the atlantic world and virginia, 1550–1624 QW Published for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, Virginia, by the University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill The atlantic world and virginia, 1550–1624 edited by peter c. mancall QW The Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture is sponsored jointly by the College of William and Mary and the Colonial Williamsburg Foundation. On November 15, 1996, the Institute adopted the present name in honor of a bequest from Malvern H. Omohundro, Jr.
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The Atlantic world and Virginia, 1550–1624 / edited by Peter C. Mancall. p. cm. Essays from an international conference entitled The Atlantic world and Virginia, 1550–1624, held in Williamsburg, Va., Mar. 4–7, 2004 Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn-13: 978-0-8078-3159-5 (cloth : alk. paper) isbn-13: 978-0-8078-5848-6 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Virginia—History—Colonial period, ca. 1600–1775—Congresses. 2. America—History—To 1810—Congresses. 3. Great Britain—Colonies— America—History—16th century—Congresses. 4. Great Britain—Colonies— America—History—17th century—Congresses. 5. Europe—Colonies—America— History—Congresses. 6. Acculturation—America—History—Congresses. 7. Virginia—Ethnic relations—History—16th century—Congresses. 8. Virginia— Ethnic relations—History—17th century—Congresses. 9. America—Ethnic relations—History—16th century—Congresses. 10 America—Ethnic relations— History—17th century—Congresses. I. Mancall, Peter C. II. Omohundro Institute of Early American History & Culture. f229.a875 2007 975.5'02—dc22 2007000103
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This volume received indirect support from an unrestricted book publications grant awarded to the Institute by the L. J. Skaggs and Mary C. Skaggs Foundation of Oakland, California.
cloth 11 10 09 08 07 54321 paper 11 10 09 08 07 54321 preface
ThecontentsofThe Atlantic World and Virginia, 1550–1624, had their ori- gin in an international conference of the same title, held in Williamsburg, Virginia, March 4–7, 2004. The intention of the conference and this re- sulting volume is to commemorate the four hundredth anniversary of the Jamestown settlement by approaching it from current historical perspec- tives on the encounters, collisions, and collaborations of peoples and politi- cal entities in North and South America, Africa, and Europe in the period surrounding contact between the inhabitants of Tsenacommacah and En- glishmen. The Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture orga- nized the program. Recognizing the importance of adding an intellectual component to the mix of Jamestown commemorative events, Gillian Cell, then-provost of the College of William and Mary, endorsed the undertaking and authorized the College’s financial backing. In addition, the Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, the Gilder Lehrman Institute of American His- tory, the Reed Foundation, and the Virginia Foundation for the Humanities sponsored the conference, along with the Institute. The support of these organizations made possible the convening of Native American tribal repre- sentatives from the Chesapeake region and scholars from Africa, Australia, Europe, and the Americas. The sponsors’ generous underwriting enabled the convocation of more than seventy participants and facilitated the atten- dance of about five hundred people at the public four-day event. In conceptualizing the conference, I envisioned a mosaic of groups, re- gions, individuals, and influences in play around the Atlantic that formed the backdrop for the establishment of Jamestown in 1607 and the years following to 1624 (at which point the Virginia Company lost the politi- cal struggle to retain its outpost on the James, inaugurating royal control over the colony). Published here is a collection of essays developed from the original presentations. The Atlantic World and Virginia’s premise is that reaching for a transnational vantage point can augment comprehension of the contacts between peoples from different continents and cultures and the resulting formations of new societies. Shifting forces and internal contests for political, economic, and cultural domination around the Atlantic litto- ral in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries shaped the context in which the events at Jamestown occurred. The timing of the settlement came at a transition point between an early Atlantic era of regional exchanges and a transatlantic system of merchant capital centered in the Americas and based on slavery and the plantation economy. Displacements of populations and consolidations of power in many places contributed to this transformation. For the local inhabitants of Tsenacommacah, perhaps the most remarkable sight was not the arrival of three ships but the strangers’ settling on an island the Paspaheghs deemed waste ground not fit for planting. The ex- changes and conflicts between the Powhatans and the English constituted a local story most immediately meaningful for the participants; ultimately, though, their encounters and Africans’ incorporation into their midst would have consequences for shaping the world in which we live. Most elusive to historical understanding is common people’s experiences, sometimes re- membered through oral traditions, often fragmented or lost to memory. Yet their quotidian existence is at the very core of the human story. Our grasp of others’ lives is always incomplete; our task is always to do better. At one time or another, nearly all the Institute staff played a role in the monumental undertaking of publicizing the conference, selecting the pro- gram, putting it into print, planning conference events, coordinating its lo- gistics, and preparing this volume. Ronald Hoffman’s directorial hand was there at every step of the way. He and Karen Ordahl Kupperman, Professor of History at New York University, were instrumental in shaping the confer- ence program, and he gave helpful input on papers for the volume. Beverly Smith and Sally D. Mason were crucial to the success of the conference. Mendy C. Gladden efficiently organized the conference papers into a set for the publication process. Daniel H. Usner, Jr., and three other outside read- ers gave expert and constructive advice on the essays, and Peter C. Mancall provided important critical guidance to the authors in revising their essays for the volume. Manuscript editor M. Kathryn Burdette has demonstrated her editorial mastery in honing the contributors’ prose, amassing the illus- trations, and integrating the pieces into a volume fit for print. The final product is a testament to the collective endeavor that went into its making.
Fredrika J. Teute Editor of Publications Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture
vi Preface contents
Preface v Introduction Peter C. Mancall 1
part one: native american settings
Tsenacommacah and the Atlantic World Daniel K. Richter 29 Between Old World and New: Oconee Valley Residents and the Spanish Southeast, 1540–1621 Joseph Hall 66 Escape from Tsenacommacah: Chesapeake Algonquians and the Powhatan Menace James D. Rice 97
part two: africa and the atlantic
The Caravel and the Caravan: Reconsidering Received Wisdom in the Sixteenth-Century Sahara E. Ann McDougall 143 The Gulf of Guinea and the Atlantic World David Northrup 170 Central African Leadership and the Appropriation of European Culture Linda Heywood and John Thornton 194 African Identity and Slave Resistance in the Portuguese Atlantic James H. Sweet 225
part three: european models
The Multinational Commodification of Tobacco, 1492–1650: An Iberian Perspective Marcy Norton and Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert 251 Revisioning the ‘‘French Atlantic’’: or, How to Think about the French Presence in the Atlantic, 1550–1625 Philip P. Boucher 274 Kings, Captains, and Kin: French Views of Native American Political Cultures in the Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries Peter Cook 307 Virginia’s Other Prototype: The Caribbean Philip D. Morgan 342
part four: intellectual currents
Moral Uncertainty in the Dispossession of Native Americans Andrew Fitzmaurice 383 Discourses of Western Planting: Richard Hakluyt and the Making of the Atlantic World David Harris Sacks 410 Reading Ralegh’s America: Texts, Books, and Readers in the Early Modern Atlantic World Benjamin Schmidt 454 The Genius of Ancient Britain David S. Shields 489
part five: the atlantic world and virginia, 1550–1624
Imperfect Understandings: Rumor, Knowledge, and Uncertainty in Early Virginia James Horn 513 The Iberian Atlantic and Virginia J. H. Elliott 541 Virginia and the Atlantic World Stuart B. Schwartz 558
Conference Program 571 Index 575 Notes on the Contributors 595 the atlantic world and virginia, 1550–1624 QW The Atlantic World, ca. 1600. Drawn by Rebecca Wrenn
This page intentionally left blank Peter C. Mancall introduction QW
The local inhabitants of Tsenacommacah, the Paspaheghs, knew their en- vironment well. They used the best lands in the region for their home sites and fields, knew where to hunt and fish nearby, and eschewed swamp land since it attracted mosquitoes and could not be farmed. Hence, in the spring of 1607, they must have viewed askance the group of English colonizers who had sailed up the Chesapeake to establish a fortified camp on a marshy island that the Indians deemed unworthy of settling themselves. It was not much of a village, nor did the newcomers seem like much of a threat to the Powhatan Confederacy that dominated the peoples of Tsenacommacah. But unlike earlier English visitors who had arrived farther south in the mid- 1580s at Roanoke in modern-day North Carolina, these immigrants proved to have more staying power. Despite difficult times at first, including peri- odic confrontations between the Powhatans and the English, the settlement named after King James survived. It became a permanent intrusion into In-
This volume grew from a remarkable and innovative conference sponsored by the Omo- hundro Institute of Early American History and Culture. Fredrika J. Teute designed the conference and subsequently played a crucial role in developing the individual essays here and the overall concept of the volume. Her energy led to a genuine circum- Atlantic effort and, in the process, made a lasting contribution to our understanding of the early modern world. Her vision for this book and wise counsel were invaluable for me from the moment I joined the project. I also want to thank Daniel H. Usner, Jr., and the other reviewers, who each provided detailed analyses of specific essays and helped the authors develop their arguments for this collection. Ron Hoffman, in addition to his role in the organization of the conference, also shaped particular essays here. Kathy Burdette performed remarkable copy-editing, and Mendy C. Gladden provided cru- cial support throughout the process of organizing the volume. All of the essays in this collection have benefited from the rigorous and thoughtful insights that are defining elements of the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture’s publi- cation program. In developing this introduction, I thank Lisa Bitel, Fredrika J. Teute, and Kathy Burdette for their extraordinary efforts, as well as the Huntington Library for permis- sion to reproduce the images here. dian Country and another uninvited outpost of Europeans along the mar- 1 gins of the Atlantic Ocean. Although the English managed to keep their outpost on the James River alive, it had no great significance at the time. Yet, when the English crossed the Atlantic bound for the shores of the Chesapeake, they joined a migra- tory stream that was altering the four continents bordering the ocean. By the mid-seventeenth century, that system had put in motion effects that would produce much of the modern world as we know it today—a West- ern Hemisphere in which most people speak European languages; an Afri- can diaspora that has spread people across the Americas and, to a lesser extent, Europe; a drastically reduced Native American population that has survived through cultural adjustment; and a global market that circulates goods around the world. Such transformations make the founding of James- town an almost trivial event. The essays in this volume aim to quite literally place the beginnings of Virginia in the history of the larger Atlantic Basin. Over the last quarter-century, scores of historians have described how parts of the Atlantic world came into being in the early modern age. Some have focused explicitly on migration and argued that it was a common occurrence whose significance can only be understood by looking at the myriad movements of early modern peoples. Others have analyzed the en- vironmental consequences of the transatlantic exchange, including the mi- gration of animals, which (together with people) remade landscapes across 2 the Atlantic Basin and facilitated the movement of devastating diseases.
1. ‘‘George Percy’s Account of the Voyage to Virginia and the Colony’s First Days,’’ in Warren M. Billings, ed., The Old Dominion in the Seventeenth Century: A Docu- mentary History of Virginia, 1606–1689 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1975), 25; James Horn, A Land as God Made It: Jamestown and the Birth of America (New York, 2005), 56. 2. For works on the emergence of the Atlantic world, see, for instance, Bernard Bailyn, Atlantic History: Concept and Contours (Cambridge, Mass., 2005); Alison Games, ‘‘Atlantic History: Definitions, Challenges, and Opportunities,’’ American His- torical Review, CXI (2006), 741–757; J. H. Elliott, The Old World and the New: 1492– 1650, The Wiles Lectures (Cambridge, 1970); J. H. Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492–1831 (New Haven, Conn., 2006); John Thornton, Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400–1800, 2d ed. (Cambridge, 1998); Alan Taylor, American Colonies: The Settling of North America (New York, 2001); David Armitage and Michael J. Braddick, eds., The British Atlan- tic World, 1500–1800 (Basingstoke, 2002). Migration: see esp. Bailyn, The Peopling of British North America: An Introduction (New York, 1986); Bailyn, Voyagers to the West: A Passage in the Peopling of America on the Eve of the Revolution (New York, 1986); Nicholas Canny, ed., Europeans on the
2 Introduction Many have examined the rise of the slave trade and Africans’ participa- tion in it, primarily as its victims, though other early modern peoples also became enslaved once Europeans decided to extract American natural re- sources and sought the labor to do so. But it is not only such grand topics that have attracted scholars. Historians and anthropologists have examined the movement of specific goods such as sugar, rice, and furs; one enterpris- ing scholar compiled a five-volume work tracing the rise of tobacco and its spread across the Atlantic world. Even the potato, an American tuber that purportedly first traveled to England with Sir Walter Ralegh, has its own 3 historians. Yet while American plants improved the lives of Europeans, the westward movement across the Atlantic of infectious diseases took a horren-
Move: Studies on European Migration, 1500–1800 (Oxford, 1994); Alison Games, Mi- gration and the Origins of the English Atlantic World (Cambridge, Mass., 1999); Ida Altman and James Horn, eds., ‘‘To Make America’’: European Emigration in the Early Modern Period (Berkeley, Calif., 1991); David Eltis, ed., Coerced and Free Migration: Global Perspectives (Stanford, Calif., 2002). Environment: see William Cronon, Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England (New York, 1983); Alfred Crosby, Ecological Imperial- ism: The Biological Expansion of Europe (Cambridge, 1986); Timothy Silver, ANew Face on the Countryside: Indians, Colonists, and Slaves in South Atlantic Forests, 1500– 1800 (Cambridge, 1990); Jon T. Coleman, Vicious: Wolves and Men in America (New Haven, Conn., 2004), 1–143; Virginia DeJohn Anderson, Creatures of Empire: How Domestic Animals Transformed Early America (New York, 2004); Elinor G. K. Mel- ville, A Plague of Sheep: Environmental Consequences of the Conquest of Mexico (Cam- bridge, 1997). 3. Few areas of early modern scholarship have received as much serious attention as slavery and the slave trade. See, for instance, Barbara L. Solow, ed., Slavery and the Rise of the Atlantic System (Cambridge, 1991); David Eltis, The Rise of African Slavery in the Americas (Cambridge, 2000); ‘‘New Perspectives on the Transatlantic Slave Trade,’’ special issue of William and Mary Quarterly, 3d Ser., LVIII (January 2001); ‘‘Slaveries in the Atlantic World,’’ special issue of WMQ, 3d Ser., LIX (July 2002); and Allan Gallay, The Indian Slave Trade: The Rise of the English Empire in the American South, 1670–1717 (New Haven, Conn., 2002). For sugar, see Sidney Wilfred Mintz, Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History (New York, 1985), and Stuart B. Schwartz, ed., Tropical Babylons: Sugar and the Making of the Atlantic World, 1450–1680 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2004); for rice, see Peter A. Coclanis, The Shadow of a Dream: Economic Life and Death in the South Carolina Low Country, 1670–1920 (New York, 1989); for the trade in fur (and deerskins), see, e.g., Eric R. Wolf, Europe and the People without History (Berkeley, 1982), 158–194; for tobacco, see Jerome E. Brooks, Tobacco: Its History Illustrated by the Books, Manuscripts, and Engravings in the Library of George Arents, Jr., 5 vols.
Introduction 3 dous toll on the indigenous peoples of the Americas. The most significant population decline probably took place before 1700, though viruses such as smallpox continued to devastate American populations well beyond 1800, when other lethal, infectious diseases, notably tuberculosis, also arrived in 4 Indian Country. Ideas moved almost as efficiently as goods and diseases. Native Ameri- can and African spiritual beliefs and nature knowledge spread among Eu- ropeans as well as between Indians and Africans. Catholic and Protestant missionaries carried their religious ideologies into Africa and across the Americas, and European concepts about politics, property, and power became rooted wherever newcomers established settlements. Cultures blended in the Atlantic world, evident in the spread of foods from one place to another, in peoples’ dress, and in individuals’ notions of history and cos- mology. In French and Spanish America, the mixing of peoples led to in- tricate elaborations about different castes of individuals—ideas represented not only in legal codes and learned treatises about purity of blood but in sev- 5 eral remarkable series of paintings categorizing racial groups. Indigenous
(New York, 1937–1952). The success of these plants was no coincidence; Europeans in particular continued to look for exotic (to them) plants that could improve their lives. See Londa Schiebinger, Plants and Empire: Colonial Bioprospecting in the Atlantic World (Cambridge, Mass., 2004). Potato: Redcliffe N. Salaman, The History and Social Influence of the Potato (Cam- bridge, 1949); see also D. Humbert, Histoire de la pomme de terre (Nîmes, 1992); Larry Zuckerman, The Potato: How the Humble Spud Rescued the Western World (Boston, 1998); and Michael Pollan, The Botany of Desire: A Plant’s-Eye View of the World (New York, 2001),181–238. 4. Scholars continue to debate the extent and effects of population loss in the Ameri- cas caused by the arrival of diseases from Eurasia, but all agree that increased exposure to Europeans and their animals meant repeated exposure to diseases for which Native Americans possessed no acquired immunities. See, among many sources, Russell Thornton, American Indian Holocaust and Survival: A Population History since 1492 (Norman, Okla., 1987); Jared M. Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies (New York, 1997); Noble David Cook, Born to Die: Disease and New World Conquest, 1492–1650 (Cambridge, 1998); Suzanne Austin Alchon, Native Society and Disease in Colonial Ecuador (Cambridge, 1991); Elizabeth A. Fenn, Pox Americana: The Great Smallpox Epidemic of 1775–82 (New York, 2001); Daniel K. Richter, Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America (Cam- bridge, Mass., 2001); David S. Jones, Rationalizing Epidemics: Meanings and Uses of American Indian Mortality since 1600 (Cambridge, Mass., 2004). 5. For Native Americans’ lifeways and ideas influencing Europeans’ consciousness, see, e.g., Anthony Pagden, European Encounters with the New World (New Haven,
4 Introduction peoples resisted these new ways of ordering affairs in their temporal and spiritual worlds, but in the long run Europeans tended to prevail, even if that meant using violence to eradicate Native Americans’ resistance. But the reshaping of Native America did not always involve armed struggle. By the late eighteenth century, and earlier in many places, Native American adap- tations to European expansion across the Atlantic had effectively remade their communities. Some, including the Carolina Algonquians, painted by the English artist John White in Roanoke in the 1580s, disappeared as distinctive groups; others found ways to retain their cultural identity de- spite the continued presence of European colonists on lands they once con- 6 trolled.
1993); Anthony Grafton, New Worlds, Ancient Texts: The Power of Tradition and the Shock of Discovery (Cambridge, Mass., 1992); Stuart B. Schwartz, ed., Implicit Under- standings: Observing, Reporting, and Reflecting on the Encounters between Europeans and Other Peoples in the Early Modern Era (Cambridge, 1994); Karen Ordahl Kupper- man, ed., America in European Consciousness, 1493–1750 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1995); and Susan Scott Parrish, American Curiosity: Cultures of Natural History in the Colo- nial British Atlantic World (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2006). For the adoption of goods, see James Axtell, ‘‘The Indian Impact on English Colonial Culture,’’ in Axtell, The Euro- pean and the Indian: Essays in the Ethnohistory of Colonial North America (New York, 1981), 272–315; and Timothy J. Shannon, ‘‘Dressing for Success on the Mohawk Fron- tier: Hendrick, William Johnson, and the Indian Fashion,’’ WMQ, 3d Ser., LIII (1996), 13–42. For the images, see Ilona Katzew, Casta Painting: Images of Race in Eighteenth- Century Mexico (New Haven, Conn., 2004); for discussions of French and Spanish con- cerns with the purity of blood, see Guillaume Aubert, ‘‘‘The Blood of France’: Race and Purity of Blood in the French Atlantic World,’’ and María Elena Martínez, ‘‘The Black Blood of New Spain: Limpieza de Sangre, Racial Violence, and Gendered Power in Early Colonial Mexico,’’ WMQ, 3d Ser., LXI (2004), 439–478, 479–520. 6. The suppression of indigenous resistance and strategies of survival have been ably described by historians of Spanish America; see, among others, Steven W. Hackel, Children of Coyote, Missionaries of Saint Francis: Indian-Spanish Relations in Colo- nial California, 1769–1850 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2005); James F. Brooks, Captives and Cousins: Slavery, Kinship, and Community in the Southwest Borderlands (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2002); Ramón A. Gutiérrez, When Jesus Came, the Corn Mothers Went Away: Marriage, Sexuality, and Power in New Mexico, 1500–1846 (Stanford, Calif., 1991); Nancy M. Farriss, Maya Society under Colonial Rule: The Collective Enterprise of Sur- vival (Princeton, N.J., 1984). There was no single strategy for success in Native American communities; some peoples managed to retain parts of their lands, while others moved. The best way to assess the situation is through case studies. Among the most revealing are James H. Merrell, The Indians’ New World: Catawbas and Their Neighbors from European Con-
Introduction 5 plate 1. Map from Pietro Martire d’Anghiera [Peter Martyr d’Anghera], De orbe novo, ed. Richard Hakluyt (Paris, 1587). By permis- sion of The Huntington Library, San Marino, California Many of the developments that had already begun and would eventually change the demography of the Atlantic Basin were not obvious before 1625, but the clues were there for canny observers. A map that appeared in a Latin edition of Peter Martyr’s De orbe novo, published in Paris in 1587, provided a visual hint of the territorial expropriations and representational displace- ments occurring in the century after Christopher Columbus’s historic first voyage to the West. The book was not just another edition of an impor- tant text describing parts of the Americas. Its publication was arranged by the younger Richard Hakluyt, the most avid promoter of the English colo- nization of eastern North America. As such, it is not surprising that the map included the term ‘‘Virginia,’’ the first time any continental map had included the designation. (The map also included California and claimed it was English territory by right of Sir Francis Drake’s circumnavigation several years earlier.) Despite these new place names, much of the Western Hemisphere remained in Native American hands. A generation later, how- ever, European maps revealed more extensive claims, although most of the Americas and the African interior remained in indigenous hands. Who con- trolled the telling of the story is a factor that too many American historians have ignored, especially during major anniversaries of 1607.
