Approach on Buddhist Ethics: Wŏnhyo on the Doctrinal Problem of the Buddha-Nature and the Icchantika

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“Middle Way” Approach on Buddhist Ethics: Wŏnhyo on the Doctrinal Problem of the Buddha-nature and the Icchantika

Lee Sumi

Acta Koreana, Volume 22, Number 2, December 2019, pp. 231-248 (Article)

Published by Keimyung University, Academia Koreana

For additional information about this article https://muse.jhu.edu/article/756404

[ Access provided at 27 Sep 2021 12:36 GMT with no institutional affiliation ] ACTA KOREANA Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2019: 231–248 doi:10.18399/acta.2019.22.2.002

“Middle Way” Approach on Buddhist Ethics: Wŏnhyo on the Doctrinal Problem of the Buddha-nature and the Icchantika

LEE SUMI

The Buddhist ethical concept of kuśala (C. shan 善), which is usually rendered as “wholesome” or “skillful,” has drawn significant scholarly attention. Although scholars have not reached a consensus on how to approach Buddhist ethical systems, it seems to be commonly acknowledged that the wholesome dharmas in early Buddhism are divided into two types: the wholesome dharmas on the mundane level and the wholesome dharmas on the supramundane level. According to the typical account of Buddhist soteriology, a practitioner should cultivate these two types of wholesome dharmas in order to reach the final goal of nirvāṇa. However, in Mahāyāna Buddhism, in which the division between the mundane and the supramundane sphere was ultimately denied, the distinction between the wholesome dharmas on the mundane and supramundane levels was often seen as being problematic. As a result, a philosophical problem arose concerning how to explain the doctrinal contrast between the ultimate universality and the concrete particularities. In ancient East Asia this problem emerged centering on the two conflicting notions of the Buddha-nature (Skt. buddha-dhātu, alt. tathāgatagarbha, C. foxing 佛性), the universal spiritual capability innate in all sentient beings, and the icchantikas (C. yichanti 一闡提), “incorrigibles,” those who are devoid of the capability (or, the wholesome dharmas) to attain Buddhahood. This article discusses the philosophical conundrum entailed from doctrinal incompatibility between the universal capability to become a Buddha and the beings who lack the wholesome dharmas by examining the Silla scholar monk Wŏnhyo’s 元曉 (617–686) understanding of the four antinomies (Skt. catuṣkoṭi, C. siju 四句) on the Buddha-nature of the Nirvāṇa Sutra.

LEE SUMI ([email protected]) is HK Research Professor in the Academy of Buddhist Studies, Dongguk University, Korea. 232 Acta Koreana, Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2019

Key words: Buddhist Ethics, Buddha-nature, icchantika, Wŏnhyo 元曉 (617– 686), the Nirvāṇa Sutra

In Buddhism the ethical concept of “wholesome” (Skt. kuśala, C. shan 善) is generally discussed in association with the final soteriological goal. In early Indian Buddhism, to attain liberation from the cycle of rebirth (Skt. saṃsāra, C. lunhui 輪廻), a practitioner should cultivate two types of wholesome dharmas: first, the wholesome dharmas on the mundane (Skt.loka , C. shijian 世間) level and, next, the wholesome dharmas on the supramundane (Skt. lokottara, C. chu shijian 出世間) level.1 By cultivating the wholesome dharmas of the mundane level, practitioners receive a good reward, such as good rebirth among the six destinies (Skt. ṣaḍgati, C. liuqu 六趣); once in a favorable condition, they proceed to conduct the wholesome dharmas on the supramundane level, which will ultimately lead them to the final goal of nirvāṇa. However, the mundane and the supramundane wholesome dharmas do not represent the entire scope of the Buddhist ethical concept of “the wholesome dharma,” or the dharmas that are characterized as wholesome. In Mahāyāna Buddhism the notion of a “sphere beyond the supramundane” (C. chu chu shijian 出出世間) emerged, fundamentally transcending the division between the mundane and the supramundane sphere.2 In terms of Buddhist soteriology, the concept of the wholesome dharma beyond the supramundane sphere accordingly appeared—the wholesome dharmas that transcend the distinction between the mundane and the supramundane sphere. According to the typical account of the early Indian Buddhist soteriology, a practitioner cultivates the mundane and the supramundane wholesome dharmas throughout numerous life times to reach the ultimate goal of nirvāṇa.3 By contrast, the

1 For instance, in his book on the bodhipakkhiyā dhammā (Skt. bodhipākṣikadharma, C. daopin 道品 or putifenfa 菩提分法), Rupert Gethin discusses in detail that the early Buddhist texts, including the Pāli Nikāyas, the Abhidhamma, and the commentaries, coherently concern with the process whereby the ‘ordinary’ (lokiya), unawakened mind, transforms itself into the ‘world transcending’ (lokuttara), awakened mind, through various types of meditative practice (Gethin 2001 [1992], 6). 2 For instance, in the She dasheng lun 攝大乘論, Paramārtha’s translation of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha-śāstra by Asaṅga (c. fourth century), “the wholesome dharma of the sphere beyond the supramundane” (C. chuchushi shanfa 出出世善法) appears (T1593:31.131c08), and, in the Shedashenglun shi 攝大乘論釋, Paramārtha’s translation of the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha-bhāṣya by Vasubandhu (c. fourth century), it is stated, “While the wholesome [dharmas] of the two vehicles are called as supramundane [wholesome dharmas], [those] on the eighth stage through the stage of Buddhahood as [the wholesome dharmas] beyond the supramundane sphere. The supramundane dharmas are prescribed in respect to the mundane dharmas; the dharmas beyond the supramundane sphere are prescribed in respect to the supramundane dharmas” 論曰：出出世善法功能所生, 釋曰: 二乘善名出世，從八地已上乃至佛地名出出世. 出世法為世法對治，出出世法為出世法對治 (Shedashenglun shi T1595:31.263b07–10). 3 While the spiritual transformation from the mundane to the supramundane is generally accepted as the soteriological scheme of the early Buddhism, there is some research that calls this view into question. In his book on the notion of diṭṭhi, or ‘view,’ in Theravāda Buddhism, Paul Fuller introduces two types of understanding of diṭṭhi in line with the general account of the two types of wholesome dharmas in early Buddhism, namely, “the opposition understanding of views,” according to which right view stands in opposition to wrong view, and “the no-views understanding of views,” in which right view is equated with no-view. Fuller ultimately denies this distinction and argues that “the attainment of right-view and the practicing of no-view amount to the same thing,” since “the consequence of achieving right-view is that one does not hold any views.” By indicating that Lee: “Middle Way” Approach on Buddhist Ethics 233 distinction between these two phases of cultivation is often ignored in Mahāyāna Buddhism. It is often stated such that the birth-and-death is none other than nirvāṇa (C. shengsi ji niepan 生死即涅槃); that the defilement is none other than the enlightenment (C.fannao ji puti 煩惱即菩提); or that one becomes a Buddha upon seeing one’s own nature (C. jianxing chengfo 見性成佛), suggesting that the enlightenment can be attained even at this very moment in present lifetime.4 As it is regarded that an ordinary being is not different from the Buddha, or the samsaric world is not distinguished from nirvāṇa, the wholesome dharmas are sometimes not regarded as what should be cultivated to accomplish the soteriological goal. Instead, the idea comes to the fore that every sentient being is already endowed with the Buddha-nature (Skt. buddha-dhātu, alt. tathāgatagarbha, C. foxing 佛性), the spiritual capability to become a Buddha. In other words, the ultimate goal of the enlightenment or the Buddhahood is not considered what is attained by cultivating the wholesome dharmas, but what is already inherent in all sentient beings. In this sense, the Buddha-nature may be said as a new type of wholesome dharma in the Mahāyāna worldview beyond the supramundane sphere.5 According to this Mahāyāna view, nirvāṇa also is not an object remote from the present world, but may be experienced anywhere and anytime—whether it be the mundane or the supramundane realm. This concept of nirvāṇa is well known as “nirvāṇa of no-abiding” (Skt. apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇa, C. wuzhu[chu] niepan 無住[處]涅槃).6

