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Does Bouteflika's Candidacy Preclude Change in Algeria?

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Situation Assessement | 17 February 2019 Does Bouteflika’s Candidacy Preclude Change in Algeria? Policy Analysis Unit Does Bouteflikas kandidac Precune Ckane la Algeri? Series: Situation Assessement 17 February 2019 Policy Analysis Unit The olicy Analysls Unit ls tCe eater’s nepartmeat nedicaten to tCe study of tCe Pegion’s most pPessing aurreat kffairs. An lategral and vltal part of tCe ACR Sa katlvltles, lt offePs academically rigoPous analysls oa lssues that are Pecevant and usefuc to tCe pubcla, academlas and policy-makePs of tCe Arab Pegioa and becond. The olicy Analysls Unit draws oa tCe aollaboratlve effoPts of k aumbeP of scholars bksen wlthin and outslne tCe ACR S. It pPonuaes three of tCe eater’s publicatloa series: ssessmeat RepoPt, olicy Analysls, and Case Analysls PepoPts. opyright © 2019 Arab eateP foP Research and olicy Stunles. All Rights ResePven. TheAra b eateP foP Research and olicy Stunles ls an independeat Pesearch lastltute and think tank foP tCe study of history and social salences, wltC partlaular emphasls oa tCe kppclen social salences. The eater’s paramouat aoncern ls tCe knvancemeat of Arab soaletles and stktes, tCelP aooperatloa wltC oae anotCeP and lssues aoncerning tCe Arab natloa la neaeral. To that end, lt seeis to exkmlae and diagnose tCe sltuktloa la tCe Arab world - stktes and aommunitles- to analyze social, eaoaomla and auctural poclales and to pPovlne pocltical analysls, fPom an Arab pePspeatlve. The eateP pubclsCes la botC Arabla and EnglisC la ordeP to make lts work accesslbce to botC Arab and aoa- Arab PesearchePs. The Arab eateP foP Research and olicy Stunles Al-Tarfk StPeet, Wknl Al Banat Al-Dayaea, Qktar O Box 10277, Doha +974 4035 4111 +974 40354114 www.nohainstltute.org Does Bouteflikas kandidac Precune Ckane la Algeri? Series: Situation Assessement Table of Contents 17 February 2019 Candidacy Announcemeat oP Eceatoral Program? . 1 Eceatloa Mechanism . 2 Policy Analysis Unit The olicy Analysls Unit ls tCe eater’s nepartmeat nedicaten to tCe study of tCe Pegion’s most pPessing aurreat Most Promlaeat ompetltoPs . 2 kffairs. An lategral and vltal part of tCe ACR Sa katlvltles, lt offePs academically rigoPous analysls oa lssues that are bnelazlz Bouteflik . 3 Pecevant and usefuc to tCe pubcla, academlas and policy-makePs of tCe Arab Pegioa and becond. The olicy Analysls bnerrazak Makri . 3 Unit draws oa tCe aollaboratlve effoPts of k aumbeP of scholars bksen wlthin and outslne tCe ACR S. It pPonuaes Ali Beafls . 4 three of tCe eater’s publicatloa series: ssessmeat RepoPt, olicy Analysls, and Case Analysls PepoPts. onclusloa . 5 opyright © 2019 Arab eateP foP Research and olicy Stunles. All Rights ResePven. TheAra b eateP foP Research and olicy Stunles ls an independeat Pesearch lastltute and think tank foP tCe study of history and social salences, wltC partlaular emphasls oa tCe kppclen social salences. The eater’s paramouat aoncern ls tCe knvancemeat of Arab soaletles and stktes, tCelP aooperatloa wltC oae anotCeP and lssues aoncerning tCe Arab natloa la neaeral. To that end, lt seeis to exkmlae and diagnose tCe sltuktloa la tCe Arab world - stktes and aommunitles- to analyze social, eaoaomla and auctural poclales and to pPovlne pocltical analysls, fPom an Arab pePspeatlve. The eateP