The Anniversary Volume as Cultural Artifact Just short of the centennial of Jamestown’s founding, in 1705, Robert Bev- erley’s History and Present State of Virginia, in Four Parts appeared in print in London. Unaware of, or indifferent to, the impending anniversary, he wrote not to commemorate it but because ‘‘no Body has ever presented the World, with a tolerable Account of our Plantations.’’ There had been ‘‘some few General Descriptions’’ of the place earlier, but they had ‘‘been calcu- lated more for the Benefit of the Bookseller, than for the Information of Mankind.’’ Beverley celebrated the importance of his Virginia, but he made no great claims about the significance of its origins. Publications of French translations occurred in Paris and Amsterdam in 1707, not as anniversary volumes, but in response to a burgeoning European market for natural his- 7 tories and travel accounts about the expanding world. Beverley devoted one
tact through the Era of Removal (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1989); Daniel K. Richter, The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colo- nization (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1992); and Joshua Piker, Okfuskee: A Creek Indian Town in Colonial America (Cambridge, Mass., 2004). 7. Robert Beverley, The History and Present State of Virginia, in Four Parts (Lon- don, 1705), quotations at sig [A3v] (‘‘Plantations’’) and sig. Ar (‘‘Information of Man-
8 Introduction of the four parts of the History to an ethnographical account of the region’s Indians, explicitly including them in his Virginia. Unlike later narrators of Virginia’s beginnings for whom the ongoing role of Indians would be in- visible, Beverley attended to Native Americans, their customs and values, as integral to the unfolding history of the colony, and he used Indians’ habits as a means of critiquing the shortcomings of his fellow colonists’ behavior. Once the colonial era belonged to another time, the anniversary of James- town’s settlement became noteworthy. During the bicentennial in 1807, Virginians gathered together in Jamestown to commemorate the colony’s founding and to link their new state’s storied past with the heroic efforts of its leaders during the American Revolution. A pamphlet from that bicen- tennial appropriated Jamestown’s origins for political purposes. As such, it began a trend that would be repeated every fifty years. Like later celebra- tions, this one came with its festive trappings, including sailing ships, his- torical lectures, and ritual toasts. The 250th anniversary in 1857 inspired at least one poet to reflect on the glories of the past. With the nation then con- sumed by the passions that would soon ignite civil war, James Barron Hope wrote wistfully about the tragic passing of ‘‘the poor Indian’’ and celebrated the founding of the new settlement.
And here, at last, there rose the rambling town, A smile contending with the forest’s frown, And busy sounds were borne upon the breeze, 8 The swarming hum of England’s settling bees. kind’’); Beverley, Histoire de la Virginie . . . (Amsterdam, 1707). Four new editions of John Smith’s Generall History were published in Leyden or the Hague 1707 as part of Pieter van der Aa’s Naaukeurige versameling der gedenk-waardigste zee en land-reysen na Oost en West-Indiën ...,orhisDe aanmerkenswaardigste en alomberoemde zee-en landreizen der Portugeezen, Spanjaarden, Engelsen, en allerhande natiën. These works were only part of Aa’s body of travel accounts published at the time, which also included a Dutch translation of Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas’s account of such authorities as Diego de Lopes and Amerigo Vespucci. See John Alden and Dennis C. Landis, eds., European Americana: A Chronological Guide to Works Printed in Europe Relating to the Americas, 1493–1776 (New York, 1980–1997), V, 98–99; Antonius de Herrera et al., Vyf verscheide voyagien der Kastiliaanen en Portugezen ter ontdekking gedaan naar de West-Indien, in de jaren 1500 en 1501 ...(Leyden,1706).Aaalso published some of the parts of his larger work as separate fascicules, including Twee Scheeps-togten van Kapiteyn Johan Smith, beyde gedaan na Nieuw Engeland ...(Leyden,1707). 8. Report of the Proceedings of the Late Jubilee at James-town, in Commemoration of the 13th May, the Second Centesimal Anniversary of the Settlement of Virginia (Peters- burg, Va., 1807; HEH 78538), 3–6, 11, 16–17, 19, 46–48; James Barron Hope, A Poem
Introduction 9 plate 2. Title page from Report of the Proceedings of the Late Jubilee at James-town ...(Petersburg, Va., 1807). By permission of The Huntington Library, San Marino, California Throughout the nineteenth century, serious historians showed no steady interest in Jamestown or its settling. Yet anniversary celebrations continued to inspire rhetorical flourishes. During the preparations for the tercenten- nial, observers once again traced direct links between the founding of Jamestown and the growth and development of the United States. None did so more effectively than Lyon G. Tyler, the president of the College of William and Mary. Tyler, who had recently completed a history of James- town and contributed to a multivolume history of the nation, summed up the meaning of Jamestown: ‘‘But for the plantation at Jamestown there would have been no Virginia, no New England, and no United States.’’ To Tyler, what happened in Virginia was essentially a series of ‘‘firsts,’’ or, as he put it, ‘‘the most important events affecting the destiny of the United States, viz.: The settlement itself at this place introducing the institutions of marriage, the right of trial by jury, the Protestant religion, and all the principles of En- glish civilization; the birth of the first white child; the conversion of the first heathen; the arrival of the first cargo of negroes; the establishment of the first free school,’’ and even the first stand against royal action. Tyler knew that Jamestown itself was ‘‘never anything more than a mere village with some considerable buildings of a metropolitan character; but as the first in- vention, it is, in the language of Bacon, ‘of more dignity and merit’ than the imperial cities of New York, New Orleans, Philadelphia, Washington, or Chicago.’’ Jamestown’s significance was that of a relic, valued because from its struggles came a nation. ‘‘Hither the pilgrim may come in years far distant,’’ Tyler concluded, ‘‘to behold some last sign of those who laid the foundation-stone of the great republic.’’ Others, too, promoted the impor- tance of the anniversary, including the Daughters of the American Revo- lution, who wanted to see a statue of John Smith erected at Jamestown, and President Theodore Roosevelt, who encouraged other nations to send ships to Virginia to join in the celebration. At the same time, however, early- twentieth-century anthropologists were conducting field research to estab- lish the cultural continuity and survival of specific Virginia tribal groups, and the American Anthropological Association dedicated most of its Janu- ary 1907 issue to articles on Virginia Indians as a timely contribution to the 9 Jamestown anniversary. on the Two Hundred and Fiftieth Anniversary of the English Settlement at Jamestown (Richmond, Va., 1857; HEH 77489), quotations at 6 and 14. 9. Lyon G. Tyler, The Cradle of the Republic: Jamestown and the James River (Rich- mond, Va., 1900); Tyler, England in America, 1580–1652, vol. IV of The American Na-
Introduction 11 By the time scholars gathered in Williamsburg fifty years later, the schol- arly academy had finally come to focus squarely on Jamestown. To be sure, filiopietism continued to mark the anniversaries, manifested in ephemera such as a special issue of the Virginia Gazette. But scholars who met in 1957 to recast the origins of the colony took a hard look at the colony’s past. Some examined how Natives and newcomers dealt with each other, whereas others took a far more critical look at Virginia during its early decades. Still, despite the shift, some nationalist tendencies lingered in the scholar- ship. ‘‘At the beginning of the seventeenth century,’’ wrote James Morton Smith, the editor of the Institute of Early American History and Culture’s anniversary volume, ‘‘all America was a vast expanse of the unknown and the unexpected.’’ By the end of the seventeenth century, as Smith put it, ‘‘it was becoming increasingly clear that the emerging civilization of the En- glish colonies was something more than a transatlantic projection of En- gland.’’ If Smith’s comments echoed the celebratory assertions of the past —he quoted John Locke’s famous dictum that ‘‘in the beginning, all the world was America’’—the scholarship in this volume nonetheless reflected 10 the emergence of a more nuanced view of Jamestown and early Virginia. The 1957 volume, like all works of history, was a product of its specific moment. Reflecting postwar America’s sense of distinctiveness, the over- arching interpretation was an explanation of Virginia’s history in situ as a growth of local attachments and separation from an English imperial out- look. The contributors emphasized the development of Virginia, including its historiography, its social structure and politics, and its relations with Native Americans. Two of the essays, though, were harbingers of historio- graphical turns that reached fruition in the latter part of the twentieth cen- tury. One provided a view from Indian Country; the other cast a glance to- ward the larger Atlantic world. Together, these essays point to the historical tion: A History (New York, 1904); Tyler, First Settlement at Jamestown ([Williams- burg, Va.?], 1895; HEH 119972), 1, 5; Mrs. A. A. Blow, An Address Delivered before the Daughters of the American Revolution at Their Congress Held in Washington, D.C., April, 1905 (n.p., [1905?]; HEH 118844), quotations at 3 and 4. Roosevelt’s procla- mation appeared in a brief pamphlet describing Jamestown’s history for the benefit of those attending the commemoration; see Address at the Opening of the Jamestown Ex- position, April 26, 1907 ([Washington, D.C., 1907]; HEH 49942), 5; American An- thropologist, N.S., IX (1907), 31–152. 10. Virginia Gazette: Jamestown Festival Edition, June 28, 1957 (Williamsburg, 1957; HEH 319634); ‘‘Introduction,’’ in James Morton Smith, ed., Seventeenth- Century America: Essays in Colonial History (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1959), ix, xv.
12 Introduction perspective that shapes this current volume, the interplay of particular cir- 11 cumstances in the context of emerging global systems.
The Essays As this brief historical survey suggests, each generation creates the history 12 of early Virginia that it needs, and the present is no exception. The four hundredth anniversary of Jamestown’s founding has arrived at a moment when scholars are crafting innovative ways to understand the occurrences in Virginia and putting forward new interpretations based on contempo- rary understanding of crucial events. One recent collection aimed to present early Virginia as the origin not of a great nation but of an empire. By con- trast, scholars of the British Empire have paid little attention to what hap- pened there. Jamestown scarcely appeared in the now-standard multiauthor history of the British Empire before 1700, nor does its founding matter in any significant way to a new generation of imperial historians who, together, 13 have revived a once-stale field.
11. ‘‘Introduction,’’ in Smith, ed., Seventeenth-Century America, xv. Nancy Oest- reich Lurie wrote an ethnohistorical account of the internal dynamics of the Powhatan confederacy that affected their reception of the English; Bernard Bailyn included ma- terial relating to migration to the colony from England. See Lurie, ‘‘Indian Cultural Adjustment to European Civilization,’’ and Bailyn, ‘‘Politics and Social Structure in Virginia,’’ in Smith, ed., Seventeenth-Century America, 33–60, 90–115. 12. For the historiography of Virginia specifically and the Chesapeake more gener- ally, see Thad W. Tate, ‘‘Seventeenth-Century Chesapeake and Its Modern Historians,’’ in Tate and David L. Ammerman, eds., The Chesapeake in the Seventeenth Century: Essays on Anglo-American Society (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1979), 3–50. Two preeminent modern historians have also examined Virginia as it appeared in the work of its his- torians in the seventeenth century, thereby revealing patterns in historical interpreta- tion: see Richard S. Dunn, ‘‘Seventeenth-Century Historians of America,’’ in Smith, ed., Seventeenth-Century America; and Alden T. Vaughan, ‘‘The Evolution of Virginia History: Early Historians of the First Colony,’’ in Vaughan and George Athan Billias, eds., Perspectives on Early American History: Essays in Honor of Richard B. Morris (New York, 1973), 9–39. 13. Robert Appelbaum and John Wood Sweet, eds., Envisioning an English Empire: Jamestown and the Making of the North Atlantic World (Philadelphia, 2005) (it should be noted that, despite the title of the volume, the essays within it seem more concerned about establishing early Virginia’s place in a larger Atlantic history than in its creation as a crucial stage in the development of the British Empire); Nicholas P. Canny, ed., Oxford History of the British Empire, I, The Origins of Empire: British Overseas Enter- prise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century (Oxford, 1998). For the new generation of historians mentioned, see, for example, David Armitage, The Ideological Origins of
Introduction 13 The authors whose work appears here reject the earlier teleological no- tions that emphasized the origins of democracy in America. Instead, these scholars recognize the establishment of the settlement for what it was at the time—namely, the creation of another outpost on the margins of expanding European influence. Jamestown itself is in fact a minor player in the drama described in these essays, and those who write about it see it as a commu- nity whose residents and neighbors included Africans and Native Ameri- cans along with Europeans. In this volume, non-Europeans are as impor- tant as the English. The essays here all reveal the ways that large forces operating within the Atlantic world shaped the lives of specific peoples from approximately 1550 to 1625. Some of the authors show Virginia as part of the larger story, but others focus on different arenas in the Atlantic Basin. As a result, the vol- ume’s emphasis reflects this scholarly generation’s understanding of the era from the mid-sixteenth century to the early seventeenth century. This col- lection is an anniversary volume that deemphasizes the narrative of James- town’s significance in favor of essays that examine the meeting of peoples in different regions across the Atlantic world. The first section in this volume focuses on eastern North America, the homeland of the Powhatans and other Native American groups. In- digenous peoples had created complex societies and polities long before Europeans arrived in the sixteenth century. Despite the rather facile gen- eralizations about the likelihood of success offered by promoters, all of the newcomers quickly recognized that they would need to master indigenous protocols. As Daniel K. Richter demonstrates with extraordinary subtlety— in an essay that uses anthropology and linguistics to explain this era—Euro- peans who dealt with Native Americans on either side of the Atlantic Ocean often fell short of Natives’ expectations. Few Europeans were able to master the intricate play of trade, diplomacy, and spirituality that together guided indigenous responses to the Spanish and English. Given the limitations of the documentary record, it is often difficult to know exactly what Indi- ans thought about these interlopers. Did they view Jesuits as open-minded clerics who sought the improvement of indigenous souls or as murderous sorcerers whose baptism of ailing children killed babies? Could leaders of the English mission, most notably John Smith, ever understand how to deal the British Empire (Cambridge, 2001); Niall Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power (New York, 2002), 66– 67; Christine Daniels and Michael V. Kennedy, eds., Negotiated Empires: Centers and Peripheries in the Americas, 1500–1820 (London, 2002).
14 Introduction properly with headmen? Smith and his colleagues could barely grasp Pow- hatan concepts such as weroance. The term, meaning ‘‘he is wealthy,’’ re- ferred to the authority that accrued to an individual who obtained and then redistributed goods. The newcomers had no obvious way to understand the individuals called mamanatowick, a word that included within it the idea of manitou, or power. No European who arrived in the Western Hemisphere had suitable preparation for dealing with such multilayered concepts. By the time the English arrived, changes on the ground in Indian Coun- try had already begun. As Joseph Hall argues, the story starts around 1540, when indigenous peoples in the southeast encountered Spanish explorers who had sailed to mainland North America. The Iberians never launched expeditions in this region as substantial as their invasion of Mexico, but their presence still had an effect on Native Americans, especially since the newcomers inadvertently brought Old World diseases that devastated In- dian communities. From an indigenous perspective, the early Spanish for- 14 ays constituted only the start of what later became a full-blown invasion. Though not obvious to many Europeans, indigenous polities were as complicated as those of the newcomers. Long-standing tensions existed be- tween the Powhatans and their neighbors in Tsenacommacah. As James D. Rice reveals in an essay that breaks away from some historians’ fixation on the Powhatans, other peoples of the Greater Chesapeake manipulated poli- tics in the area, seeking to reduce the hold of the headman whose confeder- acy confronted the English. This region was not a land forgotten by time, as some of the newcomers might have believed since indigenous material culture and architecture differed so markedly from European standards. Instead, when the English arrived, they—like the Spanish conquistadores who traveled with Hernán Cortés to Mexico in 1519—entered into a frac- tious world suffering from conflicts produced by the expansionary visions of particular Native Americans. As a result, various indigenous groups re- sponded to the English, who needed to make alliances if they were going to survive, with competing expectations and demands. The second group of essays further complicates our understanding of the early modern Atlantic world. Here the focus is on Africa. The authors col- lectively explain the background to one of Virginia’s most distinctive events:
14. As David S. Jones has recently argued, the transmission of pathogens alone did not lead to substantial mortality among Americans. Instead, as modern-day infectious disease experts have demonstrated, newly introduced viruses and bacteria proved so deadly because of other stresses placed on American bodies by colonizers, who sought land, goods, labor, and souls. See Jones, ‘‘Virgin Soils Revisited,’’ WMQ, 3d Ser., LX (2003), 703–742.
Introduction 15 the arrival in 1619 of ‘‘20. and odd Negroes’’ from Africa in Jamestown. The legal status of these emigrés is not clear from the surviving documents, though they likely were slaves. But why were they in Virginia before there was serious demand for their labor? Even if there was some demand for bound labor, why did these people come from Africa? The answers to these questions are not obvious. Unless these individuals were captured by Eu- ropeans on the African coast and bundled directly onto ships, their migra- tion across the ocean necessarily involved other Africans. As the studies in this volume reveal, the emergence of the slave trade followed an indigenous logic and was not simply imposed by arriving Europeans. The origins of the slave trade can be traced to commerce within Africa. As E. Ann McDougall reveals in her study of the Sahara, the salt trade in northern Africa was so advanced that its participants had developed the 15 trade language azayr to facilitate long-distance exchange. Profits from the Saharan salt trade allowed some participants to support towns with resi- dent communities of scholars. The trade posed many challenges for Afri- can entrepreneurs, who had to deal with the powerful kin groups that controlled it as well as the regional rules for moving the product. The Saha- ran economy became part of a larger Atlantic commercial network through the efforts of the Sa’adien dynasty of Morocco, who used the port at Agadir (conquered by the Portuguese in 1541 and renamed Santa Cruz) to funnel the resources out of the desert and into the wider world. Salt was only one good produced in parts of Africa. David Northrup’s reconstruction of the economy of the Gulf of Guinea shows that Africans, especially the residents of Benin, had developed commercial networks long before Europeans established themselves in the region. Archaeological analysis reveals that African markets existed as early as the ninth century. By the turn of the first Christian millennium, the region boasted its own gold trade; gold fields were so rich that Africans were willing to trade their excess to Europeans during the fifteenth century. Before the first Euro- peans arrived, Africans had created sophisticated commercial systems that moved desirable goods from producers to consumers, created rules for the
15. A similar development had taken place in the interior of the southeast of the modern-day United States, where Americans had developed what scholars now refer to as ‘‘Mobilian,’’ a lingua franca that facilitated trade from one group to the next before Europeans arrived. For its significance, see James M. Crawford, The Mobilian Trade Language (Knoxville, Tenn., 1978). The origins of the language remain obscure, but it became more important during the colonial period; see Daniel H. Usner, Jr., Indians, Settlers, and Slaves in a Frontier Exchange Economy: The Lower Mississippi Valley be- fore 1783 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1992), 258–259.
16 Introduction exchange of goods, facilitated trade through the development of commercial languages and cowrie shell currency, and enabled economic development. When Europeans traveled to the capital city of the Benin region, they stood awestruck at its large palaces, highly trained artisans, broad thoroughfares, and great wealth. Even residents of smaller communities participated in the gold trade, a sign that the benefits of commerce stretched across the region. Europeans who arrived in West Africa beginning in the fifteenth century recognized that they had to find ways to enter this network if they wanted to extract gold, pepper, and cloth from the region. The Dutch and the English, who began serious trade with West Africans by the latter decades of the sixteenth century, found discriminating consumers who appreciated some of Europe’s finest wares, such as Dutch textiles. Africans traded for Euro- pean cloth because it possessed an aesthetic appeal and an alluring novelty. By the early decades of the seventeenth century, Africans also developed a fondness for tobacco, a product from the Americas that Europeans trans- ported across the Atlantic in order to enhance the prospects of acquiring African goods. Some Africans embraced trade to such an extent that, by the middle of the seventeenth century, they participated in the capture and sale of humans in exchange for commodities produced in Europe for use in the interior capital of Benin and along the coast. The slave trade accelerated after 1650, but its origins lay in the long his- tory of trade among African communities and between Africans and Eu- ropeans. Further, as Linda Heywood and John Thornton reveal in their highly detailed study of Central African elites, certain aspects of European culture had long held a powerful attraction, especially Christianity, literacy, and diplomatic protocols. A painting showing the Kongolese Dom Antonio Manuel receiving last rites from Pope Paul V in the Vatican reveals the ex- tent of cultural borrowings and adaptations. Even Antonio Manuel’s ser- vants dressed like Europeans. By the time the English founded Jamestown, Europeans had long entertained embassies from Kongo, in large part be- cause of the perception that at least the elite members of this Central African kingdom had converted to Christianity. By 1600, there were thirteen par- ishes in Kongo, and the church in São Salvador even had an organ and a bell tower. Not everyone in Kongo accepted the tenets of this European-based faith, of course; African churchmen battled those who still worshipped idols, fighting the same kinds of battles as European clerics trying to root out paganism at home. Religious conversion was only one sign of this pro- cess of appropriation; elites in Kongo and Ndongo also spoke and read Portuguese.
Introduction 17 The cultural adaptations of African elites facilitated the developing slave trade. That noxious commerce had only begun to reach the shores of Vir- ginia in 1619, but the buying and selling of Africans had already developed elsewhere in the Atlantic Basin; 58,000 African slaves had arrived in the Americas by 1580 and another 507,000 landed there, primarily in Iberian colonies, by 1640. The earliest African slave trade focused less on supplying slaves to staple plantations than to Spanish haciendas, which had less poten- tial for profit and generated lower demand for bound laborers than later sugar plantations. The emergence into the Atlantic Basin of the English, Dutch, and French encouraged the rise of a more explicitly profit-oriented system with its far higher demands for laborers. The result was a massive expansion of the slave trade, especially after 1700. Yet even before the mod- ern slave trade took hold, slavers nonetheless hauled bound laborers across the ocean. James H. Sweet’s contribution to this volume shows the nature of slavery in the Portuguese world long before tobacco plantations began to crowd the shores of the Chesapeake Bay. From Lisbon to the island colony of São Tomé to the mainland of Brazil, Africans working for the Portuguese sought ways to escape their burden. Slavery had not yet spread as far as it 16 would across the basin, but its brutality was already apparent. There are many lessons to be learned from these essays about Africans’ participation in the Atlantic world, but despite the richness of modern schol- arship, how many Europeans, or at least how many people in England, possessed a sophisticated view of Africa and its peoples’ accomplishments remains unclear. On the other hand, the residents of Tudor and Stuart En- gland were very familiar with developments on the European mainland and with European efforts to expand influence across the ocean. The essays in the third group in this volume investigate elements of Eu- ropean activity that were of obvious relevance to the English, especially the efforts of the Spanish and the French. In the years following 1492, many Europeans became convinced that the Americas held potentially profitable resources. Though Europeans purchased some goods from Native Ameri- cans, they also employed violent means of extracting resources. Some Eu- ropeans found such conflicts unpleasant and even lamentable. The Domini- can Bartolomé de Las Casas’s excoriating critique of Spanish atrocities in the Indies, first published in 1552, still stands as a monument to imperial
16. Eltis, Rise of African Slavery, 9. On the distinction between the early and later systems of slavery in the Atlantic basin, see P. C. Emmer, ‘‘The Dutch and the Making of the Second Atlantic System,’’ in Barbara L. Solow, ed., Slavery and the Rise of the Atlantic System (Cambridge, 1991), 76–81.
