The London Gazette of TUESDAY, the Ist of JUNE, 1948 Published By
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TOumb, 38308 3289 SUPPLEMENT TO The London Gazette Of TUESDAY, the ist of JUNE, 1948 published by Registered as a newspaper WEDNESDAY, 2 JUNE/1948 -THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE BRITISH PACIFIC FLEET TO THE . ASSAULT ON OKINAWA, 1945. The following Despatch was submitted to the and help of all were invaluable to our success, Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty on the a result which I know is most satisfactory to jth June, 1945, by Admiral Sir Bruce A. them. Eraser, G.C.B., K.B.E., Commander-in- 6. We shall not, however, be able to play our Chief, British Pacific Fleet. full part until sufficient forces are available to Office of the Commander-in-Chief, form a second task group, since the effort of British Pacific Fleet. one, alternatively striking and re-fuelling, must yth June, 1945. necessarily be discontinuous and uneconomical of force. " ICEBERG "—REPORT. 7. The British Pacific Fleet have been making British naval history by operating off the enemy Be pleased to lay before Their Lordships a coast for periods up to 30 days each, but it is report on the actions fought by the British well to remember that similar American task Pacific Fleet during the first phases of Opera- groups are doing the same thing for twice as tion " Iceberg." long. When we have mastered the technique 2. It is impossible yet to judge the effect of of ammunitioning and storing at sea, we shall these operations on the conquest of Okinawa, also be able to do .this. .These are matters but I consider that we have successfully carried receiving close attention. out our undertakings, employing a method of 8. In this connection, I wish to commend sea warfare with which we were previously most whole-heartedly the work of Rear-Admiral unfamiliar. D. B. Fisher, C.B., C.B.E., whose successful 3. It is not less than was expected, since all servicing of the Fleet at sea and in harbour has had turned their minds to it, but the credit been the admiration of all. must go to Vice-Admiral Sir Bernard Rawlings, •(Signed) BRUCE FRASER, K.C.B., O.B.E., whose inspiring leadership, Admiral. resolution and fine judgment were responsible. 4. Doubt as to our ability to operate in the Office of the Vice-Admiral, Pacific manner was somewhat naturally in Second-in-Command, American minds. This, however, was soon British Pacific Fleet, •changed. The toll taken by the suicide bomber SIR, gth May, 1945. of the more lightly armoured American carriers I have the honour to forward for your in- led to an increase in the proportionate effort formation reports of proceedings from the ships provided by our carriers, and the evidence of of the British Pacific Fleet which participated American eyes that we could support ourselves in the initial stages of Operation " Iceberg " logistically, relieved their anxieties on that score. We have now, I am sure', 'become not for the period from 26th March until 2oth April, only welcome but necessary in Central Pacific together with a general narrative of events for •operations. this period.* This latter duplicates inevitably Admiralty footnote :— • 5. Despite their doubts, the Americans put * Reports of proceedings of individual ships are not their trust in us unstintedly, and the generosity being reproduced. 59683 32QO SUPPLEMENTED THE LONDON GAZETTE, 2 JUNE, 1948 many of the events and remarks made in the these • American authorities responsible for the enclosures but is designed to present an overall provision and movements of Lifeguard Sub- and brief picture. marines* and aircraft: I know too that what 2. The successful capture of Okinawa, as a their units have accomplished is no 'less a source stepping stone~bn the way to the overthrow of of pleasure to them than it is to us. I am very the Japanese Empire, was 'appreciated as of grateful for their work. paramount importance, and it was in. conse- " .. .1 have the,honour to be,. Sir, quence a matter of great satisfaction to .'all in . Your obedient Servant, the two Forces, 57 and 112, that the former (Signed) .BERNARD RAWLiNGsr was able, in however small a degree, to draw Vice-Adm&aL a little of the enemy fire from those American The Commander, * '• Forces destined to bear the brunt of the attack United States Fifth Fleet. in these initial stages of the operation. It is hoped that, by their efforts in this area, any major staging of Japanese aircraft to the critical INTRODUCTION TO NARRATIVE. scene of operations was impeded. The resources Allied Object. • - of the Rear-Admiral, Fleet Train Task Force 1. The first objective of Operation " Iceberg " 112 on which we depend for logistic support are was to capture Okinawa Gunto and, gaining in some matters still somewhat embryonic: T control of the Nansei Shoto area, use them to have reason to believe that he.stretched them attack the main islands of Japan with their considerably to keep my Force-operating. sea and air approaches. 