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Biographies BIOGRAPHIES 327 Biographies BIOGRAPHIES 327 ALDRICH, John Herbert Articles 1. “A method of scaling with applications to the 1968 and 1972 U.S. presidential elections.” American Political Born Science Review, 11(March):1977 (with Richard September 24, 1947, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA McKelvey). Current Position 2. “The dilemma of a paretian liberal: some consequences Pfizer-Pratt University Professor of Political Science, Duke of Sen’s theorem,” and “Liberal games: further thoughts University, Durham, North Carolina, 1997–. on social choice and game theory.” Public Choice, 30(Summer):1977. Degrees 3. “Electoral choice in 1972: a test of some theorems of B.A., Allegheny College, 1969; M.A., Ph.D., University of the spatial model of electoral competition.” Journal of Rochester, 1971, 1975. Mathematical Sociology, 5:1977. 4. “A dynamic model of presidential nomination Offices and Honors campaigns.” American Political Science Review, Co-Editor, American Journal of Political Science, 14(September):1980. 1985–1988 (with John L. Sullivan). 5. “A spatial model with party activists: implications for President, Southern Political Science Association, electoral dynamics,” and “rejoinder.” Public Choice, 1988–1989. 41:1983. Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral 6. “A downsian spatial model with party activism.” Sciences, 1989–1990. American Political Science Review, 17(December):1983. Fellow, Bellagio Center, 2002. 7. “Southern parties in state and nation.” Journal of Heinz Eulau Award (best article in the American Political Politics, August:2000. Science Review), 1990 (with Eugene Borgida and John L. 8. “Challenges to the American two-party system: Sullivan). evidence from the 1968, 1980, 1992, and 1996 presi- Gladys Kammerer Award (best book on U.S. national dential elections.” Political Research Quarterly, 53(3): policy, APSA), 1996. 2000 (with Paul R. Abramson, Phil Paolino, and David CQ Press Award (Legislative Studies Section, APSA, best W. Rohde). paper on legislative politics), 1996 (with David Rohde). 9. “Conditional party government in the States.” American Pi Sigma Alpha Award (best paper, SPSA), 1997 (with Journal of Political Science, 46(1):2002 (with James S. David Rohde). Coleman Battista). Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Principal Contributions Principal Fields of Interest John Aldrich has worked primarily on various aspects of American Politics; Democratic Theory; Political Economy; democratic practices. These have included developing and Methodology. applying theories of electoral politics in American and com- parative elections and theories of individual political behav- Selected Publications ior. He then turned to institutional models. He developed a Books theory of political parties, particularly in the American set- 1. Before the Convention: Strategies and Choices in ting, which led to a long series of collaborations with David Presidential Nomination Campaigns (University of Rohde, in which they have developed a theory of legislative Chicago Press, 1980). politics in the presence of political parties. A final major 2. Change and Continuity in the 1980 Elections (CQ project, in collaboration with a number of others, examines Press, 1982) (with Paul R. Abramson and David W. the impact of economic globalization (or other forms of Rohde) (Revised edition, 1983). uncertainty-inducing economic shocks) on the public’s pol- 3. Analysis with a Limited Dependent Variable: Linear icy preferences and political demands. Aldrich has tried to Probability, Logit, and Probit Models (Sage Series on combine methods and approaches from Economics, Quantitative Analysis, 1984) (with Forrest Nelson). Psychology, and History, along with those from his own dis- 4. Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political cipline, under the supposition that genuine progress in Parties in America (University of Chicago Press, 1995). understanding human choices is most likely only through 5. Change and Continuity in the 2000 Elections (CQ Press, the most general application of the social and behavioral 2002) (with Paul R. Abramson and David W. Rohde). sciences. 