual distribution of alliance partners could have which they submit to military rule during a pro- occurred by chance was less than 1% (Babst, 1972, longed war are "conclusive in themselves" (Schum- p. 56). However, this assumes that there was an peter, 1950, p. 129). equal possibility that any two nations could have 2. Clarence Streit (1938, pp. 88, 90-92) seems to gone to war with each other, and this is a strong have been the first to point out (in contemporary assumption. Rummel (1983) has a further discussion

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of the issue of statisticalsignificance as it appliesto empirically merely a "pious hope" (MM, pp. his libertarianthesis. 164-75)-though even here he finds that the pacific 4. Thereare seriousstudies showing that Marxist union is not "impracticable" (MM, p. 171). In the regimes have higher military spending per capita Universal History (UH), Kant writes as if the brute than non-Marxistregimes (Payne, n.d.), but this force of physical nature drives men toward in- should not be interpretedas a sign of the inherent evitable peace. Yovel (1980, pp. 168 ff.) argues that aggressiveness of authoritarian or totalitarian from a post-critical (post-Critique of Judgment) governmentsor of the inherentand global peaceful- perspective, Perpetual Peace reconciles the two ness of liberal regimes. Marxist regimes, in par- views of history. "Nature" is human-created nature ticular, representa minority in the current inter- (culture or civilization). Perpetual peace is the "a nationalsystem; they are strategicallyencircled, and prior of the a posterior'-a critical perspective that due to theirlack of domesticlegitimacy, they might then enables us to discern causal, probabilistic pat- be said to "suffer"the twin burden of needing terns in history. Law and the "political technology" defensesagainst both externaland internalenemies. of republican constitutionalism are separate from Andreski (1980), moreover, argues that (purely) ethical development, but both interdependently lead militarydictatorships, due to theirdomestic fragili- to perpetual peace-the first through force, fear, and ty, have little incentiveto engagein foreignmilitary self-interest; the second through progressive adventures.According to WalterClemens (1982, pp. enlightenment-and both together lead to perpetual 117-18), the United States intervenedin the Third peace through the widening of the circumstances in World more than twice as often during the period which engaging in right conduct poses smaller and 1946-1976 as the Soviet Union did in 1946-79. smaller burdens. Relatedly,Posen and VanEvera(1980, p. 105; 1983, 9. For a comparative discussion of the political pp. 86-89) found that the UnitedStates devoted one foundations of Kant's ideas, see Shklar (1984, pp. quarterand the Soviet Union one tenth of their 232-38). defensebudgets to forces designedfor ThirdWorld interventions(where responding to perceivedthreats would presumablyhave a less than purelydefensive References character). 5. All citations from Kant are from Kant's Andreski, Stanislav. 1980. On the Peaceful Dis- Political Writings(Kant, 1970), the H. B. Nisbet position of Military Dictatorships. Journal of translationedited by Hans Reiss. The works dis- Strategic Studies, 3:3-10. cussedand the abbreviationsby which they are iden- Armstrong, A. C. 1931. Kant's Philosophy of Peace tified in the text are as follows: and War. The Journal of Philosophy, 28:197-204. PP PerpetualPeace (1795) Aron, Raymond. 1966. Peace and War: A Theory of UH The Idea for a UniversalHistory with a . Richard Howard and CosmopolitanPurpose (1784) , trans. Garden City, NY: CF The Contestof Faculties(1798) Doubleday. MM The Metaphysicsof Morals(1797) Aron, Raymond. 1974. The Imperial Republic. 6. I think Kant meant that the peace would be Frank Jellinek, trans. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: establishedamong liberal regimes and would expand Prentice Hall. by ordinarypolitical and legal meansas new liberal Babst, Dean V. 1972. A Force for Peace. Industrial regimesappeared. By a processof gradualextension Research. 14 (April): 55-58. the peace would becomeglobal and then perpetual; Banks, Arthur, and William Overstreet, eds. 1983. the occasionfor wars with nonliberalswould disap- A Political Handbook of the World; 1982-1983. pear as nonliberalregimes disappeared. New York: McGraw Hill. 7. Kant'sfoedus pacificumis thus neithera pac- Barnet, Richard. 1968. Intervention and Revolution. tum pacis (a single peace treaty) nor a civitas gen- Cleveland: World Publishing Co. tium (a world state). He appearsto have anticipated Brzezinski, Zbigniew, and Samuel Huntington. something like a less formally institutionalized 1963. Political Power: USA/USSR. New York: League of Nations or United Nations. One could Viking Press. arguethat in practice,these two institutionsworked Carnesale, Albert, Paul Doty, Stanley Hoffmann, for liberalstates and only for liberalstates, but no Samuel Huntington, Joseph Nye, and Scott specifically liberal "pacific union" was institu- Sagan. 1983. Living With Nuclear Weapons. tionalized.Instead, liberal states have behaved for New York. Bantam. the past 180 years as if such a Kantianpacific union Chan, Steve. 1984. Mirror, Mirror on the Wall...: and treaty of perpetualpeace had been signed. Are Freer Countries More Pacific? Journal of 8. In the Metaphysicsof Morals(the Rechtslehre) Conflict Resolution, 28:617-48. Kant seems to write as if perpetualpeace is only an Clemens, Walter C. 1982. The and the epistemologicaldevice and, while an ethicalduty, is Third World. In Charles Kegley and Pat

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Michael Doyle is Assistant Professorof Political Science, JohnsHopkins University, Baltimore,MD 21218.

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