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Russia’s New Europe Janusz Bugajski

SPECTER is haunting the new “decade of lunacy under ” Europe, the specter of “Russian and is “placing a damper on the assault on A pragmatism.” Following a ’s resources by American compa- decade of ambiguity and uncertainty in nies.” In recent weeks, Exxon Mobil and Russian policy, ’s Kremlin Chevron Texaco were vying to acquire a has embarked on a coherent and rational large part of Yukos’ shares and this seri- plan to regain its influence over former ously disturbed Moscow. satellites and to limit Western penetration Meanwhile, Russia’s growing in key parts of this region. assertiveness toward its neighbors was on Two recent dramatic events have display when workers constructed a highlighted President Vladimir Putin’s causeway across the Kerch Strait that foreign policy ambitions: the crackdown links the Black and Azov seas between on independent-minded big business and Russia’s Taman Peninsula and ’s the assault on Ukraine’s territorial integri- Tuzla islet. Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry ty. Putin views the mammoth energy warned Moscow that the construction industries as valuable tools to expand violated his country’s territorial integrity. Moscow’s foreign policy influence. While The Kremlin is applying strong pressure Yeltsin used the oligarchs to guarantee his on Kiev in demanding shared sovereignty own power, Putin is determined to con- over the navigable parts of the Kerch trol the oligarchs to expand Russian state Strait that legally belong to Ukraine, and interests. YUKOS CEO Mikhail it wants to turn the Azov sea into an Khodorkovsky not only crossed the line “internal water” of the two states despite in his domestic political ambitions, but Ukraine’s substantially longer coastline. also increasingly contradicted the The incident demonstrates how Moscow Kremlin’s external goals. A telling Pravda has unilaterally assumed the role of a editorial on November 7 expressed out- guarantor or violator of its neighbors’ rage over the outcry in the west at security. The Kerch provocation is Khodorkovsky’s arrest. According to the intended to gain territorial concessions editors, Putin is putting Russia back into from Kiev and to test the international the hands of the authorities after a response. Putin has openly challenged the legitimacy of an existing CIS border and Janusz Bugajski is Director of the East European the muted Western response will simply Project at the Center for Strategic and encourage bolder moves in the future. International Studies and is completing a book Moscow is intent on steadily rebuild- entitled Cold Peace: Russian Policy Toward the ing Russia as a major power on the New Europe. “Eurasian” stage and for this purpose has

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defined three categories of states in the ment with the failures of Westernization, eastern half of Europe: former Soviet the shortcomings of liberalism and republics that can develop into vassals, ex- alleged American aims to weaken Russia. satellite states that need to be politically Muscovite foreign policy became more neutralized and former non-allies that coherent and methodical in terms of can become useful partners. The first goals, strategies and tactics. Putin injected category, consisting of Belarus, Ukraine greater coordination between state and Moldova, constitute the core of organs, business interests and intelligence Putin’s current “empire building.” services and exploited the country’s mam- In the first few years of Boris Yeltsin’s moth energy concerns in an effort to har- presidency, Moscow was accommodating ness them closer to the state apparatus. toward its neighbors while pursuing a poli- This new foreign policy concept, issued in cy of radical democratization at home. 2000, emphasized securing Russian eco- This position altered as Russia’s foreign nomic interests and rebuilding Russia’s policy became more assertive. Key policy economy as an important component of documents, including the foreign policy foreign policy. concept and the military doctrine, were The remnants of the KGB regained characterized by marked suspicion of much of that institution’s power as Putin Western intentions and a resolve to restore systematically promoted the Russian Russia’s waning position as a global power. intelligence and security apparatus, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev including the Foreign Intelligence Service announced a more stridently imperialist and the Federal Security Service. High- position by claiming that the entire eastern ranking ex-KGB officials were elevated to European zone remained a “sphere of senior Kremlin positions and the intelli- Russia’s vitally important interests.” Such gence services were buttressed in their trends were reinforced after the December foreign operations. The reinvigoration of 1993 parliamentary elections steered Russia’s state security was especially trou- Yeltsin on a more nationalist course. bling for countries prone to Russian dom- With the appointment of Foreign ination in the past. But while Poland, Minister in January Hungary and the Czech Republic fit 1996, Russia took a more active and under the NATO umbrella, Belarus, expansive role toward its former satellites. Ukraine and Moldova remained vulnera- Few political leaders were willing to ble to Kremlin pressures. acknowledge the permanent loss of the Russia’s policy toward eastern Europe union of subordinate Soviet republics. has been regionalized into four zones: the Primakov’s tougher stance, coupled with European wing of the Commonwealth of his espousal of a multipolar world and the Independent States (CIS), the Baltic expansion of Russia’s economic reach, republics and central and southeastern prepared the ground for Putin’s recasting Europe. The European CIS (Belarus, of Russian foreign policy. Ukraine and Moldova) are viewed as important for regaining a broad sphere of The Putin Doctrine Russian influence and projecting power toward central and western Europe. The LADIMIR Putin’s election in Baltic states are considered a buffer 2000 precipitated the consoli- against Western influences in former V dation of a strong central Soviet territories. Central Europeans, government that sought to rebuild its especially Poland, are perceived as a eroded international status. This “Russia potentially negative source of influence First” policy was a reaction to disenchant- over CIS neighbors and therefore in need

