DOCSLIB.ORG

Approach on Buddhist Ethics: Wŏnhyo on the Doctrinal Problem of the Buddha-Nature and the Icchantika

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Approach on Buddhist Ethics: Wŏnhyo on the Doctrinal Problem of the Buddha-Nature and the Icchantika “Middle Way” Approach on Buddhist Ethics: Wŏnhyo on the Doctrinal Problem of the Buddha-nature and the Icchantika Lee Sumi Acta Koreana, Volume 22, Number 2, December 2019, pp. 231-248 (Article) Published by Keimyung University, Academia Koreana For additional information about this article https://muse.jhu.edu/article/756404 [ Access provided at 27 Sep 2021 12:36 GMT with no institutional affiliation ] ACTA KOREANA Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2019: 231–248 doi:10.18399/acta.2019.22.2.002 “Middle Way” Approach on Buddhist Ethics: Wŏnhyo on the Doctrinal Problem of the Buddha-nature and the Icchantika LEE SUMI The Buddhist ethical concept of kuśala (C. shan 善), which is usually rendered as “wholesome” or “skillful,” has drawn significant scholarly attention. Although scholars have not reached a consensus on how to approach Buddhist ethical systems, it seems to be commonly acknowledged that the wholesome dharmas in early Buddhism are divided into two types: the wholesome dharmas on the mundane level and the wholesome dharmas on the supramundane level. According to the typical account of Buddhist soteriology, a practitioner should cultivate these two types of wholesome dharmas in order to reach the final goal of nirvāṇa. However, in Mahāyāna Buddhism, in which the division between the mundane and the supramundane sphere was ultimately denied, the distinction between the wholesome dharmas on the mundane and supramundane levels was often seen as being problematic. As a result, a philosophical problem arose concerning how to explain the doctrinal contrast between the ultimate universality and the concrete particularities. In ancient East Asia this problem emerged centering on the two conflicting notions of the Buddha-nature (Skt. buddha-dhātu, alt. tathāgatagarbha, C. foxing 佛性), the universal spiritual capability innate in all sentient beings, and the icchantikas (C. yichanti 一闡提), “incorrigibles,” those who are devoid of the capability (or, the wholesome dharmas) to attain Buddhahood. This article discusses the philosophical conundrum entailed from doctrinal incompatibility between the universal capability to become a Buddha and the beings who lack the wholesome dharmas by examining the Silla scholar monk Wŏnhyo’s 元曉 (617–686) understanding of the four antinomies (Skt. catuṣkoṭi, C. siju 四句) on the Buddha-nature of the Nirvāṇa Sutra. LEE SUMI ([email protected]) is HK Research Professor in the Academy of Buddhist Studies, Dongguk University, Korea. 232 Acta Koreana, Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2019 Key words: Buddhist Ethics, Buddha-nature, icchantika, Wŏnhyo 元曉 (617– 686), the Nirvāṇa Sutra In Buddhism the ethical concept of “wholesome” (Skt. kuśala, C. shan 善) is generally discussed in association with the final soteriological goal. In early Indian Buddhism, to attain liberation from the cycle of rebirth (Skt. saṃsāra, C. lunhui 輪廻), a practitioner should cultivate two types of wholesome dharmas: first, the wholesome dharmas on the mundane (Skt.loka , C. shijian 世 間) level and, next, the wholesome dharmas on the supramundane (Skt. lokottara, C. chu shijian 出世間) level.1 By cultivating the wholesome dharmas of the mundane level, practitioners receive a good reward, such as good rebirth among the six destinies (Skt. ṣaḍgati, C. liuqu 六 趣); once in a favorable condition, they proceed to conduct the wholesome dharmas on the supramundane level, which will ultimately lead them to the final goal of nirvāṇa. However, the mundane and the supramundane wholesome dharmas do not represent the entire scope of the Buddhist ethical concept of “the wholesome dharma,” or the dharmas that are characterized as wholesome. In Mahāyāna Buddhism the notion of a “sphere beyond the supramundane” (C. chu chu shijian 出出世間) emerged, fundamentally transcending the division between the mundane and the supramundane sphere.2 In terms