Buddhist Ethics and International Relations

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Buddhist Ethics and International Relations BUDDHIST ETHICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS J. M. Kitagawa This article was written as a commentary on the paper by Professor R. H. L. Slater of Harvard entitled The Implications of Buddhist Ethics for International Relations. which he presented at the conference of the Church Peace Union at Princeton, September 25, 1959. Dr. Shoson Miyamoto, visiting professor of Buddhist philosophy at the University of Chicago, 1958-59, who had originally agreed to write the critique, could not undertake the task because of his commitment to the Conference on Philosophy East and West held at the University of Hawaii. Professor Miyamoto, being a recognized authority on Mahayana Buddhism, would have made a valuable contribution to the discussion on this import- ant question. The present writer, who was asked to take Dr. Miyamoto's place at the last minute, can only make a few sketchy remarks. Dr. Slater rightly states that Buddhist ethics must be seen in its total context: It belongs to a whole, rich, varied context of religious thought and practice, with twenty-five hundred years of history behind it. The total context, in Dr. Slater's sense, includes the historical context, the aspect which he excluded from his paper. I am inclined to f eel, however, that a very brief reexamination of the historical context of Buddhism is essential for our understanding of the present-day ethos of Buddhism. At the expense of oversimplification, I wish to depict three historic stages of Buddhism-(1) Early Buddhism, (2) Buddhism under King Asoka, and (3) Modern Buddhism. (1) Early Buddhism: Some of the contemporary Buddhist philosophers accept the view that Buddhism is a way of life following from the accept- ance of a certain set of propositions which are considered to represent the facts of existence pertaining to the life and destiny of man in the -777- BUDDHIST ETHICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (J. M. Kitagawa) (2) universe. But, as E. J. Thomas reminds us, Buddhism began not with a body of doctrine but with the formation of a society bound by certain (1) rules. The external similarities between the Buddhist community and other groups of ascetics in India tend to obliterate the unique character of the Buddhist samgha. According to Brahman orthodoxy, the cosmic, eternal dharma sanctioned and supported the empirical social order. Buddhists and Buddhism revolted not only against the hollowness of the Brahman ritua- lism of Buddha's time but more fundamentally against the metaphysico. social principles of Brahmanism. The burden of Gotama's message was that the Dharma could not be apprehended by observing external religious practices. Early Buddhists believed that the cosmic Dharma was fully realized by Gotama's Enlightenment, and that Dharma was integrally re- lated to the Samgha, which alone provided the path of deliverance. Hence the Threefold Affirmation in the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Samgha 1 From the beginning, Buddhism was conducive to philosophical inquiry. However, what concerned Gotama was not a metaphysical explanation of the universe but the salvation of finite beings. Equally important was Go- tama's insistence on the importance of moral discipline. According to early Buddhism, right conduct (sila) is the prerequisite of meditation (samadhi) and insight (Panna) abhinna), and both in turn are prerequisites for attain- ing liberation (vimutti, tanha-kkhya) and the experience of Nirvana. Pro- fessor Bahm rightly observes that the middle way is not merely a way (2) to the goal, but is, in a fundamental sense, the goal itself. Professor Pachow ably argues that all the cardinal moral principles of (3) early Buddhism were taken from Brahmanism. What was novel in Bud- dhist ethics was the context in which moral discipline was placed. For example, early Buddhism had no political or social philosophy. We learn (1) Thomas, Edward J., The History of Buddhist Thought, New York: Barnes & Noble, (Second Edition), 1951, p. 14. (2) Bahm, A. J., Philosophy of the Buddha, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958, p. 78. (3) Paschow, W., A Comparative Study of the Pratimoksa, Santiniketan: The Sino-Indian Cultural Society, 1955. -776- (3) BUDDHIST ETHICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (J. M. Kitagawa) from the Pall Mahaparinibbana Sutta that Gotama took for granted the legitimate existence of a secular political community: so long as the ri- ghtful protection, defence, and support shall be fully provided for the Arahats among them, so that Arahats from a distance may enter the realm, and that the Arahats therein may live at peace It is evident that Gota- ma did not advocate a new Buddhist socio-political theory; he was pri- marily concerned with the proper relationship between the Buddhist Com- munity and the political realm, and he defined the relationship between them from the perspective of the samgha. (2) Buddhism under King Asoka: The