A Mini Guide to Critical Thinking Joe Lau Department of Philosophy The
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“Joking, Kidding, Teasing”: Slippery Categories for Cross-Cultural
Intercultural Pragmatics 2018; 15(4): 487–514 Cliff Goddard* “Joking, kidding, teasing”: Slippery categories for cross-cultural comparison but key words for understanding Anglo conversational humor https://doi.org/10.1515/ip-2018-0017 Abstract: Terms like to joke (and joking)andto tease (and teasing)havea curious double life in contrastive and interactional pragmatics and related fields. Occasionally they are studied as metapragmatic terms of ordinary English, along with related expressions such as kidding. More commonly they are used as scientific or technical categories, both for research into English and for cross-linguistic and cross-cultural comparison. Related English adjectives, such as jocular and mock, are also much-used in a growing lexicon of compound terms, such as jocular abuse, mock abuse, jocular mock- ery,andthelike. Against this background, the present paper has three main aims. In the first part, it is argued that the meanings of the verbs to joke and to tease (and related nouns) are much more English-specific than is commonly recognized. They are not precisely cross-translatable even into European languages such as French and German. Adopting such termsasbaselinecategoriesforcross- cultural comparison therefore risks introducing an Anglocentric bias into our theoretical vocabulary. Nor can the problem be easily solved, it is argued, by attributing technical meanings to the terms. Detailed analysis of the everyday meanings of words like joking and teasing, on the other hand, can yield insights into the ethnopragmatics of Anglo con- versational humor. This task is undertaken in the second part of the paper. The important English verb to kid and the common conversational formulas just kidding and only joking are also examined. -
Language and Definitions
This asset is intentionally omitted from this text. It may be accessed at Language and Definitions www.mcescher.com. (Waterfall by 1 Language Functions M.C. Escher) 2 Emotive Language, Neutral Language, and Disputes 3 Disputes and Ambiguity 4 Definitions and Their Uses 5 The Structure of Definitions: Extension and Intension 6 Definition by Genus and Difference 1 Language Functions When people reason, they typically do so using language, manipulating proposi- tions in a logical or informative spirit. But language is used in a great variety of ways, only some of which are informative. Without the intention to inform, we may express ourselves using language: “That’s really great!” we may say; and the poet, overcome by the beauty of an ancient city, channels his emotions in writing these lines: Match me such marvel, save in Eastern clime— A rose-red city—“half as old as time.”1 Of course, some expressive discourse also has informative content, and may express attitudes as well as beliefs. Grow old along with me! The best is yet to be, The last of life for which the first was made.2 Moreover, some discourse is directive, with or without expressive or informa- tive elements. It seeks to guide or to command. “Step on the scale, please,” we may be told, or we may receive this good advice: Drive defensively. The cemetery is full of law-abiding citizens who had the right of way. A mixture of functions is a natural feature of almost all our uses of language. We can see this in our own speech and writing. -
Lecture 5. Formal Semantics and the Lexicon. Meaning Postulates And
Topics in Formal Semantics, Lecture 5 Topics in Formal Semantics, Lecture 5 B.H. Partee, MGU, March 22, 2005 B.H. Partee, MGU, March 22, 2005 Lecture 5. Formal semantics and the lexicon. Ideally, this abstraction should mirror a “real” abstraction which our “language faculty” Meaning postulates and the lexicon. Adjective meanings. imposes on the real world, “natural language metaphysics” or “naïve picture of the world” (naivnaja kartina mira in the terminology of Moscow semantic school). We will discuss this later when considering the integration of formal and lexical semantics. 