of Buddhist soteriology, the concept of the wholesome dharma beyond the supramundane sphere accordingly appeared—the wholesome dharmas that transcend the distinction between the mundane and the supramundane sphere. According to the typical account of the early Indian Buddhist soteriology, a practitioner cultivates the mundane and the supramundane wholesome dharmas throughout numerous life times to reach the ultimate goal of nirvāṇa.3 By contrast, the 1 For instance, in his book on the bodhipakkhiyā dhammā (Skt. bodhipākṣikadharma, C. daopin 道品 or putifenfa 菩提分 法), Rupert Gethin discusses in detail that the early Buddhist texts, including the Pāli Nikāyas, the Abhidhamma, and the commentaries, coherently concern with the process whereby the ‘ordinary’ (lokiya), unawakened mind, transforms itself into the ‘world transcending’ (lokuttara), awakened mind, through various types of meditative practice (Gethin 2001 [1992], 6). 2 For instance, in the She dasheng lun 攝大乘論, Paramārtha’s translation of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha-śāstra by Asaṅga (c. fourth century), “the wholesome dharma of the sphere beyond the supramundane” (C. chuchushi shanfa 出 出世善法) appears (T1593:31.131c08), and, in the Shedashenglun shi 攝大乘論釋, Paramārtha’s translation of the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha-bhāṣya by Vasubandhu (c. fourth century), it is stated, “While the wholesome [dharmas] of the two vehicles are called as supramundane [wholesome dharmas], [those] on the eighth stage through the stage of Buddhahood as [the wholesome dharmas] beyond the supramundane sphere. The supramundane dharmas are prescribed in respect to the mundane dharmas; the dharmas beyond the supramundane sphere are prescribed in respect to the supramundane dharmas” 論曰：出出世善法功能所生, 釋曰: 二乘善名出世，從八地已上 乃至 佛地名出出世. 出世法為 世法對治，出出世法為 出世法對治 (Shedashenglun shi T1595:31.263b07–10). 3 While the spiritual transformation from the mundane to the supramundane is generally accepted as the sote- riological scheme of the early Buddhism, there is some research that calls this view into question. In his book on the notion of diṭṭhi, or ‘view,’ in Theravāda Buddhism, Paul Fuller introduces two types of understanding of diṭṭhi in line with the general account of the two types of wholesome dharmas in early Buddhism, namely, “the opposition understanding of views,” according to which right view stands in opposition to wrong view, and “the no-views understanding of views,” in which right view is equated with no-view. Fuller ultimately denies this distinction and argues that “the attainment of right-view and the practicing of no-view amount to the same thing,” since “the consequence of achieving right-view is that one does not hold any views.” By indicating that Lee: “Middle Way” Approach on Buddhist Ethics 233 distinction between these two phases of cultivation is often ignored in Mahāyāna Buddhism. It is often stated such that the birth-and-death is none other than nirvāṇa (C. shengsi ji niepan 生死即涅槃); that the defilement is none other than the enlightenment (C.fannao ji puti 煩惱即 菩提); or that one becomes a Buddha upon seeing one’s own nature (C. jianxing chengfo 見性成 佛), suggesting that the enlightenment can be attained even at this very moment in present lifetime.4 As it is regarded that an ordinary being is not different from the Buddha, or the samsaric world is not distinguished from nirvāṇa, the wholesome dharmas are sometimes not regarded as what should be cultivated to accomplish the soteriological goal. Instead, the idea comes to the fore that every sentient being is already endowed with the Buddha-nature (Skt. buddha-dhātu, alt. tathāgatagarbha, C. foxing 佛性), the spiritual capability to become a Buddha. In other words, the ultimate goal of the enlightenment or the Buddhahood is not considered what is attained by cultivating the wholesome dharmas, but what is already inherent in all sentient beings. In this sense, the Buddha-nature may be said as a new type of wholesome dharma in the Mahāyāna worldview beyond the supramundane sphere.5 According to this Mahāyāna view, nirvāṇa also is not an object remote from the present world, but may