Timor-Leste's Displacement Crisis
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TIMOR-LESTE’S DISPLACEMENT CRISIS Asia Report N°148 – 31 March 2008 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. THE ORIGINS OF THE IDP CRISIS ......................................................................... 2 III. WHO ARE THE IDPS? ................................................................................................. 3 IV. CONDITIONS IN THE CAMPS .................................................................................. 4 V. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENTS’ EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE CRISIS.............. 6 VI. OBSTACLES TO RETURN.......................................................................................... 7 A. FEAR/SECURITY....................................................................................................................7 B. PULL FACTORS......................................................................................................................8 C. POLITICISATION AND CRIMINALISATION OF THE CAMPS........................................................9 D. LACK OF HOUSING ALTERNATIVES .......................................................................................9 1. Failure to rebuild houses..........................................................................................10 2. Land issues...............................................................................................................10 VII. GOVERNMENT STRATEGY.................................................................................... 12 A. THE RECOVERY STRATEGY HAMUTUK HARI’I FUTURU........................................................13 1. Building homes........................................................................................................14 3. Building stability .....................................................................................................15 4. Building social economy .........................................................................................15 5. Building trust ...........................................................................................................15 VIII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 16 APPENDICES A. MAP OF TIMOR-LESTE ........................................................................................................17 B. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................18 C. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA SINCE 2005..................19 D. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES.........................................................21 Asia Report N°148 31 March 2008 TIMOR-LESTE’S DISPLACEMENT CRISIS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS The shooting of President José Ramos-Horta in not sparked the unrest among his urban supporters and February 2008 underscored the urgency of addressing sympathisers that many predicted, though there is still sources of conflict and violence in Timor-Leste. The potential for trouble after the curfew and state of siege unresolved displacement crisis is one of the important are lifted. But Reinado was a manifestation, not the problems, both a consequence of past conflict and a cause, of Timor’s divisions. The government needs to potential source of future trouble. Nearly two years address fundamental drivers of conflict, such as after the country descended into civil conflict in April communal tensions, problems within the security 2006, more than 100,000 people remain displaced. forces and lack of economic opportunities – before Successive governments and their international partners the next Reinado appears. have failed to bring about the conditions in which they might return home or to prevent further waves of Secondly, the provision of free food and shelter makes displacements. The new government’s national recovery life in a camp in some respects more attractive than the strategy needs to be properly funded and accompanied alternatives. A further factor that makes IDPs from the by a number of other crucial elements, most significantly countryside reluctant to leave the camps in Dili is that the creation of a fair and functioning land and property the capital offers many more economic opportunities. regime, an increase in overall housing stock, an end to Thirdly, some of the camps are in effect run by individuals the cycle of impunity and reform of the justice and and groups that have vested interests in keeping numbers security sectors. high, either because they control the black market for reselling food aid or because they believe greater numbers With 30,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) living give them more political weight. In a few instances, they in camps in the capital, Dili, the displaced are highly have intimidated or prevented people from leaving. visible evidence of the failure to provide security and enforce the rule of law. As well as a humanitarian Finally, many displaced do not have homes to go back tragedy, they are a conflict risk in their own right. The to. Destroyed or damaged houses have not been rebuilt, 70,000 living outside camps, with families and friends, and others are subject to ownership disputes that cannot may be less visible but are a significant burden on their be settled under Timor-Leste’s incomplete and inadequate hosts. system of land law. More generally, housing stock is simply not sufficient for the country’s population. Four main obstacles prevent the IDPs from going home. Unless more houses are built and systems introduced First, many continue to fear further violence from their for resolving ownership disputes and providing secure neighbours and do not trust the security forces to tenure, the sheer demand for homes will continue to guarantee their safety. This needs to be tackled by be an impediment to resettling displaced persons and speeding up security sector reform, including prioritising a driver for further displacements. community policing; prosecuting arsonists and violent criminals; and promoting a process of local and national Little beyond humanitarian aid was done in 2006-2007 dialogue and reconciliation. Still, in some cases, it will to address the displacement crisis, but the government not be possible for people to return to their original that assumed office in August 2007 has a more vigorous community, and alternatives will need to be provided. approach. It is phasing out universal food distribution in the camps and has not backed down despite protests and The attacks on 11 February 2008 on President Ramos- fears of unrest after Reinado’s death. It now is moving Horta and Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão, which left on a government-wide plan – the national recovery the former seriously injured, showed why many people strategy – which addresses many, though not all, aspects fear further violence. However, the death of rebel leader of the problem. Some senior officials still retain unrealistic Alfredo Reinado may help reduce fear, particularly if expectations about the ease and speed with which IDPs his remaining fighters can be dealt with. His death has can be induced to go home. However, the government Timor-Leste’s Displacement Crisis Crisis Group Asia Report N°148, 31 March 2008 Page ii as a whole is beginning to understand the complexity each line ministry, is allocated at least some and is planning on a more realistic multi-year basis. funding from central government resources, with the balance made up from international While the new national recovery strategy contains many concessional lending and external donor support. of the elements needed for reintegrating IDPs into their communities or, where not possible, moving them into 3. Restart the social solidarity ministry’s dialogue new homes, the government has not allocated sufficient processes, focusing on communities where resources to it. Only the first pillar – rebuilding houses violence displaced large numbers of people, to – is funded in the 2008 budget, and that inadequately. encourage them to accept IDP returns and allocate No money has been provided for the equally important additional resources to the ministry for this purpose. non-infrastructure elements, such as bolstering security, 4. Disseminate and adopt the recommendations of livelihood support, reconciliation and social safety nets. the Commission of Reception, Truth and Reconciliation’s Chega! (Enough!) report, as a The strategy also does not address options for rebuilding contribution to national dialogue and reconciliation. those properties – the majority – that are the subject of ownership disputes. Timor badly needs new land 5. Bring those primarily responsible for the 2006 laws, a land register, a system for issuing titles, and violence, including arsonists, to justice and ensure mediation and dispute-resolution mechanisms. Most land that the crime of arson is treated seriously by the ownership records were destroyed in 1999, and many justice system. people never had them in the first place; there are also conflicts between traditional, Portuguese and 6. Accelerate the process of security sector Indonesian land regimes. These problems underlie reform, giving priority to community policing many displacements – people took advantage of the and protection of vulnerable persons, while 2006 chaos to chase neighbours