U.S. Army General Matthew Ridgway (second from left) in Ribera, Sicily, July 25, 1943

On Operational Leadership

By Milan Vego

There were commanders-in-chiefs who could not have led a cavalry regiment with distinction and cavalry commanders who could have led armies.

—Carl von Clausewitz

uccess of any military organiza- Ideally, all commanders should have a are not won or lost at the tactical level tion depends on the experience high level of professional education and but at the operational and strategic S and good judgment of its leaders. training in addition to some critically levels. Hence, it is critically important important character traits. Moreover, that operational commanders are the higher the level of command, the selected based solely on their proven or Dr. Milan Vego is R.K. Turner Professor of more important it is that commanders potential warfighting abilities and not Operational Art in the Joint Military Operations and staff meet these requirements. Wars their political connections or manage- Department at the Naval War College.

60 JPME Today / On Operational Leadership JFQ 77, 2nd Quarter 2015 ment skills. Operational commanders tions short of war and high-intensity are developed throughout life and a mili- are not managers but should be first conventional war. They range from an tary career—and through self-study.4 and foremost warfighters. army corps and its naval/air equivalents (numbered fleets/air forces) to the Operational Thinking Leadership vs. Management theater armies/fleets/air forces and One of the principal requirements for Leadership can be defined as the art of multi-Service (joint) theater commands success at the operational and strategic influencing others and environments (theater of war/theater of operations). levels of command is to think broadly directly and indirectly and the skill of Theater commands are the principal and have a broad vision.5 Such ability, creating conditions for sustained orga- operational levels of command because which Germans call operatives Denken nizational success to achieve desired they have sufficient forces to conduct (operational thinking), is only in some results.1 The quality of one’s leadership campaigns/major operations. The rare cases the result of a commander’s cannot be quantified in any meaning- lowest level of command that could inherent predisposition to think big ful way. It is essentially intangible. plan and execute a major operation is and far ahead of current events. Opera- Leadership and management are not the joint/combined task forces and tional thinking is not identical to what identical things. Management deals in some cases even single divisions information warfare advocates call “situ- with the allocation and control of (as Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 ational awareness” (SA).6 The extensive resources—whether human, material, or illustrated). use of this term in the U.S. and other financial—to attain the objectives of an militaries is one of the best proofs of organization.2 Traditionally, superiority Personality Traits tactical vs. operational thinking therein. in materiel was one reason that the U.S. Successful operational commanders Many classical military thinkers and military emphasized management think- usually do not have some inborn quali- practitioners of warfare have recognized ing and a business approach to solving ties that set them apart from successful the need for commanders to think in military problems. Among other things, tactical commanders. Both operational broad terms. Prussian General Gerhard the strong emphasis on the managerial and tactical commanders need to Johann David von Scharnhorst (1755– values and entrepreneurial ethics con- possess a good balance of the most 1813), for example, observed, “One has tributed significantly to the inability of important personality traits. In contrast to see the whole before seeing its parts. the U.S. Army to perform well during to a tactical commander, the personality This is really the first rule, and its cor- the Vietnam War.3 and command style of an operational rectness can be learned from a study of Despite these negative experiences, commander is understood indirectly history.”7 Field Marshal Helmuth von the U.S. military apparently did not learn rather than directly through the chain Moltke, Sr. (1800–1891), wrote, “All the proper lessons; a business approach of command. This is especially true individual successes achieved through to the conduct to war is alive and well in in the case of naval or air operational the courage of our [German] troops on the U.S. military. An emphasis is still put commanders because their subordinate the battlefield are useless if not guided on management and military efficiency forces are deployed over a large part of a by great thoughts and directed by the instead of effectiveness. Various quantifi- theater. Another major difference is that purpose of the campaign and the war as a able methods called “metrics,” based on an operational commander cannot be whole.”8 He believed that “it is far more business models, are extensively used to successful without thinking operation- important that the high commander evaluate the performance of U.S. forces in ally versus tactically in performing his retain a clear perspective of the entire combat. But experience shows that one’s numerous responsibilities in peacetime state of affairs than that any detail is car- military performance is bound to be dis- and in time of war. ried out in a particular way.”9 Moltke, Sr., mal against a strong and skillful opponent Personality traits of commanders at also wrote, “All successive acts of war are unless there is a consistent and strong any echelon include strong character, thus not premeditated implementations emphasis on leadership and warfighting personal integrity, high intellect, sound of some plan but spontaneous actions in peacetime. Also, the conduct of war is judgment, courage, boldness, creativ- in response to the military situation of largely an art and not a science or akin to ity, presence of mind, healthy ambition, the moment. What is important, in each a business activity. humility, mental flexibility, foresight, concrete case, is to see clearly through mental agility, decisiveness, understand- a mist of uncertainty, assess the facts ac- The Term ing of human nature, and the ability to curately, guess the unknowns, reach a In generic terms, operational leadership communicate ideas clearly and succinctly. decision quickly, and then move to carry refers to those commanders and their Clearly, no commander can ever have all it out vigorously without letting oneself staffs who need to think operationally these traits represented in equal measure. be sidetracked.”10 instead of tactically in exercising their Perhaps the most critical of these for suc- authority and responsibilities across the cess are a strong character, high intellect, Importance entire spectrum of conflict—that is, creativity, and boldness. These qualities An operational commander should from peacetime competition to opera- think operationally in exercising his

