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ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 1/44 EK PT Annex E.4.12 Public ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 2/44 EK PT GEORGIA: A VOIDING WAR IN SOUTH OSSETIA 26 November 2004 international crisis group Europe Report N° I 59 Tbilisi/Brussels GEO-OTP-0008-0615 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 3/44 EK PT TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ANO RECOMMENDATIONS i 1. INTRODUCTION 1 II. UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT 2 A. H1sTORIC/\1, CAust-:s 2 1. Competing narratives of South Ossetia's past.. 2 2. The 1990- 1 992 conflict and its aftermath 3 3. The peace agreement and peace implementation mechanisms 4 B. HUlvl/\N RlGHTS VIOL.I\ TIONS J\ND POPULATION DISPL./\CE:tviEl\T 5 I. Ossetian and Georgian population settlement and displacement.. 5 2. War-time atrocities 7 c. POLITICAL CA USES or rnt CONfLICI 7 D. GEOPOLITICALC AUSES 8 E. POLITICAL-ECONOlvflCC AUSES Of CONfLICT 9 III. UNFREEZI~G THE CONFLICT 11 A. FOCUSING ON THE POLTTTC'\L ECONO\ifTC CAUSES OF CONFLICT I I 1. Attacking greed 1 I 2. Addressing grievance 12 3. The South Ossetian reaction 12 B. THE START OF VIOLENT CONFLICT 14 C. THE UNEASY TRUCE 15 IV. INTER OR INTRA-STATE CONFLICT? 16 A. Gt-:C)R(tl1\N ALLl-:0/\TIONS ON RUSSJ/\'S ROLi·: ] 6 8. Tm: Vn.w FROM RUSSI/\ 17 C. UNITED STATES INVOLVElviENT 18 D. THE OSCE ·19 E. THE EUROPR/\>J UNTOK I 9 F. THF. W/\R NOBOOY WANTID 20 V. OPTIONS FOR CONFLICT ALLEVIATION AND PREVENTIOl\" 22 A. STRJ(N(iTI ll(NIN(j Sl(ClJRITY ANI) COJ\Fll)l(NCE-BlJIL))IN(l 22 I. Law enforcement and peacekeeping 23 2. Addressing the civilian dimension of security 23 8. ECONOl'vfTC RECONSTRUCTION, REHABTLITA TION /\ND COOPER!\ TION 24 C. PIWMOTIN<T Rt-<:J-lJ(rf<:f<: /\ND !DP Rt-<:TlJR"l 25 D. ADDRESSING POLITICAL STATUS 27 \11. CONCLUSION 29 GEO-OTP-0008-0616 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 4/44 EK PT APPEl\"DICES A. MAP (ff GEORGlA 30 B. MAP Of TI IE soun I OSSETIAN REGION 31 C. GLOSSARY or ACRONYMS 32 D. AHOlJT THE ll\TERNATIONAL CRISIS GROlJI' 33 E. TCG REPORT8 AND BRTEFINGS ON ElJROPE 34 F. ICGBOARDJ\.fEMDERS 36 GEO-OTP-0008-0617 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 5/44 EK PT ]CG Europe Report N°159 26 November 2004 GEORGIA: AVOIDING \VAR IN SOUTH OSSETIA EXECUTIVE SUl\tJMARY AND RECOMl\tJENDA TION A precarious peace is back in place between Georgia people in the region with the benefits of economic and South Ossetia after the long-frozen conflict nearly and cultural projects. became a hot war again and drew in Russia when dozens were killed in August 2004 fighting. President The strategy backfired. Rather then capitalising on real Saakashvili tried to break a twelve-year deadlock and popular discontent, it caused many average citizens take another step to restore Georgia's territorial who depended on illegal trade for their economic integrity by undermining the regime in Tskhinvali, survival to regroup around Kokoity. Ossetian de facto but seriously miscalculated. A more comprehensive authorities successfully portrayed Georgian moves as approach is needed to resolve this conflict peacefully. aggressive first steps towards a remilitarisation of the The onus is on Georgia, with help from its conflict that had enjoyed a ceasefire since 1992. international panners, to increase the security and Kokoity's popular support rose as he described himself confidence of people living in the zone of conflict, as the only leader capable of guaranteeing Ossetians' promote economic rehabilitation and development, security, as well as their political, economic and ensure the right of Ossctians to return to South cultural interests. Assistance sent by Tbilisi was Ossetia and Georgia proper, and create arrangements portrayed as a cheap attempt to buy support. guaranteeing South Ossetia effective autonomy. South Ossetia must enter a real dialogue with Georgia The Georgian approach failed in large part because it on its status and not use the winter to force Georgian was based on a limited analysis of the causes of the villagers still in South Ossetia to leave their homes. conflict. Since 1992 little progress has been made to bring Ossetians and Georgians closer together. Many After peacefully resolving its decade-old conflict with of the grievances and ambitions developed during the Ajara earlier this year, the Georgian decision-makers war that broke out as the Soviet Union was dying turned their attention to South Ossetia. In May 2004 remain tough obstacles to peace. Unless they are they believed their Ajarian success could easily be addressed, efforts to re-integrate South Ossetia into repeated. They considered that South Ossetia's de Georgia are almost certain to lead again to violence. facto president, Eduard Kokoity, had little democratic legitimacy or popular support and that, as in Ajara, In the past few months Georgia has shifted gears the people would rapidly switch loyalty from and begun to emphasise the geopolitical nature of Tskhinvali to Tbilisi. the conflict, terming it "a problem between Georgia and Russia". Russia