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Leonard Nelson a Theory of Philosophical Fallacies Argumentation Library Leonard Nelson A Theory of Philosophical Fallacies Translated by Fernando Leal and David Carus A Theory of Philosophical Fallacies Argumentation Library VOLUME 26 Series Editor Frans H. van Eemeren, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands Editorial Board Bart Garssen, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands Scott Jacobs, University of Illinois at Urbana-Campaign, USA Erik C.W. Krabbe, University of Groningen, The Netherlands John Woods, University of British Columbia, Canada More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/5642 Leonard Nelson A Theory of Philosophical Fallacies 123 Leonard Nelson Göttingen Germany Translated by Fernando Leal and David Carus Deceased—Leonard Nelson (1882–1927) ISSN 1566-7650 ISSN 2215-1907 (electronic) Argumentation Library ISBN 978-3-319-20782-7 ISBN 978-3-319-20783-4 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-20783-4 Library of Congress Control Number: 2015945152 Springer Cham Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London © Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 Main text translated from the German language edition: Typische Denkfehler in der Philosophie by Leonard Nelson, © Felix Meiner Verlag 2011. All rights reserved Appendix translated from the German language edition: “Die kritische Ethik bei Kant, Schiller und Fries: eine Revision ihrer Prinzipien”, Gesammelte Schriften in neun Bänden, vol. VIII, pp. 27–192 by Leonard Nelson, © Felix Meiner Verlag 1971. All rights reserved This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. Printed on acid-free paper Springer International Publishing AG Switzerland is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com) Contents Introduction by Fernando Leal ............................. 1 What Is the Theory? . 2 Who Was Leonard Nelson? . 6 Some Objections to the Theory. 9 Note on the Translation . 13 References . 18 Lecture I.............................................. 21 References . 28 Lecture II ............................................. 29 Reference. 34 Lecture III ............................................ 35 References . 41 Lecture IV ............................................ 43 References . 50 Lecture V ............................................. 51 References . 56 Lecture VI ............................................ 57 References . 63 Lecture VII ............................................ 65 References . 71 Lecture VIII ........................................... 73 References . 81 v vi Contents Lecture IX ............................................ 83 References . 89 Lecture X ............................................. 91 References . 98 Lecture XI ............................................ 99 References . 107 Lecture XII ............................................ 109 References . 116 Lecture XIII ........................................... 117 References . 125 Lecture XIV ........................................... 127 References . 134 Lecture XV ............................................ 135 References . 142 Lecture XVI ........................................... 143 References . 149 Lecture XVII .......................................... 151 References . 158 Lecture XVIII .......................................... 159 References . 165 Lecture XIX ........................................... 167 References . 174 Lecture XX ............................................ 175 References . 181 Lecture XXI ........................................... 183 References . 190 Lecture XXII .......................................... 191 References . 200 Appendix: Seven Kantian Fallacies........................... 203 Introduction by Fernando Leal Abstract In 1921 Nelson presented what seems to be the first theory of philo- sophical argumentation, or at least of its negative or destructive part—a theory of philosophical fallacies. That theory says that the peculiar nature of philosophical thinking repeatedly leads people to take ordinary concepts with great philosophical import, such as causality or duty, and replace them with new, made-up ones, whose content is very different from that of the originally available ones. When the new concepts usurp the place of the original ones within a philosophical argument, they invariably produce false results—on all sides of philosophical disputes. Many apparently irresolvable disputes in philosophy are the product of such fallacious concept-swapping. The relationship between philosophy and argumentation is, to say the least, pecu- liar. Philosophers argue all the time, that much we all know, even though quite often it is difficult, and sometimes exceedingly difficult, to make out what exactly their arguments are. But even conceding (for the sake of argument) that philosophy is all about arguing, it is again a hard fact that philosophers, in sharp contrast to mathematicians or scientists, are rarely if ever convinced by each other’s argu- ments. Moreover, the favourite occupation of philosophers is to pick holes in the arguments of their fellow philosophers, thereby indicating to the outside world that there is something rotten with all philosophical arguments. None of this is controversial. A curious observer would therefore be readily excused if he or she would draw the conclusion that, surely, philosophers must have by now developed a theory of philosophical argumentation. This is hardly the case. A careful inspection of the relevant literature reveals it to consist basically of two kinds of publications. On the one hand, there are practical ‘textbooks’ purporting to give students some analytic tools to analyze and evaluate philosophical arguments or to construct and present their own. On the other hand, there are metaphilosophical texts presenting a certain view of the nature of philosophy with more or less loose © Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 1 L. Nelson, A Theory of Philosophical Fallacies, Argumentation Library 26, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-20783-4_1 2 Introduction by Fernando Leal observations about the role that arguments play or do not play in philosophy.1 None of these books, however, present a systematic theory of philosophical argumentation as such, a theory of how philosophers actually argue or fail to argue.2 This is the main reason why the book the reader is now holding in his or her hands merits attention. This book does present a theory of philosophical argu- mentation. It is perhaps too soon to say whether the theory is correct, entirely or in part, but it is quite a clear theory, so that at the very least it might start a much needed discussion about what a theory of philosophical argumentation should be. In the following I shall first briefly state what that theory is, then I shall present its author, for he is not well known, and finally I shall endeavour to meet some objections that can be raised against the theory. What Is the Theory? Nelson’s theory of philosophical argumentation, as set forth in this book, is only a partial theory, for it only concerns those philosophical arguments that go wrong, that contain a fallacy, i.e. an error in reasoning. It does not say anything about philosophical arguments that are correct and fallacy-free. Moreover, the theory does not purport to cover all fallacies, but only the ‘typical’ ones, viz those that a philosopher will commit sooner or later because of the peculiar business he is in. Fallacies of such a typical sort are as it were an occupational hazard. Even the plural—fallacies—has to be taken with a pinch of salt, for at bottom there is, according to the theory, only one typical fallacy in philosophical argu- mentation, although it comes in many shapes and forms. This may not look very promising. A theory of philosophical argumentation that is in fact about one fallacy? For it to work we must assume that in philosophy we will, always or at least for the 1To the first group belong e.g. Cornman et al. (1992), Rosenberg (1996), Morton (2004), Cohen (2004), Martinich (2005), Baggini and Fosl (2010); to the second e.g. Stove (1991), Glymour (1992), Bouveresse (1996), Williamson (2007), Gutting (2009), Schnädelbach (2012). I am nat- urally excluding from consideration those textbooks written by philosophers about argumentation in general (usually in view of courses in logic or critical thinking) as well as papers or books in which particular arguments of particular philosophers are subjected to scrutiny either for historical or systematic purposes. They may contain valuable remarks about philosophical argumentation but belong to a different
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