Contemplation of Mutual Identity Theory in Chinese Buddhism*
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Contemplation of Mutual Identity Theory in Chinese Buddhism* Ae Soon Chang (Ven. Kye Hwan)1 Abstract While many scholars consider pratītyasamutpādavāda (緣起論, The theory of Dependent Arising) as the basic thought of Buddhism, it is possible to say that Ji (卽) is the main logic which is necessarily derived from this pratītyasamutpādavāda thought. Meanwhile, in order to construct logic of Ji, the inconsistency which stands on the basis of śūnyatā (空, emptiness) must be resolved first. Besides this, the reason why Huayan’s Ji gets involved with others (相卽相入) in the Dharma Realm of non-obstruction of particular-phenomena and particular-phenomena (事事無碍法界) is that it tides over (超克) being functioned by the negative catalyst of śūnyatā. Ae Soon Chang is a professor of Department of Buddhist studies at Dongguk Univ. (Seoul), Korea. ([email protected]) * This study is supported by Brain Korea 21 Buddhist Studies in a Global Era, Dongguk Univ. This article is a abridged version of “Contemplation on ‘Mutual Ji Theory’ in Chinese Buddhism” listed in the Hanguk Bulgyohak: Journal of Korean Association for Buddhist Studies, vol. 30, pp. 51‒72. (Seoul: 2001) International Journal of Buddhist Thought & Culturer February 2012, vol. 18, pp. 25‒46. ⓒ 2012 International Association for Buddhist Thought & Culture The day of submission: 2011.12.12 / Completion of review: 2012.1.4 / Final decision for acceptance: 2012.1.15 26 Ae Soon Chang (Ven. Kye Hwan): Contemplation of Mutual Identity Theory in Chinese Buddhism So firstly, from this point of view, I intend to find an example of how Ji (卽) is translated and investigate what aspect of previous logics it criticizes through Jizang’s Mutual Identity Theory of the Absolute Truth and Conventional Truth (二諦相卽論, Erdixiangjilun). And secondly, I intend to investigate the original meanings of Ji mainly through the writings of Fazang and also investigate the true nature of Ji in Huayan doctrines and how and why it utilizes Ji. By doing so, I finally intend to supplement previous studies and at the same time, through contemplation of Mutual Ji Theory (相卽論), I intend to investigate the true ideal : the viewpoint of truth (眞理觀). Namely, I mean to investigate Mutual Ji Theory which is an indispensible logical gateway when one is about to study non-obstruction of particular-phenomena and particular-phenomena (事事無碍, Shishiwoai), which is the main theory of Huayan doctrines. Key words: Chinese Buddhism, Huayan, Wujiaozhang, Fazang, Jizang. I. Introduction The concept of Ji (卽) is a very important way to express some key points of Buddhist philosophy. Its special significance is found in the way that it functions harmoniously and unobstructively, and itself composes the absolute realm in the Huayan doctrine that originated in China. Accordingly, it is thought that in one is contained within the concept of two or ten and that it is possible to derive two or ten by way of one. It is by this pathway that the relationship in which one is the same as all things (一卽一切) and all things are one (一切卽一) is established; furthermore, there come mutual identity and mutual intercausality (相卽相入), which result in this infinitely repeated (重重無盡) Dharma Realm of non-obstruction of particular-phenomena and particular-phenomena (事事無碍法界). This shows an understanding from the standpoint of dependent arising (緣起) in its every part. It has already become a widely-accepted opinion that dependent arising International Journal of Buddhist Thought & Culture 27 forms the fundamental idea of Buddhism; and from this basis we can say that the very logic of Ji is a pivotal one inevitably drawn from this idea of dependent arising. The reason why the conflictive contradiction based on emptiness (空) should be a precondition in establishing the logic of Ji, and why the ultimate goal of Huayan Ji is mutual identity and mutual intercausality in the Dharma Realm of the interpenetration of all things, is that Ji means transcending through the intermediation of conflictive contradiction among particular-phenomena (事). It was Jizang (吉藏, 549‑623) that ideologically developed the logic of Ji in Chinese Buddhism, and this monograph begins by examining in what respect the proposal of the mutual identity theory of the absolute truth and conventional truth (二諦相卽論) criticizes the previous logic. After that, it contemplates the fundamental significance of mutual identity and mutual intercausality, focusing on what is Ji in the Huayan doctrine, how Ji happens and why Ji takes place. By understanding these matters traditional studies1 could be complemented, and on the other hand, the Huayan viewpoint on truth (眞理觀) could be revealed through examining mutual identity theory; that is the final purpose of this manuscript. II. The Mutual Identity Theory of the Twofold Truth (二諦相卽論) by the Three Treatise School (三論宗) A. Pioneering the Mutual Identity Theory of the Twofold Truth The statement focusing on the “mutual identity of the twofold truth” in the second volume of the Meaning of the Twofold Truth (二諦義) written by Jizang served to make Ji come into ideological question in Chinese Buddhism. The scriptures which Jizang made the direct basis of his arguments discussing the meaning of the mutual identity of the twofold truth in the Meaning of the Twofold Truth are the Nirvāṇa Sūtra (涅槃經), the Mahāprajñāparamitā Sūtra 1 Kamekawa 1950; Sato 1954; Ishii 1989; Jang 1993. 