18 Introduction anxieties of the era. But the souls to be harvested for Christ and the goods that would flow to European markets made the pursuit worthwhile to ex- 17 plorers and colonizers. Europeans saw a variety of possibilities in the Americas. In places where the climate seemed appropriate, the newcomers hoped to cultivate well- known plants, such as grapes and (as the rise of plantations in São Tomé and Brazil reveal) sugar. But Europeans were also open to new commodi- ties, such as chocolate. The most important of these was tobacco, which seemed able to heal a variety of human ailments and bring pleasure as well. Some Europeans, notably the English king James I, opposed the trade be- cause they feared it would lead to the degradation of their societies. But as Marcy Norton and Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert reveal, such hesitance emerged long after the plant had become an international phenomenon. Merchants saw profits in tobacco well before English colonists considered 18 planting it along the banks of the James River. Most historical interpretations of sixteenth-century European interest in the Americas emphasize the role of the Spanish and the Portuguese, but the French were also active participants in the Atlantic Basin. Scholars have earlier written at length about the inability of the French to establish popu- lous colonies in the Western Hemisphere, and some have also addressed 19 Americans’ understanding of French efforts. In this volume, Philip P. Bou- cher manages nothing less than what he calls a ‘‘tour d’horizon’’ of the French presence across the Atlantic world before 1635. During this forma- tive era, major French interest was not in Canada but instead in Brazil and Florida. As Boucher reveals, matters of religion were central to their over- seas efforts.
17. Bartolomé de Las Casas, Brevissima relacion de la destruycion de las Indias (Seville, [1552]). 18. See Marcy Norton, ‘‘Tasting Empire: Chocolate and the European Internaliza- tion of Mesomerican Aesthetics,’’ AHR, CXI (2006), 660–691. For the history of Euro- peans’ understanding of the plant during this era, see Peter C. Mancall, ‘‘Tales Tobacco Told in Sixteenth-Century Europe,’’ Environmental History, IX (2004), 648–678. 19. For the French presence in North America see Peter Moogk, La Nouvelle France: The Making of French Canada—A Cultural History (East Lansing, Mich., 2000); for the long-term impact of the French in Canada, see J. M. Bumsted, ‘‘The Cultural Landscape of Early Canada,’’ in Bernard Bailyn and Philip D. Morgan, eds., Strang- ers within the Realm: Cultural Margins of the First British Empire (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1991), 363–392; for indigenous views, see Cornelius J. Jaenen, ‘‘Amerindian Views of French Culture in the Seventeenth Century,’’ Canadian Historical Review, LV (1974), 261–291.
Introduction 19 But worldly concerns also mattered to the French, as Peter Cook demon- strates. When the French crossed the ocean, they paid attention to Native American organization of their communities. His close study of newcomers’ words used in describing indigenous societies suggests that the French, to make sense of Native Americans, were breaking away from preexisting cul- tural and political categories. This shift in a European mentalité had ramifi- cations in the three American locales where the French established overseas entrepôts during the sixteenth century. Even more, it suggests that the At- lantic experience—specifically European knowledge of indigenous Ameri- can nations—altered intellectual constructs everywhere. English policymakers knew about the overseas expeditions of the Span- ish, Portuguese, and French, and they knew, too, the ways that continental Europeans profited from the Americas. When the time came to plant an En- glish colony in Virginia in the early seventeenth century, the English also had a model of colonization that had worked for them in the Caribbean. This expansion into the West Indies is the subject of Philip D. Morgan’s detailed re-creation of an English colonial effort that, though known to some histori- ans, has not yet become central to our collective understanding of the early colonial era. No other area attracted so much English attention during the sixteenth century, and over time many of those whose initial overseas jour- neys took them to the islands found their way to the mainland. By the latter decades of the seventeenth century, this migration played a crucial role in the establishment of South Carolina as, in Peter Wood’s memorable phras- 20 ing, a ‘‘colony of a colony.’’ That later colonial project was a long-term re- sult of this earlier English venture and the documentation of its profits in published travel accounts and unpublished navigational maps. The islands also served as a laboratory for English experiments with the plant that would, in the long run, provide Virginia’s economic salvation: tobacco. The fourth section of this book follows English efforts to interpret the mass of information they had gathered about Native Americans, Africans, and other Europeans. Many of the English who prepared plans for what became Virginia drew on the history of their own nation. They located the settlement of eastern North America within the context of an ancient out- ward expansion of the Anglo-Norman population that began soon after the Norman invasion of 1066. Long before the Virginia Company tried to find investors and recruits, the English had already subdued much of Wales and Scotland. The Elizabethans had renewed the effort to bring Ireland into the
20. Peter Wood, Black Majority: Negroes in Colonial South Carolina from 1670 through the Stono Rebellion (New York, 1974), 13–34.
20 Introduction English realm. Sir Humphrey Gilbert was one of a number of individuals who had the opportunity to obtain lands in America because of his prior service in Ireland. Other Englishmen gained opportunities in the Western Hemisphere because of their individual experiences elsewhere. John Smith, Sir Walter Ralegh, and other men crisscrossed the Atlantic; their experi- 21 ences link personal biography with the history of colonization. Further, the Elizabethans and early Stuarts knew that they were not the first Europeans to establish settlements in the Western Hemisphere. The most astute of these English observers might have read Richard Eden’s mid-sixteenth-century translation of the history of early Spanish conquest written by the Italian linguist Peter Martyr (known to those on the Con- tinent as Pietro Martire d’Anghiera). Others might have seen Richard Willes’s collection of travel accounts, published in 1577, which included Peter Martyr’s Decades (De orbe novo) as well as details about Europeans who made long-distance voyages. By the 1580s English readers could have found a translation of Las Casas’s indictment of the conquistadores’ treat- ment of Natives in the Western Hemisphere; this text later encouraged what became known as the Black Legend of the Spanish conquest. The Protes- tant English already believed in the superiority of their religion over that of Rome, as they demonstrated on the battlefield in Ireland and celebrated in their literature. Now they had proof that Catholics were despoiling the Americas and retarding the spread of Reformed Christianity. They knew that they could not repeat the errors of their European predecessors’ ways. This anxiety forms the subject of Andrew Fitzmaurice’s sensitive examina- tion of the appropriation of indigenous property. The English approached the Americas with full understanding of the potential rights possessed by indigenous peoples, and they accused the Spanish of violating these rights. Drawing distinctions between the Spaniards’ morality and their own, how- ever, was not always easy, especially for members of the English elite who 22 had great qualms about the entire overseas venture.
21. R. R. Davies, Domination and Conquest: The Experience of Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, 1100–1300 (Cambridge, 1990); Nicholas Canny, The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland: A Pattern Established, 1565–76 (Hassocks, 1976); Canny, Making Ireland British, 1580–1650 (Oxford, 2001). 22. The Decades of the Newe Worlde, or West India (London, 1555); Willes, The His- tory of Travayle in the West and East Indies (London, 1577); Bartolomé de Las Casas, The Spanish Colonie, or Briefe Chronicle of the Acts and Gestes of the Spaniardes in the West Indies, Called the Newe World ...,trans. M. M. S. (London, 1583); a later edi- tion, with ghastly engravings of purported Spanish atrocities, circulated again in the middle of the seventeenth century with a title that revealed its intent: Las Casas, The
Introduction 21 As a result of the deep knowledge available in England during the six- teenth century, none of the founders of the Virginia Company could have imagined himself as an innovator. The entire purpose of their venture was to establish an English presence on the North American mainland before their European competitors used up its natural resources or converted the locals to Catholicism. This desire to colonize sprang from the efforts of indi- viduals who believed that the future success of the realm lay in establish- ing developments abroad. No one promoted the venture more assiduously than the younger Richard Hakluyt. In the 1580s and 1590s, he collected and published historical travel narratives to goad the English into action. En- glishmen, he argued, needed to pay attention to their own history as well as current-day adventures of other Europeans. David Harris Sacks investi- gates a long manuscript Hakluyt wrote in 1584 but never published, now known as the ‘‘Discourse of Western Planting.’’ Hakluyt made an explicit argument for English colonization based on economic concerns, specifically the possibility of extracting material wealth from the Western Hemisphere and finding work for unemployed and underemployed Englishmen. He also urged the English to halt the spread of Catholic influence in North America. Sacks’s essay explores compelling hints in Hakluyt’s manuscript that sug- gest one way to overcome the kinds of qualms that Fitzmaurice describes: colonization, even if it meant appropriation of indigenous property, could be justified on the grounds that the English would bring reformed (Prot- 23 estant) religion to the American mainland. Hakluyt was, in many ways, a man consumed with books and the les-
Tears of the Indians: Being an Historical and True Account of the Cruel Massacres and Slaughters of above Twenty Millions of Innocent People; Committed by the Spaniards in the Islands of Hispaniola, Cuba, Jamaica, Etc. ...(London,1656).ProtestantEnglish: see Thomas Churchyard, A Generall Rehearsall of Warres...(London, 1579); John Derricke, The Image of Irelande ([London?], 1581); Sir William Herbert, Croftus sive de Hibernia Liber, ed. Arthur Keaveny and John A. Madden (Dublin, 1992). 23. Richard Hakluyt, Divers Voyages Touching the Discoverie of America, and the Ilands Adjacent ...(London, 1582); Hakluyt, The Principall Navigations Voiages and Discoveries of the English Nation ...(London,1589); and Hakluyt, The Principal Navi- gations, Voyages, Traffiques, and Discoveries of the English Nation ...,3vols.(London, 1598–1600); and, now available in a superb modern edition, Hakluyt, A Particuler Dis- course concerninge the Greate Necessitie and Manifolde Commodyties That Are Like to Growe to This Realme of Englande by the Westerne Discoveries Lately Attempted ..., ed. David B. Quinn and Alison M. Quinn, Works Issued by the Hakluyt Society, Extra Ser., no. 45 (London, 1993).
22 Introduction 24 sons they offered about the wider world. Benjamin Schmidt’s essay dem- onstrates the crucial influence that printed books had in this era—not only for the English but for continental Europeans as well. Schmidt focuses on Sir Walter Ralegh’s reading and others’ printing and reading of his texts. Ralegh’s account of Guiana, specifically the details about the monsters he heard roamed the South American interior, have struck modern observers as extravagant. But the extravagance was crucial to this information’s circu- lation. Schmidt depicts an explorer as reader and also as the object of read- ers’ attention, made even more compelling by fantastic images later fabri- cated by continental publishers. Books also figured centrally in the life and reputation of Captain John Smith, the most famous Englishman who actually saw Virginia during its formative years. In David Shields’s interpretation, Smith was more than a heroic and battle-scarred warrior who proved himself in Turkey before set- ting sail for the Chesapeake. By the end of his life, he had also become a figure of great literary significance whose experience in the Americas testi- fied to the next logical arena for English expansion. Schmidt’s Ralegh and Shields’s Smith share traits, but the differences are crucial: one spent years imprisoned in the Tower of London for advancing what he believed to be the goals of his nation, whereas the other, a blustering egomaniac, helped provide an ideological justification for overseas expansion. Why did Smith become so vital to the enterprise and its history? Because, as Shields cleverly reveals, Smith’s biography evoked the ancient Britons, men of both action and contemplation. Smith’s life story summed up British history and what the Stuarts hoped was the realm’s boundless future. The final essays in this volume bring the reader back to Tsenacomma- cah at the time of the English settlement of Jamestown. James Horn re- turns us to the shores of the Chesapeake and reconstructs a polyglot world from the perspective of the three peoples who hoped to control it. None of them possessed perfect information about where others could be found or their adversaries’ true intentions. Though the Indians possessed the upper hand initially, the Spanish were at the time the most powerful European nation interested in North America, and the English ultimately prevailed in this region; Horn exposes ‘‘the half-baked impressions’’ that impeded
24. For an in-depth study of Hakluyt and how his understanding of printed books, among other sources, shaped his views on English overseas efforts, see Peter C. Man- call, Hakluyt’s Promise: An Elizabethan’s Obsession for an English America (New Haven, Conn., 2007).
Introduction 23 each group’s ability to devise appropriate strategies for coping with rapidly changing conditions. Horn’s essay reminds us of the importance of contin- gency and error. It appears near the conclusion to make a very specific point: no matter how much the peoples of the territory the English labeled ‘‘Vir- ginia’’ had learned about the aspirations, cultures, and mores of others in the region, travel across the Atlantic necessarily launched the putative colo- nists into a world of suspicion and rumor—a world still dominated by the Powhatans, at least until the 1620s. Even as they tried to find their way in a world of imperfect knowledge, the English also knew all too well that some of those same Europeans they had been studying wished them ill. In the sixteenth century, as J. H. Elliott explains in his keynote address to the conference, Iberians controlled much of the North Atlantic. When other Europeans tried to challenge Spanish hegemony, as the French did in Florida in the mid-1560s, the Iberians be- lieved they should be eradicated. The English could get away with estab- lishing a colony in Jamestown in the early seventeenth century only because the Spanish saw no need to push them away: there was no gold or silver there, despite the occasional claims of some Englishmen, and so the Span- ish were not interested. The English remained at Jamestown, then, because they were insignificant to European competitors and because they managed 25 to survive, if at times only barely, the region’s notorious ailments. The words of Stuart B. Schwartz, whose summary comment to the con- ference appears as the last substantive contribution to this volume, provide the ideal concluding message for a book that focuses on early Virginia—a place that he correctly notes ‘‘played simply a small part in a great global story.’’ Although the repercussions of the founding of English colonies on the North American mainland would eventually be felt everywhere, the story told by the chapters in this book are more specifically Atlantic in focus because, by 1625, the later global story was not yet clear. The Atlantic world of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries was far more complex and interconnected than previous historians of Vir- ginia acknowledged. The story of Jamestown cannot be understood by erecting a statue to Captain John Smith or beating a pilgrim’s path to the shores of the James to worship at the shrine of democracy’s birth in North
25. For the dangers facing the English, see Carville V. Earle, ‘‘Environment, Dis- ease, and Mortality in Early Virginia,’’ in Tate and Ammerman, eds., The Chesapeake in the Seventeenth Century, 96–125; Karen Ordahl Kupperman, ‘‘Apathy and Death in Early Jamestown,’’ Journal of American History, LXVI (1979), 24–40.
24 Introduction America. Virginia’s story only becomes intelligible when seen as a small, and not always significant, part of an Atlantic history.
Bishop Hall’s Failure Many early witnesses hoped that Virginia would fail. The Powhatans watched in dismay when colonists multiplied in Tsenacommacah by the early 1620s. Some English contemporaries, pace American lore, also thought that colonization was a bad idea. Among them was Joseph Hall, later the bishop of Norwich, who published a small book in an effort to halt what he believed was unnecessary travel. In a scathing pamphlet en- titled Quo Vadis? A Just Censure of Travell as It Is Commonly Undertaken by the Gentlemen of Our Nation, published in London in 1617—soon after colonists along the James recognized that tobacco production might bring profit—Hall complained about the very fact of travel. He acknowledged the potential material reward of the ‘‘Earthly commodities’’ found abroad but concentrated on the soul-diminishing effects of the ‘‘unnecessary agita- tion’’ brought by travel. He sought to prevent travel among the elites who, for their part, saw visits to distant places as crucial stops on the path to 26 civility. Hall had no qualms about travel for commercial benefit or diplomacy. God, after all, might have surrounded England with the sea, but the Al- mighty did not intend for the English or anyone else to remain always at home, for God ‘‘hath stored no parcell of earth with a purpose of pri- vate reservation.’’ Hall sought to stop only what he termed ‘‘the Travell of curiosity.’’ He feared that exposure to different people and alluring ideas would lead to moral bankruptcy. It was an act of desperation ‘‘to send forth our children into those places which are professedly infectious, whose very goodnesse is either impietie, or superstition[.] If wee desired to have sonnes poisoned with mis-beleefe, what could wee doe otherwise?’’ The most dreadful places were ‘‘those parts which are only thought worth our viewing, [as they] are most contagious; and will not part with either plea- sure, or information, without some tang of wickednesse.’’ Travel, so Hall argued, had become too popular. The English seemed to believe that ‘‘he should not bee worthy to tread upon the earth, that would not emulate Drake, and Candish [Cavendish], in compassing it.’’ Hall admonished the
26. Frederic W. Gleach, Powhatan’s World and Colonial Virginia: A Conflict of Cul- tures (Lincoln, Neb., 1997); [Joseph Hall], Quo Vadis? A Just Censure of Travell as It Is Commonly Undertaken by the Gentlemen of Our Nation (London, 1617), sig. A4r, [A5r].
Introduction 25 gentry to stay put. ‘‘God hath given us a world of our owne, wherein there is nothing wanting to earthly contentment.’’ The Almighty had already pro- vided whatever a rational individual could want, and so Hall told his En- glish readers to ‘‘enrich your selves with your owne mines, improve those blessed opportunities which God hath given you, to your mutuall advan- tage; and care not to be like any but your selves.’’ He enjoined Englishmen to preserve their identities by remaining at home and eschewing the stimu- 27 lation of eye-opening wonders. Had Hall’s plea succeeded, Virginia would not have become a permanent New World settlement. Jamestown and Virginia survived because individu- als converged there who used their imagination and curiosity to engage with their new circumstances. Their motivations are mostly lost to history, but two things remain clear. Despite Joseph Hall’s caveat, people traveled to strange and different lands, some voluntarily and many not, expanding the Atlantic world’s compass. Second, the indigenous residents of Tsenacom- macah, seeing certain advantages in the English presence, allowed them to remain near the shores of the Chesapeake, thus ensuring their survival even though the newcomers proved unreliable and annoying neighbors. In the end, neither the Powhatans, other European nations, nor English skeptics could halt the development of Virginia in the seventeenth century. By 1624, the struggling outpost had become a colony under royal auspices, survived an uprising by Powhatans who had decided that the English had overstayed their welcome, incorporated Africans into the labor force, and begun to make a profit from shipping tobacco across the ocean. In the pro- cess, Native Americans, Europeans, and Africans together made Virginia a critical arena of the emerging Atlantic world.
27. Hall, Quo Vadis? 2 (distribution of commodities by God), 5 (curiosity), 11–13 (children), 24 (Drake and Cavendish); 87 (happy at home), 97 (misnumbered as 91) (‘‘enrich your selves’’).
26 Introduction part one native american settings QW This page intentionally left blank Daniel K. Richter tsenacommacah and the atlantic world QW
In what may be the only surviving early-seventeenth-century example of the genre, William Strachey, secretary of the Virginia Company of London, did his best to reduce to Roman letters a ‘‘scornefull song’’ that victorious Powhatan warriors chanted after they killed three or four Englishmen ‘‘and tooke one Symon Score a saylor and one Cob a boy prisoners’’ in 1611:
1. Mattanerew shashashewaw crawango pechecoma Whe Tassantassa inoshashaw yehockan pocosak Whe, whe, yah, ha, ha, ne, he wittowa, wittowa.
2. Mattanerew shashashewaw, erawango pechecoma Captain Newport inoshashaw neir in hoc nantion matassan Whe weh, yah, ha, ha, etc.
3. Mattanerew shashashewaw erowango pechecoma Thomas Newport inoshashaw neir in hoc nantion monocock Whe whe etc.
4. Mattanerew shushashewaw erowango pechecoma Pockin Simon moshasha mingon nantian Tamahuck Whe whe, etc.
Strachey explained that the refrain—which almost needs no translation— mocked the ‘‘lamentation our people made’’ for the deaths and captive-
Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at the Atlantic World Workshop at New York University, Feb. 24, 2004; ‘‘The Atlantic World and Virginia, 1550–1624,’’ con- ference, Williamsburg, Va., Mar. 4, 2004; and Centre interuniversitaire d’études sur les lettres, les arts et les traditions, Université Laval, Québec, Feb. 11, 2005. I thank the participants in those events and, especially, Lauren Benton, Kathleen J. Bragdon, Anna C. Brickhouse, William H. Carter, Nicole Eustace (whose ‘‘very big Rolodex’’ analogy did not make it into the text but clarified many things), J. Frederick Fausz, April Lee Hatfield, Juan José Ponce, Sharon Richter, Larry E. Tise, Laurier Turgeon, and Alden T. Vaughan for their comments and assistance. taking. But far more interesting is the gloss he provided for the verses. The Powhatans sang of
how they killed us for all our Poccasacks, that is our Guns, and for all Captain [Christopher] Newport brought them Copper and could hurt Thomas Newport (a boy whose name indeed is Thomas Savadge, whome Captain Newport leaving with Powhatan to learne the Language, at what tyme he presented the said Powhatan with a copper Crowne and other guifts from his Majestie, sayd he was his sonne) for all his Monnacock that is his bright Sword, and how they could take Symon...Prysoner 1 for all his Tamahauke, that is his Hatchett.