JFQ 77, 2nd Quarter 2015 Vego 61 forces in terms of personnel, materiel, and time than the commander who skillfully applies the tenets of operational leader- ship. Moreover, there is always a great risk that a weaker opponent who thinks operationally could inflict large losses on, or even defeat, larger but poorly led forces. Operational thinking is both a foun- dation and framework for developing operational vision—that is, the command- er’s ability to envisage correctly the flow of events until the ultimate objective of a major operation or campaign is accom- plished. This means the commander has to think like a good chess player in terms of combination (action-reaction-coun- terreaction) until the military endstate is achieved. As in a game of chess, the operational commander who views the board as a single interrelated plane of action and each move as a prelude to a se- ries of further moves is more likely to be successful than an opponent who thinks only a single move at a time. Operational commanders should think of how to cre- ate opportunities for the employment of their forces while at the same time reduc- ing the enemy’s future options.11 By correctly anticipating the enemy’s reaction to his own actions, the opera- tional commander can timely make a sound decision, act, and then prepare to make another decision to respond to the enemy’s reaction. The key to success is to operate within the enemy’s decision cycle. Without this ability, the operational Lieutenant General George S. Patton, U.S. Third Army commander, pins Silver Star on Private Ernest A. Jenkins of New York City (NARA) commander cannot seize and maintain initiative, and without this initiative, his responsibilities and authority across commander must have the ability to build freedom of action is greatly restricted by the entire spectrum of conflict. Obvi- a strategic or operational “picture” of the opponent. ously, operational thinking is the most the situation in a theater. This means an Operational vision is inherently critically important in a high-intensity uncanny ability to know and understand narrower in its scope than operational conventional war. Yet all types of opera- all military and nonmilitary aspects of thinking, and in terms of time is limited tions short of war, such as combating the situation in a theater, reduce com- to anticipated duration of a campaign/ maritime terrorism/piracy, counterin- plexities of the situation to their essentials major operation. No campaign or major surgency, and peace operations, also by properly differentiating between operation can be coherently planned require that operational commanders important and less important or trivial and executed without a vision of how it think operationally rather than tactically. elements, link disparate events (“connect should end. Among other things, opera- Operational thinking helps the com- the dots”), deduce patterns, and envisage tional vision ensures that an operational mander to employ friendly forces in such future trends in the situation for several commander is focused on defeating or a way that each action directly or indi- weeks or even months. The operational neutralizing the enemy center of gravity rectly contributes to the accomplishment commander who does not think opera- instead of being distracted by the pursuit of the ultimate strategic or operational tionally may eventually be successful but of purely geographic or economic objec- objective. Hence, an operational at substantially heavier costs for friendly tives. Practical application of operational

