Tegerm:.An Gen -Eral Sta~Ff: Training And3 Develiopine T Of' General .Taft

TeGerm:.an Gen-eral sta~ff: training and3 develiopine t of' general .tafTof fie rs Vol VIII , fita oi iv~c,~OM

#P.-031b

Hermann FOERTSCH General der Infanterie OjO', First Army

Project # 6

GERMN GONEAL S TAFF Vol VIII

TRAINING AND D VLOP1 T OF GERMAN GE2IERAL STA "F OFFICER

Translator: Code # 1. Editor: Dr. FREDE IKSEN Reviewer: Lt Col. VERNON

HISTORICAL DIVISION EUROPEAN COMMND z

Ns # P-031b

INDEX CONTAINED IN~ THE GERMN COPY MS # P-031b -a-

This is Volumn VIII of 30 volumes concerning the Training and Development of German Generaal Staff, Officers. It is divided into two general portions, manuscripts numbered P-031a are the results of studies solicited from individual writers by the Historical Division, EUCOM, and consist of Volumes XXII to XXX inclusive. The evaluation and synopsis given in Volume I does not consider these volumes Inasmuch as this material is considered to be of immediate value to the General Staff Department of the Army as well as to service schools from the level of Command and General Staff College up- ward, these volumes are submitted as they are produced rather than waiting for completion of the project.

Volumes I to XXI were completed for Historical D)ivision, EUCOM, by individual writers under the supervision of the Con- trol Group and consist of manuscripts numbei- ed P-031b. This particular series has been evaluated and co-ordinated by the Control Group.

LOUIS M. N.AW CKY Lt Col, Armor Chief, Foreign Military Studies Branch MS # P-031b

GERMAN G ERAL STAFF PROJECT LIST OF CONTRIBUT( S Vol 1* TRAINING AND DEWEN T OF GERMAN GENERAL. STAFF OFFICERS

u o Karl ALL[MEDINGER, General der Infanterie.

Vol II Auhr Guenther BLUIETRITT, General der. Infanterie..

Vol III Authk : Kurt BRENNEOKE, General der Infanterie.

Vol IV Author: Horst Freiherr von BUTTLAR, Generalmajor.

Vol V Author : Waldemar ERFURTH, General der Infanterie. Vol VI Author : Friedrich Joachimn FANGOliR, General der Infanterie.

Vol VII Author : Hans FELBER, General. der Infanterie.

Vol VIII Author; Herman FOERTSCH, General der Infanterie.

Vol IX Auhr Peter von CQOEBE, Generalleutnant.

Vol X Auk Franz BALDER, Generaloberst.

Vol XI Author: Wolf HAUSR, General ua jor. Vol XII Author: Helmnut KLEIKAIAP, Generalmajor.

Vol XIII Autho: Rudolf LANGRABUSER, Generalrnajor.o

*An Introduction and Explanatory Notes by Hans von ( EIFFENBERG, Gen- eral der Infanterie, and Comentaries on the Individual Contributions by George von ODENSTERN, General der Infanterie, are included in Vol I. lIls # P.-031b _c_C

Vol XIV Author: Wilheln LIST, - GeneralfeldmarschaUl.

Vol XV Author: August Victor von QUAST, Generals j or.

Vol XVI Author : Walter B JING , Oberst j.G,

Vol XVII Author: Hans Georg RIECHNMT, Oberst i.G.

Vol XVIII Auhr Albrecht 8CHUBEItT, General der Infanterie.

Vol XIX Author: Hans SPTH., Generalleutnant.

Vol 1X Author: Hermuann TElSKE, Oberst i.G.

Vol XX Author: Siegfried VVSTPHAL, General der Kavallerie.

Vol XXII Author: Fritz BB ~MSEN, Oberst ioG. Vol XXIII Atho: Werner von TIPPELSKIRCH{, Oberst i.G.. Vol XXIV Auhr Leo Freiherr Geyr von SCHIWPPENBURG, General der Panzer. Vol XXV Author: Hans SPEIDEL, Dr., Generalleutnant.

Vol XXVI Author: Wilhelm SPELDL, General der Flieger.

Vol XXVII Author: Albert K SELRING, Gene ral f eldwar schall.

Vol VIII Autho: Heinz GUBDRIAN, ^ Generaloberst, Vol M=I Author: Kurt MAELZEH, Dipl. Inf, Generalleutnant (Luftwafe), Vol XXX Author: Erich NDAIEBRG , l General der Artillerie. MS # P-031b

The Author

Hermann FOEBTSOH, GSC General der Infanterie Born: 4 April 1895, Drohnow, Westpreussen.

After training in the Officer Candidate School, Potsdam, in 1913-4, FO TSCH served in the field forces throughout World War I. From 1921-25 he received training for the post of assistant chief of staff and in 1926, in the rank of captain, was appointed Press Officer in Berlin,

When war broke out in 1939, FOMTSCH, then a colonel, was Chief of Staff, XXYI Infantry Corps, in position on the western front. In 1941 he was assigned Chief of Staff, II Infantry Corps in southeastern Europe. Promoted brigadier general in 1941 and major general in 1943, he remained in southeastern Europe until 1944, serving in turn as Chief of S1iCf of Army Group E and Army Group F. In November 1944 FO TSCE was promoted lieutenant general and transferred to the Kurland front as commander of 21 Infantry D~ivision where he later served as Commander in Chief of X Infantry Corps.

Early in 1945 General FOTSCH assumed command of the f irst Army in the western front, retaining that position until capitulation took place on 6 May 1945. The numerous books published by General FOERTSC, all on military subjects, include MILITARY SCIENCE, PRESENT AND FUTURE which was also published in the United States.

* Kriegskunst, heute and morgen, Publisher: Andermann, Berlin. MS# P-031b

CONTENT!

Page

INTRODUCTION by General von GR IFFENBERG ...... 3.

A. THE SECTION. EDUCATION AND) TRAINING OF GENERAL

STAFF OFFICERS *... . *. "if *0@*"" 6

1." The Airy ...... 6

II. Selection for General Staff Training . . 13 1. Students . " 13 2. Instructors. " . . . 18

III. The Education of General Staff Officers. 23 IV. The Training of General Staff Officers . 28 3.. The Plan ....." " . .. 28 2. Matter and Method of Instruction . . 33 3. Training During the War. "...... 49 V. Qualification for General Staff Officers 52

VI. Further Training of the General Staff Of- fficer. After Completion of t he uar Acad- emy Courses " ...... " 56 B. THE WAY OF THINKING AND ACTING OF THE GEMAN ARMY

G3ERAL STAFF. . . . . " . ... 60 Ms # P-03lb -1- von ~EFF FNBEtG General der Infanterie Koenigatein/Taunus 6 January 1950

INTRODUCTION

The present work has been written by a soldier whose name has become wellknown for his versatile activity as instructor and chief of higher Army Schools as well as for his publication of military books.

The author divides his work into two main parts:

A. Selection, Education, and Training of General Staff

Officers.

B, The Way of Thinking and Acting in the German General

Staff.

As to part A, special attention should be called to the introductory chapter entitled "The Aim" giving the author's conception of the ideal officer and the ways to achieve this aim. His ideal is the. "all-round officer" of cirlical judg-

nent and intellectual versatility. He objects to exaggerated specialization, which he thinks to be dangerous becaise of one-sidedness and will result in producing the "special" officer instead of the "all-round officer."

It is to the author's deepest regret that the German

Army High Command, which was the strongest factor in the Ioi # P-031b -2-

Wehrmacht, did not endeavor to win the leading position in the command of the total 'ehrmacht by organizing a universal

Wehrmacht General Staff. Whether in the face of HITILR and

GOERING it really would have been possible to win this superiority, .s still a question of dispute which has not yet been answered and probably should be answered in the negative.

Part III of the present work, "Selection for General

Staff Training," deals with students and instructors. In this part, the author's interpretation conforms, to generally accepted ideas. His suggestion of establishing a Government

Book Fund in order to enable every officer to acquire valuable books, is new.

The author's ideas with regard to the selection of instructors are based on personal experience and for this very reason may be considered valuable. He makes suggestions for a more thorough preparatory study program (visiting univers- ities, assignment to positions of command in different branches of service, and travelling abroad). He objects to the choice of retired officers and onesided technicians. He demands that the man in charge of instruction and of course the commander of the Academy be "thoroughbred officers," and rejects pedantic schoolmasters.

In' Part IV, the author deals with "education" and "training", comparing and defining these concepts. He arrives at MS P.-031b -3

the conclusion that there has been hardly another modern profes-

sion in Germany with so much screening and constant testing as

that of the General Staff officer, whose everyday duty meant

continuous probation. At the end of this chapter, the author

describes the main personal qualifications and virtues of the

General Staff officer, pointing out that these should be developed

and fostered while the officer is being educated. The author

does not fully agree with the curriculum of the War Academy after

its refounding. In his opinion, the curriculum was far too closely

connected with and too similar to the War Academy program of 1914.

Special knowledge was overrated, the students were almost over-

specialized, and the general understanding of really big problems was neglected. Foertsch draws up a three-year program which is roughly given as follows:

First Year: Division year. Commander of a division, or in some cases of a reinforced regiment;.training in secondary subjects.

Second Year: Army year. Commander of a corps or an army; review of first year's course.

Third Year: Wehrmacht year. Operations, including air force and navy, extensive service abroad.

Military History should be taught during all three years.

The author does not agree with the objection that the material is too vast to be mastered, for: Mns #~Pl -4-

1. One need learn only how to think, not what to think.

2. The aim of education should be the training of the abilities for critical judgnent and intellectual versatility. Special knowledge may be acquired in practice.

Such is the author's opinion. Obviously he is thinking of the ideal student and the ideal instructor. Whether these ideals will be found in reality may be doubtful. As usual, the golden mean will be the solution of the problem. A satisfactory curriculum should include thorough basic training as well as sufficient special knowledge. At the same time it should offer opportunities to develop a general understanding of big problems.

Foertsch's vast experience enables him to deal with such special subjects of instruction as tactics and military history, as well as with the most important secondary subjects i .uding operations, air force, military history, _and the system of training tours.

There is no doubt that everybody reading these last statements of the author will agree, especially regarding what he says about military history. (See also his basic discussion in Part

D) .* The author's opinion on efficiency reports, final examinations, and eventual selection of students (he divides them into three groups: First class students, average students, and below average students) will be also accepted and found right.

* See Vol I of Project # 6, MS # P-031. # P-03b -5-

In his last chapter of Part A*, the author objects to

a period of probation service prior to transfer to the General

Staff. He expresses his regret that the constant work load of

the prewar times prevented officers from pursuing further edu-

cation by themselves. There was no time left, to study foreign

languages or countries, to study military, political or economic

problems. The author holds that the abolition of the Armed

Forces Academy due to personnel difficulties in 1943, was a bad mistake. Instead of achieving universal education, all these

reasons led to the increased specialization of the officer, and that at a time when it was unavoidably clear that military

war was expanding to beccome total war.

The second paper (subject B) dealing with "The Way of

Thinking and Acting of the German General 'taff" is much shorter.

In the beginning Foertsch describes basic theory and organiza-

tion problens. He then comes to the General Staff's position, its importance, and its way of thinking and acting during World

War II.

Finally, Foertsch gives a sumary of the theory and the

conclusions found after having studied all the problems mentioned above.

/signed/ v. GREIFF NBBRG

* See Vol 1 of Project # 6, M13 # P-031. Mss P- ~lb -3-

A . THE SESLt~;TIO 9 EDUCA~C~TION. TRAINING OF EN.AL STAFF OFFIC

A critical review of conditions in the German Army before

World War I.

