DOCSLIB.ORG

Leonard Nelson a Theory of Philosophical Fallacies

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

Argumentation Library

Leonard Nelson

A Theory of Philosophical Fallacies

Translated by Fernando Leal and David Carus

A Theory of Philosophical Fallacies

Argumentation Library

VOLUME 26

Series Editor
Frans H. van Eemeren, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Editorial Board
Bart Garssen, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Scott Jacobs, University of Illinois at Urbana-Campaign, USA Erik C.W. Krabbe, University of Groningen, The Netherlands
John Woods, University of British Columbia, Canada

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/5642

Leonard Nelson

A Theory of Philosophical Fallacies

123

Leonard Nelson Göttingen Germany

Translated by Fernando Leal and David Carus

Deceased—Leonard Nelson (1882–1927)

  • ISSN 1566-7650
  • ISSN 2215-1907 (electronic)

ISBN 978-3-319-20783-4 (eBook)
Argumentation Library ISBN 978-3-319-20782-7 DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-20783-4

Library of Congress Control Number: 2015945152 Springer Cham Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London © Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Main text translated from the German language edition: Typische Denkfehler in der Philosophie by Leonard Nelson, © Felix Meiner Verlag 2011. All rights reserved

Appendix translated from the German language edition: “Die kritische Ethik bei Kant, Schiller und Fries: eine Revision ihrer Prinzipien”, Gesammelte Schriften in neun Bänden, vol. VIII, pp. 27–192 by Leonard Nelson, © Felix Meiner Verlag 1971. All rights reserved

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made.

Printed on acid-free paper Springer International Publishing AG Switzerland is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)

Contents

Introduction by Fernando Leal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . What Is the Theory? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Who Was Leonard Nelson? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Some Objections to the Theory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Note on the Translation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1269
13 18

Lecture I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
21 28

Lecture II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Reference. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
29 34

Lecture III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
35 41

Lecture IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
43 50

Lecture V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
51 56

Lecture VI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
57 63

Lecture VII. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
65 71

Lecture VIII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
73 81

v

  • vi
  • Contents

Lecture IX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
83 89

Lecture X . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
91 98

  • Lecture XI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  • 99

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

Lecture XII. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

Lecture XIII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

Lecture XIV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

Lecture XV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

Lecture XVI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

Lecture XVII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158

Lecture XVIII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165

Lecture XIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174

Lecture XX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

Lecture XXI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190

Lecture XXII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200

Appendix: Seven Kantian Fallacies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203

Introduction by Fernando Leal

Abstract In 1921 Nelson presented what seems to be the first theory of philosophical argumentation, or at least of its negative or destructive part—a theory of philosophical fallacies. That theory says that the peculiar nature of philosophical thinking repeatedly leads people to take ordinary concepts with great philosophical import, such as causality or duty, and replace them with new, made-up ones, whose content is very different from that of the originally available ones. When the new concepts usurp the place of the original ones within a philosophical argument, they invariably produce false results—on all sides of philosophical disputes. Many apparently irresolvable disputes in philosophy are the product of such fallacious concept-swapping.

The relationship between philosophy and argumentation is, to say the least, peculiar. Philosophers argue all the time, that much we all know, even though quite often it is difficult, and sometimes exceedingly difficult, to make out what exactly their arguments are. But even conceding (for the sake of argument) that philosophy is all about arguing, it is again a hard fact that philosophers, in sharp contrast to mathematicians or scientists, are rarely if ever convinced by each other’s arguments. Moreover, the favourite occupation of philosophers is to pick holes in the arguments of their fellow philosophers, thereby indicating to the outside world that there is something rotten with all philosophical arguments.
None of this is controversial. A curious observer would therefore be readily excused if he or she would draw the conclusion that, surely, philosophers must have by now developed a theory of philosophical argumentation. This is hardly the case. A careful inspection of the relevant literature reveals it to consist basically of two kinds of publications. On the one hand, there are practical ‘textbooks’ purporting to give students some analytic tools to analyze and evaluate philosophical arguments or to construct and present their own. On the other hand, there are metaphilosophical texts presenting a certain view of the nature of philosophy with more or less loose

