Südosteuropa 56 (2008), H. 3, S. 418-423 KOSOVOS UNABHÄNGIGKEIT AUS DER SICHT DER NACHBARN KENNETH MORRISON Montenegro’s Kosovo Crisis Abstract. Montenegro’s recognition of Kosovo in October 2008 precipitated a political crisis. Prior to recognition, both internal and external factors had contributed to an increasing tension that pressed for a decision on the issue. With the Serb community in Montenegro still coming to terms with the country’s break from Serbia in 2006, it heavily opposed a recognition of Kosovo. The Albanian community, on the other hand, well integrated and loyal to the Montenegrin state, perceived an unnecessary delay in the act of recognition. The U.S., the U.K. and the EU exercised considerable pressure on the Montenegrin government. Yet regional relations, above all with Serbia, had been stable for some time. Montenegro chose to recognize Kosovo in the immediate aftermath of its support for Serbia’s appeal to the UN General Assembly, arguing with the need to acknowledge political realities. The decision was followed by violent riots. Yet, as the article demonstrates, the recognition not only helped the Montenegrin government gain the favour of international powers, but also served to set off political dynamics within the country, which may prove advantageous to the present government of Milo Djukanović in the upcoming elections of September 2009. Kenneth Morrison is Lecturer in Nationalism and Ethnic Politics at Birkbeck College, Uni- versity of London. The Montenegrin government’s decision to formally recognise Kosovo’s in- dependence in October threw the republic into a political crisis. Montenegro’s government has a number of pressing priorities to attend to – EU accession, NATO membership, the privatisation process, and attempts to attract invest- ment for infrastructural and energy projects – but none has thus far presented a challenge that equates with the problem of Kosovo. The issue of Kosovo has been ever-present in Montenegrin politics (in 1989, 1999, and in 2008) and analysts have been watching closely the government’s strategy with regard to Kosovo.1 With thirty percent of the Montenegrin population defin- ing themselves as Serbs, the issue was always likely to be a source of conflict. 1 For an analysis of how the issue of Kosovo affected Montenegrin politics during the dis- integration of Yugoslavia see Kenneth Morrison, Montenegro: A Modern History. London, New York 2008; Veseljko Koprivica / Branko Vojičić, Prevrat ‘89. Podgorica 1994; Branka Magaš, The Destruction of Yugoslavia, London 1993; Nebojša Čegorović, Montenegrin Montenegro’s Kosovo Crisis 419 The decision to recognise Kosovo presented the Montenegrin leadership with something of a dilemma. Since Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February, the Montenegrin authorities delayed recognition. The reasons for adopting such a cautious approach are self-evident. Internally, the problem lay in finding a policy that would satisfy both Montenegro’s Serb and Albanian minorities. The large Serb minority vehemently opposed the existence of an independent Kosovo, and the parties representing them, particularly the Serb List (Srpska lista), a coalition of Serb parties, had threatened that recognition would bring protests and violence to the Montenegrin capital, Podgorica.2 The government’s policy of procrastina- tion suited Montenegro’s Serbs and kept tensions between them and the ruling authorities at bay. On the other side, the same procrastination threatened to un- dermine the stable relations between the government and Montenegro’s ethnic Albanian community. Beyond the boundaries of internal politics, regional and international factors were also crucial. The Montenegrin government was eager to avoid antagonising its traditional ally, Serbia, with whom it had enjoyed only lukewarm relations since Montenegro’s own declaration of independence fol- lowing a referendum in May 2006.3 Furthermore, the Montenegrin government wished to remain on good terms with the government in Prishtina and sought to retain good diplomatic relations with those countries – particularly the U.S. and the U.K. – which had already recognised Kosovo. Collectively, this represented a complex balancing act for the Montenegrin government. Montenegro’s Serbs claimed that they would not recognise the new state. Indeed, they are still coming to terms with the break from Serbia, and debates over dual citizenship, national symbols, language, and the details of the first post- independence Montenegrin constitution have characterised the often troubled relationship between the Serb minority and the government. Discontent among Montenegro’s Serbs was clearly demonstrated in the wake of Kosovo’s declaration of independence. Demonstrations, organised by Serb parties, took place in Podgorica, and some Montenegrin Serb leaders, such as Andrija Mandić of the Serb People’s Party (Srpska narodna stranka, SNS), travelled to northern Mitrovica to show solidarity with the Kosovo Serbs. Leaders from across the Serb List called upon the government to commit to never recognising an independent Kosovo, stating that such recognition would represent a historic Identity: Past, Present and Future, Journal of Contemporary European Studies 1 (1993), no. 3, Special issue: Antagonism and Identity in Former Yugoslavia, 129-136. 