328 BIOGRAPHIES ANDERSON, Lisa Reneé 8. “An experimental analysis of rent seeking under varying competitive conditions” Public Choice, 115:2003 (with S. Stafford). Born June 8, 1967, Petersburg, Virginia, USA Principal Contributions Lisa Anderson’s thesis was an experimental investigation of Current Position how patterns of conformity might develop when people Associate Professor of Economics, The College of William have private information and make public decisions in and Mary, 2002–. sequence. These patterns, known as information cascades, have been used to explain phenomena ranging from stock Past Positions market bubbles to animal mating behavior. This work Assistant Professor of Economics, The College of William resulted in several publications and she continues to do and Mary, 1997–2002; Visiting Assistant Professor, research involving information processing. For example, American University, 1995–1997. she is currently using the cascade framework to compare majority rule and unanimity in a sequential voting frame- Degrees work. Also in the area of public choice, her research B.S., M.A., Virginia Commonwealth University, 1988, includes experimental studies of public goods provision 1989; M.A., Ph.D., University of Virginia, 1992, 1994. and rent seeking. Finally, she is actively involved in pro- moting the pedagogical use of economics experiments. She Principal Fields of Interest has written six papers on this topic and has organized three Experimental Economics; Economics of Information; national conferences on using experiments as a teaching Public Choice. tool. Selected Publications Books 1. “Public choice as an experimental science,” in Shughart BAUMOL, William J. and Razzolini (eds.) The Elgar Companion to Public Choice (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2001). 2. “Information cascades and rational conformity” forth- Born coming in McCabe (ed.) The Encyclopedia of Cognitive February 26, 1922, New York, New York, USA Science (Macmillan, 2003) (with C. Holt). 3. “Information cascade experiments” forthcoming in Current Positions Plott and Smith (eds.) The Handbook of Results in Professor of Economics, New York University, 1970–; Experimental Economics (North-Holland, 2003) (with Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Economist, C. Holt). Princeton University, 1992–. Articles Past Positions 1. “Understanding Bayes’ rule.” The Journal of Economic Joseph Douglas Green Professor of Economics, Princeton Perspectives, 10(2):1996 (with C. Holt). University, 1949–1992; Assistant Lecturer, London School 2. “Information cascades.” The Journal of Economic of Economics, 1947–1949; Junior Economist, U.S. Perspectives, 10(4):1996 (with C. Holt). Department of Agriculture, 1942, 1946. 3. “Information cascades in the laboratory.” The American Economic Review, 87(5):1997 (with C. Holt). Degrees 4. “Agendas and strategic voting.” The Southern Economic B.S.S, College of the City of New York, 1942; Ph.D., Journal, 65(3):1999 (with C. Holt). University of London, 1949. 5. “Choosing winners and losers in a permit trading game.” The Southern Economic Journal, 67(1):2000 Offices and Honors (with S. Stafford). Chairman, Committee on Economic Status of the 6. “Cultural differences in attitudes towards bargaining.” Profession, 1962–1970. Economics Letters, 69(October):2000 (with Y. Rodgers Past Chairman and Member, Economic Policy Council, and R. Rodriguez). State of New Jersey, 1967–1975. 7. “Payoff effects in information cascade experiments.” Past First Vice President, American Association of Economic Inquiry, 39(4):2001. University Professors, 1968–1970. BIOGRAPHIES 329 Joseph Douglas Green 1895 Professorship of Economics, 11. Global Trade and Conflicting National Interests, 2000 Princeton University, 1968. (with Ralph E. Gomory). Elected Member, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1971. Principal Contributions John R. Commons Award, Omicron Delta Epsilon, 1975. William Baumol’s contributions include the sales maximiza- Townsend Harris Medal, Alumni Assoc. of the City tion model which is used to demonstrate the possibility of College of New York, 1975. formal analysis of the behavior of the firm with objectives Eastern Economic Association, 1978–1979. other than profit maximization. His work with William Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, 1979. Bowen on the economics of the arts led to formulation of the Past President, American Economic Association, 1981. cost disease model that helps to explain the persistently ris- Atlantic Economic Society, 1985. ing real cost of services with handicraft components, includ- Winner, Assoc. of American Publishers Award for Best ing health care, education and live performing arts. Later Book in Business, Management and Economics, work with other economists provided the Contestable Superfairness: Applications and Theory, 1986. Markets analysis that shows how under free entry and exit Recipient, Frank E. Seidman Distinguished Award in the market can determine industry structure, and how analy- Political Economy, 1987. sis can provide guidance to antitrust and regulation in indus- Elected Member, National Academy of Sciences, 1987. tries with scale economies, in which large firms are Winner, Assoc. of American Publishers Annual Awards for unavoidable and can be desirable. Baumol’s analysis of Excellence in Publishing, Honorable Mention in Social entrepreneurship as a critical input that can be allocated by Sciences, Productivity and American
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