I. THE AIK

Any selection, education, and training must depend upon their aim. In this case the aim was to recruit General Staff officers who were to be assistants to the higher commanding officers of troops as well as to the leading men in the central headquarters of the Army High Command. The General Staff officer was not to become a higher commander himself, at least not in direct command, and he was not, as might have been the case after 1935, to be the operational assistant of the 'Wiehr- macht High Command in the conduct of war,

It is important to define this aim, the restrictions of which were partly conscious and partly voluntary, partly forced and, according to my observations, partly not fully recognized.

In the 100,00-mansarmy of the Weimar Republic, the aims, endeavor and actual position of which were based on SEfCKT' s ideas, there were in practice only a few higher commanders who had not passed through the General Staff career. (This army had the limited number of 42 generals). This situation 16 # F-~-031b -7- had to comply with SEECKT's intentions as well as with the requirements of so small a professional army, if it were not to become a mere police force. In the Third Reich the General

Staff officer was an "indispensable evil." HITLR and his closest advisers, who were not in the Wehrmacht, considered the General Staff officer to be the undesirable "intellectual independent thinker" whose sober and critical way of thinking did not comply with the requirements of the "faith'. Even then, some of the higher commanders were recruited from the

General Staff Corps, but, as time went on, the majority of the favorites were recruited from the troops, very much to the disadvantage of the military command as a whole. In my opinion, this forced restriction, as I may call it, considerably limited the possibilities of selection, education, and training. From the very beginning, the War Academy, the basic educational center of the General Staff, would have appeared different, or should have appeared different, if the aim had been for all higher commanders, regardless of rank and command assignments, to pass the War Academy.

Almost the same holds true for the Armed Forces Command and military command during the war, or their assistant commanders. It was neither the task nor the aim of the War Academy, which was an Army installation, to serve as a preparatory school for the Armed Forces Command machinery. Up to 1933, the "REIN- 5 P-031b -4

HARDT-Course" and from 1934 onwards, the Armed Forces Acad-

emy served this purpose. It is surprising and at the same

time also regrettable that the Army Command or the Army Gen-

eral Staff, fearing competition, opposed the idea of organiz-

ing an Armed Forces General Staff and establishing a War Acad-

emiy for its education. Considering the developments in war-

fare which required uniform command of the whole Armed Forces

and in view of the internal political development, this proved

to be a mistake. Those Army circles opposing the idea of organiz-

ing an Armed Forces General Staff, but aiming at the superiority

of Army influence, did not realize that they would have gained

this superiority if the Army, and consequently also the Anmy

General Staff, had won the command of the Wehrmacht' and succeeded

in occupying most of the key positions. The fact that Army Gen-

eral 3 taff officers, nevertheless, did hold leading positions in the

Army High Command is not contradictory to my opinion. The best

heads, the greatest personalities, and the most passionate hearts

should have been there. Actually the assignment to these posi-

tions became casual and in the end even routine.

At first sight it might seem unusual for me to start my review with the definition which I gave including the restrictions on our aim. In my opinion, however, they are most essential.

First, they are a proof that the General Staff was not the M' # P-031b -9-

deciding factor as people at home and abroad believe either by way of praise or of blame; secondly, it follows that the

Wgar Academy, the "nursery" of the General Staff, was always a higher technical school and never became a center of broad military thought.

A discussion here of the history of the General staff and the Var Academy with regard to their ideal aims would lead me too far. However, at the risk of using slogans, I should like to point out that SCHARNHOSTts "higher War Academy" in its more universal character was in conformity with the p hilosophy and the tendencies of his age. In the course of time, the

War Academy followed the general tendency towards specialization and consecuently developed more and more into a technical school. The universal staff officer became the General Staff officer, and at all times and especially after the refounding of the War Academy in 1935 (125 years after its foundation), its best heads tried to prevent the General Staff officer from becoming a special staff officer. The same decline may be also characterized by the series of the following concepts: education - training - mere drill. In the age of total war, the endeavor to build p a base for all higher commanding and leading positions should have led to a desire for the universal education of the General Staff officer. Saying that, I am fully conscious of the dangers of amateurism. I also realize 10# P-031b -10.-

the impossibility of achieving a thorough general education

in military and political subjects and in the conduct of war

at the same time. This problem will be dealt with in detail

in the chapter on training. I am not advocating scholastic

brains, but rather educated heads; I do not defend the unfortu-

nate slogan of World War I "the officer knows everything," but

the plain idea of SCHARNHORST : "One should not look at things

without considering the whole." If the German General Staff

officer nevertheless did accomplish all his tasks, it was be-

cause his ability resulted from the deeprooted tradition of

evaluating personal character higher than technical ability

and of estimating personality higher than position. This de-

velopment depends on the national character and its foundations

are rooted in the subconscious. There is no necessity for any

form of cult, but the memory of such really great personalities

as SCHARNHORST, MGLTKE, and SEEOKT must be kept alive. They

excel the professional-type staff officer, who often gained in-

fluence and trained outstanding technicians although lacking

historical understanding and general comprehension. My posi-

tive judgment with regard to the total achievements may as well

be the justification for the criticism iui my review which more

than once will expose the dangers of one-sided technical training. Consequently, I reject specialized training for General

Staff work; on the contrary, I hold, that the education of the

all-round officer is the right one. MS # P-031b -11-

"The General Staff officer has no name" -- this severe statement of SEECKT's was always the favored ideal in times of military success and led to the basic conclusion that the officer's sense of duty and self-control is more important than his name. "To be more than one seems to be" has become the second leading principle. It means that. personal qualifications are considered most important in the selection and education of officers. -A additional psychological study would be necessary to explain all the difficulties in conform- ing with the other fundamental requirements for the education of General Staff officers, especially critical judgment and intellectual versatility. These qualifications form the basis for a sound self-esteem, for a certain pride, for mental immu- nity in times of turbulent changes; however, they should not result in the arrogance for which the enemies of the General

Staff liked to blame the General staff officer. Critical judga. ment and a duty to obey will easily conflict and require much tactfulness. Intellectual versatility of the genuine military I commander includes the imaginative faculty for foreseeing future developmerts and practical results of decisions or orders given. The assistant to the comander also has to have at his disposal these noble qualities, characteristic of every leading man. "The true commander must be able to inspire his men with his own martial spirit and to turn them to activity" (General US # P-031b --12-

alter REINHARDT). The same holds true for the Genera) Staff

officer, with the limitation that the latter will have to con-

trol. his martial ambitions until he himself holds a position

of command. Scharrhorst waited and longed to become a commander

himself, but he never saw the fulfilment of these dreams,

The aim of German General Staff education and training

culminates in the requirement of combining ethically high qual-

ifications with intellectual capabilities in order to achieve

the highest martial morale and ability characterized by self-

denial and pride only in serving. The most difficult problem

in the selection, education, and training was to discover, develop and control these powers. US # p-031b -- 13-

II. EECTION FOR CiERAL STAFF

TRAINING

1. Students

From the previous chapter dealing with aims, it is quite obvious that the basic principle in selection of General Staff aspirants was to find the best men with regard to character as well as to ability or educational capacity. Selection was based on officerst efficiency ratings and the so-called Wehr- kreis examination. Naturally, all ratings may show errors; there are always people who make mistakes in judging others.

In that case it will be important to know the person who did the rating and to find a somewhat balancing estimate. It was most important for the Chief of the Wehrkreis general staff to take the trouble to form his personal judnent on the aspirants concerned. This was not always done with the same care.

In general, really bad mistakes seldom occurred. Minor mistakes could be corrected in the course of training.

Every year the War Ministry summoned officers of a certain age class to take part in the Wehrkreis examination. Most of them had had about five years of officers' service, their age ranging between 25 and 30 years. This regulation of the War

Ministry was successful. The officers were ordered to partic- MAS P-031b -14- ipate in the examination. Selection on a broad basis was possible and nobody was left out who might have been fit for the General Staff Service. Before World War I, participation in this examination was voluntary and consequently not complete. Dring a preparatory period those officers who obviously were not gifted to become members of the General Staff were

excluded0 As to the age, the choice was also right. The

aspirants had passed a certain period of line service, and, as far as possible, their educational capabilities were not yet exhausted.

The examination itself is a matter of dispute. Prepara-

tion was too short and not intense enough to acquire all the necessary knowledge. This, however, was not the aim, since actual training was to start at the Academy itself. The purpose of this examination was merely introductory, an occasion for study, an opportunity to examine the aspirants. Certainly, individual study is always important. Any examination offers the possibility of proving one's abilities. The examination pressure may be compared with the numerous "frictions" of war and has a certain advantage. The Wehrkreis examination was indispensable in order to guarantee a certain standard- ization of Wehrkreis in the whole of Germany. There was no other possibility of checking the general education level.

It was most essential that capable men should not be excluded # -031b -15- and that questionable aspirants should pass whenever their personal qualifications met the requirements. For this very reason it was possible to repeat the examination although the aspirants did not have much interest in doing so. Event- ually, possibilities existed of calling outstanding capable officers to the Viar Academy to attend an abridged one-year course. These students were called "unrecognized geniuses."

However, in general, selection and examination were hough enough; only a small number of these "unrecognized geniuses" were reported and after completing the course in the Academy most of then were not above average.

As far as I can recall, the examination and the preparation for it included only a few subjects, namely, tactics, topog- raphy, special training, history, one political subject, one foreign language or mathematics, physics, and general chemistry.

As to non-military subjects, a certain part, which could be studied, was announced in advance. This limitation proved to be successful. It was desirable for the aspirant to know typing.

General regulations were issued from above as to examination problems and the evaluation of results. The number of aspirants transferred to the gar Academy depended on the number of personnel required; every year the best aspirants were called to the Academy. However, since the educational level MS # P-033b -16- of age classes differed considerably, there should have been the possibility of reserving aspirants of a certain age class of a higher level for another course if they could not go to the Academy that very year. In that way an over-all balance might have been achieved.

In the individual Wehrkreis, preparations for the examination differed very much, depending on the abilities and the diligence of the General staff officers in charge of these preparatory studies as well as on the assistaice by superiors and comrades. Consequently the results of the examination turned out very differently. The result of individual preparatory studies depended upon the ambition and abilities of the applicant as well as on the possibilities for studying. Unfortunately, the

German Army offered its officers very little opportunities for individual study. Wehr1reis libraries were seldom accessible for officers in the smaller garrisons. The level of military technical journals was low and the articles were usually written by retired officers. Active officers had little time for publication work. And unfortunately even in higher military circles, the prejudice prevailed that writing was undesirable.

In some cases authors who had published new ideas had been rep- rimanded and therefore many others were deterred from writing.

More than once I proposed to the Minister of War the establishment of a book fund for officers, similar to the clothing fund, MS # P-031b -17-

but my suggestion was always rejected. The Minister of Aar

answered that he had provided cheap special editions of gen-

eral and technical literature published with Government sub-

sidies and that the officers might buy these books. He held

that intellectual life had been promoted considerably. Re-

viewing the past, I cannot help saying that the young German

officer did too little serious reading.

Social origin and financial status did not have any ef-

fect on selection, except that it will be always true that

a well-to-do person will develop his judgment by travelling, that the son of a scientist will not be onesided in military

interests only, and that the son of an old soldier's family

will display greater military talents than others. Occasion-

ally former non-commissioned officers passed the examination

and were successful in completing Academy courses. These, how-

ever, were exceptions.

