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Spotlight on Iran (June 28, 2020 – July 12, 2020)

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Spotlight on Iran (June 28, 2020 – July 12, 2020) רמה כ ז מל ו תשר מה ו ד י ע י ן ( למ מ" ) כרמ ז מה עדימה י עד מל יעידומל ו ד י ע י ן רורטלו ו רטל ו ר Spotlight on Iran June 28, 2020` – July 12, 2020 Author: Dr. Raz Zimmt Overview The Iranian chief of staff of the armed forces and the Syrian minister of defense signed a comprehensive agreement concerning military cooperation between the two countries. The Iranian chief of staff declared that Iran intends to bolster Syria’s air defense systems as part of the effort to enhance military ties between Syria and Iran. The presidents of Iran, Russia and Turkey discussed the settlement of the war in Syria at a video-teleconferenced summit. In his speech, the Iranian president declared that Iran will continue to back Syria, and called for the withdrawal of the “American terrorist forces” from Syria and the entire region. In the statement concluding the summit, the three presidents stressed their commitment to the independence and territorial integrity of Syria and condemned the continuation of Israeli strikes in the country. Iran issued only a tepid response to the raid carried out on June 25th by the Iraq’s Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) on the compound of the Shia pro-Iranian militia, Kataeb Hezbollah, in Baghdad. During the raid, 14 members of the militia were arrested and the CTS confiscated launchers and rockets that were apparently intended to be used in future strikes against American targets in Iraq. The spokesman of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that Iran does not intend to meddle in Iraq’s domestic affairs or express an opinion on matters that are not connected to it. Iran’s official response stems from Tehran’s desire to avoid increasing tensions with the Iraqi Prime Minister, Mustafa al- Kazimi, as he attempts to curtail the power of the Iranian-backed militias. The Iranian news agency Mehr, on the other hand, published an opinion article critical of al-Kazimi, accusing him of operating based on American dictates. The Iranian Ambassador to Baghdad, Iraj Masjedi, assessed that in the coming year, Iranian pilgrims will not be able to participate in the annual pilgrimage to the Shia holy sites in Iraq 173-20 2 (the “Arbaeen”), which are set to take place in October 2020. According to him, the severe COVID-19 outbreak in Iraq will not allow the country to host foreign pilgrims. The Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khamenai, sent a letter to the head of Hamas’ political bureau, Ismail Hanniyeh, in which he stressed Iran’s ongoing commitment to support the Palestinians. In addition, the Speaker of the Iranian Majlis, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, spoke on the phone with Ismail Hanniyeh and the leader of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Ziad al- Nakhleh, and stressed Iran’s opposition to President Trump’s “Deal of the Century” and the annexation plan of the Israeli government. Finally, the Iranian ambassador to Lebanon met with a delegation headed by Ahmad Abdul Hadi, the Representative of Hamas in Lebanon, and declared Iran’s support for the Palestinians and “the resistance.” Iranian Involvement in Syria The Lebanese TV channel al-Mayadin, which is affiliated with Hezbollah, reported (July 8) that the Syrian Minister of Defense, Ali Ayoub, and the Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, Mohammad Baqeri, signed a comprehensive military cooperation agreement. An Iranian official told al-Jazeera (July 8) that in their meeting in Damascus, Baqeri discussed the importance of removal of “illegal” foreign forces in Syria and responding to the Israeli strikes. During the signing ceremony Baqeri proclaimed that the agreement bolsters cooperation between the two countries in countering American pressures. He remarked that Iran intends to buttress Syrian air defense systems as part of the effort to augment the military ties between the two countries. Baqeri condemned Turkey’s military presence in Syria, stating that it must know that this presence will not solve Turkey’s security challenges. The Syrian minister of defense declared that those who count on destroying the ties between Iran and Syria are delusional. He stated that if the United States had been able to subdue Syria, Iran and the “resistance axis,” this moment would not have been reached. According to him, Israel is a powerful partner in the war against Syria, and the deployment of the “terrorist gangs” [Syrian opposition] is part and parcel of the Israeli aggression. 