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Case 1:18-Cv-02425 Document 1 Filed 10/23/18 Page 1 of 163 Case 1:18-cv-02425 Document 1 Filed 10/23/18 Page 1 of 163 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GEORGE LON WILLIAMS, ELIZABETH § GRACE WILLIAMS, KAYLEIGH ANN § WILLIAMS, NICKOLAS ALAN § WILLIAMS, CHARLES WAYLAND § GRIFFITHS, SR., ROSA PRATT, LINDA § ANN GRESS, DANIEL GAUTIER, § PATRICIA A. GAUTIER, ALEXIS § HOUCHINS, MELISSA C. NETZNIK, § PEGGY O. RUTKOSKIE, K.J.Y., A § MINOR CHILD, EDNA FAYE ADAMS, § LORETTA LUCILLE YOUNG, MARY § NIQUETTE, THOMAS NIQUETTE, § WILLIAM MARCUS CHINN, JOSEPH § WILLIAM GREENALCH, A.M.K. 1, A § MINOR CHILD, SARA MARGARET § KINNEL-FREDERICK, A.M.K. 2, A § MINOR CHILD, JAMES MICHAEL § OHRT, ANDREA DEVIN SIMMONS, § RODNEY LEWAYNE MCBRIDE, ERIC § PLAINTIFFS’ JAMES ATKINSON, JEANETTA DAWN § COMPLAINT BIVENS, TERRENCE ALEXIS § ELIZENBERRY, JOSHUA DIVON § TRAVIS, M.D.T., A MINOR CHILD, § Case No.: A.C.J., A MINOR CHILD, D.R.G., A § MINOR CHILD, J.S.A., A MINOR CHILD, § CHRISTOPHER BRYANT ANDERSON, § TAHNEE ANDERSON, K.T.A., A MINOR § CHILD, T.M.A., A MINOR CHILD, T.K.A., § A MINOR CHILD, JONATHAN BROCK § HOGGE, T.B.H., A MINOR CHILD, § K.A.H., A MINOR CHILD, ANTONIO § HAROLD WARD, DALIS B. WARD, § DENNIS H. WARD, ANGELA LEPIN § KONEN, MELVIN JEROME § GATEWOOD, MILDRED LUE SMITH, § RONALD LYNN GATEWOOD, JR., § JAMES A. GILBERT, VICTORIA ELENA § PHILLIPPI, TERESITA SAPITULA § CASTILLO, WILFREDO RAMIREZ § CASTILLO, AND MARIA LUISA § CASTILLO, § § (Addresses filed under Seal) § Case 1:18-cv-02425 Document 1 Filed 10/23/18 Page 2 of 163 Plaintiffs, § v. § § THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN § The Ministry of Foreign Affairs § Imam Khomeini Street § Imam Khomeini Square § Tehran, Iran § 1136914811 § § THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY § GUARD CORPS (“IRGC”) § Mahallati Avenue § The End of Piriouzi Street § District 14 § Tehran, Iran § § IRANIAN MINISTRY OF INTELLIGENCE § & SECURITY § (a/k/a Vezarat-e Ettela’at Va Amniat-e § Keshvar a/k/a VEVAK a/k/a VAJA) § Second Negarestan Street § Pasdaran Avenue § Tehran, Iran § § BANK MARKAZI JOMHOURI ISLAMI § IRAN § (a/k/a the Central Bank of the Islamic § Republic of Iran) § Mirdamad Boulevard § No. 198 § Tehran, Iran § P.O. Box: 15875/7177 § § BANK MELLI IRAN § Ferdowsi Avenue § 10 Building § Tehran, Iran § 1135931596 § Mail Box 11365.144 § § NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY § Roodsar Street No. 18 § Tehran, Iran § § Defendants. § Case 1:18-cv-02425 Document 1 Filed 10/23/18 Page 3 of 163 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. RELATED CASE .....................................................................................................1 II. NATURE OF THE CASE ........................................................................................1 III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE ...............................................................................4 1. THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER ALL CLAIMS AND ALL PARTIES. ...........................................................................................................4 A. THIS COURT MAY EXERCISE JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF ALL CLAIMS ASSERTED HEREIN. .................................5 I. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT .......................................5 B. THIS COURT MAY EXERCISE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER ALL PARTIES TO THIS ACTION. ............................................................6 2. VENUE IS PROPER IN THIS COURT.............................................................7 IV. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND............................................................................7 V. THE DEFENDANTS................................................................................................9 1. THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN ..............................................................9 2. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS..........................................13 3. THE IRANIAN MINISTRY OF INTELLIGENCE & SECURITY (MOIS) ..14 4. BANK MARKAZI JOMHOURI ISLAMI IRAN ............................................18 5. BANK MELLI IRAN .......................................................................................20 6. NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY .......................................................24 VI. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS .................................................................................26 1. IRAN’S LONG HISTORY OF MATERIALLY SUPPORTING AND ENCOURAGING ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM...................27 2. IRAN’S SPONSORSHIP AND MATERIAL SUPPORT OF TERRORISM IN IRAQ.................................................................................................................32 3. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS—QODS FORCE (IRGC- QF) ....................................................................................................................35 i Case 1:18-cv-02425 Document 1 Filed 10/23/18 Page 4 of 163 4. HEZBOLLAH...................................................................................................38 5. IRAN’S MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND ARMED FORCES LOGISTICS (MODAFL).......................................................................................................45 6. ANSAR AL ISLAM .........................................................................................47 7. AL QAIDA NETWORK ..................................................................................53 A. ABU MUSAB ZARQAWI AND THE RISE OF AL QA’IDA IN IRAQ (“AQI”) .......................................................................................................60 8. THE SPECIAL GROUPS.................................................................................65 A. THE BADR CORPS/BADR ORGANIZATION .......................................70 B. KATA’IB HIZBALLAH ............................................................................71 C. JAYSCH AL MAHDI & THE PROMISED DAY BRIGADES................77 D. ASA’IB AHL AL HAQ..............................................................................78 9. IRANIAN SIGNATURE WEAPONS USED IN THE TERRORIST ATTACKS ........................................................................................................80 A. EXPLOSIVELY FORMED PENETRATORS...........................................80 B. IMPROVISED ROCKET ASSISTED MUNITIONS................................88 10. IRAN EVADES SANCTIONS & COMMITS ACTS OF TERRORISM THROUGH ITS AGENTS/PROXIES .............................................................91 A. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES ...............................92 B. MAHAN AIR..............................................................................................95 C. NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY (NIOC)....................................98 D. KHATAM AL-ANBIYA CONSTRUCTION COMPANY & THE HEADQUARTERS FOR THE RESTORATION OF HOLY SHRINES ..99 VII. THE PLAINTIFFS & THE TERRORIST ATTACKS ........................................107 1. THE DECEMBER 21, 2004 ATTACK – FOB MAREZ, MOSUL...............110 A. PLAINTIFFS THE GEORGE LON WILLIAMS FAMILY....................111 B. PLAINTIFFS THE JONATHAN BROCK HOGGE FAMILY ...............113 ii Case 1:18-cv-02425 Document 1 Filed 10/23/18 Page 5 of 163 C. PLAINTIFF JAMES MICHAEL OHRT..................................................114 D. PLAINTIFFS THE ANTONIO HAROLD WARD FAMILY .................115 E. PLAINTIFF JAMES A. GILBERT ..........................................................116 F. PLAINTIFFS THE DAVID ALAN RUHREN FAMILY........................117 G. PLAINTIFF THE MARK JOSEPH PRATT FAMILY............................118 H. PLAINTIFFS THE DANIEL LEE BIVENS FAMILY ...........................119 I. PLAINTIFF ANGELA LEPIN KONEN..................................................120 J. PLAINTIFFS THE VICTORIA ELENA PHILLIPPI FAMILY..............121 K. PLAINTIFFS THE JOSHUA DIVON TRAVIS FAMILY......................122 L. PLAINTIFF JOSEPH WILLIAM GREENALCH ...................................124 M. PLAINTIFF ERIC JAMES ATKINSON .................................................125 N. PLAINTIFFS THE CHRISTOPHER BRYANT ANDERSON FAMILY ...................................................................................................................126 O. PLAINTIFF CHARLES WAYLAND GRIFFITHS, SR. ........................127 2. THE JULY 10, 2011 ATTACK – FORWARD OPERATING BASE GARRY OWEN.............................................................................................................129 A. PLAINTIFF WILLIAM MARCUS CHINN ............................................129 B. PLAINTIFFS THE SEAN M. NIQUETTE FAMILY .............................130 3. THE MAY 17, 2007 ATTACK – BAGHDAD ..............................................131 A. PLAINTIFFS THE GAUTIER/HOUCHINS FAMILY...........................131 4. THE FEBRUARY 14, 2006 ATTACK – BAGHDAD ..................................133 A. PLAINTIFF THE TARA KATHLEEN HUTCHINSON FAMILY ........133 5. APRIL 19, 2005 ATTACK – ROUTE MIDLAND, ANBAR GOVERNATE .........................................................................................................................134 A. PLAINTIFF RODNEY LEWAYNE MCBRIDE.....................................135 B. PLAINTIFFS THE MELVIN JEROME GATEWOOD FAMILY..........136 iii Case 1:18-cv-02425 Document 1 Filed 10/23/18 Page 6 of 163 C. PLAINTIFFS THE ANTONIO MARTINEZ FREDERICK FAMILY ...137 D. PLAINTIFF TERRENCE ALEXIS ELIZENBERRY .............................139 6. THE AUGUST 16, 2004 ATTACK – SADR CITY, BAGHDAD ................140 A. PLAINTIFF DAVID ALLEN SIMMONS II FAMILY...........................140 7. THE DECEMBER 23, 2003 ATTACK – SADR CITY, BAGHDAD...........142 A. PLAINTIFFS THE ROGER LEE YOUNG FAMILY.............................142 VIII. ALL OF THE TERRORIST
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