EU Accession, NATO Membership, the Privatisation Process

Südosteuropa 56 (2008), H. 3, S. 418-423

KoSovoS unAbhänGIGKeIt AuS deR SICht deR nAChbARn

KENNETH MORRISON

Montenegro’s Kosovo Crisis

Abstract. Montenegro’s recognition of Kosovo in October 2008 precipitated a political crisis. Prior to recognition, both internal and external factors had contributed to an increasing tension that pressed for a decision on the issue. With the Serb community in Montenegro still coming to terms with the country’s break from Serbia in 2006, it heavily opposed a recognition of Kosovo. The Albanian community, on the other hand, well integrated and loyal to the Montenegrin state, perceived an unnecessary delay in the act of recognition. The U.S., the U.K. and the EU exercised considerable pressure on the Montenegrin government. Yet regional relations, above all with Serbia, had been stable for some time. Montenegro chose to recognize Kosovo in the immediate aftermath of its support for Serbia’s appeal to the UN General Assembly, arguing with the need to acknowledge political realities. The decision was followed by violent riots. Yet, as the article demonstrates, the recognition not only helped the Montenegrin government gain the favour of international powers, but also served to set off political dynamics within the country, which may prove advantageous to the present government of Milo Djukanović in the upcoming elections of September 2009.

Kenneth Morrison is Lecturer in Nationalism and Ethnic Politics at Birkbeck College, Uni- versity of London.

The Montenegrin government’s decision to formally recognise Kosovo’s independence in October threw the republic into a political crisis. Montenegro’s government has a number of pressing priorities to attend to – EU accession, NATO membership, the privatisation process, and attempts to attract invest- ment for infrastructural and energy projects – but none has thus far presented a challenge that equates with the problem of Kosovo. The issue of Kosovo has been ever-present in Montenegrin politics (in 1989, 1999, and in 2008) and analysts have been watching closely the government’s strategy with regard to Kosovo.1 With thirty percent of the Montenegrin population defin- ing themselves as Serbs, the issue was always likely to be a source of conflict.

1 For an analysis of how the issue of Kosovo affected Montenegrin politics during the dis- integration of Yugoslavia see Kenneth Morrison, Montenegro: A Modern History. London, New York 2008; Veseljko Koprivica / Branko Vojičić, Prevrat ‘89. Podgorica 1994; Branka Magaš, The Destruction of Yugoslavia, London 1993; Nebojša Čegorović, Montenegrin Montenegro’s Kosovo Crisis 419

The decision to recognise Kosovo presented the Montenegrin leadership with something of a dilemma. Since Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February, the Montenegrin authorities delayed recognition. The reasons for adopting such a cautious approach are self-evident. Internally, the problem lay in finding a policy that would satisfy both Montenegro’s Serb and Albanian minorities. The large Serb minority vehemently opposed the existence of an independent Kosovo, and the parties representing them, particularly the Serb List (Srpska lista), a coalition of Serb parties, had threatened that recognition would bring protests and violence to the Montenegrin capital, Podgorica.2 The government’s policy of procrastination suited Montenegro’s Serbs and kept tensions between them and the ruling authorities at bay. On the other side, the same procrastination threatened to un- dermine the stable relations between the government and Montenegro’s ethnic Albanian community. Beyond the boundaries of internal politics, regional and international factors were also crucial. The Montenegrin government was eager to avoid antagonising its traditional ally, Serbia, with whom it had enjoyed only lukewarm relations since Montenegro’s own declaration of independence following a referendum in May 2006.3 Furthermore, the Montenegrin government wished to remain on good terms with the government in Prishtina and sought to retain good diplomatic relations with those countries – particularly the U.S. and the U.K. – which had already recognised Kosovo. Collectively, this represented a complex balancing act for the Montenegrin government. Montenegro’s Serbs claimed that they would not recognise the new state. Indeed, they are still coming to terms with the break from Serbia, and debates over dual citizenship, national symbols, language, and the details of the first post- independence Montenegrin constitution have characterised the often troubled relationship between the Serb minority and the government. Discontent among Montenegro’s Serbs was clearly demonstrated in the wake of Kosovo’s declaration of independence. Demonstrations, organised by Serb parties, took place in Podgorica, and some Montenegrin Serb leaders, such as Andrija Mandić of the Serb People’s Party (Srpska narodna stranka, SNS), travelled to northern Mitrovica to show solidarity with the Kosovo Serbs. Leaders from across the Serb List called upon the government to commit to never recognising an independent Kosovo, stating that such recognition would represent a historic

