DOCSLIB.ORG

From Nuremberg to Bosnia to the Nobel Peace Prize

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
From Nuremberg to Bosnia to the Nobel Peace Prize Yeshiva University, Cardozo School of Law LARC @ Cardozo Law Articles Faculty 1997 What Price Peace: From Nuremberg to Bosnia to The Nobel Peace Prize Malvina Halberstam Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-articles Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Malvina Halberstam, What Price Peace: From Nuremberg to Bosnia to The Nobel Peace Prize, 3 International Law Students Association Journal of International & Comparative Law 571 (1997). Available at: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-articles/348 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty at LARC @ Cardozo Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of LARC @ Cardozo Law. For more information, please contact [email protected], [email protected]. WHAT PRICE PEACE: FROM NUREMBERG TO BOSNIA TO THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE Malvina Halberstam • In the fifty years that have elapsed since the Nuremberg Trials, we have made tremendous progress in the development of human rights. The Genocide Convention,1 the Convention on Civil and Political Rights,2 the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,3 the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women; and the Convention Against Torture5 have all been adopted by the United Nations and ratified by the vast majority of states in the world. 6 • Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University Prepared for presentation at the Panel on International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law After Bosnia, The International Law Weekend, New York, November 1, 1996. The author wishes to thank Allan Blutstein, Cardozo 1997, for his assistance in the preparation of this article. 1. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. 2. International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 3. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. 4. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980). 5. International Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1987) . 6. Some of these are now considered to be binding under customary law and even to constitute jus cogens . See Jordan J. Paust, The Significance and Determination of Customary International Human Rights Law: The Complex Nature, Sources and Evidence of Customary Human Rights, 25 GA. 1. INT'L. & COMP. L. 147, 153 (1996) (noting that the prohibition of genocide is a well-recognized peremptory norm of jus cogens); see also RESTATEMENT (fHIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 702, and cmts. d, f (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT); Jordan J. Paust, Symposium, The Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Avoiding 'Fraudulent ' Executive Policy: Analysis of Non-Self­ Execution of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REV . 1257, 1274 (1993) (explaining that certain rights reflected in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights have now become peremptory norms of jus cogens); Nadine Strossen, Recent U.S. and International Judicial Protection of Individual Rights: A Comparative Legal Process Analysis and Proposed Synthesis, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 817 (1990) (noting that human rights values embodied in the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are all elements of customary international law that are rapidly ' 572 ILSA Journa.l of Int'l & Comparative Law [Vol. 3:571 Treaties prohibiting various aspects of terrorism, such as hostage taking,' airplane hijacking,' sabotage,9 seizure of ships on the high seas, 10 and attacks on diplomats, 11 have also been ratified by a large number of states. 12 These Conventions, not only prohibit the conduct, but make it criminal 13 or require states parties to make the conduct criminal under their 1 internal laws, • punishable by "severe penalties,"" and require any state in which an alleged offender is found to either prosecute or extradite him. 16 In one respect, however, we have not progressed, and seem to have regressed: those responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity and terrorism, still go unpunished. They walk free, with impunity, and in some cases are even courted by heads of state and honored with the most prestigious awards that the international community can bestow. In the case of the former Yugoslavia, an International Criminal Tribunal has been established to try those responsible for war crimes and establishing themselves asjus cogens); Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather Than the States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1982) (noting that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well as about fifty additional declarations and conventions concerning issues such as discrimination against women and racial discrimination, have become a part of international customary law). 7. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S. 11081, 1315 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Hostage Convention] . 8. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641 , 860 U.N.T.S. 105 [hereinafter Hijacking Convention] . 9. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N.T.S. 177, reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 1151 [hereinafter Sabotage Convention]. 10. Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 668 (1988) [hereinafter Maritime Terrorism Convention] . 11 . Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter Internationally Protected Persons Convention] . 12. As of January 1, 1996, -157 States had ratified the Hijacking Convention, supra note 8; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 326-27 (1996); 157 States had ratified the Sabotage Convention, supra note 9, at 327-28; 94 States had ratified the Internationally Protected Persons Convention, supra note 11, at 441-42; 76 States had ratified the Hostage Convention, supra note 7, at 442; and 32 States had ratified the Maritime Terrorism Convention, supra note 10, at 398. 13. See Hijacking Convention, supra note 8, art. 2; Sabotage Convention, supra note 9, art. 1; Hostage Convention, supra note 7, art. 1; Maritime Terrorism Convention, supra note 10, art. 3. 14. See Internationally Protected Persons Convention, supra note 11, art 2. 15. See e.g., Hijacking Convention, supra note 8, art. 2, 22 U.S.T. at 1646, 860 U.N.T.S. 110. 16. See Hijacking Convention, supra note 8, art. 7; Sabotage Convention, supra note 9, art. 7; Internationally Protected Persons Convention, supra note 11, art. 7; Hostage Convention, supra note 7, art. 8; Maritime Terrorism Convention, supra note 10, art. 10. 1997] Halberstam 573 crimes against humanity. 11 A number of persons, including prominent leaders in the conflict, responsible for unspeakable atrocities, have been indicted. 11 But, they have not been apprehended and brought to trial. 19 There appears to be great reluctance to do s0. 20 Although they have been barred from running for office, and display of their pictures has been prohibited, those seeking office showed empty frames to convey the message that they identify with and have the support of these leaders whose image was barred. 21 The question of whether the leaders should be prosecuted has been the subject of scholarly debate, with some commentators taking the position that perhaps we should forego prosecution. 22 For example, Professor Ruth Wedgwood stated, [i]t may not be possible to bring about a peace settlement in the fonner Yugoslavia if the Tribunal is going forward with active prosecutions of the state leaders of the belligerent parties . You may need to accept a punto final, and sacrifice the prosecutorial interest in general deterrence for the sake of future peace. 23 She suggests that "the slow start. of the Tribunal reflects a fear that the Tribunal's work could impede the peace process. "24 The picture is even bleaker with respect to those responsible for terrorist acts . No international tribunal has been established to try terrorists who have killed innocent men, women, and children. Although 17. See U.N. SCOR, Res. 827, May 25, 1993, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1203. 18. See William Drozdiak, Top Serbs Charged With War Crimes, WASH. POST, July 26, 1995, at Al (reporting the tribunals indictment of Bosnian-Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and his top military commander, Ratlco Mladic). 19. See Robert Marquand, Bosnia War Crimes Judge Talks of Quitting, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 22, 1996, at 1 (noting that only seven of 74 people indicted by the tribunal for war crimes are in custody, none of whom are leaders). 20. See Philip Shenon, Mixed Signals on Bosnia War Crime Issue, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1996, at Al (discussing statements by Pentagon officials that NATO commanders are reluctant to step up efforts to capture accused war criminals because arrests might endanger peacekeeping forces).
Load more

Recommended publications
  • 10 Ecosy Congress
    10 TH ECOSY CONGRESS Bucharest, 31 March – 3 April 2011 th Reports of the 9 Mandate ECOSY – Young European Socialists “Talking about my generation” CONTENTS Petroula Nteledimou ECOSY President p. 3 Janna Besamusca ECOSY Secretary General p. 10 Brando Benifei Vice President p. 50 Christophe Schiltz Vice President p. 55 Kaisa Penny Vice President p. 57 Nils Hindersmann Vice President p. 60 Pedro Delgado Alves Vice President p. 62 Joan Conca Coordinator Migration and Integration network p. 65 Marianne Muona Coordinator YFJ network p. 66 Michael Heiling Coordinator Pool of Trainers p. 68 Miki Dam Larsen Coordinator Queer Network p. 70 Sandra Breiteneder Coordinator Feminist Network p. 71 Thomas Maes Coordinator Students Network p. 72 10 th ECOSY Congress 2 Held thanks to hospitality of TSD Bucharest, Romania 31 st March - 3 rd April 2011 9th Mandate reports ECOSY – Young European Socialists “Talking about my generation” Petroula Nteledimou, ECOSY President Report of activities, 16/04/2009 – 01/04/2011 - 16-19/04/2009 : ECOSY Congress , Brussels (Belgium). - 24/04/2009 : PES Leaders’ Meeting , Toulouse (France). Launch of the PES European Elections Campaign. - 25/04/2009 : SONK European Elections event , Helsinki (Finland). Speaker on behalf of ECOSY. - 03/05/2009 : PASOK Youth European Elections event , Drama (Greece). Speaker on behalf of ECOSY. - 04/05/2009 : Greek Women’s Union European Elections debate , Kavala (Greece). Speaker on behalf of ECOSY. - 07-08/05/2009 : European Youth Forum General Assembly , Brussels (Belgium). - 08/05/2009 : PES Presidency meeting , Brussels (Belgium). - 09-10/05/2009 : JS Portugal European Election debate , Lisbon (Portugal). Speaker on behalf of ECOSY.