right view is not simply another view opposed to wrong view, nor is it the rejection of all views, but apprehend- ing things without attachments, Fuller also makes an important point that right view is not a type of proposition, which are adopted or believed in, but “a different order of seeing,” which should be practiced. This understanding of right view seems to be addressing some features of right view beyond the supramundane level, in that right view is described as transcending the distinction between “the opposition understanding of views” and “the no-views understanding of views,” or the mundane level of right view and the supramundane level of right view. It may be said that although the soteriological scheme of early Buddhism may appear in these two levels, the supramundane elements were inherent in it and thus the distinction between the two levels may be seen as not viable from the ultimate perspective (Fuller 2005). 4 The birth-and-death and nirvāṇa are identified to each other in such Mahāyāna texts as the Laṅkāvatāra Sutra (Lengqie abatuoluo aojing 楞伽阿跋多羅寶經 T672:16.597a15–17), the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra (Dasheng zhuangyan jinglun 大乘莊嚴經論 T1604:31.599a02), and Paramārtha’s translation of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha-śāstra (She dasheng lun T. 1593:31.129b27–29). For the passages, in which defilements are identified to the enlightenment, see the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra (Dasheng zhuangyan jinglun T1604:31.622b12–13). The phrase that one becomes a Buddha upon seeing one’s own nature (C. jianxing chengfo 見性成佛), one of the well-known Chan phrases, is generally attributed to the school’s putative founder Bodhidharma 菩提達磨 (c. late-fourth to early-fifth centuries), and included in such a text as Huangbo Xiyun’s 黃檗希運 (?–850) Chuanxin fayao 傳心法要 (T2012:48.384a05–06) together with another phrase, “directly point to one’s mind” (C. zhizhi renxin 直指人心). 5 In fact, it is stated in the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra, that “the Buddha-nature is the wholesome [dharma]” 一闡提等無有善法，佛性亦善，以未來有故一闡提等悉有佛性 (Dabanniepan jing T374:12.524c02–04); 世尊！一闡提輩不斷佛性，佛性亦善，云何說言斷一切善？(Dabanniepan jing T374:12.562c20–22). What should also be noted is that, in the latter part of the Sutra, it is said that when the unsurpassed perfect enlightenment is not yet attained, not only the wholesome dharmas but also the unwholesome dharmas and the indeterminate (C. wuji 無記, Skt. avyākṛta) dharmas are all called as the Buddha-nature (未得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提時，一切善、不善、無記，盡名佛性 [Dabanniepan jing T374:12.580c11–13]). This suggests that the Buddha-nature does not merely refer to a new type of wholesome dharma, but has further connotation, which encompass all three kinds of dharmas, including such seemingly contradictory concepts as the wholesome dharmas and the unwholesome dharmas. More discussion will be following below as regards to the significance of the Buddha-nature. 6 The nirvāṇa of no-abiding is generally introduced in the Mahāyāna literature as one of the four types of nirvāṇa, 234 Acta Koreana, Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2019

However, the emergence of transcendent concepts, such as the sphere beyond the supramundane or the Buddha-nature, entailed a philosophical concern. Although this notion of the sphere beyond the supramundane presented comprehensive vision that encompasses both the mundane and the supramundane sphere, the question of how to explain the universal feature along with the practical differences that still remain between the two spheres. In East Asia, where the notion of Buddha-nature was influential throughout the tradition, disputes occurred revolving around the doctrinal contrast between the notion of Buddha-nature, which is universally inherent in sentient beings, and the practical differences of sentient beings in their spiritual capacity.7 In this context, the concept of universal Buddha-nature was regarded contradictory to the notion of icchantika (C. yichanti 一闡提), “incorrigibles” who are devoid of the spiritual capability to become a Buddha. This article explores the philosophical conundrum involved with the doctrinal incompatibility between the two soteriological notions of the universally inherent spiritual capability and the particularly cultivated wholesome dharmas, by focusing on the concepts of Buddha-nature and icchantika. I shall first overview the typical account in early Indian Buddhism of the wholesome dharmas in gradual soteriological scheme, then present the Mahāyāna concept of Buddha-nature and its philosophical problem, and finally observe how Silla scholar-monk Wŏnhyo 元曉 (617–686) resolves the doctrinal conflict between the Buddha-nature and icchantika by examining his explanation of the four antinomies (Skt. catuṣkoṭi, C. siju 四句) on these two concepts, presented in his commentary of the Nirvāṇa Sutra, the Yŏlban chongyo 涅槃宗要.

Wholesome Dharmas on Mundane and Supramundane Level

Scholars present various views on Buddhist ethics. Some divide Buddhist ethics into two incompatible systems based on the dichotomy between “karmatic Buddhism” practiced by lay people and “nirvanic Buddhism” of priests, and regard the accumulation of good karma of the karmatic Buddhism as a mere instrument, which should ultimately be transcended in the nirvanic Buddhism (Spiro 1971). Others interpret Buddhist ethics in the frame of Western ethical theory, such as Aristotelian virtue ethics, arguing that the reason why good actions in Buddhism are defined as such is because they have intrinsic qualities ofnirvā ṇa and in this sense

