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Putin's New National Guard. Bulwark Against Mass Protests and Illoyal

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Putin's New National Guard. Bulwark Against Mass Protests and Illoyal Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments Putin’s New National Guard WP Bulwark against Mass Protests and Illoyal Elites Margarete Klein S A new Russian security organ was created on 3 July 2016. The National Guard takes over the interior ministry’s internal troops and police special forces and places them directly under the president’s control. The new force’s remit ranges from public order through counter-extremism and counter-terrorism to assistance in territorial defence and border protection. This reform represents the most significant restructuring of Russia’s internal security organs in more than ten years, and exposes Putin’s concerns over the robustness of his political system in face of persistent economic crisis and upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections. In this context the National Guard can serve not only as an instrument of repression against possible mass protests, but also as a means of disciplining potentially illoyal elite groups. On 5 April 2016 President Vladimir Putin services for companies and private indi- ordered the founding of the National Guard. viduals. The corresponding legislation passed the State Duma and Federation Council on 22 and 29 June respectively, and came into Tasks, Powers, Equipment force on 3 July. Under the new legislation, the National The National Guard will comprise some Guard’s principal responsibility is “protect- 350,000 to 400,000 members. Its backbone ing public order and security”. This means is formed by the “internal troops” previously dissolving unauthorised demonstrations, controlled by the interior ministry, a para- suppressing mass unrest and enforcing cur- military force of 170,000 to 180,000 includ- fews during any state of emergency. It is ing conscripts. They are joined by heavily planned to involve National Guard forces in armed police special forces (about 30,000), fighting extremism and terrorism, and they including the OMON riot police and can also be deployed to reinforce border pro- the OMSN/SOBR counter-terrorism units. tection and for territorial defence. The National Guard has also taken over The National Guard’s powers extend administrative and training facilities as from identity checks, house searches and well as the federal enterprise Okhrana, detention through to robust coercive meas- which supplies security and protection ures. If the lives or safety of its members or Dr. Margarete Klein is Deputy Head of SWP’s Eastern Europe and Eurasia Division SWP Comments 41 September 2016 1 the public are endangered, the National the police and the domestic intelligence Guard may fire into crowds without prior service FSB – does not possess. In counter- warning. They have access to military and terrorism the new structure functions specialist equipment for fighting extrem- merely as a force multiplier. ism and terrorism and tackling hostage situations. The National Guard accordingly possesses a broad arsenal ranging from Fear of Social Unrest or a non-lethal means (such as sonic weapons) “Russian Maidan” through machine guns to armoured per- The National Guard possesses greater im- sonnel carriers and rocket-propelled portance as protection against internal grenades. unrest and mass demonstrations. Since the “colour revolutions” of the 2000s and the Arab Spring of 2011, and above all since Anti-Terrorism and the World Cup the protests against election manipulation According to President Putin, the National in Moscow and St Petersburg in 2011/2012, Guard had to be established in order to the Kremlin’s security discourse has been fight terrorism more effectively. Russia is dominated by the spectre of a “Russian indeed one of the European countries worst Maidan”. affected by terrorist attacks. Since the Che- At present there is little sign of immi- chen wars of the 1990s and 2000s, lack of nent mass protests in the Russian popula- economic perspective has turned the North tion. In a survey by the Levada Center in Caucasus in particular into a region of June 2016 only 11 and 8 percent respectively unrest, within and out of which numerous said they would participate in social or acts of terrorism have been committed. In political demonstrations. And since the recent years thousands of Islamist fighters annexation of Crimea in 2014, President have left the North Caucasus to fight in Putin’s approval ratings have returned Syria and Iraq. They had come under pres- to levels consistently above 80 percent. sure after Ramzan Kadyrov consolidated his Yet the Russian leadership faces great power as head of the Chechen Republic and domestic challenges. The basis of its Russia conducted successful anti-terrorism legitimacy, its ability to raise the standard operations in the region. There are reports of living of broad sections of the popula- that Russian security forces actually assisted tion, is crumbling. Compounded by a low Islamists to leave ahead of the 2014 Sochi oil price and the impact of Western sanc- Winter Olympics. While this may have tions, the failure to push through economic brought short-term relief, the move risks structural reforms has led to a collapse of blow-back when they return – especially the rouble, rising prices and falling real in- with Russia now firmly in the Islamists’ comes. In view of dwindling state revenues sights since its intervention in Syria began and reserves, there will be no alternative in September 2015. Moreover, protecting to either increasing taxes or making cuts in the 2018 football World Cup in Russia will welfare and education. require considerable resources. If the leadership fails to provide the ex- However, even if fighting terrorism pected socio-economic outputs, hitherto represents a central challenge, that alone isolated social protests could increase. Mass is not adequate reason to create a National demonstrations by the liberal opposition – Guard. That purpose would have been served of the kind seen in 2011/2012 – appear less equally well by expanding the interior likely, as the liberal camp is marginalised troops and police special forces within the and lacks popular leaders. But issues like interior ministry. Above all, fighting terror- corruption and nationalism could still in- ism requires intelligence and investigatory ject political demands into social protests. powers that the National Guard – unlike One potential trigger could be elections to SWP Comments 41 September 2016 2 the State Duma in September 2016, and him directly and led by one of his closest above all the presidential election in spring confidants, Viktor Zolotov. Both come from 2018. the KGB, and have known each other since With the National Guard the Kremlin the early 1990s. From 2000 to 2013 Zolotov has created an effective, broader-based headed the president’s security service. In instrument for deterring and repressing the event of conflict with parts of the elite, possible (mass) protests, which was pre- Putin thus enjoys direct recourse to a loyal viously the responsibility above all of the paramilitary organisation, whose up to OMON special forces. From the Kremlin’s 400,000 members make it larger than the perspective this would be especially advan- army or the FSB. tageous if a state of emergency had to be Furthermore, the process of redistribut- declared to contain growing, coalescing ing powers and capacities associated with protests. But the National Guard is only one the founding of the National Guard itself element in a series of measures by which strengthens Putin’s position as the decisive the Moscow leadership seeks to protect mediator. Reshuffling the polycentric secu- itself against threats “from below”. In order rity structures exacerbates institutional to prevent mass protests arising in the first rivalries and insecurities. The overlapping place, legislation imposing state controls nature of the individual institutions – with on NGOs and media outlets and restricting the National Guard on the one side and the the activities of the opposition has been FSB (border protection, counter-terrorism), tightened since 2012. interior ministry (public security) and de- fence ministry (territorial defence) on the other – creates potential for conflict. Other Disciplining the Elites institutions are likely to be jealous of the The National Guard is not only an organ of National Guard receiving its own – as yet repression against possible protests in the unspecified budget – and possibilities for population. It functions even more strongly enrichment, for example through the inte- as the president’s personal instrument for grated state-owned company Okhrana. disciplining the elites. Their loyalty to Putin The biggest internal security reform in has been rooted in his ability to distribute more than a decade will also allow Putin economic resources and political offices to keep in check individuals and networks and to operate as the ultimate mediator that have grown in influence in recent recognised by all factions. But the economic years. The focus here is less on the interior crisis has reduced the wealth available ministry, as the institution most strongly to distribute, while the president has cur- affected by the founding of the National tailed his own room for manoeuvre since Guard, even though it loses about one-third 2012 by weakening the reformist techno- of its personnel including its paramilitary crats and one-sidedly strengthening the “muscles”, and is reduced de facto to respon- siloviki, politicians and officials with a back- sibility for
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