    [Show full text]
  • The Oslo Accords and Hamas Response
    www.ijcrt.org © 2020 IJCRT | Volume 8, Issue 9 September 2020 | ISSN: 2320-2882 THE OSLO ACCORDS AND HAMAS RESPONSE DR. BALAL ALI (ASSISTANT PROFESSOR) DEPARTMENT OF CIVICS AND ETHICAL STUDIES ADIGRAT UNIVERSITY, TIGRAY, ETHIOPIA) ABSTRACT The signing of Oslo Accords between Israel and PLO was a historic event. There were several factors and events which played vital role but the intifada that started in December 1987 was the milestone event which led to the Oslo Accords. Hamas which was founded during intifada in a very short time became the face and voice of Palestinian liberation movement but it was the Oslo Accords which gave impetus to the movement. Throughout the entire Oslo Peace Period Hamas adopted a very calculative strategy. On the one hand it continued to criticize PLO and its leadership for selling out Palestinian cause in exchange of millions of dollars and on the other hand remain committed to Jihad including revenge killings against Israel. Thus, Hamas was able to preserve its identity and legitimacy as well as its revenge killings were widely accepted because it was presumed as the best means to redress Israeli assassinations. All these factors along with other gradually made Hamas what it is today. KEY WORDS: Israel, Hamas, PLO, Intifada, Islam, Zionism, Palestine BACKGROUND OF THE OSLO ACCORDS The Oslo Accords and process need to be explained in thoroughly structural terms, with an eye to the long- term projects, strategies, policies, and powers of the Israeli state and the PLO.1 The road to Oslo was a long one for both Israelis and Palestinians.
    [Show full text]
  • Palestinian Forces
    Center for Strategic and International Studies Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy 1800 K Street, N.W. • Suite 400 • Washington, DC 20006 Phone: 1 (202) 775 -3270 • Fax : 1 (202) 457 -8746 Email: [email protected] Palestinian Forces Palestinian Authority and Militant Forces Anthony H. Cordesman Center for Strategic and International Studies [email protected] Rough Working Draft: Revised February 9, 2006 Copyright, Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. May not be reproduced, referenced, quote d, or excerpted without the written permission of the author. Cordesman: Palestinian Forces 2/9/06 Page 2 ROUGH WORKING DRAFT: REVISED FEBRUARY 9, 2006 ................................ ................................ ............ 1 THE MILITARY FORCES OF PALESTINE ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 2 THE OSLO ACCORDS AND THE NEW ISRAELI -PALESTINIAN WAR ................................ ................................ .............. 3 THE DEATH OF ARAFAT AND THE VICTORY OF HAMAS : REDEFINING PALESTINIAN POLITICS AND THE ARAB - ISRAELI MILITARY BALANCE ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 4 THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY FORC ES ................................ ................................ .......... 5 Palestinian Authority Forces During the Peace Process ................................ ................................ ..................... 6 The
    [Show full text]
  • Israel, Palestine, and the Olso Accords
    Fordham International Law Journal Volume 23, Issue 1 1999 Article 4 Israel, Palestine, and the Olso Accords JillAllison Weiner∗ ∗ Copyright c 1999 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke- ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj Israel, Palestine, and the Olso Accords JillAllison Weiner Abstract This Comment addresses the Middle East peace process, focusing upon the relationship be- tween Israel and Palestine. Part I discusses the background of the land that today comprises the State of Israel and its territories. This Part summarizes the various accords and peace treaties signed by Israel, the Palestinians, and the other surrounding Arab Nations. Part II reviews com- mentary regarding peace in the Middle East by those who believe Israel needs to surrender more land and by those who feel that Palestine already has received too much. Part II examines the conflict over the permanent status negotiations, such as the status of the territories. Part III argues that all the parties need to abide by the conditions and goals set forth in the Oslo Accords before they can realistically begin the permanent status negotiations. Finally, this Comment concludes that in order to achieve peace, both sides will need to compromise, with Israel allowing an inde- pendent Palestinian State and Palestine amending its charter and ending the call for the destruction of Israel, though the circumstances do not bode well for peace in the Middle East. ISRAEL, PALESTINE, AND THE OSLO ACCORDS fillAllison Weiner* INTRODUCTION Israel's' history has always been marked by a juxtaposition between two peoples-the Israelis and the Palestinians 2-each believing that the land is rightfully theirs according to their reli- gion' and history.4 In 1897, Theodore Herzl5 wrote DerJeden- * J.D.