along with the nirvāṇa with remainder (Skt. sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇa, C. youyu niepan 有餘涅槃), the nirvāṇa without remainder (Skt. anupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa or nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa, C. wuyu niepan 無餘涅槃), and the nirvāṇa of the originally pure self-nature (C. benlai zixing qingjing niepan 本來自性淸淨涅槃), and regarded as a feature of bodhisattvas, who do not see the difference between the birth-and-death and nirvāṇa. The texts that discuss the nirvāṇa of no- abiding include the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha-bhāṣya (Shedashenglun shi T1595:31.247b02–06); the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi- śāstra (Cheng weishi lun T1585:31.55b07–19); the Madhyāntavibhāga (Zhongbian fenbie lun T1599:31.453b15–16); and the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra (Dasheng zhuangyan jinglun T1604:31.598b14–15). Besides, the Mahāprajñāpāramitā -sūtra also says that all bodhisattvas reside in neither the birth-and-death nor nirvāṇa (Da bore boluomiduo jing T220:07.1106c06–21). 7 This controversial situation in ancient East Asia is generally known as “Buddha-nature controversy.” I shall discuss it in more detail soon below. Lee: “Middle Way” Approach on Buddhist Ethics 235 they are distinguished from other “moral” actions that are not motivated by the nirvanic virtue (Keown 1992). Others argue that Buddhist ethics cannot be reduced into a Western ethical theory, by dividing good actions in Buddhism into two types, “instrumental actions,” which are non-nirvanic but still good because they lead to favorable conditions for cultivating nirvanic virtues, and “teleological actions,” which have nirvanic virtues (Velez de Cea 2004). Although Buddhist ethics has been approached from various perspectives, the common presumption adopted by all these scholars is that wholesome actions are explained in two types depending on whether they are directly related to the ultimate goal of nirvāṇa. One type of wholesome actions is identified as such in the sense that they produce good consequences, or merits. This type of actions stand in opposition to the unwholesome actions, which entail unfavorable or bad consequences. However, these wholesome actions do not directly lead a practitioner to the ultimate goal of nirvāṇa. In other words, these actions are defined as wholesome or meritorious just within the karmic law. The favorable results generated from these actions mainly come in the form of a happy rebirth within the samsaric world, often along with other salutary conditions such as material wealth, physical soundness, and so on. However, these actions, in which an individual’s attachment, consciously or not, is involved, are characterized as karmic because they bring about corresponding consequences within saṃsāra. Thus, this type of wholesome actions cannot be called “wholesome” from the higher perspective beyond the karmic law. By contrast, the other type of wholesome actions constitutes a crucial condition for a practitioner to proceed to the goal of nirvāṇa. These actions are not originated from on an individual’s attachment, for example, out of one’s desire of attaining a specific reward including nirvāṇa, but naturally performed by the practitioner who have reached a certain spiritual level beyond the samsaric world. In other words, a practitioner of this level cultivates these wholesome actions without any attachment. Thus these actions are not karmas that entail certain types of consequence within saṃsāra; on the basis of these actions a practitioner may be liberated from saṃsāra. In fact, the two types of good actions presented by these modern scholars— the “karmically good” actions and the “nirvanically good” actions—exactly parallel Buddhist notions of the mundane wholesome [dharma] and the supramundane wholesome [dharma], or the contaminated wholesome [dharma] (Skt. sāsrava-kuśala, C. youlou shan 有漏善) and the uncontaminated wholesome [dharma] (Skt. anāsrava-kuśala, C. wulou shan 無漏善).8 The contaminated wholesome dharmas include various types of wholesome actions, such as the five precepts (Skt. pañcaśīla, C. wujie 五戒) and the ten wholesome courses of action (Skt. kuśalakarmapatha, C. shanyedao 善業道), which are generally regarded as what should be conducted by ordinary beings (Skt. pṛthagjana, C. fanfu 凡夫) in saṃsāra. By practicing this type of wholesome dharmas, the practitioner is rewarded with wholesome karmic results in present or later life. By contrast, the uncontaminated wholesome dharmas, or the

8 In the Dazhidu lun (Skt. *Māhāprājñāpāramitā-śāstra/*Mahāprajñāpāramitopedeśa), for instance, the contaminated dharma and the uncontaminated dharma are described as the mundane dharma and supramundane dharma respectively. According to the passage, the former is possessed both by ordinary beings and Buddhist saints, while the latter only by the saints (Dazhidu lun T1509:25.483c19–27). 236 Acta Koreana, Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2019 supramundane wholesome dharmas, refer to spiritually higher level of wholesome actions, such as the thirty-seven factors pertaining to enlightenment (Skt. bodhipākṣikadharma, C. daopin 道品 or putifenfa 菩提分法), or the six perfections (Skt. pāramitā, C. boluomi 波羅蜜), which are conductible only by Buddhist saints (Skt. ārya, C. shengren 聖人), not by ordinary beings. This type of uncontaminated wholesome dharmas does not cause any, even good, karmic result, but serves as the basis on which a practitioner becomes liberated from saṃsāra. According to the soteriological scheme based on the contaminated and the uncontaminated dharmas, a Buddhist practitioner should conduct the mundane and supramundane wholesome dharmas to reach the highest goal. By practicing the wholesome actions of the mundane sphere, an individual is rewarded with wholesome results, such as a good rebirth, which serves as the significant condition for the practitioner’s path toward nirvāṇa. Especially, a good rebirth may be seen crucial for the process of the path, because the practitioner can proceed to practice the supramundane wholesome actions only when the mundane conditions are good enough. However, the mundane wholesome actions, which are the contaminated dharmas involved in samsaric cycle, cannot lead the practitioner to the liberation. For instance, a practitioner’s observance of the five precepts out of his/her desire for reaching nirvāṇa is none other than a karmic action that causes a karmic consequence within saṃsāra. The mundane wholesome actions/dharmas are “good” just to the extent that their karmic results—such as a rebirth in human or heavenly realm—provides the preliminary, yet crucial, condition that makes possible the next-step cultivation of the supramundane wholesome actions/dharmas. In order to break out of the closed cycle of birth-and-death of the mundane world, a practitioner should first cultivate the contaminated wholesome dharmas of the mundane realm and proceed to practice the uncontaminated wholesome dharmas of the supramundane sphere.9 However, Mahāyāna Buddhism takes a remarkable turn along with the introduction of the concept of “sphere beyond the supramundane,” as I shall discuss in the next section below.

9 The Buddhist ethical theory that deploys the transitional process from the mundane to supramundane cultivation is well presented in Vaibhāṣika Abidharma school’s soteriological schema, which is explained in terms of the threefold typology of “roots of goodness” or “wholesome roots” (Skt. kuśalamūla, C. shangen 善根), that is, the wholesome faculties of a practitioner depending on the spiritual level achieved. The first class, “wholesome roots associated with merit” (Skt. puṇyabhāgīya-kuśalamūla, C. shun fufen shangen 順福分善根), are attained by conducting good actions, such as the five precepts (Skt. pañcaśīla; C. wujie 五戒) or the ten good actions (Skt. kuśala-karmapatha; C. shanyedao 善業道). This class of wholesome roots are rewarded with merits such as fortune rebirth in the realm of humans or heavenly divinities among the six destinies. The second class of “wholesome roots associated with liberation” (Skt. mokṣabhāgīya-kuśalamūla, C. shun jietuo fen shangen 順解脫分善根) is associated with various elements that eventually lead a practitioner to liberation or the truth of the path (Skt. mārgasatya; C. daodi 道諦). Third, the “wholesome roots associated with penetration” (Skt. nirvedhabhāgīya-kuśalamūla, C. shun jueze fen shangen 順決擇分善根) refers to the four constituent stages, which are also well known as the four wholesome faculties (Skt. catvāri kuśalamūlāni, C. shi shangen 四善根): heat (Skt. ūṣman, C. nuan 煖), summit (Skt. mūrdhan, C. ding 頂), receptivity (Skt. kṣānti, C. renru 忍辱), and highest worldly dharmas (Skt. laukikāgradharma, C. shidiyifa 世第一法). Upon achieving these four faculties in order, the practitioner starts to recognize the uncontaminated wisdom (Skt. anāsrava-jñāna, C. wulou zhi 無漏智) and enters into the path of vision (Skt. darśanamārga, C. jiandao 見道), the first moment of sanctity. The step-by-step description of wholesome roots in the soteriological system of Vaibhāṣika school represents a typical account of gradual cultivation of the mundane through the supramundane good toward nirvāṇa (Buswell and Lopez 2014, Kindle Locations 34736–34747). Lee: “Middle Way” Approach on Buddhist Ethics 237