does play a special role. Hut it The initial strategy aimed to address the political• is unlikely that Georgia can successfully persuade economic causes of the conflict through an anti• the U.S. or European Union to duel with Moscow smuggling operation, aimed primarily at closing the over South Ossetia. sprawling Ergneti market on the outskirts of Tskhinvali, in the Georgian-South Ossetia zone of A new ceasefire holds since 19 August 2004. At a conflict. The theory was that Kokoity and a small high level meeting between Georgian Prime circle of officials around him were maintaining Minister Zurab Zhvania and South Ossetian leader control over South Ossetia through their involvement Eduard Kokoity on 5 November in Sochi, an in black market trade. Tn parallel, the Georgian side agreement on demilitarisation of the zone of conflict organised a humanitarian "offensive" to provide was signed. Some exchange of fire continues in the GEO-OTP-0008-0618 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.12 13-10-2015 6/44 EK PT Georgia: .1 voiding War in South Ossetia ]CG Europe Report N° 159, 26 November 2004 Page ii zone of conflict, apparently primarily initiated by the 1992 conflict that takes into consideration the Ossetian side, but there is still cause for optimism comments of the Venice Commission and other that the conflict will be resolved non-violently since international experts, and discuss with the JCC all sides seem to be reconsidering their policies. creation of a property claims commission. Georgia's legitimate insistence on the preservation of 6. Adopt legislation permitting those affected by its territorial integrity needs to be balanced with the the conflict to hold dual citizenship. Ossetians' concerns for the protection of their national minority rights. 7. Agree with Russia, and in particular North Ossetia, on measures to boost economic For the negotiations that are needed with Russia, South cooperation, coordinate custom policies and and North Ossetia to succeed, Georgia must show it is facilitate the free movement of goods and putting in place political, economic, legal, and social persons along the Transcaucasian highway and conditions to guarantee Ossetians equal rights in a Russian military highway. multi-national and democratics tate. The greatest lesson 8. Deal with the legacy of the 1990-1992 conflict from the May-August period is that attempts to by investigating war crimes, prosecuting those resolve the conflict swiftly wil1 lead to war. President responsible, and adopting legislation to amnesty Saakashvili seemed to recognise this when, at the UN those who participated in the conflict but General Assembly, he pledged to engage in a "stage• committed no war crimes. by-stage settlement plan" To avoid further casualties and displacement, Georgia, together with 9. Open discussion on the status of South Ossetia its international partners, must implement a with local and international experts, including comprehensive strategy to resolve the root causes of experts from the parties to the conflict, with a the conflict and make non-violent re-integration view to developing a comprehensive concept possible. within the framework of an overall administrative• terrironal reform of Georgia. RECOMMENDATIONS To the de facto Government of South Ossetia: To the Government of Georgia and the de facto 10. Guarantee full freedom of movement on the Government of South Ossetia: territory of South Osseria and do not obstruct implementation of economic rehabilitation, J. Stop all armed hostilities and implement step• by-step demilitarisation of South Ossetia with refugee return, or confidence-building measures respect to all troops not part of the Joint agreed upon at the JCC and within Georgian• Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF) or local police, Russian bilateral talks. starting in the zone of conflict. J J. Participate in a diaJogue with the Georgian side 2. Implement all previously agreed upon JCC on means to reach a final resolution to the conflict, including determination of the future decisions and bilateral Georgian-Russian administrative-territorial status of South Ossetia agreements regarding the conflict. and the work of a property claims commission. 3. Engage citizens and civil society in conflict resolution efforts. To the Government of Russia: To the Government of Georgia: 12. Prevent any armed formations or weapons not approved within the JCC framework from 4. Fund in the 2005 budget the costs of social crossing into South Ossetia from Russia. services and economic development in and J 3. Create with Georgia an inter-state body on around the zone of conflict, confidence building measures, rehabilitation of communities in return and economic rehabilitation in the zone Georgia proper to which Ossetian refugees may of conflict and work with Georgia to devise and return, and a new Russian-Georgian inter-state fund from 2005 budgets programs to facilitate body to facilitate return and economic return and economic rehabilitation in South rehabilitation in the zone of conflict.
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