ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 1/44 EK PT
Annex E.4.12
Public ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 2/44 EK PT
GEORGIA:
A VOIDING WAR IN SOUTH OSSETIA
26 November 2004
international crisis group
Europe Report N° I 59 Tbilisi/Brussels
GEO-OTP-0008-0615 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 3/44 EK PT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ANO RECOMMENDATIONS i 1. INTRODUCTION 1 II. UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT 2
A. H1sTORIC/\1, CAust-:s 2 1. Competing narratives of South Ossetia's past.. 2 2. The 1990- 1 992 conflict and its aftermath 3 3. The peace agreement and peace implementation mechanisms 4 B. HUlvl/\N RlGHTS VIOL.I\ TIONS J\ND POPULATION DISPL./\CE:tviEl\T 5 I. Ossetian and Georgian population settlement and displacement.. 5 2. War-time atrocities 7 c. POLITICAL CA USES or rnt CONfLICI 7 D. GEOPOLITICALC AUSES 8 E. POLITICAL-ECONOlvflCC AUSES Of CONfLICT 9 III. UNFREEZI~G THE CONFLICT 11
A. FOCUSING ON THE POLTTTC'\L ECONO\ifTC CAUSES OF CONFLICT I I 1. Attacking greed 1 I 2. Addressing grievance 12 3. The South Ossetian reaction 12 B. THE START OF VIOLENT CONFLICT 14 C. THE UNEASY TRUCE 15 IV. INTER OR INTRA-STATE CONFLICT? 16
A. Gt-:C)R(tl1\N ALLl-:0/\TIONS ON RUSSJ/\'S ROLi·: ] 6 8. Tm: Vn.w FROM RUSSI/\ 17 C. UNITED STATES INVOLVElviENT 18 D. THE OSCE ·19 E. THE EUROPR/\>J UNTOK I 9 F. THF. W/\R NOBOOY WANTID 20 V. OPTIONS FOR CONFLICT ALLEVIATION AND PREVENTIOl\" 22
A. STRJ(N(iTI ll(NIN(j Sl(ClJRITY ANI) COJ\Fll)l(NCE-BlJIL))IN(l 22 I. Law enforcement and peacekeeping 23 2. Addressing the civilian dimension of security 23 8. ECONOl'vfTC RECONSTRUCTION, REHABTLITA TION /\ND COOPER!\ TION 24 C. PIWMOTIN GEO-OTP-0008-0616 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 4/44 EK PT APPEl\"DICES A. MAP (ff GEORGlA 30 B. MAP Of TI IE soun I OSSETIAN REGION 31 C. GLOSSARY or ACRONYMS 32 D. AHOlJT THE ll\TERNATIONAL CRISIS GROlJI' 33 E. TCG REPORT8 AND BRTEFINGS ON ElJROPE 34 F. ICGBOARDJ\.fEMDERS 36 GEO-OTP-0008-0617 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 5/44 EK PT ]CG Europe Report N°159 26 November 2004 GEORGIA: AVOIDING \VAR IN SOUTH OSSETIA EXECUTIVE SUl\tJMARY AND RECOMl\tJENDA TION A precarious peace is back in place between Georgia people in the region with the benefits of economic and South Ossetia after the long-frozen conflict nearly and cultural projects. became a hot war again and drew in Russia when dozens were killed in August 2004 fighting. President The strategy backfired. Rather then capitalising on real Saakashvili tried to break a twelve-year deadlock and popular discontent, it caused many average citizens take another step to restore Georgia's territorial who depended on illegal trade for their economic integrity by undermining the regime in Tskhinvali, survival to regroup around Kokoity. Ossetian de facto but seriously miscalculated. A more comprehensive authorities successfully portrayed Georgian moves as approach is needed to resolve this conflict peacefully. aggressive first steps towards a remilitarisation of the The onus is on Georgia, with help from its conflict that had enjoyed a ceasefire since 1992. international panners, to increase the security and Kokoity's popular support rose as he described himself confidence of people living in the zone of conflict, as the only leader capable of guaranteeing Ossetians' promote economic rehabilitation and development, security, as well as their political, economic and ensure the right of Ossctians to return to South cultural interests. Assistance sent by Tbilisi was Ossetia and Georgia proper, and create arrangements portrayed as a cheap attempt to buy support. guaranteeing South Ossetia effective autonomy. South Ossetia must enter a real dialogue with Georgia The Georgian approach failed in large part because it on its status and not use the winter to force Georgian was based on a limited analysis of the causes of the villagers still in South Ossetia to leave their homes. conflict. Since 1992 little progress has been made to bring Ossetians and Georgians closer together. Many After peacefully resolving its decade-old conflict with of the grievances and ambitions developed during the Ajara earlier this year, the Georgian decision-makers war that broke out as the Soviet Union was dying turned their attention to South Ossetia. In May 2004 remain tough obstacles to peace. Unless they are they believed their Ajarian success could easily be addressed, efforts to re-integrate South Ossetia into repeated. They considered that South Ossetia's de Georgia are almost certain to lead again to violence. facto president, Eduard Kokoity, had little democratic legitimacy or popular support and that, as in Ajara, In the past few months Georgia has shifted gears the people would rapidly switch loyalty from and begun to emphasise the geopolitical nature of Tskhinvali to Tbilisi. the conflict, terming it "a problem between Georgia and Russia". Russia does play a special role. Hut it The initial strategy aimed to address the political• is unlikely that Georgia can successfully persuade economic causes of the conflict through an anti• the U.S. or European Union to duel with Moscow smuggling operation, aimed primarily at closing the over South Ossetia. sprawling Ergneti market on the outskirts of Tskhinvali, in the Georgian-South Ossetia zone of A new ceasefire holds since 19 August 2004. At a conflict. The theory was that Kokoity and a small high level meeting between Georgian Prime circle of officials around him were maintaining Minister Zurab Zhvania and South Ossetian leader control over South Ossetia through their involvement Eduard Kokoity on 5 November in Sochi, an in black market trade. Tn parallel, the Georgian side agreement on demilitarisation of the zone of conflict organised a humanitarian "offensive" to provide was signed. Some exchange of fire continues in the GEO-OTP-0008-0618 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 6/44 EK PT Georgia: .1 voiding War in South Ossetia ]CG Europe Report N° 159, 26 November 2004 Page ii zone of conflict, apparently primarily initiated by the 1992 conflict that takes into consideration the Ossetian side, but there is still cause for optimism comments of the Venice Commission and other that the conflict will be resolved non-violently since international experts, and discuss with the JCC all sides seem to be reconsidering their policies. creation of a property claims commission. Georgia's legitimate insistence on the preservation of 6. Adopt legislation permitting those affected by its territorial integrity needs to be balanced with the the conflict to hold dual citizenship. Ossetians' concerns for the protection of their national minority rights. 7. Agree with Russia, and in particular North Ossetia, on measures to boost economic For the negotiations that are needed with Russia, South cooperation, coordinate custom policies and and North Ossetia to succeed, Georgia must show it is facilitate the free movement of goods and putting in place political, economic, legal, and social persons along the Transcaucasian highway and conditions to guarantee Ossetians equal rights in a Russian military highway. multi-national and democratics tate. The greatest lesson 8. Deal with the legacy of the 1990-1992 conflict from the May-August period is that attempts to by investigating war crimes, prosecuting those resolve the conflict swiftly wil1 lead to war. President responsible, and adopting legislation to amnesty Saakashvili seemed to recognise this when, at the UN those who participated in the conflict but General Assembly, he pledged to engage in a "stage• committed no war crimes. by-stage settlement plan" To avoid further casualties and displacement, Georgia, together with 9. Open discussion on the status of South Ossetia its international partners, must implement a with local and international experts, including comprehensive strategy to resolve the root causes of experts from the parties to the conflict, with a the conflict and make non-violent re-integration view to developing a comprehensive concept possible. within the framework of an overall administrative• terrironal reform of Georgia. RECOMMENDATIONS To the de facto Government of South Ossetia: To the Government of Georgia and the de facto 10. Guarantee full freedom of movement on the Government of South Ossetia: territory of South Osseria and do not obstruct implementation of economic rehabilitation, J. Stop all armed hostilities and implement step• by-step demilitarisation of South Ossetia with refugee return, or confidence-building measures respect to all troops not part of the Joint agreed upon at the JCC and within Georgian• Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF) or local police, Russian bilateral talks. starting in the zone of conflict. J J. Participate in a diaJogue with the Georgian side 2. Implement all previously agreed upon JCC on means to reach a final resolution to the conflict, including determination of the future decisions and bilateral Georgian-Russian administrative-territorial status of South Ossetia agreements regarding the conflict. and the work of a property claims commission. 3. Engage citizens and civil society in conflict resolution efforts. To the Government of Russia: To the Government of Georgia: 12. Prevent any armed formations or weapons not approved within the JCC framework from 4. Fund in the 2005 budget the costs of social crossing into South Ossetia from Russia. services and economic development in and J 3. Create with Georgia an inter-state body on around the zone of conflict, confidence building measures, rehabilitation of communities in return and economic rehabilitation in the zone Georgia proper to which Ossetian refugees may of conflict and work with Georgia to devise and return, and a new Russian-Georgian inter-state fund from 2005 budgets programs to facilitate body to facilitate return and economic return and economic rehabilitation in South rehabilitation in the zone of conflict. Ossetia. 14. Together with Georgia agree on measures to 5. Adopt a law providing restitution of property boost economic cooperation, coordinate customs and compensation to all affected by the 1990- GEO-OTP-0008-0619 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 7/44 EK PT Georgia: .1 voiding War in South Ossetia ]CG Europe Report N° 159, 26 November 2004 Page iii policies, and facilitate the free movement of To the European Union: goods and persons along the Transcaucasian and Russian military highways. 20. Play a more active role as mediator through the EU Special Representative to the South 15. Support the increase of OSCE staff in Caucasus in the effort to develop a consensus Tskhinvali and the implementation of its between Georgia and Russia on the final status mandate to work throughout South Ossetia. of South Ossetia To the Joint Control Commission (JCC): 21. Consider re-allocating some funds of the third rehabilitation program for rebuilding houses and 16. Meet at least monthly and agree to hold bi• infrastructure in Georgia proper for returning annual meetings between the de facto president Ossetian refugees, approve funding for a fourth of South Ossetia and the prime minister of rehabilitation program, and encourage the design Georgia. of joint Georgian-Ossetian economic and 17. Establish a technical working group, including community development projects. international experts and ethnic Georgians To the United States Government: living in South Osseria, to define the territorial• administrative status of South Ossetia. 22. Secure commitments when donating military 18. Establish a property claims commission with equipment or ammunition to the Georgian participation of Georgian, Ossetian and military that these will not be used for offensive international experts, create a working group to actions in the South Ossetian or Abkhaz disputes investigate any claims of human rights abuse in and extend USAID programs and funding to the zone of conflict, and reinvigorate the work of support confidence-building measures between the Special Coordination Centre (SCC) to Osseuans and Georgians. facilitate law enforcement cooperation. To the Wider International Community: To the OSCE and its Member· States: 23. Support existing agreements with additional 19. Be more pro-active in the search for a political financial assistance, especially in the field of settlement to the conflict, increase the number of economic development, refugee return and OSCE monitors and officers in South Ossetia, confidence building. and add civilian police, democratisation/human rights, and political officers to the Tskhinvali Tbilisi/Brussels, 26 November 2004 Field Office. GEO-OTP-0008-0620 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 8/44 EK PT ]CG Europe Report N°159 26 November 2004 GEORGIA: AVOIDING \VAR IN SOUTH OSSETIA INTRODUCTION should be solved in the intermediary months between the resolution of the Ajara crisis in May and October. Tn July and August 2004 the Georgian-South Ossetian Events during the summer, however, showed that a conflict became, among all frozen conflicts in the peaceful resolution of the conflict wilJ take years. Tt South Caucasus, the most likely to spill over into full• remains unclear whether decision-makers in Georgia scale war. Since the signature of the "Agreement on are ready to commit the time, funds, and political the Principles of the Settlement of the Georgian• effort needed for a peaceful outcome. In August an Ossetian Conflict between Georgia and Russia" in influential MP said, "We don't have three years to 1992, no military confrontations had occurred. As the solve South Ossetia".' As recently as 14 October, years passed, contacts and trade revived between President Saakashvili insisted on short-term Ossetians and Georgians Jiving in and around the zone resolution, reportedly stating that "South Ossetia is a of conflict. A slow but progressive negotiation process very small region, so I think that a breakthrough in brought Georgia, Russia, South and North Ossetia reunification would rake a matter of months. The together, leading to agreements on the maintenance of main problem related to South Ossctia is contraband, peace and security, economic rehabilitation and but we have resolved that problem"." development, and refugee return. Georgia and Russia had made commitments -- many not yet implemented -• Contraband is indeed one of the causes of the to political steps and budgetary expenditures to conflict, but there are many other factors. The improve Georgian-Ossetian relations. TI1e final status Georgian government's limited interpretation led to a of South Ossetia remains unresolved as the key serious escalation of tensions in South Ossetia in obstacle to conflict settlement. mid-2004 and undermined what feelings of trust had been restored. Addressing the full range of causes After becoming president of Georgia in January 2004, and restoring territorial integrity peacefully requires Mikheil Saakashvili made restoration of territorial sustained effort by the Georgian government with integrity a main goal. In December 2003, he ruled out international support. force and stated, "I am sure, that if the Abkhaz and South Ossetian sides see that the economy is growing in Georgia they will come to us. We should attract them with economic opportunities". 1 At the same time Saakashvili WdS dear that the reintegration process should be completed rapidly -- during his term in office -- and in progressively difficult stages, with Ajara first, South Ossetia second and Abkhaz.ia third. Efforts to engage Abkhazia would not be restarted until presidential elections had been held there in October 2004 . .::. Thus initial thinking was that South Ossetia 3 Crisis Group interview with Georgian MP, AU!,'USt 2004. 1 Civil Georgia, IO January 2004. 4 "South Ossetia Will be Georgian in Several Months", 2 Interview with Georgian MP, Giga Bokaria, Civil Georgia, Caucasus Press, 14 October 2004, and lrucrfax Presidential 26 July 2004. Interview with Georgian State Minister, Goga Bulletin Report for same day, at http://worldnews.xignite.com/ Khaindrava, Civil Georgia, 28 July 2004. xW orldNcws.aspx''articlcid=CEP2004l0140003 20. GEO-OTP-0008-0621 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 9/44 EK PT Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia ]CG Europe Report N° 159, 26 November 2004 Page Z UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE region is surrounded on the south, east and west by CONFLICT Georgia proper. South Ossetia was granted the status of an autonomous region (oblast) in the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic in I 923.7 The Ossetian In taking its first action, Saakashvili's government people claim to be descendants of the Alanian and was driven by conviction the conflict could be Scythian tribes that migrated from Persia to the resolved rapidly and through the application of Caucasus at least five millennia ago." The Ossetian strategies similar to those employed in Ajara.' As in language belongs to the ludo-European group and is Ajara, Georgian authorities sought to unseat South related to Pushto and (more distantly) Farsi, hut uses Ossetia's political leadership in order to re-establish the Cyrillic alphabet." When and how Ossetians control." They utilised a two-pronged approach: migrated to the southern Caucasus is much disputed." launching a large scale anti-smuggling campaign to Georgian sources mostly claim that mass movement block local authorities' ability to gain from illegal to Georgia took place in seventeenth to nineteenth trade, and implementing a "humanitarian aid" centuries" But Ossetians claim they have been living offensive to win the hearts and minds of inhabitants. much longer on both sides of the Caucasus, and their The strategy was based on the expectation that when presence in the region is at least as ancient as the local authorities could no longer deliver basic Georgians'." They argue that Ossetia:ns i:n the North services, citizens would turn against their leadership. and South in 1774 chose to join the Russian Empire." Animosities against Tbilisi would be tempered by This different understanding of the duration of aid. As will be described in more detail below this Ossetian presence causes deep divisions, providing strategy had the opposite e.ITect, as Ossetians ral' lied fodder for Georgians to claim they are "guests" in the around their de facto president. South, while Osserians argue that they populate their historical homeland on both sides of the Caucasus. Tbilisi's erroneous strategy was largely based on a limited and selective interpretation of the roots of the conflict. Policy makers focused on political-economic 1 Oblasts had the least autonomy, mostly cultural. within the causes, I argely ignoring others. However, the conflict's Soviet system. North Osseua was given Ute status of origins include, but are not limited to, different autonomous republic in the Russian SSR. understandings of history; grievances from the l 990- ~ P. Kozaev, .. skms-Arvans(V ladikavkaz, 1998). 1992 conflict especially with regard to displacement :) Nikola Svetkovsky, "TI1e Georgian-South Ossetia Conflict", and human rights violations; institutional arrangements Danish Association for Research on the Caucasus, at and political influences; geopolitical interests; and hl.lp://www.cau.casus.dk/publica.tion5.1llm. 1 0 The rivalry is visible in the different titles of the region, political-economic realities. South Ossctia is often referred to as "Samacuablo". "Shiela Kartli", or "the Tskhinvali Region" by Georgians. Georgian hard-line nationalists call it "Samachaolo" -- the land of the HISTORICAL CAUSES A. aristocratic Georgian Machabcli family. This term is offensive to Ossetians and reminiscent of fonner President 1. Competing narratives of South Ossetia's Gamsakhurdia's nationalistic rhetoric; they prefer "South past Osscria", emphasizing tho cthno-cultural amnitv with North Ossetia. This report uses South Ossetia, as it is the most frequently used in official documents and diplomatic discourse. South Ossetia is located along Georgia's northern 1 1 frontier in the southern foothi11s of the Caucasus G. Zhorzholiani, S. Lekishvili, L. Mataradze, L. Toidze. and E. Khosluaria, The Historical, Potitical and t egol Aspects of Mountains, bordering the North Ossetian the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict (Tbilisi, 1992), pp. 3-4: See Autonomous Republic of the Russian Federation. The also, A Surguladzc and P. Surguladzc, A History of Georgia (Tbilisi. 