Australian Naval Review 2018

Australian Naval Review 2018 – Edition 1

The Australian Naval Review is the annual publication of the Australian Naval Institute (ANI). After the retirement of the quarterly Headmark, the ANI transitioned to an annual peer-reviewed journal in 2016. This is alongside the frequent publication of articles on the Institute’s website.

Editorial Commodore Lee Goddard, CSC, RAN Coordinators Midshipman Eamon O’Shea, RAN Midshipman Ben Page, RAN

Editorial Board Chair Professor Rob McLaughlin

Board Members Commodore Richard Menhinick, AM, CSC, RAN (Retired) Dr Stephen Fruehling Dr Tom Lewis, OAM Dr John Reeve

Editor Ms Kiri Mathieson

Printed by Instant Colour Press, Canberra Set in Calibri 12pt

ISSN 2207-2128 (Hard Copy)

Copyright of the articles published in this issue, unless specified, resides with the authors. Copyright in the form of the article printed in the Australian Naval Review is held by the Australian Naval Institute.

1 Australian Naval Review 2018 Australian Naval Review 2018 – Edition 1 About the ANI The ANI is the leading forum for naval and maritime affairs in Australia. Formed in 1975, the main objectives of the ANI are:

x to encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and the maritime profession; and x to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navy and the maritime profession.

Contributing to the ANR The ANI publishes articles and comments on naval and maritime issues. Articles concerning naval strategy, operations, administration or policy are of particular interest, but we will consider all articles.

Contact the ANI Secretariat at [email protected] for further information (including the Australian Naval Review’s Style Guide for prospective authors) or to submit a contribution to the Review.

Disclaimer The views expressed in this review do not represent the official views of the , the , the Chief of Navy or the ANI. That said, Headmark, and now the Australian Naval Review, have a proud tradition of over 40 years of contributing informed research, writing, and opinion on naval and maritime matters.

ANI Membership Members of the ANI receive discounts on events run by the Institute, a copy of the annual Australian Naval Review, full access to the ANI website and the knowledge that they are contributing to the ever-important public debates on naval and maritime affairs. Further information on membership is available on the Institute’s website (www.navalinstitute.com.au) or from the ANI Secretariat ([email protected]).

2 Australian Naval Review 2018

Council

President , AO, DSC, RAN (Retired) Vice President Commodore Lee Goddard, CSC, RAN Treasurer Commander Nick Tate, RANR Secretary Lieutenant Commander Stephanie Foulkes, RAN Councillors Dr Greg Gilbert Commander Richard Hobbs, RAN (Retired) Dr Benjamin Herscovitch Captain Mat Hudson, RAN Commodore Justin Jones, CSC, RAN Midshipman Rebecca Li, RAN Mr Brian Mansell Lieutenant John Nash, RANR Commodore Alison Norris, CSC, RAN Midshipman Eamon O’Shea, RAN Midshipman Ben Page, RAN Captain Tom Phillips, RAN Brigadier Will Taylor, OBE (Retired) Lieutenant Commander Desmond Woods, RANR Business Manager Ms Sue Hart

Front Cover: Australia’s Federation Guard during the Chief of Navy Change of Command Parade at Russell Offices, Canberra. Photographer: Mrs Lauren Larking. Back Cover: Outgoing Chief of Navy Vice Admiral , AO, CSC, RAN, is received on parade by Australia's Federation Guard during the change of command parade at Russell Offices, Canberra. Photographer: Mrs Lauren Larking.

3 Australian Naval Review 2018

Table of Contents

Foreword from the President ...... 5 Vice Admiral Peter Jones, AO, DSC, RAN (Retired) 2018 Vernon Parker Oration ...... 7 Ambassador John Berry (Retired) 2018 McNeil Prize ...... 15 Andrew Whittaker The Navy and the Nation: A Tribute...... 17 Vice Admiral Tim Barrett, AO, CSC, RAN (Retired) A Message from the Chief of Navy ...... 23 Vice Admiral , AO, RAN The Future of Contested Amphibious Assaults ...... 32 Josh Abbey An Introduction to Maritime Crime in West Africa ...... 51 Dr Phillip Drew, CD The Pacific Program ...... 64 Commodore Jack McCaffrie, RAN (Retired) Naval Exceptionalism - Part One ...... 80 Captain Sean Andrews, RAN The Forgotten Force is back ...... 98 Associate Professor Alexey Muraviev

4 Australian Naval Review 2018 Vice Admiral Peter Jones (Retired)

Foreword from the President Vice Admiral Peter Jones, AO, DSC, RAN (Retired)

2018 has been another year of growth and reinvigoration for the ANI. To many, this is symbolised by the new-look web site. Pleasingly, the Institute is on a sound financial basis and continues to steadily grow its membership and subscriber base. At the end of 2018 we will come to the close of our Strategic Plan horizon and work is underway by the Council to examine ways we can be more vibrant and relevant. This will be articulated in our Strategic Plan 2019–2021.

The centrepiece of the ANI’s events is the annual Vernon Parker Oration and the award of the McNeil Prize. This year a near capacity audience heard Ambassador John Berry (retired) give an impassioned Oration on the security challenges facing the Asia Pacific region. The Oration was reported in the national media and is reproduced in full in this edition of the Australian Naval Review.

The very worthy recipient of the 2018 McNeil Prize for an individual contribution to the Navy’s capability from Australian industry was Mr Andrew Whittaker, Director of Shipbuilding at Raytheon Australia. The Prize reflects the ANI’s view that industry plays a vital role in enabling the Navy to be able to fight and win at sea. It is important therefore to recognise excellence in this endeavour.

5 Australian Naval Review 2018 Foreword from the President This is the third edition of the Australian Naval Review and I hope you will share my view that it continues to grow in stature and quality. There are articles from the outgoing and incoming Chiefs of Navy as well as articles by eminent and emerging writers about the Russian Pacific Fleet, piracy, amphibious operations and naval shipbuilding.

I trust you enjoy the 2018 edition of the Australian Naval Review.

Vice Admiral Peter Jones, AO, DSC, RAN (Retired) President Australian Naval Institute

6 Australian Naval Review 2018 Ambassador John Berry (Retired)

2018 Vernon Parker Oration Defending Democracy Ambassador John Berry (Retired)

Delivered at the 2018 Annual Dinner, held 10 May 2018 at Hotel Realm, Canberra.

Distinguished guests, members of the Diplomatic Corps, ladies and gentlemen:

Let me begin by thanking Vice Admiral Peter Jones, the President of the Australian Naval Institute, for the very kind invitation to join you this evening and offer this oration. It is an honour to be joined by the Patron and dear friend, Vice Admiral Tim Barrett, the Chief of Navy, and special thanks to Lockheed Martin Australia for their sponsorship of this evening. It is also wonderful to see so many friends from our embassy here, along with many wonderful diplomats, academicians and members of the strategic studies community. Thank you for being here tonight.

But my most heartfelt thanks go to our members from the greatest generation – heroes one and all, and dear friends who I am honoured could join us: Bill White, Andrew Robertson, Derek Holyoak and my thoughts are with Norm Tame and condolences for our recently departed Gordon Johnson and his family. These are the men who fought and survived the Battle of the Coral Sea over 76 years ago, as well as numerous other battles that secured victory in the Pacific for democracies, freedom and the rule of law. Some have travelled a long way to join us tonight – though happily not as far as they travelled last year to New York City, to commemorate the 75th anniversary of their battle. Let me tell you – they painted the town red from dawn to midnight, proving once again that Americans are no match for the steel livers of Australians – no matter their age! The many friends that you made throughout your trip, from little Italy to the battery to the decks of the Intrepid all still ask about you and send their love and highest respect to each of you!

I would ask us all to rise and observe a moment of silence on behalf of Gordon Johnson, a Coral Sea and Guadalcanal veteran, who had hoped to be here tonight, and was buried yesterday in his beloved Canberra.

Today, we are awakening to a new challenge that our democracies and the freedoms we love so dearly are facing. But I will argue that the new challenge which

7 Australian Naval Review 2018 2018 Vernon Parker Oration democratic nations face this century comes once again, as it did in the 1930s and 40s, from authoritarian nations with anti-democratic agendas.

First, this is a challenge that is not best met through confrontation. In fact, confrontation in our age must be the last tool used in our policy toolbox.

Rather, I would argue that democracies should pursue a clear-eyed strategy of risk management, with a full spectrum of engagement choices to be used in direct and increasingly aggressive competition with authoritarian governments, so that we hopefully can avoid ever using the final tools of confrontation. America and Australia are two democracies poised to best shape this risk management response and build broad based support among other democracies as well.

Risk management is best thought of just as someone who lives in a wildfire prone environment. Prudent steps to manage risk counsel a range of increasing options such as trimming back growth, fireproofing roofs and constructing water reservoirs. So too should democracies prepare carefully for engagement with authoritarian governments, to be ready for anything, up to and including the worst fire imaginable. That doesn’t mean our rural farmer desires a fire any more than democracies seek confrontation. It does mean good common sense would always counsel ‘be prepared’.

Russia’s new authoritarian model is a good example of how broad the challenges we face. On one hand Russia seeks to grow through trade with Europe and international partners while making no pretence of reciprocal benefits to those same partners within its borders. While pretending to comply with the liberal world order created by democracies and free market economies, it has aggressively sought to undermine and assault that order, most notably on its borders, but increasingly further afield – even into the electoral processes of the United States and murder within Great Britain. Its efforts in Ukraine and multiple adjacent nations, along with its active efforts to undermine NATO and wedge unity amongst democratic nations through everything from predatory economics and strategic blackmail to outright intervention, captures the spectrum of challenges I am trying to describe that democracies face in the 21st century when engaging authoritarian governments.

Another example is China. Since the end of the last century, both republicans and democrats pursued a foreign policy with China that encouraged its economic

8 Australian Naval Review 2018 Ambassador John Berry (Retired) growth and closer integration into liberal institutions under the belief that eventually with a broader middle class, there might be convergence with our free market system and increased pressure for broader political freedoms, rule of law and human rights. We hoped that as one of the primary beneficiaries of the international rules based order democracies created post World War II, China and other authoritarian governments might eventually be integrated with that order.

That approach was not without cost for democracies: since 2001 when China joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO), for example, US manufacturing declined 40% - losing more than a million jobs in Ohio, Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin alone. It is interesting to note that those four states are responsible for making Donald Trump President in the last election.

As to trade reforms in China? China still applies a 25% tariff on US car imports, compared to 2.5% tariff in the USA. Under pressure by the President, they are now finally talking about reducing this. No US auto company may own even 50% of a factory in China – while in the USA there are now five 100% owned Chinese electric vehicle auto companies. Finally, US technology companies are required to have a joint venture and share intellectual property with a Chinese partner as well as storing all data on Chinese servers – with no countervailing requirement in the US. It speaks volumes that despite these attempts to handicap the USA for decades, we still exported over $400 billion to the Asia Pacific region in 2017, up 160% from a decade before.

But regarding our bipartisan hopes and dreams for China? Those dreams are now over. We have awakened to a new day that requires clearer thinking and sharper vision. Both republicans and democrats clearly see that the Communist Party and its single leader are now more firmly ensconced than ever; with protectionist and predatory economic policies that jeopardize intellectual property, benefit state- owned enterprises and block fair trade. All democracies see China’s clear violations in the expansions and recent militarization of artificial islands in the South China Sea, despite Rose Garden promises not to do so. China clearly seeks unilateral hegemony in defiance of international law over this busy trade region. And, sadly, all people see China’s use of the internet to enforce greater authoritarian control and violation of human rights within its borders behind a not so great modern firewall.

9 Australian Naval Review 2018 2018 Vernon Parker Oration The new US defence strategy captures this clearly: ‘China and Russia are now undermining the international order from within the system by exploiting its benefits while simultaneously undercutting its principles and rules of the road.’ It is important to emphasize that those rules, which were created by democracies after World War II were an attempt to raise all boats, and we largely succeeded beyond all expectations. America and Australia led the charge for the United Nations, the World Bank, the WTO, International Monetary Fund and other institutions that comprise the rules of the road we speak of when we speak about the ‘international rules based system’. Global trade did succeed in lifting millions out of poverty. But it did not, as we had hoped for a generation, lead authoritarian nations into partners for the global commons. Great power competition has returned, with one of the most important stakes being none less than a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Finally, we ignore at our peril the fact that authoritarian nations are all clearly expanding military investments, including some modernizing nuclear arsenals, as well as aggressively pursuing artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and space miniaturization. Second place is not an option for democracies in any of these fields – lest we find out too late that a new ‘Sputnik’ looms, or that the ‘silk curtain’ is actually made of steel.

All is not dark. The US economy continues to lead the world and is poised for potentially much greater growth. Australia continues one of the world’s longest recession free periods in history. Congress has approved an additional $80 billion in defence investment and upgrades for every year going forward. History counsels us that when democracies push back against authoritarian overreach, it is very effective. Witness Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s response to the tightest sanctions ever – led by the US and Australia. Witness Australia’s bolder approaches to enhancing its ADF and strengthening regional security through its high end/high technology fighting capability linked with US force posture and multi-lateral and quadrilateral architectures. It is when democracies either fail to push back, or are slow to do so, that authoritarian governments take advantage – exploiting our hesitation to their gain.

What would some key attributes of this new thinking require of democracies? How can we best manage the risks we face?

First and foremost, we must recommit ourselves to our values of freedom, democracy and the rule of law. Those values are true and right and as strong as 10 Australian Naval Review 2018 Ambassador John Berry (Retired) ever. Recently, the Chinese Ambassador to the US presumed: ‘an old American era is about to end’. He was dead wrong. Freedom, democracy and the rule of law are not in decline and are nowhere near the end. Authoritarian governments wish they were, say they are and will do everything they can to undermine them – why? Because they fear those values more than anything else. That is why it is critical that democracies not only recommit, but publicly defend these values in each and every forum against any attempt to undermine them.

Authoritarian governments do not just seek some benign form of mercantilism. At their core, authoritarian nations seek the abolition and extinction of our core values, the control of the state over the individual, the use of might to determine right, and never to be accountable to the will of the people.

What authoritarian governments want is a world that is at its core diametrically opposed to any world anyone in a democratic society would want to live in. And thank God for the blood and courage of the men and women in this room who have made sure it is not a world we live in today. Thank you to each and every veteran who has fought for our values and rights and for our Australian and American way of life.

Second, as we compete, it must be on a level playing field, and authoritarian governments must not be given ‘free passes’ to create one-sided rules under the misguided thinking that democracies must only engage as things are. Democracies are strong enough and will remain so to demand and require that level playing field, equal access and fair competition. And it is essential that America and Australia both refresh and defend the rules based order we spoke of earlier – supporting the rising of all boats – and being on guard for authoritarian termites undermining the foundations of these institutions.

Third, we – democracies - must always ‘show up’ and not allow a vacuum to exist that can be quickly exploited by authoritarian governments. The new Chinese movie ‘Wolf Warrior’ shows that they want the world (specifically Africa in the movie) to believe that the USA ‘left you’ and ‘we are here’. The USA and our allies aren’t perfect by a long shot, and we occasionally drop a ball like anyone – but don’t mistake dropping a ball for leaving the field. Let no one doubt that the USA and our democratic allies are here to play and will stay for the whole game.

11 Australian Naval Review 2018 2018 Vernon Parker Oration Fourth, democracies must maintain strong, capable and connected alliances. The greatest difference between democracies and authoritarian governments is very plain: democracies want stronger partners – authoritarian governments want weaker ones.

Fifth, encourage rule of law and deter coercion and force as a method for achieving goals.

Sixth, work to establish peaceful resolution methods and conflict avoidance to the greatest extent possible between us. A good example is possibly norms for cyber engagement, as well as modernizing hot lines of communication.

Seventh, strengthen, modernize and protect our basic democratic electoral and campaign finance systems as well as ensuring human rights are protected and advanced by technology, not undermined. Democracies should apply full transparency when authoritarian money is changing hands as the best defence against forked tongues. And most importantly, there is no legitimate purpose – ever - for an authoritarian nation to make political contributions or to engage in political social media in a democratic nation. Such actions should be illegal in each and every democratic nation.

Finally, prepare, prepare, prepare. Every democracy should work together to ensure that we are never in second place when it comes to technology, education, or our national defence.

Let me end with where I began, with Bill, Derek and Andrew.

Think of the challenges they faced as young men. A world at war, genocide, all led by authoritarian governments that made critically wrong choices and gambled everything on war. And like it or not, they seem to make that mistake over and over throughout human history.

Modern democracy is a new and young form of government. It is far from perfect. But it is superior in every sense to authoritarian government. Democracies draw strength from the well of human rights and diversity that encourage creativity in every endeavour.

Democracies are slow to go to war – because they care about the life of each and every sailor, soldier and airman and woman in a way that authoritarian governments do not. But make no mistake – when democracies do go to war – they 12 Australian Naval Review 2018 Ambassador John Berry (Retired) quickly produce the fiercest, most capable and best motivated fighting forces of human history.

Our heroes here tonight did not seek war. But when it came – they fought with every ounce of their strength – because they were not only fighting to protect their homes and families. They were also fighting to defend the values that still distinguish us today: freedom, democracy and the rule of law.

My father fought with them. Though he was born 14 000 miles away in Philadelphia, those same values made them brothers. And from Guadalcanal through New Guinea and up the island chain they proved the metal of the democratic soldier, sailor, airman and marine.

For 100 years now – since the battle of Hamel on the Western Front to the present day, Australians have fought alongside Americans in every major battle. You are the only ally to have done so, and we celebrate and remember that centennial of mateship. Together, we fought and achieved victory in freedom’s greatest crises.

We stand in the shadow of these brave men and every other serviceman and woman who has fought for those values over these many years. Our challenges are tough – but nowhere near as tough as the ones these gentlemen wrestled to the ground – giving the world the longest period of peace and prosperity in human history. If we are one hundredth as good as each of them, we will do just fine.

God bless our heroes. God bless Australia and God bless the United States of America.

13 Australian Naval Review 2018 2018 Vernon Parker Oration Ambassador John Berry (Retired)

The President of the American Australian Association comes to the job well prepared after serving as the 25th US Ambassador and President Obama’s personal representative to Australia. Prior to that, John served in multiple senior government positions, earning three unanimous Senate confirmations, including: the head of Human Resources for the Federal government as Director of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM); the Chief Operating Officer of the Department of Interior; as Assistant Secretary for Policy, Management and Budget; the head of 40% of Federal law enforcement as Acting Assistant Secretary for Enforcement at the Treasury Department; and Legislative Director for Rep. Steny Hoyer.

John has also been a leader in the non-profit sector, serving as the Director of the Smithsonian National Zoo; The National Fish and Wildlife Foundation, and Government Relations for the Smithsonian Institution. John has accomplished many firsts, most notably, the first openly LGBT US Ambassador to a G20 country and while at OPM, he was the highest ranking LGBT executive official in US history. John is married to his partner of 22 years, Curtis Yee.

14 Australian Naval Review 2018 2018 McNeil Prize

2018 McNeil Prize Andrew Whittaker

The prestigious Australian Naval Institute McNeil Prize is named in honour of Rear Admiral Percival McNeil, CB, RAN (1883-1951), one of the founding fathers of Australian shipbuilding. Rear Admiral McNeil’s contribution to both the Navy and industry is particularly noteworthy, as was his faith in Australia’s ability to build world class .

The McNeil Prize, instituted in 2016, is awarded to an individual from Australian industry who has made an outstanding contribution to the capabilities and sustainment of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN).

The McNeil Prize is presented at the Institute’s annual Vernon Parker Oration and dinner, and is judged by an esteemed panel of retired naval officers. This year, the panel consisted of Vice Admiral David Shackleton, Rear Admiral Rowan Moffitt, and Rear Admiral James Goldrick. This year’s prize was presented by the Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Tim Barrett, in front of a near capacity audience, which included members of the McNeil family, at the Vernon Parker Oration on 10 May 2018.

The winner of the 2018 McNeil Prize is Andrew Whittaker, Director of Shipbuilding at Raytheon Australia.

Mr Vince Di Pietro, Lockheed Martin; Mrs Elspeth Killip and Mrs Fiona Blanch, McNeil family; Vice Admiral Tim Barrett, Chief of Navy; Mr Brad Ferguson, Raytheon Australia, who accepted the award for Andrew Whittaker. 15 Australian Naval Review 2018 2018 McNeil Prize Andrew is part of Raytheon’s South Australian workforce, which includes more than 350 highly skilled combat system integrators, engineers and program managers, working as part of the Air Warfare (AWD) Alliance team. He is based at the Osborne Shipyard.

AWD Program Manager, Commodore Craig Bourke, recognised the pivotal role that Andrew has played in the AWD program over the last 12 years. ‘Andrew has been awarded the McNeil Prize for exceptional engineering and program management leadership in delivering Australia’s most potent and capable to the Royal Australian Navy’, said Commodore Bourke. ‘As an example of his leadership, Andrew established, maintained and integrated the engineering activities and technical integrity risk management framework for the program.’

In recognising Andrew in this most prestigious way, the ANI also recognises the capability of the AWD and the more than 5000 people who have dedicated millions of hours to deliver these warships. The AWD features Australia’s most advanced anti- warfare capability, state-of-the-art radar technology and an advanced air defence system capable of engaging enemy aircraft and missiles at extended range.

‘The success of the combat system integration activity is a source of tremendous pride for Andrew and his Raytheon Australia colleagues’, said Michael Ward, Managing Director of Raytheon Australia. ‘Not only has Andrew and his team performed admirably on this program but they have also built for Australia a national asset in combat system integration.’

Andrew’s work, in keeping with the finest traditions of the Australian Defence Industry, has truly made an outstanding contribution to the capabilities and sustainment of the RAN. As such, Andrew is a very worthy recipient of the 2018 McNeil Prize.

16 Australian Naval Review 2018 A Tribute to Vice Admiral Tim Barrett (Retired)

The Navy and the Nation: A Tribute Vice Admiral Tim Barrett, AO, CSC, RAN (Retired) Chief of Navy 2014-2018

Vice Admiral Tim Barrett, AO, CSC, RAN handed over command of the Royal Australian Navy to Vice Admiral Michael Noonan, AO, RAN on 7 July 2018, a command he himself had assumed on 1 July 2014. This marked the end of a distinguished career of service to the Navy, and the nation, over a period of more than 40 years for Vice Admiral Barrett.

Vice Admiral Barrett joined the Royal Australian Navy in 1976 as a Seaman Officer, and later specialised in aviation.

A dual-qualified officer, Vice Admiral Barrett served in HMA Ships Melbourne, Perth and Brisbane and HMS Orkney as a Seaman Officer and then as Flight Commander in HMA Ships Stalwart, Adelaide and Canberra. His staff appointments include Deputy Director Air Warfare Development, Director Naval Officer’s Postings and Director General of Defence Force Recruiting.

Vice Admiral Barrett has served as Commanding Officer 817 Squadron, Commanding Officer HMAS Albatross, Commander Australian Navy Aviation Group, Commander Border Protection Command and Commander Australian Fleet.

Receiving a Conspicuous Service Cross in 2006 for his achievements in naval aviation, Vice Admiral Barrett became a Member of the Order of Australia in 2009 for his service as Director Naval Officers' Postings and Commander Australian Navy 17 Australian Naval Review 2018 A Tribute to Vice Admiral Tim Barrett (Retired) Aviation Group. He was made an Officer of the Order of Australia in 2014 for his leadership of Border Protection Command and the Australian Fleet.

Vice Admiral Barrett holds a Bachelor of Arts in Politics and History and a Masters of Defence Studies, both from the University of New South Wales. He has also completed the Advanced Management Program at Harvard Business School.

As reported in Navy News, Vice Admiral Barrett’s time as Chief of Navy has been one of significant change. He guided the decisions to acquire the Offshore Patrol Vessels, Navy’s next generation of replenishment ships, Future , and the Hunter Class along with the associated infrastructure investments. Vice Admiral Barrett also oversaw the introduction into service of the Landing Helicopter Docks Ships, HMA Ships Canberra and Adelaide, the MH60R Seahawk helicopters, and the first of Navy’s new air warfare , HMAS Hobart. These new capabilities, combined with the Navy wide reforms driven by Plan Pelorus, have enabled Navy to generate and deploy maritime task groups capable of accomplishing the full spectrum of maritime security operations.

Speaking at the handover ceremony, incoming Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Michael Noonan said history will consider Vice Admiral Barrett to be ‘the father of Australia’s 21st century Navy’.

‘His commitment and dedication has been both extraordinary and selfless, and over the last four years as the Chief of Navy, he has set our Navy on a new course’, he said.

Throughout his career, Vice Admiral Barrett was made an Officer of the Order of Australia, an Officer of the French Legion of Honour, awarded the Conspicuous Service Cross and the Singaporean Meritorious Service Medal, as well as the Australian Active Service Medal, the Australian Service Medal, the Defence Long Service Medal with Federation Star and the .

The ANI is sincerely grateful to Vice Admiral Barrett for his support of the Institute over many years, including as Patron during his tenure as Chief of Navy. The ANI wishes Vice Admiral Barrett all the very best for his retirement.

18 Australian Naval Review 2018 A Tribute to Vice Admiral Tim Barrett (Retired) Vice Admiral Barrett’s final speech as Chief of Navy is printed here.

Delivered at the Chief of Navy Change of Command Ceremony, held 6 July 2018 at Blamey Square

Chief of the Defence Force, Air Chief Marshal ; Secretary of the Department of Defence, Mr Greg Moriarty; Fellow Senior Australian Defence Force and Defence leaders; Men and Women of the Royal Australian Navy; Ladies and Gentlemen.

When I assumed command of the RAN over four years ago I had three priorities. They were to:

x maintain our contract with government and with it the trust of the Australian people; x transition new capabilities into service; and x continue our reform and cultural change journey.

I was also of the view, given the ever-changing strategic environment, that Navy needed to be deploying self-supported and sustainable maritime task groups, task groups that were capable of accomplishing the full spectrum of maritime security operations, task groups that were flexible, scalable and structured to achieve the operational outcomes directed by Government.

I was also very clear in my mind that the Navy must be respected by the Government and the people of Australia for our professionalism, our agile responses to contingencies, our innovative approaches to dealing with problems, our workforce management practices, and for the responsible management of the resources provided to us by Government.

Through the efforts of the whole Navy team we have, I believe, while not without some challenges, been successful in achieving those goals.

We as a Navy are routinely deploying task groups to conduct operations based around the two Landing Helicopter Docks HMA Ships Canberra and Adelaide, the

19 Australian Naval Review 2018 A Tribute to Vice Admiral Tim Barrett (Retired) new Seahawk MRH60 Romeos, and our first destroyer in over 20 years, HMAS Hobart.

We are delivering the seaworthy maritime capabilities required by Government, within the manpower, cost and time constraints mandated by Government.