be experienced anywhere and anytime—whether it be the mundane or the supramundane realm. This concept of nirvāṇa is well known as “nirvāṇa of no-abiding” (Skt. apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇa, C. wuzhu[chu] niepan 無住[處]涅槃).6 right view is not simply another view opposed to wrong view, nor is it the rejection of all views, but apprehend- ing things without attachments, Fuller also makes an important point that right view is not a type of proposi- tion, which are adopted or believed in, but “a different order of seeing,” which should be practiced. This un- derstanding of right view seems to be addressing some features of right view beyond the supramundane level, in that right view is described as transcending the distinction between “the opposition understanding of views” and “the no-views understanding of views,” or the mundane level of right view and the supramundane level of right view. It may be said that although the soteriological scheme of early Buddhism may appear in these two levels, the supramundane elements were inherent in it and thus the distinction between the two levels may be seen as not viable from the ultimate perspective (Fuller 2005). 4 The birth-and-death and nirvāṇa are identified to each other in such Mahāyāna texts as the Laṅkāvatāra Sutra (Lengqie abatuoluo aojing 楞伽阿跋多羅寶經 T672:16.597a15–17), the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra (Dasheng zhuangyan jin- glun 大乘莊嚴經論 T1604:31.599a02), and Paramārtha’s translation of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha-śāstra (She dasheng lun T. 1593:31.129b27–29). For the passages, in which defilements are identified to the enlightenment, see the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra (Dasheng zhuangyan jinglun T1604:31.622b12–13). The phrase that one becomes a Buddha upon seeing one’s own nature (C. jianxing chengfo 見性成佛), one of the well-known Chan phrases, is generally attributed to the school’s putative founder Bodhidharma 菩提達磨 (c. late-fourth to early-fifth centuries), and included in such a text as Huangbo Xiyun’s 黃檗希運 (?–850) Chuanxin fayao 傳心法要 (T2012:48.384a05–06) together with another phrase, “directly point to one’s mind” (C. zhizhi renxin 直指人心). 5 In fact, it is stated in the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra, that “the Buddha-nature is the wholesome [dharma]” 一闡提等無 有善法，佛性亦善，以未來有故一闡提等悉有佛性 (Dabanniepan jing T374:12.524c02–04); 世尊！一闡提輩 不斷佛性，佛 性亦善，云何說言斷一切善？(Dabanniepan jing T374:12.562c20–22).
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Bhāra Sutta the Discourse on the Burden | S 22.22/3:25 F Theme: There Is No “Person” in the Aggregates Translated & Annotated by Piya Tan ©2005
    S 3.1.1.3.1 Saṁyutta 3, Khandha Vagga 1, Khandha Saṁy 1, Mūla Paṇṇāsaka 3, Bhāra Vg 1 14 Bhāra Sutta The Discourse on the Burden | S 22.22/3:25 f Theme: There is no “person” in the aggregates Translated & annotated by Piya Tan ©2005 1 Introduction 1.1 In his well-acclaimed work, How Buddhism Began, Richard Gombrich points out the relationship between the Buddhist conception of upādāna (clinging) and its early Indian roots in meta- phors of fuel and fire: The word upādāna has both a concrete and an abstract meaning. In the abstract, it means attach- ment, grasping; in this sense it is much used in Buddhist dogmatics. Concretely, it means that which fuels this process. The PED sv: “(lit that [material] substratum by means of which an active process is kept alive and going), fuel, supply, provision.” So when the context deals with fire it simply means fuel… In my opinion, it is clear that the term the term khandha too was a part of the fire metaphor. (Gombrich 1996:67)1 1.2 Gombrich goes on to discuss the historical problem related to the Bhāra Sutta (S 22.22), where the aggregates are said to be a burden (bhārā paca-k,khandhā) to be put down. The metaphor is more historically correct and spiritually more urgent when upādāna-k,khandha is translated as “the aggregates that are fuelled)” or even “the aggregates that are on fire (or burning).” It is a burden for the early brahmins to daily collect fuel (wood, herbs, etc) to feed the sacred fire (Gombrich 1996:67).