Transcendental Wholesome Dharmas and the Icchantika

Mahāyāna Buddhism is marked by its transcendental teaching. As is represented in the famous phrase from the Heart Sutra: “Form is none other than emptiness; emptiness is none other than form” (Skt. yad rūpaṃ sā śūnyatā yā śūnyatā tad rūpam, C. se jishi kong kong jishi se 色卽是空空卽是色), the mundane world is not different from the supramundane world, and vice versa, in Mahāyāna perspective. As form and emptiness are non-dual, the division between the mundane and the supramundane sphere is ultimately denied. As a consequence, the universal quality that transcends the differences of the two spheres is noted as a unique feature of Mahāyāna Buddhism. As the emphasis is placed on the universal quality of Mahāyāna Buddhism, however, doctrinal problems also arise: How can the two seemingly opposed notions of universality and particularity be compatible? If the mundane sphere and the supramundane sphere are non-dual, or if saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are not distinct from each other, then why the mundane world is full of suffering and numerous sentient beings are still in delusion? Similar questions may be also raised in terms of Buddhist soteriology. In particular, these questions were proposed in East Asian Buddhist tradition when the notion of Buddha-nature was introduced through the Nirvāṇa Sutra.10 Just as the transcendental logic of Mahāyāna Buddhism refused to discriminate between the mundane and supramundane spheres, the notion of Buddha-nature was sometimes used as doctrinal basis for negation of various types of discriminations represented in conventional moralism. While the universal nature of Buddha-nature worked as an encouragement to all beings in pursing the soteriological path on the one hand, it obscured the practical distinction of spiritual levels between those whose wholesome roots are all cut off (Skt. samucchinnakuśalamūla, C. duanshangen[ren] 斷善根[人]) and those who maintain them (Skt. kuśalamūla, C. shangen[ren] 善根[人]) on the other hand.11

10 The Nirvāṇa Sutra is one of the representative sutras that discuss the Buddha-nature as the main tenet. In a passage of the Nirvāṇa Sutra, the Buddha-nature is described in contrast to the wholesome roots, as follows: “The wholesome root is divided into two types: the internal and external [wholesome root]. The Buddha-nature is neither internal nor external, and therefore the Buddha-nature is incessant. Again, [the wholesome root] has two kinds: contaminated and uncontaminated. The Buddha-nature is neither contaminated nor uncontaminated, and therefore it is incessant. Again, [the wholesome root] has two kinds: permanent and impermanent. [However,] the Buddha-nature is neither permanent nor impermanent, and thereby it is incessant” 善根有二種：一者內，二者外。佛性非內非外，以是義故，佛性不斷。復有二種: 一者有漏，二者無漏。佛性非有漏，非無漏，是故不斷。復有二種: 一者常，二者無常。佛性非常，非無常，是故不斷 (Dabanniepan jing T374:12.493c27–a02). 11 The concept of Buddha-nature is known as a Mahāyāna notion, but it seems that an initial form of the idea was already embedded in the early Buddhist texts. For we sometimes see passages deviated from the typical expla- nations in the early Buddhist soteriology of arhats as superior to those whose wholesome roots are eradicated. In the essay on the problem of eradication of the wholesome roots, Robert E. Buswell introduces unique passages in the Vibhāṣa, in which arhats are described as inferior to those whose wholesome roots are eradicated (Buswell, Jr 1992, 116–17). This suggests that the typical gradual or hierarchical scheme of soteriology was sometimes dismissed in the early Buddhism and the preliminary idea of equality between sentient beings with different soteriological capabilities was implicit in the early Buddhism. In this regard, it is also noteworthy that Indian Buddhist ethics is “overwhelmingly positive” to the extent that even the most serious sins, such as five sins of immediate retribution, do not have permanent effects and will be expiated in the long run (Silk 2007). This also suggests that all sentient beings, including those who are morally the worst, has the spiritual potential 238 Acta Koreana, Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2019

In other words, the logic of transcendence provided the appealing idea that sentient beings are “equal” in that they all have the spiritual capacity to become a Buddha, but in practice sentient beings are not Buddhas as they are. In East Asia controversies arose surrounding the problem of how to explain the doctrinal gap between the Buddha-nature, which transcends all distinct spiritual levels, and the actual spiritual differences of those who have wholesome roots. The doctrinal contradiction was particularly noted between the concepts of Buddha- nature and icchantika, since the universal character of the Buddha-nature was contradictory to the notion of icchantikas, those who lack the capacity to become a Buddha.12 It was one of major tasks given to the contemporary East Asian Buddhist exegetes to explain the seeming contradiction. This doctrinal conflict between the concepts of Buddha-nature and icchantikas was involved with a polemic situation known as ‘Buddha-nature controversy.’ When the famous pilgrim Xuanzang 玄奘 (602–664) translated new corpus of Buddhist literatures that he brought from India, the doctrine of “five distinct [spiritual] lineages” (Skt. pañcagotra, C. wozhong xing 五種性)13 addressed in such Yogācāra texts as the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (C. Yuqieshidi lun 瑜伽師地論) and the *Buddhabhūmi-śāstra (C. Fodijing lun 佛地經論) turned out contradictory to the notion of universal Buddha-nature of the Nirvāṇa Sutra. Especially, “no [spiritual] lineage” (Skt. *agotra, C. wuxing zhongxing 無性種性), the fifth among the five lineages, was considered to contradictory to the doctrine of universal Buddha-nature. Those who focused on the universality of Buddha-nature on the basis of the Nirvāṇa Sutra interpreted the icchantikas as those who lost the spiritual capability only for temporal time. They argued in this regard that all sentient beings, including those who cut off the wholesome roots, eventually achieve Buddhahood.14 On the contrary, those who defended the doctrine of the five spiritual lineages identified the group of no lineage, the fifth of the five lineages, with the icchantikas.15

to reach the goal. 12 Chinese monk Daosheng 道生 (355–434) is famous for his claim that all sentient beings, including even icchantikas, attain Buddhahood, unlike the theory described in the Dabannihuan jing 大般泥洹經 (418), which was the first and only known Chinese translation by Faxian 法顯 (d. 418–423) of the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa Sutra of that time. Daosheng was expelled from the saṃgha due to this claim, but, after Dharmakṣema (385–433) translated the sutra in a full version into the Dabanniepan jing 大般涅槃經 (421) in forty fascicles, Daosheng’s argument was vindicated, because the newly translated part included the declaration that icchantikas also could be saved. For more biographical information of Daosheng, see (Liebenthal 1955). 13 The five spiritual lineages are as follows: (1)Śrāvaka lineage (Skt. śrāvaka-gotra, C. shengwen zhongxing 聲聞種性), (2) Pratyekabuddha lineage (Skt. pratyekabuddha-gotra, C. dujue zhongxing 獨覺種性), (3) Tathāgata lineage (Skt. tathāgata- gotra, C. rulai zhongxing 如來種性), (4) indeterminate lineage (Skt. aniyata-gotra, C. buding zhongxing 不定種性), and (5) no lineage (Skt. *agotra, C. wuxing zhongxing 無性種性). 14 For example, Fabao 法寶 (ca. 627–705), who is known to have participated in Xuanzang’s translation project, argues in his commentary of the Nirvāṇa Sutra that the icchantikas eventually attain the Buddhahood. For detailed information, see (Kuge 1973). 15 Ji 基 (632–682; alt. Kuiji 窺基) is one of the most influential exegetes who advocated the theory of five spiritual lineages. He is the de-facto founder of the Dharma Characteristics School (C. Faxiang zong 法相宗), which is the Chinese equivalent of the Indian Yogācāra school. Ji argued for three types of icchantikas, including one who are eternally devoid of the capability to reach nirvāṇa. For detailed information, see (Yoshimura 2009, 310–296). Lee: “Middle Way” Approach on Buddhist Ethics 239