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

L. Nelson, A Theory of Philosophical Fallacies,

1
Argumentation Library 26, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-20783-4_1

  • 2
  • Introduction by Fernando Leal

observations about the role that arguments play or do not play in philosophy.1 None of these books, however, present a systematic theory of philosophical argumentation as such, a theory of how philosophers actually argue or fail to argue.2
This is the main reason why the book the reader is now holding in his or her hands merits attention. This book does present a theory of philosophical argumentation. It is perhaps too soon to say whether the theory is correct, entirely or in part, but it is quite a clear theory, so that at the very least it might start a much needed discussion about what a theory of philosophical argumentation should be.
In the following I shall first briefly state what that theory is, then I shall present its author, for he is not well known, and finally I shall endeavour to meet some objections that can be raised against the theory.

What Is the Theory?

Nelson’s theory of philosophical argumentation, as set forth in this book, is only a partial theory, for it only concerns those philosophical arguments that go wrong, that contain a fallacy, i.e. an error in reasoning. It does not say anything about philosophical arguments that are correct and fallacy-free. Moreover, the theory does not purport to cover all fallacies, but only the ‘typical’ ones, viz those that a philosopher will commit sooner or later because of the peculiar business he is in. Fallacies of such a typical sort are as it were an occupational hazard.
Even the plural—fallacies—has to be taken with a pinch of salt, for at bottom there is, according to the theory, only one typical fallacy in philosophical argumentation, although it comes in many shapes and forms. This may not look very promising. A theory of philosophical argumentation that is in fact about one fallacy? For it to work we must assume that in philosophy we will, always or at least for the

1To the first group belong e.g. Cornman et al. (1992), Rosenberg (1996), Morton (2004), Cohen (2004), Martinich (2005), Baggini and Fosl (2010); to the second e.g. Stove (1991), Glymour (1992), Bouveresse (1996), Williamson (2007), Gutting (2009), Schnädelbach (2012). I am naturally excluding from consideration those textbooks written by philosophers about argumentation in general (usually in view of courses in logic or critical thinking) as well as papers or books in which particular arguments of particular philosophers are subjected to scrutiny either for historical or systematic purposes. They may contain valuable remarks about philosophical argumentation but belong to a different ballgame altogether. A special case is Nicholas Rescher, who in a series of papers and books (e.g. 2001, 2006, 2008) has made some interesting, albeit in my opinion somewhat rambling, attempts at a theory of philosophical argumentation. 2There seem to be two theories of philosophical argumentation apart from Nelson’s. Johnstone (1959, 1978), developed in a long and distinguished career a theory that is both profound and undeservedly underrated by philosophers, although it has fortunately met with some attention in the field of argumentation studies (see e.g. the special issue in his honour in Informal Logic, 2001, as well as van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2007). I can see clear points of contact as well as undeniable differences between Johnstone’s theory and Nelson’s, and I certainly hope to tackle the task of comparing them in the future. As for the other theory, see Footnote 7 of this chapter.

  • What Is the Theory?
  • 3

most part, reason correctly if only we avoid that one fallacy to whose description and illustration this whole book is devoted. That is exactly what Nelson assumes.
But what exactly is this fallacy? The analysis that uncovers it is a two-step procedure.