We are employing the Capability Life Cycle to ensure that our successors are equipped with cutting edge and highly capable submarines, frigates, and new offshore patrol vessels, and importantly have the appropriate support ashore to meet the challenges of the future.

We are consistently demonstrating that we are an agile Navy, adaptive and capable of responding to a range of contingencies from humanitarian aid and disaster relief, law enforcement, international engagement, and ensuring the stability of the maritime environment in our region and around the world.

Our people are more resilient and innovative, and they are getting the job done safely. Our workforce better reflects the diversity of the Australian community, demonstrating a bias for action, and seeking to continuously improve the way we do business.

And, despite some reports, the vast majority are upholding Navy’s Values and living Navy’s Signature Behaviours, on duty and off duty, in uniform or out of it, at sea and ashore.

The considerable successes that Navy has enjoyed during my tenure is due to the important and valuable work undertaken by uniformed and civilian people ashore as much as they are due to the outstanding efforts of our sailors and officers both at sea and ashore, whether permanent or reserve.

Thank you for all your efforts — I am confident that you all understand the serious nature of our work, ensuring our nation’s security and prosperity.

I would like to thank the Chief of the Defence Force, Air Chief Marshal Mark Binskin, for his leadership during the last four years. He has very skilfully led the Australian

20 Australian Naval Review 2018 A Tribute to Vice Admiral Tim Barrett (Retired) Defence Force through a challenging time demonstrating outstanding wisdom and sense of judgement.

Sir, thank you for your steadfast support to me and the other Chiefs. On behalf of your first Service, I wish you, Gitte, and your children fair winds and following seas.

Likewise, I would like to acknowledge the wisdom and guidance that the Secretary, Greg Moriarty, and his predecessor, Dennis Richardson, have provided me. Thank you to you both.

To my fellow Service Chiefs and Group Heads — thank you. Defence is a highly complex and, at times, challenging organisation — your good humour and willingness to work together has been greatly appreciated.

To my three deputies, Rear Admirals Michael van Balen and Mark Hammond, and now Vice Admiral Michael Noonan. I thank you for your passion, dedication and support — it has been invaluable.

To the Navy Senior Leadership Group — I am thankful for your efforts in starting the significant changes required to ensure the Naval Shipbuilding Plan is a success in the decades to come.

To my office staff, especially the Chiefs of Staff and Flag Lieutenants — your loyalty, patience and support has been exceptional — thank you.

And most importantly — to my wife, Jenny, and my daughters, Alice and Lucy — thank you. You will never truly understand how much I have valued your unwavering support, understanding and most importantly, patience. I know the late nights, middle of the night phone calls, and the regular travel has taken its toll.

To the next Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Michael Noonan, we have discussed at length the challenges that you will need to grapple with. I know you are the right person to be the next professional head of the RAN.

21 Australian Naval Review 2018 A Tribute to Vice Admiral Tim Barrett (Retired) Your experiences at , as Head Navy People Training and Resources, and as the Deputy Chief of Navy have set you up well to navigate the challenges that lay ahead for our Navy. I am confident that you will succeed and I wish you all the very best as you become the 32nd Chief of Navy.

It’s been an absolute honour and privilege to lead the RAN.

Thank you.

22 Australian Naval Review 2018 A Message from the Chief of Navy

A Message from the Chief of Navy Vice Admiral Michael Noonan, AO, RAN

Leading the RAN, an institute that is so vital to the security and prosperity of Australia, is a true privilege and it brings with it a responsibility that I do not take lightly. This security and prosperity is tied directly to the maritime domain, and our economy is dependent upon the security of our international trade routes, shipping and vast marine resource.

It is my belief that the Navy currently enjoys a strong relationship with Government and the Australian people as a result of the quality of our men and women and their contributions over an extended period. Nonetheless, we still have much to do if we are to realise our full potential.

It is an important time for Navy and an important time to be in our Navy. After many years of hard work, the majority of Navy’s future capability decisions have now been made and we have a very good understanding of what the Navy will look like over the next 20 years. So we must now shift our focus to the successful delivery and sustainment of our current and future force, in close partnership with Industry. We have a significant challenge ahead of us to bring together the National Shipbuilding Enterprise and execute our Naval Shipbuilding Plan. I know that both Navy and Industry are fully on board and committed to it.

In parallel, we must also continue to deliver on our contract with Government and with the Australian people during a period of increasing uncertainty and unpredictability, both globally and regionally. We must be ready now, while concurrently becoming ready for the future. This includes managing both our current capability and our capacity, with a focus on preparedness for existing and future contingencies.

Throughout my tenure, I will continue to work with my Senior Leadership Team to refine our strategic plans and address our various challenges, through the lens of three command themes:

23 Australian Naval Review 2018 Vice Admiral Michael Noonan x A Thinking Navy. Our success will increasingly depend on the quality of our thinking and our agility in decision making. We will encourage improved decision making and greater accountability at all levels of Navy. We will encourage transparent reporting, free flow of information, challenging assumptions, promoting advice without fear and innovation through positive disruption. We will pass a ‘value add’ lens over everything that we do and will strive to become a learning organisation. In short, we will focus on being better every day, in everything that we do and be worthy of the trust and responsibility that Government and the Australian people have bestowed upon us.

x A Fighting Navy. We live in complex and uncertain times with unprecedented regional competition and a real potential for future conflict. We are the first line of defence and we must be ready to provide combat ready forces to the Chief of Joint Operations. We have an agile, resilient and lethal fighting force and we will fight alongside our brothers and sisters in the Army and Air Force as a professional Navy Team. We must also be ready to fight in all domains, including cyber and electronic warfare.

x An Australian Navy. We must continue to reflect on the importance of what we do, every day, for our country. Our people reflect the best of Australian society; we support and are supported by, our families and our community; we are ready to defend Australia. The quality of our men and women is our most important contributor to Australia’s maritime power and to our future success. Our quality will increasingly depend on our culture and the generation and maintenance of a fighting spirit. We don’t lose. We won’t lose.

As I stated above, there are a number of key challenges that we will address together and I also look to our broader Navy Family to continue to lend support.

For Australia to efficiently, safely and securely access and defend the maritime domain now and into the future, the Navy must be able to contribute to complex, joint, missions in a dynamic region.

24 Australian Naval Review 2018 A Message from the Chief of Navy To achieve this vital task, the Navy’s Officers and Sailors must be professional, well trained, and empowered to lawfully use the full range of available capabilities when call upon by our Government.

Many of these naval capabilities are highly complex, technical systems which must be cost effectively managed, well maintained, regularly upgraded and battle ready; cognisant of the ever changing strategic threats and technical challenges.

Not surprisingly, the Navy workforce remains a primary focus and we will look at innovative ways of attracting new skills and retaining our people. We will promote and operate within a culture that encourages those who are currently serving to continue to serve, those who have left to want to return, and those Australians who are looking to be part of something bigger, to see in our Navy the attributes of a unique organisation worthy of their commitment and service.

Bringing together a National Enterprise is no easy feat and you will see Navy engage more broadly domestically and internationally with the community, Industry and our international partners. We will also be looking to our Navy community to help reinforce the importance of what we do and why; nothing short of the security and prosperity of our nation.

Sustainment and through life support of our platforms is paramount. While we well understand the cost of sustaining our current fleet, we will need to ensure we have thorough and comprehensive planning, with all stakeholders, to ensure capability requirements are fully understood and costed. Our Navy does not need to do more with less, it needs to do more in better ways. Our Navy needs to deliver on the total capability life cycle.

Navy’s licence to operate will be through empowering Navy people at all levels, and improved decision making. I will drive decision making down through the provision of timely planning guidance and direction. In line with driving decision making down, I expect decision makers to accept accountability for their decisions. Improved decision making and acceptance of accountability at all levels is the key to our agility.

Navy culture remains one of our cornerstones and I am fully committed to ensuring that Navy’s Values and Signature Behaviours remain at our forefront. This is the

25 Australian Naval Review 2018 Vice Admiral Michael Noonan daily demonstration of who we are as individuals, as a Team and as the Australian Navy.

We will listen to our people, trust in them, believe in them, respect them, and give them a fair go. We will inspire our people to be more than they thought they could be; to reach their potential; and to reach our potential. This will enable our Navy to ‘Fight and Win at Sea’, directly contributing to the current and future security and prosperity of Australia.

We will Think like a Fighting Navy, and Fight like a Thinking Navy.

Vice Admiral Michael Noonan, AO, RAN

Vice Admiral Michael Noonan, AO, RAN joined the RAN in 1984, trained as a seaman officer and then subsequently completed Principal Warfare Officers course and specialised in Air Direction and Above Water Warfare.

Throughout his career, he had experience in a wide range of Navy and ADF operations through various sea and shore posting and operational roles. Highlights have included deployments to the Middle East, Southern Ocean and being the Commissioning Commanding Officer of the Anzac class HMAS Parramatta.

He has fulfilled leadership positions at all levels of the Australian Defence Force, with senior positions including the Director of Military Strategic Commitments, Director General of Operations at HQJOC, Commander Maritime Border Command and Deputy Chief of Navy.

In June 2018, he was appointed as an Officer of the Order of Australia in recognition of his distinguished service in significant senior ADF command roles.

Vice Admiral Noonan assumed command of the RAN on 7 July 2018 and will be the 32nd professional head of the Australian Navy, and the 9th officer to hold the title of Chief of Navy Australia. In this role, he is entrusted by Government to be its principal naval advisor, and to raise, train and sustain Australia’s naval forces to execute maritime missions in a dynamic region.

26 Australian Naval Review 2018 A Message from the Chief of Navy Vice Admiral Noonan’s first speech as Chief of Navy is printed here.

Delivered at the Chief of Navy Change of Command Ceremony, held 6 July 2018 at Blamey Square

Minister for Defence, Senator the Hon. Marise Payne, Shadow Assistant Minister for Defence Industry and Support, the Hon. Mike Kelly, Chief of the Defence Force, Air Chief Marshal Mark Binskin and Secretary of the Department of Defence, Mr Greg Moriarty, Fellow Senior Australian and visiting Defence Force and Defence leaders, Warrant Officer of the Navy – Warrant Officer Gary Wight, Men and women of the RAN – past, present and future, Ladies and gentlemen, and to my family.

Thank you for being here with me and your Navy today, I know that a number of you have travelled a long way to be here – and that means a lot to me personally.

I would like to acknowledge the traditional owners of this land, the Ngunnawal people, and I pay my respects to their elders, past, present and future. I would like to also acknowledge the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders who have, and continue to, serve in our Defence Force – thank you for your service.

It is my absolute honour to assume command of the Royal Australian Navy at midnight tonight.

Leading an institution that is so vital to Australia’s security and prosperity is a true privilege, and it brings with it a responsibility that I do not take lightly.

I wish to firstly recognise the contribution that Vice Admiral Tim Barrett has made to our Navy and the nation over the last 42 years. His commitment and dedication has been both extraordinary and selfless, and over the last four years as the Chief of Navy, he has set our Navy on a new course.

Through his ability to demonstrate how the naval enterprise plays a vital role in Australia’s prosperity, he has been one of the most influential people in driving the largest recapitalisation of our Navy in modern times.

27 Australian Naval Review 2018 Vice Admiral Michael Noonan He has guided the decisions to acquire the Offshore Patrol Vessels, our next generation of Replenishment Ships, the Future Submarines, and the Hunter Class Frigates, along with the associated infrastructure investments.

He has overseen the introduction into service of the Landing Helicopter Dock Ships, HMA Ships Canberra and Adelaide, the MH60R Seahawk helicopters, and the first of our new destroyers, HMAS Hobart.

These new capabilities, combined with the Navy-wide reforms driven by his Plan Pelorus, have enabled our Navy to generate and deploy maritime task groups capable of accomplishing the full spectrum of maritime security operations in support of our national interests.

I expect that in the years to come, history will consider Vice Admiral Barrett to be the father of Australia’s 21st century Navy.

He is a great Australian, and I know that he will continue to actively contribute to our Navy and our national interests well beyond midnight tonight. Tim, thank you for your service and I sincerely wish you and Jenny the best of health and happiness for the future.

I would also like to publicly acknowledge and thank another officer who will shortly retire from full-time naval service. Vice Admiral yesterday handed over the role of Vice Chief of the Australian Defence Force to Vice Admiral , after an extraordinary four years in one of the most demanding roles in Australian public office, and this of course was preceded by three years as the Chief of Navy. Ray, thank you for your service to our Navy and our Defence Force, and I wish you and Chloe all the best for the future.

Notwithstanding all that has been achieved during the tenure of my predecessors — we still have much to do if we are to realise our full potential.

It is an important time to be in the Navy. With the majority of capability decisions now made, we must shift our focus to successful delivery and sustainment of our current and future force.

28 Australian Naval Review 2018 A Message from the Chief of Navy In parallel, we must also continue to deliver on our contract with Government and with the Australian people during a period of increasing uncertainty and unpredictability, both globally and regionally.

Over the next four years, I will strive to lead a Navy that:

x works closely with our Government and the men and women of Australian Industry to mature the design, production and delivery of our future surface, subsurface and aerial platforms and weapon systems; and x is operationally ready thanks to committed, resilient and well-trained men and women, who are able to deploy nationally, regionally and internationally in support of our national interests and the international rule of law – proud Australians who want, and are able, to make a difference.

To achieve these outcomes, we need to think like a fighting Navy, and fight like a thinking Navy.

We must all work together, alongside our brothers and sisters in the Army, the Air Force and the Defence civilian workforce, as a professional Navy team that understands, and is committed to, our nation, our mission and each other.

We must all strive to be better, every day, in everything we do. We must be worthy of the trust and responsibility that the Government and the Australian people have bestowed upon us. We will be inclusive, respectful and innovative. We will embody and display the best of Australian values and virtues, and we will build upon the hard earned reputation for excellence that we have inherited from those who have served before us.

And we must grow as a Navy – both as people and as a force. We will promote, and operate within, a culture – a New Generation Navy (NGN) culture – that encourages those who are currently serving, to continue to serve, those who have left, to want to return, and those Australians who are looking to be part of something bigger, a national institution, a national family, to see in our Navy the attributes of a unique organisation worthy of their commitment and service.

29 Australian Naval Review 2018 Vice Admiral Michael Noonan Be in no doubt that the quality of you, our men and women, is our most important contributor to Australia’s maritime power and to our future success.

It is my commitment to you — the Sailors and Officers of the RAN, the women and men of the Australian Defence Force (ADF), those working in the broader Defence Department, the elected members of Parliament, and the people of Australia — I will give you my best so that our Navy, your Navy, can achieve these outcomes.

I will strive every day to lead by example — to do what is right — to live Navy’s Values of Honour, Honesty, Courage, Integrity and Loyalty and demonstrate our Signature Behaviours.

I want to lead a Navy that reflects our nation, takes account of the changes that occur in our nation, and is a ready, agile, resilient and lethal fighting force which, when called on by our Government, is able to contribute to the safety and security of the world’s maritime environment and safeguard Australia’s ability to freely navigate the world’s oceans and engage in global trade – a Navy that stands ready to execute our mission to ‘Fight and Win at Sea’.

This is my commitment to all before me today, and the great nation we serve.

Thank you.

30 Australian Naval Review 2018

Josh Abbey

The Future of Contested Amphibious Assaults Josh Abbey

Amphibious operations are victims of circumstances; contested assaults even more so. That circumstance is a conflict, and one in which it is appropriate for amphibious operations to play a role. Since World War II few conflicts have coalesced together the necessary factors for major amphibious operations to be required in a contested environment. The US Marines’ last major contested amphibious landing, at Inchon in 1950, best demonstrates this.1 Thus there is difficulty in using the past to gauge the nature of amphibious operations in the future, for though numerous successful amphibious operations have occurred since World War Two, the majority have occurred in at least a semi-permissive environment.2,3 There is of course a simple explanation for this: when an amphibious operation does become necessary, naturally the idea is to undertake it in an area free from opposition.

The transition from World War to Cold War and the age of atomic weapons portended for some the end of amphibious operations. When General Omar Bradley opined, ‘I am wondering if we shall ever have another large-scale amphibious operation? Frankly, the atomic bomb, properly delivered, about precludes such a possibility’, it seemed the door had been closed on major amphibious assaults.4 And although the landing at Inchon diminished Bradley’s bold assertion, at Inchon the defender was not in possession of nuclear weapons. However, such circumstances presaged the future. In the Cold War era, an amphibious operation the size of D-Day or Okinawa would likely be dealt with by a nuclear strike. It was the fear of escalation to a higher intensity or nuclear conflict that decreased the likelihood of contested amphibious operations from occurring. The Suez Crisis and the amphibious Operation ‘Musketeer’ set the precedence for such an escalation. Nikita Khrushchev’s threat of nuclear intervention at the Anglo- French actions and President Eisenhower’s political intervention halted the crisis after the British and French invasion.5 However, the precedent was set. An amphibious operation had escalated a conflict to a higher intensity, in this case potentially nuclear, and thus ended the Suez Crisis.6

Nor were amphibious operations well placed for the unconventional warfare of Vietnam. The extensive preparations for amphibious assaults often give considerable forewarning to the enemy. In Vietnam 62 amphibious assaults were 32 Australian Naval Review 2018 The Future of Contested Amphibious Assualts conducted between 1965 and 1969; the majority saw little fighting and little success.7 Guerrillas by doctrine, and as a rule, avoid major contact, and the extensive warning of amphibious operations via pre-landing gunfire, reconnaissance, bombing and the visibility of aircraft and naval vessels, give guerrillas ample warning to withdraw. In Operation ‘Double Eagle’, American and South Vietnamese forces failed to locate the Vietcong who had disengaged.8 The Vietcong was unlikely to enter a fight firmly on America’s terms. When the US did consider amphibious assaults north of the Demilitarised Zone, they thought better of them, not wanting to suffer the expected casualties or risk Chinese or Soviet intervention.9 Post-World War II, few belligerents of the powers capable of major amphibious operations possessed the ability to oppose the air, surface or undersea forces arrayed against them, and the fewer that could chose not to do so. Quite simply when one asks, ‘Where is the big one?’, inquiring why there has been no D- Day sized amphibious assault since World War II, one must respond that there has not been cause for one. Instead, an examination of the threats to amphibious operations using conflicts such as the Gulf War, Korea or the Falklands, is the best application of history.

Amphibious operations, as a rule, are offensive. An elucidation of the potential threats is better served if we understand what is required for a successful amphibious operation. Success requires two certainties from the start: naval and air superiority, and that at the operation’s location the enemy is at a significant disadvantage in numbers and firepower.10 Then, one must be able to maintain air and naval superiority and must be able to reinforce the beachhead. Amphibious operations face six main threat areas: sea mines, submarines, anti- missiles, aircraft, air defences and forces at the landing location.11 This article will examine the first five threats, noting that examining the last threat with the changes in land warfare since World War Two would require significant research. Several other factors must be borne in mind, much in the vein of the famous maxim ‘amateurs talk strategy, professionals talk logistics’. The logistical chain or sea-basing supporting the operations is vital for success but often incredibly vulnerable to attack. Guadalcanal demonstrated the importance of logistical supply remaining at the landing location, whilst in the Falklands had the Argentines focused on attacks on British supply lines, the capture of the Falklands could have been significantly impeded.12

33 Australian Naval Review 2018 Josh Abbey Sea Mines Sea mines are perhaps the most pervasive and cost-effective threat to amphibious operations. The sea mine threat to amphibious operations is one posed by more nations than air, missile or submarines threats. Since World War II mines have sunk or damaged more US Navy ships than air or missile attacks.13 To be effective and minimise losses, minesweeping in a non-permissive environment whether by a diver, ship or helicopter requires naval and air superiority. Sea mines require neither, they are a set and forget weapon. Sea mines offer a cheap early warning system by virtue of the time-intensive process of mine clearance.

As a corollary of the post-World War II demobilisation, minesweeping capabilities decreased. The reduction in mine warfare ships, equipment and experienced personnel would coalesce in the Korean War to demonstrate the problem of not maintaining a sufficient mine warfare capability.14 De-mining is a time and resource intensive undertaking, capable of inflicting significant losses with disproportionate investment. In anticipation of an amphibious assault, North Korea laid approximately 3000 magnetic mines in the Port of Wonsan in three weeks.15 UN forces removed 224 of the 3000 magnetic mines to clear a channel for their amphibious assault. Clearing these 224 mines delayed the operation by five days, resulting in four ships sunk and inflicting over 200 casualties.16 The mines did not merely delay the assault, they restricted the logistical capacity of the port and forced ships out to sea, reducing the distance that inland naval gunfire support could be delivered.17

The episode at Wonsan demonstrated the benefit of sea-mines beyond area denial. The minesweeping gave clear warning to the enemy as to the succeeding operations’ location. Additionally, without sufficient mine sweeping resources to feint and threaten a different location, the defenders could concentrate their forces. The time delay offered by sea-mines allows the enemy to reinforce the location or withdraw their forces. Minimising the available space for the amphibious landing reduces the logistical capacity, increases operational pause and the potential of failure on the beachhead. Comments made by Rear Admiral Smith, Commander of the Amphibious Task Force at Wonsan, demonstrate the asymmetry in mine warfare. ‘We have lost command of the sea to a nation without a navy, using weapons that were obsolete in World War I laid by vessels that were used at the time of the birth of Jesus Christ.’18 It showed a defender could disrupt or halt

34 Australian Naval Review 2018 The Future of Contested Amphibious Assualts amphibious assaults with an investment many times less than the cost of mine clearance operations.

The onward march of technology had done little to change the mine warfare equation by the time the Gulf War broke out. Once again the asymmetry and effectiveness of mine warfare would be demonstrated. Iraq deployed over 1600 mines between the Al-Faw Peninsula and the Kuwait-Saudi border, in a density that was nearly impenetrable.19 The US would have required four to six days to clear the mines given the resources on hand. This would have provided the Iraqis with ample warning. Clearing the mines in 24 hours would have taken twice the the US Navy possessed.20 Estimated casualties from Iraqi mines alone for the Marines’ amphibious operation were 3000–5000.21 One would think such a casualty rate from mines alone would render an operation untenable. A near-peer opponent, combining dense, high-technology minefields with effective shore-based anti-ship missiles, air defences and air power could significantly impede the amphibious threat with little seaborne investment. For a navy considering amphibious operations, investing in mine clearing capabilities is a must. In the past, neglecting mine warfare has significantly impeded amphibious assault and come at the expense of achieving operational goals. The threat of an amphibious capability will be rendered moot if it does not possess the necessary minesweeping capacity.

Submarines Since World War II submarine warfare has been limited, however, the Falklands conflict provides a valuable post World War II example of the submarine threat to amphibious operations. Indeed, the was the only near-peer conflict since World War II to feature aircraft carriers, submarines, anti-ship missiles, large- scale air-to-air combat and an opposed amphibious assault and thus provides for much analysis.22 The difficulties the Royal Navy (RN) faced in submarine warfare in the Falklands demonstrates the danger of submarines to amphibious operations. The effort of the RN’s anti-submarine warfare was no doubt complicated by the difficulty of using sonar in shallow water.23 In shallow water the changing ocean floor topographies, sound propagation and high ambient noise levels present significant difficulties in locating attack submarines.24 The likelihood of the amphibious operations occurring close to oil platforms, factories, commercial shipping and recreational sailing further increases the ambient noise level and the difficulty of anti-submarine warfare.25 As shallow water will often be the operating

35 Australian Naval Review 2018 Josh Abbey environment for an amphibious assault, even aged attack submarines can pose a significant threat to amphibious operations. Such was the case in the Falklands.

The ARA San Luis was the major cause of the Royal Navy’s sub-surface trouble. She managed to manoeuvre and attack British ships three times in nine days whilst remaining undetected.26 The British expended more than 200 pieces of ordinance against the San Luis and false contacts without any success.27 Fortunately for the British, the Argentines suffered a number of failures. The failure of the San Luis efforts against the British can be attributed to a malfunctioning fire control system, broken guidance wires and a failure in the SST-4 torpedo’s to arm due to improper preparation such that if the torpedo did strike home, it would not explode.28 The San Luis also failed to prioritise high-value targets; a successful attack on one of the British aircraft carriers would have likely made the British’s position untenable.29 Despite the failures, the lessons were stark; one successful submarine attack could stop an entire amphibious operation or even war. Further, the resources required for anti-submarine warfare are far greater than the resources required to pose a significant submarine threat.30 The proliferation of conventional submarines since the Cold War has only increased the threat. Anti-submarine warfare is best performed by submarines themselves, and thus a successful amphibious operation requires a potent submarine capability.

Aircraft, Anti-Ship Missiles and Air Defence The experience of Guadalcanal confirmed the importance of air superiority as a precondition for successful amphibious operations at the time of landing and afterwards.31 The presence of aircraft is vital for amphibious operations. By the numbers, only 14% of amphibious operations have succeeded without air superiority.32 The emergence of precision-guided munitions brought a dramatic change to the effectiveness and lethality of air power, as evidenced in the Gulf War, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. Air power lethality allows the option of utilising fewer ground troops to achieve objectives, but also prevents the concentration of enemy ground forces.33 In the context of amphibious operations where fewer land forces can be deployed from the sea than in a comparable land operation, such an advantage is vital in achieving success.

The sinking of the Eilat by a Styx missile in 1967 ushered in the era of missiles over gunnery.34 Since that incident, the littoral is the only environment where major naval engagements have taken place.35 The Indian-Pakistan War, Arab-Israeli War

36 Australian Naval Review 2018 The Future of Contested Amphibious Assualts and Iran-Iraq War saw major engagements between anti-ship missile equipped fleets.36 The Falklands War was the first instance where these new weapons combined with a contested amphibious operation. The Falklands War demonstrated the continued importance of air superiority, all six British ships sunk by the Argentine Navy were hit with munitions delivered by Argentine naval jets, four with dumb bombs and two with Exocet missiles.37 The losses could have been worse, over one-third of the bombs that struck British ships failed to explode.38 The British failed to attain air superiority until they could deploy land-based air defence systems and had the Argentines prioritised supply lines over the combat fleet, the British operations could have been more significantly impeded.39 The lesson was evident: without air superiority or air denial, amphibious operations were still under serious threat of failure. Amphibious fleets would either require land-based air cover, a strong carrier-based air contingent, a potent air defence capability or a combination of all three. Even without the latter two, surface to air and anti-ship missiles can threaten ships and air support from more than 200 nautical miles, creating a need for over the horizon capabilities.40 Whilst western armies rely on air power to augment the firepower of ground forces, achieving air superiority and suppression of air defences (SEADs) will be vital to successful contested amphibious operations.