1. The Lexicon in Model-theoretic Semantics. .................................................................................................1 1.1. Languages, world, models. Axioms.............................................................................................................1 In Montague’s formal semantics the simple predicates of the language of intensional 1.2. Axioms and theories. ..................................................................................................................................2 logic (IL), like love, like, kiss, see, etc., are regarded as symbols (similar to the “labels” of 2. Integrating formal semantics, lexical semantics, natural language metaphysics ...............................................4 PC) which could have many possible interpretations in many different models, their “real 2.1. Formal semantics in the broader setting of natural language use. ...............................................................4 -
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16 Definition Robert H. Ennis 1. Introduction1 Definition, though often neglected, plays an important role in critical thinking by helping us make our positions, inquiries, and reasoning clear. Every definition has three dimensions: form, action, and content. The form of a definition is essentially the structure of the definition. An example of form is definition by synonym, a simple form of definition in which the word being defined is equal in meaning to one other word. Three definitional actions that can be performed with any form of defini- tion are reporting a meaning, stipulating a meaning, and advocating a mean- ing that incorporates a position on an issue. This chapter focuses on these first two dimensions, form and action. The third dimension, content, deals with the meaning conveyed by the def- inition. The content dimension is enormous because it involves the defini- tional content of all subject matter areas, as well as all other areas of human life. Attention to the content dimension will here be exemplified only in a dis- cussion of a case of probable equivocation with the term ‘reliability’. To the extent possible, a definition should be clear, brief, efficient, informa- tive, responsive to background information, and easy to remember and under- stand. It should be at an appropriate level of sophistication and difficulty for the situation. It should employ an appropriate form and have a reasonable amount of vagueness and specificity. Because so much depends on the situa- tion, and because these general criteria overlap to some extent, informed cau- tious judgment is required. 1 I deeply appreciate the help and advice of Jennie Berg, David Hitchcock, and Kevin Possin in the development of this chapter. -
Characterizing the Definitions of Anatomical Concepts in Wordnet and Specialized Sources
Characterizing the definitions of anatomical concepts in WordNet and specialized sources Olivier BODENREIDER Anita BURGUN National Library of Medicine Laboratoire d’Informatique Médicale 8600 Rockville Pike Avenue du Pr Léon Bernard Bethesda, MD, 20894 35043 Rennes Cedex, France [email protected] [email protected] Abstract Objectives : The objective of this study is to characterize the definitions of anatomical concepts in a general terminological system (WordNet) and a domain-specific one (a medical dictionary). Methods : Definitions were first classified into five groups with respect to the nature of the definition. The principal noun phrase (or head) of the definiens was then compared to the definiendum through a reference hierarchy of anatomical concepts. Results : This study confirms the predominance of genus-differentia definitions for anatomical terms. Hierarchical relationships are, as expected, the principal type of relationships found between the definiendum and the head of the definiens. Discussion : Differences in the characteristics of the definitions between WordNet and medical dictionaries are presented and discussed. Introduction We are interested in characterizing the definitions of medical terms in various sources in order to get a better understanding of their structure. Our ultimate goal, though, is to obtain a representation of the definitions in a formalism such as conceptual graphs in order to compare definitions from various sources. This study is part of a larger project aimed at comparing definitions of medical terms in specialized sources such as medical dictionaries with those in general resources such as WordNet . In other words, our goal is to compare definitions of medical terms for health professionals and for users of consumer health applications. -