Step 1 Nelson starts with the fact that a philosophical argument is always part of an ongoing, if not always fully explicit, discussion between philosophers each one of whom affirms something that appears to imply denying what the other holds. The logical building constituted by the opposing arguments Nelson calls the ‘dialectics’ of the issue at hand—harking back to Plato, who invented the term to name the peculiar art of dialogue developed by his master, Socrates. Although such logical buildings—the sets of propositions and arguments pitted against each other all along the history of philosophy—can sometimes be abstruse and convoluted, Nelson’s analysis tries to reduce the basic opposition to its raw core, which he sometimes represents in the shape of elegant diagrams. The reader will find in this book five of those. Popper for one expressed his admiration for this analytical feat of reduction and tried to imitate it (see Popper 1979).
Those diagrams show that the way philosophers arrive at their positive philosophical doctrines is byway of denying the positive doctrines of their opponents. They manage to believe they have proved something, say P, because they have shown the opposite doctrine, say Q, to be false. Their opponents play exactly the same game, so that the net result is the appearance of a relation of contradiction between P and Q where there is in fact no such contradiction. The game is played again and again by philosophers on the strength of a common assumption, a usually hidden presupposition shared by the two adversaries, viz that P and Q exhaust all possibilities available to philosophical thought. Yet if P and Q exclude each other, their negations do not. In other words, if P is true, then Q has to be false, and if Q is true, then P has to be false; but if P is false, Q does not have to be true, and if Q is false, P does not have to be true. In the traditional logical jargon, the two philosophical doctrines are not contradictory but rather contrary to each other—they cannot both be true yet they may very well both be false, viz if the common assumption that they are the only alternatives is itself false. The starting point of the discussion is then the choice between two options (either P or Q), a logical disjunction which is understood by both discussion partners as being both exclusive and exhaustive. Starting from such a disjunction the discussion evolves in a predictable way, which Nelson’s diagrams try to represent in a terse, parsimonious manner. If we use arrows to indicate an inferential relation, then the following would be the general form of a Nelson diagram:

  • 4
  • Introduction by Fernando Leal

We see here that there is contradiction between P and not-P as well as between
Q and not-Q, but there is no contradiction between P and Q; not even if we concede that P and Q exclude one another. At least there is no contradiction unless and until we assume that tertium non datur, that there is no third possibility, say R, which excludes both P and Q. Nelson’s argument is not only that R is available but that R is indeed the true alternative.
So far we would have one form of what is usually referred to as a false dilemma or a false dichotomy (Nelson himself calls it an ‘incomplete disjunction’). It would not be much of an exaggeration to say that for Nelson the history of philosophy has a dilemmatic structure, and that all breakthroughs in that history consist in showing some of these dilemmas to be false. But the question now arises as to why philosophers become prisoners of a false dilemma in the first place. This leads to the second, and the most important, step in Nelson’s analytical procedure.

Step 2 This consists in breaking down the sentences and arguments used in philosophical disputes so as to identify the underlying concepts. The leading idea is that quite often at least one of those is a fake and a phony, an extra-ordinary concept masquerading for an ordinary one by an artful or unwitting sleight of hand, something that a philosopher has made up instead of respecting the meanings our common vocabulary puts at our disposal. Such a replacement of one concept by a different one—sometimes introduced by a seemingly harmless definition—creates an instance of equivocation, or what in traditional syllogistic was called quaternio terminorum, a well-known fallacy by which the same word or phrase is used, within the same argument, in more than one meaning. When this happens, a false dilemma

Recommended publications
  • Leonard Nelson a Theory of Philosophical Fallacies

    Leonard Nelson a Theory of Philosophical Fallacies

    Argumentation Library Leonard Nelson A Theory of Philosophical Fallacies Translated by Fernando Leal and David Carus A Theory of Philosophical Fallacies Argumentation Library VOLUME 26 Series Editor Frans H. van Eemeren, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands Editorial Board Bart Garssen, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands Scott Jacobs, University of Illinois at Urbana-Campaign, USA Erik C.W. Krabbe, University of Groningen, The Netherlands John Woods, University of British Columbia, Canada More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/5642 Leonard Nelson A Theory of Philosophical Fallacies 123 Leonard Nelson Göttingen Germany Translated by Fernando Leal and David Carus Deceased—Leonard Nelson (1882–1927) ISSN 1566-7650 ISSN 2215-1907 (electronic) Argumentation Library ISBN 978-3-319-20782-7 ISBN 978-3-319-20783-4 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-20783-4 Library of Congress Control Number: 2015945152 Springer Cham Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London © Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 Main text translated from the German language edition: Typische Denkfehler in der Philosophie by Leonard Nelson, © Felix Meiner Verlag 2011. All rights reserved Appendix translated from the German language edition: “Die kritische Ethik bei Kant, Schiller und Fries: eine Revision ihrer Prinzipien”, Gesammelte Schriften in neun Bänden, vol. VIII, pp. 27–192 by Leonard Nelson, © Felix Meiner Verlag 1971. All rights reserved This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.
  • Nora Platiel1 1896-1979 Biografische Notizen