Helicopters have also proved vulnerable to the most rudimentary of air defences. The attack on Karbala in Iraq on 23 March 2003, provides a perfect example of how even a low threat environment can lead to the failure of a helicopter attack.41 A flight of 31 AH-64 Apaches arrived over their target area three hours after the completion of SEADs sorties.42 Iraqi air defences consisted of PKM and NSV machine guns, rocket propelled grenades, 23 mm anti-aircraft guns and six 57 mm S-60 anti- aircraft guns, relatively unsophisticated air defences.43 The Apaches suffered one Apache shot down and 29 damaged, two of which were beyond repair. It took a month before the regiment was operational again.44 US Secretary of the Army Thomas White admitted the US was lucky not to have lost more aircraft.45 This was a flight of attack helicopters against unsophisticated air defence; transports helicopters operating in an environment with man-portable air-defence systems and surface to air missiles would likely suffer even greater casualties. Air defence systems have become increasingly sophisticated. They will continue to grow in capability and doctrinal importance and proliferation amongst state and non-state

37 Australian Naval Review 2018 Josh Abbey actors, and defeating modern integrated air defence systems will be restricted to stealth aircraft. 46

Changes in Offensive Capabilities It would be remiss to consider the changing threats to amphibious operations since World War II without addressing advancements and developments in offensive capabilities. Helicopters have added an extra dimension to ship to shore movement allowing amphibious groups to stage further out to sea whilst threatening a greater area and increasing the speed, mobility and flexibility of the ship to shore movement. However, helicopters are not without their limitations. Episodes such as the ‘shoot up’ at Karbala in Iraq or Battle of Mogadishu demonstrate the vulnerability of helicopters to comparatively simple weapons.47

In the vein of helicopters, hovercrafts allow fleets to stage from greater distances. Further, they also increase the amount of coastline accessible to . Conventional landing craft can only land on 25% of the world’s coastline, but for hovercrafts this increases to 75%.48 A craft such as the Ship to Shore connector can transport a main battle tank or 145 soldiers at over 30 knots.49 By contrast, the Amphibious Combat Vehicle can carry only 13 marines at six knots.50 Faster ship to shore movement decreases the time assaulting forces are vulnerable to defensive fire but unable in turn to return fire. Helicopters, hovercrafts and improved landing craft have facilitated threatening assaults on extended fronts to disperse defending forces, whilst historically reducing casualties and empowering greater manoeuvre once ashore.51 In the age of limited warfare and limited smaller amphibious assault forces, such advantages are manifold. The increasing range and speed of anti-ship missiles necessitate over the horizon capabilities for amphibious fleets to operate safely.52 The loss or rendering mission incapable of an portends the end of any attempted operation.

A corollary of the post-World War II reduction in the size of was a decrease in the fire power support amphibious fleets could offer. This trend has repeated since the end of the Cold War. Further, the change from gunfire to missiles as the default weapon of ships decreased the availability of fire support. Navies are unlikely to expend expensive munitions destroying machine gun emplacements where previously naval gunnery had sufficed, whilst some munitions may not be usable as close fire support due to their effect radius being too large. Further, ships carry limited numbers of missiles and are unlikely to want to expend them all on

38 Australian Naval Review 2018 The Future of Contested Amphibious Assualts land attack, not when they may be required for ship to ship engagements, whilst a number will be air defence missiles and so not usable. Though the supply of fire support has decreased, the demand for fire support remains.53 Naval gunfire played a considerable role in Vietnam and also particularly in the Falklands, enabling small British units to combat larger Argentine forces.54 Air power to an extent filled this vacuum, the advent of precision-guided munitions more so. In the Falklands campaign, air strikes from harriers made up for the lack of gunfire support.55

The Future of Contested Amphibious Assaults Population distribution will change the nature of warfare and thus amphibious assaults. In the future populations not only will be increasingly urban, but also increasingly coastal.56 Populations will congregate into coastal megacities. Of the 26 current megacities, 14 are on the coast, whilst an additional two are in close proximity to the coast, a distribution that will likely only increase.57 Amphibious operations are considered amongst the most complex of military operations; combining this with urban warfare will only complicate success.

Whilst landing unopposed is desirable, one must plan, train and procure for contested operations. Any competent navy with access to commercial shipping can take a port or beach that is unopposed. Far fewer, however, are disposed to do so in a contested environment.58 A defining factor of the viability of contested assault is whether the operation is multi-lateral or unilateral, though for large militaries such as the US armed forces, the distinction is less important. This distinction determines the size, firepower and capability of the force to engage in a contested assault. In the Gulf War, it took 31 amphibious ships to muster an assault force of 17 800 marines, comprising 39 tanks, 96 mobile TOW antitank missile systems, 112 amphibious assault vehicles, 39 tanks, 52 light armoured vehicles, 52 artillery pieces, 63 attack aircraft and six infantry battalions.59 Applying the traditional 3:1 ratio of attackers to defenders,60 the Iraqis could have opposed this force with approximately 6000 soldiers. Instead, the Iraqis deployed a force 15 times the Marines’ number.61 Such an example would seem to validate Basil Liddell Hart’s assertion that amphibious forces can distract a force disproportionate to their number.62 However, few nations can supply the volume of equipment and number of soldiers the US can. For nations with amphibious fleets, the average fleet size excluding the US is two ships (refer table 1).63 Therefore, few nations will be able to deliver the necessary forces to the beach to satisfy force concentration ratios, even against moderate numerical opposition. Landing forces will need exceptional 39 Australian Naval Review 2018 Josh Abbey firepower and protection to account for the possibility of a significant overmatch between defender and attacker. The majority of contested amphibious operations will be determined in the planning phase; if the opposition forces are too great and the anticipated casualties too high, contested assaults will simply not occur. The enemy need only render the amphibious assault force mission incapable or combat ineffective for success, whilst for the attacker, success requires much more

Table 1: Nations possessing Amphibious Warfare Ships

Carriers Aircraft LHA LHD LPD LSD LSL LST LSM Cra Landing AAV f t

Algeria - 0 1 - - - 2 1 3 - Australia - - 2 - 1 - - - 17 - Brazil - - 1 - - 2 1 - 16 27 Chile - - - 1 - - 2 1 3 12 Egypt - - 2 - - - - 3 15 - France 1 - 3 - - - - - 38 - India 1 - 1 - - - 1 3 10 - Indonesia - - - 5 - - 19 - 72 - Italy 2 - 3 - - - - - 24 15 Japan 4 - 3 - - - - - 8 4 Netherlands - - - 2 - - - - 17 -

People's Republic of 1 - - 4 - 30 23 87 300 China Republic of China - - - - 1 - 8 - 12 - Singapore - - 4 - - - - - 23 - South Korea - - 1 2 - - 4 - 22 166 Spain - - 1 2 - - - - 14 16 Thailand 1 - 1 - - 2 - 14 - United Kingdom 2 1 - 2 3 - - - 30 99 United States 11 1 8 10 12 8 - - 315 1200 Source: The Military Balance, 118, 1 (2018): 49-396.

Key: Landing Helicopter Assault (LHA) Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) Landing Platform Dock (LPD) Landing Ship Dock (LSD) Landing Ship Logistics (LSL) Landing Ship Tank (LST) Landing Ship Medium (LSM) Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV)

40 Australian Naval Review 2018 The Future of Contested Amphibious Assualts When forces are moving to the area of operation, an assault fleet’s vulnerability will depend on their size, either by being multi-lateral or a large unilateral fleet, distance from the shore and enemy naval dispositions. Defenders will need to compute a calculus as to whether contesting naval superiority in the area of operations is worth it. Adversaries will seek technological and asymmetric threats to achieve mission kills on critical infrastructure. For example, the relatively small size of Australia’s Amphibious Ready Group of two Landing Helicopter Docks and one Landing Ship Dock serves as a prime example of how an enemy might render such a force mission incapable via a sub-surface approach.64 Rendering one well deck mission incapable would likely end the operation. Weaponised unmanned underwater vehicles deployed singularly or swarming could be used to target well decks making an amphibious ship mission incapable.65 Further, unmanned underwater vehicles attacking towed and hull-mounted sonar arrays could blind a fleet’s anti-submarine warfare allowing for hunter-killer submarines to strike at valuable targets. Swarming unmanned aerial vehicles launched from submarine missile tubes could damage flight decks and vital radar equipment.66 Such tactics would work best against a small adversary, with the potential to render a fleet mission incapable, and thus have deterred the threat of the operation. Against a larger or multi-lateral fleet, a defender would be best put to use these methods to harass the enemy, attriting them of capabilities. Every well or flight deck rendered inoperable ultimately reduces the number of troops that can come to shore each wave. Should the amphibious fleet possess a carrier group, then rendering that mission incapable first would make the most sense. Though many have questioned the future of aircraft carriers,67 whilst air power is dominant on land, it will still be relevant amphibiously. Air power in an amphibious context is much more than combat air support; airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and resupply are vital to the western way of warfighting.

The power of aircraft is a known quantity in naval, amphibious and land warfare. However, adversaries will look to asymmetric capabilities to render moot air power. Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategies will challenge carrier-based air superiority, restricting air power to fifth generation platforms only.68 Adversaries unable to challenge air power in the air will attempt to neutralise it via air defence, electronic warfare and cyber warfare as a means of limiting combat air support to landing troops and air interdiction of reinforcements to landing zones. Investing in naval based aircraft like the B-21s designed for the mission of penetrating and

41 Australian Naval Review 2018 Josh Abbey destroying land-based integrated air defence systems is a must whilst air power remains vital for combat air support. Whilst ground forces rely on air power to augment their firepower, air power must find a way to break through or assaults must defer to cross-domain fires. Stealth electronic warfare platforms that can penetrate and disable air defences allowing follow-on aircraft is a further avenue of research. Cyber and electronic warfare will be undertaken to disrupt the attacker’s highly network dependant air forces.69 Advances in electronic warfare as a part of a combined arms doctrine as demonstrated in Ukraine will necessitate hardened communications platforms and mission command strategies, in this instance of broken information links.70 Airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms which have become inseparable to western militaries may be unable to operate in the contested littoral.71

Air defence via A2/AD strategies will also threaten helicopters which have traditionally taken a major role in ship-to-shore doctrine. However, the proliferation of man-portable air-defence systems, unmanned aerial vehicles and even simple anti-aircraft weapons will restrict their use in the future in contested assaults. Helicopters will likely only be able to sling lift or transport heavy equipment internally until well after the need for that equipment arises. Significant SEADs will need to prelude any helicopter transportation or assault, and thus the enduring position of air power remains, whilst cross domain fires may have to take up the burden.

Sea mines are widely available, twenty nations export them, whilst underwater improvised explosive devices can be easily fashioned.72 Adversaries faced with a significant asymmetry in force are likely to defer to sea mines to counter amphibious operations. Given the small minesweeping capacity most navies possess, minesweeping offers adversaries considerable warning to an amphibious operation and its location. Further, as technology improves, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance packages could be installed in mines to update the enemy and target enemy de-mining vessels or personnel. Clearing a channel as quickly as possible is a priority. Limiting the enemy’s ability to reinforce the assault location is paramount given the importance of superiority in manpower and firepower to successful assaults.73 Interdicting this reinforcement with missiles and air power would be of considerable importance, confirming the necessity of air superiority again. Sea mines cannot delay operations or inflict casualties if they are not deployed. One should be ready to prioritise destroying enemy mine laying 42 Australian Naval Review 2018 The Future of Contested Amphibious Assualts capabilities over other targets. Such a prioritisation would make considerable sense for navies with nominal de-mining capabilities, or those reliant on freedom of movement and rapidity of operations to be successful amphibiously. Conversely, states wishing to deploy sea-mines defensively should focus on the capacity to deploy as many as possible as quickly as possible. Active autonomous mines could automatically deploy themselves underwater, as well as the potential for mine swarms.74 Submarine deployed mines is a capability that would allow one to deploy mines covertly or grant one a head-start in laying mines before an adversary can prevent them. In a non-permissive environment, this could present quite an advantage.

A2/AD strategies will enable artillery and rocket batteries to nestle within air defence bubbles whilst threatening extensive zones using unmanned aerial vehicles, unmanned underwater vehicles, and anti-ship missiles. The effect of this will be to force amphibious fleets further out to sea even against non-state actors. Amphibious fleets may have to stage assaults as far out as 160 kilometres from the shore.75 The bubble of air defence that A2/AD can project over advancing transports will lengthen ship to shore movement, negate the ability of naval gunfire to provide fire support deep inland, whilst also drawing the assaulting force deeper into an asymmetric electronic warfare environment. Hezbollah possesses Noor anti-ship missiles with a range of 120 kilometres.76 For state actors the range is greater, China’s YJ-62 has a range of around 220 kilometres, with newer systems boasting further ranges.77 Experiences in Ukraine have demonstrated the exceptional lethality of mass fires.78 A barrage such as the Zelenopillya fire strike of July 11 could leave the first wave of an assault combat ineffective.79 Russia emphasises mass fires in its fire strikes,80 and so given the lethality of precision, it is logical to expect increasing precision in artillery and rocket systems. Laser-guided munitions capable of striking moving targets and top attack munitions such as the BAE Bofors 155 BONUS or SMArt 155, will be capable of significant devastation. Targeting transports whilst they are still ferrying will be possible with a ground presence of a small reconnaissance team or unmanned aerial vehicles. A larger force armed with anti-tank guided missiles will necessitate the need for active protection systems amongst landing craft.

A number of complications result from these implications. First, these ranges could cease the helicopter’s role in initial assaults as the distance from ship to shore may be beyond its combat radius. Secondly, it complicates ship to shore manoeuvre by 43 Australian Naval Review 2018 Josh Abbey landing craft. The range at sea of the Amphibious Combat Vehicle is 19 kilometres,81 well short of the potential 160 kilometres. Instead, connectors will need to be utilised to transport the Amphibious Combat Vehicle and other amphibious vehicles from the ship to a point within 19 kilometres of the beach. As this point unmanned aerial vehicles and mast mounted, targeting platforms may be able to direct precision munitions on to the approaching forces. Finally, it increases the time between waves as the connectors and hovercrafts must return. Unless fleets are capable of multiple waves in quick succession, extensive waiting for the next wave opens the assaulting force up to defeat in detail.

In the future, speed and survivability of ship to shore connectors will be of essence to the attacking forces, in order to decrease their time under fire. Thus, ship to shore transports will either require point air defence and counter rocket, artillery and mortar (C-RAM) systems intrinsic to their vehicles or need to be escorted by small missile boats carrying munitions such as the Miniature Hit-to-Kill Missile for air point air defence and C-RAM. As the lesson of the Falklands demonstrates, naval gunfire is a must but is rarely available in the desired quantities as the main armament of ships these days is missiles. Small boats carrying missiles such as the Spike NLOS or armed with naval gunnery survivable in the environment, may play a key role in success. Larger missile boats armed with guided multiple launch rocket systems (GMLRS) or air defence missiles are also an option for providing fire support and air defence close in to shore. This role would otherwise be provided by larger surface vessels however these vessels would be forced out to sea by anti- ship missiles. A squadron of GMLRS equipped boats, capable of firing the Small Diameter Bomb, the Deep Strike Missile, the Alternative Warhead and other munitions could provide a powerful mix of close-in fire support and deeper interdiction fires. The proliferation of anti-tank guided missiles may also necessitate widespread adoption of active defence across all platforms.

Unmanned vehicles will likely be the ‘troops’ delivered in the first assault waves. The US Marine Corps is already experimenting with such a method.82 On the approach, a platform such as the AeroVironment Switchblade could be deployed ten kilometres out to swarm and saturate targets with fire.83 Such a system with its multi-pack launcher could be deployed from multiple landing craft platforms.84 Unmanned combat ground vehicles like Russia’s Uran-9 could be utilised to destroy machine gun and ATGM positions. However, unmanned vehicles will be likely countered by attempted neutralising through electronic warfare and thus whilst 44 Australian Naval Review 2018 The Future of Contested Amphibious Assualts they have the capacity to revolutionise the Marines’ role they must be operable in a non-permissive electronic warfare environment either through autonomy or un- jammable communication links.

Conclusion Contested amphibious operations will be possible in the future, however not in all circumstances and not without significant investment. In summary, there are six considerations for assaults to be successful.

Maintain sufficient mine countermeasures. De-mining gives considerable warning to an assault location. Thus, one must be able to pierce the barrier as quickly as possible to prevent reinforcement of the assault location.

Air superiority is still vital. Air power is still the king for air support and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. Given the assaulting force is likely to be outnumbered at the point of landing, air power is a must for its firepower. Secondly, if threatening along extended fronts, air power can be used to interdict reinforcements as they move in response.

Be prepared to use cross-domain fires if air superiority cannot be achieved. The fire power that combat air support brings must be provided by another platform if air power is denied access to the environment. Without accurate, lethal firepower that can be sustained, assaults may founder.

Project a counter A2/AD bubble in order to allow amphibious ships to get as close to shore as possible. Counter the anti-ship missiles of anti-access strategies by projecting your own air defence, missile defence and electronic warfare into the enemy’s A2 bubble to allow the fleet to come closer to the shore. This will decrease the transit time of ship to shore movements, allowing for more waves in a given time whilst potentially allowing for gunnery platforms or ship-mounted GMLRS to provide supporting fires.

Deploy missile boats to escort assaulting waves of connectors to provide area and point short range air defences, C-UAV, C-RAM and offensive supporting fires. Attacking waves will likely face a large amount of incoming fires, especially from swarming unmanned aerial vehicles as technology improves. Nor will the fleet be able to provide point defence to assaulting waves. Thus, this capability must be intrinsic to ship to shore connectors and supporting craft. Amphibious assault

45 Australian Naval Review 2018 Josh Abbey vehicles will need to be well protected given the likelihood of munitions they will face.85

Expect and procure for losses. No amphibious force is likely to survive a contested assault without losses.86 If navies are anticipating engaging in contested assaults, they must procure with the expectation that ships or landing craft may be lost.

Ultimately there will always be a need for contested amphibious assaults such as there was for D-Day, but it will be increasingly important to procure, plan and prepare for such endeavours to a sophisticated extent. As long as amphibious forces can achieve air or firepower superiority they have the capacity for success.

Josh Abbey Josh Abbey is undertaking a research internship at the Royal United Services Institute of Victoria. He is a second-year Bachelor of Arts student majoring in History and Philosophy at the University of Melbourne. He has a deep interest in military history, especially the British Army of the 18th and 19th century. He is further interested in sea power, information and unconventional warfare.

1 G Parker, Seabasing Since the Cold War: Maritime Reflections of American Grand Strategy, Washington DC, Brookings Institute, 2010, p. 94. 2 M Garrod, ‘Amphibious Operations: Why?’ The RUSI Journal, Vol. 133, No. 4, 1998, p. 28. 3 C Weinstein, ‘Sink or Swim: The Marine Corps Capacity to Conduct a Marine Expeditionary Brigade Amphibious Assault Using Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare’, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, p. 11-12. 4 W Manchester, American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964,Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1978, p. 573. 5 C Malkasian, Charting the Pathway to OMFTS: A Historical Assessment of Amphibious Operations from 1941 to the Present, Virginia, CAN, 2002, p. 31-32. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid, p. 34. 8 J Shulimson, US Marines in Vietnam An Expanding War - 1966, Virginia, History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 2012, p. 297–298. 9 J Alexander and M Bartlett, Sea Soldiers in the Cold War, Maryland, Naval Institute Press, 1995, p. 56. 10 M Hanlon, ‘Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan’, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2, 2000, p. 4. 11 B Martin, Amphibious Operations in Contested Environments: Insights from Analytic Work, Santa Monica, CA, RAND Corporation, 2017, p. 3-4. 12 F Boynton, Force projection operations: Lessons from amphibious warfare doctrine, Kansas, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1996 p. 38-39.

46 Australian Naval Review 2018 The Future of Contested Amphibious Assualts

13 National Research Council, Naval Mine Warfare: Operational and Technical Challenges for Naval Forces, Washington, DC, The National Academies Press, 2001, p. 2. 14 S Dwight, ‘A Study of the United States Navy's Minesweeping Efforts in the Korean War’, Diss MA, Texas Tech University, 1993, p. 1. 15 M Cagle and F Manson, The Sea War in Korea, Maryland, United States Naval Institute, 1957, p. 144. 16 P McElroy, The Mining of Wonsan Harbor, North Korea in 1950: Lessons for Today's Navy, Maryland, Virginia: Marine Corps War College, 1999, p. 30. 17 Ibid, p. 14. 18 Ocean Studies Board, National Research Council, Oceanography and Mine Warfare, Washington, DC. National Academy Press, 2000, p. 12. 19 J Ball, The Effects of Sea Mining Upon Amphibious Warfare, Kansas, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1992, p. 118. 20 Ball, Effects of Sea Mining upon Amphibious Warfare, p. 121. 21 Ibid, p. 118. 22 L Sullivan, Commanders Guidance and Campaign Planning - The Falkland Islands War 1982, Kansas, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2017, Abstract. 23 B Longworth, ‘Solutions to the Shallow-Water Challenge’, Jane's Navy International, Vol. 101 No. 5, 1996, p. 10. 24 J Pittman, Zone Defense -- Anti-Submarine Warfare Strategy in the age of Littoral warfare, MA Diss., Kansas, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2008, p. 3. 25 J Husaim, Anti-Submarine Warfare in the Littoral: An Essential Element of Battlespace Dominance, Newport, Rhodes Island, Naval War College, 1995, p. 10. 26 S Harper, Submarine Operations During the Falklands War, Newport, Rhodes Island, Naval War College, 1994, p. 10-11. United States Fleet Forces Command, Atlantic Fleet Active Sonar Training: Environmental Impact Statement, Washington, DC, Department of the Navy, 2008 p. 8. 27 J Fitzgerald and J Benedict, ‘There Is a Submarine Threat’, Proceedings, August 1990, p. 63 28 Harper, Submarine Operations during the Falklands War, p. 11. 29 S Nietzel, The Falklands War understanding the power of context in shaping Argentine strategic decisions, p. 35 30 Boynton, Force Projection Operations p. 24-25. 31 E Howard, Demand the Advantage. When Is Air Power Central to a Campaign?, Diss., Alabama, Air University Press, 1992, p. 20-21. 32 I Speller and C Tuck, Amphibious Warfare: Strategy and tactics from Gallipoli to Iraq, London, Amber Books, 2001, p. 59. 33 C Wills, Air power, Afghanistan, and the Future of Warfare: An Alternative View, Alabama, Air University Press, 2006, p. 6. 34 B Watts, Six Decades of Guided Munitions and Battle Networks: Progress and Prospects, Washington, DC, CSBA, 2007, p. 6. 35 J Schulte, An analysis of the historical effectiveness of anti-ship cruise missiles in littoral warfare, Diss., California, Naval Postgraduate School, 1994, p. 1. 36 Ibid, p. 4-9. 37 B Dunn and P Watson, Military Lessons of the Falkland Islands War, Colorado, Westview Press, 1984, Appendix. 38 Ibid. 39 Boynton, Force Projection Operations p. 38-39. 40 B Clark and J Sloman, Advancing Beyond the Beach: Amphibious Operations in an Era of Precision Weapons, Washington, DC, CSBA, 2016, p. I. 47 Australian Naval Review 2018 Josh Abbey

41 J Gordon, P Wilson, J Grossman, D Deamon, M Edwards, D Lenhardt, D Norton, and W Sollfrey, Assessment of Navy Heavy-Lift Aircraft Options, Santa Monica, CA, RAND Corporation, 2005, p. 63. 42 R Atkinson, In the Company of Soldiers, Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 2004, p. 147-153. 43 J Bernstein, AH-64 Apache Units of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Osprey Publishing, 2005, p. 51. 44 Atkinson, In the Company of Soldiers, p. 147-153. 45 PBS Frontline, ‘Interview Thomas White’, PBS Frontline, 2004, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/invasion/interviews/white.html (accessed June 30, 2018). 46 C Kopp, Proliferation of Advanced Air Defence Systems, Defence Today, 2010, p. 27. C Kopp, ‘Surviving the Modern Integrated Air Defence System’, Air Power Australia, 2009, http://www.ausair power.net/APA-2009-02.html#mozTocId418713 (Accessed, July 1, 2018). 47 J Gordon, Assessment of Navy Heavy-Lift Aircraft Options, p. 87. 48 K Gleiman and P Dean, Beyond 2017: the Australian Defence Force and amphibious warfare, Canberra, APSI, 2015, p. 17. 49 ‘Ship to Shore Connector’ Textron Systems, https://www.textronsystems.com/sites/default/files/resource-files/TS_MLS_SSC_Datasheet.pdf (Accessed June 27, 2018). 50 ‘Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) 1.1’, BAE Systems, baes_ds_Amphibious%20Combat%20Vehicle%20(ACV)%201.1_redesign_digital.pdf (Accessed June 27, 2018). 51 Malkasian, Charting the Pathway to OMFTS, p. 90-91. 52 B Clark and J Sloman, Advancing Beyond the Beach, p. I. 53 Malkasian, Charting the Pathway to OMFTS, p. 41. 54 Ibid, p. 41. 55 E Tilford, ‘Air Power Lessons’, Military Lessons of the Falkland Islands War: Views from the United States, eds. B Watson and P Dunn, Colorado, Westview Press, 1984, p. 45. 56 D Kilcullen and T Farrell, Urbanization and the Future of Conflict, transcript, London, Chatham House, 2013 p. 4. 57 T Brinkhoff, ‘Major Agglomerations of the World’, City Population, 2011, https://www.citypopulation.de/world/Agglomerations.html, (Accessed July 2, 2018). 58 See Table 1.1 59 Naval Forces: Valuable Beyond the Sum of Their Parts, p. 5. 60 Speller and Tuck, Amphibious Warfare: Strategy and tactics from Gallipoli to Iraq, p. 5. 61 Ibid 62 B Liddell Hart, ‘Marines and Strategy’, Marines Corps Gazette, July, 1960, p. 17. 63 See Table 1.1 64 Gleiman and Dean, Beyond 2017, p. 24. 65 T Hammes, ‘Cheap Technology Will Challenge U.S. Tactical Dominance’ Joint Force Quarterly vol. 81, no. 2, 2016, p. 81. 66 Ibid. 67 T Ricks ‘Hendrix vs. McGrath: A heavyweight bout on the future of the ’ Foreign Policy, 2015, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/15/hendrix-vs-mcgrath-a-heavyweight-bout-on- the-future-of-the-aircraft-carrier/ (Accessed July 1, 2018). 68 J Harrigan and M Marosko, ‘Fifth Generation Air Combat Maintaining the Joint Force Advantage’, JAPCC Journal vol. 24, spring/summer, 2017, p. 54. 69 S Sukhankin, ‘Russian Electronic Warfare in Ukraine: Between Real and Imaginable’, Eurasia Daily Vol. 14 No. 71, 2017. Unified Quest 2016 Future Force Design II Final Report, Virginia, Army Capabilities Integration Center Future Warfare Division, 2016, p. 2. 48 Australian Naval Review 2018 The Future of Contested Amphibious Assualts

70 Ibid. 71 N Johnson, Operational Reconnaissance for the Anti-Access /Area Denial Environment, Diss., Alabama, Air University Press, 2015, p. 3. 72 S Truver, ‘Taking Mines Seriously: Mine Warfare in China’s Near Seas’, Naval War College Review Vol. 65, No. 2, 2012, p. 31. 73 M O'Hanlon, ‘Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan’ International Security Vol. 25, No. 2, 2000, p. 54. 74 Z Kallenborn, ‘Swarming Sea Mines: Capital Capability?’, CIMSEC, 2017 http://cimsec.org/swarming-sea-mines-capital-capability/33836 (Accessed June 15, 2017). 75 A Feickert, Marine Corps Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) and Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC): Background and Issues for Congress, Washington, DC, Congressional Research Service, 2018, p. 6. 76 Missile Defence Advocacy Alliance, ‘Hezbollah’ Missile Defence Advocacy, http://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/todays-missile-threat/non- state-actors/hezbollah/ (Accessed June 30, 2018). 77 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015, Washington, DC, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2015, p. 10. 78 P Doran, Land Warfare in Europe: Lessons and Recommendations from the War in Ukraine, Diss., Washington, DC, Center for European Policy Analysis, 2016, p. 3. 79 A Fox, Hybrid Warfare: The 21st Century Russian Way of Warfare, Kansas, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2017 p. 37-38. 80 P Karber, ‘Learned’ from the Russo-Ukrainian War, Virginia, Potomac Foundation, 2015, p. 14. 81 P Tucker, “Marines: ‘The First One Through the Door Should Be a Lethal Robot’”, Defense One, 2017, https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/05/when-robots-storm-beach/137464/ (Accessed July 1, 2018). 82 Ibid. 83 ‘Switchblade’ AeroVironment http://www.avinc.com/uas/view/switchblade (Accessed July 2, 2018). 84 Ibid. 85 Doran, Land Warfare in Europe, p. 4. 86 Martin, Amphibious Operations in Contested Environments p. 9.