62 JPME Today / On Operational Leadership JFQ 77, 2nd Quarter 2015 vision is in formulating and articulating Attributes resources one has oneself and see the fu- operational commander’s intent. Operational thinking encompasses ture effects to determine what one has to History gives many examples of several critical and diverse but closely fear or hope from political maneuvers.”15 highly successful operational com- related attributes. The most important Moltke, Sr., was the first German chief of manders. Perhaps with few exceptions, for the commander are having an opera- the general staff to demand that military- most of them were both thinkers and tional rather than a tactical perspective; political considerations be included in practitioners of operational art; there balancing operational factors with operational planning. He invariably based is no contradiction between the two. the objective; fully understanding the his plans on the advantages and disadvan- Napoleon I (1769–1821), Moltke, Sr., levels of war and their interrelation- tages of the military-political situation.16 and Field Marshal Erich von Manstein ships; understanding geography and Needless to say, an operational (1887–1973) belong to a small, select operational features of the operating commander should have a thorough group of brilliant operational thinkers environment; making sound operational knowledge and understanding of the and practitioners. There is also a rela- decisions; and fully comprehending theory and practice of operational art.17 tively large group of above average to the linkage among policy and strategy, Otherwise, he will not be able to have an excellent operational commanders of all operational art, and tactics. operational perspective in assessing the three services who conducted successful Perhaps the most important proof of situation in his theater and then to make campaigns and major operations, such as operational thinking is the commander’s sound decisions. At the same time, an Field Marshals Albert Kesselring, Erwin ability to have an operational instead of operational commander must have solid Rommel, and William S. Slim; Marshal tactical perspective. In terms of the fac- knowledge and understanding of tactics Georgy Zhukov; Generals Douglas tor space, the operational commander’s in his chosen specialty and tactics of other MacArthur, George S. Patton, Bernard area of responsibility is a theater or major combat arms/branches of his service. He L. Montgomery, and George T. Kenney; part of it. The size of a theater can vary also needs to have a full understanding of and Admirals Ernest J. King, Chester W. from several hundred to millions of the tactical employment of forces of other Nimitz, Raymond A. Spruance, Andrew square miles. For example, U.S. Pacific services. Cunningham, Erich Raeder, and Karl Command encompasses an area of Another major problem is applying a Doenitz. Since the end of World War II, about 100 million square miles with 44 “targeteering” approach to warfare—that there have been only a few operational countries, while U.S. Central Command is, when the focus of planning is on commanders who performed excellently encompasses an area of about 21 mil- targets to be degraded, neutralized, or in combat. Perhaps one of the best but lion square miles with 51 countries. In destroyed. It is also common to deter- most underappreciated U.S. military contrast, the perspective of a tactical mine targets first and only then formulate leaders in the postwar era was General commander is much smaller because it objectives. In U.S. practice, many com- Matthew B. Ridgway. He performed su- pertains to a given combat zone/sector mands and agencies, from the Joint Staff perbly as the U.S. 8th Army commander or area of responsibility. In terms of time, to tactical commanders in the field, are by turning the situation around in Korea an operational commander has to assess involved in target development, selection, in the spring of 1951.12 a situation several weeks or even months and approval. The inability to think operationally ahead, while the time window for a tacti- Moreover, an operational commander has resulted in major setbacks or even cal commander is from several hours to 2 will lose operational perspective if he failures of campaigns or major operations. or 3 days. grossly interferes with the responsibilities For example, the lack of operational An operational commander should of his subordinate tactical command- thinking was the main reason for the evaluate fully the influence of nonmili- ers. By “micromanaging” subordinate Allied defeats in Norway and France in tary aspects of the situation (political, commanders, an operational com- 1940 and in Southeast Asia in 1941– diplomatic, economic, religious, legal, en- mander would spend time and effort 1942. Besides the serious disconnect at vironmental, informational, and others) on the things that would be better left the U.S. strategy and policy level, the on planning and employing forces. This to the commanders on the scene of Vietnam War was essentially conducted requirement is not something entirely action. This unwillingness to delegate at the theater-strategic and tactical levels new as some leading proponents of infor- authority is often the result of the so- only; again, operational art was not ap- mation warfare falsely claim. For example, called zero-defect tolerance or when plied.13 A major reason for the Argentine Frederick the Great pointed out that the higher commanders do not tolerate defeat in the Falklands/Malvinas War policy and military art must be taken into mistakes made by subordinates. The of 1982 was the lack of operational account in preparing for a campaign.14 end result of such a style of command thinking. Likewise, the Iraq-Iran War He wrote that one should “know one’s is waiting on orders, lack of motiva- (1980–1988) degenerated into a war of enemies, their alliances, their resources, tion, stifling creativity, and careerism on attrition at the operational level because and the nature of their country in order the part of subordinates. This cannot of the lack of operational thinking by to plan a campaign. One should know but have highly negative consequences both sides. what to expect of one’s friends, what on performance in combat. Another

JFQ 77, 2nd Quarter 2015 Vego 63 Brigadier General Courtney Whitney, General Douglas MacArthur, and Major General Edward M. Almond observe shelling of Inchon from USS Mt. McKinley, September 15, 1950 (NARA/U.S. Army/Nutter) problem is the false belief that advanced be conducted, are sacrificed. An auda- the factor time or force. Balancing of the information technologies allow better cious decision can be arrived at by one operational factors versus the objective is assessment of situations by an operational man only.18 An operational commander’s largely an art rather than a science. The commander than his subordinate tacti- freedom of action is achieved primar- most successful operational commanders cal commanders. Frequent interference ily by properly balancing the factors of consistently displayed a high ability to of an operational commander with the space, time, and force with a selected harmonize the factors of space, time, and responsibilities of tactical commanders is operational/strategic objective.19 These forces against the objective in planning the best proof that the operational com- operational factors and, increasingly, in- and executing their campaigns and major mander does not trust subordinate ability formation are critically important to make operations. to exercise initiative based on command- sound decisions. This means among Operational warfare is largely war on er’s intent. Moltke, Sr., stated that the other things that a deficiency or disad- a map. Almost all successful operational most unfortunate of all high commanders vantage in one factor or element must commanders have had a solid knowledge is the one who is under close supervision be roughly balanced by surpluses or ad- of geography and a good appreciation of and who has to give an account of his vantages in others. Bringing these factors the operational features of the physical plans and intentions every hour of every into harmony with an objective requires a environment. Napoleon I was once asked day. This supervision may be exercised thorough knowledge and understanding how he always divined the intentions of through a delegate of the highest author- of all the military and nonmilitary aspects the enemy so accurately. He responded, ity at the headquarters or a telegraph of the situation. Any serious imbalance “I did not know beforehand the mistakes wire attached to his back. In such cases, could be among other things resolved by the enemy would make which I took all independence, quick decisions, and scaling down the size of the objective or advantage of; I simply studied my map.” audacious risk, without which no war can reducing the factor of space or increasing Napoleon I continuously studied the