    Nora Platiel1 1896-1979 Biografische Notizen

    Nora Platiel1 1896-1979 Biografische Notizen Laura Schibbe Nora Platiel wurde am 14. Januar 1896 als Eleonore Block in Bochum geboren. Sie war das achte von zehn Geschwistern. Ihre Eltern Bendix und Therese Block betrieben ein Bekleidungsgeschäft in Bochum. Trotz hoher Arbeitsbelastung waren die Beziehung der Eltern und das Familienleben sehr herzlich und harmonisch. Das Haus wurde mit- unter auch Blockstation genannt, weil viele Menschen ein- und ausgingen. Die Familie Block lebte nicht nur in einer Hausgemeinschaft mit einem Verkäufer und zwei Haus- angestellten. Der Vater war noch für weitere Kinder als Vormund eingesetzt, so dass die Blockstation auch ein reger Treffpunkt für die Kinder aus der Nachbarschaft war. Die Familie Block gehörte der jüdischen Gemeinde an, lebte jedoch nach liberalen Grundsätzen. Bild 12 Familie Therese und Bendix Block, ca. 1900 Nora ist die Dritte von links Foto: E. Risse Bochum 1912 starb Bendix Block an einem Gallenleiden. Der plötzliche Verlust des geliebten Vaters bedeutete für Nora Block den ersten tiefen Einschnitt ihres Lebens. Sie konnte ihre begonnene Schulausbildung am Lyzeum nicht beenden und musste zum Lebens- unterhalt der Familie beitragen, der nun ungesichert war. Nora Block war gezwungen, sich Arbeit zu suchen. Zunächst half sie noch in der vom Vater neu gegründeten Rekla- mefirma mit, jedoch konnte deren Bankrott nicht verhindert werden. 1917 verließ sie 1 Eine kürzere Version dieses Textes findet sich in der Hessischen Biografie, abgerufen am 12.09.2019. 2 Weitere Angaben zu den Bildern am Ende des Textes. 1 Deutschland und meldete sich zur Internationalen Kriegsdiensthilfe. Sie kam nach Rumänien und war dort als Sekretärin tätig.
  • Die Geheime Geistesgeschichte Der Frühen Bundesrepublik Erfreute Sich Vermittels Ulrich Raulffs Kreis Ohne Meister

    Die Geheime Geistesgeschichte Der Frühen Bundesrepublik Erfreute Sich Vermittels Ulrich Raulffs Kreis Ohne Meister

    GÜNTER DAMMANN HEINRICH NELSONS AHASVER-ROMAN EIN ANEKDOTON AUS DER GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE LEONARD NELSONS Die geheime Geistesgeschichte der frühen Bundesrepublik erfreute sich vermittels Ulrich Raulffs Kreis ohne Meister. Stefan Georges Nachleben von 2009 seinerzeit einer gewissen Beliebtheit. Da hätte auch ein weiterer Zirkel in den Blick kommen können, der die westdeutsche Nachkriegsgeschichte gleichfalls mit vielen ver- deckten Strängen durchwirkt hat: derjenige um den Göttinger Philosophen Leonard Nelson (1882–1927). Zu den Schülern und Vertrauten Nelsons gehörte etwa Willi Eichler (1896–1971), der im Londoner Exil zur SPD stieß und nach dem Tod Kurt Schumachers zwar nicht zur Nachfolge antrat, weil er als öffentlichkeitsunwirksam galt, dafür aber als entscheidender Theoretiker das Godesberger Programm der Partei auf den Weg brachte. Oder die Pädagogin Minna Specht (1879–1961), die zunächst im Nelson-Kreis Leiterin des Landerziehungsheims Walkemühle wurde und nach ihrer Rückkehr aus dem Exil für fünf Jahre die (vom Nationalsozialismus nicht ganz unverschonte) Odenwaldschule übernahm, was vor längerer Zeit zur Ver- vollständigung von ganz anders interessierten Zeitungsberichten durch die Presse ging. Oder Fritz Eberhard (1896–1982), geboren als Helmut von Rauschenplat, promovierter Ökonom, Dozent an der Walkemühle, der nach der Rückkehr aus dem britischen Exil von der SPD in den Parlamentarischen Rat delegiert wurde und an- schließend für zehn Jahre Intendant des Süddeutschen Rundfunks war. Oder noch Hanna Bertholet (1901–1970),
  • Introduction

