Vilnius, Lithuania Issue 4 (4), April 2009 The invitation of A. Lukashenka to the Eastern Though official Moscow welcomes the initiative, the Partnership Summit in Prague has recently been Russian goodwill cannot be overestimated. Anatol the main topic in Belarus. Even those who are not Pankovski studies Russia’s diminishing “energy particularly interested in Belarus could notice the superpower” ambitions, which eventually should dilemma of the Czech EU Presidency – to invite lead to a softer attitude towards the CIS countries, CONTENTS all the leaders of the Eastern Partnership countries including Belarus. or to bypass the legitimization of the authoritarian AUTHORITIES AND decade in Belarus. The Eastern Partnership is assumed as an oppor- OPPOSITION IN The internal situation in Belarus is even more com- tunity for Belarus transforming the longstanding BELARUS: NEW plex. Due to the internal political circumstances, status quo. However, its success or failure depends PERSPECTIVES OR substantial part of the Belarusian opposition’s on all the actors to be involved. The varying opinions NEW THREATS IN THE activities used to be focused outwards, mainly to are presented in this issue to better understand the CONTEXT OF EU- the European Union. Now the opposition has to tensions inside the country. BELARUS DIALOGUE find ways to reform its political strategies since it has ceased to be a single legitimate representa- This edition also includes the supplement with a list Pavel Usov, New Europe tive of Belarus and its society. Thus Belarusian of the Belarusian media platforms: online magazines, 1 opposition has its reasons to object the dialogue analytical portals and websites that unite various that the EU started with the official Minsk under clusters of independent Belarusian experts. We PaRTICIPATION OF the current political situation in Belarus. The first believe these websites will contribute for a more BELARUS IN EASTERN contribution by Pavel Usov analyses in detail the comprehensive picture of the country that is once PaRTNERSHIP controversies regarding the EU-Belarus relations so close and so far from Europe. INITIATIVE and opposition’s role in it. Anna Krevskaya, The discussions on external environment would Independent Expert be incomplete disregarding the “Russian factor”. Julija Narkeviciute, Editor Community, www. expertby.org 3 PRAGMATISM AND AUTHORITIES AND OPPOSITION MORALITY IN INTERNATIONAL IN BELARUS: NEW PERSPECTIVES RELATIONS: CaSE OF BELARUS OR NEW THREATS IN THE CONTEXT Andrei Fedarau OF EU-BelARUS DIALOGUE 5 and that the dialogue is but a betrayal of the demo- OLD NEW RUSSIAN Pavel Usov, New Europe cratic ideas.2 POLICY TOWARDS The inclusion of Belarus into the Eastern Partnership ITS BORDERLINE and the invitation of members of the Belarusian rul- Apparently, despite a number of political defeats revealing its incompetence, the Belarusian opposi- TRANSIT COUNTRIES ing elite to the summit in Prague provoked a broad tion has not yet exhausted its optimism and faith Anatol Pankovski, discussion and debate in the opposition and the Nashe Mnenie in its own strength. It believes that had the EU put analytical community. As usual, opinions differ. just a little more pressure, the regime would have 6 Some representatives of the Belarusian opposition collapsed under the democratic forces. Alternatively, it would have at least given way to the Belarusian claim that the dialogue with A. Lukashenka will LIST OF BELARUSIAN opposition and would have launched a liberalization ANALYTICAL result in enforcing “the failing Belarusian ruler”1 process (possibly granting admittance into power). CENTRES AND 1 Анатолий Лебедько. Переговоры. Нужна перезагрузка, MEDIA PLATFORMS 2 Белорусские демократы: Приглашение диктатора на http://naviny.by/rubrics/opinion/2009/03/30/ саммит в Прагу – «индульгенция» его режиму, http:// 8 ic_articles_410_161904/ www.charter97.org/be/news/2009/3/16/16200/. 1 4 (4), April 2009 Speculations like that are illusive and self-deluding. sian ruler has never laid particular stress on it. One The political First of all, taken as a whole or severally, the opposi- may state with confidence that the “dialogue” will tion is no longer ready to exert any influence on be used by the authorities for internal propaganda rhetoric of a number the Lukashenko regime, let alone to win power. Its as a proof that the regime has pursued a proper expectancy upon the West is but another evidence. internal socioeconomic policy, which has been of opposition Secondly, its becoming increasingly obvious that acknowledged by the EU. leaders and online the opposition forces expect to resolve internal Besides, the improving bilateral relations will deprive political issues and decide on Belarus’ fate beyond discussions suggest the opposition of a very important bargaining issue its borders and at the expense of the influence com- which it uses for its internal information struggle that the Belarusian ing from Moscow and Brussels. Thirdly, it is also with the