A Practical Guide to Constructing and Evaluating Definitions of Terms Definition: a Practical Guide to Constructing and Evaluating Definitions of Terms
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Language and Definitions
This asset is intentionally omitted from this text. It may be accessed at Language and Definitions www.mcescher.com. (Waterfall by 1 Language Functions M.C. Escher) 2 Emotive Language, Neutral Language, and Disputes 3 Disputes and Ambiguity 4 Definitions and Their Uses 5 The Structure of Definitions: Extension and Intension 6 Definition by Genus and Difference 1 Language Functions When people reason, they typically do so using language, manipulating proposi- tions in a logical or informative spirit. But language is used in a great variety of ways, only some of which are informative. Without the intention to inform, we may express ourselves using language: “That’s really great!” we may say; and the poet, overcome by the beauty of an ancient city, channels his emotions in writing these lines: Match me such marvel, save in Eastern clime— A rose-red city—“half as old as time.”1 Of course, some expressive discourse also has informative content, and may express attitudes as well as beliefs. Grow old along with me! The best is yet to be, The last of life for which the first was made.2 Moreover, some discourse is directive, with or without expressive or informa- tive elements. It seeks to guide or to command. “Step on the scale, please,” we may be told, or we may receive this good advice: Drive defensively. The cemetery is full of law-abiding citizens who had the right of way. A mixture of functions is a natural feature of almost all our uses of language. We can see this in our own speech and writing. -
Language and Definitions 3
M03_COPI1396_13_SE_C03.QXD 10/12/07 11:54 AM Page 71 Language and Definitions 3 3.1 Language Functions 3.2 Emotive Language, Neutral Language, and Disputes 3.3 Disputes and Ambiguity 3.4 Definitions and Their Uses 3.5 The Structure of Definitions: Extension and Intension 3.6 Definition by Genus and Difference 3.1 Language Functions We reason using language, manipulating propositions in a logical or informative spirit. But language is used in a great variety of ways, only some of which are informative. Without the intention to inform, we may express ourselves using language: “That’s really great!” we may say; and the poet, overcome by the beauty of an ancient city, channels his emotions in writing these lines: Match me such marvel, save in Eastern clime— A rose-red city—“half as old as time.1 Of course, some expressive discourse also has informative content, and may express attitudes as well as beliefs. Grow old along with me! The best is yet to be, The last of life for which the first was made2 Moreover, some discourse is directive, with or without expressive or in- formative elements. It seeks to guide or to command. “Step on the scale, please,” we may be told. Or we may receive this good advice: “Drive defensively. The cemetery is full of law-abiding citizens who had the right of way.” A mixture of functions is a natural feature of almost all our uses of lan- guage. We can see this in our own speech and writing. Emotive language may be used to advance our purposes in directing others: “That conduct is utterly 71 M03_COPI1396_13_SE_C03.QXD 10/12/07 11:54 AM Page 72 72 CHAPTER 3 Language and Definitions disgusting!” says parent to child, expressing an attitude, seeking to direct be- havior, and (with those same words) probably reporting a fact. -
Critical Thinking
Critical Thinking Mark Storey Bellevue College Copyright (c) 2013 Mark Storey Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License, Version 1.3 or any later version published by the Free Software Foundation; with no Invariant Sections, no Front-Cover Texts, and no Back-Cover Texts. A copy of the license is found at http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.txt. 1 Contents Part 1 Chapter 1: Thinking Critically about the Logic of Arguments .. 3 Chapter 2: Deduction and Induction ………… ………………. 10 Chapter 3: Evaluating Deductive Arguments ……………...…. 16 Chapter 4: Evaluating Inductive Arguments …………..……… 24 Chapter 5: Deductive Soundness and Inductive Cogency ….…. 29 Chapter 6: The Counterexample Method ……………………... 33 Part 2 Chapter 7: Fallacies ………………….………….……………. 43 Chapter 8: Arguments from Analogy ………………………… 75 Part 3 Chapter 9: Categorical Patterns….…….………….…………… 86 Chapter 10: Propositional Patterns……..….…………...……… 116 Part 4 Chapter 11: Causal Arguments....……..………….………....…. 143 Chapter 12: Hypotheses.….………………………………….… 159 Chapter 13: Definitions and Analyses...…………………...…... 179 Chapter 14: Probability………………………………….………199 2 Chapter 1: Thinking Critically about the Logic of Arguments Logic and critical thinking together make up the systematic study of reasoning, and reasoning is what we do when we draw a conclusion on the basis of other claims. In other words, reasoning is used when you infer one claim on the basis of another. For example, if you see a great deal of snow falling from the sky outside your bedroom window one morning, you can reasonably conclude that it’s probably cold outside. Or, if you see a man smiling broadly, you can reasonably conclude that he is at least somewhat happy. -