    Introduction

    Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-89871-3 - Kant’s Moral and Legal Philosophy Edited by Karl Ameriks and Otfried Hoffe Excerpt More information Introduction Karl Ameriks and Otfried Höffe I. Background The widespread influence of Immanuel Kant’s moral and legal philosophy is a striking exception to the division that can often be found between the approaches of modern European philosophy and the Anglophone ana- lytic tradition. Although Kant’s system as a whole exhibits a deeply cos- mopolitan orientation even in its general foundations, his philosophy has become especially relevant in our time primarily because of the numerous practical implications of its central ideal of autonomy, which still deter- mines the dominant liberal views of history, law, and politics.1 The international reception of Kant’s practical philosophy has become so enthusiastic that it has tended to stand in the way of an appreciation of the distinctive contributions of contemporary German Kant scholarship. This development is in one sense a compliment to the openness of German scholars to the outstanding achievements of earlier Anglophone Kantians such as H. J. Paton, Lewis White Beck, and John Rawls. In another sense, however, it may also be a testimony to the perplexing fact that for more than two centuries, Kant’s ethics has often been displaced from a cen- tral position within Germany itself – even though, from the outside, it 1 See, for example, Rechtsphilosophie der Aufklärung, ed. R. Brandt (Berlin, 1982); Autonomy and Community: Readings in Contemporary Kantian Social Philosophy, eds. J. Kneller and S. Axinn (Albany, 1998); and Katerina Deligiorgi, Kant and the Culture of the Enlightenment (Albany, 2005).
  • The Polemic Between Leonard Nelson and Ernst Cassirer on the Critical Method in the Philosophy*

    The Polemic Between Leonard Nelson and Ernst Cassirer on the Critical Method in the Philosophy*

    „Folia Philosophica”. Vol. 35, pp. 53—69 Katowice 2016 ISSN 2353-9445 (online) ISSN 1231-0913 (print) Tomasz Kubalica The polemic between Leonard Nelson and Ernst Cassirer on the critical method in the philosophy* Abstract: The subject of the paper is a polemic between Leonard Nelson and Ernst Cassirer mainly concerning the understanding of the critical method in philosophy. Nelson refutes the accusation of psychologism and attacks the core of the philosophy of the Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism. In response to those allegations, Cassirer feels obliged to defend the position of his masters and performs this task brilliantly. The present paper considers similarities and differences in the positions of both sides in this debate. I try to evaluate the arguments of both sides and argue that they took basically the same positions, while the existing discrepancies did not jus- tify such an intense polemic. If the disputing sides had approached the discussion in a less emotional way, it could have led to substantive and interesting conclusions. Keywords: Leonard Nelson, Ernst Cassirer, Marburg School, Neo-Kantianism, criti- cal method Nelson was known in Germany for rediscovering the philosophy of Fries.1 This was caused by the confrontation between Nelson and Cassirer, who were representatives of the Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism. An important point in this debate was Nelson’s sharp critique of this School in his texts Die kritische Methode und * Projekt został sfinansowany ze środków Narodowego Centrum Nauki przyzna- nych na podstawie decyzji numer DEC-2013/11/B/HS1/03937. 1 Cf. A.J. Noras: Historia neokantyzmu. Katowice 2012, p.
  • Leonard Nelson and Metaphysical Knowledge Against the Neo-Kantian Background