    [Show full text]
  • THE PLO and the PALESTINIAN ARMED STRUGGLE by Professor Yezid Sayigh, Department of War Studies, King's College London
    THE PLO AND THE PALESTINIAN ARMED STRUGGLE by Professor Yezid Sayigh, Department of War Studies, King's College London The emergence of a durable Palestinian nationalism was one of the more remarkable developments in the history of the modern Middle East in the second half of the 20th century. This was largely due to a generation of young activists who proved particularly adept at capturing the public imagination, and at seizing opportunities to develop autonomous political institutions and to promote their cause regionally and internationally. Their principal vehicle was the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), while armed struggle, both as practice and as doctrine, was their primary means of mobilizing their constituency and asserting a distinct national identity. By the end of the 1970s a majority of countries – starting with Arab countries, then extending through the Third World and the Soviet bloc and other socialist countries, and ending with a growing number of West European countries – had recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The United Nations General Assembly meanwhile confirmed the right of the stateless Palestinians to national self- determination, a position adopted subsequently by the European Union and eventually echoed, in the form of support for Palestinian statehood, by the United States and Israel from 2001 onwards. None of this was a foregone conclusion, however. Britain had promised to establish a Jewish ‘national home’ in Palestine when it seized the country from the Ottoman Empire in 1917, without making a similar commitment to the indigenous Palestinian Arab inhabitants. In 1929 it offered them the opportunity to establish a self-governing agency and to participate in an elected assembly, but their community leaders refused the offer because it was conditional on accepting continued British rule and the establishment of the Jewish ‘national home’ in what they considered their own homeland.
    [Show full text]
  • CEPS Middle East & Euro-Med Project
    CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY WORKING PAPER NO. 6 STUDIES JULY 2003 Searching for Solutions PALESTINIAN REFUGEES HOW CAN A DURABLE SOLUTION BE ACHIEVED? TANJA SALEM This Working Paper is published by the CEPS Middle East and Euro-Med Project. The project addresses issues of policy and strategy of the European Union in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the wider issues of EU relations with the countries of the Barcelona Process and the Arab world. Participants in the project include independent experts from the region and the European Union, as well as a core team at CEPS in Brussels led by Michael Emerson and Nathalie Tocci. Support for the project is gratefully acknowledged from: • Compagnia di San Paolo, Torino • Department for International Development (DFID), London. Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed are attributable only to the author in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which he is associated. ISBN 92-9079-429-1 CEPS Middle East & Euro-Med Project Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (http://www.ceps.be) Copyright 2003, CEPS Centre for European Policy Studies Place du Congrès 1 • B-1000 Brussels • Tel: (32.2) 229.39.11 • Fax: (32.2) 219.41.41 e-mail: [email protected] • website: http://www.ceps.be CONTENTS 1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 2. Background.....................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Fatah and Hamas: the New Palestinian Factional Reality
    Order Code RS22395 March 3, 2006 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Fatah and Hamas: the New Palestinian Factional Reality Aaron D. Pina Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Summary For the first time in its history, the Palestinian parliament is set to be led by Hamas, which the United States and European Union have designated a foreign terrorist organization. Although some lauded the generally free and fair election in January 2006, others criticized the outcome and accused Hamas of “hijacking” democracy. This report provides an overview of the new political realities in the West Bank and Gaza after the election, the challenges Fatah and Hamas face, and possible implications for U.S. policy. This report will be updated as warranted. For more information on the Palestinians, see CRS Report RL33269, Palestinian Elections, by Aaron D. Pina, CRS Issue Brief IB91137 The Middle East Peace Talks, by Carol Migdalovitz, and CRS Report RS22370, U.S. Assistance to the Palestinians, by Jeremy M. Sharp. Background On January 25, 2006, Palestinians voted in parliamentary elections and Hamas emerged as the clear winner, with 74 out of 132 parliamentary seats. Fatah, the dominant party in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), won 45 seats, and 13 seats went to other minor parties. Since then, several governments, including the United States, have cautioned that unless Hamas disavows terrorism, recognizes Israel, and accepts all previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements, diplomatic and economic relations with the Palestinian Authority may be circumscribed or ended altogether. Hamas1 During the 1970s and 1980s, Palestinians experienced a rise in political Islam, embodied in Hamas, founded in 1987 by the late Sheik Ahmad Yasin.