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of neutralization or containment. coordinated. Furthermore, Russian enter- Southeastern Europe is viewed as a tradi- prises themselves have sought to gain tional zone of interest where conflicts political influence through involvement could be manipulated and opportunities with officials, parties and media outlets in exploited to Russia’s advantage. targeted states. Putin’s Russia has set for itself six Fourth, Russia attempts to limit the long-term objectives for that part of the scope and pace of Western institutional world. The first goal is to achieve pre- enlargement in the European CIS. eminent influence over the foreign poli- Moscow has obstructed the creation of cy orientations and security policies of “rival alliances” such as the GUUAM ini- nearby states. This is especially evident tiative (including Ukraine and Moldova) in the CIS, where Moscow seeks exclusive that could block Russian efforts to solidify policy control, but also applies to key influence. Russian officials have opposed countries in the other sub-regions. The the process of security integration with Kremlin has focused on capturing politi- NATO and sought to prevent these coun- cal allies on the international stage and tries from participating in any U.S.-led neutralizing potential opposition to coalitions opposed by Moscow, thereby Russian policy. ensuring closer military integration in Second, Russia seeks increasing eco- Russian-dominated “collective security” nomic benefits and monopolistic posi- mechanisms. Putin understands that tions through targeted foreign invest- Russia is too weak to prevent NATO ments and buyouts of strategic foreign enlargement in three of the sub-zones and infrastructure. This can supply Moscow that any failed opposition would be with substantial influence over the target domestically and internationally damag- country’s economic, financial, trade and ing. Instead, he has sought to minimize investment policies. Russian government the impact of NATO’s growth by seeking a officials have tried to direct capital toward role in Alliance decision-making to weak- nearby regions in which the Russian state en its effectiveness. has long-term strategic interests. In spe- Fifth, Moscow is preparing to use the cific economic sectors, such as energy region, especially the European CIS, as a supplies, Russia pursues a monopolistic springboard to rebuild a larger sphere of regional position. In addition, by reigning influence and reverse Moscow’s decline as in some of the most influential oligarchs, a major international player. Strategists the Putin Administration has sought to calculate that this can be accomplished increase its influence over targeted for- with the help of Western resources and by eign investments, intensify its political establishing “Great Power” status in east- leverage and capture a greater share of ern Europe and Central Asia. Russia can revenues for the state. then pose as a key player alongside the Third, Moscow aims to increase east- United States and act as a balancer of ern Europe’s dependence on Russian ener- American influence throughout Eurasia. gy supplies and economic investments and Finally, by intensifying its involve- convert this dependence into long-term ment in the European arena, Moscow inter-governmental influence. Close con- seeks to weaken transatlantic relations. nections between the Kremlin and large The objective is to strengthen the Russian companies—whether through European-Russian or Eurasian strategic executive appointments; the promotion of “pole” vis-à-vis the United States. By cat- overseas operations; or financial, legal and alyzing the emerging transatlantic drift, police instruments— demonstrate that Russia can begin revising the post-World foreign and economic policy are closely War II order and establish a Russian-EU