    Leonard Nelson and Metaphysical Knowledge Against the Neo-Kantian Background

    Title: Leonard Nelson and metaphysical knowledge against the neo-kantian background Author: Tomasz Kubalica Citation style: Kubalica Tomasz. (2017). Leonard Nelson and metaphysical knowledge against the neo-kantian background. "Diametros" (Nr 52 (2017), s. 64-80), doi 10.13153/diam.52.2017.1059 Diametros 52 (2017): 64–80 doi: 10.13153/diam.52.2017.1059 LEONARD NELSON AND METAPHYSICAL KNOWLEDGE AGAINST THE NEO-KANTIAN BACKGROUND – Tomasz Kubalica – Abstract. Leonard Nelson is known primarily as a critic of epistemology in the Neo-Kantian mean- ing of the term. The aim of this paper is to investigate the presuppositions and consequences of his critique. I claim that what has rarely been discussed in this context is the problem of the possibility of metaphysics. By the impossibility of epistemology Nelson means the possibility of metaphysical knowledge. I intend to devote this paper to the analysis of this problem in relation to the Neo- -Kantian background. Keywords: Leonard Nelson, Neo-Kantianism, metaphysics, epistemology, knowledge. Leonard Nelson was a popular philosopher in the first three decades of the twentieth century, whose importance faded with the eclipse of Neo- -Kantianism. Recently, a significant increase in the interest in Neo-Kantianism can be noticed. This research is part of an important trend in contemporary philosophical historiography and systematic exploration of contemporary phi- losophy. This paper aims to shed new light on the psychological trend in the development of Neo-Kantian philosophy, especially Leonard Nelson’s theo- retical philosophy with regard to his attitude to the problem of possibility in the theory of knowledge (epistemology). In my opinion, despite the stereo- types and simplifications concerning the epistemological nature of Neo- -Kantian philosophy, it did not lack deep metaphysical reflection that took a critical look at epistemology.
  • KARL POPPER's DEBT to LEONARD NELSON Nikolay

    KARL POPPER's DEBT to LEONARD NELSON Nikolay

    Grazer Philosophische Studien 86 (2012), 137–156. KARL POPPER’S DEBT TO LEONARD NELSON Nikolay MILKOV University of Paderborn Summary Karl Popper has often been cast as one of the most solitary fi gures of twentieth- century philosophy. Th e received image is of a thinker who developed his scien- tifi c philosophy virtually alone and in opposition to a crowd of brilliant members of the Vienna Circle. Th is paper challenges the received view and undertakes to correctly situate on the map of the history of philosophy Popper’s contribution, in particular, his renowned fallibilist theory of knowledge. Th e motive for doing so is the conviction that the mainstream perspective on Popper’s philosophy makes him more diffi cult to understand than might otherwise be the case. Th e thinker who fi gures most signifi cantly in the account of Popper devel- oped in these pages is Leonard Nelson. Both a neo-Friesian and neo-Kantian, this philosopher deeply infl uenced Popper through his student Julius Kraft, who met with Popper on numerous occasions in the mid 1920s. It is in the light of this infl uence that we understand Popper’s recollection that when he criticized the Vienna Circle in the early 1930s, he looked upon himself “as an unorthodox Kantian”. Introduction Since Nelson’s philosophy is little known today, the essay commences with a brief account (in § 1) of how he developed elements of what was later dubbed analytic philosophy. Following that we identify (in § 2) the main points of Nelson’s impact on Popper, as well as some elements of divergence between them.
  • Scientific Philosophy and Philosophical Science Hourya Benis Sinaceur

