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Russia's New Europe Bugajski 11/13/03 9:42 Page 1 Russia’s New Europe Janusz Bugajski SPECTER is haunting the new “decade of lunacy under Boris Yeltsin” Europe, the specter of “Russian and is “placing a damper on the assault on A pragmatism.” Following a Russia’s resources by American compa- decade of ambiguity and uncertainty in nies.” In recent weeks, Exxon Mobil and Russian policy, Vladimir Putin’s Kremlin Chevron Texaco were vying to acquire a has embarked on a coherent and rational large part of Yukos’ shares and this seri- plan to regain its influence over former ously disturbed Moscow. satellites and to limit Western penetration Meanwhile, Russia’s growing in key parts of this region. assertiveness toward its neighbors was on Two recent dramatic events have display when workers constructed a highlighted President Vladimir Putin’s causeway across the Kerch Strait that foreign policy ambitions: the crackdown links the Black and Azov seas between on independent-minded big business and Russia’s Taman Peninsula and Ukraine’s the assault on Ukraine’s territorial integri- Tuzla islet. Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry ty. Putin views the mammoth energy warned Moscow that the construction industries as valuable tools to expand violated his country’s territorial integrity. Moscow’s foreign policy influence. While The Kremlin is applying strong pressure Yeltsin used the oligarchs to guarantee his on Kiev in demanding shared sovereignty own power, Putin is determined to con- over the navigable parts of the Kerch trol the oligarchs to expand Russian state Strait that legally belong to Ukraine, and interests. YUKOS CEO Mikhail it wants to turn the Azov sea into an Khodorkovsky not only crossed the line “internal water” of the two states despite in his domestic political ambitions, but Ukraine’s substantially longer coastline. also increasingly contradicted the The incident demonstrates how Moscow Kremlin’s external goals. A telling Pravda has unilaterally assumed the role of a editorial on November 7 expressed out- guarantor or violator of its neighbors’ rage over the outcry in the west at security. The Kerch provocation is Khodorkovsky’s arrest. According to the intended to gain territorial concessions editors, Putin is putting Russia back into from Kiev and to test the international the hands of the authorities after a response. Putin has openly challenged the legitimacy of an existing CIS border and Janusz Bugajski is Director of the East European the muted Western response will simply Project at the Center for Strategic and encourage bolder moves in the future. International Studies and is completing a book Moscow is intent on steadily rebuild- entitled Cold Peace: Russian Policy Toward the ing Russia as a major power on the New Europe. “Eurasian” stage and for this purpose has The National Interest—Winter 2003/04 1 Bugajski 11/13/03 9:42 Page 2 defined three categories of states in the ment with the failures of Westernization, eastern half of Europe: former Soviet the shortcomings of liberalism and republics that can develop into vassals, ex- alleged American aims to weaken Russia. satellite states that need to be politically Muscovite foreign policy became more neutralized and former non-allies that coherent and methodical in terms of can become useful partners. The first goals, strategies and tactics. Putin injected category, consisting of Belarus, Ukraine greater coordination between state and Moldova, constitute the core of organs, business interests and intelligence Putin’s current “empire building.” services and exploited the country’s mam- In the first few years of Boris Yeltsin’s moth energy concerns in an effort to har- presidency, Moscow was accommodating ness them closer to the state apparatus. toward its neighbors while pursuing a poli- This new foreign policy concept, issued in cy of radical democratization at home. 2000, emphasized securing Russian eco- This position altered as Russia’s foreign nomic interests and rebuilding Russia’s policy became more assertive. Key policy economy as an important component of documents, including the foreign policy foreign policy. concept and the military doctrine, were The remnants of the KGB regained characterized by marked suspicion of much of that institution’s power as Putin Western intentions and a resolve to restore systematically promoted the Russian Russia’s waning position as a global power. intelligence and security apparatus, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev including the Foreign Intelligence Service announced a more stridently imperialist and the Federal Security Service. High- position by claiming that the entire eastern ranking ex-KGB officials were elevated to European zone remained a “sphere of senior Kremlin positions and the intelli- Russia’s