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system of international security for the al arrangements through the application old continent. of direct pressure against targeted gov- A key mechanism for Russia to recre- ernments. This has included diplomatic ate a sphere of dominance is the CIS, coercion, disinformation campaigns, mil- which was established to bind smaller itary threats, peacekeeping deployments, neighbors closer to Moscow and create a energy controls, economic pressures, political superstructure that would coor- ethnic manipulation, exploitation of dinate foreign, security and economic criminal networks and intelligence ser- policy. The Commonwealth or the “near vice penetration. abroad” was defined as a zone of Russia’s Putin views economic relations as an “primary interests”, the unity of which especially valuable means of gaining polit- needed to be restored and outside influ- ical influence. As the region’s dominant ences minimized. An important economic energy supplier, Moscow has deepened calculation was involved, as Moscow the dependence of eastern European sought to ensure access and control over states whose vulnerability can be trans- the major transportation routes and ener- formed into political leverage. Energy gy pipelines crisscrossing the region. and other strategic resources can be Under the CIS umbrella, Russia also decreased or severed in order to exert gained control over military facilities in pressure on particular capitals to adjust its former dominions and focused on the their policies. The threat of potential eco- outer border of the CIS as its own military nomic chaos through energy shortages frontier. has generated powerful pressures on Russia is not intent on territorial neighboring governments to synchronize incorporation, as this is an expensive their policies with the Kremlin. Russian proposition. Instead, it pursues selective purchase of key infrastructure elements, domination in key areas such as energy, such as pipelines and refineries, enables business and the military to enable prima- Moscow to apply additional pressure. The ry influence over a country’s foreign, most vulnerable states were burdened security and economic policies. The CIS with enormous debts that Moscow structures, although weak under the exchanged for a share in the ownership of Yeltsin presidency, have provided Moscow strategically important industries, particu- with a vehicle for projecting political larly in the energy sector. In this way, influence and limiting unwelcome Moscow attached more strings to its for- Westernization. Putin’s Kremlin calculat- mer puppets. ed that an invigorated Russian-dominated CIS would become a distinct pole of influ- Between Eurasia and Euramerica ence in a future multipolar world. This would entail the development of suprana- HE STRUGGLE over east- tional organs, including an economic ern Europe revolves around union styled as the Eurasian Economic T two opposing strategic con- Community and a Collective Security cepts: Eurasia and Euramerica. The Organization launched in October 2002 Euramerica option envisages the close under Russian command. As could be engagement of the United States in expected, Moscow has pressed for “asym- European security, whether through metrical sovereignty”, in which it assumes NATO or in various bilateral and sub- the decisive voice in all Commonwealth regional arrangements. In marked con- affairs. trast, the Eurasian variant would consist In addition to the CIS structures, of a prominent Brussels-Moscow axis in Russia has pursued more binding bilater- which the EU achieves a greater security

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role in close collaboration with Russia. sectors of Belarusian industry and support While most of the new democracies clear- a Russia-Belarus monetary union. ly favor the Euramerica structure, compe- During Putin’s presidency, the pace of tition with the Eurasian alternative is controlling Belarus’ energy infrastructure most pronounced in Belarus, Ukraine, has accelerated. In November 2002, the and Moldova. All three countries are now government in Minsk passed various legal defined as “strategic partners” by amendments that enabled the transforma- Moscow, which calculates that their close tion of the Belarussian gas transportation integration with Russia can counter the system, Beltranshaz, into a joint enter- process of NATO enlargement and limit prise with the Russian company American involvement in eastern Europe. Gazprom. The Beltranshaz deal was put Moscow’s exertions proved most on hold this June as the two companies fruitful in Belarus, a country with a weak failed to agree on a purchase price: sense of national identity and whose pres- Gazprom insisted on acquiring over 50 ident, Aleksandr Lukashenko, maintained percent of shares. In a gesture of defiance, dictatorial powers and harbored ambi- Lukashenko declared that he would not tions to become a pan-Slavic leader. A sell Beltranshaz “for nothing” and con- close relationship with Belarus was viewed demned Russia’s “imperialistic tenden- as a strategic imperative because control cies.” He has also backpedaled on the over Minsk’s foreign policy eliminated the introduction of the Russian , con- prospect of a Baltic-Black Sea “belt” that cluding that a currency union with Russia could isolate Russia. Forged in the late- would give the Kremlin overwhelming 1990s, the Russia-Belarus Union could control. Minsk can expect to experience either develop into a confederated state. intensive pressure from Moscow and Another option, however, judging by Lukashenko’s intransigence could result Putin’s August 2002 proposal, is that in sanctions, including higher prices for Belarus may simply be incorporated as a Russian energy. unit of the Russian Federation. For the present, Moscow has little Security has been a key component of reason to interfere in Belarussian politics, this union: Moscow pursues close military as Lukashenko’s foreign policy is either in integration through the unification of tune with Russian interests or casts defense structures, including air defense, Moscow in a relatively moderate light. intelligence networks and arms produc- Despite calls by Western powers for tion. Belarus has also been wholly depen- Russia to take a more active pro-democ- dent on Russian energy and obtains high- racy role in Belarus, the Kremlin is little ly subsidized supplies. Moscow remains concerned over democratization or the Minsk’s major trading partners, while the rule of law and was content to let bulk of Russia’s exports to Europe travers- Lukashenko determine the outcome of es Belarus, making Minsk’s compliance all the deeply-flawed 2001 presidential elec- the more imperative. Through cheap tions. But Lukashenko may eventually be energy supplies, currency-support credits considered a hindrance to further integra- and a customs union that favored Minsk, tion, in which case the Kremlin will use Russian economic support has con- its arsenal of influences to find a suitable tributed to salvaging Lukashenko’s hold pro-Moscow replacement. on power. In recent years, an increasing Tu rning to Ukraine, Moscow’s ideal number of Belarussian enterprises have scenario amounts to doing to Kiev what become dependent on Russian capital. has been done to Minsk, all to culminate Russian companies are seeking primary in a close political and military alliance. access in the eventual privatization of key For most of the 1990s, Moscow’s exer-