GST203 Final 1__Docx
Course Information Course Code: GST 203 Course Title: Introduction to Philosophy and Logic Credit Unit: 2 Course Status: Compulsory Semester: 2nd Required Study Hour: 4 hours per week Year of Course Review 2018 Course Team Course Reviewer: Dr, Oyekunle O. Adegboyega Instructional Designer: Inegbedion, Juliet O. (Ph.D.) Learning Technologists: Dr. Adewale Adesina, Nura Maidoki,& Henry Ude Content Editor: Prof. Uduma Oji Uduma Copy Editors: Inegbedion, Juliet O. (Ph.D.) & Christiana Uzoukwu (Mrs) Ice Breaker Upload your passport and introduce yourself by stating your names, what you do for a living, your hobby, your expectation in this course and the name you would prefer to be called during this course. NATIONAL OPEN UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA 1 © 2018 by NOUN Press National Open University of Nigeria Headquarters University Village Plot 91, Cadastral Zone Nnamdi Azikiwe Expressway Jabi, Abuja Lagos Office 14/16 Ahmadu Bello Way Victoria Island, Lagos e-mail: [email protected] URL: www.nou.edu.ng All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, in any form or by any means, without permission in writing from the publisher. Published by: National Open University of Nigeria Printed by NOUN Press [email protected] Printed 2018 ISBN: 978-978-8521-92-1 2 Course Guide Introduction Welcome to GST 203: A Study Guide for the Distance Learner. GST 203 is a two-credit unit course that has minimum duration of one semester. It is a compulsory course for undergraduate students in Science Programmes including Science Education in the university. The course guides you on the techniques of studying to achieve academic success through open and distance learning. -
Definition by 9Enus and Species: When an Expres Liver, It Is Possible for a Vertebrate Thing to Sion Is Said to Be Applicable to Some but Not Lack a Liver
IFrom: Audi, Robert, ed . The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge University Press (2 nd Edition 1999). I definition, specification of the meaning or, alter tually defines 'exactly one' as it occurs in natlvely, conceptual content. of an expression. 'There ts exactly one F'. Recursive defini For example, 'period of fourteen days' Is a delin· tions (see below) are an Important variety ltloo of 'fortnight'. Definitions have traditionally of contextual deflnltlon. Another impor been judged by rules like the following: tant application of contextual definition is Russell's theory of descriptions, which (1) A definition should not be too narrow. defines 'the' as It occurs In contexts of the 'Unmarried adult male psychlatrlst' is too form 'The so-and-so is such-and·such'. narrow a delinitlon for 'bachelor', for some coordinative definition: definition of a theoretical bachelors are not psychiatrists. 'Having term by non-theoretical terms: e.g., 'the vertebrae and a llver' is too narrow for forty-millionth part of the circumference of 'vertebrate', for, ~ven though all actual the earth' for 'meter'. vertebrate things have vertebrae and a definition by 9enus and species: When an expres liver, it is possible for a vertebrate thing to sion is said to be applicable to some but not lack a liver. all entities of a certain type and inapplica (2) A definition should not be too broad. ble to all entities not of that type, the type 'Unmarried adult' ls too broad a definition in question is the genus, and the subtype of for 'bachelor', for not all unmarried adults all and only those entities to which the ar~ bachelors. -
Seria “{Tiin\E Umanistice” Lingvistic= [I Literatur= ISSN 1857-209X
Seria “{tiin\e umanistice” Lingvistic= [i Literatur= ISSN 1857-209X DEFINITION OF PROPER NAME VERSUS ITS DICTIONARY DEFINITION Svetlana CORCODEL Catedra Traducere, Interpretare şi Lingvistică Aplicată Intenţionăm ca, prin cele ce urmează, să aducem unele clarificări cu privire la natura raportului dintre sens şi ceea ce numim „definiţie lexicografică” a sensului unui cuvânt. Lăsând la o parte, pentru simplificare, celelalte părţi de vorbire, se poate spune că numele (proprii şi/sau comune) împreună cu adjectivele au ca denotate clase de obiecte, înţelegând prin obiecte toate entităţile cu care este populat universul nostru. Generalizând, putem spune că, în cele mai multe cazuri, o definiţie lexicografică nu poate servi la definirea propriu-zisă a unei clase-denotat. Aceasta se întâmplă din cauza faptului că definiţia lexicografică a unui cuvânt nu este sensul cuvântului, ci aproximaţia sensului acestui cuvânt – o dovedesc şi definiţiile aceluiaşi sens în dicţionare diferite. Caracteristicile comune pentru un semn sunt observabile, dar nu în mod necesar şi definitoriu. Lexicograful nu face decât să selecteze una sau mai multe trăsături comune obiectelor denotate de un semn, conferindu-i, prin ipoteză, un caracter definitoriu. Caracterul de ipoteză al acestei selecţii nu este explicit în formularea definiţiei. Admiţând că sensul poate fi aproximat printr-o definiţie lexicografică, atribuim sensului o interpretare conceptualistă. “Definition – a statement which captures the meaning, the use, the function and the essence of a term or concept.” [12] Definition is one of the most crucial issues in any science; an improper understanding of it can vitiate the success of the whole enterprise not because valid theorems will fail to appear, but because their import will not be grasped. -