49 Australian Naval Review 2018 Who is a leading training systems integrator R΍HULQJ comprehensive naval training solutions?

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An Introduction to Maritime Crime in West Africa Dr Phillip Drew, CD

Where mariners go, maritime criminals follow. Throughout the history of maritime commerce, seafaring criminals have sought out susceptible vessels, appropriated their cargoes and committed violence against their crews and passengers. While some view piracy through the swash-buckling tales of movies and legend, the stark reality is that piracy and maritime crime are a serious threat to individuals, the shipping industry and the countries that rely on maritime commerce for international trade.

Following the dissolution of the state of Somalia in 1991, the country’s government and economy collapsed.1 The lawlessness, over-exploitation of ocean resources and poverty that gripped the failed state during the first decade of the millennium led to an outbreak of piracy that threatened shipping throughout the Indian Ocean region. As the risk to mariners and maritime commerce posed by Somali piracy increased, the international community reacted with force, resources and programs. Ultimately, the international response to Somali piracy covered a broad range of initiatives, including; naval intervention,2 the placement of armed security personnel on merchant vessels, support to law enforcement, and significant educational, social and legal programs3. As a result of the multifaceted approach to the problem, the incidence of piracy in that region declined significantly.

While piracy has been largely eliminated in the Indian Ocean, it is on the rise along the coasts of West Africa and particularly in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG). In spite of increased international awareness of the problem of maritime crime in the region, there has been a steady increase in the number of recorded incidents of piracy, armed robbery, and other illegal activities over the past several years,4 with a significant spike in incidents in 2018.5

This paper will examine the issue of maritime crime in West Africa, discuss some of the factors that are contributing to its continuing growth, and consider options for addressing the problem.

51 Australian Naval Review 2018 Dr Phillip Drew

Defining Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea The extent and variety of criminal acts that can occur at sea is very similar to the list of crimes that can be carried out on land. Although trafficking in arms, people and drugs is a serious problem in West Africa, for the purposes of this paper, the term ‘maritime crime’ will refer only to piratical acts and armed robbery at sea.

One of the most common forms of maritime crime is piracy. Contemporary maritime law defines piracy as a very specific act, which can only be labelled as ‘piracy’ if it meets all of the criteria set out in the definition as found in article 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, as follows: 101. (a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation,1 committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:

a) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;

b) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;

c) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;

d) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b). 6

The definition for ‘armed robbery at sea’ is set out in the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships.7 Defined at article 2.2, ‘Armed robbery against ships’ means any of the following acts:

i. any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed against a ship or against persons or property on board such

52 Australian Naval Review 2018 An Introduction to Maritime Crime in West Africa

a ship, within a State's internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea; ii. any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described above.8

As can be noted, there are two constituent elements of piracy that set it aside from armed robbery at sea;

a) piracy can only occur outside of the jurisdiction of any state (i.e. outside internal and territorial waters) and, it requires an attack from one vessel upon another (the two ship rule);

b) armed robbery occurs inside territorial seas and need not involve a second vessel.

The distinction between piracy and armed robbery is particularly important in the GoG. Unlike the situation in East Africa, where pirate attacks have generally been targeted against vessels transiting through international waters, many of attacks in the GoG occur within territorial seas, often against vessels that are either at anchor or transiting into or out of ports.9 Because the preponderance of the attacks occur within the territorial seas of the littoral states, foreign navies and coast guards are, absent specific authorization, powerless to intervene. Consequently, unlike the case in Indian Ocean region, where multi-national naval forces can exercise universal jurisdiction to arrest and prosecute offenders, the responsibility to deal with most maritime crime in West Africa rests primarily with the States in whose territorial waters the incidents occur.10

Gulf of Guinea Maritime Crime at a Glance In order to understand how maritime crime can flourish in an area, it is necessary not to look at crime as a singular problem. While contemporary piracy and maritime crime are crimes that occur at sea, their roots of are firmly grounded in the political instability, poverty, disenfranchisement and uncertain security environments that pervade the territories from which pirates operate. As was the case with piracy in the Indian Ocean, maritime crime in West Africa is most prevalent along the coasts of states that, for a variety of reasons, do not have the capacity to deal effectively with the myriad of problems that permit such activities to grow.

53 Australian Naval Review 2018 Dr Phillip Drew

Nigeria is the primary source of maritime crime in West Africa. As was the case with Somalia, Nigeria meets many of the criteria for a failed state,11 particularly in the rebellious Niger Delta, the epicentre of maritime crime in the region. Situated in the southeast of the country, the oil rich territory (also known as Biafra) has been in a state of turmoil since its unsuccessful bid to secede from Nigeria during the civil war of 1967-70. Although the rebellion was ultimately quashed by the Nigerian military, government conflict resolution efforts since the war have had limited success.12 Some forty years after the hopes for the creation of the Republic of Biafra were crushed, the Delta remains an area where the government struggles to exercise control or effectively deliver public goods and services.13 Unhindered by effective law enforcement, and encouraged by a seemingly endless supply of oil to steal, the Delta’s ‘Petro-Pirates’ flourish.

While oil theft has been occurring in the Niger Delta since Shell’s first discovery in 1956,14 the sharp increase in world oil prices in the first years of the millennium ushered in a completely new business model for those involved in organised petroleum theft. Whereas most oil thieves had been content to siphon oil from pipelines and process it at home refineries to sell on the local market, others began to recognize that the burgeoning international black market for petroleum products could be very lucrative. Turning their attention seaward, the ‘Petro-Pirates’ soon realized that they could achieve much higher profits by hijacking oil tankers at anchorages and delivering their cargoes to vessels waiting off-shore. Thus began the practice of what West Africans refer to as ‘Illegal Oil Bunkering’.15

The profitable nature of the cargo in oil theft poses very serious dangers to mariners. Unlike the situation in Somalia where the main focus of pirate attacks was in obtaining ransom payments for the kidnapped crews,16 in West Africa the ‘Petro-Pirates’ generally want only to unload their cargo, get their money, then escape. Because the lives of the crews are of comparatively little value; attempts to stop the pirates, either by the crew or security forces, often end in the violent deaths of the crew.17

Factors That Contribute to Piracy It is no mere coincidence that piracy flourishes where governance is weak. Piracy is organized predation that is a product of economic and social dislocation that has no singular cause.18 Martin Murphy has identified seven primary factors that are

54 Australian Naval Review 2018 An Introduction to Maritime Crime in West Africa common to areas of high levels of piracy and armed robbery at sea:

1. Legal and jurisdictional opportunities 2. Favorable geography 3. Conflict and disorder 4. Underfunded law enforcement and inadequate security 5. Permissive political environments 6. Cultural acceptability and maritime tradition 7. Reward19

Oceans Beyond Piracy, The State of Maritime Piracy 2017.

In considering the factors as laid out by Murphy, and comparing them to the statistics of West African maritime crime, it becomes apparent that much of the region is susceptible to the growth of criminal activity. To varying extents, each of the countries in the Gulf of Guinea share a number of the factors that provide a permissive environment for maritime criminals to thrive. As the map below indicates quite clearly, and as will be discussed below, there is a direct correlation, between the extent to which the factors are present and the preponderance of maritime crime in a given place.

The countries along the GoG share comparable coastal geography, have similar maritime traditions, yet some are more disposed to the growth of piracy than others. By addressing the remaining factors identified by Martin Murphy, it is

55 Australian Naval Review 2018 Dr Phillip Drew possible to understand the fundamentals that contribute to the prevalence of piracy vis a vis the various coastal states.

Legal and Jurisdictional Opportunities Most states in the GoG have criminal legislation that is applicable throughout their territory (including their territorial sea). It follows, therefore, that they have full jurisdiction to arrest and prosecute individuals who engage in criminal acts in their territorial waters. However, the mere fact that a state has the jurisdiction to deal with crime in its territorial sea, does not mean that its enforcement jurisdiction extends into international waters, where the crime of piracy occurs.

It is well accepted in international law that piracy is a crime that is subject to universal jurisdiction. ‘Universal jurisdiction in criminal matters […] means the competence of a State to prosecute alleged offenders and to punish them if convicted, irrespective of the place of commission of the crime and regardless of any link of active or passive nationality, or other grounds of jurisdiction recognized by international law.’20 The essential aspect of universal jurisdiction in the case of piracy is that the naval forces from any state, ‘may seize a pirate ship … [irrespective of the vessel’s flag] or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board.’21 United Nations Convention on the Law Of the Sea (UNCLOS) informs us further that the domestic courts of the state that conducted the seizure can prosecute and ‘decide upon the penalties to be imposed’22 when the offenders are found guilty.

As Professor Douglas Guilfoyle points out, '[t]he international law on piracy is straightforward and provides all the legal authority needed to combat pirate attacks … The real difficulties arise in national legal systems' implementation of that law and its application in individual cases'.23 Even though international law permits the exercise of universal jurisdiction over piracy, a domestic court cannot deal with piracy cases unless its government has exercised its prerogative to provide its courts with the necessary jurisdictional powers.

Jurisdiction for domestic courts is provided through domestic laws, such as criminal codes and other similar legislation. Although piracy has always been present in West African waters, until very recently none of the states in the region had created the necessary domestic laws to provide their courts with jurisdiction to try cases of

56 Australian Naval Review 2018 An Introduction to Maritime Crime in West Africa piracy.24 Although organizations such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) have been cooperating with, and supporting legislative initiatives for maritime crime with regional states for the past several years, little progress has been made thus far. This fact became painfully clear in Nigeria in November 2017, when six accused who had been apprehended for hijacking the oil tanker MT Maximus were found not guilty of piracy due to the fact that Nigeria did not have valid domestic piracy legislation.25 Although the dismissal of charges against the pirates sent a message to regional governments, it also broadcast a message to potential pirates; for the time being, there is little risk in engaging in criminal acts in the international waters off West Africa.

Underfunded Law Enforcement and Inadequate Security Until recently the issue of maritime crime in West Africa was considered by a number of states to be a particularly Nigerian problem, primarily because most incidents occurred in Nigerian territorial waters and were targeted against the Nigerian oil industry.26 However, as economies in the region have grown, incidents of maritime crime against vessels transiting off the coasts of other West African States have demonstrated that maritime crime is a regional issue of international importance and consequence.27 Even though it is widely recognised that piracy and armed robbery at sea are of international concern, thus far very few international maritime resources have been allocated to the region.28 It is also well understood that in spite of their best intentions, even the largest of West Africa’s navies have extremely limited resources,29 and generally lack the capabilities to operate beyond their territorial seas. Although several countries have improved their capacities to operate within their territorial seas in recent years, countries such as Nigeria and Ghana struggle with the size and scope of the problem.

Permissive Political Environments As is the case with any form of organised crime, piracy and armed robbery flourish in areas where effective governance is lacking. While it would be unfair and inaccurate to ignore the outstanding efforts that are being made by officials to combat maritime crime throughout West Africa, it would be equally incorrect to ignore the central role that corruption plays in the proliferation of piracy and maritime crime in the region.

57 Australian Naval Review 2018 Dr Phillip Drew

A simple review of statistics on maritime crime in the region shows that the vast majority of maritime criminal activity is occurring in or near Nigerian territorial waters, and that when acts of piracy do occur the primary participants are Nigerian nationals.30 Nigeria is a pirate’s dream; it has no effective legislation to deal with pirates, and maritime criminals are able to take advantage of the instability of the Niger Delta from which to establish their bases of operation.

The problems in Nigeria are further compounded by the plague of corruption that infects every aspect of society. ‘The fact that corruption in Nigeria is systemic means that large parts of entire state sectors, such as parts of the security apparatus or government departments, are embedded in networks that engage in resource extraction for private gain.’31 This corruption is endemic, from the very lowest ranks of the navy and police, through to the heads32 of security organisations33 and the judiciary.34 While neighbouring countries of the region do not suffer from the same levels of corruption as Nigeria, none of them are immune from its effects. Understanding the corrosive effects of corruption, Nigeria’s current President, Mohammadu Buhari, campaigned on an anti-corruption platform in the 2015 general election. Under his tenure, significant progress has been made toward exposing and prosecuting corrupt officials.35 Although the arrests thus far have just begun to scratch the surface of Nigeria’s most serious malaise, they have signalled an intent by the government to finally address and dissemble the pervasive culture of corruption. Insofar as corruption perpetuates systemic criminality, every step toward its demise is a step toward solving the problems of maritime crime in the GoG.

Reward It goes without saying that when the risk is small and the reward is high, criminals will take advantage of a situation. This is particularly true when the criminal elements arise from communities that are impoverished and view themselves as disenfranchised, as is the case in a number of the region’s states.

A successful hijacking of an oil tanker, or an oil platform, can reap huge rewards on the attackers. Understanding that security forces have a very limited capacity to react to such attacks serves to embolden maritime criminals in their exploits. The fact that criminals throughout the region are aware that counter-piracy legislation is non-existent in the domestic courts of the GoG states, leaves very little risk for

58 Australian Naval Review 2018 An Introduction to Maritime Crime in West Africa those who engage in such activity, even if they are caught. While efforts to enshrine counter piracy legislation into domestic law are expected to gain traction in the near future, much work remains to be done. In the meantime, there is very little36 to deter criminal elements from continuing to profit from their crimes.

Conclusion Piracy and other forms of maritime crime in the GoG are amongst the most significant threats to economic growth and security in West Africa. Until such time as maritime crime and its underlying issues are effectively addressed, any chances of prosperity in West Africa will be stymied, and its lower and middle classes will languish.

In an effort to address the serious problems of criminality, a number of countries and international organisations have engaged in capacity building with the states of the GoG. While their principal goals are to bring a speedy halt to attacks on vessels, more and more benefactors are recognising that lasting solutions to maritime crime require a broad approach that provides resources not only for the region’s military and law enforcement challenges, but also the underlying social problems that affect much of the continent.

59 Australian Naval Review 2018 Dr Phillip Drew

Dr Phillip Drew, CD

Dr Phillip Drew is a Canadian Barrister and Solicitor with expertise in international humanitarian law, military operations law and maritime security.

Dr Drew is a retired military officer who served in the Canadian Armed Forces for 30 years before moving into academia. During the first half of his military career he served as an Intelligence Officer, before joining the Office of the Judge Advocate General as a Legal Officer following his call to the bar in 2002. He has commanded a variety of military units both in Canada and overseas, and was the Legal Advisor to the Canadian Pacific Fleet from 2004- 2009. In 2013 Dr Drew attended specialized training in the Czech Republic with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). He is currently the only lawyer in the world who is certified by the OPCW as a qualified expert in chemical weapons. As a Senior Consultant for the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) he regularly works with governments in West Africa to develop and implement counter-piracy and maritime crime legislation.

Dr Drew was awarded his Juris Doctor from the European University Via Drina in 2016. His LL.M. (2012) and J.D. (2000) degrees were conferred by Queen’s University in Kingston, Ontario. He also has a Bachelor of Arts in Political Studies from the University of Manitoba and is a graduate of the Canadian Army Command and Staff College.

Dr Drew is a co-author of the San Remo Handbook on Rules of Engagement as well as the Oceans Beyond Piracy Handbook on the Rules for the Use of Force by Private Security Companies. A foremost expert on use of force protocols, he has assisted a number of states in developing ROE programs and has conducted training on use of force throughout the world.

By Australian standards, Dr Drew is a phenomenal ice hockey player.

60 Australian Naval Review 2018 An Introduction to Maritime Crime in West Africa

1 ‘Somalia’, The World Fact Book, Washington DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 29 August 2018, . 2 ‘CTF 151: Counter-piracy’, Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), September 17, 2010, . 3 Counter-Piracy Programme Support to the Trial and Related Treatment of Piracy Suspects, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, February 2012, . 4 The State of Maritime Piracy 2017 (Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2017), . 5 Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships for the Period 1 January - 30 June 2018 (ICC International Maritime Bureau, July 2018), . 6 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, vol. 3163 UNTS 94, 1982, art. 101. 7 International Maritime Organization, Code of Practice for The Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, 2010. 8 Ibid., art. 2.2. 9 The State of Maritime Piracy 2017 (Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2017), . 10 The exception to this rule lies in UNCLOS, art. 27. 11 M Murphy, Petro-piracy: predation and counter-predation in Nigerian waters: Legal Challenges and Responses (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013), p. 87, . 12 Tom Lodge, ‘Conflict resolution in Nigeria after the 1967–1970 civil war’, African Studies 77, no. 1 (January 2, 2018): 1–22, doi:10.1080/00020184.2018.1432125. 13 Douglas Guilfoyle, ed., Modern piracy: legal challenges and responses͕ŚĞůƚĞŶŚĂŵ͕h<ථ͖ Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar, 2013, p. 87. 14 Ibid., p. 68. 15 Ibid., p. 77. 16 A Hassan, ‘Somali pirates free German-owned ship after ransom’, Reuters World News, July 19, 2009, . 17 Murphy, Petro-piracy, p. 81. [Of note, when petroleum prices fall, Nigerian pirates will sometimes take crews as hostages.] 18 Ibid., p. 68. 19 M Murphy, Pirates, terrorists, and warlords: the history, influence, and future of armed groups around the world, New York, NY: Skyhorse Pub, 2009, p. 167. 20 C Kress, ‘Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes and the Institut de Droit international’, Journal of International Criminal Justice 4, no. 3 (July 5, 2006): 565, doi:10.1093/jicj/mql037. 21 UNCLOS, sec. 105. 22 Ibid. 23 MURPHY, supra note 10 at 66. 24 Murphy, Petro-piracy, p. 66. 25 The State of Maritime Piracy 2017, Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2017, . 26 Guilfoyle, ‘The Legal Challenges In Fighting Piracy’, pp. 81– 85. 27 The State of Maritime Piracy 2017.

61 Australian Naval Review 2018 Dr Phillip Drew

28 An exception to this is Africa Partnership Station, a program in which the UNited States navy is providing training and resources to local authorities to assist them in combatting maritime crime. See http://www.c6f.navy.mil/tags/africa-partnership-station?page=1. 29 ‘Ghana’s Navy’ (Global Security), ; ‘Nigeria’s Navy: Fleet’ (Nigerian Navy), . 30 Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships for the Period 1 January - 30 June 2018 (ICC International Maritime Bureau, July 2018), . 31 Gilje Østensen, Sheelagh Brady, and Sophie Schütte, Capacity Building for the Nigerian Navy: Eyes Wide Shut on Corruption?, U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2018, p. 14, . 32 'Nigeria’s Dasuki "arrested over $2bn arms fraud"', BBC World News (British Broadcasting Corporation, December 1, 2015), . 33 O Ramon, ‘ICYMI: I used part of NIMASA fund to build hotel – Calistus Obi’, Punch Nigeria, February 27, 2018, . 34 ‘Top Nigerian Lawyer Sent to Jail for Bribing Judges’, Daily Nigerian, April 30, 2018. 35 J Campbell, Nigeria Sees More High Level Corruption Convictions Under Buhari (Council on Foreign Relations, May 31, 2018), 3 Sept. 2018, .

62 Australian Naval Review 2018            

         

       

  

    

    Commodore Jack McCaffrie (Retired) The Pacific Patrol Boat Program: Train, Advise and Assist in The South Pacific1 Commodore Jack McCaffrie, RAN (Retired)

Introduction Australia has a long-standing and wide-ranging Defence Cooperation Program (DCP) through which assistance has been provided to many countries throughout Asia-Pacific. While the RAN has participated in several DCP activities, none has been as significant as its role in the Pacific Patrol Boat (PPB) Program.1 Beginning in the late 1970s, with a request for assistance from some Pacific Island Countries (PIC), the program grew into an Australian commitment to provide 22 patrol boats to 12 PICs.

The RAN has been involved in the program from the outset; contributing to the early maritime surveillance studies, managing the patrol boat build project and providing ongoing support for the program to the present day.

Project Genesis The Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC), agreed in 1982 and in force from 1994, created a major challenge for coastal states which were then able to claim 200 nautical mile (nm) Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). It meant that they gained responsibility for much broader areas for resource management, and thus a need for surveillance and patrolling to ensure law enforcement.2 Many coastal states had very a limited ability to do this. The PICs were especially disadvantaged: huge EEZs were created and they had virtually no domestic capacity to search or patrol them.3

In 1979 Australia and New Zealand sent Defence representatives to the South West Pacific, at the request of the PICs, to identify surveillance and patrol needs. These visits resulted in a set of country-specific studies which set out recommendations for the establishment of civil coastal surveillance programs for each of the 11 countries covered.4 Although these studies in no way committed Australia (or New Zealand) to the provision of any resources, Australia subsequently established a

1 This is a revised version of a paper published in Tom Frame, ed., ‘The Long Road: Australia’s Train, Advise and Assist Missions’, NewSouth Publishing, Kensington, NSW, 2017. 64 Australian Naval Review 2018 The Pacific Patrol Boat Program Defence Cooperation Project for provision of suitable patrol boats as well as training and associated infrastructure to the PICs.5

The year 1979 also saw what might have been the prelude to the PPB Program, with the handing over to the Solomon Islands Police of a small patrol boat which was named Her Majesty’s Solomon Islands Ship (HMSIS) Tulagi. Delivered in May, the 15.6 m patrol boat was to be used for fisheries patrols, to counter smuggling and for search and rescue.6 At the time, there was a suggestion that a larger patrol boat might be acquired in 1980 and the then South Pacific Fisheries Agency was developing a regional approach to deal with illegal fishing. This included the establishment of Headquarters in Honiara and plans for aircraft (presumably maritime patrol aircraft) and additional patrol boats.7 The limited economic capacity of the PICs led to suggestions that surveillance and patrol forces be pooled. Patrol boats considered for future use included the RAN’s Attack class, once replaced by the Fremantles, or other Hawker de Havilland designs.8

Following Cabinet consideration on 9 August 19839 the PPB program was formally announced by Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke during the South Pacific Forum meeting in Canberra on 29 and 30 August 1983.10 The primary aim of the program was to help the regional states to protect their 200 nm EEZs. Initially the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea (PNG) expressed strong interest in acquiring patrol boats through the Defence Cooperation Program and Australia expected a build program for five or six boats.11

For the next year the project progressed through the Defence acquisition machinery and the Request for Tenders (RFT) was issued on 22 August 1984 to 13 companies. Prime Minister Hawke was informed of this while on board HMAS Tobruk bound for the South Pacific Forum.12 With the government pressing for faster progress in the project, the tender evaluation was completed in early 1985. Then, on 8 February 1985 the Defence Source Development Committee (DSDC) decided in favour of the ASI 315 boat, over two other acceptable bids, the Taipan by NQEA and the WASP also by ASI. The ASI 315 was cheaper than either of the other two acceptable bids at $A38.81 million for 10 boats, with the ASI WASP $A41.47 million and the Taipan at $A42.89 million.13 The ASI 315 also appeared to be a better seakeeping boat than the other contenders as well as being longer, larger and roomier than them.14 65 Australian Naval Review 2018 Commodore Jack McCaffrie (Retired)

The starting point had been for 10 boats at $A24.0 million and it was later reduced to three boats for $A8.4 million at November 1984 prices – a slightly higher cost per boat.15 The three boats were to be delivered for Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and Western Samoa16 in January and July 1987 and in January 1988. As will be explained below, in the early stages of the project there was considerable uncertainty as to which PICs would accept the PPBs. Contention centred on potentially high operating costs and the differing capability needs of the various countries involved.

The Pacific Patrol Boat Program With the DSDC having determined that the ASI 315 design was the preferred solution for the PPB, the Minister for Defence announced the decision publicly on 9 May 1985. His news release described the ASI 315 as being 31.5 metres long, displacing 165 tonnes, with a steel hull, wide beam and aluminium superstructure. It also noted the boat’s useful range, speed, accommodation and ease of maintenance as being especially attractive to the PICs. More specifically, the PPB had a range of 3000 nm, a top speed of between 18 and 20 knots, an endurance of 21 days with a crew of 12 to 14 people. Armament could comprise a 20 mm cannon, or .50 calibre and 7.62 mm machine guns. The first PPB was expected to be completed by mid-1986.17 Ultimately, 22 boats were provided to 12 PICs, allocated as shown in Table 1 below.