regime. To be more precise, it will no obvious that under no conditions will Lukashenko longer be able to present the Belarusian regime opposition has share his power with anyone. as a dictatorship which civilized countries do not chosen the EU as its The political rhetoric of a number of opposition want to talk to. It should be pointed out that the dialogue will allow expansion of maneuvering in scapegoat. leaders and online discussions suggest that the Belarusian opposition has chosen the EU as its the relations with Russia, even though the regime scapegoat. Now all the blame for political failures will not change sharply its geopolitical preferences of the Belarusian opposition as well as its own so that not to provoke Russia’s harsh reaction. impotence can be placed safely on the shoulders Nevertheless, despite apparent benefits for the of the European Union since the expected social political regime, benefits for Belarus are also revolution aided by the EU and scheduled, according obvious, especially when viewed in a long-term to A.Kazulin, to summer-autumn 2009, might not perspective. 3 take place. Therefore it is the EU to blame that it First, one should acknowledge that to date there has contributed to the preservation of the political are no internal threats in the country presenting regime in Belarus. danger to the stability and security of the regime. The other part of the opposition members is less The regime has substantial political resources to sup- optimistic in assessing its own potential as well as press any moods of social protest. Should the crisis the opposition on the whole, deeming it “failing and strike all elements of the economic system, national marginal”4, and therefore, incapable of presenting emergency situation could be introduced. and defending its political interests. Coincidentally Second, the opposition is weak and divided, which it positively assesses the dialogue initiated between denies it the opportunity of being a feasible political the EU and Belarus. actor in Belarus. It is incapable of consolidating and The debate over the “necessity” or “needlessness” acting as a united camp despite, as it might seem, of the dialogue between the EU and Belarus within favourable socioeconomic conditions created by the Belarusian opposition is used as a mechanism to the crisis. In the foreseeable future there will be no earn political capital in the run-up to the presidential consolidation of the opposition. Therefore, even if campaign 2011 and to discredit opponents. elemental revolts broke out in the country, it would not be able to coordinate them. Naturally, given To give a balanced view of the new dialogue “the the political isolation of the country, the opposi- EU-Belarus” and its perspectives as well as to provide tion would remain the only legitimate mediator an overall assessment of the current relationship or representative of Belarus in Europe; however, it between the two political actors one must have would serve its own personal interests and by no a general understanding of the geopolitical and means the interests of the country. Coming to terms internal political state of Belarus. with the political regime, Europe has divested the There is no doubt that, as a result of a thaw in the opposition this status, i.e., the possibility to posi- relations with the European Union, the regime of A. tion itself as a political force on the international Lukashenka harvests a number of political and eco- arena. However, Belarus’ destiny must depend nomic dividends. Of course, one can hardly expect neither on Lukashenka’s games, nor on those of that with the beginning of the dialogue Belarusian the opposition. economics will instantly become attractive for the Finally, as has already been noted, the opposition European investments and business. Belarus has expects and hopes that the deterioration in the not yet created enough favourable conditions while socioeconomic situation of the country will result in the EU faces its own internal economic problems its citizens, primarily workers, taking to the streets brought about by the global crisis. That is why it so that the “democratic forces” will be able to head takes little interest in the economic problems of them. However, according to social surveys, 72% Belarus. of Belarusians do not intend to take part in the 5 For A. Lukashenka the dialogue with Europe has events of this sort (since in the country there is no primarily a political meaning as it will remove the proletariat which has nothing to lose). In addition, stigma of an outlaw off him. However, the Belaru- even given the situation of the “presumed instability”, the opposition acts as a passive subject that merely 3 Аляксандр Казулін: «Вельмі хутка waits for the society to move yet is unable to set up Лукашэнка можа страціць уладу», a propaganda and mobilization campaign. Besides, http://www.charter97.org/be/news/2009/3/14/16155/. 4 Аляксандр Милинкевич: Оппозиция стала маргинальной, 5 НИСЭПИ, Логика тревожных ожиданий.