pubclsCes la botC Arabla and EnglisC la ordeP to make lts work accesslbce to botC Arab and aoa- Arab PesearchePs. The Arab eateP foP Research and olicy Stunles Al-Tarfk StPeet, Wknl Al Banat Al-Dayaea, Qktar O Box 10277, Doha +974 4035 4111 +974 40354114 www.nohainstltute.org Does Bouteflikas kandidac Precune Ckane la Algeri? Ia k message nlPeaten to tCe neaeral pubcla, Algerian pPeslneat bnelazlz Bouteflik (82 cears ocn) announcen his candidacy foP tCe fiftC pPeslneatial tePm la tCe eceatloas to be Cecn oa 18 pril 2019. Thls may be k clear signal that Ce will be staying la poweP, kfteP speaulatloa that Ce may step nowa fPom tCe eceatloas this cear givea that his CealtC aoucn hindeP his kbilitc to exeaute pPeslneatial nutles. Thls nealsloa aoucn cekn some of tCe most pPomlaeat opposltloa candidates to PeaoaslneP tCelP candidacy. Many see that tCePe ls ao Peal oppoPtunitc to wla givea that Bouteflikas candidacy ls suppoPten bc tCe two mkjoP partles and tCe armc. ThePe are also noubts kbout tCe aeutralitc of tCe eceatoral supePvlsloa kutCoritc. Candidacy Announcement or Electoral Program? Ia his message, Preslneat Bouteflik pPeseaten k clst of tCe achievemeats of his knministratloa oveP tCe pkst two necades. He Peminden tCe Algerians of his effoPts to end tCe bcoody aoaflat of tCe 1990s (Peferren to ks tCe “black necade”) following tCe annucmeat of eceatloas woa bc tCe Islamla Salvktloa FPoat la DeaembeP 1991. He also Pecallen his eaoaomla successes, PepPeseaten la “fPeeing tCe aouatry fPom nebts, tCe aolleatloa of exchange PesePves and tCe aPektloa of significant pubcla skvings” la k way that enabcen “Algeria to wltCstand tCe aollapse of oil prices la Peaeat cears and allowen lt to aoatlaue nowa tCe pktC of nevecopmeat “.(1) He also bPought up tCe social achievemeats of his knministratloa, speaking kbout tCe pPovlsloa of Cousing, wkteP, eaergy, enucatloa, CealtC and empcocmeat oppoPtunitles, aombkting uaempcocmeat and suppoPting tCe ksaeasloa of womea la tCe pocltical, eaoaomla and social seatoPs. He expPessen his netePminatloa to aoatlaue his pPeslneatial nutles, nesplte acknowcedging his CealtC, Pecalling his Poce la tCe war of natlonal clberatloa that cen to Algeria’s clberatloa fPom FPench aoconialism la 1962. The Pp eslneat acknowcennen tCe many challenges Ce woucn have to aoafPoat; most aPucially building k “aompetltlve and pPonuatlve eaoaomc” to fPee tCe aouatry of exaesslve oil nependency. He also Peaognizen tCe ePosloa of tCe aouatry’s Pesources, tCe spPekn of aorruptloa and cow pPonuatlvltc, and callen foP natlonal pocltical aoaseasus to meet tCese challenges. He pPomlsen that lf Ce wePe to wla la tCe 2019 pPeslneatial eceatloas that “la tCe aouPse of this cear, all tCe pocltical, eaoaomla and social forces of tCe populace will aoaveae k natlonal scmposlum that will estkbclsC k aoaseasus oa tCe PefoPms and transfoPmktloas that tCe aouatry sCoucn undergo la ordeP to no fuPtCeP than eveP la building lts nestiny”. He also callen foP grekteP partlalpktloa of alvil soaletc la tCe fight against aorruptloa, enhancing tCe altlzen’s aoatributloa to tCe aonduat of cocal kffairs, and k grekteP Poce foP tCe privkte seatoP la job aPektloa and increksing tCe aouatry’s income. Thela slstence of Algeria’s Puling estkbclsCmeat oa tCe aominatloa of Bouteflik, nesplte wlnespPekn popular criticism that has touchen oa ridicuce, indicates that tCePe ls ao “natural” alternatlve agreen upoa bc tCe Puling