Country No. Country No. Cook Islands 1 Marshall Islands 1 FSM18 3 Solomon Islands 2 Fiji 3 Tonga 3 Kiribati 1 Tuvalu 1 Palau 1 Vanuatu 1 PNG 4 Western Samoa 1

Table 1: Allocation of Pacific Patrol Boats

At the time, the PPB project was the largest and most complex Defence Cooperation Project undertaken by Australia.19 It took a comprehensive approach to the provision of the patrol boat capability; including training for crews and the

66 Australian Naval Review 2018 The Pacific Patrol Boat Program allocation of RAN advisers to operating countries, as well as through life logistic and technical support.20 The advisers were to include an officer with patrol boat experience as the Maritime Surveillance Adviser (MSA) as well as one or two senior sailors qualified in marine or electrical engineering, as technical advisers (TA). Some operating countries have also received Australian financial assistance for PPB operating costs as well as associated infrastructure – including wharves, workshops, operating headquarters and accommodation for the RAN advisers.21 A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the governments of Australia and each operating country provided the terms under which the PPBs would be transferred to each country. Some of the more important conditions included:22

x The provision of Australian advisers, initially for two years, and then as mutually agreed by the two governments, to provide advice to the nominated surveillance authority of the operating government on the introduction into service of the PPB(s) and the establishment of infrastructure, a surveillance system, operational procedures and maintenance systems for the vessel(s); x Agreement that the advisers would not be involved in operating the PPBs or employed in any other capacity except as provided for in the MOU; x Details of support arrangements for the PPBs, provided by Australia, at three levels; onboard spares, base spares and continuing assistance with regional support; x Provision of onboard spares for a normal three week period away from base support; x Provision of base spares to cover the normal repair and maintenance for the PPBs for two years after handover; x Establishment of a Follow-on Support Facility to provide continuing assistance with technical advice and support; x Provision of initial and follow-on training for PPB crews and base staff; x Agreement that for the first year after handover, Australia would bear the cost of warranty repairs for the PPBs and equipment, but that in subsequent years, these would be a cost to the operating countries; x Agreement that the cost of all routine maintenance would be borne by the operating countries; and

67 Australian Naval Review 2018 Commodore Jack McCaffrie (Retired) x Agreement that the operating countries would assume ownership of the PPBs on handover, but that title or possession would not be transferred without the written consent of the Government of Australia.

The Benefits of the Pacific Patrol Boat Program

Benefits to the Pacific Island Countries For all of the receiving countries, the PPBs represented significant maritime patrol and response capability, and for around half of these countries they represented their first such capability. Most of the smaller countries had no maritime patrol capability before the arrival of the PPBs and some such as Kiribati, for example, lacked even the basic supporting infrastructure of a wharf.23 Several others had wharves but in many cases they needed upgrading to cater for the PPBs. Thus, the introduction of the PPBs led to the building or improvement of shore infrastructure in virtually all receiving countries.

Three of the receiving countries, Fiji, PNG and Tonga, had functioning maritime surveillance organizations, formal if small defence forces and limited patrol capacity, mostly with aging vessels. PNG, for example, operated ex-RAN Attack class patrol boats.24 The Solomon Islands also had a small patrol craft.25 Consequently, the arrival of the PPBs provided either an initial or increased capacity to patrol the often very extensive national EEZs. In most cases the allocation of boats reflected individual country capacity to operate and support them rather than respective needs. For example, Tonga with one of the smallest of the PIC EEZs received three PPBs while Kiribati with its huge EEZ, spread across three widely separated stretches of ocean, received only one boat.26

Practically, the PPBs enabled receiving countries to patrol their EEZs to deter and counter illegal activities, illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing being the most common one. The main limitations of the PPBs in this role were their modest speed and the limited search horizon of their radar. Their best results would normally be gained when responding to detection of potential IUU fishing by aerial surveillance, which was provided almost exclusively by Australia, New Zealand, France and the US.27 This combination of surveillance and response enabled the PICs to impose licensing on foreign fishers wishing to operate in their EEZs and to apply the law against fishers found to be operating illegally. 68 Australian Naval Review 2018 The Pacific Patrol Boat Program

Another significant, but very much secondary, advantage of the PPBs proved to be their capacity to conduct a wide range of other tasks. Humanitarian work such as disaster relief and search and rescue has been significant for most of the PPB operators.28 Some have also been used for border protection work, controversially in at least one instance in PNG.29 Finally, the PPBs have been used as a means of transporting political leaders and other dignitaries to isolated and otherwise difficult to reach parts of some of the island nations.30 The importance of being able to use the PPBs in these secondary tasks should not be underestimated. It demonstrates all round utility to political leaders whose support for the program was essential.31

The PPB Program also contributed to capacity building within individual PICs and across the South Pacific. For countries without prior maritime surveillance capability, new skills were needed, from managing surveillance programs to commanding, crewing and maintaining the patrol boats. Australia established training programs, primarily at the Australian Maritime College in Launceston and in several RAN establishments. Some of the skills gained by those involved were taken into the broader community when they took up other employment.32

Regionally, the PPB Program provides opportunities for cooperation among operating countries, notwithstanding the great distances between most of them. The Niue Treaty of 1993 provides for cooperative patrolling of the EEZs of signatory countries by third parties who are also signatories.33 Such an arrangement would not have been possible without the PPB Program. While the extent of cooperative patrolling is not great, today it is exemplified by the annual activities such as Operations Kuru Kuru and Big Eye, which brings the patrol boats of several PICs together for exercises and operational activities.34

Benefits to Australia Australia has, of course, also benefited from the PPB Program, although perhaps not as directly as have the PICs. The generation of national maritime surveillance capacity, however limited, has provided a level of self-reliance for the operating countries and has likewise reduced the need for more direct Australian operational assistance. This has been important in recent years when the RAN’s patrol boat force has been so heavily committed to domestic border protection duties. Table 2 69 Australian Naval Review 2018 Commodore Jack McCaffrie (Retired) illustrates, inter alia, the dramatic reduction in South Pacific patrol boat deployments in recent years.

Year of Patrol Boat Activity and Number of Boats Involved Tasks ’02- ’03- ’04- ’05- ’06- ’07- ’08- ’09- ’10- ’11- ’12- 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 South 8 13 7 7 0 2 4 1 0 4 0 Pacific deployment Southeast 4 0 2 2 1 1 5 2 5 1 0 Asia deployment Exercises - 9 10 11 5 2 2 5 4 7 2 2 domestic SAR 6 11 3 6 1 5 13 16 17 9 13 Public 2 5 1 6 2 8 13 16 13 2 1 relations Scientific 0 0 2 0 1 1 2 2 0 1 0 trials TOTALS 29 39 26 26 7 19 42 41 42 19 16

Table 2: Fremantle and Armidale Class Patrol Boat Tasking For Other Than the Constabulary Function35 On the other hand, the existence of the PPBs in the PICs does provide opportunities for the RAN to exercise and operate with those countries in ways that were not previously possible.36 RAN patrol boats are comparable in size, capability and tasking with the PPBs thus making cooperative activities feasible and relevant for the PPB operators.

Australia also gains improved domain awareness from the activities of the PPBs37 and the presence of the advisers in the operating countries. The MSAs who are intimately involved in planning of the PPB operations and the liaison officers present in the Forum Fisheries Agency in Honiara are especially important in this.38 Domain awareness is also improved through the complementary aerial surveillance operations conducted by the RAAF, RNZN, French Navy and US Coast Guard. The 70 Australian Naval Review 2018 The Pacific Patrol Boat Program improved domain awareness, essentially knowledge of maritime activities in the South Pacific, comes about through having a more comprehensive picture of potentially illegal activities and sharing the knowledge among regional law enforcement bodies.39

The gifting of the PPBs and the presence in operating countries of the advisers also generates improved influence and access for Australia in these countries. For example, the presence of the patrol boats has generated a flow of Pacific Islander trainees to RAN and AMC training courses and has thereby established often long- term contacts and relationships between the training providers and the trainees. Having the patrol boats operating throughout the South Pacific also generates opportunities for RAN patrol craft and sometimes other units to engage with the PPBs.

Undoubtedly the most significant contribution to improved Australian influence and access in the South Pacific countries has been the presence in PPB operating countries of the RAN advisers, especially the MSAs. The MSAs work alongside the senior leaders of the military or police forces to which they are assigned and have frequent contact with government ministers.40 In some cases, such as Tuvalu until recently, for example, they are the only Australian government representatives in the country.41 They are thus well positioned to gauge the PICs’ approach to maritime security affairs and to provide an Australian view on those issues.

Challenges of the Pacific Patrol Boat Program

Challenges for the PICs Despite the gifting of the patrol boats and the provision of ongoing support by Australia, operating and maintaining the PPBs present challenges for almost all of the operating countries, primarily with respect to cost and people. Several of the PICs were initially very wary of accepting PPBs, with Kiribati and Tuvalu being especially doubtful, before Kiribati initially declined the offer, because of its anticipated inability to cover the operating costs.42 The smaller PICs generate very limited national budgets and even the relatively minor $A100k approximate annual cost of operating a PPB has continued to pose major problems for them.43

71 Australian Naval Review 2018 Commodore Jack McCaffrie (Retired) Similarly, for the smaller PICs especially, the provision of suitably educated people to crew and maintain the PPBs continues to be a challenge. This applies especially to technical skills which tend to be highly sought after and in limited supply.44 Added to this, in almost all cases, training of the crews and support staff has to be conducted in Australia because of a lack of suitable facilities in the operating countries. This generates additional cost and time penalties. The shortage of in- country training facilities also makes the provision of continuation training for crews more difficult.

The combination of cost pressures, skills shortages and limited in-country training capacity leads to reduced operational effectiveness of the patrol boats. The PPBs have not been able to achieve any more than 56 days per year at sea in recent years, which of course limits the deterrent effect and the prospect of apprehending illegal fishers.45 The limited number of sea days and the lack of shore training facilities make it difficult for levels of expertise and currency to be maintained by patrol boat crew members and result in degraded operational effectiveness when the boats do go on patrol.

Yet another challenge for the PPB operating countries which degrades the operational effectiveness of their efforts is the lack of responsive aerial surveillance. Surface vessels like the PPBs are much more effective when responding to detections of potential illegal activity by aerial surveillance than when patrolling with their own limited-range radar. The Quadrilateral partners (Australia, France, New Zealand and the USA) do provide maritime patrol aircraft for EEZ surveillance, requests for the surveillance must be lodged some months in advance. This makes it impossible to respond to short notice demands for surveillance.

72 Australian Naval Review 2018 The Pacific Patrol Boat Program

Provider Estimated Source Annual Air Hours

Royal Australian Air 94 Average of RAAF reported Force effort 2004 - 2008. Royal New Zealand 307 Total of individual PIC Air Force estimates. French Navy 70 Total of individual PIC estimates. United States Coast 250 USCG estimate of total air- Guard hours distributed and rescaled to match PIC estimates United States Navy 26 Total of individual PIC estimates. Total 747

Table 3: Estimated aerial surveillance contributions within the WCPO46 Challenges for Australia

Establishing the program and gaining commitment from potential operating countries proved to be quite a challenge for Australia and for the Department of Defence in particular. Many years passed before the number of boats and recipient countries settled at 22 and 12 respectively. The uncertainty was evident early in the program, when contract negotiations with ASI were conducted for a build of 10 boats. Yet the initial contract was reduced to three boats because of previously committed nations withdrawing from the program.

Getting all 12 countries to agree to a single design was another significant challenge for Australia. Several countries had very different and incompatible requirements of the PPB. For example, the PNGDF wanted a vessel with combat capability, while the PNG Prime Minister wanted only a ‘Sharkcat’ equipped with radar.47 Similarly the Fiji Navy wanted a much larger vessel capable of operating a helicopter,48 while Tonga wanted a smaller craft capable mainly of high speed pursuit and interception.49 Ultimately all 12 countries did accept the PPB as offered; the result 73 Australian Naval Review 2018 Commodore Jack McCaffrie (Retired) of patient negotiation by Australia and the realization that it was the PPB or nothing.

While Australian authorities always accepted that the program cost would grow as the number of participating countries and patrol boats increased, there was a conscious effort to limit long term financial support commitments for the operation of the PPBs.50 Nevertheless, the sometimes parlous state of PIC economies and the normally constrained nature of small country economies, meant that Australia has had to provide ongoing financial support to several countries – often in the form of funding to enable the purchase of fuel for the PPBs.

Australia has also had to contend with the difficulties some of the PICs have had in keeping the PPBs operational because of personnel shortfalls – both in numbers and in skills. Together with economic pressures, the personnel shortfalls have made it difficult for many of the PICs to provide trained crews and to maintain their operational effectiveness. This has in turn placed additional pressures on the Australian advisers, the technical advisers especially, to provide continuation harbour and sea training and frequent checks of processes, procedures and operational and technical documentation.51

Finally, the provision of the Maritime Surveillance Advisers and Technical Advisers has had its own challenges for Australia. There have been times when the RAN has had difficulty in providing suitably qualified and experienced people. Nevertheless, the Navy remains very much aware of the need to select appropriately qualified people to be advisers.52 This remains very important, given the value of the advisers to the PPB operating countries and the value to Australia’s security posture in having them in the South Pacific.

While the professional skills and experience are vital attributes, the advisers and their families must also be able to adapt to life in the PICs. The challenges in doing this should not be underestimated for two reasons. Firstly, the Pacific Island cultures are quite different to our own in some ways and advisers and their families must be able to adapt to this in their professional and personal lives. Secondly, not all of the PICs are tropical paradises. Most are very isolated with quite limited facilities, especially in respect of health and education. In 2012, for example, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade declared Kiribati as unsuitable for the 74 Australian Naval Review 2018 The Pacific Patrol Boat Program children of advisers because of shortcomings in health and education services. And without wishing to focus unnecessarily on Kiribati, the first MSA and his family endured several months of significant interruptions to power, telephones, air services and water early in their posting.53

Lessons for the Future As the PPBs approach the end of their operational lives, the Australian government has committed to provide replacements to the extent of 21 vessels for 13 countries as part of the Pacific Maritime Security Program (PMSP).54 This decision reflects the value of the original PPB program to both the PICs and to Australia. The first of the new patrol vessels will become available in late 2018. This provides an opportunity to take account of experiences from the first generation of PPBs, their operations and support. Experience to date suggests that the following matters should be considered as the second generation of patrol vessels begins to emerge:

x The inability to provide responsive aerial surveillance has limited significantly the effectiveness of PPB patrols by all countries. Consequently, serious consideration must be given to the provision of timely aerial surveillance to meet the needs of the PICs. This has been enacted within the PMSP through the provision of 1400 hours per year from two contracted surveillance aircraft from December 2017.

x While the provision of the PPBs has been a benefit to the PICs it has also generated a burden, especially for the smaller countries. Consequently, for the future, Australia will need to commit to providing comprehensive support for the long-term, based on the needs of individual PICs.

x With PIC financial and personnel limitations in mind, the design of the second generation vessel should provide for maximum simplicity of operation and maintenance – as was planned for the original PPBs.

x Just as a greater commitment of aerial surveillance will be needed into the future, so too the RAN patrol boat force should deploy more frequently to the South Pacific, both to bolster Australia’s presence in the region and to help develop the capability of the PIC patrol boat operators.

75 Australian Naval Review 2018 Commodore Jack McCaffrie (Retired) x Australia should continue to provide surveillance and technical advisers to the PICs, unless the capabilities they bring become unnecessary. They continue to provide much needed expertise and advice and add to Australia’s commitment to and presence in the region.

Commodore Jack McCaffrie, RAN (Retired)

Jack McCaffrie is a member of the Naval Studies Group at the University of New South Wales (Canberra) and a Visiting Fellow at the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security at Wollongong University. He is co-author (with James Goldrick) of Navies of Southeast Asia – A Comparative Study. His current work includes a history of the Pacific Patrol Boat Program and a contribution to a book on the RAN Chiefs of Naval Staff.

76 Australian Naval Review 2018 The Pacific Patrol Boat Program

1 In this paper the term ‘Pacific Patrol Boat Program’ will encompass all aspects of the activity, while the term ‘Pacific Patrol Boat Project’ will refer only to the build of the 22 boats. 2 ‘The Pacific Patrol Boat Project’, SEMAPHORE, Issue 2, February 2005, p. 1. 3 ‘The Pacific Patrol Boat Project’, SEMAPHORE, Issue 2, February 2005, p. 1. 4 See for example, ‘Civil Coastal Surveillance Survey of Pacific Forum States 1980: report prepared for the Government of Western Samoa’, the Australian and New Zealand Civil Coastal Surveillance Assessment Team, undated. NAA, file 1736/6/1 Part 1, ‘Law of the Sea – South Pacific, Australia and New Zealand Civil Coastal Surveillance Assessment Team. 5 ‘The Pacific Patrol Boat Project’, SEMAPHORE, Issue 2, February 2005, p. 1. 6 ‘Government of the Solomon Islands Police Force (Marine Division) Ship List’, p. 47. 7 ‘Government of the Solomon Islands Police Force (Marine Division) Ship List’, p. 47. 8 ‘Government of the Solomon Islands Police Force (Marine Division) Ship List’, p. 47. 9 DFDC Agendum No. 14/1984, ‘Pacific Patrol Boat Project: Information paper on the Pacific Patrol Boat Project’, dated 1 August 1984. 10 ‘”Pacific” class patrol boat’, p. 2, (27 November 2012). 11 Department of Defence News Release, No. 136/83 dated Monday 29 August 1983, ‘Pacific Patrol Boat Announced’, Department of Defence file 2008/1084567/1. 12 Message Defence Canberra to Australian High Commission Port Moresby, dated 24 August 1984. 13 Minute, DSDC 6/1985, ‘Navy 1363: Pacific Patrol Boats’, dated 23 March 1985. 14 News release, ‘Design for Pacific Patrol Boat Selected’, Minister for Defence, No. 71/85, dated 9 May 1985. 15 Brief from CNM to Minister for Defence, ‘South Pacific Patrol Boat – Contract Negotiations’, 1363 CON, dated 13 September 1985. 16 Minute, A/DEPSEC B to Minister for Defence, ‘Pacific Patrol Boat – PNG Participation’, dated 29 October 1985. 17 News release, “Design for Pacific Patrol Boat Selected”, Minister for Defence, No. 71/85, dated 9 May 1985.

18 FSM is the Federated States of Micronesia. 19 Commodore Sam Bateman, RANR, Associate Professor Anthony Bergin, Review of Pacific Patrol Boat Program, Centre for Maritime Policy, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, May 1998, p. 43. 20 Bateman and Bergin, Review of Pacific Patrol Boat Program, p. 44. 21 Bateman and Bergin, Review of Pacific Patrol Boat Program, p. 44. 22 Bateman and Bergin, Review of Pacific Patrol Boat Program, pp. 51-2. 23 ‘Kiribati Multi-Purpose Patrol Boat – Support Requirements Study Tour Report’, July 1985. 24 ‘The Australian and New Zealand Civil Coastal Surveillance Assessment Team: Civil Coastal Surveillance Survey of Pacific Forum States, 1980’, Department of Defence, October 1980, p. 30. 25 Message Australian High Commission Honiara to Defence Canberra, ‘Pacific Patrol Boat Project – Solomon Islands Participation, dated 14 September 1985. 26 Tonga’s EEZ covers 700,000sq.km and Kiribati’s covers 3,550,000sq.km. ‘The Kingdom of Tonga Country Statement’, Ministry of Transport, Tonga. (11 July 2016) and ‘Kiribati’, (11 July 2016). 27 Sam Bateman and Anthony Bergin, ‘Staying the Course: Australia and maritime security in the South Pacific’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra, May 2011. (11 July 2016). 77 Australian Naval Review 2018 Commodore Jack McCaffrie (Retired)

28Anthony Bergin, The Pacific Patrol Boat Project: A Case Study of Australian Defence Cooperation, Australian Foreign Policy Papers, The Australian National University, Canberra, 1994, p. 36. 29 Bergin, The Pacific Patrol Boat Project: A Case Study of Australian Defence Cooperation, p. 23. 30 ‘LOTE Questionnaire PPB Technical Advisor Minute to IP Division, STA/97/IF2/25 dated 12 May 1998. 31 Bergin, The Pacific Patrol Boat Project: A Case Study of Australian Defence Cooperation, p. 37. 32 Bergin, The Pacific Patrol Boat Project: A Case Study of Australian Defence Cooperation, p. 37. 33 Environmental Treaties and Resource Indicators (ENTRI), (13 July 2016) 34 ‘Operation Kuru Kuru completed’, Fiji News, 28 October 2014, (13 July 2016). See also ‘Big Eye ends on high note’, Solomon Star, 8 August 2015, (24 July 2016). 35 The information in this table comes from issues of Navy News, the fortnightly RAN internal newspaper, for the period January 2002 to December 2012, as well as from the annual series of books, Australia’s Navy, which finished in 2008. It also includes information from Patrolling the Line 2002 and Patrolling the Line 2003, annual summaries of patrol boat activity, regrettably published only in those two years. For the years 2008–2012 information is also taken from the monthly reports rendered by each patrol boat Commanding Officer. These reports are the most complete records available of patrol boat activity. The table is taken from the author’s unpublished PhD thesis. 36 Bergin, The Pacific Patrol Boat Project: A Case Study of Australian Defence Cooperation, pp. 19 - 20. 37 Bergin, The Pacific Patrol Boat Project: A Case Study of Australian Defence Cooperation, p. 19. 38 See for example, ‘Big Eye ends on high note’, Solomon Star, 8 August 2015, (24 July 2016). 39 See for example, ‘Pacific Transnational Crime Network (PTCN)’, which notes the activities of the Forum Fisheries Agency and the Pacific Patrol Boat Program in its work. (24 July 2016). 40 Anthony Bergin, The Pacific Patrol Boat Project: A Case Study of Australian Defence Cooperation, Australian Foreign Policy Papers, The Australian National University, Canberra, 1994, pp. 22 - 23. 41 ‘Tuvalu’, (24 July 2016) 42Minute, A/SASIP to Minister for Defence, ‘Pacific Patrol Boat Project – Recent Developments’, SPFD 86/30015, dated 17 November 1986. 43 See for example, ‘LOTE Questionnaire’, Minute from PPBTA to IP Division, STA/97/1f2/25, dated 12 March 1998, which notes the impact of the Solomon Islands financial; crisis on PPB funding. 44 By way of example, in the Federated States of Micronesia in 1995, temporary staff had to be hired to make up numbers and on another occasion technical sailors could not attend training in Australia because of shortfalls. See, ‘Maritime Surveillance Adviser – Federated States of Micronesia Quarterly Reports for the Period 1 May – 30 June 1995 and 1 July - 30 September 1995’, LCDR P.J Briers, 11 July 1995.

45 Linda McCann, The Future of Australia’s Pacific Patrol Boat Program: the Pacific Maritime Security Program, Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies, Australian Defence College, dated August 2013, Attachment B. For individual boats the average days at sea in the period 2006 – 2012 varied from 14.5 to 79.3. 46 This table is taken from Duncan Souter, et. al; ‘Safeguarding the Stocks’, MRAG Asia-Pacific, Brisbane, 14 October 2009, p. 65. The WCPO is the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. 78 Australian Naval Review 2018 The Pacific Patrol Boat Program

47 Cable Australian High Commission Port Moresby to Canberra, undated but believed to be late 1983. 48 Minute A/ASIP (PCP) to FASSIP, ‘PPB Briefing Visit – Fiji, Western Samoa, Tonga and New Zealand, 26 June – 9 July 1985’, dated 15 July 1985. 49 Message Australian High Commission Nuku’alofa to Defence Canberra, ‘South Pacific Patrol Boat Proposal’, July 1984 (probably 31 July). 50 Minister for Defence Statement on Pacific Patrol Boat Project, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, No. 141 of 1985, 9 May 1985, p. 1960. In this statement the Minister indicated that all operating countries would pay for PPB operating and support costs. 51 See ‘Report: Maritime Safety Audit Republic of Fiji Navy – Pacific Patrol Boats’, 02–05 July 1996, CAPT Michael Jackson, undated. This is one of a series of audits of PPB operators which often found significant discrepancies in processes and procedures. 52 Message from NPCMA, ‘Maritime Surveillance Adviser and Surveillance Officer Rotations December ’13 – January ’14 and July ‘14’, dated 2350Z 14 May 2013. The message listed the professional qualifications needed as well as the required personal qualities. 53 See ‘MSA Kiribati Report – 1 October to 31 December 1995’, MSA (K) 223/95, LCDR C.L. Dodd, dated 3 January 1996. The report notes that during the period, phones were cut off for two weeks, all flights were cancelled for three weeks, water was cut off for three days along with ongoing water shortages and there were other lengthy power outages. 54 The initial contract is for 19 patrol boats and Timor Leste (the 13th country) has an option to take two, bringing the number to 21. ‘Contract signed for Pacific Patrol boat replacements’, Australian Defence Magazine, 5 May 2016, (22 July 2016).