In spite of all their material goods—their guns, their copper, their swords, their hatchets—and in spite of the fact that many of these same vaunted items had been given to the Powhatans by Virginia’s leader, Newport, in the name of the mighty King James, the Englishmen had, at least on this 2 occasion, been made subject to Native people’s power. Like the song, this essay tells a story about goods and power. Or, rather, it tells three related stories about Chesapeake Algonquian men and what appear to have been their quests for goods and power from the emerging Atlantic world of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries: Paqui- quineo (Don Luis), who left the Chesapeake around 1561 and returned with a party of Spanish Jesuit missionaries in 1570; Namontack, who traveled to England with Christopher Newport in 1608 and again in 1609 (while the Thomas ‘‘Newport’’ Savage of the song took up residence in Powha- tan country); and Uttamatomakkin (also known as Tomocomo or Toma- kin), who made the oceanic voyage with Pocahontas in 1616–1617. We know
1. William Strachey, The Historie of Travell into Virginia Britania (1612), ed. Louis B. Wright and Virginia Freund, Works Issued by the Hakluyt Society, 2d Ser., no. 103 (London, 1953), 85–86. On Strachey’s linguistic skills, see Frank T. Siebert, Jr., ‘‘Res- urrecting Virginia Algonquian from the Dead: The Reconstituted and Historical Pho- nology of Powhatan,’’ in James M. Crawford, ed., Studies in Southeastern Languages (Athens, Ga., 1975), 291–294. Except in direct quotations, wherever possible I have standardized the spelling of Algonquian words according to the usage in Helen C. Rountree, Pocahontas’s People: The Powhatan Indians of Virginia through Four Cen- turies (Norman, Okla., 1990). 2. Strachey’s gloss, of course, also needs a gloss, thanks to the irregularities of seven- teenth-century punctuation and the ambiguity of the word for. While it is possible that Strachey meant that the English had been killed for their weapons—to take possession of them—the references to Newport and Savage and, especially, the combination of the word all with the singular sword and hatchet makes ‘‘in spite of’’ a more likely read- ing, for all April Hatfield’s much-appreciated efforts to convince me otherwise.
30 daniel k. richter very little about any of these men, their status, or their motives, and what we do know comes down to us in highly colored tales written by Euro- peans who were not exactly their friends. Nonetheless, for all the dangers of skimpy sources, of European chroniclers’ distortions, and, possibly, a histo- rian’s overactive imagination, the stories deserve serious attention. Travel- ing at crucial moments in their people’s early engagement with Europeans, the three voyagers allow us to glimpse what the emerging Atlantic world meant to the elite of the Powhatan paramount chiefdom—if not to the com- mon people who gave their ‘‘densely inhabited land’’ its name, Tsenacom- macah. In their travels, Paquiquineo and Namontack apparently attempted to exert control over the access to the goods the 1611 song would mock in order to build power for their people, their political superiors, and them- selves. Uttamatomakkin’s travels, by contrast, confirmed what the singers by then already knew: that power would have to be asserted in spite of, not 3 by way of, ‘‘guifts from his Majestie.’’
Chiefdoms and the World of Goods Just as the arrival of Spaniards and English in the Chesapeake cannot be understood apart from the political and economic characteristics of competi- tive early modern nation-states, the exploits of these three voyagers from Tsenacommacah—and the significance of material goods in the Powhatan song—cannot be understood apart from the political and economic charac- teristics of the social forms known as chiefdoms. In the classic definition by anthropologist Elman R. Service, ‘‘Chiefdoms are redistributional societies with a permanent central agency of coordination’’ and a ‘‘profoundly inegali- tarian’’ political order in which redistributive functions center on exalted hereditary leaders. For Service and his contemporary Morton Fried, the
3. Strachey, Historie of Travell, ed. Wright and Freund, 86. Most scholars translate Tsenacommacah (or Tsenacomoco) as ‘‘densely inhabited land’’ (Frederic W. Gleach, Powhatan’s World and Colonial Virginia: A Conflict of Cultures [Lincoln, Neb., 1997], 25). According to David Beers Quinn, drawing on the work of James A. Geary, the word combines a root meaning ‘‘‘land dwelt upon,’ ‘dwelling-house,’ ‘house-site,’’’ with a prefix meaning ‘‘close together’’ (‘‘The Map of Raleigh’s Virginia,’’ in Quinn, ed., The Roanoke Voyages, 1584–1590: Documents to Illustrate the English Voyages to North America under the Patent Granted to Walter Raleigh in 1584, 2 vols., Works Issued by the Hakluyt Society, 2d Ser., nos. 104–105 [London, 1955], II, 854). On another occa- sion, Geary proposed ‘‘it is a nearby dwelling-place’’ (‘‘Strachey’s Vocabulary of Indian Words Used in Virginia, 1612,’’ in Strachey, Historie of Travell, 211). Helen C. Roun- tree suggests ‘‘our place’’ (Pocahontas, Powhatan, Opechancanough: Three Indian Lives Changed by Jamestown [Charlottesville, Va., 2005], 8).
Tsenacommacah & the Atlantic World 31 material underpinnings of stratified chiefdoms lay in ‘‘differential rights of access to basic resources...either directly (air, water, and food) or in- directly’’ through the control of such basic productive resources as ‘‘land, raw materials for tools, water for irrigation, and materials to build a shel- ter.’’ Subsequent comparative archaeological work, however, moves beyond such straightforward materialist definitions to embrace a much more com- 4 plex variety of cultural forms. Much of this work roots chiefdoms in what is known as a ‘‘prestige-goods economy.’’ As archaeologists Susan Frankenstein and Michael Rowlands ex- plain, in such an economy, ‘‘political advantage [is] gained through exer- cising control over access to resources that can only be obtained through external trade.’’ These resources are not the kind of basic utilitarian items described by Service and Fried but instead ‘‘wealth objects needed in social transactions.’’ They may be, in the words of anthropologist Mary Helms, ‘‘crafted items acquired ready-made from geographically distant places’’ or things ‘‘valued in their natural, unworked form as inherently endowed with qualitative worth—animal pelts, shells, feathers, and the like.’’ In either case, they ‘‘constitute a type of inalienable wealth, meaning they are goods that cannot be conceptually separated from their place or condition of ori- gin but always relate whoever possesses them to that place or condition.’’ The social power of such goods thus comes from their association with their source, often described as ‘‘ancestral beings—creator deities, culture- heroes, primordial powers—that are credited with having first created or
4. Elman R. Service, Primitive Social Organization: An Evolutionary Perspective (New York, 1962), 143–177, quotations on 144, 150; Morton H. Fried, The Evolution of Political Society: An Essay in Political Anthropology (New York, 1967), 52 (quota- tion), 185–226. Fried’s four-stage evolutionary scheme of ‘‘egalitarian,’’ ‘‘ranked,’’ and ‘‘stratified’’ ‘‘societies’’ and ‘‘the state’’ does not entirely coincide with Service’s ‘‘band,’’ ‘‘tribe,’’ ‘‘chiefdom,’’ and ‘‘state’’ levels of ‘‘sociocultural integration,’’ but clearly the two scholars had similar views on the political-economic principles at work. The literature critiquing and elaborating evolutionary typologies is vast. For useful overviews, see Thomas E. Emerson, Cahokia and the Archaeology of Power (Tuscaloosa, Ala., 1997), 12–18; and Timothy Earle, ‘‘Archaeology, Property, and Prehistory,’’ Annual Review of Anthropology, XXIX (2000), 39–60. For comments on the continued heuristic value of such an approach, see Robert D. Drennan, ‘‘Regional Demography in Chiefdoms,’’ in Drennan and Carlos A. Uribe, eds., Chiefdoms in the Americas (Lanham, Md., 1987), 313–315; Patricia Galloway, Choctaw Genesis, 1500–1700 (Lincoln, Neb., 1995), 38– 40; and Earle, How Chiefs Come to Power: The Political Economy in Prehistory (Stan- ford, Calif., 1997), 1–16. For an introduction to chiefdom forms in the southeast during the period of European contact, see Charles Hudson, The Southeastern Indians (Knox- ville, Tenn., 1976), 202–211.
32 daniel k. richter crafted the world, its creatures, its peoples, and their cultural skills.’’ In- deed, inalienable goods never fully belong to those to whom they have been given; they always remain in some sense the property of the giver. Those who control such prestige goods wield power because of their connection 5 to—and control over—power at the goods’ source. In eastern North America, the prestige goods that shaped the power of chiefdoms were the crystals, minerals, copper, shells, and mysteriously crafted ritual items that moved through the ancient trade routes of the con- tinent. Their potency came from their rarity and their association with dis- tant sources of spiritual power. But those same characteristics made eastern North America’s prestige-goods chiefdoms inherently unstable. Lacking a monopoly of force to defend their privileges, chiefs depended for their status on a fragile ideological consensus at home and on equally fragile external sources of supply and trade routes they could not directly control. Chief- doms thus perched on a fine line between slipping ‘‘back’’ into less hierar- chical forms or moving ‘‘forward’’ toward the coercive apparatus of a state while ‘‘cycling’’ between periods of centralization and decentralization. As 6 a result, as social forms, they were forever in flux. The basic political units of late-sixteenth- and early-seventeenth-century Tsenacommacah were just such unstable prestige-goods chiefdoms, headed by men and women called, respectively, weroances and weroansquas, whose
5. Susan M. Frankenstein and Michael J. Rowlands, ‘‘The Internal Structure and Regional Context of Early Iron Age Society in South-western Germany,’’ Institute of Archaeology Bulletin, XV (1978), 73–112, quotation on 76; Mary W. Helms, ‘‘Politi- cal Lords and Political Ideology in Southeastern Chiefdoms: Comments and Obser- vations,’’ in Alex W. Barker and Timothy R. Pauketat, eds., Lords of the Southeast: Social Inequality and the Native Elites of Southeastern North America, Archaeological Papers of the American Anthropological Association, no. 3 (Washington, D.C., 1992), esp. 187–188 (quotations); Pauketat, ‘‘The Reign and Ruin of the Lords of Cahokia: A Dialectic of Dominance,’’ ibid., 31–51. Important theoretical statements on the po- litical economy of gift giving include Marcel Mauss, The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies, trans. W. D. Halls (1924; London, 2002); Marshall Sahlins, Stone Age Economics (Chicago, 1972); Mary Douglas and Baron Isherwood, The World of Goods (New York, 1979); Annette B. Weiner, Inalienable Possessions: The Paradox of Keeping-While-Giving (Berkeley, Calif., 1992); and Maurice Godelier, The Enigma of the Gift, trans. Nora Scott (Chicago, 1999). 6. Timothy K. Earle, ‘‘Chiefdoms in Archaeological and Ethnohistorical Perspec- tive,’’ Annual Review of Anthropology, XVI (1987), 281, 297; Galloway, Choctaw Gene- sis, 67–74; Emerson, Cahokia and the Archaeology of Power, 17–18; Frankenstein and Rowlands, ‘‘Internal Structure and Regional Context of Early Iron Age Society,’’ Insti- tute of Archaeology Bulletin, XV (1978), 78–79.
Tsenacommacah & the Atlantic World 33 titles descended, as John Smith explained, to ‘‘the first heyres of the Sis- 7 ters, and so successively the weomens heires.’’ Most of these local chief- doms were subordinate to a larger paramount chiefdom that Powhatan, or Wahunsonacock, presided over as mamanatowick in the early seven- teenth century. The weroances and particularly the mamanatowick owed their status in part to kinship, through their own matrilineages and through marriage alliances with the multiple spouses to which apparently only the elite were entitled. (Wahunsonacock reputedly had a hundred wives stra- tegically placed in subordinate towns.) In a way Service and Fried would recognize, weroances also to some extent controlled food surpluses through tribute from subordinates and through corn, bean, and squash fields their people planted and harvested to be stored in their granaries. (These food stores might have taken on additional significance during the repeated droughts and crop failures of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth cen- turies.) But most important, weroances’ power evidently rested on their control of such goods as copper from the continental interior and pearls from the Atlantic coast. As archaeologist Stephen R. Potter puts it, ‘‘Chiefs handled worldy risks confronting their societies by serving as both a banker 8 to their people and a culture broker to outsiders.’’ To a significant degree, the power that derived from these functions came from a weroance’s ability to distribute prestige goods to followers and thus create bonds of asymmetrical obligation. ‘‘He [who] perfourmes any re- markeable or valerous exployt in open act of Armes, or by Stratagem,’’ ob-
7. Helen C. Rountree, The Powhatan Indians of Virginia: Their Traditional Culture (Norman, Okla., 1989), 103–125; John Smith, A True Relation ...(1608),inPhilip L. Barbour, ed., The Complete Works of Captain John Smith (1580–1631), 3 vols. (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1986), I, 61 (quotation). 8. Kathleen M. Brown, Good Wives, Nasty Wenches, and Anxious Patriarchs: Gen- der, Race, and Power in Colonial Virginia (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1996), 45–53; Alex W. Barker, ‘‘Powhatan’s Pursestrings: On the Meaning of Surplus in a Seventeenth Cen- tury Algonkian Chiefdom,’’ in Barker and Pauketat, eds., Lords of the Southeast, 61–80; E. Randolph Turner III, ‘‘Native American Protohistoric Interactions in the Powhatan Core Area,’’ in Helen C. Rountree, ed., Powhatan Foreign Relations, 1500–1722 (Char- lottesville, Va., 1993), 78–83; Stephen R. Potter, Commoners, Tribute, and Chiefs: The Development of Algonquian Culture in the Potomac Valley (Charlottesville, Va., 1993), 149–173, quotation on 169; Martin D. Gallivan, James River Chiefdoms: The Rise of Social Inequality in the Chesapeake (Lincoln, Neb., 2003), esp. 1–8, 21–31; Margaret Holmes Williamson, Powhatan Lords of Life and Death: Command and Consent in Seventeenth-Century Virginia (Lincoln, Neb., 2003), esp. 129–172. On the droughts and crop failures of this period, see David W. Stahle et al., ‘‘The Lost Colony and Jamestown Droughts,’’ Science, CCLXXX (1998), 564–567.
34 daniel k. richter served Strachey, ‘‘the king taking notice of the same, doth...solemnely reward him with some Present of Copper, or Chayne of Perle and Beades.’’ Lavish feasts from chiefly stores and perhaps the bestowal of sexual favors from young women in the weroance’s household served similar redistribu- tive functions for diplomatic visitors. Such actions merged into a broader pattern that might best be described as the conspicuous display of chiefly power. Wahunsonacock ‘‘hath a house in which he keepeth his kind of Trea- sure, as skinnes, copper, pearle, and beades, which he storeth up against the time of his death and buriall,’’ wrote Smith. The structure was ‘‘50 or 60 yards in length, frequented only by Priestes,’’ and at each corner stood ‘‘Images as Sentinels, one of a Dragon, another a Beare, the 3[d] like a Leopard and the fourth a giantlike man, all made evillfavordly, according to their best workmanship.’’ Smith—who, it should be recalled, appeared to be an emissary from a strangely female-less society—also went out of his way to note that the mamanatowick ‘‘hath as many women as he will, whereof when hee lieth on his bed, one sitteth at his head, and another at his feet, 9 but when he sitteth, one sitteth on his right hand and another on his left.’’ Such conspicuous display embodied the strength and wealth of the peo- ple and their connection to the sources of the power that prestige goods and marriage connections represented; indeed, the term weroance roughly translates as ‘‘he is wealthy.’’ Such goods visibly accumulated at the apex of the social and political order, in the person regarded ‘‘not only as a king but as halfe a God’’: the mamanatowick, a word incorporating the term mani- tou, or ‘‘spiritual power.’’ The material, the spiritual, and the political were inseparable in the person of the mamanatowick and the people for whom he acted. ‘‘The wealth of the chief and his distribution of it are alike means by which he confers life and prosperity on his people,’’ anthropologist Mar- garet Holmes Williamson explains. ‘‘Indeed, he really has nothing of ‘his own’ as a private person. Rather, he is the steward of the group’s wealth, de- ploying it on their behalf for their benefit.’’ The mamanatowick, ‘‘by being rich and generous and by living richly...makesbountiful the macrocosm 10 that he represents.’’ The material, the spiritual, and the political also came together in the fact that most of the powerful goods that chiefs accumulated were interred with
9. Strachey, Historie of Travell, ed. Wright and Freund, 114; Brown, Good Wives, 66–67; John Smith, A Map of Virginia ...(1612),inBarbour, ed., Works of Smith, I, 173–174. 10. Gallivan, James River Chiefdoms, 169; Gleach, Powhatan’s World, 28–34; Wil- liamson, Powhatan Lords of Life and Death, 152. See also Sahlins, Stone Age Economics, 185–191.
Tsenacommacah & the Atlantic World 35 them when they died. Weroances’ ‘‘bodies are first bowelled, then dryed upon hurdles till they bee verie dry, and so about the most of their jointes and necke they hang bracelets or chaines of copper, pearle, and such like, as they use to weare,’’ Smith observed and archaeologists confirm. ‘‘Their inwards they stuffe[d] with copper beads and covered with a skin, hatch- ets and such’’ before wrapping the corpses ‘‘very carefully in white skins’’ and laying them on mats in a temple house with ‘‘what remaineth of this kinde of wealth...setattheir feet in baskets.’’ In effect, then, because pres- tige goods died with the chief, weroances and would-be weroances always had to create for themselves anew the tribute networks, the trade connec- tions, the diplomatic and marriage alliances, the masses of prestige goods that undergirded their power. This fact, more than some abstract historical force called ‘‘cycling,’’ undergirded the inherent instability of these chief- doms. And it brings us at last to our three travelers, who apparently sought just such connections, alliances, and goods, either as rising chiefs them- 11 selves or on behalf of the weroances who sent them.
Paquiquineo We cannot be absolutely certain that the man usually known by the Spanish name Don Luis or Don Luis de Velasco was originally from Tsenacomma- cah, or even that Tsenacommacah was the same place that he and the Span- ish called Ajacán. Yet through careful detective work, Clifford M. Lewis and Albert J. Loomie reasonably concluded in the mid-twentieth century that ‘‘there are enough indications available to link Don Luis with the ruling Powhatan clique’’ and that Ajacán included territories between the James and York rivers that were later known to be part of the Powhatan paramount 12 chiefdom. Spanish sources variously describe Paquiquineo as ‘‘a young ca-
11. Smith, Map of Virginia, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, I, 169 (quotation); Strachey, Historie of Travell, ed. Wright and Freund, 94–95; Potter, Commoners, Trib- ute, and Chiefs, 210–220. As Helen C. Rountree observes, ‘‘‘things’ is the operative word’’ in describing the Powhatans’ agenda in dealing with Europeans (‘‘The Powha- tans and the English: A Case of Multiple Conflicting Agendas,’’ in Rountree, ed., Pow- hatan Foreign Relations, 110, 177–183, quotation on 178). Seth William Mallios, ‘‘In the Hands of ‘Indian Givers’: Exchange and Violence at Ajacan, Roanoke, and James- town’’ (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 1998), begins from similar premises about the importance of material exchange in relations between Powhatans and Europeans. 12. Clifford M. Lewis and Albert J. Loomie, The Spanish Jesuit Mission in Virginia, 1570–1572 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1953), 28–40, 58–62, quotation on 58; Rountree, Poca- hontas’s People, 15–20. None of the documents in Lewis and Loomie give Paquiquineo’s
36 daniel k. richter cique,’’ as ‘‘a person of note’’ who ‘‘said he was a chief,’’ as ‘‘the Indian son of a petty chief of Florida’’ who ‘‘gave out that he was the son of a great chief,’’ as a chief’s son ‘‘who for an Indian was of fine presence and bearing,’’ or as ‘‘the brother of a principal chief of that region.’’ Unhelpfully, the same sources say that, in 1570, he was either ‘‘more than twenty years of age’’ or ‘‘a man of fifty years.’’ It is quite possible that, as Lewis and Loomie sug- gest, Paquiquineo was either the brother or father of Wahunsonacock and his successors Opitchapam and Opechancanough. Given the matrilineal de- scent of chiefs’ titles and European chroniclers’ unfamiliarity with the intri- cacies of Algonquian kinship terms, Paquiquineo might also have been the uncle of these later paramount chiefs. There is less reason to believe that, as Carl Bridenbaugh proposed, Paquiquineo actually was Opechancanough, although nearly anything is possible. Whatever the case, he was almost cer- tainly a member of a chiefly lineage, if not that of the paramount mamana- towick, then of a subsidiary weroance. The one surviving Spanish document that uses his Algonquian name suggests his high status by referring to his 13 traveling companions as his Indian servants (‘‘su criado indios’’). And, whatever the case, Paquiquineo seems to have gone into the At- lantic world because of his chiefly lineage, either on his own initiative, or at the behest of his weroance, or because the Spanish perceived him as a high-value captive. We do not know exactly how he found his way onto what was probably Antonio Velázquez’s ship Santa Catalina in 1561. Ac-
Algonquian name, which, as far as I know, first appeared in English-language schol- arship in Paul E. Hoffman, A New Andalucia and a Way to the Orient: The American Southeast during the Sixteenth Century (Baton Rouge, La., 1990), 184. 13. ‘‘Relation of Luis Gerónimo de Oré,’’ ca. 1617, in Lewis and Loomie, Spanish Jesuit Mission, 179; ‘‘Relation of Juan de la Carrera...March 1, 1600,’’ ibid., 131; ‘‘Relation of Juan Rogel between 1607 and 1611,’’ ibid., 118; ‘‘Relation of Bartolomé Martínez,’’ Oct. 24, 1610, ibid., 156; Francisco Sacchini, Borgia, the Third Part of the History of the Society of Jesus (1649), ibid., 221; Lewis and Loomie, Spanish Jesuit Mission, 58–62; Carl Bridenbaugh, Jamestown, 1544–1699 (New York, 1980), 10–17; Rountree, Pocahontas’s People, 18–19; entry 85, contaduría 286, no. 1, datas, fol. 171v, Archivo General de Indias, Seville. Ralph Hamor reported that the Chickahominies, who were not part of Powhatan’s paramount chiefdom, considered the Spanish ‘‘odious’’ because ‘‘Powhatans father was driven by them from the west-Indies into those parts’’ (Raphe Hamor, A True Discourse of the Present Estate of Virginia, and the Success of the Affaires There till the 18 of June, 1614 [London, 1615], 13). Helen Rountree argues that Paquiquineo was from a different kin group than Powhatan and that his chiefdom was not yet part of the paramount chiefdom in 1570 (Pocahontas, Powhatan, Opechan- canough, 27–29).