Identity: Past, Present and Future, Journal of Contemporary European Studies 1 (1993), no. 3, Special issue: Antagonism and Identity in Former Yugoslavia, 129-136. 2 Vijesti (Podgorica), 22 June 2008, 6. 3 The independence referendum had brought a narrow victory for the pro-independence bloc. With the European Union insisting on a threshold of 55 per cent, the margin of victory was only 0.5 per cent (55.5 per cent in favour of independence, 45.5 per cent opposed to it). Thus a significant minority was opposed to Montenegro’s independence, and as a consequence, the Montenegrin government treated delicate ethnic issues such as Kosovo with great caution. For an in-depth analysis of the Montenegrin referendum process see, Morrison, Montenegro (above fn. 1), 205-220. 420 Kenneth Morrison error.4 Mandić also took a hard-line toward Kosovo during his recent presidential campaign, often linking Kosovo’s independence with demands by Albanians for higher levels of autonomy in Montenegro and warning that Kosovo’s independence would only encourage Albanian separatists’ claims. Conversely, however, it was precisely the policy of procrastination that caused discomfort within Montenegro’s Albanian community. Albanian political leaders became increasingly impatient over what they perceived to be an unnecessary delay in the recognition of Kosovo. Albanians are well integrated into, and loyal to, the Montenegrin state (unlike many Kosovo Albanians in relation to Serbia).5 No Montenegrin Albanian leader, despite the community’s support for an independent Kosovo, has ever publicly called for separation or incited separatism among Montenegro’s Albanians. However, bonds between Albanians in Kosovo, Western Macedonia and Albania proper, are strong, and Montenegro’s Albanians became increasingly frustrated at the government’s lack of clarity. Statements emanat- ing from Albanian political parties over the last months are indicative of these frustrations. High-profile Albanian politicians publicly urged the Montenegrin government not to delay recognition and stated that Montenegrin Albanian parties would continue to lobby for the recognition of Kosovo.6 The issue thus served to worsen relations between the government and Montenegro’s Albanian community (although pre-existing relations were hardly what one could regard as deeply strained). Albanian political leaders were and are seeking a greater level of autonomy in certain spheres, the first being linguistic parity within the education system. Albanian parties have argued that Albanians should have access to all levels of education in their language. Currently, school textbooks are printed in Serbian (and now Montenegrin), university education is offered only in Serbian (and Montenegrin). The second point of contention is the Albanian request to have the predominantly Albanian area of Tuzi (near Podgorica) recognised as a separate municipality; the third is centred on the use of national symbols. Albanian leaders have consistently argued that Albanian symbols should be used more liberally and have expressed dismay that the Albanian flag could not be raised on the Tuzi council building. These issues may be more matters of practicality than of emotion, but the issue of Kosovo was different. As internal forces continued to push and pull, i. e. internal dynamics continued to shift, the Montenegrin government faced significant external pressure. State- ments from the U.S. Ambassador, Roderick Moore, the U.K. Ambassador, Kevin Lyne, and the EU’s Special Representative, Pieter Feith, set alarm bells ringing in Podgorica. The latter stated, in an interview given to Montenegrin state television,

4 Dan (Podgorica), 28 June 2008, 3. 5 Morrison, Montenegro (above fn. 1), 125-127. 6 Zeri (Prishtina), 22 July 2008, 2-3. Montenegro’s Kosovo Crisis 421 that he expected Montenegro to recognise Kosovo “as soon as possible”.7 But whilst recognition may have been in Montenegro’s best interests with regard to the country’s EU ambitions, regional relations appeared to remain predominant; good relations with Serbia, in particular, were of great importance. Serbia’s Presi- dent Boris Tadić and Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremić, had consistently implored the Montenegrins not to recognise Kosovo and to support Serbia’s appeal to the United Nations General Assembly to raise their case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ).8 The Montenegrin leadership had indicated that they would wait until such a ruling was forthcoming before recognising Kosovo, but on 9 October, immediately following Montenegro’s support for Serbia’s appeal to the General Assembly, the Montenegrin authorities made their move, announcing that they would formally recognise Kosovo as an independent state. Whilst recognition was widely hailed as a positive move by the U.S., U.K. and the EU, a political storm was brewing within Montenegro. Anticipating the controversy that would inevitably be generated, Prime Min- ister Milo Djukanović immediately presented the justifications for the course of action his government had taken. Arguing that Montenegro could no longer deny the political reality of an independent Kosovo, Djukanović simultaneously emphasised that – however unpleasant the decision was – recognition of Kos- ovo would bring benefits, implying that Montenegro’s path into the European Union and NATO could be accelerated as a consequence. Beside that there were a myriad of reasons pertaining to internal Montenegrin political dynamics that were instrumental in official Podgorica’s decision to formally recognise Kosovo. Such a move would not only endear the Montenegrin government to the U.S. and the U.K., but it would help to mitigate and neutralise the increasing power of political opposition in the tiny republic. The decision to recognise Kosovo mobilised the opposition, but it also made clear their inherent weaknesses and highlighted divisions within. Opposition parties organised demonstrations in Podgorica for the evening of 13 October to protest against what they argued was an illegal and illegitimate act on the part of the Montenegrin government. The opposition’s demands were three- fold: firstly, that the government rescind the decision that – as they argued – does not have democratic legitimacy; secondly, that a democratic referendum on the issue be held, and finally that early parliamentary elections be called. The demonstrations began peacefully but soon turned violent, as protestors attempted to storm Montenegro’s government building.9 Police used tear gas and baton charges to disperse the crowds, making thirty-five arrests in the process. In the aftermath, each side blamed the other. Officials from the ruling