79 Australian Naval Review 2018 Captain Sean Andrews, RAN

Naval Exceptionalism1 - Part One: Blue water thinking, the last capability bridge to cross Captain Sean Andrews, RAN

… Formulated principles, however excellent, are by themselves too abstract to sustain convinced allegiance; the reasons for them, as manifested in concrete cases, are the imperative part of the process through which they really enter the mind and possess the will. On this account the study of military history lied at the foundation of all sound military conclusions and practice …2 AT Mahan US Naval War College Introduction In the 1960s, Donald Horne in his often-misinterpreted opus The Lucky Country argues that Australia is a second-rate country, run by second-rate people with second rate ideas.3 Arguably, if this hypothesis were applied to the RAN there is enough real and anecdotal evidence available to argue that the Navy’s performance intellectually and in fact its deep naval thinking has been second-rate because second-rate ideas have always, and will always, win out in the battle of ideas.4 But why write an essay on naval exceptionalism as it pertains to deep blue water thinking; strategic thinking? Three reasons; firstly, there is no tangible evidence to suggest that the Navy, except a few, understand what its purpose is in supporting a national security policy or in fact why the Navy exists at all. Secondly, there is no unified thought in the RAN on what sea power is and what it should mean to Australia. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, Australia’s regional security environment is vulnerable, but the public discourse is muted by a strategically comfortable, yet alliance dependant political cohort, an indifferent public, a logically inconsistent defence policy and a constrained defence budget. Two questions are posed to Navy students at the Australian Command and Staff College (ACSC); why do we have a Navy and what is sea power? Both these big questions perplexed the students and the answers were not readily available. Unlike the other services, including the Public Service, who have embraced thinking as a capability with the rise of the Airman Scholar and the Army’s long held Soldier Scholar Philosophy, the RAN is about to be defeated in the knowledge space.5 80 Australian Naval Review 2018 Naval Exceptionalism: Part One Navy will not enjoy intellectual parity with the other services because it prioritises the labour of daily routine and the enduring challenges of emerging technology over the intellectual advancement of its personnel and more importantly, those who are qualified for sea or air command: its warfare officers.6 So, if the Navy is interested in driving its mission and capability narrative, then the Navy must invest in achieving intellectual parity, even intellectual superiority to bridge this vital, available, yet unexploited, capability. The aim of this essay is to argue that Navy has no focused deep research philosophy or program for its warfare specialists, despite the fact that the Navy’s mission remains ‘To Fight and Win at Sea’. 7 Consequently, the Navy needs to embrace the principle of educating for uncertainty and invest to prepare its future leaders for the challenges of the strategic political-military environment.8 The Navy has deep courses for several of its professional qualifications, including research courses for management executives who undertake post-graduate research degrees at the Naval Post-Graduate School (NPS) in Monterey, California. But there are no deep research programs available to undertake professional intellectual mastery of the Navy’s core business. Moreover, there is no culture of ‘blue water thinking’ and no time specifically dedicated to reflecting and advancing complex discussions on the implications of national policy.9 Noting that Australia’s principal operating area is experiencing a most profound geopolitical redux and volatility, the Navy should be attuned to the strategic implications and reconcile its routine to the emerging realities. Perhaps it is Mahan who states the reason for the advancement of ‘blue water thinking’ reform more succinctly: Men who deliberately postpone the formation of opinion until the day of action, who expect from the moment of inspiration the results commonly obtained only from the study and reflection, who hope for victory, are guilty of yet a greater folly, for they disregard all the past experiences of our race … 10

This paper will make a case for why the naval war fighter needs to think and suggest areas that are rich for enquiry. Moreover, it will consider the strategic culture from where the naval war fighter comes, this unconscious, but like-minded group united by shared core values, issues and experiences, but from a unique environment. Additionally, to achieve the advancement for an intellectual resurgence of the naval

81 Australian Naval Review 2018 Captain Sean Andrews, RAN war fighter and cultural reform to embrace intellectual invigoration, a Street to Fleet, Fleet to Flag concept is proposed with a principal education program requiring investment called the Captains of War program. The Captains of War program is a concept to enable naval war fighters to develop their capacity for thought and prepare them for the strategic political-military context in which they will advance after their operational careers. Additionally, the Captains of War program will propose a professional and academic pathway that harnesses the talents of the naval war fighter who wants to, and has demonstrated rigorous ‘blue water’ thoughts and theories. Get the War Fighters Thinking? We had competent administrators, brilliant experts of every description, unequalled navigators, good disciplinarians, fine sea officers, brave and devoted hearts: but at the outset of the conflict (WWI) we had more Captains of ships than Captains of War.11

The Sailor and the State The late Harvard Professor Samuel P Huntington, at the age of 27 in 1954, wrote an essay for the United States Naval Institute magazine, Proceedings called ‘National policy and the Transoceanic Navy’. This essay was written three years before his seminal work, Soldier and the State. Huntington made some key observations and pointed to three elements of military service; the first was the Navy’s purpose or role in implementing national policy, the strategic concept of the service. Perhaps his most pointed view was that: … If a service does not possess a well-defined strategic concept, the public and the political leaders will be confused as to the role of the service, uncertain as to the necessity of its existence, and apathetic or hostile to the claims made by the service upon the resources of society … 12 The second element of naval service was how the service is resourced in the human and material terms required, to deliver the strategic concept. The Navy’s organisational structure was Huntington’s final and third element of a military service. Here there is no one size fits all solution. The naval service arguably consists of a strategic concept which describes the role of the service within national policy, the public support which will fund the resources to execute this

82 Australian Naval Review 2018 Naval Exceptionalism: Part One role, and an organisational structure which commands, controls and coordinates the resources so as to efficiently undertake the strategic concept.13 Huntington’s challenge still resonates and arguably his first two points relate to the key areas in which the Navy has been unable to gain any foothold within the psyche of the Australian political and academic elite and an indifferent public. Napoleon is said to have declared that: An Admiral commanding a Fleet and a General commanding an Army are men who need different qualities. One is born with the qualities proper to command an Army, while the necessary qualities to command a Fleet are acquired only by experience. 14 Julian Corbett reinforced a subtler point when he said: ‘nothing is more dangerous in the study of war as to permit maxims to become a substitute for judgements’.15 These two points of view reinforce the principle of the thinking naval war fighter, but why does this band of sea farers have shared views, beliefs, values and habits? In the Navy, there are three key line officer professions, the Surface Warfare officer, the Sub Surface Warfare officer and the Aviation Warfare officer. All are qualified to exercise sea or air command and only these professions are qualified to be called naval war fighters. But it is for after their operational service that the war fighters have to date had limited preparation and it is the political-military environment to which they will progress that requires the most astute of naval minds.

Politics, Strategy and the Economy Stupid The Agadir crisis in 1911 exposed the inept performance of the British Admiralty and a war staff type organisation was forced upon the RN, which was greeted with little enthusiasm. One observer noted that ‘we had the opportunity but not the intellectual capital to float a staff’.16 To accommodate the new war staff, a naval staff course was introduced in 1912, it was able to conduct training in the processes of planning and preparation of operational orders. But, it had no experts to advance thought on strategy and tactics and more importantly, original thought. 17

The opposition to the war staff concept could be linked to the emergence of new technology and capability and a change in operational concepts. History reveals that three generations after Nelson, senior RN leadership thought that the knowledge of war should be restricted to those of flag rank. The Naval War College,

83 Australian Naval Review 2018 Captain Sean Andrews, RAN founded in 1909 only gave Captains and Commanders’ instructions in naval tactics, junior officers were at odds as to where they were to learn ‘their trade’ on war.18 Nelson emboldened junior officers to think and enlarged their ideas; Fishers reforms were to diminish this brave self-reliance. However, on balance, serving in a fleet during Nelson’s time was the exception and self-reliance was born from the tactical necessity incurred by detached duty.19

The RAN and perhaps more precisely duty in the Australian primary operating environment, it could be argued, has always been a detached duty; away from the intellectual bases of the its key partner force, the RN before the Second World War and the United States Navy (USN) after the conflict. Interestingly, both world wars were played out in our very theatre and principal operating area which philosophically, forms the basis for the ‘arc of instability’ concept that can be traced to the fall of Singapore, the Darwin attacks, the battle of the Coral Sea and the Papuan campaign of World War II.20 It was observed by the Australian academic Coral Bell that this battle space and its proximity during World War II have ‘haunted strategic inquiry since’.21 But not the Navy’s. Whilst these conflicts have been subject to significant historical analysis, strategic review through a maritime lens appears to be limited and framed within the context of the ANZUS alliance.

But regardless of the devotion to duty and sacrifices of the RAN in the service of Australia, the greatest challenges faced by the Navy in defining its place in the Australian psyche have been a distracted political establishment and national reliance upon strategic dependencies and partnerships. Whilst both World Wars focused pragmatic governments of the day, peace and a lack of cohesive policy meant the absence of a specific Australian strategy which could have guided capability procurement. Between the wars economic pressures undermined the RAN to the point that abandonment of the RAN as an independent entity was seriously considered.22

The Hawke Government’s Minister for Defence, the Honourable Kim Beazley is regularly quoted on his musing that, ‘Australia is not a maritime nation and its people do not sustain much interest in Australian Maritime strategy’.23 Moreover, he believed that Australia was not interested in Defence and it was notable that a comprehensive poll in 1987 rated the RAN last when the public was asked to consider Defence. Whilst domestically palatable during the great peace of the 84 Australian Naval Review 2018 Naval Exceptionalism: Part One 1980s, this lack of interest in Defence would be momentarily reversed less than three years later with the outbreak of the first Gulf War. In terms of an Australian commitment, it was a predominantly naval affair and, arguably, the start of continuous coalition operations that have not only matured to a state of political normalisation, but to the point of public indifference.

But it is not just both sides of the political divide that demonstrate limited knowledge of what the Navy does, the public is also not convinced of our requirement or existence. Most recently, Senator Linda Reynolds (Liberal, Western Australia) lamented that Australia has no maritime consciousness; she cited that people in her own state did not know that there is a ship building industry in Western Australia, let alone a significant naval base.24 At a recent special war seminar on the anniversary of the battle of Milne Bay, the Director of the Australian War Memorial, Dr Brendan Nelson, praised the Army. Dr Nelson stated that Duntroon had produced some of Australia’s finest academics, including, he noted, Professors David Horner and John Blaxland.25 Admittedly, the Milne Bay Battle was primarily an Air Force and Army fight, but it does not diminish the fact that there are more Army-raised academics than Navy and they have significantly affected the strategic narrative in this country. This is because in Army there is a culture that encourages learning and thinking.

In 1992, the Chief of Navy created the Sea Power Centre - Australia (designated the Maritime Studies Program until 2000) to advance research on naval and maritime issues with a focus on promoting sea power; one of the reasons for this initiative was that naval staffs contribute to making the Defence policy of Australia.26 However, in the more than 25 years since the advent of the Sea Power Centre it could be argued that it has had only limited success in its primary mission to ‘promote understanding of sea power and its application to the security of Australia's national interests’.27 Whilst it has enabled significant historical research, the Sea Power Centre has not achieved any significant influence or provided a narrative that could be argued to have contributed to the geopolitical and geostrategic discussion on the realities of the in which Australia resides.

In 2003-2004 a Parliamentary Inquiry into maritime strategy was held, but it failed to accommodate and understand the maritime issues facing Australia and the role 85 Australian Naval Review 2018 Captain Sean Andrews, RAN Navy had in executing potential government directed operations. Additionally, the Navy was not allowed to make a submission, rather a broad Defence Department submission was tabled late in the inquiry as Defence officials were already being questioned by committee members.28 Moreover, if the report is read in detail coupled with its Terms of Reference, the reader would feel disappointment as to the achievement of its intent. Recommendation one states that the Government should develop a national security strategy to address Australia’s key interests. They are no doubt worthwhile pursuits, but leisure and tourism came in at number three; defence and security came last as a national interest.29 This demonstrates an extraordinary paradox, in which the broader defence organisation diminishes the strategic utility of the Navy and the comprehensive strategic discussion on sea power for an unknown purpose.30

It is often stated by governments that the number one priority of any government is to keep their nation safe, the Turnbull Government restated this dictum in January this year.31 But, Defence as a portfolio sits at number fifteen in seniority, beaten by health as a priority.32 Whilst the lack of broader maritime understanding is not the fault of the Sea Power Centre it points to the key challenges that the Centre faces in getting its narrative circulated. Navy, and more broadly Defence, face an enormous intellectual challenge to cut through the lows of the domestic political discussion.

The politics of any White Paper is self-evident, although presented as statements of policy, defence strategy, procurement and budget. The White Papers also carry the very personal and political aspirations of the governments which issue them. Whilst it is fascinating to assess the development of White Papers since 1976 and expose the nuances of the political ideologies of the two major parties, it is perhaps the Hawke Government’s 1987 White paper based upon the Defence Review by Paul Dibb that is best known for its core policy outcomes.33

It could be argued that there was bipartisan support for Defence policy in 1987, 1990, 1993, 1996 and 1998. The Liberal-National coalition went to the elections in 1993 and 1996 with a proposal to cut spending. Both parties were happy that Defence sat in a sort of middle ground that let politics focus on other more popular targets. But on review, the Defence of Australia concept has never been tested. Nor is it likely, as an attack upon Australia is considered utterly remote.34 The Defence 86 Australian Naval Review 2018 Naval Exceptionalism: Part One of Australia concept is a model of good policy development and it achieved the political objectives, but it is over three decades old and just as Dibb’s review refreshed the strategic outlook of ‘forward defence’ it is an area worthy of fresh strategic debate to accommodate emerging challenges.35 After all, strategy is just an idea.

Another area worthy of intellectual pursuit is defence funding and, whilst the Government’s 2% pledge may serve Defence's interests well, limitations with regard to good strategy, policy, budgeting and broader public understanding are starting to become apparent. Arguably the most damaging is that the use of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is not good strategy. An often-quoted adage of Sir Arthur Tange was, ‘strategy without funding is not strategy’.36 Andrew Carr and Peter Dean observe that the inverse is also true: funding without strategy is still not strategy.37 Moreover, they argue that there is no automatic or inevitable link between a nation's security policy and a threshold budget like 2%. Carr and Dean cite the Americans in 2001, when the US Defence budget was primarily dedicated to state- based threats, while non-state actors attacked the Twin Towers, which heralded the advent of the global war on terror. 38

Comparing the Australian GDP in two different periods (1938 and 2012), which has been done in recent years by politicians and commentators, is also unhelpful as it oversimplifies the facts. For example, in 1938 Australia had only 10 885 full time service personnel with limited equipment. Today, for the same GDP cost of 1.56%, the ADF is a highly modern force of 58 645 personnel, supported by 17 800 Defence civilians whose numbers were much smaller in 1938. 39

The most critical issue when arguing for higher Defence spending is that it needs to be articulated and crafted with carefully honed logic that presents any potential increase in Defence funding as good policy development. This could persuade the public, or at the very least provide a cogent argument when the comparisons of hospital beds, roads and education are offered as counter points. The worst outcome of an unsubstantiated funding target is the increased risk of waste, poor strategic planning and mismanagement.40 Again, this is an area worthy of careful examination; any force design or structure analysis that lacks rigorous intellectual prioritisation will fail in its first contest with logic.

87 Australian Naval Review 2018 Captain Sean Andrews, RAN Where does the Naval War Fighter come from? The sea and a certain skill set Where does a naval war fighter come from? Most recently, every naval officer seems to consider that they are a war fighter. This is disingenuous and unsupported by a cogent conceptual framework. Samuel Huntington in Soldier and the State argues that the military profession, the vocation of officership has a skill set that is not common to the civilian population. On face value and using the Navy as the framework, there are many specialists within it who have civilian counterparts. These include engineers, doctors, logisticians, nurses, lawyers, personnel and management experts, communications and intelligence and even ordnance experts. Yet there is a skill that distinguishes a certain officer from the others and this is where Huntington cites Lasswell’s ‘management of violence’.41 The key function of the Navy is to fight and win at sea, which includes the training of the force, the planning of these activities and the execution of the operation. The application of violence inherent to all this is a peculiar skill that only resides with officers. This skill distinguishes the naval warfare officer from the other specialist officers, whilst the skills of engineers, doctors and logisticians are essential to the achievement of the military objective. These professionals, providing the pivotal operational enablers, are not warfighting specialists; there is no philosophy, no literature and no tradition of warfighting by these professionals. None of the Navy’s key enablers are capable of the management of violence.42 A warfare officer should build their foundation knowledge, first in the tactical and then in the operational level of warfare, with increasing understanding of the intricacies of staff procedures and functions. This development should culminate in command, as the apex of technical mastery in leadership; including as it does understanding of the human dimension of warfare and the delivery of maritime capability as it applies to the execution of government directed operations. This evolution prepares the warfare officer to recognise the complexities and variety of skills required to manage violence. It could be argued that those who will rise to command Maritime Task Groups represent the highest level of competence, but it is those who would be equipped for a joint-combined command appointment that could be considered the uppermost echelon of warfare officers. 43 It should be reinforced that the management of violence by the warfare officer is not an act of violence by itself, firing a gun or a launching a torpedo is a mechanical outcome of a technical process.44 It is the direction of operations, the command of 88 Australian Naval Review 2018 Naval Exceptionalism: Part One a Surface Action Unit or Surface Action Group that require a different skill set. Whilst this can be learnt in part from professional literature it should aspire to evolve through practice; mastery is not achieved by being competent with existing techniques, but rather through a process of continuing development. The warfare officer must continually develop and professionalise their knowledge of emerging tactics and trends based on a deep appreciation of the historical development on the organising and coordinating of naval forces, something gained through the application of military writing and studies.45 The warfare officer through this process of continuing development must be able to translate political policy into plans and actions through the lenses of analysis, with creative ideas and with a sense of perspective. Girt by Beach Australia has been uninterested in the purpose of the ocean beyond the beach break. This is extraordinary for a nation that was founded by a sea power; its two key strategic relationships have been, and remain, with a sea power. Australia is a maritime state, without much use for the ocean, yet its very survival depends upon the trade brought by the sea, which has ensured a very high standard of living. George Friedman argues that one needs to think of Australia as a creature whose primary circulatory system is outside the body, making it extremely vulnerable which in turn, requires unique defensive systems. 46 This unique defensive system for Australia is being aligned with a maritime great power, or at the very least, not hostile to a maritime great power. The reason is that Australia alone cannot simply oppose or confront those maritime powers which can exert control of the sea lanes that Australia relies upon.47 This is an exciting area of enquiry that requires further and deeper research. To call Australia inward looking is too simplistic and crude, as is the label ‘sea blind’, but to understand the strategic, political and societal levers is the first step to reconciling a national maritime operating concept that is convincing, defensible, believable and something Australia as a nation could embrace. At this time, contemporary strategic debate around maritime affairs is conducted by academics not necessarily attuned to the nuances of the ocean.48 Considering Corbett’s maxim regarding that because men live on land great issues are resolved on land, it is arguable that those who have limited relationships with the size, scope and environment of the ocean also have a limited grasp of the broader implications and interrelationships of the multi-dimensional complexity that the ocean presents. 89 Australian Naval Review 2018 Captain Sean Andrews, RAN This limited perspective of the oceans and the strategic ideas which result, underpinned by the inherent constraints and restrictions, are rarely probed by deep enquiry. Mahan and Corbett, who have joined Clausewitz as founding philosophers of their areas of expertise who are regularly quoted, never read and are too white and dead to be considered relevant to contemporary strategic discussion. Contemporary discussion that purports to be maritime strategy generally revolves around the numbers of platforms, why there should be more submarines than surface ships, why big ships are better than small ships. The current argument relates to whether building is being pursued to resurrect Australian manufacturing. What is missing is the discussion on Australian sea power, the link between naval and maritime affairs and their undeniable interrelationship with national and international issues. To be polite, the arguments are rudimentary at best, and there has been little change since Dibb’s 1986 review lamented that serious enquiry had yet to be applied to maritime strategy.49 This is a key area where the warfare officer should draw their quest for enquiry from: a conceptually rich, ever changing environment, whose practitioners are from even a smaller cohort than those that use the ocean in general. 50 Operating day and night out of the sight of land in any weather imposes a concept of vigilance that is a prerequisite at sea in peace and war. Naval operations are unique; they possess a unique vocabulary and require thought supported by theory and it is arguable that no Australian has developed a cogent argument regarding national policy and the sea.51 Australian Naval Thought – The Captains of War Concept … It might be surprising to find that the few who have the capacity of original thought are so frequently able to be frustrated by those who either do not have or do not exercise the attributes … Vice Admiral Sir Hastings Harrington, RAN,52 Chief of Naval Staff 1963 – 1965

Sir Hastings Harrington’s haul down report of 1965 is rich in detail. Whilst he focused on the capability and personnel challenges that affected his service, he also was critical of the intellectual capacity of the commissioned ranks and lamented the combat deaths of leading naval personnel that had left the service bereft of

90 Australian Naval Review 2018 Naval Exceptionalism: Part One sound leadership. His frustration of some 50 years ago echoes an enduring malaise, that the Navy is consumed by daily routine and technology. It has neither the want or desire to undertake intellectual advancement nor the courage to promote a culture of professional mastery that inculcates a commitment to life-long learning.53 But this can be turned around and Navy can resurrect its intellectual fortunes. We need young strategists because we need senior strategists and because it takes a junior strategist to implement the guidance of the senior strategist.54

The Australia Command and Staff Course (ACSC) provides post graduate-level foundational knowledge to students with the requisite critical-thinking and writing skills. The graduates, however, are not afforded the time, incentives, and additional career opportunities to continue self-learning as they progress through their careers. Potential future maritime strategists and naval deep thinkers leave the ACSC and return to Navy, group or joint postings rather than being allowed to pursue opportunities to further develop and mature as maritime thinkers.

The Captain of War concept seeks to select specialised warfare officers at the Commander and Captain rank to be outplaced in either a think tank of significant reputation in Australia, or overseas at a world leading University. The program will require a balance of meeting service posting requirements, long-term Navy interests, key career milestones and personal preferences. Excluding important career milestone assignments, however, this should always remain the top posting priority.

Moreover, the Captain of War opportunities will be given to ‘selected’ warfare officers who graduate with distinction averages without risking their career or unnecessarily impeding the posting process. The naval war fighting community should regard this opportunity as a competitive, career-enhancing selection and encourage those who ‘get it’ to apply for further intellectual advancement that will not undermine their career, posting and promotion prospects. Conclusion This paper is designed to invoke professional discussion on the advancement of intellectual parity for those who will undertake the Navy’s core business: warfighting. Moreover, its purpose is to invoke anger, coupled with the ambition to

91 Australian Naval Review 2018 Captain Sean Andrews, RAN do better in those who have the ability to recognise that they do not think deeply enough about, nor contribute to the vital evolution of our maritime national policy. Clausewitz, often quoted, seldom read, rarely mastered, wrote ‘… war is such a dangerous business […] The maximum use of force is in no way incompatible with the simultaneous use of the intellect …’55 Moreover, the officer who is said to have given more to the United States Navy than any other, the founder of the United States Naval War College, Rear Admiral Stephen B Luce articulated that naval warfare must be given the status of a science, that officers should be required to study their profession; and that profession is war. 56 In contemporary times, there is much to be mastered and in the Australian politico- military context there are enduring challenges. Eliot Cohen’s famous dictum that, ‘in practice the high politics of war is suffused as well with the low or domestic politics’, remains true.57 This was most recently reiterated at the Australian Sea Power Conference by the West Australian Senator Linda Reynolds when she argued that the Australian politico-military relationship was fraught with ill directed internal power disputes, inadequate constitutional oversight, and poor organisational structure to deliver capability, a lack of cogent thinking, an indifferent public and an over-reliance on allies. 58 The Captain of War concept is not a panacea; it is not based on any particular advanced military education model nor is it attempting to deep select future star- ranked officers. The Captain of War concept is a development option for those with both the desire and aptitude for deeper study and reflection. Whilst this concept is aimed at middle ranking officers, it is in no way exclusive; the ‘Street to Fleet, Fleet to Flag’ concept intent is to provide the foundation that promotes professional mastery through a culture that inculcates a commitment to life-long learning. This programme is one that in time could provide the Navy and Australia with a cadre of military thinkers, selected and groomed to consider and develop policies and strategies to create maritime power, anticipate the uncertainty of national security challenges, comprehend and invest naval resources to deliver capability and achieve government directed tasking and cogently communicate Australian maritime interests to the nation, the other services, departments, partners and allies. This paper has set out a basis for enquiry. It is not exhaustive, but it lays the foundation in which potential Captains of War should commence their discussions and lay their foundations of blue water thinking. To borrow a theme on the intensity 92 Australian Naval Review 2018 Naval Exceptionalism: Part One of a narrative from a previous Prime Minister, the discussion on blue water thinking, on sea power should be such that in Australia this conversation is being consumed by every galah in every pet shop.59 It is only then Australia, as a nation, can lay claim to its unassailable destiny as a maritime nation. Captain Sean Andrews, RAN Captain Sean Andrews is a Principal Warfare Officer and Under Sea Warfare specialist, who joined the RAN as a Junior Recruit in 1982 at the age of 16 qualifying as a sonar controller. Receiving his commission in 1990 as a Seaman Officer and completing extensive sea service, Captain Andrews was promoted to Lieutenant Commander in 2004 and in 2006 assumed Command of the Australian built mine hunter HMAS Yarra. It was here he was awarded a Commander Australian Fleet Commendation for ‘Outstanding Leadership in Command’.

Captain Andrews graduated from the Australian Command and Staff College in the Class of 2009 and was selected as the RAN representative to attend the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth to undertake the Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS).