3. Although the. period under review 'Was B.P..F. Object. quiet and the enemy hard to find, those attacks 2. The particular object assigned to the British which did develop gave us valuable experience Pacific Fleet was to neutralise-the airfields in and revealed several flaws in our organisation the Sakishima Gunto as continuously, and for as which diligence, time and additional resources long as possible. - will remedy. Accurate assessments of the damage inflicted by our strikes was often diffi- Assignment of B.P.F. cult to determine; this was in part due to the 3. On I4th March, 1945, the British Pacific enemy's skilful use of dummy, aircraft, Fleet was situated as follows: — camouflage and dispersal. Most of Task. Force 113 (consisting of the ' 4. The difficulty of aircraft recognition when ist Battle Squadron, ist Aircraft Carrier friendly and enemy planes are in the vicinity Squadron, 4th Cruiser Squadron, 25th, 4th . of the Fleet is an ever present problem: several and 27-th Destroyer Flotillas) was at sea exer- proposals to obviate this confusion have Seen cising from Manus, Admiralty Islands. ' discussed, and, as remarked in the narrative, Task- Force 112 (ships of the Fleet Train a, solution to this appears of first importance. and Escort Vessels) was in harbour at Manus. I trust we shall find one. 4. On the forenoon of ,15th March-, whilst ist 5. The attack by suicide aircraft on the Fleet Battle Squadron and ist Aircraft Carrier demonstrates once again the importance of Squadron were exercising, the following signals fighter interception 'being carried out at the were received: — maximum possible range. CTF 713 (R) CTF 112 6. It has been unusual, during my generation, From C.-in-C., B.P.F. for a British Fleet of. this size to remain at COMINCHf directs you to report Task sea for the'length of time covered by this report Force 113 for,, duty "Iceberg" operations and I had beforehand found myself wondering together with Task Force 112 to C.-in-C., at times what shortcomings • in personnel and Pacific, t material it would discover. Over the' latter the TF 113 (R) TF 112 necessary steps are in hand; as regards the From C.-in-C., B.P.F. former, whilst certain adjustments and additions . TF 113 and '±12 must be employed in such to complement will be asked for, I am satisfied manner that they can be reallocated on 7 with the way in which the Fleet adapted itself days' notice from OOMINCH. to the new conditions. 5. On receipt of these signals all exercises 7. This report, dealing as it does with an were cancelled and Task Force 113 ordered into, unfinished operation, is of an interim nature harbour to top up with fuel, ammunition, only. It will not, however, be out of place to stores, and to embark the aircraft squadrons . remark on the helpfulness , of the American which had been landed for training ashore. authorities both at Manirs and Ulithi; I trust we After considering all factors the following signal did not ask for their assistance until we were was despatched: — faced with problems which frankly seemed beyond us, but whenever we did so appeal it C IN C PAC CTF ii2.C.-in-.C., B.P.F.' . was responded to with the utmost vigour. I ... From .CTF .113 would further add that the Communication Have recalled ships and am embarking air Liaison Teams in all ships have lived up to their squadrons from sea and shore training name in its best sense, and I am very conscious exercises. , (f both of the specialist help given me personally TF 113 and! 112, in accordance with orders by the Senior Communication Officer:iri my Flag- from C.-in-C., British Pacific Fleet, are.here- ship, Lieutenant, Commander R. F. Morris, by reported for duty. TF 113 with'units of U.S.N.R., as<also in general by Captain E. C. Admiralty footnotes :— " ... Eweri, U.S.N. His", knowledge and views have * Lifeguard Submarines—submarines employed for been most valuable. — . rescue of crews of aircraft." • - t COMINCH—C.-in-C., U.S. Fleets (Admiral King, JJ. I have yet to find a more helpful and re- U.S.N.). • . • . sponsive, attitude than that accorded to me by I C.-in-C., Pacific—Admiral Nimitz,' U.S.N. SUPPLEMENT TO. THE LONDON GAZETTE, 2 JUNE, 1948 32QI 112 will be ready to sail from Manus at 1200, 12. The British Pacific Fleet, until then iTth March and will join the United States Task Force 113, sailed from Ulithi at 0630 on forces under your command with feelings of 23rd March, 1945, as Task Force 57.