eclte and subsequeatly k neslPe to postpoae tCe aoaflat oa this lssue. Indeen, tCe 1 “The full text of tCe message fPom Preslneat Bouteflik to tCe natloa to announce his candidacy foP tCe pPeslneatial eceatloas”, Rknlo Algerie, 10/2/2019, last accessen 13/2/2109 kt: Cttps://blt.ly/2Sm6Q74 1 Situation Assessement | 17 February 2019 lssue aoncerning Algerians (nesplte tCe nlsaoateat and indignatloa fPom clmlting candidacy to oae pePsoa ks lf tCePe ls ao otCeP optloa) ls aot to Peplace oae pePsoa fPom tCe Puling eclte wltC anotCeP, but ratCeP PefoPms and tCe natuPe of tCe aext Pegime. The mostl mpoPtant cegacy that Bouteflik can cekve behind, kpart fPom auPtailing tCe pocltical Poce of tCe armc, to k large exteat, ls tCe pocltical and eaoaomla PefoPms that Ce can eaforce nuring his pPeslnency. Election Mechanism Thls ls tCe fiPst pPeslneatial eceatloa following Algeria’s aoastltutlonal kmendmeat of March 2016, la which pPeslneatial mandates (lasting 5 cears) wePe Penefiaen to be Peaewkbce only once. The ce eatloas of pril 2019 are Penulaten bc Organic Lkw No. 10-16, lssuen la unust 2016,(2) which pPescribes that tCe pPeslneatial eceatloas be Cecn bc single-mkjoritc suffrage bc kbsocute mkjoritc, wltC tCe posslbilitc of moving to k seaond Pound la which tCe most successfuc candidates will partlalpkte la tCe fiPst sessloa la tCe case of failuPe to achieve kbsocute mkjoritc.(3) The Pp eslneatial eceatloas, according to tCe organic law, undergo fouP main stages: • The fiPst stage: Iavoking tCe eceatorate bc pPeslneatial neaPee (Article 136). Thls shall be noae ao moPe than 90 days of tCe polling. • The seaond stage: Submltting k candidacy fice to tCe oastltutlonal ouncil. The fice must aoatain k aolleatloa of pePsonal noaumeats and k clst of kt cekst 600 indivlnual signatuPes of eceaten membePs of municipal, stkte oP parliameatary aouncils nlstributen kaPoss kt cekst 25 of tCe 48 stktes oP kt cekst 60,000 indivlnual signatuPes of peopce PegistePen la tCe eceatoral PegisteP, wltC ao cess than 1,500 signatuPes la each stkte. Thls shall be submltten 45 days kfteP tCe publicatloa of tCe pPeslneatial neaPee calling foP tCe eceating of tCe eceatorate (Article 142). • The third stage: Exkmining tCe validitc of tCe aominatloas and k nealsloa bc tCe oastltutlonal ouncil tCePeoa, wlthin 10 days of tCe fices being submltten. Then ealsloa shall be pubclsCen la tCe official journal. • The fouPtC stage: voting begins. Most Prominent Competitors Around 172 candidates submltten tCelP aominatloas bc tCe end of January 2019, including partc ceknePs and independeats. The oastltutlonal ouncil still has to aoaslneP tCe validitc of tCelP aominatloas, but tCe aompetltloa will likely be clmlten to three candidates: 2 Repubcla of Algeria, Ministry of tCe IaterioP, Local ommunitles and UPbanizktloa, Organic Lkw No. 10 - 16 daten 22 DCu'cqk'dah 1437, aorresponding to 25 unust 2016, Pelating to tCe eceatoral scstem, Journal Officiel No. 50, last accessen 8/2/2019, kt: Cttps://blt.ly/2SLcEvc 3 Articles 137-138 2 Situation Assessement | 17 February 2019 Abdelaziz Bouteflika bnelazlz Bouteflik ls tCe stPongest candidate la tCe upaoming pPeslneatial eceatloas. He ls tCe candidate la Algeria knowa foP tCe pPeslneatial alliance uniting tCe Nktlonal Llberatloa FPoat (FLN) partc that has Pucen since independence and tCe Nktlonal Democratla Rally (ND ), tCe seaPetary- neaeral of which ls Algerian Prime MinisteP Ahmen Ouyahia.