During the examination, the branch of service from which

the officer-aspirant originated was of some effect. Officers

originating from technical troops seldom achieved more than

average results. That is only natural as in most cases they

had chosen the branch of service because they preferred technical subjects to tactics or strategy. Cavalry officers often

displayed good judgment for large-scale strategy and conditions.

Even without knowing from which part of Germany the aspirant 1i0 # P-031b -18- originated, the examining person could easily recognize the man from Wuerttemberg by his characteristic diligence, the

Rhinelander by his quick apprehension, and the Eastern Prussian by his slowness and steadiness. The deciding problem remained to choose the right man for the right job.

In this respect I had much experience with regard to officers originated from the Austrian Army. Among them there was a small number of officers who displayed outstanding qualifications and a large number of officers below the average. This fact may be explained by the foxmer type of general military training in the Austrian Army. Too much stress was laid on formality and trifles.

My final conclusion is that the selection of General Staff officers based on efficiency reports and examinations proved to be a good system.

2. Instructors

With reference to the previous paragraph there is no need to emphasize the extraordinary importance of selecting efficient instructors for the War Academy and choosing the right personalities. The principal requirements for instructors included:

Exemplary bearing, knowledge of human nature, teaching skill, and more than average ability. In order to avoid repetition, I should like to enumerate the main properties of a teacher as follows: Incorruptible judgment, no tendency for J MS # P-031b -19- partiality or oppression of subordinates, self-control, a certain benevolence in criticizing, approving of, or find- ing fault with, ether people. A strong sense of the value of the individual among his comrades is essential. Poor judgment and one-sided partiality will undermine the prestige of and the trust in the teacher even more than gaps in his knowledge or lack of ability could do.

There are many persons who are not capable of teaching.

Even outstanding philosophers and experts are often unfit for teaching. If a General Staff officer has pedagogical talents they should be given first mention in his efficiency report.

In the final rating at the Academy these gifts should be noted and then constantly re-checked.

In selecting General Staff instructors it is important to consider their former positions in the General Staff. It is best to choose a person who has held a Ia position in a division and in the General Staff Headquarters. I know ky personal experience how difficult it was to start teaching without having worked in a general staff with troops. These difficulties were increased by an unexpected transfer and lack of time.for preparation. Merely the review of basic tactical regulations required too much time taken from the preparation of lectures. Besides, knowledge about all the different branches of service had to be thoroughly reviewed and enlarged. MS # P-031b -20-.

In general, less attention was paid to the training of instructors than to their selection. The so-called "instructor's trip" offered the future General Staff instructors the opportunity to prove their capability of teaching, their knowledge, and their sound judgnent. But these trips lasted for two weeks only and sere by far too short. Success would have resulted if the future instructors had had about the following tra..ning.:

Voluntary attendance at lectures held by various academy teachers during a three months period and three months of assignments to special commands of their own free choice, preferably other than their branches and academies. Due to the constant lack of personnel in the German Army General Staff and possibly to financial reasons, however, the future instructor did not receive the thorough training actually required.

There is another important question, namely, whether the instructors of the main subjects -- tactics and history of war - are to instruct in all eourses and how long they should go on teaching. In my opinion, three years will be required to bring about the beneficial effect of personal experience. Of- ficers instructing in the first academy year should be able instructors with practical experience who train their pupils in fundamental concepts and technique of orders. It will do no harm if these instructors are a little pedantic. As training goes on, the hand should not be kept too tight over the Y15s # -03b _21_ students, they should be guided but not coached or drilled.

There should be a sound tendency toward generosity. A thoroughly planned rotation system may be of balancing effect in education and training as well as in judging the students.

It might be to the purpose to utilize certain teachers for instruction during the first years only and to have others for the higher courses. However, results and effect will indi- cate the right decision of this question.

Military history should be taught by active General Staff officers only. The utilization of retired generals for this subject, as was customary during the years before World War

II because of lack of personnel, did not prove successful.

They were too old and had lost contact with the progressing development of the art of war. Furthermore, too much time had passed since they had left active troop service.

Instructors in secondary subjects, such as communication service, cconbat engineering, and motor transport service, should be General Staff officers originating from the respective branch of service. Otherwise, they would be only expert technicians, that is, what I would like to call artisans instead of artists.

There will be no doubt that the appointment of the director of training c curses as well as the appointment of the commanding officer deserves special consideration. They themselves should have been instructors, and if possible should be generals, uaB # P-031b -22- with a broad outlook, in order to be able to guide people,

to settle disputes, but to avoid any craze for uniformity

or red tape. A general understanding of possible future de- velopmuents, a good memory for persons, and outstanding sound

judgment are equally important. The Director of Training and the Commanding Officer of the Academy should be true soldiers,

"thoroughbred officers," but they should never be recruited from the class of pedantic schoolmasters.

In general, the appointment of Academy instructors was right, however they should have been trained more thoroughly. MrS # P-031b -23-

III. THE EDUCATION OF GENERAL STAFF OFFICRS

I define: Education is the cultivation and development

of moral qualities, influence exercised on feelings, guidance

toward a desired type of behavior; tramini, on the contrary,

is the cultivation and development of certain abilities, the

influence exercised on thinking, the teaching of certain skills.

By this theoretical definition I do not mean that education and

training are separate things in practical life. Good training will always be of educational value, bad education will be a

disadvantage for training.

There is no need to explain in detail that the education

of the General Staff officer, who is to be the assistant to

the higher commander and will become the second in command in many cases, must be aimed at the perfectingrof all soldierly

virtues. It is not necessary to name all these virtues in this place; I shall only deal with those qualities which should

characterize the General staff officer.

Is it reasonable to expect any educational results if one con-

siders the method of selection for the General staff in the German

Anny and the age of those called to the War Academy? The answer will be in the negative as far as any transmutation of character is concerned. The answer will be affirmative as far as the promotion and cultivation of existing but not fully developed personal NirS # P-031b-24 qualities are concerned. Undoubtedly the answer will be a clear "yes" from the standpoint of the whole body of a Gen- eral Staff corps in which the individual will be merged and to which he will no longer belong as soon as he ceases to_ comply with the requirements of this body. Consequently selection, testing, and screening and the removal of undesirable elements will be very essential for General Staff education. Self-examination in the Gerran Army General Staff was continuous, although no written law or court of honor existed, and it proved successful. Even in peacetime, the every-day work of the

General Staff officer was an uninterrupted time of probation.

It is probable that no other modern profession with so severe a probation can be found.

The common cause had to be placed first. All personal interests had to become secondary. It was not always easy to combine unselfishness with the necessary ambition. The balance between ambition and self-denial became most difficult during

World War II, when the common cause was guided by political forces which very often were contrary to the general attitude of the General staff. The self-conquest thus requested from the individual has often been underrated. The deepest problem of soldiery, the question of implicit obedience, is involved as soon as anybody claims that the resistance of the General

Staff against HITLER' s policy should have been stronger. I # P-031b -25- should like to remind my readers that HITLER hated and despised the General Staff from the bottom of his heart and never ceased to mistrust it.

It was not always in connection with politics that the

General Staff officer had to prove his courage and that he had to defend ideas which were completely contrary to his own opinion. In military every-day. life there were many occasions on which he had to fight for plans or ideas contrary to his own and had to defend them until somebody made the final decisions and relieved him of his responsibility. There was never a lack of readiness in this regard.

Another quality required of the General Staff officer was personal force, a word which has very often been misused.

It did not mean that a hard man should be rude and heartless, qualities for which the General Staff officers were often re- proached by their enemies; it means that the officer should have consistency to carry out what is necessary. However, a very fine feeling should exist for recognizing the limits of the capacity of troops and for allowing reasonable time for relaxation.

Valour and veracity, even in cases where it is not-at all pleasant to tell the truth, are very important educational aims. During World Var II many officers failed in this regard.

Sometimes it was much more convenient to sin that way; sometimes US # P-031b -26-

they did so for ideal reasons. However, authority was easily

undermined in cases of insincerity.

Critical judgment is a matter of training. To overcome

the danger of arrogance is a problem of education. To recog--

nize the enemy, see through his plans, and take into considera-

tion all resulting consequences for oneself, even the most

disadvantageous ones, is a subject of military training. To

strengthen one's will, to increase one's self-confidence and

the belief in one's own powers is a very important problem of

education. Realistic thinking, facing facts without any illu-

sions or untruthfulness, is a matter of intellectual training.

The development and promotion of all heroic soldierly virtues

is a matter of morale. To lift up all the manly virtues of

the troops is a matter of the heart. The way of thinking and

feeling of the General Staff officer would be absolutely mis-

understood, if it were thought that these qualifications should

characterize the higher troop commander only and that the Gen-

eral Staff officer must not posseus them. He would be a poor

assistant if he did not keep step with the commander and thus

remained an outsider in the troop.

The examples just sketched may serve as an explanation of methods and means of training, resulting in the promotion of

educational aims, The instructor should have a special sen-

sitivity in order to point out the limits, to show the necessary, MS # P-031b -27- to explain what is still bearable and what is to be rejected.

Training at the Academy is only theoretical. Education in many respects will be even far more theoretical. The consequences of a wrong attitude or incorrect behavior, which in life and during the war will be corrected by experience, will be difficult to explain theoretically in the class room. The education among comrades and the judgment of onets own circles, however, will always be a standard to follow.

Many educational problems are so closely connected with questions of training that I will not go into more details; they would appear too theoretical. Practice proved that the educational aims, the methods and means at the Academy and later in the General Staff service, were correct. # P-031b IV. THE T'IRAINING OF GB AL STAFF OFFICERS

1. The Plan

The German General Staff was abolished by the Versailles

Treaty and its re-establishment was prohibited. Since divi-

sion staffs (Webrkreis Headqarters) continued to exist, re-

cruiting and training of officers for these staffs was indis-

pensable. At that time they were called "Fuebrer 5 tabsoffi-

ziere" (Operational Staff Officers). The name for those offi-

cers still on training was "Fuehrer-Gehilfentt (Assistant Chiefs

of Staff), but it is not logical to call them so. Training

was provided locally in the seven Wehrkreis in each of which, starting in 1921, about ten young officers were gathered for

two-year courses. After completion of the two-year course, a very thorough screening took place and only a small number --

at my time 14 out of 70 officers -- w ere called in for the

additional course that was the third year of training, held at

the Ministry of liar in Berlin. Temporarily one practical year was put in between the two-year course and the third year of training in order to revive the troop service experience of the officer in his own branch of service. In order to keep this training system secret it had to be very highly decentral- ized and it was almost "impossible to achieve uniformity all Ms # P-031b -2' over Germany. However, there was no other way, and within its limits this system proved to be a good one. In about

1929 training was centralized, when the so-called "Officers'

Courses" in Berlin were introduced, which included two, in some cases three age classes. After the re-establishbent of military service in 1935, the War Academy was refounded aid a two-year course introduced -- an additional third year being already planned. The third year of training was seldom provided since the demand for General Staff officers increased when rearmament began. In 1938 it was planned to reintroduce the three-year training courses.

I understand that these plants were not based on the actual requremezis of a possible future war and the development of modern warfare but rather improvised in connection with the speed of rearmament and on the other hand based on the system of the "old War Academy" before World War I. This reconstruc- tion of the War Academy and looking backwards was a drag-chain.