    Scientific Philosophy and Philosophical Science Hourya Benis Sinaceur

    Scientific Philosophy and Philosophical Science Hourya Benis Sinaceur To cite this version: Hourya Benis Sinaceur. Scientific Philosophy and Philosophical Science. Tahiri Hassan. The Philosophers and Mathematics. Festschrift for Roshdi Rashed, pp.25-66, 2018, 978-3-319-93733-5. 10.1007/978-3-319-93733-5. halshs-01935233 HAL Id: halshs-01935233 https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01935233 Submitted on 26 Nov 2018 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. Hourya Benis Sinaceur Directrice de recherche émérite Institut d’Histoire et Philosophie des Sciences et des Techniques (IHPST) Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne – CNRS – ENS Ulm International Colloquium The Philosophers and Mathematics Lisbon, October 2014 Scientific Philosophy and Philosophical Science (2016-12-21) Abstract Philosophical systems have developed for centuries, but only in the nineteenth century did the notion of scientific philosophy emerge. This notion presented two dimensions in the early twentieth century. One dimension arose from scientists’ concern with conceptual foundations for their disciplines, while another arose from philosophers’ appetite for more rigorous philosophy. In the current paper, I will focus on David Hilbert’s construct of “critical mathematics” and Edmund Husserl’ and Jules Vuillemin’s systematic philosophy.
  • The Psychology of Jakob Friedrich Fries ( 1773-1843): Its Context, Natijre, and Historical Significance

    The Psychology of Jakob Friedrich Fries ( 1773-1843): Its Context, Natijre, and Historical Significance

    University of Richmond UR Scholarship Repository Psychology Faculty Publications Psychology 1982 The syP chology of Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773-1843): Its Context, Nature, and Historical Significance David E. Leary University of Richmond, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/psychology-faculty- publications Part of the Other Psychology Commons Recommended Citation Leary, David E. "The sP ychology of Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773-1843): Its Context, Nature, and Historical Significance." Storia E Critica Della Psicologia 3, no. 2 (1982): 217-48. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Psychology at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Psychology Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JAKOB FRIEDRICH FRIES ( 1773-1843): ITS CONTEXT, NATIJRE, AND HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE DAVID E. LEARY University of New Hampshire Most German philosophers in the early nineteenth century were devoted, to the idealistic « completion » of Immanuel Kant's critical philosophy. A few independent philosophers, how­ ever, were preoccupied with the elaboration of a non-idealistic, and less speculative, conclusion to Kant's thought. Among the earliest opponents of the speculativ~ idealists was Jakob Frie­ d~ich Fries (1773-1843), a philosopher of wide-ranging inte­ rests who might have had a much greater impact upon the course of German philosophy had his liberal political affilia­ tions not curtailed his academic career. As it was, his influence was considerable anyway. One aspect of this influence is of particular interest: in his reaction against idealism, and in his own « completion » of Kant, Fries laid the foundation for the development and acceptance of psychology as an independent science.
  • Kantian and Neo-Kantian First Principles for Physical and Metaphysical Cognition

    Kantian and Neo-Kantian First Principles for Physical and Metaphysical Cognition

    Kantian and Neo-Kantian First Principles for Physical and Metaphysical Cognition Michael E. Cuffaroa, b a University of Western Ontario, Rotman Institute of Philosophy b Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy Abstract I argue that Immanuel Kant’s critical philosophy—in particular the doctrine of tran- scendental idealism which grounds it—is best understood as an ‘epistemic’ or ‘metaphilo- sophical’ doctrine. As such it aims to show how one may engage in the natural sciences and in metaphysics under the restriction that certain conditions are imposed on our cognition of objects. Underlying Kant’s doctrine, however, is an ontological posit, of a sort, regarding the fundamental nature of our cognition. This posit, sometimes called the ‘discursivity thesis’, while considered to be completely obvious and uncontroversial by some, has nevertheless been denied by thinkers both before and after Kant. One such thinker is Jakob Friedrich Fries, an early neo-Kantian thinker who, despite his re- jection of discursivity, also advocated for a metaphilosophical understanding of critical philosophy. As I will explain, a consequence for Fries of the denial of discursivity is a radical reconceptualisation of the method of critical philosophy; whereas this method is a priori for Kant, for Fries it is in general empirical. I discuss these issues in the context of quantum theory, and I focus in particular on the views of the physicist Niels Bohr and the Neo-Friesian philosopher Grete Hermann. I argue that Bohr’s understand- ing of quantum mechanics can be seen as a natural extension of an orthodox Kantian viewpoint in the face of the challenges posed by quantum theory, and I compare this with the extension of Friesian philosophy that is represented by Hermann’s view.
  • Knowledge First — a German Folly?