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    THE CHALLENGES TO THE DEMOCRATIC SHIFT IN ALGERIA: BEFORE AND AFTER BOUTEFLIKA Abdelmadjid Bouguedra Université Oran2 BIBLID [1133-8571] 28 (2021) 201.1-16 Resumen: Este artículo tiene como objetivo ofrecer una visión interna del cambio democrático argelino, antes y después del gobierno de Bouteflika, tanto a nivel político como social. El artículo refleja la realidad del ciudadano argelino bajo un sistema que durante mucho tiempo no ha logrado satisfacer las aspiraciones populares de justicia social, igualdad y democracia. Proyectando luz sobre algunos elementos clave que plantean un reto para el establecimiento de un verdadero cambio democrático, el artículo se centra en examinar la vida cotidiana de las personas –y sus impedimentos– en un país que se identifica a sí mismo como una democracia en el discurso oficial y en los medios de comunicación estatales. También muestra cómo el despertar popular ha instado a los pasados regímenes a ir evolucionando gradualmente, y a veces de mala gana, hacia un cambio democrático. Palabras clave: Cambio democrático, resistencia pacífica, corrupción, reformas, Argelia. Abstract: This article aims to give an insider view of the Algerian democratic shift, before and after the Bouteflika rule, at both the political and social levels. The article reflects the reality of the Algerian citizen under a system that has long failed to meet the people’s aspirations for social justice, equality and democracy. By shedding light on some key elements challenging the establishment of a real democratic change, the article focuses on examining people’s daily life –and obstacles– in a country that self-identifies as a democracy in the official discourse and the state media outlets.
  • Algeria's Election Is a Make-Or-Break Moment | the Washington Institute

    Algeria's Election Is a Make-Or-Break Moment | the Washington Institute

    MENU Policy Analysis / PolicyWatch 3225 Algeria’s Election Is a Make-or-Break Moment by Sarah Feuer Dec 10, 2019 Also available in Arabic ABOUT THE AUTHORS Sarah Feuer Dr. Sarah Feuer, an expert on politics and religion in North Africa, is the Rosenbloom Family Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy's Geduld Program on Arab Politics. Brief Analysis The vote’s outcome will not have much legitimacy in the eyes of the people, so Washington should focus on urging all parties to lay the groundwork for longer-term reforms aimed at breaking the political deadlock. n December 12, nearly ten months after demonstrators across the country took to the streets in protest of O President Abdelaziz Bouteflika running for a fifth term, Algeria will elect his successor. Calling itself “Hirak,” the remarkably peaceful protest movement perceived Bouteflika’s candidacy as a provocation, since he had scarcely appeared in public after suffering a stroke in 2013. And though he rescinded his candidacy in April, the Hirak began calling for more radical changes, including an end to the power structures that have ruled the country since its independence from France in 1962. In response, army chief of staff Ahmed Gaid Salah stepped in to assert control over the political process, despite the parliament’s selection of an interim president. In addition to arresting activists and putting some of his establishment rivals on trial, he pressed for an election to be held by year’s end. The political situation has since devolved into a confrontation between the Hirak and the army.