1992); N. Lornouri, A l Iistory of Georgia (Tbilisi, 1993). 5 As a local conllict resolution expert explained with regards 12 T.BB Sanakocv. Origins and Factors Vladikavkaz, 2004), p. 44. For goverumem.i.People who know what happened thirteen years a wider coverage of tle historical background, see ago, who have experience, who understand !hat the issue is Svctkovsky, op. cit: also, Julian Birch, ''The Georgian/South complex ... and a younger generation. let's say hard-liners. who Ossctian Territorial and Boundary Dispute", in Wright. thought that this issue could be revolved like Ajar.111• Crisis Goldenberg, and Schofield (eds.), Transcaucasian Group interview, September 2004. · Boundaries. the SOAS/GRC Geopolitical Series (Lo11do1L 6 For background on the Ajara case, sec ICG Europe 1996), pp. 202-210. Briefing, Saakashvilt '.s Ajara Success: Repeatable Hise where u Crisis Group interviews. political. analysts, Tskhinvali, in Georgia", 18 August 2004. October 2004. GEO-OTP-0008-0622 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 10/44 EK PT Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia ]CG Europe Report N° 159, 26 November 2004 Page s Ethnic tensions became visible during the first tensions." Some attempts appear to have been made Georgian Republic. 1918-1921. The Georgian to defuse the crisis through organising public forums Mcnshcvik government accused Ossctians of attended by both Georgians and Ossctians." But the cooperating with Russian Bolsheviks. H A series of last such meeting ended violently when, on 23 Ossetian rebellions took place between 1918 and November 1989, 15,000 Georgians marched on 1920 during which claims were made to an Tskhinvali. The caravan of buses and cars was met independent territory. Violence broke out in 1920 by a mob of Ossetians, militia and soldiers from the when Georgian Mensheviks sent National Guards 81h regiment of the Soviet Army, who prevented and regular army units to Tskhinvali to crush the them from entering the city ~1 The clash caused the uprisings." Ossetian sources claim that about 5,000 first casualties." Ossetians were killed and more than 13, 000 subsequently died from hunger and epidemics." I11e situation worsened in summer 1990, prior to After the Red Army invaded Georgia in 1921, the parliamentary elections in Georgia, when the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast (SOAO) was Georgian Supreme Soviet adopted an election law created within Georgia barring regional parries. This was interpreted by Ossetians as a way to cut Ademon Nykhaz out and During the Soviet period, Georgians generally led to Ossetians proclaiming full sovereignty within considered South Ossetia an artificial entity, and the USSR on 20 September J 990. Ossetians then rivalries remained latent. Many Georgians perceived boycotted elections the next month that brought Zviad that Ossetians living in South Ossetia had benefits not Gamsakhurdia's "Round Table" coalition to power in granted to them. According to a. source originally Georgia. and held their own parliamentary contest in from Tskhinvali, "the first in charge was always December. '·1 Gamsakhurdia's government frantically Osserian, in all possible positions"." On the other reacted, cancelling the election results and abolishing hand, Ossetians in the South felt politically the autonomous oblast status of South Ossetia on J I disadvantaged compared to their kin in the North and December l 990. Tbilisi announced a state of to the Abkhaz, as both had Autonomous Republics (in emergency in the region and appointed the the Russian Federation and Georgia respectively). commander of Georgian Interior Troops as Tskhinvali's mayor. Authorities in that city organised 2. The 1990-1992 conflict and its aftermath a referendum in January I 992, which overwhelmingly supported secession and integration with Russia On The Ossetians renewed efforts to upgrade their status 19 November 1992, the South Ossetian Supreme in l 988, when Ademon Nykhaz (the South Ossetian Council voted for the same actions." Popular Front) was created." On 10 November 1989, the SOAO regional council sent a plea to the Direct military confrontation started in January 1991 Georgian Supreme Soviet for the region to be made when several thousand Georgian troops entered an Autonomous Republic, infuriating Georgian Tskhinvali, leading to a year of chaos and urban authorities. The language issue also increased 19 1t1 19R9 the Georgian Supreme Soviet promoted its language program, establishing Georgian as the principle 1~ Zhorzholiani, et.. al.. The t ltstorical, Po/Wea/ and Legat language countrywide. Ossetians reacted by passing a Aspects of'Thc Georgian-Ossetian Conflict, op. cit.. p. 6. resolution 011 Ossetiau as an official language in the 1.s Vakhtang Guruli (cd.), History GEO-OTP-0008-0623 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 11/44 EK PT Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia ]CG Europe Report N° 159, 26 November 2004 Page-t warfare. In spring 1992, fighting escalated with related to economic reconstruction in the zone of sporadic Russian involvement." On 24 June 1992, in conflict, and monitor human rights. lt is also within the Russian city of Sochi, the then Russian and JCC competence to coordinate activities of the Joint Georgian leaders, Boris Yeltsin and Eduard Peacekeeping Forces." In practice, the JCC's work Shevardnadze, signed an agreement that brought has tended to focus on three main issues, each with a about a ceasefire, but the war's consequences were working group: military and security matters, devastating: some 1,000 dead, I 00 missing, extensive economic rehabilitation of the zone of conflict, and destruction of homes and infrastructure, and many establishing conditions for the return of refugees and refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).2<; TDPs. Tn addition, ad hoc committees, expert groups, plenipotentiary delegations and other formations have 3. The peace agreement and peace met at various levels." implementation mechanisms I11e June 1992 agreement also created trilateral Joint A series of protocols to the Sochi Agreement were Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF), with Georgian, Russian signed soon thereafter including Protocol no. 3, which and Osserian units." The JPKF was mandated to defined the zone of conflict -- a circle of l 5 km. restore peace and maintain law and order in the zone radius from the centre of Tskhinvali -- and a security of conflict and security corridor, as well as in districts corridor -- a 14 km, band divided evenly on both sides and villages not in the zone of conflict." It was of the administrative border of the former South additionally tasked to monitor provisions of the Ossetia Autonomous Oblast." On the ground, the ceasefire agreement and rake decisive measures, authorities of the former oblast maintained control including the use of arms, in case of violations of JCC over the districts of Tskhinvali, Java, Znauri, and decisions by any uncontrolled armed formations of a parts of Akhalgori. The Tuilisi central government party ..~:- The Protocol gave the military command the controlled the rest of Akhalgori and several ethnic right "to use all measures to localise military clashes Georgian villages in the Tskhinvali district. and destroy armed formations in districts and villages of the former South Ossetian Autonomous Ob last that The Sochi Agreement also set up the Joint Control were not included in the security zone or corridor" :)6 Commission (JCC),2~ a quadrilateral body with However, it is specifically in the zone of conflict (on Georgian, Russian, North and South Ossetian South Ossetian territory) that the JPKF has the right to representatives," plus participation from the deploy and to establish checkpoints." Since '1992 the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe JPI 25 Svctkovsky, op. cit. Chapter 4.3. ·~<· According to the "Intergovernmental Agreement Between ~' Terms of Reference forthe JCC, 26 July 1994, op. cit. Russia and Georgia on Economic Rehabilitation in the 32 The European Commission of the European Union is Georgian-Ossetian Zone of Conflict" (14 September 1993), present in the working group on economic issues and the war damages totalkd 34.2 billion Russian rubles based 011 15 UNHCR in the working group on refugees and I DPs. July 1992 prices ($260 million). TI1e ceasefire entered fully ~-~ A common mis perception is that the JPK.F is quadrilateral into force on 28 June 1992. Figures denoted in dollars ($) including South and North Ossctian forces. Rather, the refer to U.S. dollars in this report unless otherwise noted. Ossctian unit has over time come to be staffed mainly by "' Protocol no. Three. 12 July 2004. signed in Vladikavkaz soldiers from South Ossetia under the command of a Korth by lheJCC. Ossctian officer. ~ "Sochi Agreement. on Resolving the Georgian-Ossetian ~4 Jn 1992 what is now called the JPKF was tenned the Joint Conflict". Article 3. 24 June 1992: its functions were defined Peacekeeping and Law Enforcement Forces (JPKLEF). Th.e in a 4 July I 99.l protocol signed in vladrkavka» mandate was changed m 1997 lo exclude law cntorccmcnt, ~'9 Terms of Reference for the JCC, 26 July 1994. signed by Protocol 110. Seven of the JCC Meeting, Annex I. I 3 February the Russian a.nd Georgian representatives. 1997, in Vladikavkaz. .:i o At that time, the OSCE was the Conference on Security and ~5 Protocol no. Three, Annex 1. Article I, 12 July 2004, Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). It was agreed that Ille CSCE signed in Vladikavkaz by the JCC. would participate in the work of the JCC within the Terms of ~<> Ibid. Reference for the JCC, 26 Jul}' 1994. r Ibid, Article 4. GEO-OTP-0008-0624 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 12/44 EK PT Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia ]CG Europe Report N° 159, 26 November 2004 Page S maximum of 500 troops to the JPKr,~ who served bilateral agreement was on 23 December 2000.'16 As under Russian command. ~.,, In 1996 the parties signed will be described below, it stipulated that Georgia a Memorandum to Enhance Security and Confidence and Russia should, with the North and South Building Measures and agreed to step-by-step Ossetian sides, devise two crucial programs: one on demilitarisation of the zone of conflict and reduction economic rehabilitation of the zone of conflict, the of the number of JPKF frontier posts and guards. 40 other on return, settlement, and re-integration of refugees, forcibly displaced and other persons The peacekeeping and conflict settlement process affected by the conflict, including measures for evolved over the past ten years, as various agreements restoration of the economy in places of return. were made, especially at the JCC level.41 The negotiation process was slow, with lengthy periods of inactivity." The parties made various commitments, B. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND especially relating lo economic rehabilitation and POPULATION DISPLACEMENT refugee return (detailed below). Nevertheless negotiations on full-scale resolution of the conflict 1. Ossetian and Georgian population posed significant obstacles. The May 1996 settlement and displacement "Memorandum on Measures to Ensure Security and Reinforce Mutual Confidence between the Parties to Populations were closely inter-mixed before the 1990- the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict" called on them to 1992 conflict. According to the last pre-war census in "continue their negotiations with a view to achieving 1989, Osserians living in South Osseria numbered a full-scale political settlement".'13 However, attempts 65,000, with 98,000 in the rest of Georgia." The to strut negotiations on the political settlement did not overall population of South Ossetia was begin until February l 999 and have only reached an approximately 99,700, including some 26,000 ethnic intermediary stage with the signature of the Baden Georgians." The war brought massive displacement, Agreement (Declaration) in 2000.1~ which shattered much of this coexistence and brought South Ossetians much closer to their ethnic kin m Before November 2004, the leaders of Georgia and North Ossetia (Russian Federation). South Ossetia had not met since June 1998 when Shevardnadze and Chibirov came together in the The displacements have yet to be reversed. Their Georgian town of Borjorni." The most recent brunt was shouldered by North Ossetia While precise figures are difficult to find, accounts claim that between 40,000 and I 00,000 Ossetians from South -'~ Decision no. l of the JCC, 4 July 1992, signed .in Ossetia and Georgia proper fled there during the Vladikavkaz. The commander of the JPKF is named by UlC conflict. 49 Additionally, some 10, 000 Georgians and JCC on the proposal of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. 39 JCC Decree, December 1994, signed in Moscow. 41) "Memorandum on Measures to Ensure Security and August 1996, and in Java (South Ossetia) on I 4 November Reinforce Mutual Confidence Between the Parties lo the 1997. See below for the November 2004 meeting between Gcorgian-Ossctian Conflict", Moscow, 16 May 1996. This Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania and South Osscuan reduction was to occur "as progress is made towards a full• leader Eduard Kokoitv. seale settlement... .. " 16 "Agreement Ben\~een the Government of the Russian 41 Between December 1994 and April 2004, the JCC met 30 Federation and the Government of Georgia on Economic times. Reconstruction and Rehabilitation in the Zone of Georgian• 42 For example, between August 1992-December 1994, Ossetian Conflict and on Refugee Return", Tbilisi. 23 September 1997-March 1999, and July 1999-April 2001. no December 2000. JCC sessions were held. 47 Birch, "Ossctiya", op. cir.. p. 505. 4' "Memorandum on Measures to Ensure Security and 48 Crisis Group interview, South Ossetian official, Reinforce Mutual Confidence Between the Panics lo the Tskhinvali. August 2004. Georgian-Ossetian Conflict", Moscow, 16 May I 996. 49 The lower figure is based on data from UNHCR +1 The last time the authorised delegations met to discuss a (estimations as of 1998). According lo UNHCR Tbilisi. political sculcmcnt, on 14 to 17 October 2001 in The Hague, :m.ooo Ossctians from Georgia proper registered in North the experts meeting facilitated by the OSCE ended without a Ossctia as refugees, while l (),000 from South Ossctia became concluding document. It was a follow-up to meetings in "de facto refugees" in North Ossetia, Crisis Group interview, Vienna.Baden (2000). Bucharest (2001) and Castelo Branco August 2004. Officials ofUNHCR Vladikav.kaz consider that (2!Xl2). in 1995 there were some 55,000 persons in North Ossctia 4" Two previous meetings between Shevardnadze and displaced by the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict Crisis Chibirov took place in Vladikavkaz (North Ossctia) 011 27 Group interview, October 2004. The 100,000 figure is used by GEO-OTP-0008-0625 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 13/44 EK PT Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia ]CG Europe Report N° 159, 26 November 2004 Page ti persons of mixed ethnicity were displaced from South had a population of some I 64,000 ethnic Ossetians. Ossetia to Georgia proper, and 5,000 internally Approximately 38,000 remain." A handful of displaced in South Ossctia" The 1992 ceasefire was ethnically mixed villages survive in South not followed by large-scale returns. In 2004 the UN Ossetia." While Ossetian authorities claim that up Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian to 2,000 ethnic Georgian still live in Tskhinvali," Assistance (OCHA) found that "an overwhelming Georgian officials in Gori say only a few dozen number of !DPs and returnees remain do." In parts of South Ossetia under Georgian displaced ... many if not most.ireluctant to return to government control, there am some 20,000 persons, their places of origin"." As of September 2004 the mainly ethnic Georgians, in four districts." office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had facilitated return of no more than Wartime displacement also significantly reduced 1,734 persons (513 families) from Korth Ossetia to South Ossetia's population, which has yet to reach South Ossetia and Georgia proper." 1990 numbers. Authorities there claim some 80,000 persons live in the region." However the real number The returns that did occur after 1992 tended to of full time residents is likely around 65,000.63 No strengthen the dominance of majority populations more than 36,600 are reported to have voted in the rather then promote multi-ethnic co-existence. Few 2004 South Ossetian parliamentary elections." minorities chose to regain pre-war residences. UNHCR assisted return of 278 ethnic Georgian families to Many Ossetians from South Ossetia and Georgia South Ossetia and 86 Ossetian families to Georgia." A proper have regulated their status in North Ossetia Georgian engineer who worked on the reconstruction and Russia. The number of refugees from Georgia of homes for returnees told Crisis Group (ICG) registered in North Osseria has dropped to 19,496.65 these figures were exaggerated because very few families came back permanently -- the majority sold their rebuilt property. "We did not achieve the '7 Found at Jlttp:/iwww.smtistics.ge/main/census/cen_inf/ expected results", he claimed." Allegedly South Tavi%203.hl.m. The 1989 figure is based 011 lhc '1989 Ossetian aurhorities encouraged Ossetian refugees countrywide census and thus includes South Ossetia The 2002 figure does 110l include South Osseua, only Georgia proper. to settle in South Ossetia rather then in Georgia According to the same source, 33,l:lR Ossctians lived in Tbilisi proper. In turn, Georgian local authorities did little in 1989 but only 10,266 in 2002. to assist returning Ossetians regain possession of their 5t< According to an OSC'E official, these include Ksuisi and property." From 2000 to 2004 return on all sides Arstsevi (Tskhinvali region) Akhalsheni, Tigva and Shindara virtually came to a halt. 56 (Znaun region) and several villages in the Leningori/ Akhalgori region. 59 Thus much of the inter-ethnic mixing that existed Crisis Group interview with de facto foreign minister of before 1990 has been lost. Before the war, Georgia South Ossctia, August. 2004. ~° Crisis Group interview with Gori Region government official. September 2004. According to OSCE estimates a few hundred Georgian families 1TI GEO-OTP-0008-0626 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 14/44 EK PT Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia ]CG Europe Report N° 159, 26 November 2004 Page 7 This suggests that many displaced from South Georgian paramilitary groups committed acts Ossetia have found alternative means to define their of violence against Ossetian civilians within status -- often taking Russian citizenship, registering South Ossetia that were motivated both by the as residents of North Ossetia, and moving on to desire to expel Ossetians and reclaim villages other parts of Russia or further afield. In addition, for Georgia, and by sheer revenge against the the de facto foreign minister of South Ossetia claims Ossetian people. As a consequence of this that close to 90 per cent of all Ossetians in South violence, between 60 and I 00 villages in South Ossetia haw become Russian citizens." Informally Ossetia are reported to have been burned South Ossetians note that every family has at least down, destroyed or otherwise abandoned. 