Interestingly, the concept of icchantikas makes its earliest appearance in the Nirvāṇa Sutra—the very scripture that declares the universality of the Buddha-nature. In fact, the descriptions of icchantikas in the Nirvāṇa Sutra are not consistent. The general consensus is that the Nirvāṇa Sutra consists of three parts depending on the sutra’s position toward icchantikas. For instance, in chapters one through five of theDabanniepan jing 大般涅槃經, Dharmakṣema’s (385–433) translation of Mahāparinirvāṇa Sutra (T374), icchantikas are portrayed as those whose wholesome roots have been completely eradicated; in chapters six to nine, icchantikas are referred to as those who never attain the Buddhahood on the one hand or those who are susceptible to good influences on the other; in chapters ten to thirteen, theicchantikas are described as those who possess the capacity for future enlightenment (Liu 1984, 57–81).16 Scholars suggest that the inconsistency of the Nirvāṇa Sutra in its description of the icchantikas may be the result from the fact that the Nirvāṇa Sutra is a compilation of several separate texts. However, even if the textual inconsistency of the Nirvāṇa Sutra may be explained as a feature of a complied work, it is still worthwhile asking why these doctrines were collected in a single text. One thing that should be noted in this regard is that the inconsistent statements on the icchantikas appear not just in different chapters or contexts, but also all at once in one context in a form of four antinomies (Skt. catuṣkoṭi, C. siju 四句). In other words, it seems very likely that the seemingly conflicting statements were purposefully adopted by the compiler or author of the sutra, who wished to deliver some specific message to the readers. In the following section, I shall discuss how the logical conundrum involved in the four antinomies on the relation between the Buddha-nature and icchantikas was interpreted by Silla Buddhist exegete Wŏnhyo 元曉 (617–686)

Wŏnhyo’s Interpretation of Buddha-nature as the Middle Way

In the chapter of Bodhisattva Kāśyapa (C. Jiayepusa pin 迦葉菩薩品) of the Nirvāṇa Sutra, a set of four antinomies is stated to treat the matter of whether or not the icchantikas and/or those of the wholesome roots possess Buddha-nature, as follows:

[1] In some cases the Buddha-nature is possessed by the icchantikas, but not by those who have the wholesome roots; [2] in some cases the Buddha-nature is possessed by those who have the wholesome roots, but not by the icchantikas. [3] In some cases the Buddha-nature is possessed by both; [4] in some cases the Buddha-nature is possessed by neither of them.17

In this passage, the Buddha-nature is divided into four types: Buddha-nature possessed only by the icchantikas, Buddha-nature possessed only by those having wholesome roots;

16 For more discussion of the icchantika in various contexts of the Nirvāṇa Sutra, see (Shimoda 1997, 461–84). 17 善男子！或有佛性一闡提有，善根人無。或有佛性善根人有，一闡提無。或有佛性，二人俱有。或有佛性，二人俱無 (Dabanniepan jing T374:12.574c04–07). 240 Acta Koreana, Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2019

Buddha-nature possessed by both of them; Buddha-nature possessed by neither of them. At first glance, this passage includes phrases that represent not only incommensurate, but also inconsistent doctrinal positions. The first and forth phrases appear theoretically improbable, because it is stated that those of the wholesome roots do not possess the Buddha-nature in despite of the doctrinal affinity between the wholesome roots and the Buddha-nature. Moreover, in the first phrase it is even stated that only by the icchantikas, not those of the wholesome roots, possess the Buddha-nature. In the second and third phrases the Buddha- nature is depicted as being possessed by those having wholesome roots. The second phrase that those having wholesome roots only possess the Buddha-nature seems to accord with the position of the doctrine of five distinct lineages, because in both cases the Buddha-nature is regarded as possessed by not the icchantikas, but only by those having wholesome roots. By contrast, the third phrase, in which not only those having wholesome roots but also the icchantikas are said to possess the Buddha-nature, resonates with the position that the Buddha- nature is universal to all sentient beings regardless of their spiritual differences. Regardless of all these contradictions and improbabilities between the four phrases, this passage is stated as the Buddha’s words in the Nirvāṇa Sutra. In this regard, these antinomies may be seen as a typical example to represent the author/complier’s intentional inconsistency. Wŏnhyo paid attention to this passage of the Nirvāṇa Sutra18 when the doctrinal antagonism emerged between those who advocated the five spiritual lineages and those who defended the universal Buddha-nature. In this polemic atmosphere, Wŏnhyo sought to interpret the four antinomies by drawing on both of the doctrinal positions. Wŏnhyo divides the four antinomies into two types of approach. The first two phrases are interpreted as representing the doctrine of the five lineages, and named as “the approach of dependence” (K. ŭijimun 依持門), whereas the latter two drawing on the universal Buddha-nature theory, named as “the approach of dependence arising” (K. yŏn’gimun 緣起門). Then he goes on to explain each of the phrases, as follows:

As for the first meaning,19 for the purpose of manifesting two types of approach [the Buddha] stated the four antinomies. What does it mean? In the first two phrases the five lineages are taught by the “approach of dependence” (K. ŭijimun 依持門); in the latter two, the Buddha-nature on the level of cause and the Buddha-nature of on the level of