Tsenacommacah & the Atlantic World 37 counts written more than a generation later give three different versions of the story. Francisco Sacchini wrote that ‘‘the brother of a principal chief of that region gave himself up to some Spaniards sailing near Ajacán,’’ al- though ‘‘none of his family knew of this.’’ In much more detail, Luis Geró- nimo de Oré explained that ‘‘while the Adelantado Pedro Menéndez, was governing the presidios of Florida, a ship from the port of Santa Elena lost its course toward the north, at a latitude of 37½° and put into a large bay which the sailors called the Bahía de Madre de Dios’’ and that ‘‘from among some Indians who came aboard they retained a young cacique.’’ Bartolomé Martínez improbably had Menéndez himself sailing into the Chesapeake. Native people ‘‘came alongside in canoes and boarded the flagship,’’ where ‘‘His Excellency, as was his custom, like another Alexander, regaled them with food and clothing.’’ The boarding party included ‘‘a chief who brought his son.’’ The adelantado ‘‘asked the chief for permission to take [Paqui- quineo]...alongthat the King of Spain, his lord, might see him’’ and ‘‘gave his pledged word to return him with much wealth and many garments.’’ Ac- cording to Martínez, ‘‘The chief granted this and His Excellency took him to Castile, to the Court of King Philip II,’’ who was ‘‘very pleased with him’’ 14 and bestowed on him ‘‘many courtly favors and rich garments.’’ The emphasis on clothing and material goods in these stories may cap- ture something about how Paquiquineo understood his mission in an Atlan- tic world he would come to know too well. It is reasonable to assume that he planned to establish a relationship with Europeans who could provide him, his lineage, and his chiefdom with a source of the goods that brought power. Compared to other locations on the Atlantic coast, the Chesapeake had ex- perienced few European visitors, shipwrecks, and their associated influxes of material goods before Paquiquineo’s departure. Verrazano missed the bay in 1524. An English ship apparently blew in on a storm in 1546 and found ‘‘over thirty canoes’’ full of Native people who already knew enough about Europeans to bring along ‘‘as many as a thousand marten skins in exchange for knives, fishhooks and shirts.’’ But such episodes were rare on a coast much off course for Europeans plying routes to and from either the West Indies and the Spanish Main or Newfoundland. With enough knowledge of Europeans to understand their potential as a source of copper, beads, and other prestige goods, Paquiquineo would have set off to establish a personal alliance, and a personal exchange relationship, that would substantially re-
14. Sacchini, Borgia, in Lewis and Loomie, Spanish Jesuit Mission, 221; ‘‘Relation of Martínez,’’ ‘‘Relation of Gerónimo de Oré,’’ in Lewis and Loomie, Spanish Jesuit Mission, 156, 179; Hoffman, New Andalucia, 181–187.
38 daniel k. richter inforce the power of his lineage and chiefdom by bringing Europeans and 15 their goods into the Chesapeake on a regular basis. Of course, in 1561, he could not know that it would be nearly a decade be- fore he could return home or just how much of the Atlantic world he would see in the interim. Paquiquineo seems to have spent most of his time in Mexico City, living with Dominican priests, learning Spanish, undergoing catechization, and acquiring his new name in honor of his baptismal spon- sor, the viceroy of New Spain. If he left home with any illusions that Span- iards were beneficent beings who would readily bestow their riches on Aja- cán, those illusions must have been quickly dashed in the flesh-and-blood reality of the colonial capital that was rising on the ruins of Tenochtitlán— and on the backs of oppressed Native people. Yet he must also have seen the ways in which caciques from outlying districts could extract favors from the imperial regime and in general how indigenous people with claims to elite heritage could carve out positions of relative power. Whatever he (and his Dominican teachers) did to attract the attention and favors of the viceroy must have encouraged Paquiquineo to believe he could turn his situation to his advantage—if only he could get back home under the right conditions. ‘‘A clever talker,’’ he touted ‘‘the grandeurs of his land,’’ the willingness of his people to hear the Gospel, and his eagerness to provide ‘‘the help which 16 Timothy gave to Saint Paul.’’ Such talk helped get him from Mexico to Havana where, in 1566, he set sail with a party of thirty soldiers and two Dominican friars to establish a mission in Ajacán. The expedition never reached its goal, however. Paqui- quineo claimed to be unable to recognize the entrance to Chesapeake Bay (which could have been a ruse because he distrusted the soldiers or just the honest ignorance of a landlubber), and a storm finally blew the party so far 17 out to sea that they gave up. But Paquiquineo did not. Menéndez had ‘‘chanced upon’’ him in Havana at some point during the 1565–1566 expedition that slaughtered the French
15. Lewis and Loomie, Spanish Jesuit Mission, 13 (quoting deposition of ‘‘John, an Englishman born in Bristol’’), 16; William C. Sturtevant, ‘‘Spanish-Indian Relations in Southeastern North America,’’ Ethnohistory, IX (1962), 54–56; Potter, Commoners, Tribute, and Chiefs, 161–166; Turner, ‘‘Native American Protohistoric Interactions,’’ in Rowntree, ed., Powhatan Foreign Relations, 92. 16. Charlotte M. Gradie, ‘‘The Powhatans in the Context of the Spanish Empire,’’ in Rountree, ed., Powhatan Foreign Relations, 154–172; ‘‘Relation of Rogel,’’ ‘‘Relation of Carrera,’’ in Lewis and Loomie, Spanish Jesuit Mission, 118, 131, 133. 17. Gradie, ‘‘Powhatans in the Context of the Spanish Empire,’’ in Rountree, ed., Powhatan Foreign Relations, 168–169.
Tsenacommacah & the Atlantic World 39 Huguenot colony at Fort Caroline and planted Spanish garrisons at Saint Augustine, Santa Elena (modern-day Parris Island, South Carolina), and elsewhere in La Florida. Perhaps Menéndez brought Paquiquineo with him to Spain in 1567. Certainly, at least according to Father Juan Rogel, who was stationed in Santa Elena at the time, the adelantado brought him back to Havana when he returned from Spain in 1569 or 1570. According to Father Gerónimo de Oré, who visited Florida in 1614 and 1616 and drew upon interviews and manuscripts of those who remembered the events, when Paquiquineo learned in Spain that Jesuits were already at work in other parts of La Florida, he announced ‘‘that he would venture to take some priests to his country and that with the help of God and his own indus- try, the Indians of that land would be converted to the Faith.’’ The Jesuits then ‘‘offered themselves to the King, and asked for his permission as well as for the necessary provisions to go to those parts, and to take with them the cacique Don Luis.’’ Whatever might have happened in Spain, some such exchange took place in Havana, among Paquiquineo, Menéndez, and the vice-provincial of the Jesuit mission to La Florida, Father Juan Baptista de Segura. The provincial had become increasingly disillusioned with the slow pace of conversions at Santa Elena and points adjacent and imagined in Ajacán a fresh mission field where, with Paquiquineo’s help and without the corrupting influence of Spanish soldiers and laymen, the Jesuits could 18 win souls, or martyrdom, or both. Thus Paquiquineo, Segura, a freshly arrived priest named Luis de Quirós, three Jesuit brothers, three novices, and Alonso de Olmos, a boy whose father lived at Santa Elena, sailed for the Chesapeake late in the summer of 1570. When their ship stopped at Santa Elena, Father Juan de la Carrera, who was stationed there, tried to talk Segura out of his plan to establish a mission without an armed guard—a scheme he chalked up partly to the naïveté of Segura’s ‘‘holy, sincere Christian heart’’ but mostly to the verbal wizardry of Paquiquineo, who had somehow sold Segura and Menéndez on the idea. ‘‘I pointed out the difficulty in the execution of the plan, saying that the Indian did not satisfy me, and judging from what he had told me, I saw that he was a liar,’’ Carrera wrote, thirty years after the fact, when he had long since been proved correct. Segura not only
18. ‘‘Relation of Rogel,’’ ‘‘Relation of Gerónimo de Oré,’’ in Lewis and Loomie, Spanish Jesuit Mission, 118, 180; Noble David Cook, ‘‘Beyond the Martyrs of Florida: The Versatile Career of Luis Gerónimo de Oré,’’ Florida Historical Quarterly, LXXI (1992), 169, 182.
40 daniel k. richter stood his ground but, said Carrera, sent Quirós to demand that the ex- pedition be given ‘‘the best and the larger portion of everything I had in my charge, especially the church goods.’’ Laden with ‘‘the best and richest articles...inthewayofchalices, monstrances, and vestments and other articles besides church furnishings,’’ the ship sailed for Ajacán. If Paqui- quineo had set out a decade earlier in search of prestige goods, he had 19 them now. Everyone arrived safely in the Chesapeake on September 10, 1570. A few days later, the ship that brought them departed with much of the meager food with which the expedition had been ‘‘ill-provisioned for the journey.’’ Also on board was the only letter Quirós and Segura ever sent from the mission, which made clear that things were already going horribly wrong. The paradise Paquiquineo had described had, unbeknown to him, endured ‘‘six years of famine and death.’’ Many of those who had not perished had ‘‘moved to other regions to ease their hunger,’’ and those who stayed behind said ‘‘that they wish[ed] to die where their fathers have died, although they have no maize, and have not found wild fruit, which they are accustomed 20 to eat.’’ No one on either side, Spanish or Indian, had enough food. Nonetheless, Paquiquineo had brought the Spanish and their goods. The people of Tsenacommacah ‘‘seemed to think that Don Luis had risen from the dead and come down from heaven, and since all who remained are his relatives, they are greatly consoled in him’’—at least according to Quirós and Segura, who believed that those relatives had ‘‘recovered their courage and hope that God may seek to favor them, saying that they want to be like Don Luis, begging us to remain in this land with them.’’ This might well have been true if the Jesuits were to provide the powerful gifts for which Paquiquineo hoped. But two other things happened almost immediately, one spiritual and one material, that might have determined the course of everything else that followed. ‘‘The chief has kept a brother of Don Luis, a boy of three years, who lies seriously ill, 6 or 8 leagues from here and now seems certain to die,’’ Quirós and Segura reported. As the priests under- stood it, the chief ‘‘requested that someone go and baptize him, for which reason it seemed good to Father Vice-Provincial [Segura] to send...oneof Ours to baptize the boy so close to death.’’ There is no hint in the records of what happened on that sacramental journey. But there are many indications
19. ‘‘Relation of Carrera,’’ in Lewis and Loomie, Spanish Jesuit Mission, 131–133. 20. Luis de Quirós and Juan Baptista de Segura to Juan de Hinistrosa, Sept. 12, 1570, ibid., 89, 90.
Tsenacommacah & the Atlantic World 41 from elsewhere in North America of the conclusions that Native people 21 drew when Jesuits wielded their water and spells and a child died anyway. The Jesuits might or might not have thus sealed a reputation as murder- ous sorcerers, but there is no question that they quickly dashed any hopes that they might be conduits for powerful prestige goods. ‘‘By a bit of blun- dering (I don’t know who on the ship did it) someone made some sort of a poor trade in food,’’ Quirós complained. Previously, ‘‘the Indians whom we met on the way would give to us from their poverty, [but] now they are reluctant when they see they receive no trinkets for their ears of corn.’’ To nip such expectations of reciprocity—almost certainly the Native people did not see their provision of food to people who brought exotic goods in terms of barter—Segura ‘‘had forbidden that they be given something, so that they would not be accustomed to receiving it and then afterwards not want to bargain with us.’’ Not surprisingly, ‘‘the Indians took the food away with them.’’ For the moment, at least, Segura held firm in his conviction that the fathers ‘‘must live in this land mainly with what the Indians give’’ them. ‘‘Take care,’’ Quirós warned his correspondent, ‘‘that whoever comes here in no wise barters with the Indians, if need be under threat of severe punishments, and if they should bring something to barter, orders will be given that Don Luis force them to give in return something equal to what- ever was bartered, and that they may not deal with the Indians except in 22 the way judged fitting here.’’ Over the starving months of winter, the fathers apparently did break down and exchange some goods for food, but with local villagers, rather than with Paquiquineo, his chief, or his somewhat more distant town. Pa- quiquineo himself had almost immediately fled to that town, where he sup- posedly refused all communication with the fathers and settled down to what Jesuit chroniclers delighted in describing as the life of a ‘‘second Judas’’ who ‘‘allowed himself free rein in his sins, marrying many women in a pagan way.’’ The story as usually told then reached a gruesome end. Paquiquineo supposedly responded to a final desperate Jesuit plea for aid with a brutal attack, first on the messengers and then on the mission station, where Segura and the others died from blows with their own axes. As evi- dence of the murders—and, we might add, of the power of exotic goods—
21. Ibid., 89–90; James Axtell, The Invasion Within: The Contest of Cultures in Colonial North America (New York, 1985), 122–123. 22. Quirós and Segura to Hinistrosa, Sept. 12, 1570, in Lewis and Loomie, Spanish Jesuit Mission, 92 (quotations); Mallios, ‘‘In the Hands of ‘Indian Givers,’’’ 105–153.
42 daniel k. richter Spanish sailors dispatched the next summer to supply the mission claimed that Native men were wearing the slain priests’ cassocks as they tried to 23 lure them ashore. But everything the chroniclers and subsequent historians have thought they knew about what happened after September came from the lips of the only one of the Spaniards who survived the experience, the young boy Alonso—as embroidered by the rhetorical conventions of Catholic hagiog- raphy and by what might have been poorly translated boasts from Native people. Who knows what combination of survivor guilt and intimidation shaped the tales of a boy who, nearly two years after the crisis, found him- self delivered up to a vengeful Menéndez? The governor had sailed up the river in ‘‘an armed fragatilla with 30 soldiers,’’ had lured aboard Paqui- quineo’s uncle ‘‘with five of his leaders and eight other Indians,’’ and had then forced Alonso to act as interpreter while Rogel hastily ‘‘catechized and baptized’’ eight or nine of the Tsenacommacans, ‘‘after which they were hanged from the rigging of the Governor’s ship.’’ To Rogel, it was ‘‘a mar- velous thing in how short a time the Governor learned what was happening there from the mouth of the boy.’’ Marvelous, indeed, given that Menéndez was in too much of a hurry to follow up on the boy’s story about where the priests were buried and that Alonso admitted he had not actually witnessed the murders. All we can know for certain is that the Jesuits died, that they utterly failed to live up to behavioral expectations of a prestige-goods econ- omy, and that their deaths—whether by assassination or starvation—pro- voked a brutal retaliation by the Europeans. The lessons Paquiquineo took away from his effort to master the Spaniards and their goods can only be 24 imagined.
Namontack If we know little with certainty about Paquiquineo, we know even less about Namontack, the man who joined the English in the transaction that sent Thomas Savage to live with the Powhatans in 1608, as recalled in the song of 1611. But at least in his case, thanks to the work of scholars such as J. Fred-
23. ‘‘Relation of Carrera,’’ in Lewis and Loomie, Spanish Jesuit Mission, 134. An excellent summary of the standard narrative of Paquiquineo, on which an alternate per- spective appears here, is James Horn, A Land as God Made It: Jamestown and the Birth of America (New York, 2005), 1–10. 24. Lewis and Loomie, Spanish Jesuit Mission, 46–47; Juan Rogel to Francis Bor- gia, Aug. 28, 1572, and ‘‘Relation of Juan Rogel,’’ ibid., 108–109, 120–121 (quotations); Hoffman, New Andalucia, 261–266; Gleach, Powhatan’s World, 89–97.
Tsenacommacah & the Atlantic World 43 erick Fausz, Martin Quitt, and Frederic Gleach, we have a clearer sense of the broader historical narrative in which he fits, a narrative that begins 25 shortly after the first arrival of the Jamestown colonists in 1607. As Wahunsonacock and his subordinates apparently understood it, the weroance figure among the English was Christopher Newport, not John Smith, who consistently portrayed himself as Newport’s subordinate. New- port’s initial voyage of exploration up the James River in May 1607 thus assumed crucial significance for chiefs of Tsenacommacah seeking connec- tions to goods and power. According to Gabriel Archer, Newport and his entourage ‘‘were entertayned with much Courtesye in every place.’’ Two weroances subordinate to Wahunsonacock fairly tripped over themselves to arrange ceremonial welcomes that displayed their wealth and generosity. Escorted to the presence of the weroance of Arrohateck, Newport’s entou- rage found the chief ‘‘satt upon a matt of Reedes, with his people about him’’ and another mat ready ‘‘layd for Captain Newport.’’ After the visitors had feasted on roast deer, mulberries, corn and bean soup, and cornbread, the weroance presented Newport with ‘‘his Crowne which was of Deares hayre dyed redl [redd].’’ While everyone ‘‘satt merye banquetting with them, see- ing their Daunces, and taking Tobacco, Newes came that the greate kyng Powatah was come: at whose presence they all rose of their mattes (save the kyng Arahatec); separated themselves aparte in fashion of a Guard, and with a long shout they saluted him.’’ Believing the newcomer was the Pow- hatan, rather than, as turned out to be the case, a subordinate weroance named Parahunt from the town called Powhatan, the English did their best to act like proper chiefs. ‘‘Him wee saluted with silence sitting still on our mattes, our Captaine in the myddest,’’ reported Archer. Newport then ‘‘pre- sented(asbefore...[he] dyd to kyng Arahatec) gyftes of dyvers sortes, as penny knyves, sheeres, belles, beades, glasse toyes etc. more amply then 26 before.’’
25. J. Frederick Fausz, ‘‘An ‘Abundance of Blood Shed on Both Sides’: England’s First Indian War, 1609–1614,’’ Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, XCVIII (1990), 3–56; Rountree, Pocahontas’s People, 29–55; Martin H. Quitt, ‘‘Trade and Ac- culturation at Jamestown, 1607–1609: The Limits of Understanding,’’ William and Mary Quarterly, 3d Ser., LII (1995); Gleach, Powhatan’s World; James Axtell, After Columbus: Essays in the Ethnohistory of Colonial North America (New York, 1988), 182–221. 26. [Gabriel Archer?], ‘‘A Relatyon...Written...byaGentoftheColony...,’’ May 21–June 21, 1607, in Philip L. Barbour, ed., The Jamestown Voyages under the First Charter, 1606–1609, 2 vols., Works Issued by the Hakluyt Society, 2d Ser., nos. 136–137 (Cambridge, 1969), I, 83–84. It took the better part of a month for the colo-
44 daniel k. richter On the evening of the same day, ten miles farther upriver at a hilltop town that Archer called ‘‘Pawatahs Towre,’’ the two weroances jointly presided over another feast, at which the mats prepared for the guests were ‘‘layde right over against the kynges.’’ As night came on, Newport ‘‘certifyed’’ to Parahunt that the English ‘‘were frendes with all his people and kyng- domes.’’ In response, the weroance, according to Archer, ‘‘very well under- standing by the wordes and signes we made; the significatyon of our mean- ing,’’ proposed ‘‘of his owne accord a leauge of fryndship with us; which our Captain kyndly imbraced.’’ Newport, ‘‘for concluding therof gave him his gowne, put it on his back himselfe, and laying his hand on his breast saying Wingapoh Chemuze (the most kynde wordes of salutatyon that may be) he satt downe.’’ The chiefly exchanges of gifts and food continued somewhat more awkwardly the next day when Newport invited Parahunt to a Sunday dinner of ‘‘two peeces of porke...sodd...with pease.’’ Not surprisingly, the weroance and his party brought along some more appetizing food of their own—which might have been as much a political as a gastronomic state- ment—but everyone ‘‘fedd familiarly, without sitting in...stateasbefore.’’ Parahunt ate ‘‘very freshly of’’ the salt pork stew and washed it down with enough ‘‘beere, Aquavite, and Sack’’ to feel ‘‘very sick, and not able to sitt 27 up long.’’ As the competitive feasting continued, more than just a hangover trou- bled the ceremonial displays of chiefly harmony and asymmetrical redis- 28 tribution. A particularly tense moment occurred just before that infor- mal Sunday meal, when ‘‘two bullet-bagges which had shot and Dyvers trucking toyes in them’’ turned up missing. On Newport’s protest, the two weroances ‘‘instantly caused them all to be restored, not wanting any thing.’’ That the recovery was so easy suggests that the chiefs themselves had been the ones who redistributed ‘‘the shott and toyes to (at least) a dozen sever- nists to figure out that the Parahunt was merely ‘‘a wyroaunce, and under this great Powaton’’ (Edward Maria Wingfield, ‘‘A Discourse of Virginia,’’ 1608, ibid., 215). 27. Archer, ‘‘Relatyon,’’ in Barbour, ed., Jamestown Voyages, I, 84–87, 89. 28. In Archer’s firsthand account, the next day Parahunt simply concluded that his guests’ ‘‘hott Drynckes he thought caused his greefe, but that he was well agayne, and . . . [the English] were very wellcome’’ (ibid., 89). But if the comments of Sir Walter Cope a couple of months later are accurate, Newport might have used the occasion to further increase his reputation among the Powhatans: ‘‘One of ther kinges syck with drinkinge our aquavite, thought him selfe poysoned[.] newport tolde him by signes that the nextday he showld be well and he was so: and tellinge hys cuntry men thereof they came apace olde men and old women upon Every belliach to him, to know when they showld be well’’ (Cope to Lord Salisbury, Aug. 12, 1607, ibid., 110).
Tsenacommacah & the Atlantic World 45 all persons.’’ This provided an opportunity for Newport, whether he fully understood his actions or not, to assert his superiority to the two weroances by reenacting the redistribution of prestige goods and claiming the sole right to provide them. As Archer put it, he ‘‘rewarded the theeves with the same toyes they had stollen, but kept the bulletes, yet he made knowne unto 29 them the Custome of England to be Death for such offences.’’ More troublesome for the future of Anglo-Powhatan relations were New- port’s stubborn insistence that the weroances provide guides for an overland expedition beyond the falls of the James; Parahunt’s more stubborn expla- nations of why that would be impossible; and Newport’s defiant erection, before he turned back, of ‘‘a Crosse with this inscriptyon Jacobus Rex. 1607. and his owne name belowe.’’ Parahunt did not see the cross go up at the base of the falls or the Englishmen as they prayed for their monarch and their ‘‘owne prosperous succes in this his Actyon, and proclaymed him kyng, with a greate showte.’’ If Parahunt’s family maintained any tradition of the travels of Paquiquineo in the world of Europeans, however, they must have scoffed when the Tsenacommacans who witnessed the spectacle repeated Newport’s disingenuous explanation ‘‘that the two Armes of the Crosse sig- nifyed kyng Powatah and himselfe, the fastening of it in the myddest was 30 their united Leaug, and the shoute the reverence he dyd to Pawatah.’’ Against this uneasy backdrop, as the English returned downriver to Jamestown, they participated in feasts offered with progressively less en- thusiasm, until, ominously, their guide (who was the brother-in-law of the weroance of Arrohateck) ‘‘tooke some Conceyt, and though he shewed no discontent, yet would he by no meanes goe any further.’’ The reason soon became clear; the previous day, some two hundred Tsenacommacans had attacked the English fort. As one colonist succinctly put it, ‘‘The people used our men well untill they found they begann to plant and fortefye, Then they fell to skyrmishing.’’ The fighting continued for several weeks until the mamanatowick unilaterally declared a truce, while colonist after colo- nist succumbed to dysentery, salt poisoning, and malnutrition. ‘‘Through- out the summer and autumn,’’ Fausz concludes, ‘‘Wahunsonacock kept the depleted, disease-ridden colonists alive with gifts of food until he had re- stored their trust and earned a formal recognition of their grateful depen- dence’’—a recognition driven home by the capture and ritual adoption of 31 Smith at the end of the year.