64 JPME Today / On Operational Leadership JFQ 77, 2nd Quarter 2015 enemy’s possibilities and limitations on hostilities. In contrast, levels of command the tactical level often affect strategy and the map, much more than the enemy did. exist in time of peace and war. They are policy in profound ways. Operational Yet the methods that brought Napoleon only prerequisites for conducting war at art is a critical link between strategy and I his many successes in central Europe a given level in the course of accomplish- tactics, and if that connection is weak failed him altogether in Russia in 1812. ing assigned military objectives. Yet if the or broken, no favorable strategic results In that instance, he failed to properly respective theater commander does not can be achieved quickly or decisively. evaluate the factors of space and time apply the tenets of operational art in the Whenever the ends and means at the versus the strategic objective. Rommel use of his sources of power and instead national-strategic level are seriously dis- was known for his excellent knowledge of focuses on tactics or, even worse, pure connected or mismatched, brilliance at terrain and orientation.20 MacArthur was targeteering, he does not conduct war at the operational and tactical levels—as the also well known for his excellent knowl- the operational or theater-strategic level. Germans consistently displayed during edge of military geography, which greatly The highest art of operational World War II—can only delay, but cannot helped him to evaluate the factors of leadership is making timely and sound ultimately prevent, defeat at the strategic space, time, and force in planning and ex- decisions. The principal factors in de- level of war. ecuting campaigns and major operations. cisionmaking should be the mission Operational commanders must fully and situation. Among other things, the Obtaining Operational Thinking understand the distinctions among three decision is a reflection of the personality The commander’s ability to think main levels of war (strategic, operational, traits, professional knowledge, and expe- operationally is a result of the influences and tactical) and how decisions and rience of the commander. In general, the of many factors. The societal and cul- actions at one level affect events at the higher the command level, the fewer but tural framework determines to a large others. Among other things, a compre- more important decisions are made—and degree the nature of military institu- hensive understanding of the levels of more time is available to make these deci- tions and hence professional education war and their mutual relationships is the sions. The much larger perspective at the and training. Among other things, the key prerequisite for operational com- operational level of command requires commander’s operational thinking is a manders and their staffs in sequencing a more complex and challenging deci- product of the national way of warfare and synchronizing the use of military sionmaking process than at the tactical as a whole and the common operational and nonmilitary sources of power in level. A campaign or major operation is outlook of the armed forces or a par- accomplishing strategic or operational conducted over a much larger part of the ticular service. Sound joint doctrine and objectives. Each level of war is directly theater and involves considerably larger training are the main tools for acquiring related to the corresponding military and more diverse forces than tactical ac- a common operational outlook. objective to be accomplished. Hence, tac- tions. The operational commander needs The most important direct influ- tical, operational, and strategic levels of to evaluate the situation in all its com- ence in shaping the future operational war are differentiated. Moreover, military plexity for several weeks or even months commander’s ability to think broadly objectives determine methods of combat ahead. Often the operational commander is participation in field trips, planning/ employment of one’s forces (tactical ac- must make decisions without having war games, large-scale exercises and ma- tions, major operations, campaigns) and all the information available.21 Despite neuvers, and commanding large forces. therefore the size of the area in which significant advances in technology, the in- Obviously, the most important of all opposing combat forces would operate. formation available is usually ambiguous, direct influences is combat experience. The operational level of war exists when a incomplete, or outright contradictory. However, most future operational com- single military- or theater-strategic objec- It also often arrives late. In combat it is manders rarely have the opportunity to tive has to be accomplished as in Iraq in common to have incomplete knowledge take part in combat. Hence, the best 2003. The higher the level of war, the of the situation. Hence, an operational way to obtain operational thinking is to more complex the situation military com- commander must make many decisions attend service/joint war colleges, prefer- manders and their staffs must understand, based on assumptions that might be par- ably their resident programs. Another evaluate, and synthesize. Both military tially or even completely false. method is self-education. Officers should and nonmilitary aspects of situations are An operational commander cannot make continuous efforts to improve critical for success at the operational and be highly successful without having full their professional knowledge over the strategic levels of war across the spectrum knowledge and understanding of the entire length of their military career. of conflict. This is not necessarily the case mutual interrelationships and linkage The better educated the commander, at the tactical level, except in the posthos- between strategy on one hand and strat- the more he understands the big pic- tilities phase of a campaign or operations egy, operational art, and tactics on the ture and the better he will perform other than war. other. All three components of military (provided the commander has the es- Although related, levels of war and art are closely related. Strategy dominates sential qualities of character).22 All great levels of command are not identical. The operational art, and the latter in turn captains in history, such as Julius Caesar levels of war exist only in time of open dominates tactics. Actions and events at (100–44 BCE), Gustavus Adolphus