74 one member in North Ossetia. m Lack of employment and education opportunities, as well as the generally The same report documents how Georgians in Ossetian pessimistic political-economic outlook in South villages became easy targets for Ossetian paramilitaries. Ossetia, pushes many to migrate. Both parties perpetrated hostage taking, indiscriminate shelling and summary executions." Neither Georgian 2. War-time atrocities nor Ossetian authorities have investigated these actions. The number killed remains controversial. No amnesties The conflict in the beginning of the 1990s was sporadic have been declared, and no individuals have been and anarchic." Neither Georgians nor Ossetians sentenced for crimes against civilians. The lack of possessed a disciplined army, and fighting generally accountability is a grievance raised by the South took place between small groups and paramilitaries, Ossetians. In June 2004, de facto President Kokoity facilitated by the easy availability of arms. Half a dozen stated that the Georgian Parliament should conduct a Georgian paramilitary formations, from 50 to 200 men political assessment of the 1990-1992 conflict and each, participated. 6!1 There was lack of coordination the Georgian government should acknowledge that between the groups, and they had different allegiances: genocide was carried out against South Ossetians." some were loyal to Garnsakhurdia, others to his opposition, and a third group was made up of common C. POLITICAL CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT criminals." The South Ossetians consisted mainly of a 2,400-man National Guard formed in November 1991.7: Locals also engaged in street clashes, Politically Georgians and South Ossetians are divided particularly in Tskhinvali." by the former's claims to state territorial integrity and the latter's aspirations for national self-determination. Both sides committed brutal atrocities, including President Saakashvili has made restoration of Georgia's decapitation of infants, executions in front of territorial integrity his top priority. Following his highly family members, and rape." According to a Human symbolic inauguration oath at the grave of David IV77 Rights Watch report: in January 2004, he stated, "Georgia's territorial integrity is the goal of my life". He promised that South Ossetia and Abkhazia would be restored to Georgia before the presidential elections scheduled for 2009. Finding a solution to the South Ossetian issue has a slightly higher figure, 22,631. Of these, 10527 have is key for his credibility. Public opinion is unprepared become full Russian citizens while I I, 150 have forced to accept any solution that does not involve foll re• migrant status. Crisis Group interview with UNHCR integration of South Ossetia, and Saakashvili has done Vfadikavka> staff October 2004. •i<• Crisis Group interview with de facto foreign minister of little to pave the way for any compromise. South Ossctia, August 2004. 67 Crisis Group interviews, Tskhinvali, August-September The South Ossetians have a radically different vision. 2004. Since 1989 they have promoted two options: full 68 Svctkovsky, op. cit. Chaptcr4.4. 69 These included the White Eagles, White Georgia, White Falcons, Black Panthers, the Kutaisi National Guard, and the Mcrab kostava Society. Human Rights Watch, op. cit., p. 14. '1 Human Rights Watch, op. cit. p. l7. 11; Ibid, p. 14. t » Ibid. -;i lbid, p. n. 76 "Kokoity puts everything at stake", Svobodnaya Gruziya. 72 During the conflict, Tskhinvali was divided into Georgian 15 June 2004. and Osscuan-controtlcd zones and for months was under " King David JV, born in 107.1, ruled Georgia from 1089 to shell fire, without electricity supply or communications. his death in 1125 and is considered the first unifier of the ?3 Svctkovsky, op. cit.. Chapter 4.4. country. GEO-OTP-0008-0627 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 15/44 EK PT Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia ]CG Europe Report N° 159, 26 November 2004 Page S independence and international recogrnuon, or since 1992, ties between North and South Ossetia integration into the Russian Federation. The former have strengthened in all fields. x4 head of the region, Lyudvig Chibirov, tended toward a more conciliatory stance and was considered to Ossetians argue that their rights would be better have a stabilising influence on relations. In 2000 it protected within the Russian Federation than Georgia. seemed that Chibirov and Shevardnadz.e might Crisis Group was told repeatedly by officials in No11h ultimately agree on re-integration." However Eduard and South Ossetia that since the end of the conflict, Kokoity's victory in the December 2001 elections they have received direct financial assistance from changed this." Kokoity has refused to discuss a Russia, but nothing from Georgia." Chibirov said that political settlement, especially on the issue of South "during my years as president, I have never received a Ossetia's future status in Georgia. cent from the Georgian government"." Russia has assisted with reconstruction of roads and other In 2004 the Kokoity government repeatedly called for infrastructure in South Ossetia and provided integration of South Ossetia into the Russian Federation. humanitarian aid there, while covenng On 5 June, the Ossetian legislature appealed to the State accommodation and social care costs of most 81' Duma to incorporate the territory. On 15 September, in refugees in North Ossetia x7 Moscow, Kokoity stated, "It is high time to stop dividing Ossetia into North and South. There is one big Georgians oppose South Ossetia's independence and unified Ossetia .. reintegration into Georgia is out of because it would undermine the their state's territorial the question". xi integrity. In addition, they say independence is unrealistic because the region is not economically Authorities in South and North Osseria justify their viable, is populated by Georgian citizens, and has demands as national self-determination. i:<2 They only one main road link to Russia through the Roki argue that during the Soviet period the Ossetian tunnel," while the Caucasus Mountains provide a nation was wrongly divided between the Russian "narural barrier" to North/South Ossetia reunification." SSR and the Georgian SSR. As all lived within the Soviet Union and nothing impeded freedom of D. GEOPOLITICAL CAUSES movement, it was not until the break-up of the USSR that the real consequences of this division were felt. Today members of the Ossetian elite ask: South Ossetia's strategic location on the border "why don't we as a people [narod] have the right to between Russia and Georgia has contributed to re-unite? Like the Germans, the Koreans, and now tensions. The region is a mere 3,900 sq. krns. and maybe the Albanians'l'f" They also point out that has only two large towns: Tskhinvali and Java. The remainder of the territory is made up of villages iR President Shevardnadze and de facto President Chibirov ~4 In order to promote cooperation between North and South met three times, in 1996. 1997 and 1998, and both publicly Osseua, a "Republic of South Osseua Department for expressed commitment to peaceful settlement of the contlict. Relations with Ilic Republic of North Osscna" was opened in iY Kokoity was elected with over 55 per cent of the vote in the 2002. Its aim is to "promote integration of South Ossetia into second round on 6 December 2001, defeating the chairperson North Ossetia" by strengthening ties between non• of tbe de facto Parliament and Communist Party regional governmental suuctures such as local Iinns ard fauns and also leader Stanislav Kochiyev. Turnout was estimated at 63 per building links between schools and other institutions. Crisis cent. lo the fast round Kokoity received 4 7 per cent Kochiyev Group interview with department head, Vladikavkaz, October 24 per ce111 and Chibirov 21 per cc111. "Georgia Conflict 2004. Assessment". prepared for the U.S. Agency for International s.< Crisis Group interviews, Tskhinvali, August 2004 and Development (USAID). 23 January 2002. p. 36. The election Vladikavkaz. October 2004. was not recognised intcmationally. ~6 Crisis Gro~1p interview, Vladikavkaz, October 2004. 80 "Parliament of South Ossetia Appeals to the Duma of s; Most recently refugees living in collective centres in 1'01th Russian Federation to Incorporate the Republic into Russia", Ossetia have started lo receive cash compensation from the Nl~HSru.com, at hltp://ncwsni.com/arch/world/07Jun2004/ l{ussian Federal GovemmcnL I io.ooo l{I{ ($1,800) to vacate ho4etsya.htrnl. their temporary premises. Crisis Group interview with TC'RC !!l "Kokoev calls for "United Ossetia', Rules out tntegrarion staff. Vladikavkaz, October 2004. into Georgia", Civil Georgia. 15 September 2004. sx Crisis Group interview with Georgian conflict resolution i<1. Crisis Group interviews, Tskhinvali, August 2004 and expert, September 2004. Vladikavkaz, October 2004. ~9 Crisis Group interview with former UNHCR sub• !!3 Crisis Group interviews, Vladikavkaz, October 2004. contractor, September 2004. GEO-OTP-0008-0628 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 16/44 EK PT Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia ]CG Europe Report N° 159, 26 November 2004 Pagev dispersed among small mountain valleys. The Roki appeared on the verge of signing a long-awaited tunnel. 2,995 metres above sea level, provides the framework treaty on cooperation and security issues." only paved road link between the two Ossctias, Other developments, however, strained bilateral For Russia, South Ossetia is of strategic importance relations. The Ajara crisis provided a second because it is on the border of its volatile Northern opportunity after the "Rose Revolution'I" for Igor Caucasus region. A senior Russian diplomat in Ivanov, the head of the Russian National Security Georgia told Crisis Group, "North Ossetia was an Council, to show Russia's ability to contribute to island of stability. It was important for us to keep it solution of Georgian problems, when he facilitated that way .... Events in South Ossetia destabilised Abashidze's exile to Moscow. Russia had expected this. and this is why we reacted so strongly"." As some political gratitude for its assistance, so President the only Christian people in the North Caucasus, Putin was allegedly infuriated when the day after Russia has traditionally relied on the Ossetians as Abashidze's exit, Georgian Foreign Minister trustworthy allies." Outside analysts have pointed Zurabashvili repeated demands for the removal of out that the Georgian-South Ossetian war helped Russian bases. 96 However, informed sources agree that precipitate the 1992 outbreak of fighting between the South Ossetia crisis, not Ajara, was the major Ossetians and lngush in the Russian Federation." reason for deterioration in Russian-Georgian relations in mid-2004.?? During the first part of 2004. there were expectations Russia and Georgia would informally agree on managing their common security problems. Relations E. POLITICAL-ECONO:V.CIC CAUSES OF between Presidents Putin and Saakashvili were CONFLICT reportedly improving in spring 2004, as both expressed an interest in fighting international terrorism. During The frozen nature of the conflict had provided a his first official visit to Moscow, in February, fertile ground for development of illegal business -• Saakashvili agreed to joint patrols of Georgia's smuggling, drug trafficking, kidnapping and arms northern border to contain possible terrorist incursions. trading. The Transcaucasian highway connecting The two presidents discussed creation of a joint anti• Georgia to Russia goes through South Ossetia and terrorist centre in Tbilisi, They also appeared close to allegedly serves as a key smuggling route." Due to overcoming differences over Russian military bases i.n the unresolved status of South Ossetia, neither Georgia," At the start of his presidency, Saakashvili Georgia nor South Ossetia could agree on the \1\18S adamant that the two remaining bases be closed by establishment of a system of customs control on 2006. However, he did not publicly bring up the issue at the Istanbul KATO Summit. During talks in Moscow on 10-11 August, the two defence ministers agreed to extend the bases for seven or eight years. Perhaps most importantly, Saakashvili and Putin 94 The signing of the framework agreement is now on hold. A senior source within the Russian Embassy in Thilisi informed Crisis Group that most points have been agreed. The main remaining issue concerns the Russian military bases, whose closure may be linked to a Georgian pledge not 9° Crisis Group interview with Russian diplomat in Georgia. lo accept other foreign bases. Crisis Group interview with September 2004. Russian diplomat in Georgia September 2004. °"1 Evidence of the Russian-Ossetian military alliance date at Y.' The term refers to the uprising against President least back to the nineteenth century, when Ossctia assisted Shevardnadze and the rigged 2003 parliamentary elections Russia. against Chcchcns and Dagbestanis. Birch, "Ossctiya'', that led to Saakashvili's ascent to power. op. cit. p. 525. "°Putin's reaction was described by a Russian political analyst. 9.:: Ibid. pp. 512-528. in a Crisis Group interview. Moscow. October 2004. 93 At the OSCE Istanbul Summit in November 1999, Russia Znrabaslrvili's starerrent was reported at undertook lo reduce its military strength in Georgia by the h1tp://www.rambler.ru/db/news/ print.h!ml'!mid=457375G. end of 2000 to comply with the Conventional Armed Forces ~n Crisis Group interview, senior Russian diplomat in Europe Treaty. Georgia and Russia also agreed lo September 2004. complete negotiations in 2000 on the duration and modalities ~)l! TI1e road is one of three linking Georgia with Russia. By of the bases at Batumi and Akhalkalaki. Russia has so far default it is also an important link lo Russia for Armenia. closed us bases in Vaziani (Tbilisi) and Gudauta (Abkhazia) Azerbaijan, and Turkey. Roman Gotsiridze, "Economic and but maintains those i.J.1 Bammi and Akhalkalaki, though Social Consequences of Internal Conflict in Georgia". Report negotiations on closure continue. for the Parliament Budget Office of Georgia, 2003. pp. 5-6. GEO-OTP-0008-0629 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 17/44 EK PT Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia ]CG Europe Report N° 159, 26 November 2004 Page JO transiting goods." South Ossetians refuse to allow products ($60.5 million), cigarettes ($60 million), Georgian customs officials on their territory, in petrol ($23.2 million) and kerosene ($12 million) also particular on their side of the Roki pass, claiming were smuggled yearly.'?' that an independent state has the right to its own customs administration. Georgian officials are less The market also facilitated the trade in stolen and illegal than keen on setting up customs points on their side goods. Cars stolen in Georgia proper were frequently of the divide, considering this would amount to de• taken there. Heroin and opium were also said to be facto recognition of South Ossetian independence. traded?" Georgia was particularly concerned that fake alcoholic goods, especially wine allegedly produced in Up to the end of 2003, a number of law enforcement Georgia, were being sold, tarnishing the trademark. In officials from South Ossetia and Georgia proper were the general atmosphere of lawlessness, kidnappings, believed to be participating in criminal economic assault and murder were carried out with impunity. activities.l'" II was alleged that authorities on both sides co-operated to profit from illegal trade, as did Russian Georgia lost significant customs revenue due to customs and peacekeeping troops. ioi Three Georgian smuggling; some calculated as much as 80 per MPs and the deputy governor of the Shida Kartli cent.'" Estimates of the value vary widely from 5 to region ware considered to control parts of the market 20 million lari ($2.5 to $10 million) monthly."? on the Georgian side, and the son of former South While some analysts consider that "the greatest part Ossetian leader Chibirov was seen as playing a key of the smuggled goods entering Georgia came from role on the Ossetian side."? Thus many officials were South Ossetia,'?" others argue, "the scale of believed to ha:ve little incentive to stop smuggling, let smuggling through Abkhazia and South Ossetia is alone to resolve the conflict. The lawless economy small in comparison with the volume of illegal trade helped sustain the post war status quo. through oilier (non-conflict) parts of the country". 1•Y.! When the market was closed in June 2004, Georgian The Ergneti market on a track of land between South customs claimed a four-fold increase in revenue Ossetia and Georgia proper, a part of the collected at the northern customs point with Transcaucasian highway linking Gori and Tskhinvali, Russia. 111' started to develop in the mid-I 990s as an informal trading post mainly for Georgians and South The Ergneti market generally had a negative effect Ossetians, Most frequently Georgian individuals and on Georgia's legal, political and economic companies bought goods to be re-sold in the country's environment, but it provided at least three benefits. internal market without proper customs clearance and Although much of the proceeds apparently went 10 legalisation. The most lucrative trade was allegedly elites among the locaJ authorities, law enforcement, wheat flour.!" An esrimated 450,000 tons worth, and "business community", average citizens also some $130 million a year, transited the market Dairy gained livelihoods from the trade in a context of overall high South Ossetian unemployment and poor economic development. Prices on basic goods such !1) In November 2002. South Ossetia and Georgia agreed lo as bread were artificially low because there was no participate i11 an EU Customs Control project, which included tax. Most importantly, perhaps, the market was a a joint taxation scheme on cargo traffic transiting South means for average Georgians and Ossetians to meet, Ossetia. TI1e revenue collected was to be allocated to projects in the zone of conflict. Ultimately the South Ossetians pulled out. claiming Ilic project threatened their sovereignly. UN OCHA Georgia, "South Ossetia Briefing Note", January 2004. l'x• David Darchiashvili and Gigi Tcvzadzc. "Ethnic Conflicts H"1 Ibid, p. 51. Areshidzc. op. cit. 116 and Breakaway Regions in Georgia", iluildutg Democracy in · A res hid1 re, op. ci. t 106Ibid. Georgia, Discussion Paper no. 9. May 2003, pp. 12-13. 1')1 Alexandre Kukhianidzc, Alcko Kupatadzc, and Roman 1<'7 The lower figure is in ibid. TI1e higher one was from Gotsiridze, "Smuggling Through Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Georgi Godabrekidze, chairman of the customs department, Region/South Ossetia", research report for the American Georgian finance ministry, quoted in Caucasus Press, 9 Univcrsuy's Transnational Clime and Corruption Centre, Januarv 2004. 1 200}. pp. 8. 27, 38. (JX Lc~'all Chrdilcli, deputy minister of finance. quoted in 1 '12 Marnuka Areshidze, "Current Economic Causes of Conflict Areshidze, op. cit. in Georgia", unpublished report for UK Department for 11'9 Kukhianidze, Kupatadze, and Gotsiridze. op. cit. p. 2G. tntcrnarional Development (DFID), 2002. 11'1 In August 2004, the "Northern" regional customs point 11H Kukhianidze, Kupatadze, and Gotsiridze, op. cit. pp. 28- collected GEL 4,650,000 ($2,560,000). In August 2003 it 29. collected GEL 1,200,000 ($660.000). Godabrckidzc, op. cit. GEO-OTP-0008-0630 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 18/44 EK PT Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia ]CG Europe Report N° 159, 26 November 2004 Page 11 build contacts, and identify common interests after I III. UNFREEZING THE CONFLICT the war years. 