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Ⱥ¼ì²´²ÜàôÂÚàôÜ Tatev GYURJYAN Yerevan State University [email protected] LEXICAL DEFINITION: ITS SCOPE AND SIGNIFICANCE Understanding the notion of definition is a central issue in such scientific disciplines as Philosophy, Semantics, and Lexicography. The paper considers different types of definitions focusing on lexical definition, which is the main component of a dictionary entry. An attempt is made to designate lexical definition and stipulative definition as subcategories of word-thing definition. Key words: nominal definition, word-thing definition, lexical definition, stipulative definition, truth value Definition is the main component of a dictionary entry. It can be long or short, accompanied by an example or an image. What kind of definition is presented in dictionaries? Many lexicographers would claim it is lexical definition. To have a comprehensive idea of lexical definition it is necessary to designate its place in the hierarchy of different types of definition. In its wider sense definition is not confined to a single field of science, but rather represents the product of the cognitive ability of an individual to define things, concepts, and words. The ancient tradition of defining definition mostly revolves around the following two main types – real and nominal. The former as proposed by Plato and Aristotle is the only true and universal definition of things, which is not conditioned by the word usage; the latter is the description of the word meaning, i.e. the definition of words /see Gyurjyan, 2016/. This differentiation is also adopted by Richard Robinson. In his book Definition he first of all draws a distinction between the purpose of definition (what it is trying to do) and the method of definition (how it is achieved). -
Morphology, Material for Incorporation in Curricula
REPOR TRESUMES ED 019 258 24 TE 000 261 MORPHOLOGY, MATERIAL FORINCORPORATION IN CURRICULAOF GRADES 11 AND 12. NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIV.,DE KALB 'REPORT NUMBER CRP-H-144-2 PUB DATE AUG 66 REPORT NUMBER BR -5- 1112-2 CONTRACT OEC-4-10-252 EDRS PRICE MF-$0.50 HC-$4.66 115P. DESCRIPTORS- *LANGUAGE INSTRUCTIONS*MORPHOLOGY (LANGUAGES), *CURRICULUM GUIDES, *ENGLISHINSTRUCTION, *FORM CLASSES (LANGUAGES), APPLIED LINGUISTICS,LANGUAGE GUIDES, GRAMMAR, PHONOLOGY, SYNTAX, GRACE119 .GRADE 12, SECONDARYEDUCATION, LANGUAGE, NORTHERN ILLINOISUNIVERSITY, DEKALB, PROJECT ENGLISH, THIS 'NORTHERN ILLINOISUNIVERSITY PROJECT ENGLISHUNIT IS PLANNED TO COMPLEMENT THEGRAMMAR WHICH 11TH- AND 12TH-GRADE STUDENTS ALREADYKNOW, AND TO ENRICH THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF THE ENGLISHLANGUAGE. THOUGH NOT PRIMARILY AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PARTSOF SPEECH, THE UNIT'ROVIDES SECTIONS ON NOUNS, VERBS ANDAUXILIARIES, ADJECTIVES, ADVERBS, CONJUNCTIONS, SUBORDINATORS,SENTENCE CONNECTORS, PRONOUNS, AND QUALIFIERS. THE UNITALSO CONTAINS (1) A DIAGNOSTIC TEST ON THE PARTSOF SPEECH,(2) A LESSON PLAN TO INTRODUCE MORPHEMICS,. (3) ANINTRODUCTION TO VOCABULARY STUDY, (4) A SECTION ON DERIVATIONALSUFFIXES,(5) A LESSON USING THE PARTS OF SPEECH INTEACHING THE ESSAY OF DEFINITION,(6) AN INTRODUCTION TO A12TH-GRADE UNIT ON THE PARTS OF SPEECH AND FORMALDEFINITION, AND (7)A TEST ON PHONOLOGY, MORPHOLOGY, AND SYNTAX.PARTS OR ALL OF THIS UNIT CAN BE USED (1) PRECEDING OR FOLLOWING A UNIT ON SYNTAX, (2) FOLLOWING A UNIT ON PHONOLOGY, (3) IN AN HONORS SENIOR ENGLISH CLASS, OR (4) TO ENRICHA PROGRAM FOR SUPERIOR STUDENTS. (MM) It.,1 110 e 'PO 13B MORPHOLOGY Material for incorporation in curricula of grades 11 and12 Caution:Those materials are being used experimentally by Project English participants, who are continuing to develop them. -
Study Material Lecture 16.Pdf