JFQ 77, 2nd Quarter 2015 Vego 65 of Sweden (1594–1632), Henri de la employment of one’s forces (tactical ensure sufficient freedom for subordinate Tour d’Auvergne, Viscomte de Turenne actions, major operations, campaigns) commanders, an operational commander (1611–1675), Napoleon I, and Moltke, and their elements (for example, center should apply the German-style mission Sr., constantly worked to improve their of gravity, maneuver, deception, point command (Auftragstaktik). In general, professional knowledge. Napoleon I was of culmination) are directly or indirectly this method of command and control known for untiring study and never failed related to the scale of the objective. allows greater flexibility than central- to avail himself of an opportunity to per- Thus, one of the most important tenets ized command and control for adapting fect himself.23 Moltke, Sr., was extremely of operational leadership is to have a firm rapidly to changing battlefield situations, well read in all aspects of the military and unwavering focus on accomplishing dealing with unforeseen problems, profession.24 the ultimate objective of a campaign or and exploiting fleeting opportunities.31 The critical study of past wars, and major operation. The objective, once Moltke, Sr., emphasized that the advan- campaigns and major operations in selected, must be adhered to. However, tage of a situation would never be fully particular, is a major source for develop- the initially selected objective should be used if subordinate commanders waited ing the operational perspective of future changed, modified, or even abandoned for orders. Only if the commanders at commanders. Because few military com- as demanded by the changes in the situa- all levels were competent for and ac- manders have experience commanding tion. The operational commander should customed to independent action would forces at the operational level, the best realize that there is always more than one the possibility exist for moving large way to educate them to think operation- way to accomplish that objective.25 There masses with ease.32 A higher commander ally is through the study of the successes is probably no greater mistake than to de- provides only those details necessary for and failures of great military leaders. termine and pursue several operational/ understanding and coordinating and Some of the greatest military leaders were strategic objectives simultaneously. Such leaves a lot of room for independent also great students of history. Operational a course of action can be taken only if action for subordinate commanders in commanders should be students of his- one’s forces possess overwhelming power accomplishing the assigned missions.33 tory, not historians (a big difference exists against any conceivable combination of The main prerequisites for the successful between the two). enemy forces. Any effort to weaken the application of mission command were the Future operational commanders importance of a military objective, as the commander’s proper understanding of should have a broad knowledge of proponents of effects-based operations the nature of war, common operational foreign policy, diplomacy, geopolitics, in- have done, is the antithesis of operational or tactical outlook, sound doctrine, ternational economy, finance, ethnicities, thinking and practice. excellent leadership, a high level of religions, and other issues that shape the Also important is the commander’s professional education and training, and situation in any given theater. They need ability to obtain and maintain freedom common vocabulary. to have a thorough knowledge of the area of action—that is, to act effectively The mission command method of in which their forces will be employed. at any time in meeting threats.26 The command and control is most suited to They should also have a deep knowledge operational commander should always a fast-moving and changing situation on of other countries’ histories, societies, and try to obtain and maintain freedom of the battlefield, as is in a high-intensity cultures. action.27 Otherwise, his ability to exercise conventional war. It is a loose, decentral- the initiative is lost.28 The operational ized method of command and control Tenets commander should also do everything predicated on an understanding of overall Success in combat is considerably possible to reduce the enemy’s freedom mission requirements rather than on enhanced when the operational com- to act.29 In practice, freedom of action for compliance with detailed direction from mander applies certain tenets of opera- an operational commander is invariably above. In general, it allows greater flex- tional art. These tenets are related but subject to certain political, diplomatic, ibility than centralized command and not necessarily identical to the principles military, economic, social, legal, and, control for adapting rapidly to chang- of war. Perhaps the most important today, environmental limitations. In ing battlefield situations, dealing with tenets of operational leadership are firm general, the more limitations on the op- unforeseen problems, and exploiting and unwavering focus on the objec- erational commander’s freedom of action, fleeting opportunities.34 The single most tive, obtaining/maintaining freedom the fewer the means and ways the politi- important advantage of mission com- of action, exercising initiative, taking cal leadership will have for accomplishing mand is that it encourages creativity and high but prudent risks, and applying its stated political strategic objectives.30 initiative on the part of subordinates. It overwhelming power at a decisive place Freedom to act is an absolute pre- requires steady emphasis on leadership and time. requisite for exercising the initiative on and warfighting at all levels of command. The single most important element the part of subordinate commanders. It also greatly enhances the role and value of operational art is accomplishing the The more freedom of action given to of professional education and training military objective at hand. In addition subordinate commanders, the more among officers and the rank and file. A to the levels of war, methods of combat room they have to exercise initiative. To major shortcoming of mission command