2 Vijesti (Podgorica), 22 June 2008, 6. 3 The independence referendum had brought a narrow victory for the pro-independence bloc. With the European Union insisting on a threshold of 55 per cent, the margin of victory was only 0.5 per cent (55.5 per cent in favour of independence, 45.5 per cent opposed to it). Thus a significant minority was opposed to Montenegro’s independence, and as a consequence, the Montenegrin government treated delicate ethnic issues such as Kosovo with great caution. For an in-depth analysis of the Montenegrin referendum process see, Morrison, Montenegro (above fn. 1), 205-220. 420 Kenneth Morrison error.4 Mandić also took a hard-line toward Kosovo during his recent presidential campaign, often linking Kosovo’s independence with demands by Albanians for higher levels of autonomy in Montenegro and warning that Kosovo’s independ- ence would only encourage Albanian separatists’ claims. Conversely, however, it was precisely the policy of procrastination that caused discomfort within Montenegro’s Albanian community. Albanian political leaders became increasingly impatient over what they perceived to be an unnecessary delay in the recognition of Kosovo. Albanians are well integrated into, and loyal to, the Montenegrin state (unlike many Kosovo Albanians in relation to Serbia).5 No Montenegrin Albanian leader, despite the community’s support for an independ- ent Kosovo, has ever publicly called for separation or incited separatism among Montenegro’s Albanians. However, bonds between Albanians in Kosovo, Western Macedonia and Albania proper, are strong, and Montenegro’s Albanians became increasingly frustrated at the government’s lack of clarity. Statements emanat- ing from Albanian political parties over the last months are indicative of these frustrations. High-profile Albanian politicians publicly urged the Montenegrin government not to delay recognition and stated that Montenegrin Albanian parties would continue to lobby for the recognition of Kosovo.6 The issue thus served to worsen relations between the government and Montenegro’s Albanian community (although pre-existing relations were hardly what one could regard as deeply strained). Albanian political leaders were and are seeking a greater level of autonomy in certain spheres, the first being linguistic parity within the education system. Albanian parties have argued that Albanians should have access to all levels of education in their language. Currently, school textbooks are printed in Serbian (and now Montenegrin), university education is offered only in Serbian (and Montenegrin). The second point of contention is the Albanian request to have the predominantly Albanian area of Tuzi (near Podgorica) recognised as a separate municipality; the third is centred on the use of national symbols. Albanian leaders have consistently argued that Albanian symbols should be used more liberally and have expressed dismay that the Albanian flag could not be raised on the Tuzi council building. These issues may be more matters of practicality than of emotion, but the issue of Kosovo was different. As internal forces continued to push and pull, i. e. internal dynamics continued to shift, the Montenegrin government faced significant external pressure. State- ments from the U.S. Ambassador, Roderick Moore, the U.K. Ambassador, Kevin Lyne, and the EU’s Special Representative, Pieter Feith, set alarm bells ringing in Podgorica. The latter stated, in an interview given to Montenegrin state television, 4 Dan (Podgorica), 28 June 2008, 3. 5 Morrison, Montenegro (above fn. 1), 125-127. 6 Zeri (Prishtina), 22 July 2008, 2-3. Montenegro’s Kosovo Crisis 421 that he expected Montenegro to recognise Kosovo “as soon as possible”.7 But whilst recognition may have been in Montenegro’s best interests with regard to the country’s EU ambitions, regional relations appeared to remain predominant; good relations with Serbia, in particular, were of great importance. Serbia’s Presi- dent Boris Tadić and Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremić, had consistently implored the Montenegrins not to recognise Kosovo and to support Serbia’s appeal to the United Nations General Assembly to raise their case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ).8