Center for Strategic and International Studies Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy 1800 K Street, N.W. • Suite 400 • Washington, DC 20006 Phone: 1 (202) 775 -3270 • Fax: 1 (202) 457 -8746 Web: http://www.csis.org/burke Email:
[email protected] Iraqi Force Development and the Challenge of Civil War: Can Iraqi Forces Do the Job? Anthony Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy With the Assistance of: Brian Bur ton George Sullivan Iskandar Jahja William D. Sullivan Revised, October 4, 2006 Cordesman: Iraqi Force Development 10/4/06 Page ii Executive Summary Iraq is already in a state of limited civil war. What began as a small r esistance movement centered around loyalists to the Ba’ath and Saddam Hussein has expanded to include neo - Salafi Sunni terrorism, become a broadly based Sunni insurgency, and now a broader sectarian and ethnic conflict. The current combination of insurgenc y, Sunni Arab versus Shi’ite Arab sectarian conflict, and Arab versus Kurdish ethnic conflict could easily escalate to the break up of the country, far more serious ethnic and sectarian conflict, or violent paralysis. If Iraq is to avoid this, it needs to forge a lasting political compromise between its key factions: Arab -Shi’ite, Arab Sunni, and Kurd – while protecting other minorities. Political conciliation must also address such critical issues as federalism and the relative powers of the central and r egional governments, the role of religion in politics and law, control over petroleum resources and export revenues, the definition of human rights, and a host of other issues.