    [Show full text]
  • Studies in Buddhist Hetuvidyā (Epistemology and Logic ) in Europe and Russia
    Nataliya Kanaeva STUDIES IN BUDDHIST HETUVIDYĀ (EPISTEMOLOGY AND LOGIC ) IN EUROPE AND RUSSIA Working Paper WP20/2015/01 Series WP20 Philosophy of Culture and Cultural Studies Moscow 2015 УДК 24 ББК 86.36 K19 Editor of the series WP20 «Philosophy of Culture and Cultural Studies» Vitaly Kurennoy Kanaeva, Nataliya. K19 Studies in Buddhist Hetuvidyā (Epistemology and Logic ) in Europe and Russia [Text] : Working paper WP20/2015/01 / N. Kanaeva ; National Research University Higher School of Economics. – Moscow : Higher School of Economics Publ. House, 2015. – (Series WP20 “Philosophy of Culture and Cultural Studiesˮ) – 52 p. – 20 copies. This publication presents an overview of the situation in studies of Buddhist epistemology and logic in Western Europe and in Russia. Those studies are the young direction of Buddhology, and they started only at the beginning of the XX century. There are considered the main schools, their representatives, the directions of their researches and achievements in the review. The activity of Russian scientists in this field was not looked through ever before. УДК 24 ББК 86.36 This study (research grant № 14-01-0006) was supported by The National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow). Academic Fund Program in 2014–2015. Kanaeva Nataliya – National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow). Department of Humanities. School of Philosophy. Assistant professor; [email protected]. Канаева, Н. А. Исследования буддийской хетувидьи (эпистемологии и логики) в Европе и России (обзор) [Текст] : препринт WP20/2015/01 / Н. А. Канаева ; Нац. исслед. ун-т «Высшая школа экономи- ки». – М.: Изд. дом Высшей школы экономики, 2015. – (Серия WP20 «Философия и исследо- вания культуры»).
    [Show full text]
  • Reading the Miraculous Powers of Japanese Poetry Spells, Truth Acts, and a Medieval Buddhist Poetics of the Supernatural
    Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 32/: –33 © 2005 Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture R. Keller Kimbrough Reading the Miraculous Powers of Japanese Poetry Spells, Truth Acts, and a Medieval Buddhist Poetics of the Supernatural The supernatural powers of Japanese poetry are widely documented in the lit- erature of Heian and medieval Japan. Twentieth-century scholars have tended to follow Orikuchi Shinobu in interpreting and discussing miraculous verses in terms of ancient (arguably pre-Buddhist and pre-historical) beliefs in koto- dama 言霊, “the magic spirit power of special words.” In this paper, I argue for the application of a more contemporaneous hermeneutical approach to the miraculous poem-stories of late-Heian and medieval Japan: thirteenth- century Japanese “dharani theory,” according to which Japanese poetry is capable of supernatural effects because, as the dharani of Japan, it contains “reason” or “truth” (kotowari) in a semantic superabundance. In the first sec- tion of this article I discuss “dharani theory” as it is articulated in a number of Kamakura- and Muromachi-period sources; in the second, I apply that the- ory to several Heian and medieval rainmaking poem-tales; and in the third, I argue for a possible connection between the magico-religious technology of Indian “Truth Acts” (saccakiriyā, satyakriyā), imported to Japan in various sutras and sutra commentaries, and some of the miraculous poems of the late- Heian and medieval periods. keywords: waka – dharani – kotodama – katoku setsuwa – rainmaking – Truth Act – saccakiriyā, satyakriyā R. Keller Kimbrough is an Assistant Professor of Japanese at Colby College. In the 2005– 2006 academic year, he will be a Visiting Research Fellow at the Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture.
    [Show full text]
  • Finnigan Karma Moral Responsibility Buddhist Ethics
    Forthcoming in Vargas & Doris (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology 1 Karma, Moral Responsibility, and Buddhist Ethics Bronwyn Finnigan ANU The Buddha taught that there is no self. He also accepted a version of the doctrine of karmic rebirth, according to which good and bad actions accrue merit and demerit respectively and where this determines the nature of the agent’s next life and explains some of the beneficial or harmful occurrences in that life. But how is karmic rebirth possible if there are no selves? If there are no selves, it would seem there are no agents that could be held morally responsible for ‘their’ actions. If actions are those happenings in the world performed by agents, it would seem there are no actions. And if there are no agents and no actions, then morality and the notion of karmic retribution would seem to lose application. Historical opponents argued that the Buddha's teaching of no self was tantamount to moral nihilism. The Buddha, and later Buddhist philosophers, firmly reject this charge. The relevant philosophical issues span a vast intellectual terrain and inspired centuries of philosophical reflection and debate. This article will contextualise and survey some of the historical and contemporary debates relevant to moral psychology and Buddhist ethics. They include whether the Buddha's teaching of no-self is consistent with the possibility of moral responsibility; the role of retributivism in Buddhist thought; the possibility of a Buddhist account of free will; the scope and viability of recent attempts to naturalise karma to character virtues and vices, and whether and how right action is to be understood within a Buddhist framework.