7 Politika (Beograd), 27 June 2008, 1-2. 8 Vijesti (Podgorica), 17 September 2008, 4. 9 Vijesti (Podgorica), 15 October 2008, 2. 422 Kenneth Morrison

Democratic Party of Socialists (Demokratska Partija Socijalista Crne Gore, DPS) blamed the violence on “football hooligans” and “pro-Serb agitators” from Belgrade; opposition leaders argued that the violence had been orchestrated by state security (National Security Agency, NSA) to discredit their actions.10 Fol- lowing the 13 October riots, the rhetoric from both sides became increasingly adversarial and antagonistic. The government banned further demonstrations, opposition deputies boycotted parliament and the leader of the Serb People’s Party (SNS), Andrija Mandić, embarked upon a well-publicised hunger-strike to protest about the recognition and the subsequent ban on further demonstrations.11 Mandić’s supporters in the northern Montenegrin towns of Bijelo Polje and Berane – the latter in particular being the heartland of SNS support – began a protest walk to Podgorica.12 Belgrade was also quick to act, expelling the Mon- tenegrin Ambassador in Belgrade, and recalling Belgrade’s opposite number in Podgorica whilst denying involvement in the demonstrations. Characteristically, the Metropolitan of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro, Amfilohije Radović, warned that the actions of the Montenegrin government would be a factor in creating the conditions for further conflict in Kosovo.13 However, in the final analysis, recognition of Kosovo – being ostensibly prob- lematic – may have proved a master-stroke even by Milo Djukanović’s Machi- avellian standards. It mitigated the growing pressure on him, both internally and externally, and has destabilised his political opponents. With the government’s post-referendum shine beginning to fade, the opposition were attempting to forge a coalition that could, potentially, represent a threat to the government in the next elections. The issue of Kosovo will serve to divide them because for some it is a highly emotive issue whereas for others it remains secondary. Recent local elections in Kotor, in which the DPS was victorious, may represent an early indicator of the success of this strategy. Within the opposition ranks, the differ- ing approaches vis-à-vis Kosovo could act as a mitigating factor in their ability to form a broad coalition opposing the DPS in the next elections. American and European pressure was, on the face of it, the primary motiva- tion for the government’s recognition of Kosovo. But, as ever, Djukanović had other motives which lie outside the Kosovo recognition dynamic. The quid pro quo for recognition will manifest itself thus: Now that Montenegrin leadership have done the West a big foreign policy favour, their embassies in Podgorica will almost certainly be less inclined to criticise the ruling structures and support the opposition in the next elections scheduled for September 2009. The gamble was that the government would have to face some short-term problems but the

10 Dnevnik (Novi Sad), 14 October 2008, 4; see also Vijesti (Podgorica), 15 October 2008, 3. 11 Dan (Podgorica), 20 October 2008, 1. 12 Večernje Novosti (Beograd), 20 October 2008, 4. 13 Koha Ditore (Prishtina), 18 October, 2008, 5. Montenegro’s Kosovo Crisis 423 benefits would, in the medium-term, far outweigh any negative consequences caused by recognition. In taking this gamble, Djukanović and the DPS have out- manoeuvred their opponents once again. But whilst this may have secured the ruling party’s power and weakened the opposition, they govern a population that is both fundamentally divided and growing increasingly jaded by the manipulation of the Kosovo question. What’s more, they have also shown distinct signs of arrogance in taking the decision without consulting the electorate. It has been estimated in local polls that up to 80 per cent oppose the decision.14 In the short-term, however, the decision may have proved productive – a more serious political crisis has been temporarily averted and the growing power of the opposition stemmed. Paradoxically, the manipulation of the Kosovo issue has benefited not only the so-called winners, but also the apparent losers. The SNS, which are likely to become the dominant Serb party in Montenegro, and may well seek to unify all Serb List parties, have capitalised from the crisis caused by recognition; the democratic opposition, such as Nebojša Medojević’s Movement for Changes (Pokret za Promjene, PZP) have seemed impotent watching developments from the sidelines. The issue of Kosovo has, for neither the first nor the last time, proved a thorny one for the Montenegrin government. This time, as in 1999, it may have used it to its advantage.15

14 Vreme (Beograd), 16 October 2008, 23-24. 15 Morrison, Montenegro (above fn. 1), 168-181.