11 1 It has been argued that South Ossetia's economy A. FOClJSING ON THE POLITICAL became criminalised because the region had few ECONOMIC CAlSES OF CONFLICT opportunities to participate in legal activity since it was not a recognised entity. With regards to the Policy makers in Tbilisi considered that the main Ergneti market, South Ossetian au1horiries claim the impediment to any solution to the conflict was trade was legal because they imposed custom duties smuggling. They reasoned that it was sustained on the goods from Russia. "A large part of our 112 because South Ossetian authorities had significant budget" was financed by these duties, one stated. gains from illegal trade, which gave them the means During the first half of 2004, South Ossetia's revenue to maintain control and satisfy their desire for money collection was cul in half Georgian analysts say this and power. In parallel, part of the profits was used to was a direct consequence of the closure of the market, offer basic goods and services to South Ossetia's while South Ossetian authorities claim it was due to inhabitants, in essence to secure their loyalty to the the generally difficult situation in the region.m The Tskhinvali regime. rest of the region's revenue came from the few remaining local businesses. South Ossetian GDP is 1. Attacking greed estimated at $15 million, $250 per capita 11'1 Georgia initiated a major anti-smuggling operation Ossetians argue that since l 992 South Ossetia has in and around South Osseria in December 2003, suffered from a de facto Georgian embargo." s Few which was reinforced in .M.ay 2004. Before then, its economic ties link Tbilisi and Tskhinvali, and there is police had often been accused of collusion with little legal trade. Thus South Ossetia has increasingly smugglers.'!' In December, the Ministry of Interior integrated into the North Osserian economic space (MIA) dispatched Special Forces to villages outside and separated itself from Georgia's. Tskhinvali to seize smuggled goods.!" This was followed by an operation organised by the new governor of the Shida Kartli region, Irakli Okruashvili,118 to blow up roads used for goods smuggled through South Ossetia and the Ergneti market,"? By June the market was closed and Georgian police were regularly checking vehicles for contraband. During the spring months, Georgian N.UA troop presence in the zone of conflict grew as a result of the anti-smuggling campaign.!" In some instances 111 police were returned to areas where they had not Similarly, in northern Bosnia-Herzegovina, along a. main been since the war.!" By the end of May 2004, MIA road linking Croat, Bosniak and Serb settlements, the Arizona Market has served since 1996 as a unique meeting place troops had checkpoints in Tkviavi, Pkvenisi, Nikozi facilitating reconciliation. There was no lax system to regulate and Eredvi, all ethnic Georgian populated villages its trade until 2000. 11'.? Crisis Group interview with de facto foreign minister of South Ossctia, August 2004. 1 u "Budget of the de facto Republic of South Ossctia was i ir; Kukhianidzc, Kupatadzc, and Gotsiridzc, "Smuggling", op. fulfilled by Jess then 50 per cent in the first half of 2004", cit. Black Sea Press, 30 August 2004. 117 Civil Georgia. ll December 2003. 114 Areshidze, op. cit. 118 On 14 January 2004, Okruasbvili became Georgia's 115 In direct contravention to the Sochi Agreement which prosecutor general, on 10 June the interior minister. states that "the parties shall deem unacceptable the imposition 119 Civil Georgia, 28 December 2003. 1 or economic sanctions and blockades". "Sochi Agreement on "1; Georgia appears to have acted unilaterally. without first Resolving the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict", Article 4, 24 June informing the South Ossetian side through the JCC. 1 1992. The pledge not to exert political or economic pressure ~1 For example, ill the Proni Gorge. Nineteen police were was again made in the "Memorandum on the Measl1rcs placed in Proni in May 2004. Theresa Freese, "Security, Providing Security and Strengthening Mutual Confidence Governance and Economic Reform in Shida Kartli'', Central Between the Sides of the Gcorgian-Ossctian Conflict", 1996. Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 19 May 2004. GEO-OTP-0008-0631 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 19/44 EK PT Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia ]CG Europe Report N° 159, 26 November 2004 Page 12 near Tskhinvali. On 31 May, a 300-strong, heavily based national NGOs such as Krnara to strengthen armed unit was dispatched by helicopter to reinforce South Ossetia-based groups organising for change.!" a checkpoint in Tkviavi but was withdrawn a few hours later. Saakashvili claimed it was sent after Tbilisi offered unilateral social, economic and cultural General Svyatoslav Nabdzorov, commander of the projects to benefit South Ossetians, including an JPKF, declared the roadblocks to be unauthorised Ossetian language TV station, pensions, the re-start of and threatened to remove them by force.!" the Tskhinvali railway, 126 free fertiliser and humanitarian aid. On 26 May 2004, in a speech While Georgia justified the significant increase of marking Georgian Independence Day, Saakashvili MIA troops in the zone of conflict as necessary for addressed the people of Abkhazia and South Ossetia the anti-smuggling campaign and later to protect in their native languages, urged their separatist leaders Georgian-populated villages.!" the Ossetians to launch peace talks on the breakaway regions' status perceived this as preparation for military action and invited Ossetians to reintegrate into Georgian against Tskhinvali. On 2 June the JCC determined society. In early June, various Georgian authorities the introduction of the additional police units and travelled to South Ossetia to begin implementing the new checkpoints in the zone to be in contravention pledges. They concentrated on the zone of conflict of agreements and concluded that Georgia should and ultimately mainly in Georgian-populated villages. dismantle the extra checkpoints and refrain from Their efforts were unilateral, not co-ordinated with de establishing any not first agreed to by the JCC. The facto local authorities or the JCC. Georgian side agreed to withdraw immediately any new armed units from the zone of conflict. This As the security situation worsened in the zone of conflict withdrawal, however, did not begin for two and a during the summer, Tbilisi also offered shelter refuge to half months. In the interval, tensions between South women and children from the affected area, who were Ossetian and Georgian armed groups grew until relocated to various regions, including Borjomi, lmereti, they reached a crisis point in August, when the first Kakheti, and Ajara Both ethnic Ossetians and civilian deaths were recorded. Georgians were provided for according to Georgian officials. Few central government funds were allocated 2. Addressing grievance to support this. however, so district governments and Georgian firms covered many of the costs.F Tn parallel, Tbilisi's approach aimed to address the South Ossetian population's feelings of grievance 3. The South Ossetian reaction against their local authorities. Georgia embarked on a "humanitarian offensive" to assist ethnic Ossetians and Elites as well as common citizens reacted negatively Georgians. It realised that the Ergneti market's closure to Tbilisi's anti-smuggling drive and humanitarian would affect not only corrupt officials but also the overtures. Kokoity's response was to take a more livelihoods of common people who depended on petty hard-line position. On 11 June he said, "South Ossetia trafficking for survival. It bet that resentment would is cutting off aJJ relations with Tbilisi ··12~ and would tum against Tskhinvali!" and it could capitalise on communicate with Georgia only within the JCC. growing dissatisfaction with the Kokoity regime. Just as they had in Ajara, in order to facilitate popular mobilisation, Saaka.shvili's associates called on Tbilisi- 1":1 Civil Georgia. 24 May 2004; RFE/RL Newsline. 21 May 2004. Theresa Freese, "Yet Another Rose Revolution? Georgia's 'Two Brothers' Campaign in South Osscria", Central ii: Civil Georgia, 1 June 2004; Institute for War and Peace .. isia-Caucasus Analyst, 2 June 2004. Reporting (TWPR), 3 June 2004. 126 Within the context or the Second Rehabilitation Program 12·~ Crisis Group interview, Georgian ministry of security for South Ossetia, the European Commission financed the official. September 2004. reconstruction of the railway and the restoration of Tskhinvali i:.1 Partiamcruary Chairperson Nino Burjanadzc slated, train stanon "Particular groups. which have definite interests in smuggling, I'.! Crisis Group interview. Georgian minister for refugees and have lost a significant source of income. This in itself is reason intemaJJy displaced persons, August 2004. "UNHCR/WFP for such a severe reaction 10 the Georgian authorities' Joint Assessment Mission in Relation Lo the Relocation of activilies". She added t11at "in the near future we will manage Women and Children from South Ossctia", UNHCR Georgia, to restore friendly relations with the Ossetian people". Civil 20 August 2004. Georgia, 2 June 2004. 128 Intcrfax, 11 June 2004. GEO-OTP-0008-0632 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 20/44 EK PT Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia ]CG Europe Report N° 159, 26 November 2004 Page 13 Georgia had expected the Tskhinvali regime to weaken Humanitarian aid from Tbilisi was received with deep quickly after smuggling was curbed. In fact, Kokoity suspicion. EU Special Envoy Heikki Talvitie noted appeared to grow stronger between May and August. "they [authorities in South Ossctia] arc very much On 23 May 2004, parliamentary elections were afraid. They do not have much trust towards the organised in South Ossetia, and Unity, the pro• Georgi.an aid" .133 Residents felt Tbilisi was trying to presidential party, won two thirds of the sears!" This buy them cheeply.':" Georgians involved in the at least temporarily ended divisions between the process considered that the Ossetians "politicised the presidency and Parliament, which at times had been delivery of humanitarian aid" and described how local intense under Chibirov (especially in 1996 and I 999). poJice openly threatened any who accepted it. 35 An Georgian analysts nevertheless predicted that Kokoity ethnic Ossetian in Tskhinvali was arrested -- and could not remain in office for more than three to remains in detention -- for helping organise groups of six months, and that no more than 2 per cent of the youth to take part in sponsored summer trips to the population supported him.':" Some )l'GO Georgian seaside.!" representatives in Tskhinvali agree that before May only a minority of some 20 per cent was firmly By mid-June relations between ethnic Georgians committed to independence and behind Kokoity .131 and Ossetians living in villages on the outskirts of Tskhinvali had reached a low point. The anti• However, Georgia's sudden active engagement had a smuggling operation had a direct effect on the security boomerang effect. South Ossetians were won over environment, as the Georgian checkpoints and neither by the reduction of smuggling nor by the increasing numbers of armed men in the zone shattered humanitarian efforts. Closing the F.rgneti market hit at the peaceful environment and co-existence. Roth sides a main economic lifeline, and rather than blame felt insecure. Georgian villagers who previously sold Tskhinvali, many accused Tbilisi. The South Ossetian their produce at the Tskhinvali market feared to travel authorities portrayed the operation as a direct attack to the city.!" Tbilisi attempted to strengthen their on independence and security. By July a local poll security by opening a new road to the Georgian• found that 95 per cent of the population opposed populated Didi Liakhvi Gorge (from the Parara reestablishment of Georgian sovereignty, 96 per cent Liakhvi Gorge), bypassing Tskhinvali. While supported Kokoity, and 78 per cent would personally providing a new lifeline for civilians, this road also fight i+needed.:" had strategic value. Georgian villagers north of Tskhinvali, surrounded by Ossetians, were in a particularly precarious position. On 22 June, as South Ossetian militia trained, a bullet 129 allegedly fired from a training ground slightly 111c main opposition to Unity was the Comrrmnist Party, wounded a 70-year-old ethnic Georgian womsn.!" By which 111Uil the 2004 elections had a majority of seats and whose leader. Siamstav Kochiycv, was the Parliament early July the security situation had deteriorated speaker. TI1e parties shared the aim of bringing South Ossetia significantly, with gunfire exchanges in and around closer lo North Ossetia and Russia. Kosta Dzugayev. "South the villages of Nikozi, Prisi, Argvitsi and Tamarshcni. Osscua: President Builds Power Base", lWPR, 19 May 2004. The elections were not internationally recognised. Turnout was 22,407 of whom 24.7 per cent. voted for the Communist. Patty (four proportional seats), 54.G per cent for Unity (nine proportional seals) and 11.4 per cent for the National Youth Party (two proportional seats). Unity also won all fifteen contested single mandate seals. Four single mandate 133 Civil Georgia. 6 July 2004. constituencies reserved for the region's Georgian population u4 Crisis Group interview with de facto foreign minister of were not filled. See "Summary of the Results of the South Ossetia, August 2004. Parliamentary Elections in South Osscua", Rcgnum News 135 Crisis Group interview with former UNHCR sub• Agency, 28 June 2004, at llttp://regnum.m/news/269013.html. contractor, September 2004. 13t' Crisis Group interview, analyst. Georgian national 136 Caucasus Press reported on 19 August 2004 that Osselians security council August 2004. charged Alik Kozacv, 22, with high treason 1 ii Crisis Group interviews, Tskhinvali, August and u Crisis Group interview with de facto foreign minister of September 2004. South Ossetia, August 2004. Also in Theresa Freese, "With 13~ The poll was conducted amongst 800 respondents All Roads lo Tskllinvali Closed, Zone of conllict Residents between 21 and 26 July 2004 by the North Osscnan Centre Pray for Saakashvif and Peace", Central Asia-Caucasus for Social Research and was published in SevernayaOssetia, .. inalvst. 30 June 2004. 7 August 2004. rn c:ivil Georgia. 25 June 2004. GEO-OTP-0008-0633 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 21/44 EK PT Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia ]CG Europe Report N° 159, 26 November 2004 Page 14 B. THE START OF VIOLENT CONFLICT Georgian Defence Minister Giorgi Bararnidze and the chief of the Russian General Staff, Yuri Baluyevskiy, In June and July 2004, Tbilisi accused Russia of reached an accord in Moscow on withdrawing from supplying weapons to the South Ossetians. On l l the zone of conflict all armed groups except for June, State Minister for Conflict Resolution Goga peacekeepers. A ceasefire between the Georgian and Khaindrava said 160-170 trucks loaded with weapons Ossetian sides on 13 August was quickly violated by entered the territory via North Ossetia.!" In a surprise a new exchange of gun and mortar fire. A second move on 7 July, Georgian interior ministry forces agreement, signed on 18 August by the JCC co-chairs seized two trucks belonging to Russian peacekeepers and Georgian Prime Minister Zhvania, took hold only loaded with 300 unguided missiles for helicopters. 11'1 after several peacekeepers were killed on 18-19 The Russian foreign and defence ministries August and Georgian troops took three strategic condemned this, slating that a 2 June JCC Agreement heights over a road linking the Georgian villages of authorised the resupply shiprnent.!" and the next day Patara and Didi Liakhvi Gorges during the early South Ossetian authorities appeared to retaliate, for hours of 19 August 4<; The death toll in July-August the first time openly taking offensive action against was seventeen Georgians.!" five Ossetians.!" Tbilisi forces by detaining some 50 troops in police uniforms in the Georgian-populated village of Vanati After the 19 August operation, Georgia returned inside the South Ossetian zone of conflict.'? Most control of the hills to the JPKF and started pulling were released the following day, but only after having back, eventually removing ministry of interior troops been filmed kneeling at gunpoint in a Tskhinvali from South Ossetia and filling its peacekeeper quota square.l'" On 20 July tensions flared again as Georgia from the ministry of defence. H!I Several members of accused Russia of bringing non-approved hardware Georgia's security and defence community admitted into South Ossetia, the withdrawal was because, "at this stage it is impossible for Georgia to restore its territorial The conflict had in effect reverted to a state of war, integrity militarily"."? It lacked the resources to with exchanges of gun and 11101tar fire between engage in months of combat While Tskhinvali villages in the zone of conflict. Such exchanges were could have been seized in a two or three-day reported between Tamarashcni and Tskhinvali on 28, operation, to secure the northern Java district would 29 and 30 July. and 1 August.'?' On 4 August the have taken months. Ultimately, even if Georgian chairman of the Russian Duma's Conunittee for the forces had been successful, the country risked years Affairs of the Commonwealth of Independent States of guerrilla warfare and losing much international (CIS), Andrei Kokoshin, escaped uninjured from a support and credibility."! crossfire. On 10 August, gunfire was reponed between Eredvi, Prisi, Sarabuk, Dmenis and the The remilirarisarion of the zone of conflict reversed a northern outskirts of Tskhinvali. As usual, each side decade of progress. A Georgian analyst estimated accused the other of starting the violence. there were 1,650 to 2,000 South Ossetian troops in and around the zone of conflict from the ministries of The first civilians were killed during the night of 11- defence and security and police special forces 'J 2 August, Georgian governmental sources reported (OMON), and up to a further 1,000 Russian three dead, to which South Ossetian spokespersons mercenaries who began entering the region in mid• added 28 wounded and hundreds of houses June. By the end of August the number of destroyed.!" The incidents happened soon after the 139 14<' OSCE monitored the situation and found no evidence of · Seven G corgi. an peace k ccpcrs were k·1il led and seven additional arms in the region, Civil Georgia, 15 June 2004. wounded during the night of 18-19 August. Caucasus Press, 1'K' "Georgia Seizes Russian Arms Convoy in South Ossctia". l 9 August 2004. Civil Georgia, 7 July 2004. 147 Crisis Group interview, governor of Shiela Kartli, 111 This seizure also led to a war of words between the September 2004. Georgian interior ministry and the Georgian slate minister 118 Crisis Group interview with de facto foreign minister of for contlicts resolution issues, Goga Khaindrava. South Ossctia, August 2004. M• The U.S. and the OSCE condemned the detentions. H) I nc I u di ng nu· 1·itary trame. d un d er t he U .. S Tram. and Equip . 14-~ The images were widely broadcast and were seen in Program (GIBP) for Georgia. see below. Georgia as a direct affront to national pride and honour. 15'1 Crisis Group interviews with senior analysts, Georgian 1~ Civil Georgia. 28 July 2004. defence and security ministries, August 2004. 11' Caucasus Press, 12 August 2004. 1'1 Ibid. GEO-OTP-0008-0634 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 22/44 EK PT Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia ]CG Europe Report N° 159, 26 November 2004 Page 15 mercenaries had decreased significantly.l'? The South the zone of conflict, there were night-time shootings Ossetians considered that the Georgians had up to and mutual accusations by Tbilisi and Tskhinvali 3,000 men within or in close proximity to the zone of about who shot first but no further casualties. conflict. 