The sphere of modern warfare had extended; the requirements of total war should have influenced the training of future Gen- eral Staff officers. For this reason, an extension of the training period would have been desirable. However, political events in Germany increased the speed of everything. As a consequence, the training system of General Staff officers had to be carried out, thereby avoiding two difficulties: Either MS # P-031b -30- the level would become lower or students would be overfed in too short a training time. As far as my experience goes, the latter was the case. It would have been better to reduce training to really essential points, providing limited but detailed knowledge. In fact, many things were taught which in peacetime would soon be outgrown and in case of war would even sooner become obsolete and out of date. The danger existed that interest in really essential things would grow weak. Then one of the best guiding principles would be broken in the very beginning, namely, to distinguish between essential and unessential things.

The short-sightedness existing in high circles may be illustrated by the following example. In 1937 consideration was given to discontinuing the tactical instruction on the armed division,

"since this was a special troop," instead of discontinuing or reducing the very poor instruction on motor transport; service and saving the time for tactical instruction.

During the years preceding the war, the question of two or three years of training remained a question of dispute. In my opinion, the alternative should have been: Narrow technical training or all-inclusive military training. In order to train the all-round General Staff officer to be an efficient assistant to the Army command staffs, two years of training would have been enough. If the plan was to train the future commander for tatal war at the v ar Academy, three years of training would Was # P-031b -31-

be required ai d that training should have been provided ac-

cording to absolutely different plans. Before the war, in-

struction in the most important subject, namely tactics,

started with the reinforced infantry regiment, passing then,

still during the first year of training, to the division

(excluding the armored division). During the second year of training, instruction was given on the command of divisions of all branches of service and finally dealt with the Army corps. The third year of training, if provided at all, started again with the command of divisions, then dealt with the

Army corps, giving more detailed information on the latter.

Instruction in military history and supply arms and services was given throughout all three years of training; in secondary

subjects, motor transport services, communication service,

engineering and transport, instruction was provided during the first and second years. Instruction on the Air Force was a

secondary subject. The whole instruction program was very manifold, full of intersecting repetitions and parallels lacking a real center. Teachers instructing in secondary subjects had to teach many classes and usually the assignments they gave their students were the same in all the classes. With regard to secondary subjects, the influence of the chief of the training course, who at the same time instructed in tactics, was too little.

The new curriculum I drew up in the spring of 1939 included about the following: MS II?-.031b _32.--2

First year -- Division year: Command of a division; secondary subjects as before. Second year -- Army year : Com- mand of a corps or army, frequent repetitions in divisional command problems as seen from a broader viewpoint, discontinuation of all secondary subjects except for transportation and supply arms and services, inclusion of all special subjects into tactics, calling upon instructors in special subjects to participate in the instruction in tactics. Third year --. Wehrmacht year, including service abroad: Instruc- tion in Army problems in connection with the 'ehrmacht as a whole, introduction to command problems with regard to the Luftwaffe and Navy, service in commands abroad.

Instruction in military history was to be given throughout all three years. With some other subjects I shall deal later.

In my opinion, the Army General staff officer would have been successful in meeting all requirements of World 1ar II if training had been planned on this broader basis. During the war, many of my former students honestly affirmed that they had acquired too much unessential knowledge during their training course at the Academy. They now had to forget these unessential things and instead to concentrate on a few essential points.

The objection that is was impossible to cover everything, I can only answer by saying that this is not true if one distinguishes 1S # P-031b

between the essential and the unessential. If the Army

General Staff officer, nevertheless, satisfactorily fulfilled

his tasks in World War II, this fact will rather prove the

thoroughness of selection and general education than the right way of training at the Var Academy. MEy judgment may appear

severe and, probably, will be unusual. However, if anybody

were given the task of reorganizing the War Academy, he would

surely prefer the more univei l system of training to narrow

specialization, although he might disagree with me on some de-

tails. Three basic rules should be kept in mind, and training will be thorough:

a. Teach h to think and not what to think.

b. The aim of education is to be critical judgment and intellectual versatility.

c. Only simplicity will prove successful.

2. Matter and Method of Instruction

Naturally, the main subject of all three years of train-

ing was tactics, that is, the art of leading troops. I have

already made some statements on tactics in my chapter dealing with our plan. In addition, I should like to state that start-

ing with the reinforced infantry regiment the young officers may easily fail to recognize its connections with the larger S #-031b -34- tactical unit, the division, especially with regard to artillery. It would have been better to start training from the divisional basis, occasionally going back to the regiment.

There was too little training with bigger units. I do not agree that work on a larger scale will be less thorough. My experience has taught me that the understanding of military situations, as well as the feeling for the necessity of executing orders given from above, will be increased whenever the problems the instructor puts before his students are thoroughly logical. These problems may as well be skeletonized to define briefly the enemy and the mission to be performed. The war has again proved that it is an exception for units smaller than a division or even for divisions to Light independently without orders from superior authorities. If instruction is given on a bigger scale, the tendency to act without considering the whole situation with regard to other units also, or to act against orders, will be diminished.

There will be enough freedom left for making decisions and issuing orders. However,- many mistakes were made during World

War II through departure frou tactical orders, which usually leave execution to subordinate units, and by trying to have a say in every matter; that is, by ordering too much. This danger cannot be overemphasized in theory teaching.

The amount of time available for tactical instruction was M # P-031b --3 satisfactory. Tactics was given four or five times a week for two hours each time. In addition, there was one available day a week. The method of instruction was that of applied examples, May reading, map exercises, map maneuvers, tactical rides or walks, and one - or two-sided staff exercises, illustrated certain situations for which the students had to find decisions and issue orders. situations covering a fairly long period of time were preferred. If the scope was broad enough, a large number of subjects -- attack, defense, withdrawal, etc. -- could be worked on continuously and in a manner instructive in giving orders, without the instructors and students having to keep orienting themselves in new circumstances.* This method was also the most useful in brining out the psychological aspects; that is, the material and human complications which play such a large role in warfare but can only be presented with difficulty in theoretical training. However, in connection with problems thus based on a permanent situation, care must be taken to avoid boredom. Current situations in map maneuvers and tactical rides or walks are especially well suited for training in making decisions. Short decision problems, dictated for entry on the map and to be solved in a few moments, have proved particularly valuable. Vwhen instructed the second year, I usually let the students prepare these short decision problems, S # P-031b -36-

forcing them to think over carefully the tactical developments leading to the required decision. I myself assigned the subject and asked them to submit the whole problem as

early as possible, in order to change it if necessary. Im- mediately after the students had solved the problem, the one who had made up the question had to hold critique which was

usually a test of his judgment. On other occasions, too,

e.g. on tactical rides, I was very successful in having the

students share in preparing the situation, but I kept con-

trol myself.

It is a genuine art to keep control while letting the

play maneuver take its course freely according to the deci-

sions made by the students while they are working on the

problem. Nevertheless, the instructor must hold the reins

in order to secure the fulfilment of the purpase. If the

students should ever have the impression that the instructor is trying to force decisions on them, their initiative will be reduced. In my opinion, th4 free possibilities in these maneuvers and the great variety of reports, orders, and impres.-

sions resulting from them actually represent the strong

point in the German method of tactical instruction. In many respects instruction was bound to tradition. When I visited

the Bulgarian War academy in the summer of 1939, I described

our methods to the Commanding Officer of the Academy which It # P-031 -37- was built up on French patterns, and suggested that he make use of them. However, he rejected our methods, saying that they were by far too difficult for his officers. When, in 1938, I held a preparatory course for Austrian officers transferred from the Austrian Army, they, too, had some dif-

ficulties in getting used to the German methods. Both, the

Bulgarians and the Austrians preferred more systematic methods, which, however leads to rigidity and does not provide training in intellectual versatility.

For this very reason I always rejected model orders. I

They are only bridges for donkeys, which break in case of need, since they may be applied in one certain situation only.

In order to familiarize himself with basic ideas, the student should study regulations and try to learn them very thoroughly in private study. The same holds true with regard to so-called approved solutions. However, in spite of freedom of interpretation and opinion, it will be absolutely necessary for the instructor to explain his own opinion very clearly as well as to point out the mistakes made by the students.

In assigning and solving tactical problems it will be most difficult to make them really war-like. They have to be tactically natural and entirely logical, and at the same time the instructor has to give them a war-like character, producing the very tension characteristic of war events. The Ms # P-031b -3 fact that working conditions during war are much more difficult should also be considered. Personal experiences will be helpful for both instructors and students. The recon- struction of past military situations and war events is not advisable because in most cases it will appear unnatural.

Examples should be given; repreduction avoided. I should like to stress this with special regard to war events which have happened a very long time ago, naturally under different tactical and technical circumstances. There is never a repetition of two entirely identical situations. Besides, it is difficult to reconstruct the psychological side as well as the whole atmosphere. Well-trained insight and a certain amount of imagination are better than any stereotyped repro- duction.

The tactical instruction at the 1 ar Academy, as the main subject of General Staff officers' training, was given in the right way. In World VWar II, as before, the German High Com- mand was able to meet all situations and was tactically superior to thy enemy in most cases. Probably this advantage might have become even more evident if foreign tactical methods had been more thoroughly studied. Success is the more certain, the better one understands the way of thinking of the enemy.

One should not forget, however, that it is most difficult to provide instruction on foreign tactics. One's own way of S# P-031b -39- thinking is always bound to traditions and lectures on coma- mand methods in foreign armies have generally proved of value

only for the person wno gave them.

One point which may be criticized in German tactical in-

struction was the preference given to tactical attack.*. There

is no :Idoubt that problems dealing with decisions and orders made during-attacks are more interesting and have a favorable

influence on the students' boldness and personal initiative,

both qualities being of so great importance during war. This, however, should not be the reason for neglecting other forms

of combat. It is typical that foreign students of the German

ar Academy have characterized this onesidedness as a certain weakness. In criticizing this onesidedness, however, they

could not deny the educational value of attack training for troops and commanders.

The two-year course at the Icademy did not include any operational training, by which I mean the leading of bigger units. The tactical material was so abundant that the few tactical problems which might have been of an operational character were not enough. In general, the operational instruction was left to later studies of the General Staff Officer except when he received it during his instruction in military history of war. Opinions will differ. I think it would have

* Literal translation -- taktischen Angriffs. # P-031b -40- been right to include training in operational thinking in the course at the Academy in order to widen the officerst

horizon as well as to intensify their insight into large-

scale conditions. At least the third year of training at the

Academy shouldhave included the subject of operational in-

struction. It might have been combined with instruction in

"theory of war", which could be easily expected in the Ger- man:. my. How often the name of the greatest theorist and philosopher of war of modern times, the name of Clausewitz, was mentioned) And how seldom did people really study and

read bimi Also the book written by Field Marshal General von

de GTZTZ'-PSHA on the conduct of warfare remained almost unknown. Furthermore, the ideas of great foreign soldiers, e.g.

FOCH, should have been studied. The lack of this subject of instruction may be explained by the fact that the German sol-

dier refused to deal too much with theory, Furthermore, the value of Schlieffen's ideas, which were considered to be a summary of modern military science, has certainly been over-

estimated. It is typical that - as far as I know -- no regulations or instructions on operational problems and stra- tegical principles existed in the German Army before World

War II. Nevertheless, the German Military Command - do not mean the Hitlerite amateurism - did not lack new ideas; neither did it lose its good reputation of being operationally MS #P-O3lb -41- efficient. Much more might have been achieved if a basis of systematic training had been provided.