28 Ae Soon Chang (Ven. Kye Hwan): Contemplation of Mutual Identity Theory in Chinese Buddhism (大品般若) and the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa Sūtra (維摩經). Although the examples he presented of the mutual identity of the twofold truth have the same fundamental meaning, the detailed expressions in those scriptures do not (T. 45, no. 1854, 104c). However, in Profound Questions and Answers Based on Mahayana Buddhism (大乘玄問答) Chinkai (珍海) explains this as follows: The Ji revealed by nirvāna means mutual-inclusiveness (不相離); while the Ji revealed by prajñā (般若) means sameness (卽是). We can say that there are two meanings of Ji; one is mutual-inclusiveness and the other is sameness. Therefore, the meanings disclosed by these two Sutras are not always the same. (T. 70, 573a‑c) The Ji of mutual-inclusiveness and the Ji of sameness are the description of the meaning of mutual identity (相卽義) by the masters of the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra (成實論師); this is not necessarily a unique predicate of the Three Treatise School as Chinkai said. The interpretation of the two Sutras by the Three Treatise School, which does not include conceptual distinction, just points out differences in their expressions. Besides, at the same time it could be expected that inside the dual concepts of Ji (卽) is the interpretation of the meaning of mutual identity based on these two sutras (Hirai 1976, 570). In other words, this means that in the background to the formation of the logic of Ji (卽) was the mutual identity theory of the twofold truth, which was formulated by the masters of the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra in China’s Liang dynasty (梁代) whom Jizang introduced and criticized. Then, to understand the background to the establishment of the mutual identity theory of the twofold truth we should examine how the meaning of the mutual identity of the twofold truth is explained by the masters of the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra in China’s Liang Dynasty. Jizang introduced the theories formulated by three philosophers—Sengmin (僧旻, 467‑527) of Zhuangyansi (莊嚴寺), Zhizang (智藏, 458‑523) of Kaishansi (開善寺), and Sengchuo (僧綽, unidentified) of Longguangsi (龍光 寺)—as the typical conventional meaning of mutual identity. According to International Journal of Buddhist Thought & Culture 29 Jizang’s explanation, Sengmin and Zhizang clarified that the twofold truth is one body (二諦一体), and Sengchuo made it clear that the twofold truth has a separate essence (二諦異体). Jizang went on to explain that they tried to know whether the conventional meaning of mutual identity belongs to one body (一) or a separate body (異) (T. 45, 105b). Though Jizang himself did not treat all these three theories in his Profound Theory of Mahayana (大乘玄論), he mentioned as follows: Zhizang of Kaishansi clarifies that the twofold truth (二諦) is one body (一体) and cites the Ji meaning sameness; Sengchuo of Longguangsi makes it clear that the twofold truth is name and substance (名体) and cites the Ji meaning mutual-inclusiveness (不相離). Though there are many teachers, they don’t move out of these two approaches. (T. 45, 21c) Jizang also introduced these two kinds of mutual identity theory in the Profound Meaning of the Three Treatises (三論玄義), and mentioned the theory of one body or a separate body (一·異體說) related with the twofold truth; judging from this, we could guess that these theories of the masters of the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra were featured in those days. In addition the reason for avoiding conceptual distinction allows us to get a sense of Jizang’s attitude in which he tried to discuss the mutual identity of the twofold truth from the standpoint where he took a balanced approach to the Ji meaning mutual-inclusiveness and the Ji meaning sameness; in other words, he understood them as neither one body (一) nor a separate body (異) (Hirai 1976, 571, footnote 5). B. The Influence of the Idea of Non-obstruction (無礙思想) on the Formation of the Mutual Identity of the Twofold Truth Then, what is Jizang’s own logic of mutual identity? What should be addressed before examining this is that in fact he put a high valuation on the Flower Adornment Sūtra (華嚴經) as the Sutra that reveals the fundamental viewpoint of Buddhism, though his role as a great master of the doctrine of 30 Ae Soon Chang (Ven. Kye Hwan): Contemplation of Mutual Identity Theory in Chinese Buddhism the Three Treatises (三論敎學) is so much emphasized that his relationship with the Flower Adornment Sūtra is overlooked (Kimura 1977a, 57).