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tions produced only limited results The progress of neighboring central because of Kiev’s pro-Western aspira- European states toward EU membership tions. However, during the late-1990s, is also reinforcing the dependence of Ukraine became more vulnerable to Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova on the Russian influences, largely because of the Russian market, and the Schengen regime political turmoil that began to surround is likely to strengthen this process. To President Leonid Kuchma. The Kremlin compound its problems, Ukraine has exploited the West’s ostracism of Kuchma become enmeshed in a CIS Free Trade by posing as a more reliable ally. Power Zone with Russia, Belarus and struggles between political interests, Kazakhstan. The arrangement was industrial lobbies and state structures approved in August 2003 and led to continue to swirl around the country and protests by some Ukrainian lawmakers, provide opportunities for the Kremlin to who argued that this would further pull Ukraine into a tighter orbit. The undercut the country’s sovereignty and Kremlin engages in various forms of sub- limit its prospects for EU entry. terfuge, including energy blackmail, eco- The Kremlin has skillfully exploited nomic buyouts, the discrediting of pro- the opportunities presented by Ukraine’s independence politicians, attempts at political turmoil. It offered support to an diplomatic isolation and the manipulation embattled President Kuchma in an effort of ethnic issues. to draw the country into a tighter Russian Energy supplies have been a major embrace just as Western criticisms tool of Russian policy: Ukraine remains increased against his alleged human rights dependent on Russia’s energy monopolies abuses. The importance of Ukraine to the for its basic needs. Moscow’s ability to Kremlin was underscored with the injure Ukraine’s economy by raising appointment in 2001 of ex-premier prices or calling in debts creates a perma- as Russia’s ambas- nent threat to the country’s domestic sta- sador to Kiev and as Putin’s economic bility. Moreover, pressures to integrate envoy. Chernomyrdin promptly criticized into the CIS gradually reduce Ukraine’s Kiev’s policy of neutrality and intimated sovereignty while bilateral arrangements that such a stance could undermine between Moscow and Kiev have increas- Ukraine’s “strategic interests.” He openly ingly undermined Ukraine’s ability to interfered in Ukraine’s parliamentary administer its own economy. elections in March 2002 by publicly sup- Attempts to dominate the Ukrainian porting the pro-presidential parties. energy sector accelerated under Putin. Moscow remains determined to diminish Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov and his the possibility that a pro-Western candi- Ukrainian counterpart Anatoly Kinakh date will succeed Kuchma after the 2004 agreed in August 2001 to establish an presidential elections. “energy union” and, in October 2002, Moldova remains completely depen- crafted an interstate gas consortium. The dent on Russian energy, and its foreign Ukrainian opposition issued alerts about trade is geared toward Russia. Gazprom the perils of Russian economic dominance controls Moldova’s gas pipelines while and, in February 2003, the Socialist Chisinau’s gas debts have been trans- Party’s spokesmen informed parliament formed into Russian assets. With its polit- that Russian businesses jeopardized ical breakthrough in Chisinau after the Ukraine’s national security by acquiring election victory of the communists in oil refineries, raw-aluminum production, 2001, Moscow made plans for further communications and other strategic inroads into the Moldovan economy and enterprises. the domination of its mass media. During