153 Georgian officials and some international observers have alleged that Georgian villages are being targeted,':" potentially with the aim of forcing their C. THF. UNEASY TRUCE inhabitants to leave, thus ethically cleansing villages along the Transcaucasian highway.l" In October, As the situation on the ground worsened during the residents of the Georgian villages twice blocked that May-July 2004 period, the conflict prevention highway in protest of the shootings. Recent mechanisms including the JCC and the JPKF broke developments are following a pattern similar to the down. June JCC meetings were repeatedly summer events, and several observers predict that the postponed when first the South Ossetians, then the sporadic night-time exchanges will soon trigger larger Georgians boycotted. Dialogue between them did clashes between Georgian and South Ossetian not resume within the JCC until a meeting in forces?" Moscow on 14 July. Tbilisi requested the right to set up a checkpoint at the Roki Pass linking South As winter approaches, the economic situation in and Ossetia with Russia and the withdrawal of militia around South Ossetia is deteriorating. Popular from the Java district. The Russians and South discontent among those in South Osseria, both Ossetians insisted that Georgia withdraw what they Georgians and Ossetians, is increasing. In mid said were 3,000 extra troops from the zone of October, an "Appeal of the population of the conflict and dismantle the sixteen checkpoints it had Tskhinvali region to the Georgian authorities" was established since June.':" ln July and August the published in the Georgian press, with over 70 JPKF was unable to carry out its peacekeeping signatories complaining about the Ergneti market mandate. According to an OSCE official, the three closure: "we understand that the Ergneti market's battalions were no longer operating jointly, "the closure was a serious and essential step to combat JPKF was totally not functioning ... we had cases of smuggling, but we consider that you should have one battalion firing at another" .155 thought of those who knew nothing of smuggling and remain unemployed now" .11.:i: Some observers However in the crucial mid-August week the JCC claim that although Ergneti is closed, smuggling played an essential role, bringing the sides together continues in smaller quantities and along different and facilitating the ceasefire agreement. Between 12 routes. 161 Other reports suggest that the Georgian and and 18 AU!,,11.JSt the JCC was "in near permanent Ossetian populations of the Tskhinvali region session.t" The four participants agreed on the need suffered equally from the market closure, and to demilitarise the zone of conflict and were Georgians in South Ossetia feel forgotten by represented at a high enough level to ensure Tbilisi.11;2 The bypass road -- a lifeline for Georgians implementation. Since then the situation on the ground has remained 157 Georgian Defence Minister Giorgi Baramidzc quoted in tense. After the withdrawal of Georgian troops from Liz Fuler, "Renewed Shooting in South Ossetia", RFE/RL, 27 October 2004. Also information from international organisation representative. October 2004. 1 ·'H The displacements arc most likely to have a strategic aim 1 ~'.! Crisis Group interview with senior analyst Georgian and to target Georgian villages along the Transcaucasian defence ministry. September 2004. In North Ossctia, highway (Tamarashcni, Kuna, Kckhvi) linking Tskhinvali lo government sources admitted that armed persons travelled Java. from there to the South but said they never entered the zone 1·'9 Giorgi Sepashvili, "Fears Increase Over Fresh Fighting in or conflict and were successfully pressured to leave. Crisis South Ossctia", Civil Georgia. 26 October 2004. Also Group interview with North Ossetian governmental official, information from international organisation representative, October 2004. October 2004. and iruernaiional political analyst. October 153 Crisis Group mtcrvicw with official of de racro 2004. government. or South Ossctia., Tskhinvali. August. 2004. 161; "Appeal or the Tskhinvali Region to the Authorities of 15•1 "Russia Calls on Georgia to Pullout Extra Troops from Georgia", The Georgian Times, 14-2 I October 2004, p. 4. South Ossetia", Civil Georgia, 13 July 2004. 161 David Devidze. "Ergreti Market Died . .. Smuggling"!". 155 Crisis Group interview with OSCE official, Tbilisi, Kviris Palitra, 25-1 I October 2004, pp. 5-(1. August 2004. 162 Levan Javakhishvili, "Population Threaten to Leave 156 Ibid. Samachablo", Alia, 2-4 October 2004. p. 2. GEO-OTP-0008-0635 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 23/44 EK PT Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia ]CG Europe Report N° 159, 26 November 2004 Page 16 unable to drive through Tskhinvali -- may soon be INTER OR INTRA-STATE closed by weather. South Ossetians say their salaries CONFLICT? have not been paid for two or three months. Harvests have been poor, and field commanders, unsatisfied with Kokoity's approach, are beginning to think of The conflict was initially portrayed as an internal affair taking more radical anti-Georgian rneasures.!" by Georgian officials, as Tbilisi increased its armed presence and overall engagement in South Ossetia to carry out the anti-smuggling operation that c1osed the Ergneti Market. However, by mid-summer 2004, the Saakashvili administration began to emphasise wider causes. The president elevated the dispute to an inter• state level, depicting it as one between Georgia and Russia. At an 11 July rally he said, "crisis in South Ossetia is not a problem between Georgians and Ossetians. This is a problem between Georgia and Russia. "16'1 Once the conflict was perceived as international, Thilisi turned to its external partners in the hope they would put pressure on Russia In particular, efforts were made to increase the role and presence of the OSCE inside the zone of conflict and beyond. A. GEORGIAN ALLEGATIONS ON RUSSIA'S ROLE The Georgian government considers Russia an active participant in the conflict. More specifically it accused Russia of providing armoured personnel carriers, tanks, other military equipment, fuel, and training by Russian army officers. Most of the equipment was allegedly brought through the Roki tunnel linking North and South Ossetia, Georgia also accuses Russia of allowing up to 1,000 Russian mercenaries -- many of them Cossacks -- to fight on the South Osserian side.'?' General Svyatoslav Nabdzorov, a former JPKF commander, was accused of personally siding with the South Ossetians and saying he could not see a Russian-Georgian border in South Ossetia. A source within the ministry of security told Crisis Group the Ossetian battaJion of the JPKF had given weapons to the South Ossetian OMON forces and also fired at Georgian positions.':" Georgia often accuses Russia of double standards on secessionist regions. Shortly after the September 2004 Beslan massacre, Russia closed the border with 164 "Saakashvili: Russia to Blame for South Ossctia Crisis", Eurasia Insight, I 2 July 2004. 165 Crisis Group interview. senior analyst, Georgian defence ministry, September 2004. 1 1 M Crisis Group interview with international organisation <><• Crisis Group interview with official Georgian security representative. October 2004. ministry September 2004 GEO-OTP-0008-0636 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 24/44 EK PT Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia ]CG Europe Report N° 159, 26 November 2004 Page 17 Georgia at the Larsi checkpoint'" as an anti-terrorist B. THE VIEW FROM RUSSIA measure but kept the Roki tunnel open, implying it did not consider the tunnel crossing an international Russia is a co-signatory to the Sochi Agreement of border. The Larsi closure increased traffic of goods 1992, which established a ceasefire, and has played and people via South Ossetia and put pressure on an active role in the JCC and JPKF. It considers itself Georgia to let them through.:" While Russia has a a guarantor of stability in the zone of conflict and that visa regime with Georgia, South Ossetians have a it has helped mediate between Georgian and South considerably simplified entry procedure. Ossetia, It has shouldered the costs of caring for Ossetian refugees displaced from Georgia to Russia. Georgian authorities are particularly critical that Within South Ossetia itself: it has provided financial several senior South Ossetian officials are Russian and humanitarian assistance. According to a Russian citizens with close ties to Moscow. Kokoity, though diplomatic source, this aid fit within a 2000 bilateral originally from South Ossetia, is a Russian citizen and aureement with Georgia on "Economic rehabilitation lived there from l 997 to 2000.16~ At the end of May a~d Refugee Return in the Georgian-Ossetian Zone of 2004 South Ossetia appointed as its new de facto conflict". Russia accuses Georgia of never having minister of security Majorbek Bishikuyev, who fulfilled its part of the agreement to contribute funds previously was deputy head of security in :'-Jorth to South Ossetia's economic development!" Ossetia Anatoli Barankevich, though born in Tskhinvali, was a colonel in the Russian army when Over the summer the Russians called on the Kokoity appointed him de facto defence minister on 20 Georgian government to act "with prudence" and September 2004. These officials a.re considered to have commit to confidence building -- withdrawing illegal regular and close contacts inside the Russian armed groups, promoting economic development, government. Kokoity himself has travelled to Moscow engaging in humanitarian and cultural activities -• for consultations at least monthly since May 2004. befo~ seeking a final political settlement. 173 According to opinion polls, approximately 50 per Though Russia has supported South Ossetia, it has cent of Russians believe Russia should remain not met its main demand: integration into the neutral in the conflict, 14 per cent argue it should Russian Federation. Senior Russian diplomats in take South Ossetia's side and 5 per cent want it to aid Tbilisi told Crisis Group this was unlikely to Georgia regain its territorial integrity .174 Tn mid-2004 happen.'?" ln June 2004 Russia's Constitutional Russia began to emphasise a new reason for concern Court responded to an inquiry about the legality of over developments in the zone of conflict, namely an such a move by stating that discussions on South obligation to protect the large number of Ossetians Ossetia, a region belonging to a foreign state, must who had become Russian citizens. In July the be held, with Georgia and at Georgia's initiative.'?' foreign ministry stated, "Russia is concerned over the fate of the Russian citizens who comprise the overwhelming majority of the South Ossetian populauon"?" 011 8 August 425 members of the Duma harshly criticised Georgia and said that due to 167 Larsi, the land checkpoint with Russia controlled by the Georgian authorities, is on the Russian military highway. the presence of Russian citizens in South Ossetia, 1~ Ci11j/ Georgia, 21 September 2004. According to Georgian "there appear to be circumstances that infringe upon customs information, Ute country lost 3 lo 4 million GEL Russian· soverei·g nty. nl76 ($1.57 to $2. Io million) for twenty days when the border was closed. Khutsidze Nino, "Georgia's Visa, Border Burden with Russia", Civil Georgia, 23 September 2004. im Eduard Djabccvich Kokoity was born on 11 October 1964 in Tskhinvali, where he graduated from the Pedagogic 172 Cris.is Group interview with Russian diplomat, Tbilisi, Institute in l 987. During the Gcorgian-Ossctian conflict he is September 2004. alleged to have established and led an armed detachment and 113 Crisis Group interview with Russian diplomat Tbilisi, lo have created a charity sports fund. "Yunost". He was September 2004. 1 elected to the South Ossctian Parliament in l 993 and '·1 "Poll Savs Russians Advocate Neutrality in Conflict Over appointed trade representative of South Ossctia to Russia in South Ossetia". RFE/RL, .10 July 2004. 1997. He worked in that capacity urril 2000. n Press Release Ministrv of Foreign Affairs of the Russian 17<1 Crisis Group iraerview with Russian diplomatic source. Federation, 30 Juiy 2004; Speech of the Russian representative September 2004. to Ilic OSCE Permanent Council, 10 July 2004. 1 1 "S. Ossetia's joining to Russia Impossible -- Russian 1 1<• "Russian Parliamentarians Adopt Statement on South Constitutional Court". Caucasus Press. 8 June 2004. Ossctia," Caucasus Press, 8 May 2004. GEO-OTP-0008-0637 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 25/44 EK PT Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia ]CG Europe Report N° 159, 26 November 2004 Page 18 Russia reinforced its links with South Ossetians by C. UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT giving financial aid and developing economic ties. Russia pays pensions to South Ossctians with Russian As Georgia increasingly began to perceive the citizenship, at least 660 Russian roubles per month conflict as a confrontation with Moscow, President (some $23).n Substantial humanitarian aid was sent Saakashvili turned to the US. Secretary of State to South Ossetia in 2004. In early October, for Colin Powell and National Security Adviser example, the Moscow Municipality reportedly Condoleezza Rice for support."? Powell responded delivered 700 tons of Grid in 22 train carriages.!" Ties positively and spoke twice during the second week are further strengthened by South Ossetia's use of of July 2004 with Russian foreign Minister Sergei roubles, car licence plates resembling Russian ones, Lavrov about South Ossetia.!" 4-5 August 179 On and harmonisation of legislation. Russian Saakashvili went to Washington to meet with senior companies, such as Megaphone (mobile telephones) Bush administration officials, including Powell, are active in the region. Rice, and Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfcld, to gain further help. His goal was dearly to put South During Summer 2004, the standing of President Saakashvili and his administration reached a low point Ossetia on the US.-Russia agenda and possibly to in Russia. The popular feeling was that he was quick pull the US. into the negotiation process. However, to criticise others -- especially Russia -- but slow to Powell reportedly strongly warned Saakashvili define a long term strategy for resolving Georgia's against further escalation and said if Georgia fought internal problems.':" A North Ossetian official with Russia, it would be on its own.!" expressed a. popular feeling when he asked, "will Washington has played no direct role in the conflict, Georgia always have a revolutionary government? We though Georgia has sent troops trained and equipped need a stable and normal government that fo110V\'S by the US. into the zone of conflict. li ti<'1 "Powell. Saakashvili Discussed South Osscua", Civil Georgia, I 0 July 2004. m "Powell, Lavrov Discuss South Ossetia Again". Civil Georgia, I I July 2004. ix<. Crisis Group e-mail correspondence, Washington D.C.• 177 Crisis Group interview with official of de facto based political analyst September 2004. government of South Ossetia, August 2004. Oilier sources 187 According lo the Georgian defence ministry, GlEP• suggest that the real figure is higher, $I 00-$400. Crisis trained units sent to South Osscua include the I 1 '1o Group interview with former official of de facto government Mechanised Brigade (light infantry battalion "Commando"). of South Ossctia, May 2004. 1l(8 This includes four light infantry battalions and one 178 "Moscow Transfers 700 Tons of Humanitarian Aid to mechanised army company, gcorgia.uscmbassy.gov/rclcascs/ South Ossetia". Regnum News Agency. 18:37 l October release 20040424.gemvald.html The program cost $64 million 2004. at httpJ/www.rcgnum.ni/allncws/.1]4753.html. and lasted 21 months. 179 Crisis Group interview with official of de facto 189 www.eucorn. mi1/Di rectorates/Ef'P Ali ndex, htm?http:// government of SouU1 Ossetia, August 2004. www.eucont.mil/direclorales/ecpa/opeiations/glep/e.tiglisllpr 18<' Crisis Group interviews with Russian polilical analysts, oducts/fact_ shcct6.htm&2. The GTt::P was completed in Moscow. 2004. April 2004. and there arc no plans for a follow on. Jn January 181 Crisis Group interview with North Ossetian governmental 2004, however, the U.S. provided some $3 million to pay the official. October 2004. salaries of staff trained under the GIBP for five and a half 182 Crisis Group interview with Russian diplomat, Tbilisi , months. Crisis Group interview, U.S. embassy in Georgia, September 2004. 2004. See also, georgia.usembassy .gov/releases/release 183 Ibid. 20040112.hlml. GEO-OTP-0008-0638 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 26/44 EK PT Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia ]CG Europe Report N° 159, 26 November 2004 Page 19 in the conflict. According to russian Embassy staff in In July and August 2004, Georgia increasingly looked Georgia. the U.S. pledged that GTEP troops would to the OSCE as it sought an inter-governmental not be used to resolve conflicts in South Ossctia or platform from which to express its grievances. Foreign Abkhazia.':" U.S. Embassy personnel deny this, Minister Zurabishvili made a special presentation to saying that there was only an oral agreement under the OSCE Permanent Council on 29 July, calling for a Shevardnadze that troops would not be sent to greater monitoring presence, in particular at the Rola Abkhazia. They suggested GTEP-trained forces were tunnel and in the Java district. Georgia also requested in South Ossetia because they are "Georgia's very best the OSCE to convene a conference, at presidential or trained troops". 191 Some US. poJitical analysts also prime ministerial level, on settlement of the conflict."? say the Georgian government made conunitments not Russia termed the request for more OSCE observers to use GTEP-trained forces in domestic political and their deployment on the border with Russia at the disputes, including South Ossetia and Abkhazia.l'" Roki tunnel "deliberately unrealistic"!" Noneiheless, the mission is mandated to operate on the whole Nevertheless, by September 2004 the U.S. position territory of South Ossetia.!" appeared largely to coincide with statements coming from Moscow and other European capitals. As the situation deteriorated on the ground, the OSCE According to a U.S. diplomat, "we are advising became increasingly engaged in attempts to reduce caution and restraint on both sides, to the Georgians tensions. The Bulgarian Chairmanship-in-Office and -- we are not speaking to the South Ossetians -• (CiO) sent former President Zhelyu Zhelev as a to the Russians'"!" However, US. embassy staff Special Representative to Georgia on 27 July. On 30 say, "Russia is not playing as big a role as Georgia July the CiO called for implementation of 2 June and would like to think".'?' The U.S. supports a "step by J 5 July JCC agreements, withdrawal of all step" approach to resolve the conflict, including an paramilitary and police personnel "not required", a increase of OSCE staff in South Ossetia, but JCC meeting, and a technical expert group meeting in considers international or Georgian monitoring at Tskhinvali.P" On 6 August the OSCE Permanent the Roki tunnel unlikely in the near future."? Council agreed to increase military observers in South Ossetia from four to six. Twenty diplomats from OSCE delegations in Vienna visited Georgia from 5 D. Tm:OSCE to 9 September. Zhelev reminded the parties that "the OSCE has an important role to play both in restoring The OSCB has been involved in the conflict since confidence and increasing stability ... as well as in 1992 when it set up a mission to encourage dialogue facilitating the political process aimed at a and identify and eliminate sources of tension. In comprehensive settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian March J 994, this mandate was extended to conflict"." The CiO offered to organise high-level monitoring the JPKF. The mandate now includes political negotiations in Sofia in October.?" facilitating creation of a broad political framework for a lasting political resolution; encourage active dialogue through roundtable discussions; and playing E. THE EUROPEAN UNION an active role in the JCC.1 '·"' While generally low profile over the past decade, the mission also has The European Commission (EC) of the European facilitated implementation of confidence building Union (EU) has been engaged in the conflict since measures and programs, including small projects with NGO leaders, youth, women, and journalists. 197 "OSCE proposes to open 'field offices' in Zone of conflicts", Caucasus Press, 30 July 2004. 