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On Operational Leadership U.S. Army General Matthew Ridgway (second from left) in Ribera, Sicily, July 25, 1943 On Operational Leadership By Milan Vego There were commanders-in-chiefs who could not have led a cavalry regiment with distinction and cavalry commanders who could have led armies. —CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ uccess of any military organiza- Ideally, all commanders should have a are not won or lost at the tactical level tion depends on the experience high level of professional education and but at the operational and strategic S and good judgment of its leaders. training in addition to some critically levels. Hence, it is critically important important character traits. Moreover, that operational commanders are the higher the level of command, the selected based solely on their proven or Dr. Milan Vego is R.K. Turner Professor of more important it is that commanders potential warfighting abilities and not Operational Art in the Joint Military Operations and staff meet these requirements. Wars their political connections or manage- Department at the Naval War College. 60 JPME Today / On Operational Leadership JFQ 77, 2nd Quarter 2015 ment skills. Operational commanders tions short of war and high-intensity are developed throughout life and a mili- are not managers but should be first conventional war. They range from an tary career—and through self-study.4 and foremost warfighters. army corps and its naval/air equivalents (numbered fleets/air forces) to the Operational Thinking Leadership vs. Management theater armies/fleets/air forces and One of the principal requirements for Leadership can be defined as the art of multi-Service (joint) theater commands success at the operational and strategic influencing others and environments (theater of war/theater of operations). levels of command is to think broadly directly and indirectly and the skill of Theater commands are the principal and have a broad vision.5 Such ability, creating conditions for sustained orga- operational levels of command because which Germans call operatives Denken nizational success to achieve desired they have sufficient forces to conduct (operational thinking), is only in some results.1 The quality of one’s leadership campaigns/major operations. The rare cases the result of a commander’s cannot be quantified in any meaning- lowest level of command that could inherent predisposition to think big ful way. It is essentially intangible. plan and execute a major operation is and far ahead of current events. Opera- Leadership and management are not the joint/combined task forces and tional thinking is not identical to what identical things. Management deals in some cases even single divisions information warfare advocates call “situ- with the allocation and control of (as Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 ational awareness” (SA).6 The extensive resources—whether human, material, or illustrated). use of this term in the U.S. and other financial—to attain the objectives of an militaries is one of the best proofs of organization.2 Traditionally, superiority Personality Traits tactical vs. operational thinking therein. in materiel was one reason that the U.S. Successful operational commanders Many classical military thinkers and military emphasized management think- usually do not have some inborn quali- practitioners of warfare have recognized ing and a business approach to solving ties that set them apart from successful the need for commanders to think in military problems. Among other things, tactical commanders. Both operational broad terms. Prussian General Gerhard the strong emphasis on the managerial and tactical commanders need to Johann David von Scharnhorst (1755– values and entrepreneurial ethics con- possess a good balance of the most 1813), for example, observed, “One has tributed significantly to the inability of important personality traits. In contrast to see the whole before seeing its parts. the U.S. Army to perform well during to a tactical commander, the personality This is really the first rule, and its cor- the Vietnam War.3 and command style of an operational rectness can be learned from a study of Despite these negative experiences, commander is understood indirectly history.”7 Field Marshal Helmuth von the U.S. military apparently did not learn rather than directly through the chain Moltke, Sr. (1800–1891), wrote, “All the proper lessons; a business approach of command. This is especially true individual successes achieved through to the conduct to war is alive and well in in the case of naval or air operational the courage of our [German] troops on the U.S. military. An emphasis is still put commanders because their subordinate the battlefield are useless if not guided on management and military efficiency forces are deployed over a large part of a by great thoughts and directed by the instead of effectiveness. Various quantifi- theater. Another major difference is that purpose of the campaign and the war as a able methods called “metrics,” based on an operational commander cannot be whole.”8 He believed that “it is far more business models, are extensively