66 JPME Today / On Operational Leadership JFQ 77, 2nd Quarter 2015 Iranian journalists jump from helicopter in West Front of Iran-Iraq War (Courtesy SAJED) is that a subordinate commander may situations today are in conflict preven- and ability of analysis, but also what the sometimes cause an unwanted escalation tion/management, posthostilities, and Germans called “thinking obedience” or worsening of the situation. In addi- peace operations. The principal elements (denkende Gehorsam). The Germans put tion, lower decisionmaking thresholds of mission command are the mission, great importance on the need to main- and highly diffuse centers of authority situation, commander’s intent, freedom tain the initiative once it was obtained.38 can make coordination among com- to act, and initiative. These elements have Moltke, Sr., fostered critical thinking and mand elements more difficult, thereby to be skillfully applied by both the higher independent actions among his subordi- increasing the risk of loss of control by and subordinate commanders. nates. He believed that the best results the commander. Another pitfall in apply- Commander’s intent is the principal are achieved when a commander acts ing mission command is incompetence tool in ensuring freedom of action for within the framework of his higher com- in subordinate commanders. The suc- subordinate commanders. In the German mander’s intent.39 cessful application of mission command military prior to 1945, commander’s in- The higher the command echelon, is also compounded when operational tent was sacrosanct. The intent provided the larger the area of uncertainty, and the commanders interfere in purely tactical a framework within which an isolated higher the risks the commander should decisions and actions.35 Risk aversion and subordinate commander could act in the take. Despite all the advances in informa- zero-defect tolerance so prevalent in the spirit of the mission issued by a higher tion technologies, there will always be U.S. and other Western militaries are the commander.36 It promoted unity of a rather large area of uncertainty in any antithesis of the German-style mission effort in a fluid situation that failed to given operational or strategic situation. command. conform precisely to one’s plans and ex- Among other things, the operational In general, mission command cannot pectations. The intent was aimed both to commander rarely, if ever, has complete be applied fully or at all when there is a circumscribe and encourage subordinate knowledge of all the factors in a situ- need for an urgent action or where the commanders’ exercise of the initiative.37 ation. Moreover, he must often make highest leadership cannot afford an error The execution of the mission in ac- operational decisions without waiting that can easily lead to severe political or cordance with the higher commander’s for complete information. Operational strategic consequences. Examples of such intent required not only independence decisionmaking is inherently based on

