Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, NATO Professional, Capable, and Sustainable Force
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Report No. DODIG-2018-XXXDODIG-2018-058 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY U.S. Department of Defense InspectorJANUARY 4, 2018 General Progress of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Train, Advise, and Assist the Afghan Air Force INTEGRITY EFFICIENCY ACCOUNTABILITY EXCELLENCE The document contains information that may be exempt from mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY INTEGRITY EFFICIENCY ACCOUNTABILITY EXCELLENCE Mission Our mission is to provide independent, relevant, and timely oversight of the Department of Defense that supports the warfighter; promotes accountability, integrity, and efficiency; advises the Secretary of Defense and Congress; and informs the public. Vision Our vision is to be a model oversight organization in the Federal Government by leading change, speaking truth, and promoting excellence—a diverse organization, working together as one professional team, recognized as leaders in our field. Fraud, Waste, & Abuse HOTLINE Department of Defense dodig.mil/hotline|800.424.9098 For more information about whistleblower protection, please see the inside back cover. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Progress of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Train, Advise, Resultsand Assist the in Afghan Brief Air Force January 4, 2018 Findings (cont’d) Objective the progression and transfer of maintenance responsibilities to Afghan Air Force maintainers. Although it is one of We evaluated U.S. and Coalition progress NATO’s goals for the Afghan Air Force, these contracts towards accomplishing the Train, Advise, do not contain either a plan or a timeline to transition Assist Command-Air (TAAC-Air) mission maintenance operations to the Afghans. Additionally, neither to develop the Afghan Air Force into a Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, NATO professional, capable, and sustainable force. Air Command-Afghanistan, nor TAAC-Air has identified the Findings long-term maintenance and logistics workload distribution between the contractors and the Afghan Air Force. The design of the existing contracts reduces the maintenance TAAC-Air’s efforts to train, advise, and training opportunities for Afghan Air Force mechanics and assist the Afghan Air Force have resulted delays the Afghan Air Force from establishing their own in notable accomplishments in three broad maintenance capability. areas: A-29 aircraft mission performance, night vision capability, and air-ground In addition, Afghan Air Force mission support and aircraft integration between the Afghan Air Force maintenance personnel do not receive standardized or and Afghan National Army. consistent training from the Afghan National Army schools. Furthermore, the Afghan Air Force did not leverage the However, TAAC-Air does not have a plan training opportunities that did exist at Afghan National defining the terms of its mission statement Army functional schools. Additionally, the Coalition has not to develop the Afghan Air Force into a helped the Afghan Air Force develop the institutional training “professional, capable, and sustainable” capability to augment existing Afghan National Army training force. TAAC-Air cannot track the Afghan by incorporating Air Force-specific requirements. The lack of Air Force’s progress because they have not standardized and consistent training limits the development defined the intended end state and related of the Afghan Air Force into a professional, capable, and metrics for determining the capabilities and sustainable Air Force. capacities of the Afghan Air Force. Afghan National Army corps commanders exceeded Furthermore, TAAC-Air did not fully programmed monthly flying hours for Mi-17 helicopters. This integrate its planning with NAC-A’s defined happened because Afghan Ministry of Defense and General end state or Resolute Support campaign Staff policy allows Afghan National Army corps commanders plans. Continued train, advise, and assist to use Mi-17s in direct support of ground forces. This policy efforts without a plan integrated with let the commanders directly task assigned helicopters without Resolute Support campaign plans could properly regarding the aircraft’s condition and available flying result in the inefficient and ineffective use hours. Operating aircraft beyond scheduled flying hours, and of U.S. and Coalition advisor train, advise, without the required supporting maintenance and inspections, and assist efforts. will accelerate the Mi-17 fleet’s deterioration and reduce available aircraft for operational use. Coalition advisors The Coalition administers Contractor identified this problem and, in coordination with their Afghan Logistic Support agreements for Afghan counterparts, proposed a solution. Air Force aircraft. These contracts limit FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY i DODIG-2018-058 (Project No. D2017-D00SPO-0081.000) │ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Progress of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Train, Advise, Resultsand Assist the in Afghan Brief Air Force Findings (cont’d) U.S. air advisors received training on general advising We recommend that Commander of Resolute Support: skills and cultural aspects needed for a generic train, advise, and assist mission. However, they were not fully • Coordinate with the Afghan Ministry Of Defense prepared to perform their Afghan Air Force specific and General Staff to identify and create the follow- advising mission upon arriving in country. Air advisors on institutional aviation-specific and mission did not receive training on the Afghan Air Force and support training capability necessary to support its relationship to the Afghan National Army, nor future Afghan Air Force training requirements. did the advisors receive training about the Afghan (Recommendation D.1) military staffing processes and terminology peculiar to • (FOUO) Closely monitor the implementation of Afghanistan. As a consequence, assigned personnel are the recently signed Afghan directive, less effective and less efficient as advisors until they acquire the requisite knowledge and develop the skills and provide additional advice and assistance necessary for their mission in Afghanistan. to the Afghan Ministry of Defense as required. Recommendations (Recommendation E) We recommend that the Commander of Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan compare We recommend that the Commander of Train, Advise, potential in-country training costs to the current out- Assist Command-Air: of-country approach to ascertain potential savings or • Complete and formalize (publish) its strategic benefits. (Recommendation D.2) plan that includes a set goals and metrics to We recommend that the Commander of NATO Air measure the development of the Afghan Air Force’s Command-Afghanistan provide relevant and Afghan capabilities and capacities.(Recommendation B.1) Air Force-specific training and information to incoming • Coordinate with the Commander of NATO Air advisors. (Recommendation F.1) Command-Afghanistan, to ensure that the Train, Advise, and Assist Command-Air plan, and its We recommend that the Air Education and Training supporting lines of effort, meet the requirements Command, Lead Major Command for General Purpose listed in the Headquarters Resolute Support Forces Air Advisor Education and Training oversight, campaign plans. (Recommendation B.2) policy, and guidance, periodically assess the school’s training curriculum and incorporate graduate feedback • Coordinate with Combined Security Transition into the training syllabus to support the Train, Advise, Assistance Command-Afghanistan to modify and Assist Command-Air mission. (Recommendation aircraft Contractor Logistics Support agreements F.2) to put more emphasis on building the Afghan Management Comments aircraft maintenance capability, increasing the Afghan responsibility for daily aircraft maintenance, and identifying the transition The Chief of Staff, 9th Air Expeditionary Task Force- criteria for Afghan-led maintenance within the Afghanistan, responding for the Commander, NATO Air Afghan Air Force. (Recommendation C) Command-Afghanistan and the Commander, TAAC-Air, FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ii │ DODIG-2018-058 (Project No. D2017-D00SPO-0081.000) FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Progress of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Train, Advise, Resultsand Assist the in Afghan Brief Air Force Management Comments (cont’d) agreed with four of our findings and recommendations. • Recommendation C – when we receive Specifically: documentation of the approved transition criteria for Afghan-led maintenance and a list • In response to Recommendation B.1, he stated that of the identified contract modifications to be TAAC-Air agrees and has plans that include lines implemented. of effort and a set of metrics that measure the development of the Afghan Air Force’s capabilities • Recommendation F.1 – when we receive and capacities. evidence showing that all incoming air advisors are receiving the Afghan specific information • In response to Recommendation B.2, he stated necessary to accomplish their mission. TAAC-Air agrees and ensures its lines of effort Particularly, we request evidence showing support Headquarters Resolute Support campaign air advisors are receiving information on the plans. He added that this coordination occurs on a structure of the Afghan Air Force, staffing weekly, and often daily basis, when needed. processes within the Afghan Air Force, and the • In response to Recommendation C, he stated administrative processes associated with the that TAAC-Air agrees to identify requirements Afghan Ministry of Defense Form 14. This evidence