3.4 Definitions and Their Uses
M03_COPI1396_13_SE_C03.QXD 10/12/07 11:54 AM Page 88 88 CHAPTER 3 Language and Definitions 3.4 Definitions and Their Uses Good definitions are plainly very helpful in eliminating verbal disputes, but there are other uses of definition that are important in logic. Before distin- guishing these uses, one feature of all definitions must be emphasized: Definitions are definitions of symbols (not of objects), because only symbols have the meanings that definitions may explain. To illustrate, we can define the word “chair” because it has meaning; but a chair itself we cannot define. We can sit on a chair, or paint it, or burn it, or describe it—but we cannot define it because an actual chair is not a symbol that has a meaning to be explained. Sometimes we say, misleadingly, that the thing is being defined; in fact, what we define are always symbols. Two commonly used technical terms are useful in discussing definitions. The definiendum is the symbol being defined. The definiens is the symbol (or group of symbols) used to explain the meaning of the definiendum. Put otherwise, the definiendum is the term to be defined, the definiens is the defi- nition of it. However, it would be a mistake to say that the definiens is the meaning of the definiendum—rather, it is another symbol (or group of sym- bols) that has the same meaning as the definiendum. With this preface, we may say that definitions, depending on how they are used, are of five kinds: (1) stipulative, (2) lexical, (3) precising, (4) theoretical, and (5) persuasive. -
A Theory of Definition & Concepts
Chapter Six A Theory of Definition & Concepts Abstract: This chapter has four parts. I. It is hypothesized that whenever a person asserts how a linguistic entity (i.e. word, phrase, symbol, definiendum) has been used, is used, or is going to be used; a person can only be interpreted as asserting a reportive definition, theoretic definition, or a stipulative definition. If this linguistic theory is true, then we should be able to understand any definition of a definiendum-to-definiens form (in a context) as being one of these three types. This 'tripartite definition' of 'definition' is either true or false. II. Six kinds of concepts are described as part of a descriptive metaphysics: (1) natural kind concepts (2) group resemblance concepts, (3) fixed definiens concepts (4) fictional entity concepts (5) definite description concepts, and (6) proper name concepts. As a measurement system, these concepts formulate a (non-neutral) metaphysical system. III. The relationship between three kinds of concepts (viz. natural kind, group resemblance, and fixed definiens) and the kinds of definitions that they are typically associated with is explored. These relationships help explain the normal uses of reportive, theoretic, and stipulative definitions in the physical, mathematical, and social sciences. IV. The 'tripartite theory of definition' in section I (above) is confirmed. With the methodology of conceptual analysis, other kinds of definition are examined (e.g. real, nominal, implicit, recursive, etc.). These other kinds of definitions are shown to be identical to, fall under, be explainable, or refutable under the three primary types. Part I: A Tripartite Theory of Definition With a theory of definition, I hypothesize that whenever a person asserts how a linguistic entity (i.e. -
Logic A-Z from Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia Chapter 1
Logic A-Z From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Chapter 1 Antepredicament Antepredicaments, in logic, are certain previous matters requisite to a more easy and clear apprehension of the doctrine of predicaments or categories. Such are definitions of common terms, as equivocals, univocals, etc., with divisions of things, their differences, etc. They are thus called because Aristotle treated them before the predicaments, hoping that the thread of discourse might not afterwards be interrupted. 1.1 References • This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Chambers, Ephraim, ed. (1728). "*article name needed". Cyclopædia, or an Universal Dictionary of Arts and Sciences (first ed.). James and John Knapton, et al. 2 Chapter 2 Apophasis Not to be confused with Apophysis (disambiguation), Apoptosis, or Apophis (disambiguation). Apophasis is a rhetorical device wherein the speaker or writer brings up a subject by either denying it, or denying that it should be brought up.*[1] Accordingly, it can be seen as a rhetorical relative of irony. Also called paralipsis (παράλειψις) – also spelled paraleipsis or paralepsis –, or occupatio,*[2]*[3]*[4]*[5] and known also as prae- teritio, preterition, antiphrasis (ἀντίφρασις), or parasiopesis (παρασιώπησις), apophasis is usually employed to make a subversive ad hominem attack, which makes it a frequently used tactic in political speeches to make an attack on one's opponent. Using apophasis in this way is often considered to be bad form. The device is typically used to distance -
