Marriage Decline in Korea: Changing Composition of the Domestic Marriage Market and Growth in International Marriage
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Demography (2020) 57:171–194 https://doi.org/10.1007/s13524-019-00844-9 Marriage Decline in Korea: Changing Composition of the Domestic Marriage Market and Growth in International Marriage James M. Raymo1 & Hyunjoon Park 2 Published online: 9 January 2020 # Population Association of America 2020 Abstract Explanations for the substantial decline in rates of marriage in East Asian countries often emphasize the role of rapid educational expansion for women in reducing the desirability of marriages characterized by a strong gender-based division of labor. Focusing on South Korea, we consider a very different scenario in which changing educational composition of the marriage market reduces the demographic feasibility of such marriages. Analyses of 1% microsamples of the 1990 and 2010 Korean censuses show that changes in the availability of potential spouses accounted for part of the decline in marriage rates over a period of 20 years (1985–1989 to 2005–2009) for highly educated women and less-educated men. We also show that growth in interna- tional marriages played a role in preventing an even more dramatic decline in marriage among low-educated men. These findings support the general relevance of marriage market mismatches in gender-inegalitarian societies and highlight the declining feasi- bility of marriage for low-educated men in such contexts. Findings also hint at important implications for inequality in a society such as Korea, where marriage remains a symbol of social success and is closely related to women’seconomicwell- being and men’s health and subjective well-being. Keywords Marriage . Education . Assortative mating . International marriage . Korea * James M. Raymo [email protected] Hyunjoon Park [email protected] 1 Department of Sociology, Princeton University, Wallace Hall, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA 2 Department of Sociology, University of Pennsylvania, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA Downloaded from http://read.dukeupress.edu/demography/article-pdf/57/1/171/844582/171raymo.pdf by guest on 27 September 2021 172 J.M. Raymo, H. Park Introduction Social scientists have written extensively about the long-term decline in marriage rates in the United States and other wealthy countries. Prominent explanations include increasing economic independence for women, increasing employment insecurity during young adulthood, shifting attitudes, and the emergence of alternative lifestyles, including nonmarital cohabitation (Becker 1981; Bumpass et al. 1991; Oppenheimer et al. 1997;Thornton2001). Although the trend toward later and less marriage is universal, its implications depend on context. Changing marriage behavior is more consequential for trends in union formation, fertility, and population aging in societies where the spread of nonmarital cohabitation has been slow and childbearing remains tightly linked with marriage. This is particularly true in East Asian societies where marriage remains central to family life, intergenerational relationships, and social organization more generally (Park and Lee 2017; Raymo et al. 2015). In Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, pronounced decline in marriage rates is the driving force behind low fertility and rapid population aging—demographic trends that have emerged as critical policy issues (Byoun 2017;Jo 2015; Retherford and Ogawa 2006; Suzuki 2006). Specific policy concerns include (but are not limited to) the viability of public pension and healthcare programs, reduced family support at older ages, projected labor force shortages and the roles of immigra- tion and mechanization in manufacturing and service sectors, and the promotion of work-family balance to support marriage and childbearing. Research on later and less marriage in East Asian societies has also provided important insights into how theories of marriage timing may need to be adapted or modified to reflect contextual differences, especially with respect to gender inequality. Theoretical and empirical emphases on rapid improvements in women’s economic independence and reduction in the gains to marriage are compelling in the East Asian context (e.g., Park 2007;Parketal.2013;Raymo1998, 2003). The same is true of emphases on the tension between expanding opportunities outside the home and limited change in spouses’ division of domestic labor (McDonald 2009). In both cases, gender-asymmetric division of labor within marriage is thought to present unmarried women with an either-or choice between marriage and motherhood or career and other individual pursuits. The increasing tendency for women to choose the latter is seen as evidence of the declining desirability of marriages characterized by gender-based specialization. However, there is good reason to believe that a comprehensive explanation for later and less marriage in East Asia is more complex than suggested by these commonly referenced theoretical frameworks. Of particular importance is evidence that change in the desirability of marriage is relatively limited and that expectations (and acceptance) of a clear gender-based division of labor within marriage remain strong. Tension between rapid social change and relative stability in norms and expectations around marriage sits at the core of one alternative explanation that emphasizes reductions in the feasibility (rather than the desirability) of marriages characterized by a strong gender-based division of labor. In this “marriage market mismatch” scenario, rapid relative improve- ments in women’s educational attainment, combined with limited change in normative desires and expectations regarding educational homogamy and female educational hypergamy, make it numerically more difficult for highly educated women (and less- educated men) to find a suitable partner (Raymo and Iwasawa 2005). This scenario Downloaded from http://read.dukeupress.edu/demography/article-pdf/57/1/171/844582/171raymo.pdf by guest on 27 September 2021 Marriage Decline in Korea 173 provides a framework for reconciling dramatic decline in marriage rates with the continued centrality of men’s economic prospects as a spouse-selection criterion and maintenance of expectations for a clear gender-based division of labor within marriage. In this article, we evaluate the marriage market mismatch scenario in South Korea (Korea, hereafter), a society where decline in marriage and associated reduction in the total fertility rate (TFR) have been particularly rapid (Park and Lee 2017;Parketal. 2013; Yoo and Sobotka 2018), women’s relative educational attainment has increased dramatically (Park 2007), and historical norms and patterns of spouse pairing show a strong tendency for marriages to be educationally homogamous or female hypergamous (Park and Smits 2005; Smits and Park 2009). This combination of characteristics, along with growth in international marriages, makes Korea a particu- larly interesting setting in which to evaluate the implications of changes in marriage market composition. We are not aware of any previous effort to quantify the role of increasing international marriage, especially the relatively rapid growth of marriages involving native-born men of low socioeconomic status (SES) and foreign-born women (Kim 2017), in offsetting mismatches in the domestic marriage market. We seek to answer three specific research questions about the relevance of marriage market mismatches for understanding the marked decline in marriage rates in Korea. (1) To what extent have changes in the educational composition of the marriage market contributed to declining marriage rates among highly educated women, net of changes in specific pairing propensities? (2) To what extent have changes in the educational composition of the marriage market contributed to declining marriage rates among low-educated men, net of changes in specific pairing propensities? (3) To what extent has international marriage offset the impact of mismatches in the domestic marriage market for men? Background Women’s Educational Attainment and Marriage in East Asia The pace and magnitude of the trend toward later and less marriage has been particularly pronounced in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan (Chen and Chen 2014;ParkandLee2017;Park et al. 2013;Raymo2013; Raymo et al. 2015). Mean age at first marriage has increased substantially over time for both men and women in these societies: from about age 27 for men in 1980 to about age 31 in 2010, and from less than age 25 for women in 1980 to age 29 in 2010 (Raymo et al. 2015). It is also clear that an increasing proportion of men and women in the region will never marry (Raymo et al. 2015:476). In contrast to the United States and many European countries, where nonmarital childbearing is common, the continued strength of the relationship between marriage and fertility in East Asia accen- tuates the demographic importance of later and less marriage. All three societies are characterized by period fertility rates that are well below replacement, and it is clear that the long-term decline in TFR primarily reflects reductions in the proportion of women who are married (Choe and Park 2006;TsuyaandMason1995). Downloaded from http://read.dukeupress.edu/demography/article-pdf/57/1/171/844582/171raymo.pdf by guest on 27 September 2021 174 J.M. Raymo, H. Park Efforts to understand declining marriage rates in East Asia commonly emphasize the role of educational expansion and changing occupational structure in contributing to women’s growing economic independence. Standard economic models of marriage are built on the assumption that the gains to marriage