The instruction in military history could serve only as poor compensation for systematic operational studies. I Historical studies included past events only, which can never provide the insight into possible and probable future was problems. It is true that strategic principles have not changed in the course of many centuries but their application depends on the means of conducting warfare, technically as well as intellectually. Insight into future possibilities will be all the more important, if a new development comes into use, such as in the case of aviation or radio. The failure to provide this insight is one of the weakest points with regard to instruction in military history, and according to my opinion became quite evident in the time before World

War II. verything interesting was studied and demonstrated, but matters important for the future were neglected. There was even neglect to remind the students that these interesting things would not repeat themselves, Schlieffen's statement concerning the value of military historical studies for explaining past and future events may be only partly right.

Of course, military history showing the development of warfare, informing us about the great personalities and teaching us the principal laws of strategy, are important for our UiS # P-031b -42- present time and for the future. However, the description of individual wars and battles may be only of poetic value, Operational training cannot be up-to-date if a student has to make in 1937 new decisions for Napoleonic military situations.

The average officer of today, whose thinking is based on technical inventions such as radio-telegraphy, aerial reconnaissance, etc., cannot even understand how to go back in imagination into Napoleonic times. That would be only playing and would lead to false conclusions. Only the last war, and even that with many restrictions, may serve as material for operational training. But as far as I could observe, the very last phases of World War I, that is the big battles of materiel have not been studied at all, historical research being too slow0 Studies of war history will be very valuable if they include political and military sides of the conduct of warfare and if they deal with predominant personalities and forces.

Only a few instructors succeeded in giving their audiences a vivid picture of those great personalities who played an important part in the histy of warfare and whose influence may be valued as highly as that of great battle leaders - the organizers ef armies, the teachers even in tines of peace.

Who among the instructors in military history really stressed the importance of military politics? The term might appear new, but it is only a new name; the subject has always existed. IBS # P-031b -43-

Wie were onesided in teaching the history of battles and cam- paignso We did not teach military history. In general, individual studies by the students with regard to military history included the delivery of one lecture, the subject of which was assigned in accordance with the tendencies described above. During my time of training I had to deal with two subjects which seemed to be of some value:

1. The oper'ational importance of fortifications in World War I, and

2. Fighting for rivers.

These subjects included future possibilities.

The educational value of studying military history, be

it even in the narrow sense critisized above, cannot be denied.

The student will be taught to respect great men and their deeds.

The study of wars of the past will eliminate presumption and

arrogance. One will hardly find anything more valuable for self-

control and self-education than studying the biographies, the

ideas and deeds, of great soldiers of all nations.

Among the main secondary subject, instruction in supply

arms and services was the most important one, Methods were parallel to those in tactical instruction; a certain situation was given on which the students had to work. This subjectias

taught by especially outstanding experts among the General Staff

officers, and consequently fulfilled its purpose entirely.

Although the students were never very much interested in this MS # P-031b -44-

dry subject, they never failed to recognize its importance.

As to supply services, changes in organization could take place

very quickly and then the knowledge acquired might appear ob-

solace. Therefore, the right method of instruction was to work

out the basic principles and to train the students with regard

to possibilities and improvisations. It was of no use to

emphasize the application of rigid rules. Since the majority

of the young General staff officers became Ib's in divisional

General Staffs after leaving school, the practical value of

instruction in supply services should not be underestimated.

Conditions with regard to transport are very similar.

Instruction was provided by highly trained General Staff officers.

It would have been advisable to include motor transport service

in the instruction on transportation in order to avoid an extra

subject. The details dealt with during the lectures on transport

in general referred to armored units and might as well have been taught during tactical instruction. The fact that armored units and armored combat represented something new led to exaggerated detailed training which remained rather theoretical, since the instructors did not have any personal experience in this sphere.

This will lead me to another basic problem with regard to instruction in special branches of service, communication service, engineering and transport. Instruction in all these IA # P-031b -45- subjects was by far too specialized. It would have been more practical for the future work of the General staff of-

ficer to provide a sort of summarized instruction in "war tech-

nique" including special branches of service and emphasizing possible developuents. Especially technical questions should have been dealt with by expert instructors during the tactical training. Even in war, the General Staff officer is not supposed to know all technical' details of special arms. All staffs have technical officers who are consulted in case of war. The General Staff officer should be generally informed on communication tactics, engineering tactics, etc. For this very purpose a few lectures would have been sufficient.

On the other hand, some basic lectures on organizational problems, maybe "organizational theory," should have been provided. In times of war, the General Staff officer had to do much organizational work and therefore some theoretical and historical instruction would have been very useful.

The training of General Staff officers included instruction on the Air Force. It was- rather difficult to find the best methods with regard to this subject. For many reasons, which were partly of a political nature and will not be dealt with in detail3 the Air Force represented something special within the German Armed Forces. Therefore, at the Anmy Academy, instruction in the Air Force was regarded as something separate MS # P-031b -46_.

and not belonging to general tactical instruction. This attitude did not seem to promote the mutual understanding that

was so absolutely necessary. 4ctually, instruction in this

subject was limited to reconnaissance. In this regard, too, a third year at the Academy would have been very useful and

training assignments to Air Force units would have proved much

more successful.

Only a few extra lectures were given on navy problems since

the contact between commanding authorities of the Army and

the Navy has never been very close.

Another series of extra lessons was provided on war econ-

omy and psychological warfare. If a third year of training had

been introduced, these subjects should have been dealt with more thoroughly. They might have been summed up under "military

politics", including all general political, economic, financial, and propaganda questions and in addition international law, the latter subject being not taught at all.

Upon mature consideration, lectures on general history were again introduced a few years before the war began. These lectures were held by professors from the University of Berlin.

It is hardly necessary to explain how very important it was to have the General Staff officer, the future leader, well trained in history. Due to the vastness of material, instruction in history could only serve as a stimulus for individual studies. IS # P-031b -.47-

And then it is most important for students to occupy themselves with historical events of the immediate past which are most disputed and usually too superficially dealt with by school teachers. It proved best to start from the beginning of the

18th century. In addition, important historical events in foreign countries should be included in the study.

Course in foreign languages were voluntary, the reason being lack of time. If, in general, requirements with regard to foreign languages had been higher within the Army, this would have been profitable for the education of the General

Staff officer. A.period of service in foreign countries during the last year of training at the Academy would certainly have increased the interest in foreign languages. Here, too, it must be remembered that, due to the unusual speed after 1935, many desirable things had to be neglected.

Up to ixw I have dealt only with the theoretical instruction of the General Staff officer. IVe still have to consider the work of the future General Staff officer outside the class- room. Tactical rides were most important. The Academy curriculum included: one ten-day ride at the beginning of the training course in autumn, one eight-day ride into the moun- tains in winter, horseback ride of about 8 days in spring, and one 12- to 14- day ride after completion of theoretical training, usually about Whitsuntide. With regard to training and #f P-031b -4 -

education as well as to the judnent of the students these rides were exceedingly important. They promoted comradeship in the officers' classes, usually groups of about twenty men, and at the same time offered the most intense possibilities for continuous tactical training without interruption by other lee- tures. Furthermore, they offered opportunities for physical and

intellectual training under conditions that were often similar to war conditions. The rides were made throughout Germany, not only in frontier districts, and included inspection of ob-

jects of historical and cultural interest.

TDuring the summer following the ccanpletion of the Academy

training, the officers were temporarily assigned to the main branches of service, namely, infantry, artillery, and armored units, to fir Force units, and, depending on the units from which they originated, to technical units also. Finally, the officers participated in field maneuvers of combined units and in the autumn maneuvers. There was much argument about the value of these temporary assignments. Usually they lasted for about six to eight weeks and were too short for getting really familiar with the more or less unknown special branch of service.

On the other hand, the period was too long for a short survey.

According to my experience, these temporary assignments were valuable because of the insight they provided and which theoretical training could never provide. The officer coming from 1vS # P-O3lb -49- another unit learned most if he was soon given the command of a small unit (platoon, company, or battery) and assisted therein by a young experienced officer of the same branch.

During the last few years preceding the outbreak of the war, these temporary assignments took place before the corresponding theoretical training began; that is, temporary assignments to infantry or artillery units preceded the first year of training at the academy and temporary assignments to armored units preceded the second year of theoretical training.

In addition to tactical rides and temporary assignments, instruction in special subjects included inspections of fortifications, sharpshooting, demonstrations of new weapons, and visits to armaments plants. Generally, students liked these interruptions in the theoretical instruction in the class- room.

Reviewing the eight months' course of training (the period of temporary assignment and leave is not included), I cannot help saying that much work was required both from students and instructors. However, the most critical judgment of the individual student could not deny the general success.

3. Training uing the War The training of General Staff officers during World War II # P-031b -50- was a makeshift. Constant changes took place. At the beginning of the war and during the first months of the fight against

Russia, the training of General Staff officers was even discontinued. In 1940 - 41, so-called General Staff Courses which lasted for ten weeks were introduced. During the last two years of the wax, these courses were extended to last six montku

The lack of personnel, HITL's sudden changes in organizational plans, and too favorable judgment of German prospects in tbe war were the reasons for the lack of systematic planning with regard to the training of General Staff officers. It was obvious that war. experiences of the individual permitted a shorter time of training. On the other hand, ten weeks was by far too short a time for training and education although long enough for selection and examination. Therefore, very naturally, existing qualifications and already acquired knowledge and abilities became the only foundation. If, previous to his career as a General Staff officer, the young officer had been adjutant in a regiment, or administrative officer (especially

01) in division or corps staffs, his work in this capacity proved to be the best training. Furthermore, the officers originating fron the main branches of service were superior to these originating from special branches. Even in time of war, the latter did not have the necessary insight into tactical leadership. Nevertheless, these centralized wartime courses had the advantage of granting a certain degree of equilibrium. MS # P-031b -51-

If General Staff aspirants had been transferred to General

Staff positions directly from the front, selection would have

differed too much.

These short courses included the following subjects:

Tactics, supply arms and services, and introductory studies

of transport ard Air Force problems, as well as work on prob-

lemus which due to war events became especially important.

Today it is impossible to find out whether there was a very considerable difference in practical utilization between those General Staff officers who had received their training before the war and those who had received training during the war. I, myself, did not notice considerable differences in those staffs which I headed. I, therefore, advocate a more universal, that is a less specialized, training of General

Staff officers in time of peace. The advantages of a more universal system of training would became evident at a later time after some years of practice, supplementing the valuable theoretical training. M3 # P--031b -52-

V. QUALIFICATION OR GENIMAL STAFF OFFIC S

The decision as to wham was qalified to be a General

Staff officer was based on the final judgment of the instructor in charge of the class, who at the same time was teacher of tactics. It was up to him to decide to what degree he wished to condider the ratings of the student by the other instructors.

Undoubtedly, achievements in military history and supply arms and services had to be taken into consideration in order to six w the special abilities of the student in these subjects. Addi- tional rating by the conductor of the whole course and the commanding officer of the Academy was required in order to furnish a certain standard of rating with regard to all students in the course. There were usually about five to eight classes with about twenty students in each; and naturally the rating of the instructors in charge of the classes could not be uniform. In order to make the final decision as to who was qualified, it was necessary to consider the level of requirements set by the instructors in charge of the classes. Probably, a uniform rating would have been easily achieved by establishing a final examination with the same problems for all students. As far as I know,, no examination of this kind was ever planned. I personally consider such an examination unnecessary. I am of the opinion that the whole time of training, at least the last year, offered mS # P-031b -53- the instructor in charge of the class many opportunities to judge his students correctly. If he did not feel sure about some of his students, these "weak ones" were pointed out to the chief conductor of the course or the commanding officer, e.g. during the final tactical ride. There was no rating of the students' achievements in the different subjects. An efficiency list was set up for every class. According to this list, the students were divided into three groups. The first group was the so-called "stop group" and comprised the best students; the second, or average group, included students with average achievements and abilities; and students showing abilities below the average and not fitted for the career belonged to the third group. I always disagreed with establishing a definite limitation on the number of qualifying students.

ualification cannot be limited to a certain number, and re- quirenents have to be strict. It was the task of the personnel section to note the names of qualified students for later utilization if present demands were already covered. In general, the number of unfit students did not exceed 20 percent.