used to successful without thinking operation- important that the high commander evaluate the performance of U.S. forces in ally versus tactically in performing his retain a clear perspective of the entire combat. But experience shows that one’s numerous responsibilities in peacetime state of affairs than that any detail is car- military performance is bound to be dis- and in time of war. ried out in a particular way.”9 Moltke, Sr., mal against a strong and skillful opponent Personality traits of commanders at also wrote, “All successive acts of war are unless there is a consistent and strong any echelon include strong character, thus not premeditated implementations emphasis on leadership and warfighting personal integrity, high intellect, sound of some plan but spontaneous actions in peacetime. Also, the conduct of war is judgment, courage, boldness, creativ- in response to the military situation of largely an art and not a science or akin to ity, presence of mind, healthy ambition, the moment. What is important, in each a business activity. humility, mental flexibility, foresight, concrete case, is to see clearly through mental agility, decisiveness, understand- a mist of uncertainty, assess the facts ac- The Term ing of human nature, and the ability to curately, guess the unknowns, reach a In generic terms, operational leadership communicate ideas clearly and succinctly. decision quickly, and then move to carry refers to those commanders and their Clearly, no commander can ever have all it out vigorously without letting oneself staffs who need to think operationally these traits represented in equal measure. be sidetracked.”10 instead of tactically in exercising their Perhaps the most critical of these for suc- authority and responsibilities across the cess are a strong character, high intellect, Importance entire spectrum of conflict—that is, creativity, and boldness. These qualities An operational commander should from peacetime competition to opera- think operationally in exercising his JFQ 77, 2nd Quarter 2015 Vego 61 forces in terms of personnel, materiel, and time than the commander who skillfully applies the tenets of operational leader- ship. Moreover, there is always a great risk that a weaker opponent who thinks operationally could inflict large losses on, or even defeat, larger but poorly led forces. Operational thinking is both a foun- dation and framework for developing operational vision—that is, the command- er’s ability to envisage correctly the flow of events until the ultimate objective of a major operation or campaign is accom- plished. This means the commander has to think like a good chess player in terms of combination (action-reaction-coun- terreaction) until the military endstate is achieved. As in a game of chess, the operational commander who views the board as a single interrelated plane of action and each move as a prelude to a se- ries of further moves is more likely to be successful than an opponent who thinks only a single move at a time. Operational commanders should think of how to cre- ate opportunities for the employment of their forces while at the same time reduc- ing the enemy’s future options.11 By correctly anticipating the enemy’s reaction to his own actions, the opera- tional commander can timely make a sound decision, act, and then prepare to make another decision to respond to the enemy’s reaction. The key to success is to operate within the enemy’s decision cycle. Without this ability, the operational Lieutenant General George S. Patton, U.S. Third Army commander, pins Silver Star on Private Ernest A. Jenkins of New York City (NARA) commander cannot seize and maintain initiative, and without this initiative, his responsibilities and authority across commander must have the ability to build freedom of action is greatly restricted by the entire spectrum of conflict. Obvi- a strategic or operational “picture” of the opponent. ously, operational thinking is the most the situation in a theater. This means an Operational vision is inherently critically important in a high-intensity uncanny ability to know and understand narrower in its scope than operational conventional war. Yet all types of opera- all military and nonmilitary aspects of thinking, and in terms of time is limited tions short of war, such as combating the situation in a theater, reduce com- to anticipated duration of a campaign/ maritime terrorism/piracy, counterin- plexities of the situation to their essentials major operation. No campaign or major surgency, and peace operations, also by properly differentiating between operation can be coherently planned require that operational commanders important and less important or trivial and executed without a vision of how it think operationally rather than tactically. elements, link disparate events (“connect should end. Among other things, opera- Operational thinking helps the com- the dots”), deduce patterns, and envisage tional vision ensures that an operational mander to employ friendly forces in such future trends in the situation for several commander is focused on defeating or a way that each action directly or indi- weeks or even months.
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