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Russian premier Kasyanov’s visit to the meddling of forces hostile to Chisinau in October 2001 he was given a Washington and threatening to America’s list of some sixty Moldovan enterprises closest allies in the region. If the Russian that were slated for sale and seeking Federation were a mirror image of the Russian investments. Russian companies United States or other Western powers, with close ties to the Kremlin have pur- then the expansion of Moscow’s political chased numerous Moldovan industries on and economic influence would be benign favorable terms or acquired properties to or beneficial. If Russia had a thriving lib- offset Chisinau’s unpaid debts. eral democracy, a vibrant civil society and Peacekeeping has also proved a useful a transparent market economy, then its tool for Russia in its former dominions. In influences could be welcomed, regardless its peace-enforcing operations in the of historical experiences. Unfortunately, “near abroad”, Moscow has not con- this is not the case, and Russian influences cerned itself with questions of legitimacy, need to be closely monitored and actively or been constrained by internationally countered if they are destabilizing, acceptable rules of engagement or public whether as a result of energy dominance, scrutiny. In several unstable CIS states, economic leverage, political influence, Moscow has combined peacekeeping with criminal penetration or intelligence oper- counterinsurgency, or has sought to ations. Links between government, busi- defend one of the sides in the conflict, ness and crime must be of special concern such as the Transnistrian separatists in to Washington as eastern Europe has Moldova. The conflict itself became a become a major international hub for means for exercising influence over politi- Russia’s criminal “Atlanticism.” cal developments in Moldova in Russia’s Some U.S. policymakers argue that favor. Following the communist election Putin has rejected the doctrine of “multi- triumph, Moldova declared Russia its polarity” in his dealings with the United “strategic partner” despite the country’s States. However, such premature hopes formal neutrality, and the debate on the were dashed when Moscow sided with feasibility of Moldova joining the Russia- France and Germany during the Iraq cri- Belarus Union was rekindled. As a result sis in early-2003. Putin once again elevat- of a more accommodating stance in ed “multipolarity” as a strategic objective, Chisinau, Moscow now supports a feder- which for him means the pursuit of multi- alization plan between Moldova and ple power centers in order to diminish Transnistria, calculating that the entire American “dominance.” Before he was state can be drawn into the Russian elected president, Putin himself chaired sphere with a permanent military pres- the meeting of the Russian Security ence. Council that revised the country’s nation- al security concept and its military doc- America’s Interests trine to include “unipolarity” as a threat to Russian security. In this context, to be AVING invested enormous accepted as a major “pole”, Moscow political, financial and mili- believes it has a strategic imperative to H tary capital in securing post- integrate the key CIS states and steadily communist eastern Europe, it is in project Russia’s influence further afield. America’s national interest to complete U.S. policymakers should soberly this process. Surrendering any of these reflect on the premature conclusion that countries to endemic instability, authori- Putin’s Russia has been transformed into a tarianism or foreign domination invites reliable ally and trusted partner. Long-

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range Russian policy simply cannot be gration into international economic insti- understood in response to a particular tutions is pursued in order to generate event (such as September 11) or a particu- resources and markets to help rebuild and lar campaign (such as the global anti-ter- modernize the Russian economy and rorism struggle). Urgently needed is a strengthen the Russian state. comprehensive assessment of Moscow’s Putin’s strategy lulls Washington into fundamental political and strategic objec- a false sense of security and an illusion of tives in various parts of the globe. In this permanent partnership, even while context, Russian policy toward its imme- Moscow methodically seeks to rebuild the diate eastern European neighbors is a Russian state as a global challenger. In the valuable test of Moscow’s commitment to interim, Putin has concluded that he now forging cooperative bilateral and regional possesses a free hand to restore a string of relations and its claim of having discarded vassal states along his western border and any imperial impulses. beyond, either because the West supports In a strategic version of jiu jitsu, Putin him in bringing “stability” to the region the black belt seeks economic and politi- or because Washington is preoccupied cal benefits from cooperation with the with more pressing crises elsewhere. United States in combating international Ultimately, acquiescing to Moscow’s terrorism while simultaenously recreating objectives is certain to generate conflicts a broad space of dominance aimed at in the years ahead. Such a policy will redi- undercutting American “unipolarity.” vide the continent and reinforce Russia’s Behind Russia’s economic priorities lurk expansionist ambitions in a region still the specter of competitive politics aimed prone to weakness and torn between at the global redistribution of power to Eurasia and Euramerica. Ultimately, it is Russia’s advantage. Putin displays a non- not just Russia’s former satellites that will aggressive foreign policy in which collab- lose out in this scenario; the United States oration with the United States and inte- will as well. ■

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