Opinions differed as to whether welection should have been made during the period of training. A certain sifting took place at the time when training was provided locally in the different Wehrkreis and when the demand for General Staff officers was comparatively low. Otherwise, I am not in favor I& # P-031b -54- of making the selection during the time of training. Exceptions could be made in case of absolute failures. If a student did not come up to expectations at all, he could be easily relieved.

Furthermore, I did not think it right to divide the General

Staff officers into one group of more fit individuals and a second group of less suitable ones. It was only important to record first-class achievements in order to secure the uti2.ization of the officers in assignments which best corresponded to their abilities. It would have been wrong, however, to determine in advance who of the students should become Ic's, Ib's, etc. Even if they show special abilities for certain positions, a general education and training is indispensable. It was very interesting for me to check my own judgment of the students by asking them about their desires as to their future assignments in case they should qualify. By discussing their future assignments with them I could learn for which kind of assignments they considered themselves fit and which assignments they preferred.

Furthermore, these discussions permitted conclusions with regard to the student's character, his ambition, self-consciousness, presumption, or modesty.

No special system was set up for rating the students.

And that was right. In my opinion, it was to the purpose to pay full attention to the following points; sound or abnormal I ambition, esteem among comrades, teaching ability, organizing 1i # P-031b ability, technical understanding, and weak or strong person-

ality. y judgment was based on a definite plan divided

as follows: Character, intellectual abilities and interests, knowledge and achievements, esteem among comrades, strong

points, weak points, aptitude, suggestion for assignments.

It seemed important to me to make these ratings along broad

lines, although corrections might become necessary in the

course of later service. B3ut, according to my experience,

it was possible even at the Academy to tell whether the stu-

dent would be able to occupy leading or ccmmanding positions

or whether he would remain an average worker. If the rating

is made on a broad basis, those persons who will have to rate

the same student or officer at a later time will be forced

to watch him with regard to certain abilities and will find

it easier to form a judgment. Finally, it is very important

to give the student caplete information with regard to the

rating made on him and the weaknesses stated therein. I used to talk it out fully with the student concerned, thus

giving him the possibility to work on himself and to correct his faults, and to prevent him from harboring illusions.

The student's reaction again offered opportunities to check my judgment. The fact that the number of officers who had to be excluded from service in the General Staff for reasons

of failure was very low, proved that the methods of rating

and selection were right. MS # P-03b -56-

VI. FURTHER TRAII'IING OF THE GOENEAL STAFF OFFICER

AFTER COMPLETION OF THE WAR ACADIY COURSES

My last statement that the number of officers excluded from General Staff service for reasons of failure was low may lead to the question whether a certain probation time in the General Staff (for about one year) would be advisable or whether direct permanent assignment was to be recommanded.

In my opinion direct assignments should be made. If a probation time was set up it could only serve the purpose of deter- mining whether the officer was qualified to do practical work in a higher staff or in the central office. In case of direct transfers to limited departments, there were no mire possibilities of-examining his tactical and operational abilities as well as his general military education. One might have done so by transferring the young officer to different departments, however the number of these young officers was too big and constant transfers were impracticable. Even if they had been made, the time would have been too short for the supervisor to form a final judgment.

After being assigned to the General StaffC, the General

Staff officer was fully engaged with his special sphere of work. Further education dealing with other spheres of General MS # P-O31b -57-

Staff work had to take a place in the background. Some- times it was interrupted for a long time. During prewar years, the work in higher staffs or in the Army High Command took up all his time. He was even overloaded with work. In general, he was supposed to participate in tactical rides, to solve tactical problems, and to take part in map maneuvers.

Every year the older General Staff officers were given one operational problem including the opetion of an army or bigger units. The tasks were given by the Chief of the General

Staff of the Army.

Applicants for positions as chief took part in an operational "chiefs' tactical ride" including all chiefs of general staffs of the Army. Usually the tactical ride comprised one whole frontier line and the officers were required to solve acute problems of defense. These additional possibilities for training and testing proved to be very successful. On these rides the officers had to forget their daily routine work. They then had to solve general problems of leadership.

Usually they were entirely abosrbed by their daily work and no time was left for personal reflections. Probably the epoch of rearmament could not allow any time for leisure.

But it was deeply regrettable that the complete exploitation of personnel prevented any personal study and additional training outside the daily work. As a consequence, foreign. 1S PfF-031h-

languages were neglected, possibilities of going abroad were

reduced, the understanding of other branches of service was

diminished, and individual studies of politics and economy, as

well as of technical progress, or collaboration in military literary

work were hardly possible. The danger of onesidedness and

overspecialization was great, and that in an age characterized

by a military tendency toward total war. The VWar Academy of

the Army founded in 1934 was soon discontinued for practical

reasons. I have mentioned this before. Its abolition was a

great mistake.

Only when he was on duty with troop units did the Gen-

eral Staff officer, if ever, have time left for himself.

Then he could find time to consider other than his daily prob-

lems; to look at the world outside his troop, outside his

branch of service, outside the military way of thinking, out--

side of Germany. Usually the time of duty with troop units was short, but it became a "fountain of youth" for him; and

at the same time thh troop had the possibility of learning new

ideas from him.

In this way, both sides profited. And all the educa-

tion and training, all the work and imagination of the Gen-

eral Staff, culminated in the idea of leading the troops to a final victory if ever the Reich was in danger.

The German General Staff officer used his knowledge and abilities, his moral and intellectual capacities, only MS # P-031b -59- for the benefit of his people, his homeland, his Father- land. By no legend, from whatever side it may come, can this historical truth be distorted or misrepresented.

There is no merit in this but only self-evident duty, which every man or soldier who knows responsibility will have to acknowledge, whatever his mother tongue or fatherland may be,

signed/ Hermann FTERSCH Ms # P-031b

B. THE WAY OF THINKING AND ACTING OF THE GMAN AR1MY GENRAL STAFF

The General Staff, as such in the modern sense of the

word:, came into existence after armies started to Light with

units which were combined of all arms of service; after

the commander in chief could no longer survey with his own

eyes the theater of operations, and after war became a mat-

ter of a kind of soldiering which could be scientifically

determined and assistants to the commander were systematically

trained. Up to that time, the General 6taff had consisted

of a group of intelligent officers, galloping messengers,

and advanced clerks, all chosen by the ccnmander in chief after

they had shown their aptitude and after they had had some

war experience; however, they were not trained systematically,

nor did they know any feeling of solidarity.

SOHARNHORST was the creater of the Geran General Staff.

Bile organizing the Prussian army in 1810 he established

the "General Military School", the later Yar Academy. Further. more, he organized one central c cnmanding organization which was subdivided into several theaters of war" and con-

sisted of about 45 officers. Besides, the corps had small unit General Staffs. The first Chief of General staff was

General Von GROLMN. He was one of the most versatile officers 12 # P-3bF- .61. in SCHARNHORST's circle. The first director of the

"General Military School" was Carl Von CLAUS IITZ. Since

he was overloaded with administrative work, he did not have much influence on the training of the student officers.

However, his book "Vom Kriege" (On War) has become famous throughout the world, and the general staffs of all nations adhere to the basic principles of this book. His theory

of war became the basis for the way of thinking of the Ger- man General Staff. Not all his statements were accepted to the same degree; and in times of war his theory, e.g. the basic law of war as a means of politics or his warning with regard to the culminating point of every battle and war, often seemed to be forgotten. But his statements of the necessity of destroying the armed forces of the enemy;

his evaluation of the offensive and defensive which will bring on a decision by means of counter-attack only; the warning to be as strong as possible in general as well as in deciding positions; his demand for acting as quickly as possible and with the greatest concentration possible; his ideas concerning moral forces in warfare, concerning the morals of the commander in chief, the soldier, and the whole nation; and finally his thesis on frictions in warfare- all deeply influenced the way of thinking as well as the training of commanding officers and their assistants, the MS # P-031b -62-

General Staff officers, and became fundamental. The theory which CLAUSEWITZ consolidated was tested in practice by his great masters and assistants, by SCHARNH(RST, GNJI3ENAU,

%GOLMAN, and BOYB2fI in their intellectual and practical victory over the war god NAPOLEON. It was not military regulations, but rather their moral faculties, from which these universal personalities gathered the strength to complete their difficult task. They were far above their contemporaries. Brave soldiers and old cammanders derided them, calling them "academic soldiers" or accusing them of being onlookers. They shared the fate of the community of which YORK spoke about "the inconvenience of this institution."

The great men of the wars of liberation y far overshadowed their successors. Up to the time of the outstanding personality of MOITKE, the Prussian General Staff was doing diligent work but, with the exception of MOLTKE's predecessor, did not produce any personalities. MOLTKE's predecessor had been a non-commissioned officer, the later General Von REYHER. For a long time he served as clerk in a small regiment of a

Pomeranian garrison. He will be remembered as a sound practical man, who introduced tactical rides in order to provide some practical training for General Staff officers. Further- more, he introduced the troop assignments of the General

Staff officers and thus established a definite connection MS # P-031b -63- between the assistants to the commanding officers and the object of their training. At that time the position of the

Chief of General staff meant so little in the Army that in

1864 MOLT1I felt himself excluded, and in 1866 when he transmitted a royal order he heatd the very surprised question fran the commanding officer of a unit who said: "All- right, but who is that General Von MOLTI?" Only a few years later his name was well known. I meant the beginning of an organization which was admired and imitated by the whole world and which carried the nimbus of sure victory.

The General 6taff had become the brains of the Army. It was the planning and executing organization. It determined the movements of the troop units and led them to victory.

MOLTKE, the man who won his victories in his old age, during the last phase of his industrious but quiet life became a teacher not only in Germany but far beyond its frontiers. No other man before or after him gained so much influence, not only through his doctrines but also through his deeds. He was the first of the impersonal conmanders in chief entirely devoted to service. Up to the defeat in

1945, MOLTKE's particular character and spirit remained im- printed upon the German General staff officer. He was always superior in his victories; he let his corps march separately and strike unitedly. He was a master of strategic improvisation; MS # P-031b -64- whenever necessary, he acted quickly without being bound to strict rules or systems; his sound judgment and his bold actions made him look before he learned; and yet e was so modest as to confess that his fame meant far less than

Gneisenaus heroic dead of leading a defeated army to victory.

Moltke, the quiet philosopher, was a master of the German language when he described the heroic deeds of the Army which he had commanded. His language was equally clear and superior when he wrote his geographical essays, his travel book, or when, as a young officer, he wrote a love story in order to earn money.

The German General * taff nourished itself on him; he became its standard of thinking and feeling; and it may be attributed to the influence of his personality that individuals like Count Waldersee, his assessor, who was politically ambitious and appeared to be a careerist:, were considered to be exceptions or even foreign bodies. Once more an outstanding personality held the position of the Chief of General

Staff. Count Schlieffen was Chief of General Staff in peacetime, but it was the time of preparation for threatening and decisive combats. He made it his life task to train the German General 'taff in the close leadership of mass armies. On the verge of war, this man was fanatically absorbed in the research and evaluation of the history of MS # P-031b -65- war, Making use of the examples of the past, he developed

his theory of the battle of destruction which should be

achieved by endevelopent; on the Light against the enemy

superior in strength; on possibilities of victory in spite /

of being numerically in the minority. ind all his theories

he inculcated into the minds of the General Staff officers.