JFQ 77, 2nd Quarter 2015 Vego 67 taking high but prudent risks. The uncer- superiority overall. What they aimed at wood Press, 1984), 83. 4 Werner W. Banisch, “Leadership at the tainties regarding the enemy’s intentions was to employ their available forces so Operational Level,” Army 8 (August 1987), 60. are much greater at the strategic and that they could fall in overwhelming 5 David Jablonsky, “Strategy and the Opera- operational levels than at the tactical force on a portion of the enemy and, tional Level of War: Part I,” Parameters (Spring one.40 The consequences of a failure at the having defeated it, do the same to some 1987), 71. 6 operational level are much more severe other part.46 The commander who tries This term has many meanings and is extensively used in both military and civilian than at the tactical level, and they cannot to be strong everywhere or who wastes world. In one military definition,situational be overcome easily, if at all. At the same his forces on secondary missions acts con- awareness pertains to “a pilot’s (or aircrew’s) time, however, the potential gain is much trary to this basic rule.47 continuous perception of self and aircraft in greater at the operational and strategic lev- One of the key prerequisites for relation to the dynamic environment of flight, els of command than at the tactical level. success in both operations short of war threats, and mission, and the ability to forecast, then execute tasks based on that perception.” A willingness to take calculated risks and high-intensity conventional war is See Aaron W. Schopper, “Measuring situational has distinguished all the great leaders of quality and skills of commanders and awareness of AWACS weapons directors,” Situ- the past. The attempt to fight a safe battle rank and file. The higher the level of ational Awareness in the Tactical Air Environ- without taking risks has rarely been suc- command, the more critical it is to have ment: Augmented Proceedings of the Naval Air cessful. The doctrine that leaves nothing highly educated, trained, and skilled Warfare Center’s First Annual Symposium, CSERIAC SOAR Report# 97-01, Wright-Pat- to chance has not resulted in a decisive commanders and staffs. Among other terson Air Force Base, OH, July 1997. victory. For example, Admiral Horatio things, an operational commander should 7 General Johann von Kielmansegg, cited Nelson (1758–1805) was always taking have strong character, moral courage, in Norbert Hanisch, Untersuchen Sie die ope- great risks. Those who take big risks in boldness, creativity, and an uncanny rativen Ideen Manstein hinsdichtlich Schwer- war nearly always seem to have luck on ability to think operationally instead of punkt-bildung, Ueberraschung, Initiative und Handlungsfreiheit an den Beispielen Westfeld- their side.41 tactically. Experience shows that there zug 1940 (Sichelschnitt-Plan) und Operation Willingness to take prudent risks were only few leaders who had some Zitadelle (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der means making operational decisions in inborn qualities to think broadly and far Bundewehr (FüAkBw), January 15, 1988), 4. varying degrees of uncertainty. Such ahead into the future. For most successful 8 Ibid., “Motto.” 9 decisions are critical for success, especially commanders, operational thinking was Daniel J. Hughes, ed., Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings (Novato, CA: Presidio, when one’s forces are weaker than those acquired through consistent efforts in 1993), 184. of the enemy. They are not gambles, but times of peace. Professional education, 10 Gérard Chaliand, The Art of War in carefully made calculated decisions. An self-education in particular, and train- World History: From Antiquity to the Nuclear operational commander often achieves ing are the principal means of obtaining Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, success by taking reasonable risks. Clearly, operational thinking. The tenets of op- 1994), 768. 11 Robert W. RisCassi, “Doctrine for Joint there is never enough time or enough erational leadership should not be applied Operations in a Combined Environment: A resources, and most choices involve some like a dogma but based on the mission Necessity,” Military Review 77, no. 1 (January– risks. There are no certainties in war.42 and situation. Experience shows that over- February 1997). The operational commander should emphasis on technology at the expense of 12 Thomas E. Ricks, The Generals: American not arbitrarily decide what force size and operational thinking cannot lead to success Military Command from World War II to Today (New York: Penguin, 2012), 177. mix should be employed to accomplish against a strong opponent. In a war be- 13 Edward N. Luttwak, “The Operational the assigned operational or strategic ob- tween two strong opponents, victory will Level of War,” International Security 5, no. 3 jective. In all circumstances he should use go to the side that thinks better and acts (Winter 1980–1981), 62. all the sources of military and nonmilitary faster and with greater determination. JFQ 14 Heinrich Merkens, Ausgewaehlte Krieg- power available or becoming available.43 swissenschaftliche Schriften Friedrichs des Grossen (Jena: Hermann Costenoble, 1876), 7. One is never too strong in a war if the 15 “The Instruction of Frederick the Great aim is to achieve a quick and decisive Notes for His Generals 1747,” trans. Raphael T. Phil- victory.44 There is simply no such a thing lips, in Roots of Strategy: A Collection of Military 1 as being strong enough.45 Hence, a de- Field Manual (FM) 22-103, Leadership Classics (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service and Command at Senior Levels (Washington, cisive victory could come only by using Publishing, 1940), 314. DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 16 Ludwig Freiherr Ruedt von Collenberg, one’s overwhelming strength. The key June 21, 1987), 3. Die Geschichte des Preussisch–Deutschen Gene- 2 prerequisite for success in combat is to be Cited in Brian Howieson and Howard ralstabes von seinene Anfaengen bis zum Ende stronger than the enemy at the decisive Kahn, “Leadership, Management and Com- des ersten Weltkrieges-Beilagen, 2nd part, P-135, point and to use speed, surprise, and mand: The Officer’s Trinity,” inAirpower Lead- ZA/1 2106, Studien der Historical Division ership: Theory and Practice, ed. Peter W. Gray deception. Admiral Nelson believed that Headquarters, United States Army Europe, and Sebastian Cox (London: The Stationery Foreign Military Studies Branch, BA-MA, only numbers could annihilate. Napoleon Office, 2002), 23. 155–156. 3 I remarked, “God is on the side of the Richard A. Gabriel, The Antagonists: A 17 William Slim, “Higher Command in big battalions.” Neither Napoleon I nor Comparative Combat Assessment of the Soviet War,” Royal Air Force Quarterly 2 (April Nelson thought in terms of strength and American Soldier (Westport, CT: Green- 1953), 149.