18 Before Wŏnhyo, several commentators, such as Sengliang 僧亮 (c. fifth century), Sengzong 僧宗 (438–496), Baoliang 寶亮 (444–509), Daolang 道朗 (c. fourth to fifth century), Falang 法朗 (507–581), Jingying Huiyuan 淨影慧遠 (523–592), Guanding 灌頂 (561–632), also noted the four antinomies of the Nirvāṇa Sutra. However, their interpretations of the Buddha-nature in the four antinomies are distinct from Wŏnhyo’s, because they interpreted it only from the perspective of the doctrine of Buddha-nature, whereas Wŏnhyo explains it by depending on both doctrines of the Buddha-nature and the five distinct lineages, as will be discussed soon below. The tension between the two doctrines occurred after Xuanzang’s translation project went on, and thus this was not recognized as an issue for the commentators before Wŏnhyo. For a study of these Buddhist commentators’ views on the four antinomies, see (Kimura 1981, 323–36). 19 Wŏnhyo says that although there are numerous meanings in the Buddha’s teaching of the four antinomies, he discusses only four meanings (然佛說四句意趣眾多。今且略爾四種義耳 [Yŏlban chongyo T1769:38.252b25–26]). This is the first of the four meanings. Lee: “Middle Way” Approach on Buddhist Ethics 241

result are taught by the “approach of dependent arising” (K. yŏn’gimun 緣起門). [1] In the first phrase, ‘[the Buddha-nature] is possessed by the icchantikas’ means that those of the indeterminate lineage (Skt. aniyata-gotra, K. pujŏng chongsŏng 不定種性) have the natural seeds of Buddhahood (K. chakpul pŏbi chongja 作佛法爾種子) even when they cut off the wholesome roots; ‘[the Buddha-nature] is not possessed by those of the wholesome roots’ means that those of the determinate lineage of the two- vehicles (K. kyŏlchŏng isŭng 決定二乘) do not have the seeds of Buddhahood, which is mentioned above, even when they have the wholesome roots. [2] In the second phrase, ‘[the Buddha-nature] is possessed by those of the wholesome roots’ means that those of the bodhisattva lineage (Skt. bodhisattva-gotra, K. posal chongsŏng 菩薩種性) never cut off the wholesome roots and [thus] they are originally endowed with the seeds of Buddhahood; ‘[the Buddha-nature] is not possessed by the icchantikas’ means that when those with no lineage (Skt. agotraka, K. mu chongsŏng 無種性) cut off the wholesome roots, the bodhisattva lineage becomes permanently disappeared. Therefore, it should be known that these [first] two phrases represent [the doctrine of] the five lineages. [3] In the third phrase, ‘[the Buddha-nature] is possessed by both’ means that both of the two groups mentioned in the two former phrases have the Buddha-nature of the causal level (K. in pulsŏng 因佛性) in the approach of dependent arising, because those who have mind will achieve the enlightenment in the future. [4] In the fourth phrase, ‘[the Buddha-nature] is possessed by neither of them’ means that the two groups mentioned in the third phrase do not have the Buddha-nature of the resultant level (K. kwa pulsŏng 果佛性) in the approach of dependent arising, because [they] have not yet attained the supreme enlightenment (Skt. anuttarāṃ samyak-saṃbodhi, K. musang pori 無上菩提) at this point. Therefore, it should be known that these two [latter] phrases manifest the Buddha-nature of the causal and resultant levels.20

Wŏnhyo applies the theory of five lineages in interpreting the first two phrases, in which the icchantikas and those having wholesome roots are opposed to each other in terms of their possession of the Buddha-nature. The icchantikas who have the Buddha-nature are corresponded to those of the indeterminate lineage who have cut off the wholesome roots; by contrast, the icchantikas who do not have Buddha-nature are associated to those with no lineage who have cut off the wholesome roots. Likewise, those of the wholesome roots who have the Buddha-nature are considered to refer to those of the bodhisattva lineage; those of the wholesome roots who do not have the Buddha-nature are regarded as those of the determinate lineage. Wŏnhyo’s interpretation of the first two phrases in terms of the doctrine of five

20 第一義者為顯二門故說四句。何者。前之二句約依持門說五種性。其後二句就緣起門顯因果性。謂初句言闡提人有者。不定性人斷善根時猶有。作佛法爾種子故。善根人無者。決定二來有善根時無。如前說作佛種子故。第二句中善根人有者。菩薩種性無斷善根本來具有。作佛種子故。闡提人無者。無性眾生斷善根時永無。如前菩薩種性故。故知此二句顯五種性也。第三句言二人俱有者。前二句內兩重二人皆有。緣起門中因性凡有心者當得菩提故。第四句言二人俱無者。即第三句所說二人齊無。緣起門中果性當時未得無上菩提故。故知此二句顯二果性 (Yŏlban chongyo T1769:38.251c22–252a5). 242 Acta Koreana, Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2019 lineages implies that, unlike what would be easily assumed, the icchantikas may or may not have the Buddha-nature, and, likewise, those of the wholesome roots may or may not have the Buddha-nature. In other words, whether or not an individual has the wholesome roots does not directly determine whether or not the individual has the Buddha-nature. It should be noted that this way of understanding of the icchantikas is distinct from the predominant interpretation of it in Wŏnhyo’s time. As mentioned above, the advocates of the doctrine of the five lineages did not accept that theicchantikas may have the Buddha-nature, by identifying them to those with no lineage. However, Wŏnhyo makes the possibility open that even the icchantikas may have the Buddha-nature. This means in turn that there may or may not be those with no lineage. It seems then that, for Wŏnhyo, the term “the group with no lineage” does not have its ontologically definite referent, but just suggests probability of the existence. In this regard, the sentient beings with no lineage, or the icchantikas, does not indicate those who definitely do not have the Buddha-nature; rather, as will be further discussed below, they refer to those who do not definitely have the Buddha-nature among those who have cut off the wholesome roots. In interpreting the two latter phrases, Wŏnhyo draws upon the universal Buddha-nature theory. Here, the Buddha-nature is divided into two types, the Buddha-nature of the causal level and the Buddha-nature of the resultant level.21 The Buddha-nature that is possessed by both of the groups is explained as the Buddha-nature of the causal level; the Buddha-nature that is possessed by neither of the groups, is explained as the Buddha-nature of the resultant level. The idea that the Buddha-nature is divided into the two levels, causal and resultant, has the implication that the Buddha-nature has the two aspects, universal and non-universal, since all sentient beings have the Buddha-nature of the causal level, but not all sentient beings have the Buddha-nature of the resultant level. The point is that Wŏnhyo accepts both of the two seemingly contradictory aspects of the Buddha-nature, universal and non-universal, by taking both levels of the Buddha-nature. In the polemic situation based on the doctrinal tension between the Buddha-nature and the five lineages, the Buddha-nature’s quality of universality was in sharp contrast to the implication of the no-lineage. In this context, Wŏnhyo explained the Buddha-nature, against the typical understanding of it, as having both of the two aspects,

21 The concepts of the Buddha-nature of the causal level (C. yin foxing 因佛性) and the Buddha-nature of the resultant level (C. guo foxing 果佛性) are associated with the doctrinal issue of whether the Buddha-nature is primordial (C. benyou 本有) or generated (C. shiyou 始有). In the former view that the Buddha-nature is primordial, the reason why one attains Buddhahood is because the Buddha-nature of the causal level is innate in the sentient beings. In other words, all sentient beings necessarily attain the Buddhahood because they all have the Buddha- nature of the causal level. By contrast, in the latter view that the Buddha-nature is generated, the Buddhahood is attained only when the Buddha-nature of the resultant level is accomplished. Unlike the former view, the Buddha-nature of the causal level does not guarantee one’s attainment of the Buddhahood. Only when conditions, such as practices, are met, one can become a Buddha. In the former view, which is focused on the causal level, a cause necessarily leads to its result, on the basis of the inevitable relationship between the cause and the result. However, in the latter view, which emphasizes the resultant level, a cause leads to its result only with nec- essary conditions met, on the basis of the strict distinction between the cause and the result. These two views were in opposition to each other especially in the period of the Northern and Southern Dynasties (420–589) (Lai 2017, 181–223). It seems apparent that Wŏnhyo accepts both levels of the Buddha-nature in recognition of the contemporary doctrinal tension between the two views. Lee: “Middle Way” Approach on Buddhist Ethics 243 and thereby sought to resolve the antagonism between the two positions. Wŏnhyo’s reconciliation of the two types of approach—the approach of dependence and dependent arising—is also clearly represented in his explanation of the four antinomies as the teaching for liberating [one] from the two extreme views. First, let us examine the explanation on the first two phrases.