    [Show full text]
  • THE CHALLENGE of GAZA: Policy Options and Broader Implications
    BROOKINGS 1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW Washington, D.C. 20036-2103 www.brookings.edu ANALYSIS PAPER Number 23, July 2011 THE CHALLENGE OF GAZA: Policy Options and Broader Implications Daniel Byman Gad Goldstein ANALYSIS PAPER Number 23, July 2011 THE CHALLENGE OF GAZA: Policy Options and Broader Implications Daniel Byman Gad Goldstein The Brookings Institution is a private non-profit organization. Its mission is to conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations for policymakers and the public. The conclusions and recommendations of any Brookings publication are solely those of its author(s), and do not reflect the views of the Institution, its management, or its other scholars. Brookings recognizes that the value it provides to any supporter is in its absolute commitment to quality, independence and impact. Activities supported by its donors reflect this commitment and the analysis and recommendations are not determined by any donation. Copyright © 2011 1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 www.brookings.edu Table of Contents Executive Summary . iv Acknowledgements . ix The Authors . x Introduction . 1 The Nature of the Challenge in Gaza . 3 Factors Beyond Gaza to Consider . 18 Policy Options . 24 THE CHALLENGE OF GAZA: Policy Options and Broader Implications The Saban Center at BRooKings iii Executive Summary lthough both the United States and Israel Hamas draws on many resources to stay in power . devote tremendous attention to the Middle Most notably, Hamas has long exploited its infra- East peace process, the Gaza Strip and its structure of mosques, social services, and communi- HamasA government have continued to vex Ameri- ty organizations to raise money and attract recruits .
    [Show full text]
  • Legitimization of Terrorism by Fatah and the Palestinian Authority
    רמה כ ז מל ו תשר מה ו ד י ע י ן ( למ מ" ) רמה כרמ כ ז ז מל מה ו י תשר עד מל מה ו ד ו י ד ע י י ע ן י ן ו ל ( רט למ ו מ" ר ) כרמ ז מה י עד מל ו ד י ע י ן ול רט ו רור Legitimization of Terrorism by Fatah and the Palestinian Authority: Glorification of the Murder of the Israeli Athletes at the Munich Olympic Games November 11, 2018 Overview On September 5, 2018, the anniversary of the terrorist attack at the 1972 Munich Olympics was marked, in which 11 Israelis were murdered1. The Fatah Movement, which carried out the terrorist attack, mentioned the anniversary of the event in posts posted on its official Facebook pages. These posts glorified the attack (“a high-quality military operation”) and praised its perpetrators. The terrorists who carried out the murder are referred to in the post of the Fatah Movement in Nablus as “the heroes of the Munich operation;” and in the post of the Fatah Movement in Bethlehem they are referred to as “heroes of the Fatah Movement, sons of Yasser [Arafat].” The portrayal of the terrorist attack in Munich is also expressed favorably in a Palestinian Authority history textbook, in which the murder is described as an act carried out by Fedayeen (who sacrifice their lives by carrying out a military operation) with the aim of “attacking Israeli interests abroad” (History Studies, 11th Grade, Part 2 (2017), p. 54)2. The glorification of terrorists who carried out murderous terrorist attacks is a common phenomenon in the Palestinian Authority and Fatah.