68 JPME Today / On Operational Leadership JFQ 77, 2nd Quarter 2015 18 Generalfeldmarschall Graf von Moltke 36 John F. Antal, “Forward Command: Ausgewaehlte Werke, Vol I: Feldherr und The Wehrmacht’s Approach to Command and Kriegslehrmeister (Berlin: Berlag von Reimar Control in World War II,” Armor (November– New from Hobbing, 1925), 55. December 1991), 28. 19 Erich H. Koenen, Die operativen Ideen 37 John T. Nelsen II, “Auftragstaktik: A NDU Press Mansteins hinsichtlich Nuetzung des Raumes, Case for Decentralized Battle,” Parameters for the Center for Strategic Research Gewinnen der Initiative, Schaffen von Han- (September 1987), 25. Strategic Perspectives 17 dlungsfreiheit und Wahl zwischen offensivem 38 Wolfgang Thomas, “Auftragstaktik. Vor- and defensivem Vorgehen. Eine Untersuchung aussetzungen, Grenzen und Moeglichkeiten,” The Indian Jihadist Movement: anhand der Beispiele “Rochade” und Schlacht bei Wehrkunde 11 (November 1968), 591. Evolution and Dynamics Kharkow des Winterfeldzuges 1942/43 (Ham- 39 Werner Widder, “Auftragstaktik and In- by Stephen Tankel burg: FüAkBw, November 1988), 2; FüAkBw, nere Fuehrung: Trademarks of German Leader- India has “Operative Leitlinie fuer die Fuehrung von ship,” Military Review 5 (September–October been con- Landstreitkraeften” (October 1993), Arbeitspa- 2002), 5. fronting a pier, Operative Fuehrung (Hamburg: FüAkBw, 40 Arbeitspapier, 18. August 1992), 19; Eike Middeldorf, Fuehrung 41 Russell Grenfell, The Art of the Admiral jihadist threat und Gefecht: Grundriss der Taktik (Frankfurt, (London: Faber and Faber, 1937), 134–135. from Pakistan a.M: Bernard & Graefe, Verlag fuer Wehrwe- 42 FM 22-103, 33. for decades. sen, 1968), 51. 43 Hughes, 219. Expeditionary 20 44 Alfred Gause, “Command Techniques Wilhelm Stanger, Grundzuege der Lehre terrorism Employed by Field Marshal Rommel in Africa,” von der Strategie. Studienbehelf fuer die K.K. Armor 4 (July–August 1958), 23. Kriegsschule, Vol. 1: Theorie mit Kuerzeren typically 21 Lothar Rendulic, Grundlagen militae- Bespielen (Vienna: Verlag der K.K. Kriegschule, receives the rischer Fuehrung (Herford/Bonn: Maximilian 1884), 15. most focus, but indigenous actors Verlag, 1967), 51. 45 Arbeitspapier, 17. benefiting from external support 22 46 Herbert Richmond, National Policy and Grenfell, 179. are responsible for the majority of Naval Strength and Other Essays (London: 47 Bruce Condell and David T. Zabecki, Longmans, Green, 1934), 285, 288–289. eds., On the German Art of War: Truppenfueh- jihadist attacks in India. The Indian 23 C.C. Carmine, “The Qualifications rung (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 22. mujahideen network, which an- for Leadership,” Proceedings 6 (June 1921), nounced its presence to the public 858–859. via media in 2007, is the latest and 24 Hughes, 1. most well known manifestation of 25 B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York: Praeger, 1954), 348. the indigenous Islamist militant 26 Hanisch, 2. threat. As Stephen Tankel details 27 Arbeitspapier, Operative Fuehrung (Ham- in this paper, however, its members burg: FüAkBw, August 1992), 18. were active before then. Moreover, 28 Christian Leggemann, Die taktisch/ a small number of Indian Muslims operativen Ideen Mansteins hinsichtlich Schwerpunktbildung, Ueberraschung, Initiative have been launching terrorist und Handlungsfreiheit (Hamburg: FüAkBw, strikes—with and without Pakistani January 4, 1989), 2. support—for more than two 29 Arbeitspapier, 18. decades. The dynamics of Indian 30 Eberhard Fuhr, Die Handlungsfreiheit jihadism and the nature of India’s der militaerischen Fuehrung-Moeglichkeiten und Grenzen aufgrund des heutigen Kriegsbildes evolving counterterrorism response (Hamburg: FüAkBw, February 16, 1968), 3. are not easy to comprehend. This 31 Paul K. Van Riper and F.G. Hoffman, is understandable given that, even “Pursuing Real Revolution in Military Affairs: among Indian security officials and Exploiting Knowledge-Based Warfare,” Nation- analysts, a knowledge gap exists. al Security Studies Quarterly 4, no. 3 (Summer 1998), 11–12. 32 Hughes, 132–133. 33 “Auftragstaktik und Dienstaufsicht. Zwei Seiten derselben Medaille,” Truppendienst 4 (July–August 1998), 310; Heinz Loquai, “Die Auftragstaktik als militaerische Fuehrungskonz- eption,” Truppenpraxis 6 (June 1980), 445. 34 Van Riper and Hoffman, 11–12. 35 Walter von Lossow, “Auftragstaktik am Beispiel der Operationsfuehrung einer Divi- sion des Heeres (Kurzfassung),” in Joachim Loeser, ed., “Moeglichkeiten und Grenzen der Auftragstaktik in unserer,” Rundschau 5 (May Visit the NDU Press Web site for 1976), 147. more information on publications at ndupress.ndu.edu

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