As for the fourth meaning [of the four antinomies],22 for the purpose of liberating [one] from the two extreme [views, the Buddha] stated the four antinomies. The two former phrases manifest [the purpose of] liberating [one] from the two extreme [views] in a separate way; the two latter phrases disclose [the purpose of] liberating [one] from the two extreme [views] in a synthetic way. “[The two former phrases] manifest [the purpose of liberating one from the two extreme views] in a separate way” means [as follows]: [1] ‘[The Buddha-nature] is possessed by the icchantikas’ of the first phrase is [stated] to exclude the extreme [view] that [the icchantikas] definitely do not have [the Buddha-nature]; it is not based on [the extreme view that the icchantikas] definitely do have [the Buddha-nature]. [2] ‘[The Buddha- nature] is not possessed by the icchantikas’ of the second phrase is [stated] to stop the extreme [view] that [the icchantikas] definitely dohave [the Buddha-nature]; it is not bound to [the extreme view that the icchantikas] definitely do not have [the Buddha-nature]. [This is] just as stated later [in the Nirvāṇa Sutra]: “If there is [the Buddha’s] statement that those whose wholesome roots are cut off definitely have the Buddha- nature, or that they definitely do not have the Buddha-nature, then this is called a ‘left- out answer’ (Skt. sthāpanīya-vyākaraṇa, K. sach’igi/ch’igi/ch’idap 捨置記/置記/置答). Good man! I did not say that only ‘leaving out [the question] and not answering’ is a left-out answer. [Good man!] As such, the left-out answer is divided into two kinds. The first is [the left-out answer that] excludes [the false view] and stops it; the second is [the left- out answer that] inhibits attachment [to the false view]. Based on these meanings, they can be called left-out answers.” It should be known that just as the two extreme [views] on the icchantikas are excluded and stopped, [the two extreme views on] those of the wholesome roots are also done in the same way.23

22 This refers to the fourth of the four meanings of the four antinomies. See footnote 19 above. 23 第四義者。為離二邊故說四句。謂前二句別顯離邊。後之二句總顯離邊。言別顯者。謂初句言闡提人有。遮定無邊非據定有。第二句言闡提人無。止定有邊不著定無。如下文言。若有說言斷善根者定有佛性定無佛性。是名置答。善男子! 我亦不說置而不答乃說置答。如是置答復有二種。一者遮止二者莫著。以是義故得名置答。如就闡提遮止二邊。對善根人當知亦爾 (Yŏlban chongyo T1769:38.252a29–b9). In the quote of the Nirvāṇa Sutra in this passage, a phrase is missing right after the Buddha’s introduction of the left-out answer—Bodhisattva Kāśyapa’s question to the Buddha. The Bodhisattva Kāśyapa asks the Buddha why he now calls a certain type of answer as the left-out answer, although he previously said that no answer is the left-out answer. To this question, the Buddha replies by say- ing, “I did not say that only ‘leaving out [the question] and not answering’ is a left-out answer,” as seen in the quote. The original text of the Nirvāṇa Sutra is as follows, with the missed part underlined: “若有說言，斷善根者定有佛性、定無佛性，是名置答.”迦葉菩薩言:“世尊！我聞不答，乃名置答。如來今者何因緣，答而名置答?”“善男子！我亦不說置而不答乃說置答。善男子！如是置答，復有二種:一者遮止、二者莫著。以是義故，得名置答”(Dabanniepan jing T374:12.571b18–23). 244 Acta Koreana, Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2019

In commenting on the first two phrases of the four antinomies, Wŏnhyo says that the expressions of “is possessed by the icchantikas” or “is not possessed by the icchantikas” should not be taken in the literal senses, that is, “[the icchantikas] definitely do have” or “[theicchantikas ] definitely do not have”; these expressions have been devised just to exclude the extreme views that the icchantikas “definitely do not have” or “definitely do have” the Buddha-nature. In other words, ‘to have’ in the above context does not refer to ‘to definitely have,’ but rather the negation of ‘to definitely not-have’; likewise, ‘not to have’ does not mean ‘to definitely not-have,’ but rather the negation of ‘to definitely have.’ Wŏnhyo further explains these expressions as a kind of “left-out answer/statement” (K. ch’idap/sach’igi/ch’igi 置答/捨置記/置記, Skt. sthāpanīya-vyākaraṇa) by drawing on the Nirvāṇa Sutra. The left-out answer is known as one of the four ways in which the Buddha answers to a question, along with “direct answer/statement” (K. sumundap/irhyanggi 隨問答/一向記, Skt. ekāṃśa-vyākaraṇa), “analytic answer/statement” (K. punbyŏldap/punbyŏlgi 分別答/分別記, Skt. vibhajya-vyākaraṇa), “questioning in return” (K. panmundap/panilgi 反問答/反詰記, Skt. paripṛcchā-vyākaraṇa). As a way of answering to an irrelevant question, the left- out answer—for instance, making a statement that the icchantikas do have (or do not have) the Buddha-nature—should be understood as a devised expression in order to prevent the opposite extreme view. While each of the first two phrases manifest the purpose of the four antinomies in a separate way, as Wŏnhyo says, the latter two phrases disclose it in a synthetic way, as follows:

“The two latter phrases disclose [the purpose of] liberating [one] from the two extreme [views] in a synthetic way” means [as follows]: [3] ‘[The Buddha-nature] is possessed by both’ of the third phrase clarifies that the Buddha-nature is not like [an illusion, such as] a rabbit’s horn. [It] is said ‘is possessed by’ in the sense of negating ‘is not possessed by.’ [4] ‘[The Buddha-nature] is possessed by neither of them’ of the fourth phrase manifests that the Buddha-nature is not like [a permanent dharma, such as] space (K. hŏgong 虛空 Skt. ākāśa). [It] is said ‘is not possessed by’ in the sense of negating ‘is possessed by.’ [This is] just as stated later [in the Nirvāṇa Sutra]: “The Buddha-nature of sentient beings is neither existent nor non-existent. What is the reason? Although the Buddha- nature is existent, it is not like space, because space is invisible, yet the Buddha-nature is visible. Although Buddha-nature is not existent, it is not like a rabbit’s horn, because a rabbit’s horn cannot be generated, while the Buddha-nature can be generated. Therefore, the Buddha-nature is neither existent nor non-existent. [The Buddha-nature] is both existent and non-existent. How is it called ‘existent’? [Because] all [sentient beings] have [the Buddha-nature]. [For] all these sentient beings, [the Buddha-nature] is neither cut off nor ceasing, just like flame of a lamp, until [they attain] the enlightenment. Therefore, [it] is called ‘existent.’ How is it called ‘non-existent’? [Because] all sentient beings do not have yet at present [the four virtues of] permanence, bliss, self, and purity of all dharmas of the Buddha. Therefore, [it] is called ‘non-existent.’ As ‘the Lee: “Middle Way” Approach on Buddhist Ethics 245

existent’ and ‘the non-existent’ is united [in the Buddha-nature], it is none other than the middle way (K. chungdo 中道, S. madhyamapratipad). Therefore, the Buddha stated that the Buddha-nature of sentient beings is neither existent nor non-existent.”24