    [Show full text]
  • Proquest Dissertations
    Daoxuan's vision of Jetavana: Imagining a utopian monastery in early Tang Item Type text; Dissertation-Reproduction (electronic) Authors Tan, Ai-Choo Zhi-Hui Publisher The University of Arizona. Rights Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. Download date 25/09/2021 09:09:41 Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/280212 INFORMATION TO USERS This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are In typewriter face, while others may be from any type of connputer printer. The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overiaps. ProQuest Information and Learning 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 USA 800-521-0600 DAOXUAN'S VISION OF JETAVANA: IMAGINING A UTOPIAN MONASTERY IN EARLY TANG by Zhihui Tan Copyright © Zhihui Tan 2002 A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the DEPARTMENT OF EAST ASIAN STUDIES In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY In the Graduate College THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA 2002 UMI Number: 3073263 Copyright 2002 by Tan, Zhihui Ai-Choo All rights reserved.
    [Show full text]
  • Chapter 2 Wuguang’S Quest
    Cover Page The handle http://hdl.handle.net/1887/49753 holds various files of this Leiden University dissertation Author: Bahir, C. Title: Reenchanting Buddhism via modernizing magic: Guru Wuguang of Taiwan’s philosophy and science of ‘superstition’ Issue Date: 2017-06-01 Chapter 2 Wuguang’s Quest Spirit, far from being opposed to the biological (as in the Cartesian dualism of body and mind), is the potentiality of human life—through conscious positing of future foals—for purposeful creation and growth. It is the possibility of structural self-transcendence made incipiently conscious in man...Its close connection with consciousness precludes exclusive linking of spirit with the irrational. French esprit, like German Geist and analogous terms in other languages, embraces “spirit” and “mind” in a single concept; hence the spiritual quest can include both the intellectual and scientific search for truth and the religious pursuit of salvation, which are fundamentally akin...Yet the ultimate indeterminacy of scientific truth need not entail a directionless relativism. On the contrary, an indeterminate goal engendered through purposive trial and error is a prime criterion for the spiritual quest (as for its biological and psychological antecedents), which thus attains in scientific inquiry one of its fullest expressions. ~ Robert Mitchell Torrance242 Wuguang was a complex individual who led a multi-faceted life that consisted of several somewhat self-contained phases. In each phase he attempted to master a specific thought tradition and harmonize it with those already in his eclectic repertoire. These traditions include: Daoism, Chinese folk religion, Chan, Zhenyan/Shingon and Tibetan Buddhism as well as modern philosophy and science.
    [Show full text]
  • Finnigan Madhyamaka Ethics 2018
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by PhilPapers This is a draft of a chapter that appears in The Oxford Handbook of Buddhist Ethics ed- ited by Dr Daniel Cozort and Dr James Mark Shields (2018) Madhyamaka Ethics Bronwyn Finnigan 12 Abstract There are two main loci of contemporary debate about the nature of Madhyamaka ethics. The first investigates the general issue of wheth- er the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness (śūnyavāda) is consistent with a commitment to systematic ethical distinctions. The second queries whether the metaphysical analysis of no-self presented by Śāntideva in his Bodhicaryāvatāra entails the impartial benevolence of a bodhisattva. This article will critically examine these debates and demonstrate the ways in which they are shaped by competing under- standings of Madhyamaka conventional truth or reality (saṃvṛtisatya) and the forms of reasoning admissible for differentiating conventional truth from falsity and good from bad. 1 School of Philosophy, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National Univer- sity. Email: [email protected]. 2 Many thanks to Sara McClintock, Tom Tillemans and the editors of this collection for helpful comments on a previous draft of this paper. I am also grateful for feedback from participants of the Australasian Workshop in Moral Philosophy (2016). 2 Finnigan, Madhyamaka Ethics Introduction Madhyamaka is one of two major philosophical schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism, alongside Yogācāra. It is best known for its philosophy of emptiness (śūnyavāda) as articulated by Nāgārjuna in his Mūlamadh- yamakakārikā and has an illustrious lineage of eminent exponents in In- dia, Tibet and China.