The fact that the leading men of the German General 4taff did

not kn ow how to apply these scientific theories for victory

at the beginning of 4'orld gar I was not due to a blind trust

in SCHLIEFt2E's prescriptions for victory, but was rather the

consequence of what might almost be called a national law of rise and fall. It was not until HINDENBURG and LUD DORFF

appeared at the head of the High Command of the irmy that the leadership of the German General Comm again became mentally versatile, however only with regard to military affairs. The thinking and acting of JUDNDRFF, the energetic and intellectually leading partner of the two, was extraordi- narily one-sided. His abilities as a military leader were outstanding, but they did not conceal his lack of political understanding. Thus he was an outstanding example of the type of overspecialized General Staff officer of his age.

In commanding the total operationsoe nLUDNRFF influenced the general staffs with troops to a degree that their commander in chief or commanding generals often seemed to be mechanical S P-031b -66- instruments with no will of their own in the hands of the

chief of the General 'Otaff who had been appointed by LUDEp-

DORFF and was inspired by him, was always under control, and was afraid of being recalled. Not only within the units, but

also generally, this method of leadership was disapproved as playing the "chief." This exaggerated method was regretted by the intelligent General Staff officers themselves, and at the same time it insured the reputation of the General staff.

After the war bad been lost in 1918, the General Staff

officer played a dominating part in the 100,000-man Army, but

following $EEKT's example, he consciously kept himself in the

background. Not only did he do so for reasons of foreign

policy, but he followed the idea of the General that "General

Staff officer have no names". The achievements of the General

Staff officers and field officers within the Versailles

professional Army during the second decade of this century may be called the most solid basis for the organization of

the new ehrmacht. It is impossible to prohibit thoughts.

Next to SEECKT another xan should be iwnembered, who with

his manifold ideas and vast education represented the best

type of the General Staff officer, namely, General Walter REIN-

HAfRDT. Everybody who listened to his lectures and critiques was deeply impressed by this great personaiib. iiternal condi-

tions of this time of weakness prevented the General Staff # P-031b -67-

from appearing publicly. But it is to the credit of the successors of the great Chief who were at the head of the Troop

Department in the Army Command that they preserved a great tradition. In this connection, the name of General BECK should be mentioned, not only because he is well known for his re-

sistnce against HITLER's policies, but because he personified the best qualifications of his predecessors who had been more fortunate in their positions. His judgment was clear end sound; his heart was warm; he was indefatigable in his work and very modest with regard to his own person. The German

Army is obliged to him for the regulations on "Command in the

Field"* It was not possible to find in those years a theoretical solution for all problems of modern warfare to an extent that would guarantee practical success during World War II, due to the political influence of the Third Reich and the limits of human imagination in general. But what the German Genera.

Staff actually did contribute to the art of conducting the new warfare was not only equal to the achievements of the enemy, but even excelled them. Only members of the General

Staff, who themselves worked under these conditions of improvisation and political, economic, end strategic difficulties which had to be dealt with in the General btaff headquarters as well as in the unit staffs, will be able to appreciate the achievements of the German General Staff. Ms # P-031b -c$-

Uselfish service, primary consideration for the commnon

cause, personal disregard as well as sound judgment, realistic

estimation of possibilities without illusions, indefatigable work, and renunciation of honors and fame were the aims of

the education of General Staff officers. SCHARNHORST's wellknown complaint that he gladly would have given away all his

decorations for one day's ccmmand is as characteristic of the

ethics of the General taff as SC{LIEFFEN's guiding principle:

"To do much work without trying distinguish oneself, to be more than one seems to be." Although BISMARK complained of the

"demigods" in the General Staff; although some politicians

of the present time were annoyed by the General 5 taff's urgings and warnings; although it sometimes happened, especially during wrld jWar I, that the troops no longer understood the aim of the command -- all these reproaches and criticisms fall silent in the face of the achievements of the General staff.

The fact that two lost wars were followed by indictment and inhibition on the side of the enemy may be also regarded as a sort of recognition of achievement.

The position of the General Staff within the State was closely connected with that of the monarch and his military authority with reagrd to the Army. For this reason, its part in public life was not considerable. eing a part of the War

Ministry and later becoming an independent authority under the MS # P-031b -69- supervision of the King, the General Staff was not exposed to constitutional or parlijuentary influences. Its work was not concerned with home politics. Only events and changes in foreign politics had to be dealt with fran the General Staff's point of view. In his capacity as representative in the

Reichstag, MOLTKI only seldom asked permission to speak and if he did so it was in order to warn and remind people that they should never forget to be ready for defense. As to

SCHLIEFB , he became well-known to the public by his writing.

The official records on the German wars published by the General

Staff were only read by soldiers and historians and did not meet with any response in the rest of the worl4. SECKT carefully avoided any appearance in public or in the Reichstag, but by keeping the Army, which he commanded in his silent way, always prepared, he played a more powerful part in the interior life of the Reich than many political party leaders wculd have liked for him to play. Even in later times this traditional keeping away from public life was continued. UTo be rather than seem" remained the leading principle of the whole

General Staff.

It is quite natural that the General Staff always played a special part within the Army. At first it was subordinate to the Minister of iar and had to work according to his direc- tives. After several changes, the General staff under 1s # P-03lb -70.

M0LT1E was separated from the Oar Ministry and placed under the direct authority of the monarch in 1918. But the General

Staff's influence on training, equipment, and armament did not increase. It was attended with amny formalities and did not actually correspond to its important position in times of war and during preparation fcr' Var. I have already mentioned the dominent position of the General Staff during World

War I, D)uring the Versailles epoch, too, it was the most important office within the teichs Defense Ministry. At that time its sphere of work extended even beyond the competence of its tasks as an agency of command. Nevertheless, the General

Staff remained the nerve center of the German Reichswehr. It would have been only logical if the General Staff of the Army had served as a basis for the organization of a General Staff of the entire yehrmachtt and if this consolidation had taken place in time of peace. This consolidated Staff should have been in command and charge of the total strategy and all operations of the 1ehrmacht. Thjs did not happen, and, in

World War II, the Army General Staff had to put up with the unequal but unpleasant competition. of the Commanding Staff of the Armed Forces. The fact that the consolidation of the staffs was not carried out may be partly attributed to the aversion of HITL&S and his party officials for the General Staff and its constant warning, urging, and inconvenient scepticism. LB #t5P-031b -71-

On the other hand, it nay be attributed to the fact tl4t

the General Staff did not recognize the necessity for this

consolidation. From headquarters this aversion and mistrust

extended to the General btaffs with troops. Often partly members regarded the General Staff officers as "defeatists"

and undesirable intellectual realists. This was disturbing,

but in the final analysis a kind of voluntary acknowledgmnent.

The relations between the Luftwaffe commanded by the "Party

Marshal" and the 'rny General Staff suffered in the same way.

Luftwaffe circles even went so far as to say that the General

Staff work might as well be done by the average officer if

he possessed a certain amount of intelligence and some war

experience and that no special training was required. The logical conclusion that longer and more frequent transfers to the front would have been the right thing for the General

Staff officer was not made. These line assignments would have been appreciated by every single General Staff officer since

all of them felt that assignmets to troop units, be it in

peace or wartimes, were a sort of fountain of youth, a sort of relaxation which they enjoyed, and in time of war repre-

sented an opportunity to distinguish oneself and to win decora-

tions which the General Staff officer was not often awarded.

All this does not mean that the General Staff officer was con-

sidered a foreigner to troops nor that the corps saw in him 1# P-031b -72- some opposing force. This attitude prevailed only temporarily during World War I. During the last war the selection of line officers transferred to the War Academy to receive training to become General Staff officers was so thorough and the connection between the troop staffs and the troops themselves was so close that no aversion developed.

When World War II broke out, the German General staff had been also influenced by the extent and speed by which the German rny had been increased from 1935 onward. During the short period until 1939, the most sudden organizational transitions ever made in connection with rearmament had taken place. In general, the training of General Staff officers was still thorough and long enough. In a way there was a watering-down to-the extent that all positions could no longer be occupied by the men who were best qualified to hold them, and new positions were not established to the extent desired.

This was due to a general lack of personnel within the Army.

As a consequence, individual officers at headquarters, as well as in the unit, staffs were overloaded with organizational work and could not devote themselves to further study of problems of leadership. It is rather difficult to determine to what degree this overload of work and this certain watering- down affected achievements. There is no measure for comparison.

Personal zeal and quickly gathered war experience counter- balanced some of the defects. IU # P-031b -73-

There was another decisive change of special importance.

It came in l938 when the "Manual for General Staff Service in artime t ' was put into effect. In accordance with a decision made by HITLER, the part played by the General Staff within the Army was restricted. This restriction referred to the position of chiefs of General Staffs in higher commands, army corps, armies, and army groups. As I have already described, the position of the chief of staff had been almost superior to that of the commanding officer during World

War I, owing to LUDEUDORFF's influence. This superiority may be explained partly by the fact that some commanding officers were too old, while others owed their assignments to their noble birth and were not very competent. During the epoch of rearmament, many younger men were assigned to command positions, some of whom originated from the General Staff. The authoritorian principle, which characterized the inner development of the Third Reich, could not be brought into accordance with conditions as they prevailed during World War I. At that time, the chief of staff and the commanding officer had been jointly responsible for the decisions made by the command. If the chief of staff disagreed with the ccm-- maniing officer, he had the right to make an official note about the incident. According to the new regulations, the chief of staff again became the advisor who was to be consulted 10 # ?-031b -74- with regard to tactical and operational problems, and the can- manding officer became solely responsible. This decision was sound. The so-called General Staff channels remained in existence. They were made use of in the case of internal Gen- eral Staff questions, such as the rating of the General Staff officers for which the judgment of the chief of staff of the next superior command was required.

As they began, the General Staff of the Army was only concerned with Army staff affairs. It had not become consolidated in the General Staff of the entire Wehrmacht. The General

Staff of the entire Wehrmacht fulfilled its own functions al-

though it was sometimes hampered by organizational defects. This

development was wrong. k the beginning of the ar, the Army General

Staff was the commanding installation of the most important part

of the uvehrmacht. It was predominent. After the Russian cam-

paign had begun, its influence decreased. Its competence was

restricted to this theater of war only. All the other theaters

of war were under the direct command of the Armed Forces High

Command. This worked well as long as russia remained the only

zone of action and no fighting went on at the other front lines

or on the coasts which had been occupied. Later on this partition proved to be very disadvantageous. It caused frictions with re-

gard to supply problems which became more and more difficult, it prevented any sound balance of power, and it made it impossible A'.# P-031b -75- to form a strategic reserve which was absolutely necessary. /

On the other band, the Army General Staff had to take care of many problems with regard to the entire Wehrmacht. Very

often these tasks led to friction with other branches of the

Webrmacht and therefore the General staff officers of the

ArFm1y were not very fond of these tasks.

On the whole, the Army General Staff had far less influence on the conduct of VWorld War II than it had had on the conduct of World War I. It should have played a more important part during World ar II. However, the General

Staff chiefs succeeded in fighting against those blind Party fanatics who tried to reduce the General Staff to a very low level. In most cases, the expert decisions made by the Gen-

eral Staff officers had to be recognized. They were superior " to all amateurism. As far as honesty and clean work is concerned, the other military installations could not even com- pete with the General staff, either at headquarters or of units.

