Paul Tang Abomo R2P and the US Intervention in Libya
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R2P and the US Intervention in Libya Paul Tang Abomo R2P and the US Intervention in Libya Foreword by Carter Ham Paul Tang Abomo Political Science Hekima Institute of Peace Studies and International Relations Nairobi, Kenya ISBN 978-3-319-78830-2 ISBN 978-3-319-78831-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78831-9 Library of Congress Control Number: 2018939718 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2019 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifcally the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microflms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specifc statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affliations. Cover image: Colin Anderson/Getty Images Cover design: Ran Shauli Printed on acid-free paper This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer International Publishing AG part of Springer Nature The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland To Brad Schaeffer, SJ and To Brian Paulson, SJ Two of the best mentors and friends any one could ever dream of FOREWORD If we’d gone in sooner, I believe we could have saved at least a third of the lives that were lost … it had an enduring effect on me. President Bill Clinton speaking to CNBC News in 2013 about the 1994 genocide in Rwanda The Kigali Genocide Memorial Centre leaves an indelible mark on all who visit. It is a somber site, perched atop one of Kigali’s many ver- dant hilltops. I frst visited the Memorial in 2011 during my frst visit to Rwanda as Commander, United States Africa Command. One cannot help but be moved to quiet refection in that place. Similar to the regret recounted by President Clinton and others over our belated action, I confess I felt some sense of national guilt over what happened in Rwanda in 1994. I am not alone. In the passing of years, indeed decades, since 800,000 were brutally murdered in tiny, land-locked Rwanda, much has been written and spo- ken of about genocide—what causes people to abandon their humanity and slaughter others simply because they are not like themselves? What triggered such rapid escalation in Rwanda that resulted in so many being killed in such a short period of time? Who is to blame? Where were Rwanda’s neighbors and why did they not act? Why did the United Nations fail to stop the bloodshed? And, for us Americans, why did we choose to not intervene? Of course, Rwanda is far from the only place where brutality was visited on a vulnerable population on a large scale. Hutu–Tutsi, vii viii FOREWORD Serb–Kosovar, Nazi–Jew, Japanese–Korean, and so many other ethnic, racial, or religious segregations have led to one group seeking to exert its near total control over another. Sadly, there is little in our history that leads one to sense that such hatred, such actions, such brutal murder is a thing of the past. One need only look at recent headlines—the slaughter of Christians by the so-called Islamic State, or its imprisonment and sub- jugation into slavery of the small Yazidi population in Northern Iraq—to quickly realize that what happened in Rwanda in 1994 may, sadly, not at all be an anomaly of human behavior. I promised never to let the Rwandan Genocide die because I knew the Rwandans didn’t have much power internationally and certainly didn’t have the resources. I felt it was my duty having witnessed it, and having stayed to witness it, that I had to talk about it and keep it going. Retired Canadian Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire, former Force Commander for the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda. General Dallaire took his role as witness to the atrocities in Rwanda most seriously. He and others thought, studied, wrote, and spoke about the Rwanda genocide. What is the proper role for international organ- izations such as the United Nations or the International Committee of the Red Cross to prevent or respond to potential or ongoing widespread killing? What responsibility do other states bear? Not only those which may be directly proximate to the violence, but others, and to be direct I mean the USA and other states with the capability to make a difference. If a state possesses the ability to prevent mass killings, does it bear a legal, ethical, or moral responsibility to intervene? There are both principled and pragmatic issues, often in tension, which make such decisions among the most complicated for national-level leaders. I must admit that such seemingly esoteric deliberation seemed distant to me. After all, I grew up as an Infantry offcer in the American Army. A benefciary of a Jesuit education at John Carroll University in Ohio, I felt that I had a solid grounding in ethical behavior and critical reasoning. As a mid-grade offcer, I even led my unit during a United Nations mission in the Balkans in the mid-1990s, frankly just as the Rwandan genocide was taking place. Like my peers, I annually refreshed my understanding of the Laws of Armed Confict and our responsibilities as individual sol- diers and as leaders to conduct ourselves properly even in close combat, the most uncivil circumstance one can imagine. I read and kept a copy of FOREWORD ix Michael Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars on my shelf, occasionally refer- ring to that masterful work over many years. But, my thought, my focus, was almost exclusively on preparing myself and my unit to fght and win on some future battlefeld, but to do so in a morally responsible manner. I gave scant thought to a Rwanda-like scenario. Across the US military, I suspect my behavior was common. But, others, both in and out of government in the USA and else- where, like Lieutenant General Dallaire, were thinking differently. Human rights groups and advocates, among others, were advancing the notion that states did, indeed, bear responsibility for the prevention or response to genocide. In 2001, Samantha Power wrote “Bystanders to genocide: Why the United States Let the Rwandan Tragedy Happen” for The Atlantic Monthly. Her piece not only laid bare US Government doc- uments related to Rwanda, but she sparked wide-ranging introspection and refection about who we are as a nation. What do we believe in and for what do we stand? Do our actions match our statements? As a young offcer, I served in a unit whose regimental motto was, Deeds, Not Words. A fair question to ask ourselves as Americans. In early 2011, this matter quite suddenly became no longer an aca- demic one. I had only newly been assigned as Commander, US Africa Command, one of six major American commands responsible for US military activities in regions around the globe. Muammar Ghaddaf, the strong-armed leader of Libya, had postured his military forces around Benghazi where, in the aftermath of early protests across North Africa and the Arab world, Libyan citizens were bristling under the regime’s rule. Ghaddaf’s words rang familiar—referring to those in Benghazi as cockroaches or vermin that needed to be hunted down and extermi- nated. Ghaddaf’s rhetoric, combined with his history and with the pres- ence of his military capability to actually do what he said he might do, caused the international community to act. This was “Responsibility to Protect” in implementation. Father Paul Tang Abomo, a Jesuit priest, has undertaken a thorough study of this implementation of “R2P” as it relates to the military inter- vention into Libya in 2011. First, a US-led “Coalition of the Willing” then a NATO-led effort, operations in Libya offer an instructive case study of how “R2P” plays out in the real world. It’s never clean in exe- cution, even if the underlying principles are solid. Father Paul’s work ought to cause us all to think seriously about the moral, ethical, legal, x FOREWORD and operational implications of Responsibility to Protect doctrine and methodology. Wish as we may for a more peaceful, stable global security environ- ment, our human history instructs us to conclude that some men will always seek to dominate others, particularly those who differ in color, nationality, belief, or other factors. The real question is what do we choose to do about that? Arlington, VA Carter Ham General, U.S. Army Retired Former Commander U.S. Africa Command ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This book is based on the doctoral dissertation I defended at Loyola University Chicago. Though the memory of most favors fades in a short time, that is not the case with my gratitude to all those who helped me bring this work to fruition.