29. Archer, ‘‘Relatyon,’’ ibid., 87. 30. Ibid., 87–89. 31. Ibid., 89–95, quotations on 94; Cope to Salisbury, Aug. 12, 1607, ibid., 110 (quo-
46 daniel k. richter It is significant that, from a few days after the initial attack on Jamestown through the difficult period of skirmishing and truce, famine and disease, Newport was, as George Percy put it, ‘‘gone for England, leaving us (one hundred and foure persons) verie bare and scantie of victualls, furthermore in warres and in danger of the Savages.’’ Among the Powhatans, the repu- tation of the great man Newport, who knew something of how to behave at a feast and to distribute prestige goods, can only have risen in his ab- sence, particularly in contrast to his underling Smith. In his official capacity as ‘‘Cape Marchant,’’ Smith ran about the countryside dickering with and bullying weroances for the foodstuffs that, as Quitt has pointed out, could be given or received, but never appropriately bartered for, in a prestige-goods 32 economy. If we trust the Pocahontas-free version of Smith’s captivity contained in his 1608 True Relation, the cape merchant reinforced Newport’s reputa- tion during his audience with Wahunsonacock. When the mamanatowick ‘‘asked mee the cause of our comming,’’ Smith reported, ‘‘I tolde him, being in fight with the Spaniards our enemie, beeing over powred, neare put to retreat, and by extreame weather put to this shore, where...ourPinnasse being leake[y] wee were inforced to stay to mend her, till Captaine New- port my father came to conduct us away.’’ And what a father Newport was:
In describing to...[Wahunsonacock] the territories of Europe, which was subject to our great King whose subject I was, and the innumerable multitude of his ships, I gave him to understand the noyse of Trumpets, and terrible manner of fighting were under captain Newport my father, whom I intituled the Meworames which they call King of all the waters. At his greatnesse hee admired, and not a little feared: hee desired mee to forsake Paspahegh, and to live with him upon his River, a Countrie called Capahowasicke: hee promised to give me Corne, Venison, or what I wanted to feede us, Hatchets and Copper wee should make him, and none should disturbe us. This request I promised to performe: and thus tation); Rountree, Pocahontas’s People, 29–34; Horn, A Land as God Made It, 54–59; Fausz, ‘‘An ‘Abundance of Blood Shed,’’’ VMHB, XCVIII (1990), 17; Gleach, Powha- tan’s World, 106–122. 32. George Percy, ‘‘Observations Gathered out of a Discourse of the Plantation of the Southerne Colonie in Virginia by the English, 1606,’’ in Barbour, ed., Jamestown Voyages, I, 143; Smith, True Relation, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, I, 35–39, quo- tation on 35; Smith, The Generall Historie of Virginia, New-England, and the Summer Iles ...(1624),ibid., II, 142–146; Quitt, ‘‘Trade and Acculturation,’’ WMQ, 3d Ser., LII (1995), 247.
Tsenacommacah & the Atlantic World 47 having with all the kindnes hee could devise, sought to content me: hee sent me home with 4 men, one that usually carried my Gowne and Knap- 33 sacke after me, two other loded with bread, and one to accompanie me.
In January 1608, shortly after Smith’s return to Jamestown with no in- tention of demonstrating his subordination by relocating to the place Pow- hatan had assigned him, Newport—‘‘father,’’ ‘‘King of all the waters,’’ font of ‘‘Hatchets and Copper,’’ better known among his own people as what James Axtell has called ‘‘a one-armed, one-time pirate’’—returned at last to Tsenacommacah with the ‘‘First Supply.’’ Copper flowed out of James- town, traded by Newport’s seamen so liberally that Indian corn and furs ‘‘could not be had for a pound of copper, which before was sold for an ounce.’’ Meantime, Wahunsonacock and his people ‘‘confirmed their opin- ion of Newport’s greatnes...bythegreat presents Newport often sent him.’’ In return, said Smith, ‘‘the Emperour Powhatan each weeke once or twice sent me many presents of Deare, bread, [and] Raugroughcuns [rac- coons], halfe alwayes for my father, whom he much desired to see, and halfe for me: and so continually importuned by messengers and presents, that I would come to fetch the corne, and take the Countrie their King had given me, as at last Captaine Newport resolved to go see him.’’ At about this point, Smith began to regret the whoppers he had told the Powhatans during his captivity: ‘‘The President, and the rest of the Councell, they knewe not, but Captaine Newports greatnesse I had so described, as they conceyved him 34 the chiefe, the rest his children, Officers, and servants.’’ The chiefly progress of Newport and Smith to visit Wahunsonacock in February 1608 had many rough moments, including some comical English efforts to cross fragile bridges or wade out to a barge marooned at low tide, several far less comical English refusals to lay down their arms during diplomatic ceremonies, and (on the way back to Jamestown) a tragic En- glish episode of shooting first and asking questions later that left at least one Native man dead. But as on his former embassies, Newport provided just enough evidence to confirm his reputation as a chief who might ful- fill the Natives’ economic and political expectations and take his subordi- nate place in Powhatan’s domain. For his part, Wahunsonacock spared no
33. Smith, True Relation, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, I, 53–57. 34. James Axtell, Beyond 1492: Encounters in Colonial North America (New York, 1992), 187; John Smith, The Proceedings of the English Colonie in Virginia since Their First Beginning from England in the Yeare of Our Lord 1606, till This Present 1612 ... (1612), in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, I, 215 (quotations); Smith, True Relation, ibid., 61–63 (quotations).
48 daniel k. richter plate 1. Pendants cut from sheet copper at Jamestown. Courtesy of APVA Preservation Virginia effort to display his own power, wealth, and generosity. ‘‘Before his house stood fortie or fiftie great Platters of fine bread,’’ said Smith, who entered to the sound of ‘‘loude tunes’’ and ‘‘signes of great joy’’ during a preparatory embassy while Newport waited for a future grand entry. Wahunsonacock, ‘‘having his finest women, and the principall of his chiefe men assembled, sate in rankes,’’ presided ‘‘as upon a Throne at the upper ende of the house, with such a Majestie as I cannot expresse, nor yet have often seene, either in Pagan or Christian; with a kinde countenance hee bad mee welcome, and caused a place to bee made by himselfe to sit.’’ When Smith presented the mamanatowick ‘‘a sute of red cloath, a white Greyhound, and a Hatte; as jewels he esteemed them, and with a great Oration made by three of his Nobles...,kindlyaccepted them, with a publike confirmation of a per- 35 petuall league and friendship.’’ But, lest Smith get too comfortable over the turkey dinner that ‘‘the Queene of Appomattoc, a comely yong Salvage,’’ then served him, Wahun- sonacock reminded him of whom the welcome had really been prepared for: ‘‘Your kinde visitation doth much content mee, but where is your father whom I much desire to see, is he not with you?’’ After Smith assured him that ‘‘the next day my Father would give him a child of his, in full assurance of our loves, and not only that, but when he should thinke it convenient, wee would deliver under his subjection the Country of Manacam and Pocough- taonack his enemies,’’ the mamanatowick put his visitor in his place in a different way. ‘‘With a lowd oration,’’ Smith reported, ‘‘he proclaimed me a werowanes of Powhatan, and that all his subjects should so esteeme us, and no man account us strangers nor Paspaheghans, but Powhatans, and that the Corne, weomen and Country, should be to us as to his owne people.’’ Smith, ‘‘for many reasons,’’ made no objections to this declaration of depen- dence and, ‘‘with the best languages and signes of thankes’’ he could impro- vise, beat a hasty exit. But not before Wahunsonacock further displayed his power. ‘‘The King, rising from his seat,’’ said Smith, ‘‘conducted me foorth, and caused each of my men to have as much more bread as hee could beare, giving me some in a basket, and as much he sent a board for a present to 36 my Father.’’ In Smith’s account (and probably because it is Smith’s account), New- port’s subsequent audiences with Wahunsonacock seem almost anticlimac- tic. But in at least three ways beyond keeping the great man waiting, New-
35. Rountree, Pocahontas’s People, 40–43; Smith, True Relation, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, I, 63–65. 36. Smith, True Relation, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, I, 65–67.
50 daniel k. richter port acted his peaceful and generous chiefly part. When he arrived, he presented the mamanatowick with the thirteen-year-old Thomas Savage, ‘‘whom he gave him as his Sonne.’’ When the issue of weapons at the coun- cil fire again came up, he commanded his ‘‘men to retire to the water side, which was some thirtie score [paces] from thence.’’ And when, in response to Smith’s efforts to start haggling over the price of provisions, Wahunsona- cock announced to Newport that ‘‘it is not agreeable with my greatnes in this pedling manner to trade for trifles, and I esteeme you a great wero- wans,’’ Newport bestowed on him ‘‘not...lesse then twelve great Coppers [to] try his kindnes.’’ Although Smith carped that this gift of large kettles pried from the Powhatans no more grain than a single smaller one could have purchased elsewhere, Newport’s display of asymmetrical generosity apparently had a great effect. ‘‘Thanks to God, we are at peace with all the inhabitants of the surrounding country, trading for corn and supplies,’’ colo- nist Francis Perkins wrote from Jamestown in March. Not only did Native people ‘‘value very highly indeed [our] reddish copper,’’ but ‘‘their great Emperor, or Werowance, which is the name of their kings, has sent some of his people to show us how to plant the Native wheat [maize], and to make 37 some gear such as they use to go fishing.’’ In April, Newport again sailed for England, taking with him Namon- tack, described as Wahunsonacock’s ‘‘trusty servant, and one of a shrewd subtill capacity,’’ whom the mamanatowick ‘‘well affected to goe with him for England in steed of his Sonne.’’ The thaw in Anglo-Powhatan relations after Wahunsonacock declared the English his subordinates and received a massive gift of prestige goods from the newcomers’ weroance suggests that Namontack went off into the Atlantic world with expectations similar to those of Paquiquineo. He would broker the connections to bring his people a secure supply of the Europeans’ exotic goods and thus master their power. But Namontack’s people must also have realized something that those who initially welcomed Paquiquineo home did not. The alliance symbolized by prestige goods also opened the way to an array of more mundane, but eco- nomically vital, items: copper for tools and weapons as well as for display,
37. Ibid., 69–71 (quotations); Smith, Proceedings of the English Colonie, ibid., 215– 217 (quotation); Francis Perkins ‘‘to a Friend in England,’’ Mar. 28, 1608, in Bar- bour, ed., Jamestown Voyages, I, 160 (editor’s bracketed words omitted). The four great kettles of the True Relation are not mentioned in Smith’s later versions of this story, which instead say only that ‘‘Newport [was] thinking to out brave this Salvage in osten- tation of greatnes, and so to bewitch him with his bounty’’ and that the transaction ‘‘bred some unkindnes betweene our two captaines’’ (Proceedings of the English Colonie, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, I, 217 [quotations]; Generall Historie, ibid., II, 156).
Tsenacommacah & the Atlantic World 51 iron axes and knives, cloth, perhaps even firearms. Solidifying the incorpo- ration of the people who made these things into a polity of Tsenacommacah 38 was important work indeed. It was work that was not going well during Namontack’s absence. Smith repeatedly reinforced the contrast between his own parsimony and New- port’s chiefly generosity as well as his unwillingness to play the subordinate weroance role the mamanatowick had assigned him. Wahunsonacock had, ‘‘to expresse his love to Newport, when he departed, presented him with 20 Turkies, conditionally to returne him 20 Swords, which immediatly were sent him.’’ Smith, however, refused to make a similar exchange, and the mamanatowick, ‘‘not finding his humor obaied in sending him weapons,... caused his people with 20. devises to obtain them, at last by ambuscadoes.’’ The skirmishing only ended when Wahunsonacock ‘‘sent his messengers and his dearest Daughter Pocahuntas’’ to try to patch things up—and Smith had convinced himself that the Tsenacommacans were ‘‘in such feare and obedience, as his very name wold sufficiently affright them.’’ With Smith hardly able to conceal his contempt for the mamanatowick’s authority, for the London Company policies, and for what he considered Newport’s cod- dling of Indians who should be ruled by force, the Powhatans might well 39 have pinned much of their hopes on Namontack’s successful return. No doubt, as Smith suspected, Namontack had carried instructions ‘‘to know our strength and countries condition.’’ In England, Newport tried to show him some impressive sights, or at least to show him off to all the right people who could contribute to the expedition back to Jamestown that would be known as the ‘‘Second Supply.’’ According to Spanish ambassador Don Pedro de Zúñiga, ‘‘This Newport brought a lad who they say is the son of an emperor of those lands and they have coached him that when he sees the King he is not to take off his hat, and other things of this sort.’’ Although Zúñiga was ‘‘amused by the way they honour[ed] him, for...hemust be a very ordinary person,’’ the royal treatment probably gave Namontack a simpler impression of the possibilities for mobilizing European material and political power than Paquiquineo had taken home from his longer and more difficult travels. Whatever the case, the consensus among English on
38. Smith, Proceedings of the English Colonie, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, I, 216 (quotation); Smith, True Relation, ibid., 79 (quotation). On the dangers of over- emphasizing the symbolic aspects of the underlying economic relationships prestige goods represent, see Camilla Townsend, Pocahontas and the Powhatan Dilemma (New York, 2004), 62–63. 39. Smith, Proceedings of the English Colonie, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, I, 220–221.
52 daniel k. richter both sides of the Atlantic seemed to be that ‘‘they treated him well’’ and that ‘‘the Emperor, his father, and his people were very happy over what he told 40 them about the good reception and entertainment he found in England.’’ Whatever Namontack might have said when the English were not listen- ing, his return to Tsenacommacah with Newport in the fall of 1608 brought the Powhatans’ efforts to integrate English chiefs into a prestige-goods economy to their climax, in the remarkable episode of Wahunsonacock’s coronation. Historians have almost universally agreed with Smith that the whole scheme was as cockamamie as the company’s orders that Newport was not to return to England ‘‘without a lumpe of gold, a certainty of the south sea or one of the lost company of Sir Walter Rawley’’ or that he deliver to the Chesapeake a shipload of ‘‘Poles and Dutch to make pitch and tarre, glasse milles, and sope-ashes’’ with no plans for how they would be fed. ‘‘As for the coronation of Powhatan and his presents of Bason, Ewer, Bed, Clothes, and such costly novelties, they had bin much better well spared, then so ill spent,’’ Smith concluded. ‘‘We had his favour much better, onlie for a poore peece of Copper, till this stately kinde of soliciting made him so much overvalue himselfe, that he respected us as much as nothing at all.’’ Of course, from Wahunsonacock’s perspective, a ‘‘stately kinde of soliciting’’ and the prestige goods that Namontack’s embassy had apparently acquired from the English king were exactly the point. Indeed, it is even possible that the only one of the English for whom the mamanatowick had any real respect was Newport, whose status as his subordinate weroance was about 41 to be confirmed. As at the previous ceremonial meeting between Newport and Wahun- sonacock, Smith was in charge of the preliminaries and set off to deliver Namontack and an invitation that Wahunsonacock ‘‘come to his Father Newport to accept those presents, and conclude their revenge against the Monacans.’’ A ceremonial welcoming dance that Smith utterly failed to understand—involving ‘‘30 young women [who] came naked out of the woods’’ carrying arrows, swords, clubs, ‘‘a pot-stick,’’ and other items as they ‘‘cast themselves in a ring about the fire, singing, and dauncing with excellent ill varietie’’—certainly gave no hint of subordination to the En- glish. A message from Wahunsonacock about his power might also have
40. Smith, True Relation, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, I, 79; Pedro de Zúñiga to Philip III, June 26, 1608, in Barbour, ed., Jamestown Voyages, I, 163; ‘‘Relation of What Francis Magnel, an Irishman, Learned in the Land of Virginia during the Eight Months He Was There,’’ July 1, 1610, ibid., 154. 41. Smith, Proceedings of the English Colonie, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, I, 234.
Tsenacommacah & the Atlantic World 53 been conveyed when, having ‘‘solemnely invited Smith to their lodging... all these Nimphes more tormented him then ever, with crowding, and press- 42 ing, and hanging upon him, most tediously crying, love you not mee?’’ In any event, there was no question who was in charge the next day when Wahunsonacock gave Smith an audience:
If your king have sent me presents, I also am a king, and this my land; 8 daies I will stay to receave them. Your father is to come to me, not I to him, nor yet to your fort, neither will I bite at such a baite: as for the Monacans, I can revenge my owne injuries....Butforanysaltwater beyond the mountaines, the relations you have had from my people are false.
So much for the South Sea; so much for English military might; so much for Smith, who then watched politely as Wahunsonacock literally drew him 43 a map to show him the facts. Perhaps Paquiquineo had hoped for a scene like the one that played out next: Newport and fifty of his men processing overland to the capital while three barges brought prestige goods up the river. Like Smith, most histo- rians play the scene for a laugh:
All things being fit for the day of his coronation, the presents were brought, his bason, ewer, bed and furniture set up, his scarlet cloake and apparel (with much adoe) put on him (being perswaded by Namontacke they would doe him no hurt.) But a fowle trouble there was to make him kneele to receave his crowne, he neither knowing the majestie, nor mean- ing of a Crowne, nor bending of the knee, indured so many perswasions, examples, and instructions, as tired them all. At last by leaning hard on his shoulders, he a little stooped, and Newport put the Crowne on his head. When by the warning of a pistoll, the boates were prepared with such a volly of shot, that the king start up in a horrible feare, till he see all was well, then remembring himselfe, to congratulate their kindnesse, he gave his old shoes and his mantle to Captain Newport.
Wahunsonacock and the Native people who witnessed the ceremony almost certainly were not laughing. Tribute had been brought, prestige goods dis- played, unbalanced reciprocity practiced, and the mamanatowick’s power 44 demonstrated.
42. Ibid., 235–236. 43. Ibid., 236–237. 44. Ibid., 237. See also Francis Jennings, The Invasion of America: Indians, Colo-
54 daniel k. richter plate 2. ‘‘Powhatan’s Mantle,’’ perhaps the ceremonial garment given to Christopher Newport at Powhatan’s coronation in 1608. Denver Public Library, Western History Collection, X-31119. Original at the Ashmolean Museum, Oxford, England And ‘‘Captain Newport [who] brought them Copper,’’ as the Tsenacom- macan song called him, once again went off into the Atlantic world, taking Namontack with him and leaving Smith in charge. Namontack would never return. It is likely that, sailing on the Sea Venture, flagship of the ‘‘Third Supply,’’ he was shipwrecked in Bermuda and then killed in a brawl with a fellow Tsenacommacan named Matchumps. Meanwhile, in the Chesapeake, everything that could have gone wrong in the Anglo-Powhatan relationship did. Private trade among colonists, mariners, and Indians at Jamestown undercut the authority of both Smith and Wahunsonacock to manage the flow of prestige goods. ‘‘Of 2. or 300. hatchets, chissels, mattocks, and pick- axes’’ brought on the Second Supply, Smith complained, ‘‘scarce 20 could be found’’ six weeks later. All had been illicitly traded to Native people for furs, skins, baskets, and other commodities. Food remained skimpy at Jamestown, and Smith, using ever more aggressive tactics to extract it from Indian neighbors, finally ‘‘resolved...tosurprise Powhatan, and al his pro- vision.’’ Almost simultaneously, Wahunsonacock—much as he had the last time Newport sailed away—tested Smith’s willingness to maintain the con- trolled, ritualized flow of prestige goods and allow the mamanatowick to reassert the authority that private trade threatened to undermine. If Smith ‘‘would send him but men to build him a house, bring him a grin[d]stone, 50. swords, some peeces, a cock and a hen, with copper and beads,’’ Wahun- sonacock’s messengers said, ‘‘he would loade his shippe with corne.’’ Smith, ‘‘knowing there needed no better castel, then that house to surprize Pow- hatan,’’ quickly shipped off five craftsmen he could not feed anyway to start construction on the mamanatowick’s house while he mobilized some thirty- 45 eight troops for an expedition to the Powhatan capital in January 1609. nialism, and the Cant of Conquest (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1975), 116–117; Alden T. Vaughan, American Genesis: Captain John Smith and the Founding of Virginia (Boston, 1975), 41–46; Axtell, Beyond 1492, 187–188; Rountree, Pocahontas’s People, 47–48; Gleach, Powhatan’s World, 126–127; Williamson, Powhatan Lords of Life and Death, 35; Rountree, Pocahontas, Powhatan, Opechancanough, 112–114. Two exceptions to the general dismissal of the coronation ceremony are Gallivan, who concludes that, ‘‘upon receiving exotic symbols of authority, purportedly from King James, Powhatan had in many ways reached the pinnacle of his status as Mamanatowick’’ (James River Chief- doms, 169); and April Lee Hatfield, who takes seriously Newport’s ‘‘intention to overlay Powhatan territory with an English unit of governance’’ (‘‘Spanish Colonization Litera- ture, Powhatan Geographies, and English Perceptions of Tsenacommacah /Virginia,’’ Journal of Southern History, LXIX [2003], 245–282, quotation on 265). 45. Strachey, Historie of Travell, ed. Wright and Freund, 85–86; Alden T. Vaughan, ‘‘Powhatans Abroad: Virginia Indians in England,’’ in Robert Appelbaum and John
56 daniel k. richter Smith, told along way at the town of Weraskoyack that Wahunsona- cock ‘‘hath sent for you only to cut your throats,’’ needed no convincing. The mamanatowick similarly needed little convincing from the house build- ers who (perhaps encouraged by their first decent meals since arriving in the Chesapeake) ‘‘revealed to him as much as they knew of...[English] projects, and how to prevent them.’’ Not surprisingly, the meeting between Smith and Wahunsonacock was strained. The English had to ask for the re- ception feast that earlier embassies had received as a matter of course, and Wahunsonacock almost immediately inquired when the visitors ‘‘would bee gon, faining hee sent not for’’ them. Multiplying the insult, the mamana- towick both drove a hard bargain and mocked Smith for his insistence that the expedition was about trading for food rather than about alliance and prestige goods. ‘‘Neither had hee any corne, and his people much lesse, yet for 40 swords he would procure...40bushels,’’ Wahunsonacock declared. Indeed he would not trade at all ‘‘without gunnes and swords, valuing a basket of corne more pretious then a basket of copper, saying he could eate his corne, but not his copper.’’ When Smith protested that, ‘‘as for swords, and gunnes, I told you long agoe, I had none to spare,’’ Wahunsonacock re- sponded bluntly. ‘‘Many do informe me, your comming is not for trade, but to invade my people and possesse my Country, who dare not come to bring you corne, seeing you thus armed with your men,’’ he announced. ‘‘To cleere us of this feare, leave abord your weapons, for here they are needlesse we 46 being all friends and for ever Powhatans.’’ The next day, having got nowhere with Smith on the incompatibility of arms and petty trade with the status of ‘‘being all Powhatans,’’ the mamana- towick starkly outlined the contrast between Smith and Newport:
Captaine Smith, I never used anie of [my] Werowances, so kindlie as your selfe; yet from you I receave the least kindnesse of anie. Captaine Newport gave me swords, copper, cloths, a bed, tooles, or what I desired, ever taking what I offered him, and would send awaie his gunnes when I intreated him: none doth denie to laie at my feet (or do) what I desire, but onelie you, of whom I can have nothing, but what you regard not, and yet you wil have whatsoever you demand. Captain Newport you call
Wood Sweet, eds., Envisioning an English Empire: Jamestown and the Making of the North Atlantic World (Philadelphia, 2005), 51–55; Smith, Proceedings of the English Colonie, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, I, 239–244 (quotations); Smith, Generall His- torie, ibid., II, 185–193. 46. Smith, Proceedings of the English Colonie, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, I, 244–246.