    Knowledge First — a German Folly?

    25 Knowledge First — a German Folly? KEVIN MULLIGAN 1. Introduction Timothy Williamson’s Knowledge and its Limits broke sharply with received analytic wisdom according to which knowledge-that is a species of belief. It is rather, he argued, a relation in which we stand to true propositions or facts1. The Oxonian dimension of the history of the knowledgefirst approach in epistemology, in particular in the writings of Cook Wilson and Prichard, has been magisterially expounded by Mathieu Marion2. The Germanophone dimension of the history of this approach is less well-known. It comprises two parts. Thefirst goes from Jakob Friedrich Fries in thefirst half of the nineteenth century to Leonard Nelson, an unusually lucid and argumentative neo-Kantian. The second begins with Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen in 1900-01 and is developed by several of Husserl’s students and disciples, the early, realist phenomenologists - Reinach, Scheler, and von Hildebrand. There is a connexion between the two German strands in our story. Reinach and Nelson, as well as Husserl, were colleagues in Göttingen before the Great War. 1 Williamson 2000. For the view that there are mental acts and states which are relations, in the proper (non-Brentanian) sense of the word, to objects and facts, in the proper (non-Fregean) sense of the word, cf. Smith 1984, Mulligan & Smith 1986. 2 Marion 2000 ; cf. Marion 2002, 2003. 380 KNOWLEDGE FIRST — A GERMAN FOLLY? 381 Ramsey described the Oxford view that, as Prichard put it, „Knowledge is sui generis, and, as such, cannot be explained“, as „the Oxford Folly“3. If it is a folly, it is also a German Folly.
  • Why the Question of the Synthetic a Priori Shouldn't Not Be Abandoned

    Why the Question of the Synthetic a Priori Shouldn't Not Be Abandoned

    1 Kay Herrmann Metaphysics and Contemporary Science: Why the question of the synthetic a priori shouldn’t not be abandoned prematurely (2019, unpublished) Content 1 On the question of the objective validity of scientific knowledge 2 Synthetic judgements a priori 3 Reinterpretations of the a priori 4 The Fries-Nelson thesis 5 Perspectives of a modern apriorism Keywords synthetic judgments a priori, transcendental philosophy, non-pure synthetic a priori knowledge, noumenal, phenomenal, objective knowledge, Immanuel Kant, Jakob Friedrich Fries, Leonard Nelson Abstract The problem of synthetic judgements touches on the question of whether philosophy can draw independent statements about reality in the first place. For Kant, the synthetic judgements a priori formulate the conditions of the possibility for objectively valid knowledge. Despite the principle fallibility of its statements, modern science aims for objective knowledge. This gives the topic of synthetic a priori unbroken currency. This paper aims to show that a modernized version of transcendental philosophy, if it is to be feasible at all, must “bid farewell” to the concept of being “free of empiricism” or the “purity” of the a priori. Approaches to this end can already been found in Kant’s reflections on non- pure synthetic knowledge. Moreover, the a priori validity of knowledge does not exclude the possibility that it can be discovered empirically. In keeping with Kant, Fries and Nelson anticipated this separation (usually first attributed to Reichenbach) between the validity and discovery context of knowledge and pointed out that the a priori could be discovered empirically, but never proven. There are currently still good reasons why transcendental philosophical concepts are of fundamental importance for modern science, although it must not be overlooked that even within the framework of a modernized transcendental philosophy, several unsolved problems remain or are raised.