    [Show full text]
  • A Huayan Paradigm for the Classification of Mahāyāna Teachings: the Origin and Meaning of Faxiangzong and Faxingzong∗
    IMRE HAMAR A HUAYAN PARADIGM FOR THE CLASSIFICATION OF MAHĀYĀNA TEACHINGS: THE ORIGIN AND MEANING ∗ OF FAXIANGZONG AND FAXINGZONG Introduction Dan Lusthaus finds the origin of the paradigm xing 性 versus xiang 相 in the Cheng weishi lun 成唯識論 and concludes: Ironically, this very distinction became one of the major rhetorical weapons used by Fa- tsang against Hsüan-tsang’s school, calling them ‘[the mere] fa-hsiang’ (Dharma-Charac- teristics) school against his own Sinitic ‘fa-hsing’ (Dharma-Nature) school. This distinction became so important that every Buddhist school originating in East Asia, including all forms of Sinitic Mahāyāna, viz. T’ien-t’ai, Hua-yen, Ch’an, and Pure Land, came to be considered Dharma-nature schools.1 Whalen Lai also attributes the establishment of this paradigm to Fazang, refer- ring to Zhili 知禮: “The name ‘Fa-hsiang’ was, however, attributed to it by its crit- ics; it is a derogative term alleging that the school did not know thoroughly the deeper Fa-hsing (Dharma-essence). The contrast was intended to bring out the ‘Hī- nayānist phenomenalism’ [sic] inherent in the Wei-shih school and to highlight the ‘Mahāyāna essentialism’ of its critic. As recalled by Sung T’ien-t’ai master Ssu- ming Chih-li (959–1028), the distinction arose at the time of Fa-tsang’s (643–712) attack on the Wei-shih school: At the time [of Hua-yen (Avatamsaka) patriarch, Fa-tsang,] there was widely held the theory of chen-ju sui-yüan (Suchness or tathatā accompanying the conditions [the pratyaya that brought samsāra into being]) and the theory of a (passive) Suchness that would not create (‘let rise’) the various existents (dharmas).
    [Show full text]
  • The Wisdom of the Unsayable in the Chinese Tradition Karl-Heinz Pohl
    3 The Wisdom of the Unsayable in the Chinese Tradition Karl-Heinz Pohl Concerning Eastern teachings such as Daoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism, there is often widespread confusion about how these are to be classified—as religion or as philosophy. This problem, however, is culturally homemade: the distinction between religion and philosophy based on European cultural tradi- tions often does not apply when we leave our culture behind. Thus, the Eastern teachings, which are often referred to as “wisdom religions” (e.g. by Hans Küng), are either religion and philosophy or neither religion nor philosophy; whichever way you prefer ideologically. As is well known, there is a certain “family resemblance” (as Wittgenstein would put it) between Daoism and Buddhism. There is, however, very little that connects these Asian philosophies and religions with the European tradition emanating from Greco-Roman and Christian thought. This does not mean that their philosophemes would be fundamentally alien to the Europeans: at most they do not belong to the European mainstream. So the family resemblance could certainly be extended to certain European philoso- phers and schools: There is in Europe a tradition—from the pre-Socratics through the apophatic theology and mysticism of the Middle Ages to existen- tialism and philosophy of language of modernity—that has very much in common with Daoism and Buddhism. Hence, a blend of selected passages from Heraclitus (cf. Wohlfart 1998: 24–39), Neo-Pythagoreanism, Sextus Empiricus, Gnosticism, Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, Nicholas of Cusa, Meister Eckhart, Jacob Boehme, Montaigne, Hegel (cf. Wohlfart 1998: 24–39), Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Derrida, et al.
    [Show full text]
  • DHARMA WORLD Vol3'
    Cover photo: On March 5, Rissho Kosei­ May/June 2005 kai celebrated its 67th anniversary with a VoL3' ceremony in Fumon Hall in the organiza­ DHARMA WORLD tion's headquarters complex in Tokyo. Some 4,800 members took part in the For Living Buddhism and Interfaith Dialogue event, which was relayed by satellite TV to all branches throughout Japan, where simi­ lar ceremonies were held simultaneously. CONTENTS In Fumon Hall, forty members from young women's groups offered lighted candles and flowers. Photo: Yoshikazu Takekawa From the Advisor's Desk Reflections on the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Donate-a-Meal Campaign by Kinjiro Niwano 3 Essays Healing Our Suffering World by Cheng Yen 7 The Benefits of Haza Karma and Character: Fatalism or Free Will? DHARMA WORLD presents Buddhism as a Counseling Sessions 4 by I. Loganathan 17 practical living religion and promotes in­ terreligious dialogue for world peace. It The Emerging Euroyana by Michael Fuss 19 espouses views that emphasize the dignity The Real Purpose of Prayer by Kinzo Takemura 30 of life, seeks to rediscover our inner na­ ture and bring our lives more in accord with it, and investigates causes of human Reflections suffering. It tries to show how religious The Benefits of Hoza Counseling Sessions principles help solve problems in daily life by Nichiko Niwano 4 and how the least application of such The Precept Against Killing and principles has wholesome effects on the Acting Against Violence by Nikkyo Niwano 42 world around us. It seeks to demonstrate are fundamental to all reli­ truths that Healing Our Suffering World 7 gions, truths on which all people can act.