Tsenacommacah & the Atlantic World 57 father, and so you call me, but I see for all us both, you will doe what you list, and wee must both seeke to content you.
Smith utterly rejected the status of a subordinate weroance: ‘‘Powhatan, you must knowe as I have but one God, I honour but one king; and I live not here as your subject, but as your friend.’’ Many specific affronts and skir- mishes led up to the bloodbath that J. Frederick Fausz has rightly termed ‘‘the First Anglo-Powhatan War’’ of 1609 to 1614. But Smith’s rejection of the basic assumptions of subordination and asymmetrical exchange in a 47 prestige-goods chiefdom might well have served as that war’s declaration. Yet even through the years of fighting, the goods that Namontack and Newport brought from across the Atlantic retained their power for both sides. At least one English raiding party ‘‘ransaked’’ the temple of the sub- ordinate Nansemond chiefdom and ‘‘Tooke downe the Corpes of their deade kings from of their Toambes, and caryed away their pearles Copp[er] and braceletts wherew[i]th they doe decore their kings funeralles.’’ Tsenacom- macans, meanwhile, ‘‘stopped full of Breade’’ the mouths of Englishmen they slew. Most suggestive of the continued power of goods, however, was a ceremony described by Henry Spelman, who lived among the Powhatans from late 1609 to late 1610. Spelman explained that Wahunsonacock kept most of the more ordinary ‘‘goods and presents that are sent him, as the Cornne,’’ in a house built for that purpose at the town of Oropikes. ‘‘But the beades or Crowne or Bedd which the Kinge of England sent him are in the gods’ house at Oropikes, and in their houses are all the Kinge ancesters and kindred commonly buried.’’ At least once a year, on the day after the
47. Ibid., 246–250; Fausz, ‘‘An ‘Abundance of Blood Shed,’’’ VMHB, XCVIII (1990), 19–47; Quitt, ‘‘Trade and Acculturation,’’ WMQ, 3d Ser., LII (1995), 251–258. The omission of what must be the word ‘‘my’’ from Powhatan’s description of Smith as a weroance seems more than a slip. As Smith’s modern editor notes, ‘‘Both the Gener- all Historie and Purchas’s Pilgrimes omit ‘of’’’ from the same sentence (Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, I, 248n). My suspicion is that this declaration of English subordina- tion was hastily (and thus incompletely) edited out of Proceedings of the English Colonie and then further cleaned up in later versions. On any subordination implied by kinship, Smith was a little more ambiguous but also seemed to declare his independence: ‘‘I call you father indeed, and as a father you shall see I will love you,’’ he claimed to have told Wahunsonacock, ‘‘but the smal care you had of such a child, caused my men [to] per- swade me to shift for my selfe.’’ Significantly, the paragraph containing this exchange bears the marginal note ‘‘Captaine Smith’s discourse to delay time, that hee might sur- prise Powhatan’’ (Proceedings of the English Colonie, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, I, 249).
58 daniel k. richter plate 3. Glass trade beads, most in shades of blue, from Jamestown. Courtesy of APVA Preservation Virginia people planted the corn fields that belonged to the mamanatowick, Wahun- sonacock
takes the croune which the Kinge of England sent him beinge brought him by tow men, and setts it on his heade which dunn the people goeth about the corne in maner backwardes for they going before, and the king followinge ther faces are always toward the Kinge exspectinge when he should flinge sum beades amonge them which his custum is at that time to doe makinge those which had wrought to scramble for them But to sume he favors he bids thos that carry his Beades to call such and such unto him unto whome he giveth beads into ther hande and this is the greatest curtesey he doth his people.
This was a prestige-goods chiefdom in action. That ceremony, that crown, those beads were exactly what Paquiquineo and Namontack hoped to bring home from the Atlantic world, confirming Powhatan’s power over Euro- peans and their goods even—perhaps especially—in the midst of war with 48 the English.
48. Mark Nicholls, ed., ‘‘George Percy’s ‘Trewe Relacyon’: A Primary Source for the Jamestown Settlement,’’ VMHB, CXIII (2005), 244–245, 247; Henry Spelman, ‘‘Re-
Tsenacommacah & the Atlantic World 59 plate 4. Ralph Hamor’s embassy to Powhatan. 1619. Engraving by Theodore de Bry. Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, Virginia
Uttamatomakkin As is well known, the First Anglo-Powhatan War came to an end with the kidnapping of Pocahontas in 1613, her diplomatic marriage to John Rolfe in 1614, and their voyage to England in 1616. Joining the traveling couple were several others, including Uttamatomakkin. A high-ranking priest— the prefix uttama- connotes ‘‘spiritual’’ or ‘‘priestly’’—and ‘‘an experienced Man and Counseller to Opochancanough their King and Governour in Pow- lation of Virginea,’’ in Edward Arber, ed., Travels and Works of Captain John Smith, President of Virginia, and Admiral of New England, 1580–1631, 2 vols. (Edinburgh, 1910), I, cv, cxii. Rountree and Williamson are among the few scholars who seem to have recognized the significance of this account. Rountree minimizes the significance of ‘‘the paste-jewel crown’’ (Powhatan Indians of Virginia, 110). Williamson, pointing out that ‘‘in the deep Southeast beads were structurally analogous to white body emissions,’’ elaborates upon the fertility symbolism of Powhatan’s acts: ‘‘Powhatan circled his newly planted field symbolically shooting semen all over his subjects, his workers, who faced him just as a woman might face a man during intercourse’’ (Powhatan Lords of Life and Death, 157). On beads as fertility symbols, see Townsend, Pocahontas, 86–87.
60 daniel k. richter hatans absence,’’ Uttamatomakkin was, said Samuel Purchas, ‘‘sent hither to observe and bring newes of our King and Country to his Nation.’’ To Wa- hunsonacock and Opechancanough—the rising chief whose emissary Utta- matomakkin was—the trip to England might have been a final attempt to 49 establish the kind of relationship envisioned since 1608 or 1561. Shortly after Pocahontas’s marriage, colonist Ralph Hamor visited Wa- hunsonacock in hopes he could persuade him to marry off another daughter to the English. He quickly learned that the mamanatowick had a quite dif- ferent agenda, focused on prestige goods and his image of the long-absent Christopher Newport. Wahunsonacock’s first words were to Hamor’s inter- preter, Thomas Savage: ‘‘You...aremychild, by the donative of Captaine Newport, in liew of one of my subjects Namontacke, who I purposely sent to King James his land, to see him and his country, and to returne me the true report thereof.’’ Unaware, as was Hamor, of Namontack’s death in Ber- muda, the mamanatowick complained that he had ‘‘yet...notreturned, though many ships have arrived here from thence, since that time, how ye have delt with him I know not.’’ If Namontack’s quest to harness the power of the Atlantic world for Tsenacommacah’s paramount chiefdom remained 50 unfinished, it was the fault of the English. And at Jamestown, the English also continued to ignore the demands of prestige-goods relationships. Before Wahunsonacock spoke to Hamor, he felt the Englishman’s neck and demanded to know ‘‘where the chaine of pearle was’’ that he had sent to his ‘‘Brother Sir Thomas Dale for a present, at his first arrivall’’ and that was to be worn by any future official En- glish emissary. Having talked his way out of this breach of protocol, Hamor grandiloquently announced that ‘‘Sir Thomas Dale your Brother, the prin- cipal commander of the English men, sends you greeting of love and peace, on his part inviolable,’’ and presented ‘‘in testimonie thereof...awor- thie present, vid, two large peeces of copper, five strings of white and blew beades, five wodden combes, ten fish-hookes, and a paire of knives.’’ Wa-
49. Fausz, ‘‘An ‘Abundance of Blood Shed,’’’ VMHB, XCVIII (1990), 43–49; Samuel Purchas, Purchas His Pilgrimage; or, Relations of the World and the Religions Observed in Al Ages and Places Discovered, from the Creation unto This Present (Lon- don, 1617), 954. On uttama-, see Townsend, Pocahontas, 149–150. 50. Hamor, True Discourse, 38. After Wahunsonacock’s coronation, Namontack had left with Newport as his guide on the ill-conceived expedition against the Monacans (Smith, Proceedings of the English Colonie, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, I, 237) and exploration of ‘‘the head of the Falls which takes the name of Namantack the Fynder of yt’’ (Strachey, Historie of Travell, ed. Wright and Freund, 131). It is possible the mamanatowick never saw him again.
Tsenacommacah & the Atlantic World 61 hunsonacock expressed polite ‘‘thankes’’ but made it clear that such gifts given in the king’s name were ‘‘not so ample; howbeit himselfe a greater Weroance, as formerly Captaine Newport, whom I very well love, was accus- tomed to gratefie me with.’’ To drive home the point about impudent En- glish stinginess, he announced that the daughter whose hand the English sought was already pledged to ‘‘a great Weroance for two bushels of Roa- noke [wampum].’’ Moreover, he considered ‘‘it not a brotherly part of your 51 King, to desire to bereave me of two of my children at once.’’ After a meager meal of nothing but sodden cornbread, presented with the excuse that Wahunsonacock had not expected guests, the mamanatowick ‘‘caused to be fetched a great glasse of sacke, some three quarts or better, which Captain Newport had given him sixe or seaven yeeres since, carefully preserved by him, not much above a pint in all this time spent.’’ To each of the English he dispensed ‘‘in a great oister shell some three spoonefuls.’’ After redistributing this powerful substance associated with Newport, Wa- hunsonacock sent the emissaries on their way the next day with explicit in- structions for Dale. Hamor was
to remember his brother to send him these particulars, Ten peeces of Copper, a shaving knife, an iron frow to cleave bordes, a grinding stone, not so bigge but four or five men may carry it, which would be bigge enough for his use, two bone combes, such as Captaine Newport had given him; the wodden ones his own men can make: an hundred fish- hookes or if he could spare it, rather a fishing saine, and a cat, and a dogge, with which things if his brother would furnish him, he would re- quite his love with the returne of skinnes.
Wahunsonacock insisted that Hamor repeat each item and, the Englishman said, ‘‘yet still doubtful that I might forget any of them, he bade me write them downe in such a Table book as he shewed me, which was a very fair one.’’ Like the bottle of sack and the crown from England, the notebook (which might or might not have come from Newport and which Hamor was not allowed to mark) was a prestige item that ratified the mamanatowick’s power. ‘‘He tolde me,’’ said Hamor, ‘‘it did him much good to shew it to 52 strangers which came unto him.’’ There is no record that Dale sent the goods Wahunsonacock demanded; this would have been an unlikely course for a man who a few years earlier had directed that some colonists who ‘‘did Runne Away unto the Indyans...
51. Hamor, True Discourse, 38–43. 52. Ibid., 43–45.
62 daniel k. richter be hanged some burned some to be broken upon wheles others to be Staked and some to be shott to deathe...Toterrefy the reste for attempteinge the Lyke.’’ That Uttamatomakkin returned from England filled with ‘‘rails against England English people and particularly his best friend Thomas Dale’’ suggests Dale did nothing to meet the Powhatans’ expectations. So too does Pocahontas’s embittered complaint when she met Smith in En- gland that ‘‘they did tell us alwaies you were dead, and I knew no other till I came to Plimoth; yet Powhatan did command Uttamatomakkin to seeke 53 you, and know the truth, because your Countriemen will lie much.’’ Clearly Uttamatomakkin was not impressed with the truths he found in England, where he became the brunt of a running English joke. Wahun- sonacock ‘‘sent him, as they say, to number the people here, and informe him well what wee were and our state,’’ Smith reported. ‘‘Arriving at Pli- moth, according to his directions, he got a long sticke, whereon by notches hee did thinke to have kept the number of all the men hee could see, but he was quickly wearie of that taske.’’ Purchas said he also tried to count trees, ‘‘till his Arithmetike failed. For their numbring beyond an hundred is imperfect, and somewhat confused.’’ Still, Uttamatomakkin held his own in a theological debate with Purchas (who found him ‘‘very zealous in his superstition’’) and presumably sat gamely through the theatrical produc- tions and other events where the Powhatans were paraded. Although the Tsenacommacans had been ‘‘graciously used’’ at the court of James I, Utta- matomakkin vociferously ‘‘denied ever to have seene the King,’’ because the monarch acted nothing like a proper chief. When Smith finally persuaded him otherwise, ‘‘He replyed very sadly, You gave Powhatan a white Dog, which Powhatan fed as himselfe, but your King gave me nothing, and I am 54 better than your white Dog.’’ Christopher Newport was probably in England during part of Uttamato- makkin’s unsuccessful quest for prestige goods; in November 1616, he sailed for the East Indies, where he died in August of the next year. There is no record that the two men met, although it is hard to imagine that Uttamato-
53. Nicholls, ed., ‘‘Percy’s ‘Trewe Relacyon,’’’ VMHB, CXIII (2005), 261–262; Samuel Argall to Council for Virginia[?], June 9, 1617, in Susan Myra Kingsbury, ed., The Records of the Virginia Company of London, 4 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1906– 1935), III, 73; Smith, Generall Historie, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, II, 261. 54. Smith, Generall Historie, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, II, 261 (quotations); Purchas, Purchas His Pilgrimage, 954–955 (quotations); Norman Egbert McClure, ed., The Letters of John Chamberlain (Philadelphia, 1939), II, 12, 50 (quotation), 56–57, 66; Vaughan, ‘‘Powhatans Abroad,’’ in Appelbaum and Sweet, eds., Envisioning an En- glish Empire, 58–65.
Tsenacommacah & the Atlantic World 63 makkin failed to ask after him, to hear talk of him, or to take additional um- brage if there was no response. Whatever the case, he returned home with nothing good to say about the English or Dale. Samuel Argall was con- vinced that ‘‘all his reports are disproved before opachankano and his Great men whereupon (to the great satisfaccion of the Great men) Tomakin is dis- graced.’’ Uttamatomakkin’s disgrace might have been real, but less because of the rhetorical brilliance of English counterarguments than the plain proof that Powhatan’s vision of incorporating the Atlantic world into Tsenacom- macah had been so utterly wrong and that Opechancanough would have to build chiefly authority through other means. Those who sang the taunting 55 song of 1611 already realized as much.
Tsenacommacah and the Atlantic World I have speculated here at great length but also endeavored to operate within an accepted model of how chiefdoms work and to stay very close to the texts of the few documents that describe the exploits of Paquiquineo, Namon- tack, and Uttamatomakkin in the Atlantic world. Those texts glimpse the attempts of envoys from Tsenacommacah to incorporate European things into their prestige-goods economy, to subordinate representatives of Euro- pean kingdoms to their paramount chiefdom, and to use the new world of the Atlantic to multiply their people’s power. Control of supplies of cop- per, sacred chalices, exotic crowns, blue glass beads, bottles of sack, and volumes of blank paper reinforced the power of the mamanatowick and his subordinate weroances—and, in turn, displayed to Tsenacommacans their power over Captain Newport and King James. As copper and beads became ever more accessible to ever more ordinary people, the need to display ever more esoteric items—and to send someone like Uttamatomakkin to find out exactly how things worked at the source—became ever more pressing. This particular Native world of goods perhaps had already died with Pocahontas, Powhatan, and Newport in 1617 and 1618. Perhaps it died with Namontack in 1609. But it certainly died in the devastating Powhatan as- sault on the English in 1622—an assault that, few have noticed, came within months of the arrival of word about a new Virginia Company scheme. To forestall Dutch exploitation ‘‘of a trade of Furrs to be had in Hudsdons and
55. K. R. Andrews, ‘‘Christopher Newport of Limehouse, Mariner,’’ WMQ, 3d Ser., XI (1954), 39–40; David R. Ransome, ‘‘Newport, Christopher,’’ American National Biography Online, http://www.anb.org/articles/20/20-00718.html (accessed Feb. 2, 2004); Argall to Council for Virginia, June 9, 1617, in Kingsbury, ed., Records of the Virginia Company, III, 73–74.
64 daniel k. richter De La Ware River,’’ a ship was to be dispatched from Virginia, loaded with trade goods and ‘‘two or three [men] skilfull in the languages and maners of the Indians, and expert in those places, wherein the trade is to be, that may serve for guides and Interpreters.’’ Virginia colonists who spoke Al- gonquian were hardly known for their tight lips. Opechancanough surely overheard their talk and understood what this expedition to competing dis- tant shores meant for the economic basis of his, and his people’s, power over 56 the English and their goods.
56. ‘‘Treasurer and Company. Letter to Governor and Council in Virginia,’’ July 25, 1621, in Kingsbury, ed., Records of the Virginia Company, III, 488 (quotation); ‘‘Coun- cil of the Virginia Company. A Letter to the Governor and Council in Virginia,’’ Nov. 26, Dec. 5, 1621, ibid., 526–527 (quotation), 530.
Tsenacommacah & the Atlantic World 65 Joseph Hall between old world and new oconee valley residents and the spanish southeast, 1540–1621 QW
In 1621, Lieutenant Marmaduke Parkinson and his English companions made an intriguing discovery on their way up the Potomac River. While the English were visiting their Patawomeck allies, their chief showed them ‘‘a China Boxe.’’ According to Governor George Yeardley and his council’s summary of Parkinson’s report,
This Boxe or Casket was made of braided Palmito, painted without, and lined in the inside with blue Taffata after the China or East India fash- ion. They enquiring whence it came, the King of Patomeck said, it was presented him by a certaine people of the Mountaines toward the South- west, who got it from another Nation beyond them some thirtie dayes journie from Patomacke, called Acana Echinac, beeing of small stature, who had Houses, Apparell, and Houshold stuffe like us, and living within foure dayes journey of the Sea, had ships come into their River.
Believing this intelligence confirmed that the ‘‘South Sea,’’ or Pacific Ocean, was a manageable journey beyond the Appalachian Mountains, the gover- nor reported enthusiastically that the Virginia Colony would soon benefit from ‘‘a most rich Trade to Cathay, China, Japan, and those other of the 1 East Indies.’’ Unfortunately for Yeardley, no amount of enthusiasm could compensate for the vast expanses that separated Virginians from Chinese. So what was one of their taffeta-lined palmetto boxes doing just upriver from Chesapeake
Thanks to the anonymous reader, Peter Mancall, Marvin Smith, Melissa Sundell, Mark Williams, and the Jamestown and the Atlantic World conference attendees for their comments and to Sylvia Hawks for retyping various drafts. 1. Samuel Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus; or, Purchas His Pilgrims, 20 vols. ([1625]; Glasgow, 1905–1907), XIX, 151–152. Bay? Answering that question and addressing its larger significance runs the risk of taking a flight of fancy similar to the Virginians’, to imagine a world that might enthrall but did not exist. If there are not clear answers to such a question, though, there are striking clues, which demonstrate that, in 1621, the English of Virginia inhabited the northern fringes of a region already adjusting to the demands and opportunities of colonization. To understand this region and the exchange networks through which the small box passed, we must look not to the Pacific Ocean, as Yeardley believed, but to the lands of La Florida and the town its colonists called San Augustín. To equate the sounds of Acana Echinac with the name of the Spanish colonial outpost is a stretch, and it appears even more tenuous when we note that a separate summary of Parkinson’s expedition referred to it as ‘‘Acanackchina,’’ but sketchy linguistic evidence is not the only liability 2 of such an orientation. To all appearances, the Spaniards of La Florida were far too weak to be conducting a regional trade. It was with more reach than grasp that Spaniards had already claimed the Atlantic lands stretching from the Gulf of Mexico to the Grand Banks as La Florida, and their efforts to enforce some claim to the Chesapeake, whose lands they called Ajacán, only confirmed this fact. Although they did establish a short-lived mission on the bay in 1570–1571 and sailed north again with two timid reconnais- sance missions in 1609 and 1611, none of these efforts had lasting results, and Spaniards exercised little control beyond the limits of today’s central 3 and northern Florida. Such failures, though, should not mask the impact of the colony on the wider Southeast. Many scholars have mistaken La Florida’s marginal posi- tion in North America and in Spain’s empire more generally for a lack of influence on the southeastern lands that lay beyond Spanish control. In fact, it was precisely thanks to colonial debility that Spaniards reshaped the re- gion. More accurately, Native Americans, using Spanish resources, were re-
2. Ibid., 147. Helen C. Rountree, noting the chief’s comments about a bay four days’ journey from the sea, has speculated that the Indians had originally acquired their un- usual gift from Spaniards visiting Mobile Bay. Although fishermen and traders from Cuba might have been journeying along the Gulf Coast, there is little evidence for such activity. Even if she is right, it does not diminish the larger point of this essay (Roun- tree, ‘‘The Powhatans and Other Woodland Indians as Travelers,’’ in Rountree, ed., Powhatan Foreign Relations, 1500–1722 [Charlottesville, Va., 1993], 23). 3. Charlotte M. Gradie, ‘‘The Powhatans in the Context of the Spanish Empire,’’ in Rountree, ed., Powhatan Foreign Relations, 154–172; David B. Quinn, ed., New Ameri- can World: A Documentary History of North America to 1612, V, The Extension of Settle- ment in Florida, Virginia, and the Spanish Southwest (New York, 1979), 141–158.