Just as in the first two phrases, Wŏnhyo takes ‘is possessed by both’ or ‘is possessed by neither of them’ not in literal sense, but as denoting the negation of the opposite views that have definite meanings—that is, the view that both definitely do not have the Buddha-nature and the view that both definitely do havethe Buddha-nature. However, these two latter phrases are different from the former phrases, in that the two phrases are considered together, viz., ‘in a synthetic way,’ in disclosing the purpose of liberating from the extreme views. This point is clearly represented in the quote from the Nirvāṇa Sutra, in which the Buddha-nature is described as having twofold aspect, such as “neither existent nor non-existent” or “existent and non-existent.” The third phrase of “the Buddha-nature is possessed by both” has the implication that the Buddha-nature is ‘not (definitely) non-existent’ or ‘existent’; the fourth phrase of “the Buddha-nature is possessed by neither of them” has the implication that the Buddha-nature is ‘not (definitely) existent’ or ‘non-existent.’ With these two implications combined, the Buddha-nature is considered to have the twofold feature of “neither existent nor non-existent” or “existent and non-existent” in somewhat paradoxical way. While the Buddha-nature in the two former phrases is indirectly explained merely by excluding (or negating) the opposite irrelevant view on the Buddha-nature, the Buddha-nature in the latter phrases is directly declared as having the twofold feature. Wŏnhyo associates these indirect and direct expression with the two types of statement, the excluding statement (K. ch’ajŏn 遮詮) and the revealing statement (K. p’yojŏn 表詮), respectively.25 Given that the Buddha-nature cannot be reduced to any definite ontological state, such as ‘definitely existent’ or ‘definitely non-existent,’ the direct way of expression of the Buddha-nature as “neither existent nor non-existent” or “existent and non-existent” is called the middle way.26

24 言後二句總顯離邊者。第三句言二人俱有。是明佛性不同菟角依非無義說名為有。第四句言二人俱無。是顯佛性不同虛空約不有義說名為無。如下文言。眾生佛性非有非無。所以者何。佛性雖有非如虛空。虛空不可見。佛性可見故。佛性雖無不同菟角。菟角不可生。佛性可生故。是故佛性非有非無。亦有亦無。云何名有。一切悉有是諸眾生不斷滅。猶如燈炎。乃至菩提故名有。云何無。一切眾生現在未有一切佛法。是故名無。有無合故是名中道。是故佛性非有非無 (Yŏlban chongyo T1769:38.252b9–19). Wŏnhyo’s quote from the Nirvāṇa Sutra is abbreviated at some points. This passage is also translated by referring to the original text of the Nirvāṇa Sutra. For the original text of the Nirvāṇa Sutra, see the Dabanniepan jing T374:12.572b13–23. 25 “The two former phrases, which are stated regarding the two types of people, lead [one] to be liberated from the two extreme [views] by relying on the meaning of the excluding statement (K. ch’ajŏn 遮詮). The two latter phrases, which are established considering the two types of people together, show the middle way by relying on the approach of the revealing statement (K. p’yojŏn 表詮). The meaning of the middle way is commonly applied to both of the two types of people, and thus it is stated together; the attachment to the two extreme [views] arises for each of the types of people, and thus it is stated separately.” 前二人說二句者。依遮詮義以遣二邊。後總二人立句者。依表詮門以示中道。中道之義通於二人。是故合說。二邊之執隨人各起。所以別說 (Yŏlban chongyo T1769:38.252b21–25). 26 The middle way (K. chungdo 中道, Skt. madhyamapratipad) is generally known as a doctrinal position especially advocated by Madhyamaka school. This concept is also significantly addressed in the Sanlun 三論 school, the East Asian equivalent of the Madhyamaka school. In fact, the way in which Wŏnhyo explains the Buddha- 246 Acta Koreana, Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2019

Closing Remarks

It is meaningful to attempt to explain the Buddhist ethical concept of “wholesome” within the frame of a particular ethical theory, especially for heuristic purposes. However, there are some areas in Buddhism, to which specific ethical concepts cannot consistently be applied. As is well known, Mahāyāna Buddhism is marked by its transcendent quality, and this quality is applied to its ethical system as well. Philosophical concern with how to explain sentient beings’ particular levels of the wholesome roots under the universal proposition of the Buddha-nature was deeply involved in East Asian Buddhist exegetes’ religious deliberation. A Silla monk Wŏnhyo’s interpretation of the four antinomies of the Nirvāṇa Sutra is noteworthy in that it directly deals with this philosophical conundrum, addressing the doctrinal contradiction between the Buddha-nature and icchantikas. In the contemporary controversial circumstance, Wŏnhyo explains the transcendental quality of Buddha-nature as the middle way, which is free from ontological or ethical determination. The conceptual inconsistency between the Buddha-nature and icchantikas emerges only when they are regarded as denoting definite referents. It may be said in this respect that for Wŏnhyo the ethical meaning of the wholesome dharmas should be found in the dynamic logic of the middle way.

Abbreviations

T Taishō shinshū daizōkyō 大正新修大藏經. Takakusu Junjirō 高楠順次郎 and Watanabe Kaikyoku 渡辺海旭, eds. 100 vols. Tokyo: Daizōkyōkai shuppan, 1924–1932. X Manji shinsan dai Nihon zokuzōkyō 卍新纂大日本續藏經. 90 vols. Tokyo: Kokusho Kankōkai, 1975–1989.

nature by using both the excluding statement and the revealing statement, or the indirect approach and then the direct approach, has a remarkable similarity to the logic employed by such Sanlun exegetes as Hyegyun 慧均 (c. sixth century) and Jizang 吉藏 (549–623). In other place of the Yŏlban chongyo, Wŏnhyo introduces six types of view on the Buddha-nature and then states that these views are all wrong on the one hand because the Buddha-nature is not “such” and that they are all right on the other because the Buddha-nature is not “not- such” In other words, Wŏnhyo indirectly discusses the Buddha-nature by using the method of negating any definite characters of the Buddha-nature, “such” or “not-such,” in a separate way. Meanwhile, Wŏnhyo directly discusses the Buddha-nature by declaring its character as “neither such nor not-such” in a synthetic way (Yŏlban chongyo T1769:38.249b12–14; T1769:38.249b19–25). In his research on the significance of Hyegyun’s Dasheng- silun xuanyi ji (X784) in early Korean Buddhism, Jörg Plassen indicates the striking similarity of the embedded logic between this passage of the Yŏlban chongyo and passages from the chapter “Meaning of Buddha-nature” (C. Foxing yi 佛性義) of Jizang’s Dasheng xuanlun (T1853:45.35b–42b) as well as the chapter with the same title in Hyegyun’s Dashengsilun xuanyi ji (Plassen 2007, 43–52). Lee: “Middle Way” Approach on Buddhist Ethics 247

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