    [Show full text]
  • 'Self-Blame' and Refuge in Tibetan Buddhist Lojong, Nietzsche, and the Desert Fathers
    Drive all Blames into One: Rhetorics of 'Self-Blame' and Refuge in Tibetan Buddhist Lojong, Nietzsche, and the Desert Fathers Author: Glenn Robert Willis Persistent link: http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:104051 This work is posted on eScholarship@BC, Boston College University Libraries. Boston College Electronic Thesis or Dissertation, 2014 Copyright is held by the author, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise noted. Boston College The Graduate School of Arts and Sciences Department of Theology DRIVE ALL BLAMES INTO ONE: RHETORICS OF ‘SELF-BLAME’ AND REFUGE IN TIBETAN BUDDHIST LOJONG, NIETZSCHE, AND THE DESERT FATHERS a dissertation by GLENN ROBERT WILLIS submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy DECEMBER 2014 © copyright by GLENN ROBERT WILLIS 2014 Abstract Drive All Blames into One: Rhetorics of ‘Self-Blame’ and Refuge in Tibetan Buddhist Lojong, Nietzsche, and the Desert Fathers Glenn Robert Willis Professor John Makransky, Dissertation Director The purpose of this work is to differentiate the autonomous ‘self-compassion’ of therapeutic modernist Buddhism from pre-therapeutic Mahāyāna Buddhist practices of refuge, so that refuge itself is not obscured as a fundamental Buddhist orientation that empowers the possibility of compassion for self and other in the first place. The work begins by situating issues of shame and self-aversion sociologically, in order to understand how and why self-aversion became a significant topic of concern during the final quarter of the twentieth century. This discussion allows for a further investigation of shame as it has been addressed first by psychologists, for whom shame is often understood as a form of isolating self-aversion, and then by philosophers such as Bernard Williams and Emmanuel Levinas, for whom shame attunes the person to the moral expectations of a community, and therefore to ethical commands that arise from beyond the individual self.
    [Show full text]
  • Pain and Flourishing in Mahayana Buddhist Moral Thought
    SOPHIA DOI 10.1007/s11841-017-0619-4 A Nirvana that Is Burning in Hell: Pain and Flourishing in Mahayana Buddhist Moral Thought Stephen E. Harris1 # The Author(s) 2017. This article is an open access publication Abstract This essay analyzes the provocative image of the bodhisattva, the saint of the Indian Mahayana Buddhist tradition, descending into the hell realms to work for the benefit of its denizens. Inspired in part by recent attempts to naturalize Buddhist ethics, I argue that taking this ‘mythological’ image seriously, as expressing philosophical insights, helps us better understand the shape of Mahayana value theory. In particular, it expresses a controversial philosophical thesis: the claim that no amount of physical pain can disrupt the flourishing of a fully virtuous person. I reconstruct two related elements of early Buddhist psychology that help us understand this Mahayana position: the distinction between hedonic sensation (vedanā) and virtuous or nonvirtous mental states (kuśala/akuśala-dharma); and the claim that humans are massively deluded as to what constitutes well-being. Doing so also lets me emphasize the continuity between early Buddhist and Mahayana traditions in their views on well-being and flourishing. Keywords Mahayana Buddhism . Buddhist ethics . Buddhism . Ethics . Hell Julia Annas has shown that taking seriously Stoic and Epicurean claims that the sage is happy even while being tortured on the rack helps articulate the structure of their ethics, and in particular the relationship between virtue (arête) and happiness (eudaimonia).1 In this essay, I apply this strategy to Mahayana Buddhist moral philosophy by taking seriously the image of the bodhisattva joyfully diving into the hell realms.
    [Show full text]