vitally important interests.” Such gence services were buttressed in their trends were reinforced after the December foreign operations. The reinvigoration of 1993 parliamentary elections steered Russia’s state security was especially trou- Yeltsin on a more nationalist course. bling for countries prone to Russian dom- With the appointment of Foreign ination in the past. But while Poland, Minister Yevgeny Primakov in January Hungary and the Czech Republic fit 1996, Russia took a more active and under the NATO umbrella, Belarus, expansive role toward its former satellites. Ukraine and Moldova remained vulnera- Few political leaders were willing to ble to Kremlin pressures. acknowledge the permanent loss of the Russia’s policy toward eastern Europe union of subordinate Soviet republics. has been regionalized into four zones: the Primakov’s tougher stance, coupled with European wing of the Commonwealth of his espousal of a multipolar world and the Independent States (CIS), the Baltic expansion of Russia’s economic reach, republics and central and southeastern prepared the ground for Putin’s recasting Europe. The European CIS (Belarus, of Russian foreign policy. Ukraine and Moldova) are viewed as important for regaining a broad sphere of The Putin Doctrine Russian influence and projecting power toward central and western Europe. The LADIMIR Putin’s election in Baltic states are considered a buffer 2000 precipitated the consoli- against Western influences in former V dation of a strong central Soviet territories. Central Europeans, government that sought to rebuild its especially Poland, are perceived as a eroded international status. This “Russia potentially negative source of influence First” policy was a reaction to disenchant- over CIS neighbors and therefore in need 2 The National Interest—Winter 2003/04 Bugajski 11/13/03 9:42 Page 3 of neutralization or containment. coordinated. Furthermore, Russian enter- Southeastern Europe is viewed as a tradi- prises themselves have sought to gain tional zone of interest where conflicts political influence through involvement could be manipulated and opportunities with officials, parties and media outlets in exploited to Russia’s advantage. targeted states. Putin’s Russia has set for itself six Fourth, Russia attempts to limit the long-term objectives for that part of the scope and pace of Western institutional world. The first goal is to achieve pre- enlargement in the European CIS. eminent influence over the foreign poli- Moscow has obstructed the creation of cy orientations and security policies of “rival alliances” such as the GUUAM ini- nearby states. This is especially evident tiative (including Ukraine and Moldova) in the CIS, where Moscow seeks exclusive that could block Russian efforts to solidify policy control, but also applies to key influence. Russian officials have opposed countries in the other sub-regions. The the process of security integration with Kremlin has focused on capturing politi- NATO and sought to prevent these coun- cal allies on the international stage and tries from participating in any U.S.-led neutralizing potential opposition to coalitions opposed by Moscow, thereby Russian policy. ensuring closer military integration in Second, Russia seeks increasing eco- Russian-dominated “collective security” nomic benefits and monopolistic posi- mechanisms. Putin understands that tions through targeted foreign invest- Russia is too weak to prevent NATO ments and buyouts of strategic foreign enlargement in three of the sub-zones and infrastructure. This can supply Moscow that any failed opposition would be with substantial influence over the target domestically and internationally damag- country’s economic, financial, trade and ing. Instead, he has sought to minimize investment policies. Russian government the impact of NATO’s growth by seeking a officials have tried to direct capital toward role in Alliance decision-making to weak- nearby regions in which the Russian state en its effectiveness. has long-term strategic interests. In spe- Fifth, Moscow is preparing to use the cific economic sectors, such as energy region, especially the European CIS, as a supplies, Russia pursues a monopolistic springboard to rebuild a larger sphere of regional position. In addition, by reigning influence and reverse Moscow’s decline as in some of the most influential oligarchs, a major international player. Strategists the Putin Administration has sought to calculate that this can be accomplished increase its influence over targeted for- with the help of Western resources and by eign investments, intensify its political establishing “Great Power” status in east- leverage and capture a greater share of ern Europe and Central Asia. Russia can revenues for the state. then pose as a key player alongside
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