173-20 3 The Syrian minister of defense and Iranian chiefs of staff sign an agreement on military cooperation (Tasnim, July 8, 2020) On July 1, the presidents of Iran, Russia and Turkey discussed the settlement of the war in Syria, in yet another round of Astana talks, this one conducted virtually. In his speech at the video-conferenced event, the President of Iran, Hassan Rouhani, stated that Iran will maintain its support for Syria. He also condemned the tightening of the “inhumane” American sanctions against Syria. He reiterated Iran’s support for maintaining Syria’s territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty, and continuing the struggle against terrorism until its annihilation in Syria and the entire region. In addition, Rouhani called for the withdrawal of the “American terrorist forces” from Syria and the entire region as soon as possible (Tasnim, July 1). In the concluding statement of the summit, the three presidents stressed their countries’ commitment to the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Syria, condemned foreign interventions and called for bolstering stability and security in the region. In addition, the presidents condemned the persistent Israeli strikes on Syria, which according to them harm Syria’s independence and territorial integrity, and increase tensions in the region (Reuters, July 1). 173-20 4 President Rouhani giving a speech during the teleconferenced summit with the Russian and Turkish presidents (the website of the president, July 1, 2020). A Syrian opposition website reported that in recent months, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) resumed the payment of salaries to pro-Iranian militias in Syria, after several months during which salaries were not paid or only half of the salary was paid. According to the report, the monthly salary to fighters ranges from 50,000 Syrian Pounds (about $24) paid to fighters operating in the Syrian desert (the badia) to 80,000 Syrian Pounds (about $36) to fighters operating in cities. The report claimed that Iran resumed paying the salaries due to an effort to prevent the fighters from accepting Russian offers to fight in the Libyan civil war in exchange for high monthly salaries. According to the report, the Russian efforts recently led to disagreements between Russia and Iran, following which Russian and Iranian officers met in eastern Syria in an effort to coordinate the dispatch of some fighters from the pro-Iranian militias to Libya (Euphrates Post, July 6). Iranian Involvement in Iraq Iran issued only a muted response to the raid on the headquarters of the Shia pro-Iranian militia, Kataeb Hezbollah, which is responsible for a number of attacks launched in recent months against the compound of the U.S. embassy in the “green zone” in Baghdad and against military bases hosting American troops in Iraq. On June 24, the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) raided a compound of the militia in southern Baghdad. During the raid, the force arrested 14 members of the militia and confiscated rocket launchers and projectiles, which were apparently intended to be used in future attacks against U.S. targets in Iraq. The extraordinary developments reflect an attempt by the Prime Minister, Mustafa al- Kazimi, to place the Shia militias under his effective control. The arrests aroused angry 173-20 5 responses from the Shia militias loyal to Iran, which lambasted Prime Minister al-Kazimi and accused him of cooperation with the United States. Abbas Mousavi, the Spokesman of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, declared during his weekly press conference that events taking place in Iraq are connected to Iraq alone, and Tehran does not intend to intervene in the domestic affairs of Iraq or express its opinion on matters that are not connected to Iran. He added that the Popular Mobilization Units (the umbrella of Shia militias in Iraq) is a grouping reflecting popular mobilization, established under the guidance of senior clerics that turned into an armed force. He remarked that Iran is confident that Iraq will manage its domestic affairs in the best way possible to re-establish stability and safety to the country. Addressing reports about a possible visit of the Iraqi prime minister to Tehran, Mousavi stated that Iran welcomes any ties and visits by senior officials of countries bordering on Iran, but that a final date for such a visit has not been set yet (Tasnim, June 29). The official Iranian reaction reflects Tehran’s desire to avoid exacerbating tensions with the incoming Iraqi prime minister. It is apparent that Iran prefers to work to maintain its political, military and economic influence in Iraq while avoiding a direct and public confrontation with al-Kazimi. This is while recognizing the challenges it faces in the Iraqi arena, and the assessment that at the moment, there is no immediate and significant threat to its vital interest in this arena. Iranian media also generally avoided directly criticizing the Iraqi prime minister following the incident in southern Baghdad. The Mehr news agency censured the raid on the Kataeb Hezbollah base and the arrest of the militia’s members, but did not blame al-Kazimi directly for the incident. In a commentary published on the website of the agency (June 27) it was argued that the foray against the Shia militia intended to assess the ability to dismantle “the resistance” and remove it from the political and security scene in Iraq.
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