    [Show full text]
  • What Drives Terrorist Innovation? Lessons from Black September And
    What Drives Terrorist Innovation? Lessons from Black September and Munich 1972 Authors: Andrew Silke, Cranfield Forensic Institute, Cranfield University, Shrivenham, UK. E-mail: [email protected] Anastasia Filippidou, Centre for International Security and Resilience, Cranfield University, Shrivenham, UK. Abstract: Understanding terrorist innovation has emerged as a critical research question. Terrorist innovation challenges status quo assumptions about the nature of terrorist threats and emphasises a need for counterterrorism policy and practice to attempt to not simply react to changes in terrorist tactics and strategies but also to try to anticipate them. This study focused on a detailed examination of the 1972 Munich Olympics attack and draws on the wide range of open source accounts available, including from terrorists directly involved but also from among the authorities and victims. Using an analytical framework proposed by Rasmussen and Hafez (2010), several key drivers are identified and described, both internal to the group and external to its environment. The study concludes that the innovation shown by Black September was predictable and that Munich represented a profound security failure as much as it did successful terrorist innovation. Keywords: terrorism, terrorist innovation, Munich 1972, Black September 1 Introduction A growing body of research has attempted to identify and understand the factors associated with innovation in terrorism (e.g. Dolnik, 2007; Rasmussen and Hafez, 2010; Horowitz, 2010; Jackson and Loidolt, 2013; Gill, 2017; Rasmussen, 2017). In part this increased attention reflects a concern that more innovative terrorist campaigns might potentially be more successful and/or simply more dangerous. Successful counterterrorist measures and target hardening efforts render previous terrorist tactics ineffective, forcing terrorists to innovate and adapt in order to overcome countermeasures.
    [Show full text]
  • Palestinian Groups
    1 Ron’s Web Site • North Shore Flashpoints • http://northshoreflashpoints.blogspot.com/ 2 Palestinian Groups • 1955-Egypt forms Fedayeem • Official detachment of armed infiltrators from Gaza National Guard • “Those who sacrifice themselves” • Recruited ex-Nazis for training • Fatah created in 1958 • Young Palestinians who had fled Gaza when Israel created • Core group came out of the Palestinian Students League at Cairo University that included Yasser Arafat (related to the Grand Mufti) • Ideology was that liberation of Palestine had to preceed Arab unity 3 Palestinian Groups • PLO created in 1964 by Arab League Summit with Ahmad Shuqueri as leader • Founder (George Habash) of Arab National Movement formed in 1960 forms • Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in December of 1967 with Ahmad Jibril • Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation (PDFLP) for the Liberation of Democratic Palestine formed in early 1969 by Nayif Hawatmah 4 Palestinian Groups Fatah PFLP PDFLP Founder Arafat Habash Hawatmah Religion Sunni Christian Christian Philosophy Recovery of Palestine Radicalize Arab regimes Marxist Leninist Supporter All regimes Iraq Syria 5 Palestinian Leaders Ahmad Jibril George Habash Nayif Hawatmah 6 Mohammed Yasser Abdel Rahman Abdel Raouf Arafat al-Qudwa • 8/24/1929 - 11/11/2004 • Born in Cairo, Egypt • Father born in Gaza of an Egyptian mother • Mother from Jerusalem • Beaten by father for going into Jewish section of Cairo • Graduated from University of King Faud I (1944-1950) • Fought along side Muslim Brotherhood
    [Show full text]
  • The Palestinians: Overview, 2021 Aid, and U.S. Policy Issues
    Updated September 9, 2021 The Palestinians: Overview, Aid, and U.S. Policy Issues The Palestinians and their ongoing disputes and interactions million (roughly 44%) are refugees (registered in the West with Israel raise significant issues for U.S. policy (see “U.S. Bank, Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria) whose claims to Policy Issues and Aid” below). After a serious rupture in land in present-day Israel constitute a major issue of Israeli- U.S.-Palestinian relations during the Trump Administration, Palestinian dispute. The U.N. Relief and Works Agency for the Biden Administration has started reengaging with the Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) is mandated Palestinian people and their leaders, and resuming some by the U.N. General Assembly to provide protection and economic development and humanitarian aid—with hopes essential services to these registered Palestinian refugees, of preserving the viability of a negotiated two-state including health care, education, and housing assistance. solution. In the aftermath of the May 2021 conflict International attention to the Palestinians’ situation involving Israel and Gaza, U.S. officials have announced additional aid (also see below) and other efforts to help with increased after Israel’s military gained control over the West Bank and Gaza in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Direct recovery and engage with the West Bank-based Palestinian U.S. engagement with Palestinians in the West Bank and Authority (PA), but near-term prospects for diplomatic progress toward Israeli-Palestinian peace reportedly remain Gaza dates from the establishment of the PA in 1994. For the past several years, other regional political and security dim.
    [Show full text]