Captain Andrews holds two Masters Degrees and is reading his PhD at the University of New South Wales, which he will deliver in July 2018. Captain Andrews assumed the duties as Director Sea Power Centre - Australia on 26 July 2018

93 Australian Naval Review 2018 Captain Sean Andrews, RAN

1 To consider the unusual about Australia is to view the things that make us peculiar; Christmas at Bondi, national pride at the lethality of native species for example. William Coleman argues that Australia is drifting from the tendencies of other Western nations with regard to social and economic policy. Australia is following a special path enabled nearly a century ago. For further reading see: Coleman William O, ‘Only in Australia: The history, politics and economics of Australian exceptionalism’, Oxford University Press, United Kingdom, 2016. The truth could be said of the RAN, a course that was laid over a century ago has not been kept for a variety of reasons; political, national indifference and arguably the lack of a cogent and logical argument regarding the unassailable fact that Australia is a coastal state, a maritime nation. Hence this essay, the first of three focuses on Australian naval exceptionalism. 2 AT Mahan, ‘Mahan on Naval Strategy: Selections from the Writings of the Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan in Hattendorf’, John B. (ed), Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, USA, 2015, pp. xxix and AT Mahan, ‘The Submarine and its Enemies’, Colliers Weekly, 6 April 1907, pp. 17-21. 3 D Horne, ‘The Lucky Country: Australia in the Sixties’, Penguin Books, Adelaide, 1965, pp. 24-25, 165-166, 109, 208-209. Further reading; R Menzies, ‘The Forgotten People’, Speech, 22 May 1942 accessed on 02 August 2017 http://www.liberals.net/theforgottenpeople.htm In this speech Menzies argues that in times of war Australia is not as thoughtful as it could be in the context of political, social and industrial theory. R Menzies, ‘Lend Lease’, Speech 29 May 1942 accessed on 02 August 2017 https://menziesvirtualmuseum.org.au/trnascripts/the-forgotten-people/73-chapter- 15-1 Menzies was speaking on the many troubles with democracy in that Australians take too many things for granted and that they rarely think. 4 Ibid. Horne, pp. 25, 208-209, 232-233. 5 CAF announced 5 PhD airman scholar scholarships in 2016 and 2017 at the air power conferences. Additionally, Army has just sent its first soldier scholar to Pembroke College, Oxford in the United Kingdom in 2017. 6 This is not a new concept, whilst many think Churchill was ungenerous in his criticism of the Royal Navy in 1912, to be fair Churchill did acknowledge that there was a significant amount of professional distraction for the naval officer of the day. For further reading see: W Churchill, The World Crisis 1911-1918, Penguin Classics, London, 2005, pp. 59 and James Holmes, ‘Does America Have Naval Strategists Anymore?’ The Diplomat, accessed on 12 January 2014 http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/does-america-have-any-naval-strategists-a 7 Navy’s mission is not exactly where one would think it would be; perhaps hanging on the front page of any Navy portal would be appropriate. Accessed on 14 September 2017 http://www.Navy.gov.au/about and J Hayes and J Hattendorf, ‘The Writings of Stephen B Luce, United States War College, Rhode Island, 1975, pp. 38-47. 8 D Barno, N Bensahel, K Kidder, K Sayler, ‘Building Better Generals’, Centre for New American Security, October 2013, pp. 5, 8-9, 17. For further reading in the Australian context: N Jans, ‘The Chiefs’, A Study of Strategic Leadership, Commonwealth of Australia, 2013, pp. 55, 82, 85, 104, 109 and 123. 9 J Siracusa, ‘The ANZUS treaty revisited’, Security Challenges, Volume 1, Number 1, Australia, 2005, pp. 89-103 and for further reading on Naval Education see: A Mahan, ‘Naval Education’, Proceedings, Volume 5, May 1879 accessed on 02 August 2017, https://www.usni.org/print/29493 10 A Mahan, ‘Naval Strategy’, Naval Institute Press, United States, 1991, p. 279. 11 Ibid. W Churchill, p. 59. 12 S Huntington, ‘National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy’, Proceedings, Vol. 80, No 5, May 1954, p. 483. 13 Ibid. p. 484. 94 Australian Naval Review 2018 Naval Exceptionalism: Part One

14 S Morison, ‘Notes on naval (not Navy) English’, American Neptune, 1949, 9:10 and http://www.digitalattic.org/home/war/napoleon/ and Ibid. Barno, David, Bensahel, Nora, Kidder, Katherine, Sayler, Kelley, ‘Building Better Generals’, Centre for New American Security, October 2013, pp. 8-9. 15 J Corbett, ‘Some principles of Maritime Strategy’, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1988, p. 167. 16 J Goldrick, ‘The Irresistible Force and the Immoveable Object: The Naval Review, the Young Turks, and the Royal Navy, 1911-1931’, in J Goldrick and Hattendorf (eds.) ‘Mahan is not Enough: The proceedings of a Conference on the Works of Sir Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond’, Naval War College Press, Rhode Island, USA, 1993, p. 85 and K Dewar, ‘The Navy from Within’, V Gollancz, University of Wisconsin, USA, 1939, p. 154. 17 Ibid. J Goldrick, p. 85. 18 J Keegan, ‘The Price of the Admiralty’, War at Sea from Man-of-War to Submarine, Arrow Books, London, 1990, p. 137. 19 Ibid. 20 G Dobell, ‘The Arc of Instability: The History of an Idea’, in Huiskin, Ron and Thatcher, Meredith (eds.), History as Policy, Framing the debate on the future of Australia’s defence policy, ANU Press, Canberra, Australia, 2007, pp. 86-87. 21 C Bell, Nation, Region and Context: Studies in Peace and War in Honour of Professor T.B. Millar, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, CP113, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia, 1995, pp. 50-51. Moreover, there is recorded fact that Admiral von Spee’s Pacific German Fleet existed the Pacific because of the capability of HMAS Australia, but perhaps more precisely the risk to his fleet in the interests of the German nation in the Pacific was not worth the endeavour. Germany was very much attuned to its continental philosophy and Europe. 22 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 130, 17 June 1931, p. 2693. The question was put to the Minister for Defence Mr Joseph Chifley (Macquarie, NSW) by Mr Joseph Lyons (Wilmot, Tasmania) about abolishing the Navy outright as a separate unit, Chifley responded that numerous economic options have been considered and he was not in the position to indicate what form they may take. 23 K Beazley, ‘Selected speeches 1985 - 1989 by the Hon. Kim C. Beazley, MP, Minister for Defence’, Navy Symposium,’ The Development of Australian Maritime Strategy’, 28 November 1987 accessed 23 August 2017 https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/LIB100026589 24 L Reynolds, Speech at the Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Conference 2017, Session Two, Australia’s National Maritime Identity, 1530-1650, Tuesday 03 October 2017. 25 Special War Studies Seminar: 75th Anniversary of the battle of Milne Bay, Hosted by the Australian National University, MC Professor John Blaxland, 31 August 2017. 26 A Forbes, Australia’s Maritime Past, Present and Future’, in Till, Geoffrey and Bratton, Patrick. C, Sea Power and the Asia Pacific: The Triumph of Neptune? Routledge, London 2012, p. 184 and Sea Power Centre – Australia accessed on 06 September 2017 http://www.Navy.gov.au/spc/ 27 Sea Power Centre Australia’s mission is to: to promote understanding of sea power and its application to the security of Australia's national interests, to manage the development of RAN doctrine and facilitate its incorporation into Australian Defence Force (ADF) joint doctrine, to contribute to regional engagement, to contribute to the development of maritime strategic concepts, strategies, and force structure decisions, to preserve, develop and promote Australian naval history. Accessed on 18 Sept 17 http://www.Navy.gov.au/spc/

28 Ibid. pp. 167-186.

95 Australian Naval Review 2018 Captain Sean Andrews, RAN

29 Commonwealth of Australia, Inquiry into Australia’s Maritime Strategy 21 June 2004 http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Completed_Inquiries/jfadt/M aritime/msindex 30 For further reading see the Evans, David Air Marshall, ‘A Fatal Rivalry’, MacMillan Company, Melbourne, Australia, 1990, Whilst there persist some factual errors in this book, it is still apparent that there are unhealthy competitions driven by singular and selfish needs in defence, there is a sense that Defence and the Government in its effort to risk mitigate attempts to please all the services all the time to minimise scrutiny of difficult Defence policy. 31 Prime Minister Malcolm Turnball says the number one priority of the Government is to keep the people safe, ABC News accessed on 06 September 2017 https://www.msn.com/en- au/news/videos/prime-minister-malcolm-turnbull-says-the-number-one-priority-of-the- government-is-to-keep-australians-safe/vp-BBBKSlv 32 Commonwealth of Australia, The 45th Parliament accessed on 10 September 2017, http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Pa rliamentary_Handbook/Current_Ministry_List 33 P Jennings, ‘The Politics of Defence White paper’, Security Challenges, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2013, pp. 1- 5. 34 Commonwealth of Australia, ‘2016 Defence White Paper’, Canberra, 2016, pp. 15-16 35 Ibid. pp. 4-6. 36 A Carr and P Dean, ‘Tony Abbott's most expensive three-word slogan: '2 per cent' of GDP on defence The promise to link military spending to GDP never made sense’. Accessed on 10 September 2017 http://www.canberratimes.com.au/national/public-service/abbotts-most-expensive-threeword- slogan-2-per-cent-of-gdp-on-defence-20151028-gkkt8y.html 37 Ibid. and M Thomson, ‘Defence Funding in 2013: Means, Ends and Make Believe’, Security Challenges, Vol. 9 No. 2 (2013) pp. 51-58. 38 A Carr and P Dean, ‘The Funding Illusion: 2% of GDP furphy in Australia’s Defence Debate’, Security Challenges, Vol. 9, No. 4, 2013, pp. 70-73. 39 Ibid. pp. 73-74. 40 Ibid. pp. 79-85. 41 S Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relationships, Harvard University Press, USA, 1957, pp. 11-14. For further reading see H Laswell’s ‘The Garrison State’, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Jan, 1941) pp. 455-468. 42 Ibid. and J Galvin ‘What’s the Matter with being a Strategist’, Parameters, 2-10, 19 March 1989, pp. 82-87. 43 Ibid. 44 Huntington, Ibid. p. 13. 45 Ibid. pp. 13-14 and Ibid. B Barno et al., ‘Building Better Generals’, Centre for New American Security, October 2013, pp. 17. For further reading in the Australian context: N Jans, ‘The Chiefs, A Study of Strategic Leadership’, Commonwealth of Australia, 2013, pp. 55, 82, 85, 104, 109 and 123 and Ibid. Huntington, pp. 232 – 247. 46 G Friedman, ‘Australia’s Strategy’, STRATFOR World View, geopolitical weekly, 22 May 2012, accessed on 23 May 2012 https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/australias-strategy 47 Ibid.

96 Australian Naval Review 2018 Naval Exceptionalism: Part One

48 See S Fruehling, 'Golden Window of Opportunity: A New Maritime Strategy and Force Structure for the Australian Navy', Security Challenges, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 81-104.and H White, ‘A Middling Power: Why Australia’s defence is all at sea’, The Monthly, October 2012, accessed October 2012 https://www.themonthly.com.au/issue/2012/september/1346903463/hugh-white/middling- power For further reading sees James Goldbrick’s responses to Hugh White’s essay, ‘False Thinking and Australian Strategy’ accessed in October 2012 https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the- interpreter/false-thinking-and-australian-strategy-1 and https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the- interpreter/false-thinking-and-australian-strategy-2 and https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the- interpreter/false-thinking-and-australian-strategy-3 49 P Dibb, ‘Review of Australian Defence Capabilities: Report to the Minister for Defence’, Australian Government Publishing Service, March 1986, p. 2. 50 D Redford, ‘The Influence of Identity on Sea Power’, in N Rodger, J Dancy, Ross, Darnell, Benjamin, Wilson, Evan (eds) ‘Strategy and the Sea’, Essays in Honour of John B. Hattendorf, The Boydell Press, USA, 2016, pp. 205-211 and D Redford, ‘Maritime History and Identity: The Sea and Culture in the Modern World’, I B Taurus and Co, London, 2014, pp. 69-75 and R Barnett, ‘Navy Strategic Culture: Why the Navy Thinks Differently’, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 2009, pp. 14-19. 51 J Wylie, ‘Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control’, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, USA, 1967, pp. 10-13. 52 Sir Hastings Harrington, ‘Chief of Navy Haul Down Report’, Canberra, 8 February 1965, pp. 2, 4-6 and 9. 53 Sir Herbert Richmond, ‘The Place of History in Naval Education’, Naval Policy and Naval Strength and Other Essays’, Longmans, Green and Co, London, 1928, pp. 255-277 and Ibid. Hayes et al., p. 47. 54 Ibid. J Galvin, ‘What’s the Matter with being a Strategist’, Parameters, 2-10, 19 March 1989, pp. 82-87. 55 C Von Clausewitz, ‘On War’, Howard, Michael and Paret, Peter (eds) Princeton University Press, New Jersey, USA, 1984, p. 75. 56 J Hayes, and J Hattendorf, ‘The Writings of Stephen B Luce’, United States War College, Rhode Island, 1975, pp. 38-47. 57 E Cohen, ‘Supreme Command’, First Anchor Books Edition, September 2003, p. 258. 58 Senator L Reynolds, Defence is our ‘biggest national policy failure’ speech during Sea Power Conference 2017, Session Two: Australia’s National Maritime Identity, Thursday 03 October 2017. 59 The Labor Prime Minister, the Hon Paul Keating on his challenges of economic reform, particularly micro economics stated that he would keep discussing microeconomics until every galah, in every pet shop was talking about microeconomics, thus attaining a national conversation across the broad sections of the Australian community. https://www.eurekastreet.com.au/uploads/File/pdf/EurekaStreetClassic/Vol3No6.pdf Accessed on 2 September 2017, p. 11.

97 Australian Naval Review 2018 Associate Professor Alexey Muraviev

The Forgotten Force is back: the Russian Navy in the Indo-Asia-Pacific Associate Professor Alexey D. Muraviev

Russia is one of few major powers that has a long standing naval presence in the Pacific, which can be traced as far back as the 1600s, when Russian explorers first reached Siberia’s eastern coastline and founded a seaport at Okhotsk in 1647. On 21 May 1731, Okhotsk gained the status of a naval port, and the Russian Okhotsk Flotilla was formed under the command of Skornyakov-Pisarev, beginning Russia’s naval presence in the area and laying the foundation for the future development of a regular naval fleet in being.

Since its creation 287 years ago, Russian naval power in the Pacific has experienced a long and complex evolution. Between 1731 and today, the Russian Pacific Fleet (RUSPAC) saw two major declines (after 1905 and 1991) and three major build-ups of its fallen capabilities. Each capability restoration and build-up of strength was driven by threat responses as well as rethinking the strategic importance of the Indo-Asia-Pacific for Russia.

Order of Battle The Russian Navy operates two open-ocean fleets, the Northern and the Pacific. The RUSPAC has the largest area of responsibility in the Russian Navy, with an operational area covering the entire Pacific and Indian Ocean maritime theatres, reaching South Africa, Australia, Antarctica and South America. In early 2018, the fleet had a combined strength of about 300 units, among them some 77 warships, including 23 submarines, with a total combined displacement of about 900 000 tonnes (Table 1), divided between the Primorskaya and Kamchatskaya flotillas. Its peacetime strength has more than 30 000 active personnel. The Maritime Guard element of the Russian Border Guard Service deploys an additional 80 armed surface combatants, among them frigates and capable of limited combat duties in wartime.

RUSPAC’s peacetime missions currently include:

98 Australian Naval Review 2018 The Forgotten Force is back x the maritime defence of the Far East and the Arctic; x the creation of a favourable maritime regime in littoral seas; x the maintenance of a highly capable strategic nuclear arm (the Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) force) and participation in strategic deterrent operations; x the protection of merchant shipping and guaranteed access to the sea- based resources in the Pacific; x the protection of areas of Russia’s regional industrial maritime activity and its EEZ against unsanctioned use by other states; x support for Russia’s regional foreign policy through forward presence and naval diplomacy; x peacekeeping operations sanctioned by the UN; and x counter-piracy operations, operations to counter maritime crime, and counterterrorism activities.

In wartime, the fleet is likely to prioritise two principal missions: naval strategic warfare (support of SSBN operations) and the maritime defence of eastern Russia. Depending on their significance, these missions can be divided into three levels of tasks:

1. Strategic tasks: defence of the Okhotsk SSBN bastion and strategic strike; limited anti-submarine warfare (ASW); operations against enemy SSBNs; 2. Operational–tactical (theatre) tasks: operations against enemy strike battle groups; ASW operations against nuclear-powered attack submarines; and 3. Tactical (local) tasks: local ASW; anti-sea line of communication (SLOC) warfare; mine warfare; coastal defence; limited amphibious operations.

To accomplish all three levels of tasks, the fleet will have to be ready to wage a number of naval operations, including strategic strike, ASW, anti-carrier warfare, surface strike warfare, mine warfare and amphibious warfare.

99 Australian Naval Review 2018 Associate Professor Alexey Muraviev Table 1: Russian Pacific Fleet order of battle, July 2018

Pacific Fleet Equipment, by type Submarines Strategic: 5 total SSBN 5 Tactical: 18 total SSGN 5 (2 in refit) SSN 5 (1 in refit) SSK 8 Principal surface combatants 8 total CGHG 2 (1 in reserve/conservation) DDGHM 6 (3 in refit) Patrol and coastal combatants 25 total FSGM 5 FSM 8 PCFG 9 PBM 3 Mine warfare 8 total MSO 2 MSC 6 Amphibious 8 total LST 4 LCM 3 LCU 1 Pacific Fleet Naval Aviation

100 Australian Naval Review 2018 The Forgotten Force is back Table 1: Russian Pacific Fleet order of battle, July 2018

Forces, by role Fighters 1 squadron with 12 MiG-31B/BM Foxhound ASW 3 squadrons with 29 Ka-27/6 Ka-29 Helix 2 squadrons with 8 Il-38 May, 4 Il- 38N Novella; Il-18D;1 Il-22 Coot B 1 squadron with 11 Tu- 142MK/MZ/MR Bear F/J Transport 2 squadrons with 1 An-140-100, 2 An- 12BK Cub; 3 An-26 Curl; 1 Tu-134 Equipment, by type Aircraft FTR 12 MiG-31B/BM Foxhound ASW 23 total 11 Tu-142M3 Bear F/J; 12 Il-38 May and Il- 38N Novella EW * ELINT 1 Il-22 Coot B TPT 7 total 1 An-140-100, 2 An-12BK Cub; 3 An-26 Curl; 1 Tu- 134 Helicopters ASW 29 Ka-27/Ka-27M Helix

101 Australian Naval Review 2018 Associate Professor Alexey Muraviev Table 1: Russian Pacific Fleet order of battle, July 2018

TPT – medium 6 Ka-29 Helix; 26 Mi-8 Hip, 1 Mi- 8AMTSh-VA Pacific Fleet Naval Infantry Forces, by role Manoeuvre Mechanised 2 naval infantry brigades (155th and 40th) Air defence 1 SAM regiment (1532 nd) Coastal artillery and missile troops Forces, by role Coastal defence 2 AShM brigades (72nd and 520th) Sources: The Military Balance 2018; Defence of Japan 2016; RIA Novosti (issues 2016–18), TASS (issues 2016–18); Krasnaya Zvezda (issues 2016–18); data collected by the author.

The surface arm of the fleet consists of some 50 warships, about 18% of which are ocean-going combatants capable of supporting out-of-area operations. Operational units include RUSPAC’s flagship Moskva-class guided-missile (CG) RFS Varyag and four Udaloy-class and one Sovremenny-class guided-missile destroyer (DDG).1 All major surface units are assigned to the 36th Division of Surface Ships ( and Sovremennys) or the 44th ASW Brigade (Udaloys). In peacetime and wartime, RUSPAC’s surface fleet is intended to accomplish the following combat tasks:

x forward presence; x border and the Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ) protection; x counter-piracy and search and rescue operations; x operations in the Arctic; x surveillance and intelligence gathering; x naval diplomacy; x tactical sea denial/interdiction operations;

102 Australian Naval Review 2018 The Forgotten Force is back x Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) including strategic ASW (anti-SSBN operations); and x targeted anti-SLOC operations.

Given the shortage of operational surface combatants, RUSPAC is now committing minor surface combatants to support long-range deployments such as Nanuchka III and Grisha III missile and ASW corvettes, predominantly in the Kuril Islands and the western parts of the Sea of Okhotsk.

The RUSPAC’s submarine force is the fleet’s main strategic and strike component. The Russian submarine force in the Pacific is one of the world’s oldest operating forces, and in 2017 celebrated 112 years since its creation. It has fewer units than it did back in the 1980s, but it’s now more cost-effective and better suited to Russia’s economic capacity and geostrategic requirements.

The Pacific submarine force is divided into two principal groupings:

x the 16th Red Banner Submarine Squadron based at the Rybachiy naval base, Viliuchinsk; the 10th (anti-carrier) Submarine Division [one Akula- class nuclear powered (SSN) and three Oscar-II-class cruise missile submarines (SSGNs)]; and the 25th (strategic) Submarine Division [two Boreys and three Delta IIIs]; and x the 19th Submarine Brigade, Maly Ullis Bay, Vladivostok [five operational Kilos].2

In peacetime and wartime, RUSPAC’s submarine force is intended to accomplish the following combat tasks:

x strategic nuclear deterrence; x anti-aircraft-carrier warfare; x strategic sea denial (anti-SSBN operations); x tactical sea denial/interdiction operations; x targeted anti-SLOC operations; and x surveillance and intelligence gathering.

103 Australian Naval Review 2018 Associate Professor Alexey Muraviev Russian submarines are active in traditional areas of operations in the seas of Okhotsk and Japan and the Western Pacific, with occasional deployments to the East and South China Seas. The capability upgrade of RUSPAC’s submarine arm has begun, so a further intensification of submarine operations can be expected, extending its operational reach to the Southwestern Pacific and the Indian Ocean.3 Another essential component of the fleet’s combat potential is its air arm organised in the Pacific Fleet Naval Aviation (PFNA). On 4 April 2018, PFNA celebrated the 86th anniversary of its formation as the RUSPAC’s stand-alone element. The air arm of the fleet currently has five basic missions: Anti-Ship Strike; Fighter Attack; Reconnaissance and Surveillance; ASW; and Search and Rescue (SAR). In mid-2018, PFNA had about 105 fixed and rotary-wing aircraft in its order of battle (Table 1).

Over the past two years, the intensity of PFNA’s flight operations remained high, exceeding a total of 7000 flying hours in both 2016 and 2017. Over the past three years, PFNA has started receiving new and upgraded platforms, including Il-38N Novella modernised ASW patrol aircraft, Ka-27M ASW and Ka-29M multi-role helicopters. In late 2016 and early 2017, its transport element received one An-140- 100 fixed-wing aircraft and one Mi-8AMTSh-VA multi-role helicopter designed for operations in the Arctic.4

Despite some significant force reductions in the 1990s, the RUSPAC deploys a considerable amphibious and special operations component of the fleet, including three major elements:

x the naval infantry (marines) and naval special forces (naval spetsnaz and other special-purpose units); x coastal missile artillery (the 72nd Missile Brigade stationed near Vladivostok and the 520th Missile Brigade stationed in Elizovo, Kamchatka)5; and x the amphibious sealift element.

In 2013, RUSPAC’s amphibious element was expanded with the transformation of the 3rd Independent Naval Infantry [marine] Regiment deployed in Kamchatka into a peace-strength brigade, thus increasing the number of Russian marine brigades in the Pacific to two (the 40th in Kamchatka and the 155th in Vladivostok). This larger marine force is being supported by the 100th Brigade of four large landing 104 Australian Naval Review 2018 The Forgotten Force is back ships, which remain very active and also support out-of-area operations, including the Syria campaign.

In 2017, naval infantry units assigned to the RUSPAC started to be re-equipped with advanced BTR-82 armoured personnel carriers, which would provide them with improved firepower and amphibious capability.6

Adding to the marine element of Russian power projection strike capability in the Indo-Asia-Pacific are two elements of Russian airborne troops (vozdushno- desantnye voiska or VDV): the 11th Guards Air Assault Brigade (Ulan-Ude) and the 83rd Guards Airborne Brigade (Ussuriisk).7 The 11th and 83rd brigades are part of Russia’s rapid response strike capability deployed east of the Urals. The brigades often operate side-by-side with RUSPAC naval infantry units, including during amphibious assault and counter-amphibious exercises. During a strategic-level snap exercise held in September 2014, both brigades were placed on full alert and deployed along the Far Eastern immediate defence perimeter to Sakhalin, the Kurils and Anadyr (Chukotka). Elements of both brigades were airlifted over 4000 kilometres to forward operating areas.8

The placing of both brigades under the VDV organisational and command structure will improve their training, organisation and equipment. Between 18–20 October 2017, the restructured and re-equipped 11th Brigade took part in the largest VDV exercise in the Far East, which involved the rapid redeployment of its key strike assets and assault operations behind enemy lines.9

Russia’s capability to rapidly deploy its airborne troops, other special force elements or other units will increase significantly with the formation of the 18th Military Transport Aviation Division (voenno-transportnaya aviatsiya divizia).10 The central location of a new military transport aviation division will allow it to provide rapid airlift support to all Russian military districts, as well as to assist with in- theatre force manoeuvres and out-of-area deployments.

The Eastern Military District has a deployable capacity to dispatch a naval infantry battalion (amphibious variant, about 500 personnel) and one airborne brigade (airborne variant, about 2000 personnel) in support of out-of-area operations. This combined force can be engaged in limited-scale contingencies with the support of 105 Australian Naval Review 2018 Associate Professor Alexey Muraviev naval and air power assets. In times of greater crisis or operational need, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) would redeploy elements of VDV, naval infantry and support assets (military transport aviation) from other theatres, massing a sizeable operational group in support of larger scale operations. In addition, the formation of 20 tactical battalion groups (approximately 16 000 personnel) in the Eastern Military District provides the MoD with additional force options without the immediate need to call for reinforcements from other area commands.

In 2016 and 2017, RUSPAC staged two exploratory expeditions to Matua Island in the Kurils. It seems that among the key drivers for this are plans to establish a manoeuvre naval base on the island, which could eventually home port next- generation major surface combatants, and even play a role in Russia’s plans to develop an echeloned anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defensive layout in the Far East.11 There are also plans to use a former Japanese military airfield as a forward operating base of the Russian Federation Air Space Force, including elements of the Long Range Aviation force.12 If those plans are implemented, it will signal Russia’s intent to extend its defensive barrier in the Pacific away from the littoral by gradually moving back to a two-barrier defensive layout.

Operational Activity and Power Projection In the Indo-Asia-Pacific geostrategic context, Russia’s ability to exercise strategic reach will be largely measured by the capacity of the Russian Navy to sustain out- of-area operations alongside regular deployments to the Atlantic, the Mediterranean and the Arctic, although any analysis should also include the country’s long-range aerial operations and airborne capability, including mobile force elements.

Over the past five years, the Russian Navy has considerably increased its operational tempo, operational zones and the number of units deployed in forward areas. Despite some significant numerical reductions in its overall order of battle, the Navy managed to reach Cold War levels of operational activity, involving deployments of some 70 to 100 warships and auxiliaries at any given time. According to the Chief of the Russian Navy, Admiral Vladimir Korolev, Russian warships spent 17 100 days at sea in 2017, an increase of 1500 days from 2016.13 The Russian Navy carried out a total of 139 long-range deployments in 2017, an absolute record in its post-Cold War history.14 106 Australian Naval Review 2018 The Forgotten Force is back In the new training year, which commenced on 1 December 2017, the Russian Navy staged 13 combat deployments in forward areas; Russian submarines spent over 1000 days at sea over same period; surface combatants – over 4000 days; naval aviation – about 13 000 flying hours.15

RUSPAC’s operational intensity in 2017 also remained high. According to RUSPAC’s Commander, Admiral Sergei Avakyants, in 2017 RUSPAC units spent about 10 000 days at sea; Pacific Fleet Naval Aviation flew over 7000 hours.16

Russia’s ability to project naval power across the Indo-Pacific strategic maritime theatre should not be measured only in the context of the potential of its Pacific Fleet. As open-source data and an analysis of Soviet Cold War operations show, the Russian Navy deploys assets from a number of its fleets to key forward operating areas, including the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Russian naval activities in Southeast Asian waters in late 2014 are another indicative example. During November of that year, three naval task groups drawn from the Baltic, Black Sea and Pacific fleets carried out patrols and exercises in the Philippine and Coral Seas, calling at ports in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.17 RFS Varyag operated off Australia’s Queensland coast at the time of the G20 Leaders’ Summit in Brisbane—a rare display of Russian naval activity near Australian territorial waters. The Navy’s operational activity in Southeast Asia in late 2014 highlights the practice of massing forces from different maritime theatres.

Russian out-of-area operations in the Indo-Asia-Pacific today include operations in the Western Pacific, the East and South China seas, the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and, more recently, in the southwestern sectors of the Pacific and in the Arctic. Under Russian President Vladimir Putin, Russia has once again declared the Arctic as an area of its immediate and longer term strategic interests. Swift moves by Moscow to secure its strategic dominance over the area have resulted from its aspirations to obtain maximum commercial dividends from exploring and exploiting the continental shelf, which also manifests in claims to the control of the largest EEZ in the area, and its desire to secure the northern sea route as a viable transit alternative to established Indo-Pacific maritime links.18

107 Australian Naval Review 2018 Associate Professor Alexey Muraviev At the same time, Russia’s Eastern Military District and RUSPAC are expected to play significant roles in supporting and sustaining the operations of the newly formed regional command. Apart from using the Arctic Ocean for theatre-to- theatre force transfers (predominantly submarine deployments) and aerial patrols, RUSPAC has initiated surface ship operations in the area.

The long-range activities of the Russian Navy have now extended into the traditional areas of operation of the Soviet Navy, reaching the Indian Ocean and the Antarctic. Although its deployable forces are smaller than those of the Soviet Union’s Navy, the Russian Navy continued high-tempo out-of-area operations in the Pacific throughout 2014 to 2017. Russian warships operated throughout Southeast Asia, near the Horn of Africa, in the Coral Sea and Western Pacific, and in the Mediterranean. Over that period, Russian warships operating in the Indo-Pacific strategic maritime theatre made a total of 105 port calls: 57 in the Pacific and 48 in the Indian Ocean (Figure 1).