1 i •xi Crisis Group interviews with Russian diplomat, Tbilisi. "H "Moscow Dismisses Georgian Call for Bigger OSCE August and September 2004. Role in South Ossctia", liar Tass. JI July 2004. Also. Crisis 191 Crisis Group interview with U.S. diplomat Tbilisi, Group interview with Russian diplomat, Tbilisi, August August 2004. 2004. 199 l7-2 Crisis Group e-mail correspondence. Washington U.C.• Crisis Group interview with OSCE official, October based political analyst. September 2004. 2004. 1~ Crisis Group interview with U.S. diplomat, Tbilisi, zoo OSCE Press Release, 30 July 2004. September 2004. 2 GEO-OTP-0008-0639 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 27/44 EK PT Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia ]CG Europe Report N° 159, 26 November 2004 Page 20 J 997 when it made a first grant of 3. 5 million ECU203 where to set up instruments of customs collection and to support rehabilitation in the zone of conflict 204 control. As a state-level issue, a customs project could These funds were used to finance infrastructure and not so easily bring communities together around economic rehabilitation, with special emphasis on shared interests or mutually beneficial actions. The projects that bridged the two communities. Under a decision to return to conununity rehabilitationprojects second allocation of €1.5 million the EC proposed to could be seen as a step backwards, but also one more reactivate economic links between South Ossetia and likely to promote confidence building if the projects Georgia proper. The projects included rehabilitation are selected with a view to creating infrastructure that of the Gori-Tskhinvali railroad link, the Tskhinvali establishes new dependencies and links between railroad station, and the gas network in Tskhinvali. In Ossetian and Georgian communities."? 2003 a third €2. 5 million rehabilitation program was initiated. Originally the funds were earmarked for I11e EU has also adopted a Joint Action under its starting a joint Georgian/South Ossetian customs Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), a grant collection mechanism and rehabilitating the main of €210,000 to the OSCE Mission to finance the JCC north-south road?" When the two sides could not -- in particular its office and travel costs."! agree on the location of the customs point, the furthermore in 2002 the EU also supported the program was changed to provide more general shelter special centre, which seeks to coordinate Georgian and infrastructure rehabilitation support, especially and South Ossetian law enforcement in the zone of for the refugee return process in South Ossctia.f" The conflicr.i" The EU Special Representative for the latest rehabilitation program was signed in January South Caucasus, Heikki Talvirie, travelled to Georgia 2004 but implementationh as yet to begin.?" and South Ossetia in August 2004 at the height of the recent troubles and repeatedly thereafter.T The EU programs initialJy provided opportunities for European Parliament has not been very active but Ossetians and Georgians to work together on concrete passed a resolution on 14 October 2004 "deploring projects that created links between communities and the recent outbreaks of violence in the region of South required the parties to devise common solutions.f" On Ossetia ... [and] expressling] its full support for the a local level there were examples of Georgian sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia" .214 contractors working in Tskhinvali and Ossetian villages.P" Such community-level infrastructure projects had the potential to build confidence and trust, F. THEWARNOBODYWANTED However, this contribution was lost once the projects became politicised around the questions of how and By portraying the conflict as international, Saakashvili upped the stakes. He bet he would find a sympathetic ear in the EU and L.S., which would recognise the alleged contradiction between Russia's ~m The ECU was the conunon unit of account that preceded policies in the North Caucasus, where it resists real the EU's common currency, the Euro. '.!1'4 Since 2001 the EU has participated in all JCC plenary autonomy for Chechnya, and the South Caucasus, sessions and has been present on the working group for where it supports secession in South Ossetia and economic issues . Abkhazia.?" According to this analysis, Russia's ._, i.' UN OCHA Briefing Note, "South Ossetia'', December main interest in the latter is to maintain low-level 2002. '.!!Yi "Protocol on the implementation of the third EC funded rchabiliration program in the zone of Georgtan-Osscuan conflict". The program is divided into three parts. Part l: 211' The decision to implement projects aimed at assisting €800.000 for basic shchcr assistance and repatriation kits for reiuming refugees was also somewhat unusual considering U1e refugees (UNHCR). Part 2: fl ,J00,000 euro for rehabilitation drastic reduction of numbers of refugees returning to South of basic intrastrucrure in support of permanent residents Ossetia after 2000. (UNDP). Pan .1: €400,000 for rehabilitation of basic 211 CFSP Action Profile, "South Ossctia Georgia -- Conflict infrastructure in places of refugee repatriation (UNDP). Settlement Process (JCC) 2003", Joint Action 2001/75()/CFSP ZIT! In April 2004 it was agreed lo create a Steering Committee [OJ L 286 of 30.10.2001. p.4] al http://europa.eu.int/conun/ but due to the rapid decline in the security situation after May, c:- GEO-OTP-0008-0640 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 28/44 EK PT Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia ]CG Europe Report N° 159, 26 November 2004 Page 21 conflict and perpetual instability so as to justify a Caucasus. Dy portraying the conflict as they did, continued military presence and undermine Western however, Georgian policymakers limited the range attempts to gain a stronger foothold.?" of their options. Within the Georgian government the feeling persisted in late 2004 that there was little Saakashvili's argument was well received among it could do until and unless Russia was persuaded to many Western analysts and policy circles. Editorials back off South Ossetia, a measure they continued to warned of Russia's "post-imperial determination to believe a high-level international conference might dominate the small nations to its south, notably provide the forum for.221 Until that happens, Tbilisi Georgia", and its "creeping annexation" of South appears not to see much value in defining its own Ossetia and Abkhazia,"? and described a South approach to Tskhinvali.i" Ossetia "under the control of Russian security services [sic] in a familiar symbiosis with organised crime networks" .~18 They urged international organisations and Western states to play a more active role, to openly criticise Russian intervention and encourage President Putin to stop supporting separatist regimes. ~19 Ultimately however. U.S. and EU decision-makers were reluctant to become engaged in a conflict whose outcome they were unsure of, and which would put them at odds with Russia Neither Washington nor Brussels openly chastised Moscow, and by September a consensus seemed to have formed with Moscow against use of force in South Ossetia, It appears that rather than gaining Western support, the opposite occurred, and Saakashvili was warned not to enflame passions in the Caucasus.?" Had Saakashvili continued to define the South Ossetia conflict as an internal affair, primarily an anti-smuggling operation, he might in fact have obtained greater international support. Brussels and Washington could more easily have given full backing to a Georgian administration intent on establishing the rule of law, stamping out smuggling, and promoting democratic change in South Ossetia than to an effort to push Russia back from the South 216 S. Comell, R. McDennotl, W. O'Malley. V. Socor, S.F. Starr, "Regional Security in the South Caucasus: TI1c Role or NATD" ,. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Jolm Hopkins University, 2004, at lutp://www.silkroadstudics.01~/docs/ publications/2004/nato.pdf. :n Lord Wallace. "A Contradictory Line on the Caucasus". Financial Times, 6 September 2004. ~18 Vladimir Socor, "On the Ground in Abkhazia and South Ossetia'', The Wall Street Journal Europe.s September 2004. 219 Sec Wallace and Socor, op. ciL Also, "A Matter or Russian Honour" and "The Hazards or a Long, hard Freeze". The Economist, 21August2004. ~2<1 A few weeks later, when EU Special Representative for ~~1 Crisis Group interview. analyst, Georgian national security the South Caucasus Hcikki Talvitic travcncd to the region, a council, September 2004. similar message was conveyed. Crisis Group interview with ~"" Crisis Group interview, official. office of the prime EU of.licial, August 2004. minister of Georgia, September 2004. GEO-OTP-0008-0641 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 29/44 EK PT Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia ]CG Europe Report N° 159, 26 November 2004 Page 22 V. OPTIONS FOR CONFLICT Russian/Georgian custom officials, and/or ALLEVIATION AND PREVENTION international monitors to ensure that smuggled goods and weapons no longer transit. Tbilisi also seeks more OSCE monitoring?" and to restart talks on the South Georgia, South Ossetia and their international Ossetia's status as soon as possible.i" partners are considering a range of policy and program options to alleviate and eventually resolve The Osserians, on the other hand, are calling for the conflict. None of these will succeed quickly but Georgia to fulfil commitments made at previous they may eventually provide the foundation for JCC meetings, including removal of unauthorised sustainable peace. checkpoints and withdrawal of extra troops in the zone of conflict. They accuse the Georgians of Georgian authorities have recently made statements retaining some 2,000 police and soldiers in the suggesting they understand the approach they Georgian-populated villages. 2~7 Apparently against followed from May to August 2004 was dangerous. the spirit of demilitarisation, on 9 November the In his speech to the UN General Assembly, President Georgian defence ministry set up a training ground Saakashvili called for implementation of a new "stage for reserve forces in the zone of conflicr.?" by stage settlement plan". Returning to his December 2003 approach, he said, "I believe that the most A. STRENGTHENING SECURITY AND effecri ve mechanism for establishing Georgia's long CONFJDENCE-BUil.DJNG term continuity and wholeness is the creation of a strong economy ... [in which] those who arc not yet sure if they want to remain outside Georgia will be All sides in the conflict agree demilitarisation is given real incentives a:nd chances to benefit from a needed. However, the parties are in disagreement over whether demilitarisation applies only to the zone of prosperous, tolerant and successful Georgian state".22~ conflict as defined in 1992, that is, the fifteen km. In order to move the negotiation process forward, radius around Tskhinvali, as the Ossetians prefer, or all sides should build upon existing agreements the entire territory of South Ossetia, including the signed within the JCC framework. In addition, Java district, as Georgia insists. Demilitarisation Georgia could take unilateral steps to strengthen should have occurred soon after the Sochi Agreement Ossetian confidence and trust. Greater international was signed in ·1992 but never did. Georgia argues political and financial commitment to the process there should be no armed formations in South Ossetia, will also be required if the peace is to hold and other than JPKF troops and local police. State negotiations move forward. Minister for Conflict Resolution Khaindrava insists that "all the armament possessed by the South On 5 November 2004, a meeting between de facto Ossetian side should be stored in a single location at President Kokoity and Georgian Prime Minister the base of the Russian peacekeeping forces under Zhvania occurred in Sochi, a. significant step forward OSCE monitoring". The Georgian government claims in the negotiation process. They agreed to demilitarise that, "the very existence of the so-called defence the zone of conflict by 20 November, a date that has, ministry of South Ossetia completely contradicts all however, slipped. The Georgian side proposed a the documents that have been signed".::~ plan consisting of: ceasefire implementation, full demilitarisation and increasing monitoring of the Ossetian officials consider they are entitled to defence Roki tunnel. Since exchanges of fire have continued, and security structures, as long as they are based with Georgian villages targeted, Tbilisi considers a outside the original zone of conflict. A North Ossetian complete ceasefire a priority.?" Eventually it wants full demilitarisation not only of the zone of conflict, 225 but also of all South Ossetia At the Roki tunnel, there Crisis Group interview. foreign minister of Georgia. should be "transparency", with JPKF, joint October 2004. zze "Saakashvili: Talks on South Ossetia Cannot Drag on Forever", Civil Georgia. 21 October 2004. ~'.! "Tskhinvali Protests Presence of Georgia's Extra Troops". 2~ "President Mikhail Saakashvili's Speech at the 59~' Civil Georgia, I 0 November 2004. Session of tile UN General Assembly, 21 September 2004". ~~8 "Tskhinvali Deploys Reserve Forces Battalion Near Civil Georgia, 22 September 2004. Tskhinvali'', Civil Georgia, 9 November 2004. '.!24 "Zhvania: Disarmament to Top High-Level South Ossetia ~'.!Y "Georgian PM Outlines Three-Point Plan for South Talks". Civil Georgia. 21 October 2004. Ossctia", Imcdi TV. BBC Monitoring, 5 August 2004. GEO-OTP-0008-0642 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 30/44 EK PT Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia ]CG Europe Report N° 159, 26 November 2004 Page 23 official explained, "we cannot talk about the full sec but it could also apply lessons it has learned from demilitarisation of South Ossetia. For Tskhinvali it is its police operations in other countries, for example in impossible. The necessary trust between the two sides Bosnia-Herzegovina To enhance SCC operational does not exist for this to happen the near future. For effectiveness the OSCE has already facilitated the authorities in South Ossetia this is a question of consultations between the Georgian and Ossetian their political survival"."? Even in 2000, when sides, the OSCE Strategic Police Matters Unit progress on confidence building was being made, the (SPMU) and the OSCE Kosovo Police Service Ossetians demanded security guarantees before they School. 2~5 This complements the OSCE small arms would consider full demilitarisation.?" and ammunition collection program started in 2000. However, as events in 2004 revealed, cooperation Georgia argues that the JPKF should operate in all between law enforcement personnel, including against districts to support demilitarisation, and the OSCE smuggling, is crucial to maintenance of the peace. The should in Lum be able lo carry out its monitoring conflict is as likely to involve opposing police forces mandate throughout South Ossetia. While Protocol as armies. Thus, there is a need to synchronise South Three of the So chi Agreement appears to give the Ossetian and Georgian law enforcement strategies and JPKF a mandate to work in all districts and villages modes of operation. of South Ossetia, it has not done so for many years, restricting its operations to a smaller territory. Georgian authorities have expressed deep dissatisfaction with the JPKF and called for the "internationalisation 1. Law enforcement and peacekeeping of the peacekeeping force". Th.is could mean a new peacekeeping operation entirely, or more modestly Since 1992, when the JPKF was created with both law the deployment of additional contingents from enforcement and peacekeeping mandates, the parties different countries to work with the present three have recognised the importance of addressing crime in JPKF battalions. While Georgia could envisage a the zone of conflict.+? At the 23 July 1999 meeting, NATO, EU or OSCI:.': operation.f" the three other having noted that "crimes and incidents taking place parties categorically reject this, and it has no backing [there] did not have an ethnic character", the JCC from NATO or EU member stares. For the time being, created a Special Coordination Centre (SCC).233 It was therefore, attempts to change the composition of the to coordinate law enforcement efforts to prevent and JPKF are unlikely to succeed. suppress illegal activity in the zone of conflict; organise disarmament activities; and elaborate and 2. Addressing the civilian dimension of security implement joint programs against organised crime, including smuggling, drug dealing and car tbeft.::3'1 Sununer 2004 developments undermined any fragile feelings of trust and confidence that existed between The El J and the OSCE support the SCC, hut they Georgians and South Ossetians, After 1992, face-to• could do more in this field. In February 2002 the EU face encounters were possible but they did not develop donated communication equipment and vehicles to the a strong sense of common interests. South Ossetians in particular cultivated a victim complex. Few Ossetian youths had the chance to travel to Georgia, and they ·~:i GEO-OTP-0008-0643 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 31/44 EK PT Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia ]CG Europe Report N° 159, 26 November 2004 Page 24 from wartime atrocities. In the 1996 "Memorandum this is needed, notably more Russian language places on Measures to Ensure Security and Reinforce in Georgian universities. Mutual Confidence", the parties to the conflict agreed to create the necessary conditions to investigate war Currently village and town authorities are not crimes and bring the guilty to justice. 237 Georgia officially engaged in attempts to find solutions to the should start this now, at least by apologising publicly conflict, though Ossetians and Georgians are most for violations of national minority rights during likely to be able to identify common interests and President Gamsakhurdia's time in offlce. actions precisely at the community level Locals understand each other, and as one told Crisis Group, Little has been done to engage civil society. The focus "we should be more involved in the process because to date has been on increasing the availability of our hearts and soul are dedicated to it ... as people we unbiased information to the population affected by the like and respect each other". 2"2 conflict. zss This should be extended and expanded, for instance through the organisation of meetings, humanitarian projects, and actions that satisfy the B. ECONOMIC RJ:.CONSTRUCTIOl\, common interests of average citizens. lt will take time REHABILITATION AND COOPERATION for the benefits to be felt.?" Yet, some initiatives have started and require strengthening. Experts and NGO Since signature of the Sochi Agreement, the parties representatives met at the end of July 2004 to begin have committed themselves to support the economic developing an action program to improve inter• recovery of the zone of conflict and to ensure that cornmuni ty relations. A result was the Kazbegi conditions for humanitarian aid exist.2'13 In 1993 an Declaration appealing to NGOs, international "Intergovernmental Agreement Between Russia and organisations and state actors to more effectively Georgia on Economic Rehabilitation in the Georgian• coordinate conflict resolution efforts. 241) Ossetian Zone of Conflict" was signed whereby Georgia committed itself to cover two thirds of war Youth in particular should be targeted. Since the 1992 damage costs and Russia one third, in a program to be war new generations of Georgians and Ossetians have completed by 1997. TI1e deadline was not met, and grown up with little or no interaction. The biggest until 2000 Russia and Georgia discussed their impediment to their coming together is language: few financial obligations, mechanisms to coordinate young Ossetians speak Georgian, and decreasing economic efforts. and specific projects within the JCC numbers of Georgians speak Russian, let alone frarnework.i" The 23 December 2000 "Georgian• Osseriao. Some efforts have been made to bring Russian Economic Agreement on Rehabilitation in the youths to summer schools and camps. In the 2004 Zone of Conflict and on the Return and Integration of academic year, young people from the zone of Refugees" raised expectations, and the need for further conflict who entered institutions of higher education financing was recognised?" The parties agreed on in Tbilisi were given small scholarships. 