Semantics and Pragmatics Lecture No.16 Study Material Practical Dictionary Dictionary may be seen as a reference book which is the inbuilt dictionary that everyone of us carries around as part of his mental equipment as a speaker of a language. ‘Semantic Competence’ is how a native speaker knows about lexical items to understand the meaning. Leech (1981) has used different terminologies for dictionaries such as: ‘Theoretical dictionaries, ‘flesh-and-blood dictionaries or practical dictionaries’, such as the Concise Oxford Dictionary, compiled by lexicographers – we all consult regularly. Why should we use dictionary while we are using proper lexical items? Because human language is getting vast day by day and the dictionary as a refence book adapts to the various linguistic needs which society expects it to satisfy (Leech, 1981). We have learnt to go to ‘the dictionary’ for all manners of information on words, for example; their history and origin, etc. An approach: that the meaning of a linguistic expression is precisely that knowledge which enables one to use it appropriately in linguistic communication, whether in everyday or specialist contexts. According to Leech (1981), there are two practical conditions of dictionary-writing. The first: lexicographers try to make dictionaries comprehensive even to the extent of defining easy words. The second: the more important, because it arises from a basic unavoidable difference between ‘practical and theoretical’ dictionaries: It is that a practical dictionary - definition must consist of words. It has been argued that the lexical definition, as part of the native speaker’s linguistic equipment, can be precisely represented only by a special formal language. -
Language and Definitions 3
M03_COPI1396_13_SE_C03.QXD 10/12/07 11:54 AM Page 71 Language and Definitions 3 3.1 Language Functions 3.2 Emotive Language, Neutral Language, and Disputes 3.3 Disputes and Ambiguity 3.4 Definitions and Their Uses 3.5 The Structure of Definitions: Extension and Intension 3.6 Definition by Genus and Difference 3.1 Language Functions We reason using language, manipulating propositions in a logical or informative spirit. But language is used in a great variety of ways, only some of which are informative. Without the intention to inform, we may express ourselves using language: “That’s really great!” we may say; and the poet, overcome by the beauty of an ancient city, channels his emotions in writing these lines: Match me such marvel, save in Eastern clime— A rose-red city—“half as old as time.1 Of course, some expressive discourse also has informative content, and may express attitudes as well as beliefs. Grow old along with me! The best is yet to be, The last of life for which the first was made2 Moreover, some discourse is directive, with or without expressive or in- formative elements. It seeks to guide or to command. “Step on the scale, please,” we may be told. Or we may receive this good advice: “Drive defensively. The cemetery is full of law-abiding citizens who had the right of way.” A mixture of functions is a natural feature of almost all our uses of lan- guage. We can see this in our own speech and writing. Emotive language may be used to advance our purposes in directing others: “That conduct is utterly 71 M03_COPI1396_13_SE_C03.QXD 10/12/07 11:54 AM Page 72 72 CHAPTER 3 Language and Definitions disgusting!” says parent to child, expressing an attitude, seeking to direct be- havior, and (with those same words) probably reporting a fact. -
Critical Thinking
Critical Thinking Mark Storey Bellevue College Copyright (c) 2013 Mark Storey Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License, Version 1.3 or any later version published by the Free Software Foundation; with no Invariant Sections, no Front-Cover Texts, and no Back-Cover Texts. A copy of the license is found at http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.txt. 1 Contents Part 1 Chapter 1: Thinking Critically about the Logic of Arguments .. 3 Chapter 2: Deduction and Induction ………… ………………. 10 Chapter 3: Evaluating Deductive Arguments ……………...…. 16 Chapter 4: Evaluating Inductive Arguments …………..……… 24 Chapter 5: Deductive Soundness and Inductive Cogency ….…. 29 Chapter 6: The Counterexample Method ……………………... 33 Part 2 Chapter 7: Fallacies ………………….………….……………. 43 Chapter 8: Arguments from Analogy ………………………… 75 Part 3 Chapter 9: Categorical Patterns….…….………….…………… 86 Chapter 10: Propositional Patterns……..….…………...……… 116 Part 4 Chapter 11: Causal Arguments....