relationship between the Samgha and the socio-poltical order underwent a radical transformation under the reign of Asoka. He recognized the universal message in the Dharma, but the Dharma he advocated was a kind of applied Buddhist ethics, applicable to all men, Buddhist as well as non-Buddhist. His appointment of the Dharma- maharata (Ministers of the Dharma) implied that Buddhism, for the first time in its history, had to shoulder the responsibility of guiding not only the seekers and believers but a complex society, nation and civilization. Under Asoka's leadership the Buddhist community, here using the term in its broad sense, became in effect the total nation and could develop, potentially at least, into a world-wide community, embracing peoples and nations outside India. Likewise, the Buddha was no longer portrayed as an unknown Indian ascetic; he came to be viewed as a deified spiritual monarch (atideva, devadeva or devatideva), who was represented on this earth by a Cakravartin (an ideal universal monarch). Later Buddhist rulers, for example, King Tissa in Ceylon, the Sui Emperor Wen Ti in China, and Prince Shotoku in Japan, were greatly influenced by Asoka's vision of what Buddhism ought to be. It is our contention that the Buddhist political ethics cannot be understood without taking into account this Asokan turn. Buddhism from the period of Asoka was no longer a narrow path of liberation; it became the bearer of a civilization, which was in essence an admixture of Buddhism and Hindu civilization. Asoka called the Bud- dhist missionary work a peaceful conquest through Dharma. We read in -775- BUDDHIST ETHICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (J. M. Kitagawa) (4) the Rock Edict (XIII): And such a conquest has been achieved by the Beloved of the Gods (Asoka) not only here in his own domain but also in the territories bordering his domain Wherever Buddhism was trans- planted, it was accompanied by the art of writing, technology, commerce, and the Brahrnanic concept of the divine king. Two factors influenced the development of Buddhist socio-political ethics in Southeast Asia and the Far East. The first was the cultural pattern of juxtaposition and insularity, and the second was the religious pattern of plural belongingness. For example, India and China existed side by side from time immemorial, but with the exception of the Buddhist mis- sionary work both Indian and Chinese cultures developed with relative insularity and without mutual intercourse between them. Neither India nor China had any clear principle in dealing with foreign powers, except in trade, although each had elaborate procedures in dealing with its own satel- lite nations and peoples. In other words, international relations in the mo- dern sense of the word was not a real issue in Asia until the modern period. The religious pattern of plural belongingness, to use Professor Rock- ing's phrase, developed in all parts of Asia. For example, in China Buddhism, existed side by side with Confucianism and Taoism, in Japan Buddhism co-existed with Shinto, in Tibet with the Bon Cult, and in Burma with Nat worship. Corollary to this was the development of the multivalue systems, according to which no one religion had to bear solely the rel- igious and ethical responsibilities for the whole society and culture. For instance, in Japan communal and national cults were regarded as the domain of Shinto, individual and social ethics were defined in Confucian terms, and spiritual matters were delegated to Buddhism. It is readily understandable that in such a context Buddhist ethical principles were not fully applied to all the political and international problems. (3) Modern Buddhism: Few words are needed to emphasize the impor- tance of the impact of the West on Asian religions and cultures. A far-reaching effect of modernity -the driving force behind the advance of the West-was felt in the field of education, which divided Asians -774- (5) BUDDHIST ETHICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (J. M. Kitagawa) into two categories, a minority of young intellectuals with Westernized education and the mass of people without it. This is what Coomaraswamy called the separation of literacy from culture. In the Buddhist nations, the modern elite was uprooted from its ancestral way of life, leaving indigenous culture and Buddhism to those who were less sensitive to the challenge of modern civilization. To make a long story short, in the 1920's and 1930's many Asian intel- lectuals who had had a Westernized education suddenly recognized, in the midst of the struggle for political independence, the strength and tenacity of their ancestral religions which they had hitherto spurned. Recognizing the need for relating themselves to their own peoples, some Asian intel- lectuals and leaders became converts to the traditional religions. In so doing, they did not simply return to traditional religions, they instilled the ethos of modernity into traditional religions. After World War II, many Asian nations gained political independence.
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