Between January and 1 July 2018, Russian warships operating in the Indo-Pacific strategic maritime theatre made a total of 10 port calls (seven in the Pacific and three in the Indian Ocean, Figures 1 and 2).

108 Australian Naval Review 2018 The Forgotten Force is back Figure 1: Russian Navy port calls in the Pacific maritime theatre, 2014 to 1 July 2018

12 10 8 6 4 2 0

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 TOTAL

Sources: MoD; TASS (issues 2014 to 2018); INTERFAX (issues 2014 to 2018); Naval Today (issues 2014 to 2018).

Figure 2: Russian Navy port calls in the Indian Ocean maritime theatre, 2014 to 1 July 2018

12 10 8 6 4 2 0

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 TOTAL

Sources: MoD; TASS (issues 2014 to 2018); INTERFAX (issues 2014 to 2018); Naval Today (issues 2014 to 2018); data collected by the author.

109 Australian Naval Review 2018 Associate Professor Alexey Muraviev Between 2009 and 2014, RUSPAC took an active part in Russia’s counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa by deploying at least nine task groups. However, since 2015, its forward naval deployments have been oriented more towards traditional Cold War-style activities (ASW and shadowing operations, support of friendly maritime regimes along key SLOCs, and active naval diplomacy). The fleet also supported Russia’s campaign in Syria.

It is worth noting the intensified exploratory operations of hydrographic units of the Russian Navy in recent years (Table 2). The extent of their operations is an indicator of the renewed need to obtain the most up-to-date hydrographic data in support of surface and submarine forward operations throughout the Indo-Pacific maritime theatre and the Arctic, including southwestern parts of the Pacific. To sustain Russia’s forward operations in the Indian Ocean and to further operational and strategic reach, the Russian MoD is considering plans to establish a new support base (a replenishment point) in the Red Sea area. Should these plans be implemented, Russia would acquire another overseas support naval facility in addition to Tartus in Syria and the ability to call on Cam Ranh.19

Table 2: Russian Navy’s oceanographic activities in the Indo-Pacific maritime theatre, 2014 to 1 July 2018

Month, year Fleet Operational units Area of exploratory operations

July 2014 Pacific RFS Marshal Gelovani Seas of Japan and Okhotsk and RFS Vitse- Admiral Vorontsov

Mid-2014 Pacific RFS Antarktida South China Sea and the Strait of Singapore

August – Baltic RFS Admiral The Artic (northern sea December 2014 Vladimirskiy route) and northern Pacific

110 Australian Naval Review 2018 The Forgotten Force is back Table 2: Russian Navy’s oceanographic activities in the Indo-Pacific maritime theatre, 2014 to 1 July 2018

Mid- to late 2015 Pacific RFS Marshal Gelovani Southern and and RFS Fotiy Krylov southwestern Pacific (ocean-going tug) (about 20 000 nm at sea)

August–October Pacific RFS Vitse-Admiral Sea of Japan; Okhotsk, 2015 Vorontsov Chukchi and Bering seas (about 10 000 nm at sea)

November 2015 – Baltic RFS Admiral Indian Ocean and the April 2016 Vladimirskiy Antarctic (about 30 000 nm at sea)

Mid-2016 Pacific RFS Marshal Gelovani South China Sea

October 2016 – Black RFS Donuslav Black Sea, Mediterranean March 2017 Sea and Red seas, Gulf of Aden

April – August Baltic RFS Admiral Indian Ocean 2017 Vladimirskiy

October – Northern RFS Yantar Indian Ocean November 2017

February – April Baltic RFS Admiral Indian Ocean 2018 Vladimirskiy

Source: RIA Novosti (Issues 2016–18), TASS (Issues 2016–18); Krasnaya Zvezda (Issues 2016–18); Voenno-Promyshlenny Kurier (Issues 2015–18); data collected by the author.

Over the past six years the Russian Navy has shown intensified exercise activity in the Pacific. In 2016 and 2017, the RUSPAC was declared the most combat read of all Russian naval fleets. That was determined by the outcome of the annual Chief 111 Australian Naval Review 2018 Associate Professor Alexey Muraviev of Navy’s trophy competition that extends to all main categories of individual ship and task group operations at sea. In the first half of 2018, about 60 RUSPAC surface units and submarines took part in some 10 tactical exercises. Between 7–18 June 2018 the fleet staged its single largest combined training at sea, involving about 50 warships and auxiliaries and some 15 aircraft.20 In August–September 2018, the RUSPAC together with the Northern Fleet took part in Russia’s largest wargames of the year, Vostok–2018 [East–2018], which will be held in the Russian Far East.

Capability Upgrades Russia’s near and longer-term ability to exercise influence and power projection will be conditional on its capacity to rebuild and sustain a potent Navy, including the Pacific Fleet. The collapse of the Soviet Union, coupled with the geographical remoteness of RUSPAC and a lack of funding, had a dramatic impact on the fleet’s deployable force. By 2000, the number of its submarines was reduced by 75%, while the surface element fell by 47%, and there were declines in the scale and intensity of naval operations. In the 1990s and early 2000s, RUSPAC received barely any new additions to compensate for a massive decommissioning of assets. The situation has improved over the past eight years. Between 2008 and 2018, the fleet received a total of 28 new units, mostly of auxiliary and support elements (Table 3).21 Between 2009 and July 2018 Russia’s Maritime Border Guards in the Pacific received eight new platforms.

The most noticeable additions to the Fleet’s strike element were two Borey class SSBNs, the Sovershenny guided-missile , and four surface combatants build for the Maritime Border Guards (corvette-type Project 22460 and 10410 patrol ships), which could be utilised in a warfighting environment. In 2018, RUSPAC is expected to receive two improved Project 22800/22850 guided-missile corvettes, one Project 21980 Grachenok counter-sabotage high-speed armed patrol craft, and some minor auxiliaries.22

In 2013, the then Commander of OSK Vostok, Admiral Konstantin Sidorenko, announced that RUSPAC would receive more than 40 warships, including nuclear- powered submarines, new-generation guided-missile destroyers, guided-missile frigates, missile corvettes, and amphibious and other craft.23 In March 2018, Admiral Avakyants revealed that RUSPAC would receive over 70 new units by 2027.24 112 Australian Naval Review 2018 The Forgotten Force is back

Open-source data suggests that by 2024 RUSPAC expects to receive at least 30 new warships (11 new submarines, 19 new surface combatants) and seven new major auxiliaries (Table 4). For the auxiliary vessels, the emphasis is on building up ocean- going underway replenishment, support to sustain out-of-area deployments, and surveillance, intelligence gathering and tracking.

113 Australian Naval Review 2018 Associate Professor Alexey Muraviev Table 3: New additions to the Russian Pacific Fleet, 2008 to 1 July 2018

Full Type of displacement platform Project/class (tonnes) Operational

Submarines 2 Borey-class SSBNs: 24 000 2015 to RFS Aleksandr Nevskiy and (submerged) 2016 RFS Vladimir Monomakh

Surface 1 Project 22380 guided-missile 2220 20 July combatants corvette: RFS Sovershenny 2017

4 Project 21980 Grachenok 139 2014 to counter-sabotage high-speed 2017 armed patrol craft

1 Project 21820 Diugon-class 280 2015 landing craft: RFS Ivan Kartsov

Major 1 Project 20180 ocean-going 6300 2015 auxiliaries armaments transport: RFS Akademik Kovalev

1 Project 21300C ocean-going 5150 2016 rescue ship: RFS Igor Belousov

1 Project 23470 ocean-going 3000 November tug: RFS Andrei Stepanov 2017

1 Project V19910 hydrographic 1227 2013 ship: RFS Viktor Faleev

1 Project 22030 ocean-going 1465 2014 tug: RFS Aleksandr Piskunov

Minor 3 Project 02690 self-propelled 2015 to auxiliaries floating cranes 2016

114 Australian Naval Review 2018 The Forgotten Force is back Table 3: New additions to the Russian Pacific Fleet, 2008 to 1 July 2018

4 Project 19920 BGK-797, BGK- 320 2009 to 2151, BGK-2152, and BGK-2153 2015 hydrographic cutters

8 port tugs 2014 to 2015

Maritime Border Guards of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation

Major units 2 Project 22120 Purga-class PS- 1066 2010 to 824 and PS-825 patrol corvettes 2013

3 Project 22460 Okhotnik-class 630 2014 to patrol corvettes: RFS Sapfir, 21 June RFS Korall, and RFS Dozornya 2018

1 Project 10410 Svetlayk-class 375 2009 PSKR-929 Berkut patrol shipa

Minor units 2 Project 12200 Sobol high- 57 2011 speed craft

a Project 22460 and 10410 platforms can be armed with 3M24 Uran anti-ship missile systems; Sergei Cherkasov, ‘Novye Nositeli “Kalibrov”’ [‘New carriers of the Kalibrs’], Voenno-Promyshlenny Kurier, 1–7 February 2017, 4(688): 9. Source: Jane’s Fighting Ships (editions 2009–10 to 2016–17); Voenno- Promyshlenny Kurier (Issues 2015–17); Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie (issues 2015–17); RIA Novosti (Issues 2009–17), TASS (Issues 2009–17); Krasnaya Zvezda (Issues 2010–17); data collected by the author.

For the war-fighting component, the emphasis is on sustaining Russia’s sea-based strategic nuclear deterrent capability and building up its attack submarine capability. In particular, RUSPAC will receive additional Boreys; about three Severodvinsk class SSN/SSGNs; a brigade-size SSK force (six Project 636.3 boats) by

115 Australian Naval Review 2018 Associate Professor Alexey Muraviev 2022; up to 14 Project 22800/20380/20385 guided-missile corvettes; and new (Table 4).

From 2018, RUSPAC’s strike capability is expected to be significantly expanded through the gradual introduction of new-generation strike systems armed with 3M14 Kalibr long-range submarine/surface-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). Its delivery platforms include new and refitted nuclear-powered attack submarines (Severodvinsk class, Akula M class and Oscar II M class) and diesel–electric submarines (Project 636.3 Improved Kilos) and a new line of guided-missile corvettes (Projects 22385 and 22800) and frigates (Project 22350), which the fleet is expected to receive over the next seven years.

In March 2017, it was revealed that RUSPAC’s four 24 000-tonne Oscar II-class SSGNs will receive significant upgrades at the Zvezda shipyard in Bol’shoi Kamen. Apart from getting new suites of electronics and acoustics, all four Pacific Oscars (RFS Chelyabinsk, RFS Irkutsk, RFS Omsk and RFS Tomsk) will have their 24 P-700 Granit (SS-N-19 Shipwreck) SLCMs replaced with 3C14 Universal Launch Containers, which will allow them to fire 72 P-800 Oniks or Kalibr SLCMs.25 By increasing the strike payload and by improving other systems, the Russian Navy expects to develop a potent submarine group capable of engaging enemy carrier battle groups, as well as delivering massive strikes against targets on land. Similarly, the Russian Navy will receive four upgraded Project 971M Improved Akula-class SSNs, among them RUSPAC’s RFS Bratsk and RFS Samara.26 RUSPAC’s conventional submarines are also undergoing an extensive refit program. In late January 2017, the Kilo-class B-187 Komsomol’sk-na-Amure SSK was reinstated in the fleet’s order of battle after a lengthy refit and a capability upgrade at Komsomol’ks-na-Amure shipyard.27

Major surface units are also expected to undergo extensive refits and capability upgrades in the near future, which should prolong their operational lives and provide the fleet with improved surface warfare capabilities before the arrival of the next-generation ocean-going warships.28 Similarly, minor surface combatants are receiving capability upgrades.29

In late May 2017, Russia’s then Deputy Defence Minister, Yuri Borisov, emphasised that the new State Armaments Program 2018–2027 (SAP-27) would prioritise the 116 Australian Naval Review 2018 The Forgotten Force is back development of national naval capability in the Arctic and the Pacific and continuous force posture development in Crimea.30 This may result in a further intensification of RUSPAC’s modernisation. As part of this new phase, RUSPAC’s amphibious sealift capability may get a significant boost with the commissioning of a new line of indigenously built landing platform docks.31 In late May 2017, Borisov confirmed that the acquisition of a new line of landing platform docks was part of SAP-27, and that the first unit is scheduled for delivery around 2022.32 With SAP-27, emphasis on the Pacific and the Arctic, and with the development of shore-based infrastructure for the Mistrals in Vladivostok, it’s likely that the first one or two units will be fielded with RUSPAC after commissioning.

Of all four fleets of the Russian Navy, RUSPAC was the one most affected by the post-1991 cataclysms. Now, after years of being cash starved and overlooked in force modernisation, the renewal of its ageing force has begun. By 2025, the fleet is expected to strengthen its order of battle with new and upgraded platforms. The priority is to make a qualitative leap in long-range precision strike capabilities and force sustainment during forward deployments. The modernisation will not increase RUSPAC’s numerical strength, but will aim to provide the Russian Navy in the Pacific with some core capabilities that were previously not seen in its order of battle, such as long-range, high-precision strike capabilities.

For power projection capability, the modernisation will be limited to some aerial elements (Long Range Aviation, airborne troops and special operations elements) and the naval component. The latter will continue to play the leading and most visible role in projecting national military power across the region. The deployment of sizeable combined taskforces to Southeast Asia, the southwest Pacific and the Indian Ocean and regular operational presence in the western and northern Pacific, Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean are all part of a national maritime strategy aimed at globalising Russia’s naval operations and concentrating the bulk of its out- of-area activities in key strategic areas. Its force projection capability may be increased with the possible introduction of an expeditionary element after 2022.

117 Australian Naval Review 2018 Associate Professor Alexey Muraviev Table 4: Major naval units under construction for the Russian Pacific Fleet

Project, class, type of platform Platform (number ordered) Vessels Operational

Submarines Project 955 Borey A-class RFS Generalissimus 2020 SSBNs (2) Suvorov Displacement: 14 720/24 000 RFS Imperator 2020 tonnes Aleksandr III

Project 855 Severodvinsk-class RFS Novosibirsk 2019 SSN/SSGN (3+) RFS Krasnoyarsk 2020 Displacement: 8600/13 800 RFS Perm’ 2020 tonnes

Project 636.3 Varshavyanka RFS Petropavlovsk- 2020 SSK (6) Kamchatskiy 2020 Displacement: 2350/3950 RFS Volkhov 2021 tonnes RFS Magadan 2021 RFS Ufa 2022 RFS Mozhaisk 2022 RFS not named

Surface Project 22350 Gorshkov-class RFS Admiral Flota 2020 combatants FFG(H) (1+) Sovetskogo Soiuza Isakov Displacement: 5400 tonnes (full)

118 Australian Naval Review 2018 The Forgotten Force is back Table 4: Major naval units under construction for the Russian Pacific Fleet

Project 22380 Steregyshchiy- RFS Gromkiy 2018 class guided-missile corvettes RFS Geroi Rossiiskoi 2019 (3) Federatsii Aldar 2020 Displacement: 2220 tonnes Tsydenzhapov (full) RFS Rezskiy

Project 22385 Gremyashchiy- RFS Gremyashchiy 2018 class guided-missile corvettes RFS Provorny 2019 (2+2) Displacement: 2220 tonnes (full)

Project 22800 Karakurt-class Construction to guided-missile corvettes (6) commence in 2019 Displacement: 800 tonnes

Project 12700 Georgiy Construction to Kurbatov-class minehunters (7) commence in 2018 Displacement: 890 tonnes

Major Project 23130M ocean-going Contract for the 2020 auxiliaries (1) construction to be signed in 2017 Displacement: 29 000 tonnes

Project 23131 Akademik RFS not named 2019 Kashin-class ocean-going oiler (1) Displacement: 12 000 tonnes

119 Australian Naval Review 2018 Associate Professor Alexey Muraviev Table 4: Major naval units under construction for the Russian Pacific Fleet

Project 23120 Elbrus-class RFS Kapitan 2018 ocean-going supply ship with Shechenko an ice-breaking capability (1) Displacement: 10 000 tonnes

Project 22010 ocean-going RFS Almaz 2019 oceanographic research vessel (1) Displacement: 5200 tonnes

Project 03182 small ocean- RFS Mikhail 2019 going oiler (2) Barskov 2020 Displacement: 3500 tonnes RFS Boris Averkin

Project 19910 hydrographic RFS Aleksandr 2019 ship (1) Rogotskiy Displacement: 1227 tonnes

Maritime Border Guards of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation

Major units Project 22100 Okean patrol Shipbuilding 2020 frigate (1+) number 112 Displacement: 2700 tonnes (full)

a Project 22460 platforms can be armed with 3M24 Uran missile systems. Source: Jane’s Fighting Ships (Editions 2009–10 to 2016–17); Voenno- Promyshlenny Kurier (Issues 2015–18); Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie (Issues 2016–18); RIA Novosti (Issues 2009–18), TASS (Issues 2009–18); Krasnaya Zvezda (Issues 2010–18); data collected by the author.

120 Australian Naval Review 2018 The Forgotten Force is back Associate Professor Alexey D. Muraviev

Alexey D. Muraviev is an Associate Professor of National Security and Strategic Studies at Curtin University, Perth, Western Australia. He is the founder and Director of the Strategic Flashlight forum on National Security and Strategy at Curtin. Between 2013 and 2017 Alexey was Head of Department of Social Sciences and Security Studies at Curtin.

He has published widely on matters of national and international security. His research interests include problems of modern maritime power, contemporary defence and strategic policy, Russia’s strategic and defence policy, Russia as a Pacific power, transnational terrorism, Australian National Security, among others.

Alexey is a member of the Australian Member Committee, Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region (AU-CSCAP); non-residential fellow, Sea Power Centre Australia (Royal Australian Navy); member of Russia-NATO Experts Group; member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London; reviewer of the Military Balance Annual Defence Almanac; member of the Executive Advisory Board, CIVSEC 2020 International Congress and Exposition; member of the Advisory Board, Australia Public Network, member of the Research Network for Secure Australia, and other organisations and think tanks. In 2011, Alexey was the inaugural scholar-in residence at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

In 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010, the Australian Research Council (ARC) College of Experts has nominated Associate Professor Muraviev as an “expert of international standing”. He advises members of State and Federal Government on foreign policy and national security matters and is frequently interviewed by state, national and international media.

1 According to open-source data, in late-2017 – early-2018 the Udaloy-class RFS Marshal Shaposhnikov was in refit; one Sovremenny-class DDG, RFS Bezboyaznenny, was in reserve awaiting possible reactivation; the Ushakov-class CGN, RFS Admiral Lazarev, was inactive but underwent an overhaul in 2015, which may point to plans for an eventual upgrade and full reactivation.

121 Australian Naval Review 2018 Associate Professor Alexey Muraviev

2 In 2018, four RUSPAC Akulas and two Oscar IIs were in refit; RIA Novosti (Issues 2016–18), TASS (Issues 2016–18); Krasnaya Zvezda (Issues 2016–18); data collected by the author. 3 Among other factors, this prognosis is also based on the analysis of hydrographic operations of the Russian Navy in recent years (Table 2). 4 Morskoi Sbornik, 2017, 4, pp. 13–14. 5 The 72th Missile Brigade was formed on the basis of the 72nd Missile Regiment. 6 ‘Morpehi v Primorie Perevooruzhiutsya na BTR-82A’ [Marines based in the Maritime Province are being reequipped with BTR-82A], Krasnaya Zvezda, 26 March 2018, p. 2. 7 Initially being the Far Eastern elements of the Soviet VDV, in 1996 both brigades were assigned to be under the command of the Eastern Military District. On 11 October 2013, they were returned to the VDV’s organisational structure. ‘Geographiya “Krylatoi Gvardii” Rasshiryaetsya’ [The geography of the ‘Wings Guard’ is expanding], Krasnaya Zvezda, 22 October 2013, p. 2. 8 Konstantin Lobkov, Victor Hudoleev, ‘Voiska Podnyaty po Trevoge’ [‘Troops are being placed on alert’], Krasnaya Zvezda, 13 September 2014, p. 1. 9 Konstantin Lobkov, ‘S Boyevym Nastroem’ [With the Right Combat Spirit], Krasnaya Zvezda, 19 October 2017, p. 5. 10 Over the past six years, Russian military transport aviation has demonstrated its increased capacity to support large-scale airlift operations as well as to sustain prolonged contingencies, such as Syria. In the Far Eastern theatre, it is continuously involved in practising in-theatre force manoeuvre, as discussed above. 11 ‘Korabli na Baze VMF na Kurilakh v Perspektive Mogut Stat’ Chastiu Sistemy PRO’ [‘Ships stationed at a naval base on the Kuril Islands could become part of the ABM system in the future’], RIA Novosti, 1 November 2017, https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20171101/1507970581.html. 12 Aleksandr Kholenko, ‘Stanet li Kuril’skiy Ostrov Matua Novoi Bazoi Tikhookeanskogo Flota Rossii’ [‘Will the Kurils’ Matua Island become a new base of Russia’s Pacific Fleet’], RIA Novosti, 8 June 2017, https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20170608/1496127876.html; Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2016, Japanese Government, Tokyo, 2016, p. 79. 13 According to Korolev, Russian warships spent 15,600 days at sea in 2016; Igor Dygalo, Andrei Gavrilenko, ‘Pod Andreevskim Flagom’ [‘Under the flag of St Andrew’], Krasnaya Zvezda, 30 October 2017, p. 2. 14 Dmitriy Semenov, Aleksandr Tikhonov, ‘Armiya Rossii: Dinamika Razvitaya’ [Army of Russia: Development Dynamics], Krasnaya Zvezda, 8 November 2017, p. 3. 15 Viktor Khudoleev ‘More Liubit Sil’nykh’ [The Sea Likes Strong [Personnel]], Krasnaya Zvezda, 30 May 2018, p. 1. 16 Konstantin Lobkov, ‘Dlya Nas net Vtorostepennykh Zadach, esli Oni Kasaiutsya Boyevoi Podgotovki’ [‘When it Comes to combat training we don’t have secondary tasks’], Krasnaya Zvezda, 5 March 2018, p. 4. 17 Russian warships (two guided-missile cruisers, two guided-missile destroyers, a guided-missile frigate and four to five auxiliaries, possibly supported by a at least one nuclear-powered attack submarine) formed three independent task groups. 18 On 1 December 2014, Russia established the Arctic Command, which resides with its Northern Fleet. 19 ‘Klintsevich Zayavil o Gotovnosti Rossii Sozdat’ Bazu v Sudane’ [Senator Klintsevich announced of Russia’s readiness to set up a base in Sudan], RIA Novosti, 25 November 2017, https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20171125/1509601360.html 20 Konstantin Lobkov, ‘‘Moskity’ Bili Tochno v Tsel’ [The Moskits were hitting targets with high precision], Krasnaya Zvezda, 20 June 2018, pp. 1, 6. 21 The emphasis on prioritising the upgrade of the support arm of the fleet was driven by the critical state of the auxiliary force deployed in the Pacific. Other considerations include delays in 122 Australian Naval Review 2018 The Forgotten Force is back the production of the new line of warships and their priority allocation to the Baltic and Black Sea fleets. 22 Lobkov, ‘Dlya Nas net Vtorostepennykh Zadach, esli Oni Kasaiutsya Boyevoi Podgotovki’, p. 4. 23 ‘Vostochny Voenny Okrug: ot Vintovki do Krylatykh Raket’ [‘The Eastern Military District: from a rifle to cruise missiles’], RIA Novosti, 31 July 2013, https://ria.ru/vl/20130731/953202555.html 24 Lobkov, ‘Dlya Nas net Vtorostepennykh Zadach, esli Oni Kasaiutsya Boyevoi Podgotovki’, p. 4. 25 Dmitriy Litovkin, Aleksei Ramm, ‘“Batony” Poluchat Universal’noe Oruzhie’ [‘The “Batons” will receive universal weapons’], Izveztia, 28 March 2017, https://iz.ru/news/673281 26 Dubbed ‘Super Akulas’ by the navy, the improved Akulas’ new main armament suit would enable them to launch the Kalibrs, thus allowing them to engage in strike operations against land as well as performing their traditional roles as undersea superiority platforms. Dmitriy Litovkin, Aleksei Ramm, ‘“Superakuly” Vooruzhili “Kalibrami”‘ [‘“Super Akulas” have been armed with “Calibres”’], Izvestia, 28 April 2017, p. 9. 27 Andrei Gavrilenko, ‘K Mestu Postoyannogo Bazirovaniya’ [‘Back to the point of permanent basing’], Krasnaya Zvezda, 30 January 2017, p. 1. It’s believed that B-187, which was built as an earlier variant of the Kilo class (Project 877), was upgraded to the level of the Improved Kilo (Project 636.3). 28 The RFS Varyag is scheduled to go through a major refit and modernisation after her sister ship RFS Moskva completes her refit; all Udaloys will go through a major capability upgrade aimed at increasing their multi-role capabilities; one to two Soveremmys (RFS Bezboyaznenny and RFS Burny) may be reactivated and brought back to full operational status. Author collected data. 29For example, all the Nanuchka-class corvettes of the 114th Brigade of the Kamchatskaya Flotilla were the first in the Russian Navy to receive advanced MR-123-02/3 Bagira multipurpose naval artillery fire control systems, which now allow them to engage surface and aerial targets day and night in all weather conditions. Aleksei Ramm, Evgeniy Dmitriev, ‘Opasnykh “Ovodov” Osnastili Sverkhtochnoi “Bagiroi”’ [‘Dangerous “Gadflys” are being equipped with highly accurate “Bagira”’], Izveztia, 16 October 2017, https://iz.ru/627100/aleksei-ramm-evgenii-dmitriev/opasnykh-ovodov- osnastili-sverkhtochnoi-bagiroi 30 Yuri Avdeev, ‘Oruzhie, Nadezhnoe i Sovremennoe’ [‘Reliable and modern weaponry’], Krasnaya Zvezda, 24 May 2017, p. 2. 31 The first line of Russian landing platform docks were the three Project 1174 Ivan Rogov-class, two of which were deployed with SOVPAC. Following a fiasco with French-built Mistrals, Russian shipbuilders were quick to develop several alternative concept designs for home-made landing platform docks, including Projects Priboi and Lavina. 32 Andrei Milenin, ‘Minoborony: Rossiya Postroit Svoi Vertoletonostsy po Tinu “Mistralei”’ [Ministry of Defence: Russia will build its own helicopter carriers similar to the Mistrals], Izvestia, 25 May 2017, https://iz.ru/news/716312. Later, it was announced that Russia will build two diesel- gas-turbine landing platform docks. The first unit is expected to be commissioned in 2024, followed by the second vessel in 2026. ‘Istochnik: Rossiya do 2027 goda Postroit Dva Desantnykh Vertoletonostsa’ [‘Source: Russia will build two amphibious helicopter carriers by 2027’, TASS, 31 May 2017, http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/4295810.

123 Australian Naval Review 2018

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