Lexical Definition Is the Meaning of the Term In
Kinds and techniques of definition: Lexical definition is the meaning of the term in common usage Contextual definition a word’s meaning is different in different contexts, and thus it is only in context, or use, that we can understand the meaning. Intensional definition gives the meaning of a term by giving all the properties required of something that falls under that definition; the necessary and sufficient conditions for belonging to the set being defined. Extensional definition gives the meaning of a term by listing everything in its extension - that is, everything that falls under that definition. Ostensive definition conveys the meaning of a term by pointing out examples of what is defined by it. Operational definition details the precise procedure through which we can recognize an entity; of a quantity is a specific process whereby it is measured. Theoretical definition gives the meaning of a word in terms of the theories of a specific discipline. Definition by genus and difference is one in which a word or concept that indicates a species -- a specific type of item, not necessarily a biological category -- is described first by a broader category, the genus, then distinguished from other items in that category by differentia. Circular definition A circular definition is one that assumes a prior understanding of the term being defined. For instance, we can define "oak" as a tree which has catkins and grows from an acorn, and then define "acorn" as the nut produced by an oak tree. To someone not knowing either which trees are oaks or which nuts are acorns, the definition is fairly useless. -
A Tripartite Theory of 'Definition'
A Tripartite Theory of 'Definition' Abstract: This essay analyzes the nature of 'definition' as a definiendum-to-definiens relationship. A 'tripartite theory' of definition is hypothesized. It states that whenever a person defines a definiendum-to-a-definiens, that person can only be interpreted as asserting either a 'reportive definition,' a 'theoretic definition,' or a 'stipulative definition.' In order to verify the truth of the tripartite theory of definition, a conceptual investigation about the functional use of definitions in various situations is described by examples. Of special interest and importance are the examples of stipulative definitions. As a mathematical anti-realist, I contend that formal systems are wholly composed of stipulative definitions, and that knowledge about the kinds of stipulative definitions is crucial for understanding mathematical anti-realism. Of course, an anti-realist mathematical theory isn't presented here. To back up the tripartite theory, I comment on entries about ‘definition’ from The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy Audi (1999). Introduction With a tripartite theory of definition, I hypothesize that whenever a person asserts how a linguistic entity (i.e. word, phrase, symbol, definiendum) has been used, is used, or is going to be used; that person can only be interpreted as asserting a reportive (i.e. lexical) definition, theoretic definition, or a stipulative definition. If this hypothesis is true, we should be able to understand any definition of a definiendum-to-definiens form (in a context) as being one of these three types. If this hypothesis is false, we should be able to find an instance of a linguistic token-to-meaning form that cannot be interpreted as reportive, theoretic, or stipulative. -
A Mini Guide to Critical Thinking Joe Lau Department of Philosophy The
A Mini Guide to Critical Thinking Joe Lau Department of Philosophy The University of Hong Kong August 2003 Table of contents 1. Introduction ..........................................................1 2. Meaning...............................................................1 3. Definitions ............................................................3 4. Necessary and sufficient conditions......................5 5. Linguistic pitfalls ...................................................7 6. Basic logical concepts ........................................ 12 7. Arguments.......................................................... 13 8. Validity and soundness....................................... 14 9. Patterns of valid arguments ................................ 16 10. Causation........................................................... 20 11. Morality .............................................................. 21 12. Fallacies............................................................. 22 13. Going forward..................................................... 23 1. Introduction Critical thinking is the ability to engage in reflective and independent thinking, and being able to think clearly and rationally. Critical thinking does not mean being argumentative or being critical of others. Although critical thinking skills can be used in exposing fallacies and bad reasoning, they can also be used to support other viewpoints, and to cooperate with others in solving problems and acquiring knowledge. Critical thinking is a general thinking skill