Uni Intematkdnal 300 N

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Uni IntematkDnal 300 N. Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, Ml 48106 8306748 Wood, Nelson Ovia STRATEGIC PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OF THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION: A STUDY OF NAHONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AIMS, OBJECTIVES, AND EFFECTIVENESS TheUniversity o f Oklahoma PhD. 1982 University Microfilms International3% X . Zeeb Road. Ann Arbor. MI 48106 Copyright 1982 by- Wood, Nelson Ovia All Rights Reserved THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA ŒADUATE COLLEGE STRATEGIC PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OF THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION A STUDY OF NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AIMS, OBJECTIVES, AND EFFECTIVENESS A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY BY NELSON OVIA WOOD Norman, Oklahoma 1982 ^ 1'« fc. - STRATEGIC PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OF THE TRÜKAN ADMINISTRATION A STUDY OF NATIWAL PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AIMS, OBJECTIVES, AND EFFECTIVENESS APPROVED BY DISSERTATION COMMITTEE ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS No one person can claim to have completed an extensive research project such as this. Many people gave me assistance, advice, and en couragement. I should like to thank Mrs. Helen Amabile, International Communications Agency (formerly U.S.I.A.) for her assistance in gaining access to the USIA Archives Collection. In the State Department, I owe a great debt to Ms. Jeannie Giamporcaro for her tireless efforts in finding, obtaining declassification actions, and forwarding declassified State Department documents. No scholar proceeds far without the assistance, advice, and positive encouragement of other scholars. I should like to thank Dr. Sidney Brown, Dr. Henry Tobias, Dr. H. Wayne Morgan, Dr. Gordon Drummond, and especially my faculty advisor. Dr. Russell Buhite, with out whose advice, guidance, and encouragement I should never have suc ceeded in completing this work. A great debt, and recognition, is due my typist, editor, and sometimes mind-reader, Mrs. Betty Blasdel of Oklahoma City for her ability to create a finished product from what was often a confusing subject. F inally, I must acknowledge the support, faith, and kind motivation from my parents, without whose confidence my determination might have waivered. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWT^EDGEMENTS.......................................... iii LIST OF F I G U R E S ........... v LIST OF TABLES ............... yi Chapter I. THE NEED FOR GOVERNMENT P R O P A G A N D A ..................... 1 II. EVOLUTION OF THE INSTRUMENT: THE INFORMATION SERVICE . 17 III. NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OBJECTIVES: 1947-1948 . 37 IV. NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OBJECTIVES AND AREA THEMES ............................................ 72 Interdepartmental Fight for Control................... 77 Objectives in E u r o p e ...................................102 V. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE POLICY: 1950-1952 ................. 118 VI. OTHER POLICY ACTIONS: 1951-1952 ........................ 153 VII. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ÜSIE P R OGRAM......................... 167 VIII. PROBLEMS OF THE PROGRAM.............. 219 IX. CONCLUSIONS ........ ............................ 229 BIBLIOGRAPHY .............................................. 241 iv LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1 USIE Organizational Chart ............................... 30.1 Table 1. DSIE Strength and Funding 1946-1948 ..................... 24 2. ÜSIE Strength and Funding 1949-1952 ..................... 31 V i STRATEGIC PSYCHOLOGICAL WARPAEE OF THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION A STUDY OF NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AIMS, OBJECTIVES, AND EFFECTIVENESS CHAPTER 1 THE NEED FOR GOVERNMENT PROPAGANDA The passage of Public Law 402 on January 27, 1948, was a seminal event in the history of United States government propaganda activities. This law established for the first time an official government propa ganda agency that was to function in time of peace as well as war, under clear statutory approval. Theretofore, all United States propaganda activities had been carried out as an adjunct to an actual conflict, or as part of normal diplomatic activity under the general guise of 'executive affairs.’ However, after the end of World War II, such affairs were far too encompassing and voluminous to be continued under the old, loose customs and more localized direction of the pre-war years. The event further marked the end of two eras in United States diplomacy: that of the struggling new power, eager to impress itself upon the world through diplomacy which at times was indistinguishable from outright propaganda, and the second strain that had begun under Theodore Roosevelt, of an emerging world power. In the aftermath of World War II, the United States had become the preeminent world power and, like the British before, was beginning to realize that others could not be left the task of interpreting America on the basis of their own experiences; America would have to assume the initiative and explain itself to others. The policies, objectives, techniques, and some of the results, as well as the difficulties of the Truman administrât ion psychological warfare effort, especially the "Campaign of Truth," is the focus of this dissertât ion. Before 1948, the Congress had allowed overt propaganda agencies to function only during times of war, when 'normal* channels of diplo matic intercourse were blocked or disrupted. From its earliest days, the United States' leaders had subscribed to the view that direct rep resentation to the populace of another nation was an unwarranted and uncivilized intrusion into the sovereign affairs of that state. Such action was not tolerated in the eighteenth century, and indeed wars have been fought for lighter reasons. This is not to imply that such conduct on the part of sovereign states was unknown, but that it was regarded as disreputable. American leaders in the eighteenth century, under the guidance of Benjamin Franklin, had put together a masterful campaign of propaganda during the American Revolution. The Declaration of Indepen dence, both in its legalistic phraseology as well as its carefully cal culated allusion to the Magna Carta, was itself a powerful propaganda thrust. Such, direct appeal to the masses, completely overleaping the normal bounds of international relations, was an accepted practice in time of war, for the winner. Despite their own success in such conduct Ibited States leaders held similar actions on the part of others in deep approbation. Especially during tines of peace. United States leaders did not adnit to such conduct, from the days of Citizen Edmond Genet, and the harsh reprimand George Washington lodged, to the year 1917, when United States leaders protested Imperial German propaganda actions within the United States borders.^ After World War II, international affairs not only lacked the isolation of the pre-war years, but also changed visibly under the unexpected impact of rapid, world-wide means of communications that often blurred the distinction between "official" and "native public" communi cations. Other nations, particularly the Soviet Union, were unwilling to relapse into older customs and insisted on utilizing the new communi cations means to further national objectives. It quickly was apparent that, insofar as the Soviet Union was concerned, no means found useful in war would be put entirely aside during peace. Passage of Public Law 402 also marked official recognition that the United States itself was under a propaganda attack. The law was designed to be a clear decision to act and, in the words of Harry Truman, to "tell the truth about America." The major drawback to this Presidential declaration was that, in 1948, America, the most

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