2'11 More of priority areas, including transport links, energy, communications, healthcare, civil engineering, rehabilitation of houses, and agriculture.P" However, :m "Memorandum on Measures lo Ensl1TC Security and no detailed program has been formulated. In May Reinforce Mutual Confidence Between the Parties to the 2003 the JCC appealed to both governments to create Georgian-Ossetian Conflict", 16 May 1996, Moscow. 238 In the above cited Memorandum, it was specifically staled thal the parttcs express their willingness jointly to arrange "meetings of representatives of Georgian and Ossetian political and social organisations and scholars .... 'roundtablcs' involving representatives of the creative intelligentsia, and also meetings ofjournalists", At the 25 October 2001 JCC meeting. it was decided lo create an information bulletin on JCC H:?. Crisis Group interview with Gori Region government activities and a Georgian/ Ossetian press service. official, September 2004. A similar recommendation was 239 David Darchiashvili and Gigi Tevzadze. "Etlmic Conflicts made in the above mentioned Kazbegi document. and Breakaway Regions in Georgia", Hui/ding Democracy in 213 "Sochi Agreement on Resolving the Ocorgian-Osscuan ( leorgia, Discussion Paper no. 9. May 200:), p. 14. Ccnllict". Article 4. 24 June 1992. n• Kazbegi Declaration, 28 July 2004, signed in Kazbegi, 2·M "lntergovemmenta1 Agreement Between Russia and Georgia. Georgia on Economic Rehabilitation in the Georgian-Ossetian 2•11 "Students or Tbilisi Institutions of Higher Education from Zone of C'..011mct", Article 2. Tskhinvali will be presented solemnly student certificates", ~4" Ibid. Article L Caucasus Press. 16 September 2004. 2•10 JCC Protocol. l August 2001. Moscow. GEO-OTP-0008-0644 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 32/44 EK PT Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia ]CG Europe Report N° 159, 26 November 2004 Page 25 a bilateral body to devise and implement such a Georgia/" No legal means exist for the import of program" but the process has remained frozen. goods from Russia to Georgia through South Ossetia and along the Transcaucasian highway. It is Several large donors have provided economic impossible to travel legally to or through Georgia assistance to the zone of conflict but the gap between along this route. 25'1 Between South Ossetia and 248 needs and resources has not been met. From 1996 Georgia, travel is impeded because Georgian license to I 999 the UN Development Program (UNDP) and plates cannot be used in Tskhinvali or South Ossetian UNHCR played leading roles. :<-i9 Since then funding ones in Georgia."? In June 2004 the heads of the has significantly decreased. 2'·0 The only major donor custom agencies of Russia and Georgia intended to is now the EU, whose projects have experienced discuss how to increase control over goods on the significant delays. While OSCE supports a range of South Ossetian section of the Russian-Georgian activities in South Ossetia, and UNHCR. the World border"? but the meeting never took place. The Food Program (WFP) and L"NICEF have low-level highway, however, could serve as a vital lifeline not presences, only one international NGO is currently only for persons in South Ossetia but also inhabitants fully operational in the area."! Donors have tended of Georgia, Armenia, North Ossetia, and places to focus on infrastructure and housing rehabilitation beyond in Russia?" North Ossetia in particular has an but have been wary about development projects, interest in keeping it open to trade with Georgia. It credit schemes, and social services. also seeks greater economic cooperation with Georgia, especially with the regions of Kazbegi, Georgia has a role to play supporting reconstruction Ousheti and Mtskheta along the Russian military in South Ossetia, as well as in providing public highway, the other main artery linking the two services. At the 9 July 2002 JCC meeting it was countries, and access to Georgia's Black Sea ports." agreed that Georgia and Russia should include lines for financing reconstruction in the zone of conflict in their 2003 budget?" Russia has done so but Georgia C. PROMOTING RE HJ GEE AriD I OP RETURN did not follow through. Ultimately, if the region is to reintegrate into Georgia, the government will need to The two sides pledged in 1992 to create conditions for find money to pay for services, local administration return of refugees and displaced persons.i" yet it took costs, pensions, and other regular expenditures. Even if only for confidence building, the inclusion of South Ossetia in the 2005 Georgian budget could have a positive effect. 2·'·' A handful of analysts warned !hat closing the Ergncti market -- while justifiable economically and legally -- would Developments in South Ossetia have had serious increase potential for renewed conflict between South Ossctia economic repercussions on the movements of goods and Georgia. One group of specialists recommended instead coordination of customs and tax policies with neighbouring and people between North Ossetia, South Ossetia and countries, rationalisaiion of salaries. and improvement or I.he Georgian tax code. Kukhianidze, Kupatadze, and Gotsiridze, "Smuggling", op. cit., pp. 75-77. 2·11 JCC decision, Annex no. I, 14-16 May 2003, JCC meeting 25~ From JO September to 22 October 2004, lhc only other in Gori, Georgia. The body was to consist of representatives of major border crossing between Russia and Georgia, the Larsi t.he ministries of economy, finance, energy, transport, checkpoint was closed. Georgian authorities blocked several communications and information, agricullure and narural trucks and buses carrying Armenian citizens. claiming they resources, as well as or Ille foreign ministries of Georgia and had illegally crossed into Georgia through the Roki tunnel. Russia (Article 1). 2-':1 From 20 to 27 October 2004, the police of Shiela Kartli 2'1t( As recently as 2004, the UN OCHA considered that "much region confiscated some 120 cars with Ossctian license plates, need for rehabilitation and development work remains". UN Owners were told they could not repossess their vehicles until OCHA Georgia. "South Ossetia Briefing Note". January 2004. they changed pl.ates. Civil Georgia, 22 and 27 October 2004. 2'19 UNDP earned out a $2 million rehabilitation program in 256 Russian 1'v1F A Informariou and Press Department. South Ossetia from 1996 to I 999. It set up a system of joint "Commentary Regarding Questions from IT AR-TASS About technical groups with representatives from the Georgian and Georgian-Ossetian Problems". hllp://www.llunid.ru/brp_4 .tisf Osscuan sides lo identify and approve projects by consensus. /0/01362 fl 52 922d2 f2c] 256cc40058b87 d?OpcnOocumenL The UNHCR opened ils office in Tskhinvali in 1997. lbid. ~~-· Jt is one of the few North/South trade routes that bypass 25(' From $8. I 4 million in I 997 to $338 million in I 998, for Chechnya, Dagestan and lngushetia example. Ibid. ~58 Crisis Group interview, North Ossetian JCC co-chairman, 251 Ibid. The one international NGO is Ilic Adventist Vladikavkaz, October 2004. Development and Relief Agency (ADRA). ~~Y "Sochi Agreement on Resolving the Georgian-Ossetian 252 JCC decision, 9 July 2002, signed in Moscow. Conflict", Article 4, 24 June 1992. GEO-OTP-0008-0645 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 33/44 EK PT Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia ]CG Europe Report N° 159, 26 November 2004 Page 26 over a decade to devise a detailed plan.26~1 In 1997 a return of ethnic Ossetians displaced during the 1990- procedure "On the voluntary return of lDPs and 1992 conflict. In August President Saakashvili signed refugees resulting from the Gcorgian=Ossctian a decree allocating 350,000 lari ($197,700) to assist 25 conflict to their permanent place of residence" was Ossetian families to return to pre-war homes. Returnee agreed by the JCC.:?.61 The parties expressed readiness residences were to be rehabilitated and furnished, and to accept the right to "voluntary repatriation" and to seed money provided. Deputy State Minister for "choose their place of residence". They pledged to Regional Issues Zenta Bestaeva, until recently an protect returnees and guarantee them the property Ossetian refugee herself, was made responsible. The they were deprived of, freedom of movement, civil, first five families returned in August 2004. The return cultural and social rights, and information on the of the other twenty had been expected in September return process.f" Implementation was to be but has been delayed. According to Bestaeva many coordinated by a permanent body of representatives more Ossetians originally from Georgia and now of the four JCC participants. 2"' Shevardnadze and living in North Ossetia are interested in return."? What Chibirov declared 1998 the "Year of Return". reluctance they feel is linked not to fear or ethnic However, in 1999 the JCC said "insufficient work had hatred but lack of housing and infrastructure. In many been carried out to address obstacles to return" and rural areas the homes Ossetians left fourteen years ago recommended Georgia "speed up the consideration of need rebuilding. Education facilities are derelict in the Property Restitution of Refugees and lDPs".'.!64 A previously predominantly Ossetian ethnic clear outline of the process came only with the 2000 scttlcmcnts.f" Parents arc concerned there arc no Georgian-Russian economic document on the schools, and no Russian language instruction would be rehabilitation of the conflict zone and a 2002 "Draft offered. Osserians realise it would be difficult to find Georgian-Russian Interstate Program"265 but nothing jobs -- the firms they had worked in were closed/" was implemented, and Georgia's Parliament has yet to pass a property restitution law.2"'s However, few legal mechanisms exist to facilitate return. Obtaining Georgian citizenship is difficult for In a confidence building step in summer 2004, those who left when the Soviet Union collapsed and however, Georgia unilaterally pledged to support the are not ethnic Georgians. According to the Georgian Constitution (Article 12.2) dual citizenship is illegal except as granted by the president in special cases. As 21it.1 "Draft Program on the Return, Settlement, lntegrarion, many Ossetian refugees have gained Russian and Re-integration of Refugees, Forcibly Displaced and citizenship, this could pose an obstacle to return. For Other Persons Affected by the Gcorgian-Osscttan Conllict several years the JCC has pressed Georgia for Comprising Measures for the Restoration of the Economy in property restitution legislation. Discussion on this the Pl.aces of their Rcturn'', JCC decision. Annex no. 2. 9 resumed in the justice ministry and parliamentary Julv 2002. Moscow. 261 'JCC decision, Annex no. 2. Article 1 (Procedure). 13 Legal Committee in 2004.271, The Council of Europe's February 1997, signed in Vladikavkaz, 2<1'.? These rights were guaranteed whether the persons were returning lo their exact place of pre-war residence or 267 Sile considered that up lo 40 per cent of all persons elsewhere in Georgia. Ibid. originally from Georgia now in North Ossctia arc interested ·~M The JCC agreed to create this body. Ibid. The JCC in returning. subsequently decided to create an ad hoc committee to be 26~ The South Caucasus Institute of Regional Security assessed headed by the JCC co-chairs. rather then a permanent body. conditions in Ossetian villages in Georgia proper in spring JCC decision, Anne" 2, 26 September I 997, signed in Java. 2004 and found that many buildings were unusable atlcr years ?r>-1 JCC decision Annex no. 3, 23 July 1999. of neglect -- especially schools and other public stmctures. 265 The full title is the "Draft Program on the Return, Crisis Group interview, August 2004. Settlement, lotcgration, and Re-integration of Refugees, 269 Crisis Group interview with Georgian deputy state Forcibly Displaced and Other Persons Affected by the minister for regional issues. September 2004. Through its Gcorgian-Osscuan Connie! Comprising Measures for the assistance program. the Georgian government provided Restorarion of the Economy in the Places of their Return", livestock and agriculture support. to returnees. JCC decision. Annex no. 2. 9 July 2002, signed in Moscow. Z?'J In 2001 the OSCE and Council of Europe commented on 2'.;c, lmtial JCC agreements on return tocuscd on measures to a draft Jaw, which was expected to be adopted that year. A support. the return of Ossciians from internal districts of draft of the new bill viewed by Crisis Group in 2004 would Georgia. For example, the 6 December 1994 (Moscow), 8 guarantee refugees and !DPs the right to return to one's own June 1995 (Moscow), 19-20 July 1995 (Thilisi!fskhinvali) home, property lost during lite conflict. compensation for JCC meetings. Subsequent documents prioritised those from property t11at cannot be returned. and safety. A Housing and the zone of conflict. EU funding in support of the return Property Claims Commission would also be created. Draft process has also focused on the zone of conflict. "Law of Georgia on Restoration and Protection of Housing GEO-OTP-0008-0646 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 34/44 EK PT Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia ]CG Europe Report N° 159, 26 November 2004 Page 27 Venice Commission issued an opinion on the new The divergence was over how to balance the draft at its session on 8-9 October 2004.21 While in principles of territorial integrity and national self• the past returnees faced significant obstacles to dctcrrni nation; how to define South Ossctia's legal regaining pre-war residences.?" Georgian officials place within Georgia while maintaining links with claim return for owners of private property can be North Ossetia; and the attributes of its autonomy in easily legalised. 2'' However, resolving the claims of the context of a future federal Georgian state. 2'" The those who lived in communal housing is more document also reiterated mutual intention to assess difficult, especially if the buildings have been the origins and causes of the conflict, to transform the privatised and sold. zone of conflict into a demilitarised zone, to improve law enforcement cooperation, to assist in voluntary Another large uncertainty is whether there will be organised return, including through property sufficient funding for infrastructure rehabilitation in restitution and compensation, and to solve the the Ossetian communities to sustain large scale return. problems of economic rehabilitation, investment and After years of virtually insignificant return, Ossetians developmeor.?" However, there was no timetable for need to be convinced that this time the process is real, negotiations on the political settlement, and those not just another public relations exercise. New discussions have remained in abeyance since 2000. legislation as well as inclusion of a return project in the 2005 budget could contribute to this. JCC On 29 July 2004 at the OSCE Permanent Council, agreements and EU funding on return should focus not Georgia's foreign minister stated that his country was only on the zone of conflict but also Georgia proper. ready to offer "South Ossetia broad autonomy within the Georgian state federal structure" and to begin discussions "on the basis of the Baden Document" .wi D. ADDRESSING POLITICAL STATUS This was rejected by the Ossetians. A South Ossetian negotiator in the JCC insisted to Crisis Group there The last time Georgians and South Ossetians had never been a Baden Document as such, that appeared close to settling their conflict settlement was nothing more substantial than a draft had been at an Experts Group Meeting held by the OSCE in discussed. ~''·1 A North Ossetian JCC member 2000 in the Vienna suburb of Baden. Georgian explained that people were not psychologically negotiators considered the intermediary document prepared to go back to the Baden text, and Georgia discussed "a significant achievement. "211 The should table a new proposal.?" Ossetians recall it was never finalised and say it demonstrated the incompatibility of final aims. m The Georgian officials and civil society experts have not document has been signed but remains in draft form, developed a comprehensive definition of South with agreed parts in bold print, the remainder left "to Ossetia's status within the country's borders. be negotiated". It envisaged recognition of the Government authorities say it is premature, because territorial integrity of Georgia, the right to self while Kokoiry is in power, the Osserians have no determination, South Ossetian autonomy, and security guarantees for demilitarisation of the zone of conflict. 211; TI1e two sides agreed that South Osscna should have judicial and executive bodies and symbols (coat of arms, flag and anthem) but not whether or not it would have its own Basic and Property Rights of Refugees and Internally Displaced Law. representative bodies, security forces and the tight Persons", copy obtaircd on :m August 2004. independently, with notification to the Georgian side, to '.?'1 Council of Europe, Venice Commission opinion on the conclude international agreements on trade and economy, draft law on "on restitution of housing and properly lo the science and technology, and culture. "Agreement (Declaration) victims of the Gcorgian-Ossctian conflict of the republic of on Dasie Principles of Political and Legal Relations between Georgia". adopted at Plenary on 8-9 October 2004 in Venice. the Sides in the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict", draft, 13 July :w: Crisis Group imcrvicw with UNHCR Protection staff. 2000. September 2004. ~17 Ibid. 273 Crisis Group interview with, Georgian minister of refugees 2-;8 "Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia and displaced persons. September 2004. Crisis Group at the Meeting or the OSCt:: Special Permanent Council", 18 interview with Georgian deputy state minister for regional August 2004 at ht.tp://69. 93.247 .156/news.php''newsid= issues, September 2004. updates/EpAkAEKEFFgUDLyYvr.php. '.?74 Crisis Group interview, analyst. stale ministry for conflict ~19 Crisis Group interview, South Ossetian member of the resolution, August 2004. JCC, Tskhinvali, August 2004. '.!. -' Crisis Group interview, South Ossetian member of the ~81; Crisis Group interview, North Ossetian member of the JCC. Tsklrinvali, August 2004. JCC. Tsklrinvali, October 2004. GEO-OTP-0008-0647 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 35/44 EK PT Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia ]CG Europe Report N° 159, 26 November 2004 Page 28 political will for a dialogue . .:?$] However, the issue is discussing this proposal.2R6 TI1e South Ossetians also stalled by unwillingness to determine Georgia's continue to call for either independence or integration own internal administrative-territorial structure. 