……..………….………....…. 143 Chapter 12: Hypotheses.….………………………………….… 159 Chapter 13: Definitions and Analyses...…………………...…... 179 Chapter 14: Probability………………………………….………199 2 Chapter 1: Thinking Critically about the Logic of Arguments Logic and critical thinking together make up the systematic study of reasoning, and reasoning is what we do when we draw a conclusion on the basis of other claims. In other words, reasoning is used when you infer one claim on the basis of another. For example, if you see a great deal of snow falling from the sky outside your bedroom window one morning, you can reasonably conclude that it’s probably cold outside. Or, if you see a man smiling broadly, you can reasonably conclude that he is at least somewhat happy. -
A Practical Guide to Constructing and Evaluating Definitions of Terms Definition: a Practical Guide to Constructing and Evaluating Definitions of Terms
Definition: A practical guide to constructing and evaluating definitions of terms Definition: A practical guide to constructing and evaluating definitions of terms David Hitchcock WINDSOR STUDIES IN ARGUMENTATION 11 WINDSOR, ON Copyright David Hitchcock and Windsor Studies in Argumentation Digital Copies of Definition: A practical guide to constructing and evaluating definitions of terms by David Hitchcock is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License, except where otherwise noted. Manuscript editing by Tamilyn Mulvaney Cover Art by Jonathan Whitehead (https://www.jonathanwhitehead.com/) To Inga, with love Contents viii Preface ix 1. Introduction 1 1.1 Occasions for defining terms 1 1.2 The definition of ‘term’ 2 1.3 Three dimensions of definitions 3 2. Acts of the definer 7 2.1 Reporting 7 2.2 Stipulating 25 2.3 Advocating 52 3. Content of the definition 76 3.1 Choice of words in the defining part of a 76 definition 3.2 Choice of words suitable for the 82 addressees of a definition 3.3 Theoretical constraints on the choice of 84 words in a definition 3.4 Choice of information to convey 86 4. Forms of definition: normal forms 87 4.1 Definitions by synonym 89 4.2 Definitions by antonym 96 4.3 Definitions by extended synonym 99 4.4 Definitions by genus and differentia 102 4.5 Contextual definitions 124 4.6 Range definitions 137 4.7 Extensional definitions 143 5. Forms of definition: other forms 145 5.1 Operational definitions 145 5.2 Giving examples, non-examples and 154 borderline cases 5.3 Ostensive definitions 159 5.4 Use in a sentence 160 6. -
(#5) a Tripartite Theory of 'Definition'
A Tripartite Theory of 'Definition' Abstract: This essay analyzes the nature of 'definition' as a definiendum-to-definiens relationship. A 'tripartite theory' of definition is hypothesized. It states that whenever a person defines a definiendum-to-a-definiens, that person can only be interpreted as asserting either a 'reportive definition,' a 'theoretic definition,' or a 'stipulative definition.' In order to verify the truth of the theory, a conceptual investigation about the functional use of definitions in various situations is described by examples. Of special interest are the examples of 'stipulative definition.' As a mathematical anti-realist, I contend that formal systems are largely composed of stipulative definitions that are 'precisely formalized' and 'abbreviatory' in nature. To back up the tripartite theory, I comment about the entries under ‘definition’ in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (1999). Introduction With a tripartite theory of definition, I hypothesize that whenever a person asserts how a linguistic entity (i.e. word, phrase, symbol, definiendum) has been used, is used, or is going to be used; that person can only be interpreted as asserting a reportive (i.e. lexical) definition, theoretic definition, or a stipulative definition. If this hypothesis is true, we should be able to understand any definition of a definiendum-to-definiens form (in a context) as being one of these three types. If this hypothesis is false, we should be able to find an instance of a linguistic token-to-meaning form that cannot be interpreted as reportive, theoretic, or stipulative. The tripartite theory is not an a priori truth; it is a social scientific conceptual truth that could be disconfirmed with counter examples.