I have referred to a very important point which is characteristic of the German General staff's way of acting and thinking during the last war. In all phases of the war, the

General Staff kept itself free from influences of Party politics. An outsider may think that this was quite natural.

Those, who know the situation in Germany, will undezrstand that MS 11P-031b -76- this keeping free from Party influences meant fighting and I waste of power, and was not easily to be achieved. Owing to sound traditions, the General Staff preserved its realistic judgment of facts, its critical consideration of all possibilities before takingany risks, and the General Staff warned

HITLER against all "surprises" in foreign politics. That was its duty. With regard to the occupation of the Rhineland, the annexation of Austria, and the Czech crisis, the attitude of the General Staff was very pessimistic. Its enemies could not cease reproaching the General Staff officers for this pes- simism. But they seemed to be right only temporarily. For the whole development confirmed the pessimistic warnings and the correct judgment of the General Staff. When General BECK left the position which once had been held by MOLTkE , the situation seemed to be different. But even before the war ended, the whole world knew what decisions had been connected with this change. Repeated new appointments of Chief of the

General Staff during the war meant more than a mere change of personnel. It proved the increased resistance on the part of the General Staff to the political and strategic plans of the dictator. It was only logical that as attempts were made to reduce the influence of the General Staff, the resistance of the latter should increase. These frictions existed with regard to military problems in the conduct of the war, with regard to US # P-031b -77- methods and tendencies of propaganda, and with regard to the assignment of National Socialist commanders over whom the

General Staff had no influence at all.

Naturally, it was the strategic and operational work of the General Staff which suffered most from HITLER's interference and his childish ideas, but the tactical command was also affected. In fighting against these concepts, the Gen- eral Staff's way of thinking was able to go back to those old and proved principles which, for over a hundred years, the great masters of the General Staff had established and proved in action. I shall name only a few of these principles:

Disposition in depth, concentrated action, the formation of a strong point, movement as the most important element in F operation, recognition of the culminating point, the importanc of daily discussions of the situation, sceptical estimation of the strength of the enemy, and sober and t rue calculation of time and space. Strategic improvisations, which could not help Gennany in her final emergency, became tactical make- shifts, as for instance the utterly senseless hedgehog-formation or the rule of holding a position at any price. MOLTKE'sI principle that in war only the simple method will lead to success became the basis for narrow minded tactics, and impro-\ visation meant everything. The overestimation of moral.. forces and the underestimation of technical resources led to 1MS # P-031b the disregard of economic factors and culminatediin the slo-

gan that in emergencies one man could replace divisions if only his belief was strong enough. In most cases these men were commanding officers who were influenced by party politics.

They smiled pitifully then they listened to the opinions of

the General Staff officers, but they could not avoid them.

NTevertheless, operational achievements may be reported, and by adhering to the old principles victories were won wich,

in other face of the increasing superiority =of the enemy, may be called amazing. The fame of brave German regiments is by

no means belittled by assigning these positive achievements

to the training of the General Staff officer, who also acted

as an inspiration to the lower commands. In case of failure

and dissatisfaction the General Staff was and its way of

thinldng bore the blame, but in accordance with the regulations

issued in 1938, the commanding officers were made personally

responsible in almost all cases, and not the chiefs of the unit

General Staffs as had been done in World War I under LDEIORFF's

command.

Consequently the work in the unit General Staffs suffered

less interference than that in the central General Staff.

As to the unit General Staffs, it was most important whether

the personalities of the commanding officer and of the chief

of staff were a good match. Officially their relations were MS # P-031b -7/0- put down in the "Manual for General. Staff Service,tt but in practice they depended on these two persons. To find the r.ight persons whose characters and intellects supplemented

each other and whose temperaments matched well, therein lies the art of personnel selection, on which the chief of the

General Staff of the Arny had much influence. If the unit

General Staff worked efficiently, the commanding officer was

always well informed; thoroughly-considered suggestions were made to him; and without carrying the burden of staff 'work he was free to make decisions. It was up to the commanding officer to make the decisions; it was the duty of the chief

of staff to guide the work; it was the. duty ofthe staff to

do the work. Sometimes the roles 'were exchanged, not always in favor of the whole situation, but generally the above rule was observed. The relations between the commanding officer

and the chief of staff 'were best if the former understood the ideas of the other; if one of them felt what the other 'ished

to achieve; if discussions proved that their way of think ng was the same and yet slight differences in opinion could be

clearly expressed; if the agreement of the commanding officer

'with suggestions was based on his personal conviction; if by saying nnolt he could convince his chief of staff who was

his subordinate; if the same line was followed whenever one

of the two was absent; if whenever there was an argument withi ES #OP-031b .. 80.,

superior authorities it could be settled by inforuttng then by telephone about the opinion of the chief of staff; if

subordinate staffs felt that the chief of staff represented

the gilU of the commanding officer; if the commander on his re-

turn from tours of the f ront reported to the chief of staff

that there was nothing new; if the chief of staff felt proud

that the commanding officer had received,a distinction, and

if he felt that an unpleasant remark from above made to the

commanding officer was also directed against him - then the

situation and the relations between these two men were really

perfect. The most important requirement is a long-term assignment

of chief of staff, and not too frequent changes in the most import.-

ant staff officers, the Ia, Ic and the assistant chief of staff in

charge of administration and supply. The main load of work

rested on their shoulders. It will not be necessary to go into

details with regard to their work since it is the same in almost

all armies. As to the division of the work, the German system

has served as a pattern. In most staffs, the Ic, as the one -who

studies the enemy, is tacitly given a more independent position

than he should have in accordance with the manual. The subordination

of the Ic to the Ia is a formality since their relations are charac-

terized by co-operation. The work of the staff officers in charge

of supply, in the division corps or army, is comparatively independent. MBS # P-031b .81.

If the chief of staff and the Ia were thorough workers, they were always informed with regard to supply problems or troubles and difficulties which their other technical officers had to meet. On the other hand, the latter were infonned with regard to plans and possibilities. If the supply officer was capable, it was never for the chief of staff or for the commanding officer to interfere personally in order to secure full supply. Due to the lack of personnel during the war, some of the subordinate positions, which should have been held by General Staff officers, were occupied by other than :staff officers, sometimes even by reserve officers. It would be wrong to jump to the conclusion that General Staff work can be done without any training. The appointment of other than staff officers was only possible vhere the chief of staff and his closest co-workers were exceedingly efficient, and only intelligent and versatile men who possessed organizational talents could be

selected for these subordinate positions. Of course, experience can replace training, and its practical value is even higher. But experience will be gained only if the vhole

staff is woxring efficiently and then the gaining of experience means training.

The fact that even "laymen' could fill the position of

junior general staff officers may be also regarded as evidence ML1S# P-031b -82.- of the total work done by the General Staff. Replacement of this kind is only possible when work is done 'without any red tape, where working methods are' technically clear and

simple, and where the work does not depend on individual per-

sonalities. A bureaucratic and complicated organization fitted to personalities cannot do.

It was typical of the last that very young men were as-

signed as officers. In this regard the General Staff was also

affected. The tendency to appoint young people was exaggerat-

ed. It is true that it is dangerous to have old persons fill important positions, but it is almost as dangerous to assign too young people lacking the experience and maturity which depend upon age. If this lack of experience and maturity begins to undermine authority, then youth is no longer an ad. vantage, especially in our modern armies which depend on the

'work of a large number of reserve officers who usually are

older than active officers holding corresponding positions.

'What was right for NAPOLEON's Army and what his enemies were lacking must not necessarily hold tie for an organization

'which is based on other foundations, As to the General Staff

this refers mostly to the chief of the unit staff and the Ia

in the division. The fact that the appointment of younger man

did not do any harm may be attributed to the valuable frater-

nity represented by the General Staff which did not admit

young and some'what revolutionary elements. Another regulation MAS # P-.031b

which was new for the German Army but had been effective

in other armies for a long time, provided that men who were

assigned to official positions after a short time of proba-

tion received the corresponding rank. It aids their authori-

ty he must also enjoy recognition.

Recognition, however, not advantages, and even recogni-

tion only within the Army. There were no advantages. In the

General Staff promotions were even less freqjtuently antedated

than with the troops. Decorations were seldom bestowed since

medals for good leadership or command did not exist in the

German Wehrmaclat and the General Staff officer could prove

his personal courage only by defending his views against super-

ior authorities. The fact that the selection for the General

Staff ims felt to be a distinction at any time in the war may

serve as a standard for the reputation of the General Staff,

for its way of acting and thinking, and for the high morale

of the German Officers Corps. Very seldom would a young of-

ficer refuse to enter this fraternity. There were only rare

cases of applications for transfer or permanent return to the

front and it is hardly necessary to mention them This brother-

hood was based on a common way of thinking, on common feeling,

and on a common language, It was the close comradeship of

deep and genuine soldiery; it was not, as has been expressed

during the ±Nurnberg Trial against the organizations, a criminal S # P-031b .84. group. Historical research will prove that.

It is not the only purpose of history to evaluate.

History teaches, and it -rill find something to. teach from the thinkilng and acting of the General Staff of an Amy which was defeated. I therefore should like to sumarize its ideas as followsS

The mission to lead, which is the main mission of any

General Staff, is decisive for the conduct of war and, therefore, the General Staff should not be burdened with additional work. In the beginning the staffs should be small organizations. Only those spheres of work, which are directly connected with leadership, should be included, as follows: supply of troops, information of the enemy, transport, 'and technical communication. On the other hand, the General Staff should be given the possibility of influencing all other spheres of the military conduct of war, It should have its word in economic and psychological warfare. Consequently, the position the General Staff holds 'within the Armed Forces must be a strong one-even an exceptional one.

For the same reason, but also in view of the close connections between the different branches of the Armed Forces, there should be one General Staff for the total Armed Forces instead of different General Staffs of the, Army, Navy, and

Air Force as they have e:,dsted up to now. Although strictly Miis# P-031b impersonal, this supreme authority should be conveyed to the

Chief of the General Staff. His actions should be based,

also formally, on unopposed authority.

From all these requirements, the principles for training

and education of General Staff officers may be inferred.

They have been stated and explained in the chapter dealing

with the "Selection, Education, and Training of General Staff

Officers". They culminate in the demand for a wide insight

which reaches beyond technical questions; an insight into

the philosophy of war which will not include the loss of

understanding for the practical side. One should not keep

one's own windows closed, but one should open them and have

a free look at conditions outside. All forms, methods, and means of war should be equally considered and evaluated, and

the center of gravity should only be determined after concrete

knowledge has been acquired. The variety of possibilities in

war requires a maximum of intellectual versatility, critical

judgment, and one-sidedness in observing the eternal and basic

laws of war.

The mission of the General Staff and all its officers

cannot be fulfilled by shortsighted people. They must have

the political understanding and insight into the great re-

lationships by which wars are caused and within which wars are f t r -- t b s d ya------fFouht, War can be Masteredre only by a certain disregard of MS # P-031-6 -86- its nature, on a higer level than that of professional knowledge, a.d for this a conviction that its destructive element must be limited to the minimum is necessary. Accord- ing to HEPACLITUS war is the father of all things. However, those forces which create must be valued higher than those

-Which destroy - this saying will always remain a general human commandment superior to any professional tie.

The brains and heart of the General Staff, officer should be devoted to serving his troops, his Fatherland, and for ideas -- the things for Which nations are ready to fight.

// FOFRTSCH