282 into Russia. Neither is likely if Moscow maintains its According to the constitution (Article 2.3), the state's commitment to Georgia's territorial integrity. A fourth structure is to be determined "after the complete option, described by analysts in North Ossetia, would restoration of the jurisdiction of Georgia over the be based on a form of shared rule or sovereignty over whole territory of the country". In July 2004, the South Ossetia by Georgia and Russia 2l!7 Agreement responsibilities and powers of an "autonomous on South Ossetia's final status thus remains the key republic" were defined for the first time when challenge of the conflict resolution process. Parliament passed a law on Ajara's status. However, that set a poor precedent. As Ajara's powers were significantly curtailed, the value of a Georgian "autonomy" offer was weakened for Tskhinvali. It remains to be seen whether Ossetia's status can be fully determined before Tbilisi decides if Georgia is to be a federal state, and if so, what kind. ~~3 In oral statements the Georgians have so far offered "significant autonomy within the State of Georgia", including "power-sharing at the central governmental level", and "dual Russian-Georgian citizenship".284 Tbilisi has pledged that South Ossetia's status would be better than North Ossetia's within the Russian Federation, and Ossetians' rights would be better protected in Georgia than they are in Russia 2!ls Sources within the security ministry claim that at talks in May 2004 they offered the South Ossetians an autonomous republic status that included all competencies and rights except defence institutions. The Ossetian side reportedly expressed no interest in ~1 Crisis Group interview with Georgian MP, August 2004. :x:? Conflict resolution experts point out in relation to Abkhazia: "a widely hold view (which is incorporated into I.he Georgian Constitution of l 995) is that no model for the country's admiuistrative-rerritorial structure can be determined before Georgia's conflicts, first and foremost. lliat in Abkhazia, arc resolved. However, this position confuses cause and effect - the conflicts cannot. realistically be resolved before the Georgian government articulates a clear vision for the suucture or lhc future Georgian stac". "Concept on tltc Special Status or Abkhazia in the Georgian State" (English version), prepared by Konstantine Kublashvili, Arclril Gcgcshidzc, Ivli anc Khaindrava and Paata Zakarcishvili as informal document. made available to Crisis Group in Tbilisi, September 2004. 283 Civil society activists have also begun to consider South Ossetia's status and with the assistance of the Open Society Georgia Foundation hope lo have a concept prepared by the end or 2004. Crisis Group interview with executive director, Open Society Georgia Foundation, August 2004. 28'1 "Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia at the Meeting of the OSCE Special Permanent Council". 18 ~i<<; Crisis Group interview with official, Georgia security August 2004 at htlp:/i69. 9.1.247.156/ncws.php?ncwsid= ministry, Scprcmocr 2004. updates/EpAkAEKEFfgUDLyYvr.php. ~8 Crisis Group interview with political analysts, 285 Crisis Group interview with Georgian Ml', August 2004. VJadikavkaz, October 2004. GEO-OTP-0008-0648 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 36/44 EK PT Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia ]CG Europe Report N° 159, 26 November 2004 Page 29 I VI. CONCLUSION The Georgian-South Ossetian dispute was frozen for twelve years and largely ignored -- not only by the international community but also by many Georgians. President Saakashvili was intent on changing this. He succeeded, but in doing so he also rapidly raised tensions in the region. The new fighting was on the verge of erupting into full• fledged war until a ceasefire was agreed on 18 August. In November 2004, however, even though the situation in the field remains tense and gunfire is still exchanged, there is again a hope that the conflict can be resolved peacefully, with demilitarisation and a negotiated settlement. The South Ossetians are unlikely at this stage to enter talks willingly on a status within Georgia. At the least, successful status negotiations will require an end to the sporadic shooting and Georgia's implementation of significant confidence building measures. Building on past commitments within the JCC and in bilateral agreements wid; Russia, Georgia must off er to increase the security and confidence of people living in the zone of conflict, promote economic rehabilitation and development, ensure the right of Ossetians to return to South Ossetia and Georgia proper, and create administrative-territorial arrangements that guarantee South Ossetia effective autonomous status. To implement these measures, Georgia will require greater political and financial assistance from its international partners, The alternative is bleak. Should one side use force to seek its political goals, the other would respond in kind, and massive displacement of the inhabitants of South Ossetia would ensue. The war that would engulf the region would destroy the Saakashvili presidency and Georgia's hopes for a bright future, while pulling Russia into another conflict in the volatile Caucasus region. Tbilisi/Brussels, 26 November 2004 GEO-OTP-0008-0649 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 37/44 EK PT Georgia: .1 voiding War in South Ossetia ]CG Europe Report N° 159, 26 November 2004 Page 30 APPENDIX A MAP OF GEORGIA •··· •rl-"" -~··· . .-. ... ,,,.,~ .. ..,- _". ,... , /V.... =·~i.·=·· ~:·:... ,,,,.. .,., ..·.~.....·· .... GEO-OTP-0008-0650 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 38/44 EK PT Georgia: .1 voiding War in South Ossetia ]CG Europe Report N° 159, 26 November 2004 Page 31 APPENDIXB MAP Of THE SOUTH OSSETIAN REGION South Ossetia Region Legend --c::.--c:>- kurltY-1:01 j®r \.,._.J- 19 k11::<;;911n<;;1;,i;u1•t. GEO-OTP-0008-0651 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 39/44 EK PT Georgia: .1 voiding War in South Ossetia ]CG Europe Report N° 159, 26 November 2004 Page 32 APPENDIXC GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS ADRA Adventist Development and Relief Agency CIS Commonwealth of Independent States CiO Chairman in Office (OSCE) DFID Department for International Development (UK) EC European Commission EU European Union RUPM F.U Police Mission GDP Gross Domestic Product Georgian SSR Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic GTEP Georgian Train and Equip Program I DPs Internally Displaced Persons IWPR Institute for War and Peace Reporting JCC Joint Control Commission JPKF Joint Peacekeeping Forces MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs MJA Ministry of interior MOU Memorandum of Understanding NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NGO Non-Governmental Organisation OMON Ministry of Interior Special Forces (Otriad Militsii Ocobovo Naznacheniya} OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe Russian SSR Russian Soviet Socialist Republic sec Special Coordination Centre SOAO South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast SPMU Strategic Police Matters Unit (OSCE) UN OCHA UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Assistance UNHCR UN High Commissioner for Refugees UNWFP UN World Food Program UNICEF UN Children's Fund USAID U.S. Agency for International Development GEO-OTP-0008-0652 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 40/44 EK PT Georgia: .1 voiding War in South Ossetia ]CG Europe Report N° 159, 26 November 2004 Page 33 APPENDIXD ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP The International Crisis Group (TCG) is an independent, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe; in Asia, non-profit. multinational organisation, with over I 00 Afghanistan, Kashmir, Kazakhstan, North Korea, staff members on five continents, working through field• Kyrgyzstan, Indonesia, Myanmar/Burma, Nepal, Pakistan, based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; in Europe, resolve deadly conflict. Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro TCG's approach is grounded in field research. Teams of and Serbia; in the Middle East. the whole region from political analysts arc located within or close by countries North Africa to Iran; and in Latin America, Colombia, at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent the Andean region and l laiti. conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, it produces analytical reports containing practical TCG raises funds from governments, charitable recommendations targeted at key international decision• foundations, companies and individual donors. The takers. ICU also publishes Crisiswcuch, a twelve-page following governmental departments and agencies monthly bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on currently provide funding: Agence lntergouvemementale the state of play in all the most significant situations of de Ia francophonie, Australian Agency for International conflict or potential conflict around the world. Development, Austrian Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Canadian TCG's reports and briefing papers are distributed widely Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, by email and printed copy to officials in foreign ministries Canadian International Development Agency, Dutch and intcrnarional organisations and made available Ministry of foreign Affairs, Finnish Ministry off orcign simultaneously on the website, www.icg.org. TCG works Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, German closely with governments and those who influence them, foreign Office, lrish Department of Foreign Affairs, including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and Japanese Intcmational Cooperation Agency, Luxembourg to generate support for its policy prescriptions. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New Zealand Agency for International Development, Republic of China (Taiwan) The JCG Board =which includes prominent figures from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Royal Danish Ministry of the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media Foreign Affairs, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign - is directly involved in helping to bring the reports and Affairs, Swedish Ministry for foreign Affairs, Swiss recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, '1 urkish Ministry around the world. ICG is co-chaired by Leslie H. Gelb, of Foreign Affairs, United Kingdom Foreign and former President of the Council on Foreign Relations, and Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom Department for Christopher Patten, former European Commissioner for Intcrnarional Development. U.S. Agency for International External Relations. President and Chief Executive since Development. January 2000 is former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans. Foundation and private sector donors include Atlantic Philanthropies, Carnegie Corporation of New York, Ford JCG 's international headquarters arc in Brussels, with foundation, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, William advocacy offices in Washington DC, New York, London & Flora Hewlett Foundation, Henry Luce Foundation and Moscow. The organisation currently operates lnc., John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, John nineteen field offices (in Amman, Belgrade, Bogota, Merck Fund, Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, Open Cairo, Dakar, Dushanbe, Islamabad, Jakarta, Kabul, Society Institute, Ploughshares Fund, Sigrid Rausing Nairobi, Osh, Port-au-Prince, Pretoria, Pristina, Quito, Trust, Sasakawa Peace foundation, Sarlo foundation of Sarajevo. Seoul, Skopje and Tbilisi), with analysts the Jewish Community End0\\111Cnt Fund, United States working in over 50 crisis-affected countries and territories Institute of Peace and Fundacao Oricntc. across four continents. Jn Africa, this includes Angola. Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, November 2004 Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Liberia Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Further information about !CG can be obtained from our website: www.icg.org GEO-OTP-0008-0653 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 41/44 EK PT Georgia: .1 voiding War in South Ossetia ]CG Europe Report N° 159, 26 November 2004 Page 34 APPENDIXE ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON EUROPE. SINCE 2001 DALKA~S Kosovo: T.llmlmurk Election, Balkans Report N" 120, 21 November 2001 (also available in Albanian and Serbian) Religion in Kosovo, Balkans Report N°105, 31 January 2001 Bosnia: Re. GEO-OTP-0008-0654 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 42/44 EK PT Georgia: .1 voiding War in South Ossetia ]CG Europe Report N° 159, 26 November 2004 Page 35 Return to Uncertainty: Kosovo's Internally Displaced am/ the Moldova: Regional Tensions over Transdniestria, Europe Return Process, Balkans ReporLN°139, 13 December 2002 (also Report .\I" 157, 17 June 2004 available in Albanian and Serbian) Albania: State of the Nation 2003, Balkans Report N°140, 11 March 2001 OTIIER REPORTS AND BRIEF~GS Serbia after Djindjic, Balkans Report N° 141, 18 March 2003 For ICG reports and briefing papers on: A Marriage of Inconvenience: Montenegro 2001, Balkans • Asia Report N°142, 16 April 2003 • Africa K(l.WJV(l1.\' Ethnic Dilem11111: The Need[or 11. Civic. Contract, • Latin America Balkans Report N°143, 28 Muy 2003 (u11'<) uvailublc in Albanian • Middle East and North Africa and Serbian) • Thematic Issues Bosnia 's BRCKO: Getting In, Getting 011 and Getting Out, • Crisiswatch Balkans Repent N°144, 2 June 2003 please visit our website www.icg.org Thessaloniki and After /: The EU'.f Balkan Agenda, Europe Briefing, 20 J unc 2003 Thessalonikiand After11 : TheEU and Bosnia, Europe Briefing, 20June 20(H Thessaloniki anti Aji.er 111: The Ell, Serbia.• Mmrtenegro and K(l.VOl'(I,E urope Briefing, 20 June 2003 Serbian ReformS talls Again, Balkans Report N° 145, 17 July 2003 (also available i11 Serbian). Bosnia's Nadonalls: Governmems: Paddy Ashdown and rite Paradoxes of State Ruildi11g, Balkans Report N° 146, 22 July 2003 TH'o to Tango: An Agendafor the NeH' Kosovo SRSG, Europe Report N° l 48, 3 September 2003 (also available in Serbian) Macedonia:N o Time for Complacency, Eorope Report N°149, 23 October 2003 (also available in Macedonian) Building Bridges in Monar, Europe Report N°150, 20 November 2003 (also available in Bosnian) Southern Serbia's Fragile Peace, Europe Report N°152, 9 I )ecem her 2(J()j Monitoring the Northern Ireland Ceil.'iejire.'i: Lesson» from the Balkans, Europe Briefing, 23 January 2004 Pan-Albanianism: How Big a Threat to Balkun Stability?, Europe Report l\0153, 25 February 2004 (also available in Albanian and Serbian) Serhia'.f Li-Turn; Europe Report N°1S4, 26 March 2004 Colltp.'ie in KlJ,\'(JV(J, Europe Report N°155, 22 April 2004 (also 11 vailablc in Serbian and Albanian) EU FOR: Changing Bosnia 's Security Arrangements, kurope Briefing, 29 June 2(XM (also available in Bosnian) Serhia'.f Changing Political Landscape, Europe Hriefing, 22 July 2004 Macedonia: Make or Break, Europe Briefing, 3 August 2004 CAl:-CASUS Georgia: Whllt NtJw'I, Europe Report N°T51, 3 December 2001 Ar.erbuijan: Turning Over A New Leu.ft, Europe Report N°156, 13 ~y 2004 Saaka~·h1•ili'.1· Ajara Success: Rq1elli11hle Elsewhere in Georgiar, Europe Briefing, 18 August 2004 A rmenia: Internal lm·t11/Jili<1' Ahead, Europe Report N° 158, 18 October 2004 MOLDOVA Moldova: No Quick Fix, Europe Report N°147, 12 August 2003 GEO-OTP-0008-0655 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 43/44 EK PT Georgia: .1 voiding War in South Ossetia ]CG Europe Report N° 159, 26 November 2004 Page 36 APPENDIXF ICG BOARD OF TRUSTEES Co-Chairs Wesley Clark Leslie H. Gelb Fornier N..,1TO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Preside/IfEm eritus of Council on Foreign Relations, U.S. Pat Cox Christopher Patten Former President ofIiuropean Parliament Fonner European Commissionerfo r External Relations, UK Ruth Drcifuss Former President,S witzerland President & CJX) Uffe Ellemann-Jensen Gareth Evans FormerMinist erof ForeignAffairs , Denmark Fornier Foreign Minister ofAustralia Mark Eyskens Former Prime Ministero f Belgium Executive Committee Stanley Fischer Morton Abramowitz Fic·e Chairman. Citigroup Inc.; [armer Firs/ Deputy ,\.fcmogi11g Former U.S. AssistantSecre tary ofS tateand Ambassadorw 1i111rey Director of International Monetary Fu11d Emma Bonino Bronislaw Geremek Member oflluropeanP arliament;fo rmer European Commissioner FornierMinister of'ForeignAffa irs, Poland Cheryl Carolus T.K.Gujral Former South African Ili;!,h Commissioner to the UK; former Secretary General of the AVC Former PrimeMin ister ofIndta Maria Livanos Cattaui* Carla Hills Secretary-General. InternationalC hamber t'if Commerce FormerU.S. Secretary c?(IJ011si11g;/brmeU.Sr TradeR epresentative Yoichi Funabashi Lena Hjelm-Wallen Chicf'Diplomatic Correspondent & Columnist, The Asahi Shimb1111, FormerDep utyP rimeMini stera nd Forei}!.111tffairMinius er; Sweden Japan James C.F. Huang William Shawcross Dcipury SecretatyGe neral to the President, Taiwan Journalist and author, UK Swanee Hunt Stephen Solarz= Founder and Chair of Women Waging Peace; former U.S. Former U.S. Congressman ;lmha.~.~adc>r ro Austria George Soros Asma Jahangir Chairman, Open Society lnstinue UN Special Rapporteur u11 Exnajudicia], Summary or Arbitrary Willii'tm 0. Tllylor ExecuttonstformerC hair Human RightsC ommissionof 'Pakistan Chairman Emeritus, The Boston Globe, U.S. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf "Vice-Chair Senior Advisor. Modem 1Jjiica Fund Managers;fo rmer Liberian Minister of Finance and Director qf UNDP Regiona! Bureau for Africa Adnan Abu-Odeh Former Politica! Adviser to King ,,fhdu/lah II and to King I lussein; Shiv Vikram Khemka former Jordan Permanent Representanve to /JN Founder and Executive Director (Russia) ofSU:'VGroup, India Kenneth Adelman .James V. Kimsey Former U.S. Ambassador and Director of' the Anus Control and Founder and Chairman timcritus of America Online. Inc. (1101.j Disarmament Age11cv Bethuel Kiplagat Ersin Arioglu Former Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Ajfah;~. Kenya Member of'Rariiament,T urkey; ChairmanEm eritus, Yapt Merkezi Gnmp Wint Kok Former Prime Minister, Netherlands Diego Arria Former Ambassador of Venezuela to the UN Trifun Kostovski Member qfParliamen t, '!l,.facedo11i.a;.fhw1derojK ometal Trade ( fmhh Zbigniew Brzezinski Former U.S. National Security Advisor to the President Elliott F. Kulick Chairman. Pegasus International. U.S. Victor Chu Chairman, First liastem investment Group, llong Kong GEO-OTP-0008-0656 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 44/44 EK PT Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia !CG Europe Report N°159, 26 November 2004 Page 37 Joanne Leedom-Ackerman George Robertson Novelist and journalist, U.S. Former Secretary ( ieneral qfVATO;f ormer Detence Secretary, I !K Todung Mulya Lubis Mohamed Sahnoun Human rights lawyer and author, Indonesia Special Adviser to the United Nations Secretary-General on Africa Barbara McDougall Ghassan Salame Former Secrctarv of Srarcf or tixtcmal Affan», Canada Former :\ Iinister t ebonon, Professorof international Relations, Paris AyoObe Salim A. Salim Former Prime Minister (!f" Tanzania; former Secretary General (!f" President, Civil Liberties Organisation, Ni?,eria the Organisation of/lfrican Unity Christine Ockrent Journalist and author, France Douglas Schoen Founding Parmer cf Penn, Schoen & Berland /lssociates, U.S. Friedbert Pfluger Foreign Policy Spokesman cf th« CDU!CSU Parliamentary Group Par Stenback in the German Bundestag Former Minister cfFon INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD JCG's internationalA dvisory Board comprises major individual and corporated onors who contribute their advice and experience lo !(Xi on a regular basis. Rita E. Hauser (Chair) Marc Abramowitz JP Morgan Global Foreign Sarlo Foundation of the Jewish Exchange and Commodities Community Endowment Fund Allen & Co. Anglo American PLC George Kellner Tilleke & Gibbins International LTD Michael J. Berland George Loening Stanley Weiss John Chapman Chester Douglas Makepeace Westfield Group Peter Corcoran Anna Luisa Ponti Y asuyo Yamazaki John Ehara Quantm Sunny Yoon Rita E. Hauser Michael L. Riordan SENIOR ADVISERS JCG's Senior Advisers areformer Board Members (no/ presently holding executive office) who main lain an association with ]CG, and whose advice and support are called 011 from time to time. Oscar Arias Alain Dcstcxhc Allan J. MacEachcn Volker Ruoho Zaiuab Bangura Marika Fahlen Matt McHugh Simone Veil Christoph Bertram Malcolm Fraser George J. Milchcll Michael Sohlman Jorge Castaneda Marianne Heiberg Mo Mowlam Leo Tindemans Eugene Chien Max Jakobson Cyril Ramaphosa Ed van Thijn Gianfranco Dcll'Alba Mong Joon Chung Michel Rocard Shirley Williams As at November 2004 GEO-OTP-0008-0657