Electoral Reform, Party System Evolution and Democracy in Contemporary Indonesia
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ELECTORAL REFORM, PARTY SYSTEM EVOLUTION AND DEMOCRACY IN CONTEMPORARY INDONESIA Sarah Shair-Rosenfield A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science. Chapel Hill 2012 Approved by Jonathan Hartlyn R. William Liddle Gary Marks Andrew Reynolds Graeme Robertson © 2012 Sarah Shair-Rosenfield ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ii ABSTRACT SARAH SHAIR-ROSENFIELD: Electoral Reform, Party System Evolution and Democracy in Contemporary Indonesia (Under the direction of Jonathan Hartlyn) This dissertation examines the links between electoral reform and political party system development in new democracies where iterated reforms are increasingly common, requiring an understanding of their causes and short-term consequences. It examines this relationship in detail in Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim democracy. It finds that, although the rules of the game may appear to be in flux during iterated electoral reforms, those reforms often follow a predictable dynamic and consistently demonstrate evidence of seat-maximization. Assessing how a combination of strategic and alternative motivations may affect decision- making, as well as how prior reforms constrain future reform options, is key to understanding how reforms affect the composition and shape of the ensuing party system. The dissertation employs a multi-methods approach, conducting both a large-N quantitative analysis with an original dataset of cross-national electoral reform and a case study of Indonesia. The large-N analysis includes 34 cases of electoral reform from 1950 to 2010; for the case study I draw on in-depth interviews with key reform actors, archival research, and an analysis of election outcomes from 1999-2009 to assess the relationship between electoral reform, party system change and the process of democratization in Indonesia. iii To Reed and my family, whose support has made the difficult and frustrating aspects of the process of writing a dissertation much easier to endure, and to Dirty Paws, who provided a constant reminder not to take life too seriously. iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to express my appreciation to the National Security Education Program for a David L. Boren fellowship, the UNC Graduate School for an Off-campus Dissertation Fieldwork fellowship, and the UNC Center for Global Initiatives for a Foreign Language and Area Studies fellowship which provided funding for me to complete my research and language study. I am grateful to the National Democratic Institute in Jakarta, and Paul Rowland in particular, for their sponsorship of institutional affiliation during parts of my fieldwork. I would like to thank Bill Liddle, Gary Marks, Andy Reynolds and Graeme Robertson for their assistance and invaluable feedback on this project. I want to express special thanks to Jonathan Hartlyn for the years of guidance and advice that made not only this project possible but who has been a part of every success I enjoyed during my graduate career. v TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES . viii LIST OF FIGURES . x LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS . xi Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION. 1 2. THEORY . 18 The existing literature . 22 An integrated framework for evaluating electoral reform . 42 From framework to testable hypotheses . 66 The Indonesian case relative to broader theory . 74 3. INDONESIAN CASE CONTEXT . 79 Indonesia’s transition and consolidation . 81 Political changes during the reformasi period . 87 Legislative institutions in democratic Indonesia . 92 Indonesia’s party system 1999-2009 . 94 4. 1999-2004 REFORM PERIOD . 113 Transitional context of the reform period . 117 Procedure and sequencing in the reform process . 122 Outcomes in the 2004 General Elections . 149 5. 2004-2009 REFORM PERIOD . 165 vi Political context of the reform period . 169 Procedure and sequencing in the reform process . 174 Outcomes in the 2009 General Elections . 201 6. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF ELECTORAL REFORM . 217 The dataset . 220 Electoral Reform as the Dependent Variable . 224 Electoral Reform as the Independent Variable . 260 7. CONCLUSION . 279 APPENDICES Appendix A: List of field interviews . 293 Appendix B: List of reform codes by case and observation . 297 Appendix C: The dataset codebook . 305 Appendix D: List of electoral and data sources . 311 Appendix E: Replication of previous studies . 318 REFERENCES . 323 vii List of Tables Table 4.1 1999-2004 Party Seat Percentages . 120 4.2 Proposed Changes in the New Draft Election Law (2001) . 125 4.3 Draft Election Law and Major Party Positions . 127 4.4 Change between Draft Law (2001) and Final Election Law (2002) . 146 4.5 2004 Election Outcome: Changes from 1999 . 150 4.6 Seat Distribution under SMD in 2004 . 159 5.1 2004-2009 Party Seat Percentages . 172 5.2 Proposed Changes in the New Draft Election Law (2007) . 174 5.3 2007 Draft Election Law and Major Party Preferences . 177 5.4 Changes from Draft Law (2007) to Final Election Law and Court Rulings (2008) . 195 5.5 2009 Election Outcome: Changes from 2004 . 203 5.6 Successful Candidates Under the Fully-Open Lists . 209 5.7 Seat Distributions at Different Levels of the Legislative Entry Threshold . 211 5.8 Individual Candidate Votes by Party . 213 6.1 Hypotheses of the Causes and Effects of Electoral Reform . 218 6.2 Cases and Observations . 222 6.3 Dataset Descriptive Statistics . 234 6.4 Replicating Estimates of Legislative Reform . 240 6.5 Estimates of Interparty Reform . 241 6.6 Estimates of Intraparty Reform . 244 6.7 Ratchet Effects and Outcomes in Multiple-Iteration Reform Processes . 247 viii 6.8 Summary of Hypotheses and Results: Electoral Reform as Dependent Variable . 249 6.9 Replicating the Impact of Legislative Reform . 265 6.10 Including Intraparty Reform on ENPV . 266 6.11 Including Intraparty Reform on ENPS . 268 6.12 Including Intraparty Reform on Electoral Volatility . 270 6.13 Evaluating Reform on Disproportionality, Medium-Sized and Largest Parties’ Outcomes. 273 6.14 Summary of Hypotheses and Results: Electoral Reform as Independent Variable . 276 E1. Replicating Estimates of Electoral Reforms (Remmer 2008) . 320 E2. Replicating Impact of Electoral Reforms (Remmer 2008) . 321 E3. Replicating Probability of Change from Majority Rule to PR (Colomer 2005) . 322 ix List of Figures Figure 1.1 List of Indonesian Electoral Reforms . 7 2.1 Dimensions of Electoral Reform: Intra- and Inter-party . 49 2.2 The Interparty Dimension of Electoral Systems . 50 2.3 The Intraparty Dimension of Electoral Systems . 54 2.4 Dimensions of Electoral Reform in Indonesia . 77 3.1 The Party System: The Secular Nationalist- Religious Islamist Continuum . 107 3.2 Percentage of National Legislative Votes by Party . 109 3.3 Percentage of National Legislative Seats by Party . 110 4.1 Change in Vote Differential by Party Size . 153 4.2 Average Party Magnitudes in 2004 Electoral Districts . 154 5.1 Change in Vote Differential by Party Size . 205 5.2 Average Party Magnitudes in 2009 Electoral Districts . 206 5.3 Small Party Seats without 2.5% Threshold . 210 6.1 Pre-Reform Placement of 33 Cases . 252 6.2 Post-Reform Placement of 33 Cases . 253 6.3 Single-Reform Case Trajectories . 254 6.4 Centrally-oriented Multiple-Iteration Cases . ..