Between Old World & New 67 The Oconee Valley and Its Neighbors, ca. 1600. Drawn by Rebecca L. Wrenn fashioning their societies from within. The profound consequences of these adjustments require a more careful look at two poorly understood inhabi- tants of the seventeenth-century Southeast: Indians whose histories suffer from an obvious lack of documentation and Spaniards whose histories suf- 4 fer from an alleged lack of regional relevance.
4. As David J. Weber has noted, ‘‘[Spanish] missionaries failed to advance per- manently, defend effectively, or Hispanicize deeply North American frontiers in the seventeenth century.’’ Unfortunately, this cogent observation says little about Span- iards’ unintended influences on the lands around and beyond their missions. Equally regrettably, scholars of the Southeast continue to believe that Spain’s regional influ- ence was small primarily because they have not examined it. Paul E. Hoffman’s history of the colony’s frontiers, for example, confines itself primarily to the state boundaries of Florida, and John E. Worth’s admittedly ‘‘very preliminary exploration’’ of Span- ish and English relations with southeastern Indians before 1700 has little to say about the Natives of the deep interior, who, he notes, ‘‘remained in virtually complete isola- tion from direct European contact.’’ Consequently, it is no surprise that Charles Hud- son believes that the Spanish mission system was unable ‘‘to shape Indian societies at a distance’’ and that Alan Gallay asserts, ‘‘After the initial forays of Spanish explorers, Spain’s influence did not reach much farther into the South than Florida.’’ What fol-
68 joseph hall Spaniards founded Saint Augustine in 1565, and in the following cen- tury, the Spanish population of La Florida grew feebly to fewer than two 5 thousand. Within that same period, though, tens of thousands of Native Americans inhabiting a broad territory east of the lower Mississippi val- ley reoriented economic and political structures in response to the new and 6 prestigious goods available from the Spanish outpost. The extent to which Natives effected such changes is difficult to tell from a single china box, but the larger patterns become clearer, if still only faintly so, in the history of the Oconee Valley in north central Georgia. Close to the colony but still be- yond its effective control, Oconee peoples by 1600 were using Spanish goods to reorganize their societies. Taking advantage of Spanish goods, leaders of the polity known as Altamaha managed to sever their tributary relation- lows in this essay should suggest the limitations of these assessments. See Weber, The Spanish Frontier in North America (New Haven, Conn., 1992), 121; Hoffman, Florida’s Frontiers (Bloomington, Ind., 2002); Worth, ‘‘Spanish Missions and the Persistence of Chiefly Power,’’ in Robbie Ethridge and Charles Hudson, eds., The Transformation of the Southeastern Indians, 1540–1760 (Jackson, Miss., 2002), 45, 47; Charles Hud- son, ‘‘Introduction,’’ ibid., xxv; Alan Gallay, The Indian Slave Trade: The Rise of the English Empire in the American South, 1670–1717 (New Haven, Conn., 2002), 33. For examples of works that discuss Spanish missions in their regional contexts, see Cynthia Radding, Wandering Peoples: Colonialism, Ethnic Spaces, and Ecological Frontiers in Northwestern Mexico, 1700–1850 (Durham, N.C., 1997); James F. Brooks, Captives and Cousins: Slavery, Kinship, and Community in the Southwest Borderlands (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2002); Susan M. Deeds, Defiance and Deference in Mexico’s Colonial North: Indians under Spanish Rule in Nueva Vizcaya (Austin, Tex., 2003). 5. In 1598, the population of the colonial city was seven hundred. That estimate might have included one hundred African slaves mentioned in a separate letter ten years later. By 1689, on the eve of the collapse of the missions and Spain’s larger colo- nial project in Florida, the population in Saint Augustine was about fifteen hundred. A small number of ranching families also lived to the west in Apalachee, but these did not begin arriving there until the middle 1670s. See Gonzalo Méndez de Canzo to king, Feb. 23, 1598, Archivo General de Indias, Seville, Audiencia of Santo Domingo 224, doc. 31 (hereafter cited as AGI, SD); Pedro de Ibarra to king, Jan. 4, 1608, ibid., doc. 62; Ebelino de Compostela to king, September 1689, ibid., SD 151; John H. Hann and Bonnie G. McEwan, The Apalachee Indians and the Mission San Luis (Gainesville, Fla., 1998), 148–149. All correspondence is written from Saint Augustine unless other- wise noted. 6. Gregory A. Waselkov, ‘‘Seventeenth-Century Trade in the Colonial Southeast,’’ Southeastern Archaeology, VIII (1989), 117–133; Peter H. Wood, ‘‘The Changing Popu- lation of the Colonial South: An Overview by Race and Region, 1685–1790,’’ in Wood, Waselkov, and M. Thomas Hatley, eds., Powhatan’s Mantle: Indians in the Colonial Southeast (Lincoln, Neb., 1989), 90.
Between Old World & New 69 7 ship with their Ocute neighbors to the north. More subtly and strikingly, even as Spaniards recorded struggles for preeminence among rival elites, archaeological evidence suggests that their followers were also challenging the wider political and ceremonial life of the Oconee Valley. Spaniards offered gifts because southeastern Indians successfully thwarted any efforts to impose Spanish imperial will. Although sixteenth- century Spaniards generally favored pacifying and colonizing frontier areas of their American empire with sword, pike, and arquebus, Spanish colonial ambitions in La Florida shattered repeatedly against persistent and wide- spread Native hostility. The region’s most famous invader, Hernando de Soto, frequently resorted to torture and kept his Indian porters (and some- times their leaders) as prisoners during his expedition of 1539–1543, but Soto, who had gained renown as one of Pizarro’s most ruthless lieutenants in Peru, died on the banks of the Mississippi River without ever sighting a chiefdom worthy of his avarice. By the 1590s, Florida officials knew that Natives’ military and demographic strength required quieter means of con- 8 quest. The gifts Spaniards offered in turn provided the leaders who re- ceived them with new materials to buttress sagging prestige. Although the evidence for these political modifications appear earliest in the lands, like the Oconee Valley, that lay relatively close to Spanish missions and fortifi- cations, the consequences extended not only as far as the Chesapeake but also west to the Mississippi River. In these shifts lie clues into what a china
7. Regarding the location of the Ocute and Altamaha chiefdoms, see John E. Worth, ‘‘Late Spanish Military Expeditions in the Interior Southeast, 1597–1628,’’ in Charles Hudson and Carmen Chaves Tesser, eds., The Forgotten Centuries: Indians and Euro- peans in the American South, 1521–1704 (Athens, Ga., 1994), 118 n. 20. 8. ‘‘The Account by a Gentleman from Elvas,’’ ed. and trans. James Alexander Robertson and John H. Hann, in Lawrence A. Clayton, Vernon James Knight, Jr., and Edward C. Moore, ed. and trans., The De Soto Chronicles: The Expedition of Hernando De Soto to North America in 1539–1543, 2 vols. (Tuscaloosa, Ala., 1993), I, 95, 146; Rodrigo Rangel, ‘‘Account of the Northern Conquest and Discovery of Hernando de Soto,’’ ed. and trans. John E. Worth, ibid., 276, 285–288; Paul E. Hoffman, ‘‘Hernando de Soto: A Brief Biography,’’ ibid., 439–441, 457–459. For a discussion of broader im- perial policy, see Richard W. Slatta, ‘‘Spanish Colonial Military Strategy and Ideology,’’ in Donna J. Guy and Thomas E. Sheridan, eds., Contested Ground: Comparative Fron- tiers on the Northern and Southern Edges of the Spanish Empire (Tucson, Ariz., 1998). For two roughly contemporary examples of Spaniards’ abandoning military conquest in favor of gifts, diplomacy, and what one scholar has called peace ‘‘by purchase’’ and an- other has characterized as a temporary truce, or ‘‘counterfeit peace,’’ see Philip Wayne Powell, Soldiers, Indians, and Silver: The Northward Advance of New Spain, 1550–1600 (Berkeley, Calif., 1952), 181–203; Deeds, Defiance and Deference, 56–85.
70 joseph hall box from Florida was doing on the banks of the Potomac and how it formed part of some Indians’ efforts to use Spanish goods to adjust to—and con- struct—a colonial world long before the arrival of colonial settlers. The roots of Spanish influence lay partly in their willingness to offer gifts to compensate for their military weakness, but it also depended on the political nature of the chiefdoms—like those of the Oconee—that accepted those offerings. The concept of the chiefdom is one that scholars have em- ployed for societies ranging from pre-Roman Gaul to contemporary New Guinea. Across this range of human experience, chiefdoms are generally understood to be societies ruled by hereditary elites who define and main- tain their power by receiving tribute from subordinates and mediating with the supernatural and the exotic in order to maintain and even improve their societies. Rather than depend on bureaucracies, standing armies, or other institutions frequently associated with states, chiefs depend on a degree of control over surplus food and the rare objects that indicate religious and po- 9 litical power. Southeastern chiefdoms readily impressed the explorers who witnessed them during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and Spaniards intent on controlling the region paid close attention to the political hierarchies atop which they hoped to situate themselves. Some of the best eyewitness descriptions come from the accounts of those who accompanied Soto on his fruitless search for a southeastern empire. He and his followers were the first to document the societies of Altamaha, Ocute, and other neighbor- ing polities in the Oconee Valley. Ocute’s ‘‘cacique’’ impressed the Span- iards with his ability to command ‘‘two thousand Indians’’ to bring gifts of food to the invaders. He also wielded enough influence over neighboring chiefdoms to compel some, like Altamaha, to offer tribute as signs of sub- mission. So powerful was he (or so great were his pretensions to power) that he personified his town. ‘‘Ocute’’ referred both to the town and its 10 leader.
9. My understanding of the chiefdom draws in part upon the following works: Robert L. Carneiro, ‘‘The Chiefdom: Precursor of the State,’’ in Grant D. Jones and Robert R. Kautz, eds., Transition to Statehood in the New World (Cambridge, 1981); Christopher S. Peebles and Susan M. Kus, ‘‘Some Archaeological Correlates of Ranked Societies,’’ American Antiquity, XLII (1977), 421–448; Paul D. Welch, Moundville’s Economy (Tuscaloosa, Ala., 1991); Timothy Earle, How Chiefs Come to Power: The Po- litical Economy in Prehistory (Stanford, Calif., 1997); Robin A. Beck, Jr., ‘‘Consolida- tion and Hierarchy: Chiefdom Variability in the Mississippian Southeast,’’ American Antiquity, LXVIII (2003), 641–661. 10. ‘‘Account by a Gentleman from Elvas,’’ ed. and trans. Robertson and Hann, in
Between Old World & New 71 In calling him a cacique, Spaniards were importing from the Caribbean an Arawak term for ‘‘chief.’’ Ocute’s followers understood him and other leaders in terms common to other Muskogean speakers in the Southeast. In the powerful Cofitachequi and Coosa chiefdoms of the South Carolina and Georgia interiors, the complex hierarchy required a variety of titles. An orata, which the chronicler Juan de la Bandera translated as señor menor, led small villages or groups of villages. These recognized the influence of a mico, or gran señor, who, in addition to enjoying the respect of oratas, also headed a town of his own. In both Coosa and Cofitachequi, these micos in turn owed respect to one above them. In the case of Coosa’s paramount, Bandera referred to him only as ‘‘un cacique grande’’ called Cosa. Appar- ently, the most powerful mico did not need a new title; he simply embodied 11 the town and province over which he ruled. As prospective supreme rulers coming from a society that was itself ex- tremely conscious of rank, Spaniards had a tendency to exaggerate the social hierarchies of most of the American societies they described. Micos or their superiors nonetheless had significant personal power, which appeared most obviously in the shape of massive earthen platform mounds. As the sites of chiefly residences and temples, these earthworks powerfully symbolized the authority of their elevated inhabitants. From these heights, chiefs celebrated important rituals or called their followers to war. Because southeasterners usually built their mounds in stages, the structures served two other signifi- cant purposes. The additions of new layers were themselves ceremonial acts, allowing the community to simultaneously elevate their chief and connect themselves with the earth that the mounds represented. Furthermore, these ceremonial additions usually followed the death of one leader and the suc- cession of another, with the new layer covering the remains and the goods of the deceased. Thus, although new leaders lost access to powerful sym- bolic items associated with the previous chief, such burials and new layers 12 enabled a successor to stand quite literally on the power of his predecessor.
Clayton, Knight, and Moore, ed. and trans., De Soto Chronicles, I, 77; Rangel, ‘‘Ac- count of the Northern Conquest,’’ ed. and trans. Worth, ibid., 272. 11. Charles Hudson, The Juan Pardo Expeditions: Exploration of the Carolinas and Tennessee, 1566–1568 (Washington, D.C., 1990), 62–63. 12. Pietro Martire d’Anghiera [Peter Martyr d’Anghera], De Orbe Novo: The Eight Decades of Peter Martyr D’Anghera, ed. and trans. Francis Augustus MacNutt, 2 vols. (New York, 1912), II, 262–265; Vernon J. Knight, Jr., ‘‘The Institutional Organiza- tion of Mississippian Religion,’’ American Antiquity, LI (1986), 678–679; Richard A. Krause, ‘‘The Death of the Sacred: Lessons from a Mississippian Mound in the Tennes- see River Valley,’’ Journal of Alabama Archaeology, XXXVI (1990), 92–95; Chester B.
72 joseph hall The ritually and symbolically powerful goods that leaders held close in both life and death provided crucial elements of political control. A former resident of South Carolina’s coast, Francisco Chicorana, explained one such example to the Spanish imperial historian Peter Martyr d’Anghera in the early 1500s. According to this native of Chicora now living in Spain, the people of Chicora’s neighboring province of Duhare venerated two idols ‘‘as large as a three-year old child, one male and one female,’’ which ‘‘had their residence in the palace.’’ Twice a year, during sowing season and harvest season, the chief Duhare displayed these idols for the necessary ceremonies of supplication and thanksgiving. Appearing atop his mound with the idols on the appropriate days, ‘‘he and they are saluted with respect and fear by the people.’’ During the two days of rituals, Duhare remained closely asso- ciated with these idols that assured ‘‘rich crops, bodily health, peace, or if they are about to fight, victory.’’ Throughout the Southeast, finely crafted objects, frequently of rare materials, occupied the focal point of ceremonies 13 of cosmological order, communal cohesion, and military strength. In many instances, these goods owed their power to their exotic origins and the perilous journeys that leaders undertook to acquire them. Travel be- yond the immediate protection of one’s kin and community entailed signifi- cant risk, and the ceremonies of return acknowledged both the risk that a traveler took and the prestige that accompanied success. In 1595, the leader of the recently converted village of San Pedro, just north of Saint Augus- tine, returned from a journey. The man, named Juan, and his wife entered the town with the entire populace ‘‘wailing in a high voice as if they had dropped dead before their eyes,’’ and the townspeople repeated these lamen- tations in Juan’s presence for ‘‘many days.’’ The Franciscan who recorded this event did not allude to death incidentally. After his arrival in Saint Au- gustine, he learned that nearby mission Indians cried in a similar manner 14 to memorialize a recently dead leader.
DePratter, Late Prehistoric and Early Historic Chiefdoms in the Southeastern United States (New York, 1991), 139–147. 13. Martyr, De Orbe Novo, ed. and trans. MacNutt, II, 262–263; Knight, ‘‘Institu- tional Organization,’’ American Antiquity, LI (1986), 675–687. 14. Andrés de San Miguel, An Early Florida Adventure Story, trans. John H. Hann (Gainesville, Fla., 2000), 70–71. Other accounts of mourning that accompany the re- turn of travelers in the upper Mississippi valley and coastal Brazil were, according to Native sources, ceremonies that recalled those who had died since the traveler’s last visit. This association between long-distance travel and death is an interesting and potentially helpful one, especially because it seems incomplete: the Europeans arriv- ing at these towns and recording these ceremonies were visiting for the first time and
Between Old World & New 73 In the perilous and poorly known world beyond the town, leaders con- ducted the negotiations and exchanges that gave them access to rare and powerful objects. Outsiders provided chiefs with information and goods unavailable to the less privileged. These, in turn, entered into the cere- monies and exchanges that maintained inequality. Thus, thanks to a series of short-distance exchanges among a chain of neighbors, a chief in pied- mont Georgia might be able to display ceremonial objects manufactured 15 from Gulf Coast conch shells, Appalachian chert, or Great Lakes copper. It also meant that a Patawomeck leader who died some time after 1607 could leave this world in the company of a shell gorget probably manufactured by someone in the province of Guale on the Georgia coast. In addition to conferring significant prestige on a fortunate few, these objects and the ex- changes that moved them around the region knitted the Southeast in a loose 16 but expansive network. These exchanges, and the power they bestowed, required constant main- tenance, and the regularity of these interactions knitted leaders and their polities into a wider web of relationships. Perhaps the most striking evi- dence of chiefs’ ability to cross linguistic, political, and geographic barriers thus must have been the objects of such rituals for the mere fact of their arrival and not their departure and return. Apparently, just as Mary Helms has shown in other re- gions, travel over great distances had powerful links to travel outside of this world. See Robert L. Hall, An Archaeology of the Soul: North American Indian Belief and Ritual (Urbana, Ill., 1997), 3; Mary W. Helms, Ulysses’ Sail: An Ethnographic Odyssey of Power, Knowledge, and Geographical Distance (Princeton, N.J., 1988). 15. Peebles and Kus, ‘‘Some Archaeological Correlates of Ranked Societies,’’ Ameri- can Antiquity, XLII (1977), 421–448. For a discussion of this phenomenon in the Americas more generally, see Helms, Ulysses’ Sail. 16. Jeffrey P. Brain and Philip Phillips, Shell Gorgets: Styles of the Late Prehistoric and Protohistoric Southeast (Cambridge, Mass., 1996), 39–40. For a number of ex- amples of broad distribution of very similar manufactured goods, see 360–394. Brain and Phillips do not provide a date for the shell gorget from Virginia, but John Scarry and Mintcy Maxham mention that it was part of a burial from the early historic period. See Scarry and Maxham, ‘‘Elite Actors in the Protohistoric: Elite Identities and Inter- action with Europeans in the Apalachee and Powhatan Chiefdoms,’’ in Cameron B. Wesson and Mark A. Rees, eds., Between Contacts and Colonies: Archaeological Per- spectives on the Protohistoric Southeast (Tuscaloosa, Ala., 2002), 159. For a more com- plete discussion of the Virginia burial site where the gorget was found, see Stephen R. Potter, ‘‘Early English Effects on Virginia Algonquian Exchange and Tribute in the Tidewater Potomac,’’ in Wood, Waselkov, and Hatley, eds., Powhatan’s Mantle, 162– 166.
74 joseph hall is the remarkable consistency to the rituals that gave order to these power- ful and potentially dangerous exchanges. During the two years that Soto’s force menaced and met the peoples of Georgia, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Alabama, his chroniclers recounted an amazingly uniform array of ritu- als to welcome and propitiate the powerful newcomers with gifts. Whether visiting the towns of the Oconee Valley or arriving at the provinces of Cofi- tachequi or Coosa, Soto regularly received offerings of food, valuables, and burdeners—provided he and his men did not violate the norms of such en- 17 counters by taking things not set aside for them. Although many of Soto’s hosts addressed him as ‘‘Brother,’’ these ex- 18 changes frequently reinforced unequal relations among chiefs. Various leaders accepted these unequal regional relations because they secured them a modicum of influence at home. Amid the relatively fractious politics of the Oconee Valley, some apparently sought out powerful benefactors. When Oconee residents established a town on the western edge of the valley around 1500, they probably did so to take advantage of exchanges with the 19 powerful chiefdom of Coosa, some 150 miles to the northwest. Followers in the thousands, monuments of earth, and knowledge of a wider world all protected and demonstrated significant authority, but chiefs’
17. Marvin T. Smith and David J. Hally, ‘‘Chiefly Behavior: Evidence from Six- teenth Century Spanish Accounts,’’ in Alex W. Barker and Timothy R. Pauketat, eds., Lords of the Southeast: Social Inequality and the Native Elites of Southeastern North America, Archaeological Papers of the American Anthropological Association, no. 3 (1992), 99–110. As further evidence of the extent to which elite ideas crossed language barriers, Apalachees of the Florida panhandle, Timucuas of central Florida, and Apa- lachicolas of the Georgia-Alabama border all shared common leadership terms such as inija, meaning ‘‘second-in-command,’’ and holahta, meaning ‘‘chief,’’ even though all three groups spoke distinct languages (John H. Hann, ‘‘Political Leadership among the Natives of Spanish Florida,’’ Florida Historical Quarterly, LXXI [1992], 207). 18. One of the most extreme examples of this political phenomenon appears in Moundville in west central Alabama. By controlling the production and distribution of an array of items, including utilitarian ceramics and copper ornaments, Moundville’s leaders ensured that all neighboring ceremonial and political centers depended in some form on Moundville and also that Moundville’s leaders possessed the most prestigious items. As a result, the chiefdom remained stable for a relatively long period between 1100 and 1400. See Paul D. Welch, ‘‘Control over Goods and the Political Stability of the Moundville Chiefdom,’’ in John F. Scarry, ed., Political Structure and Change in the Prehistoric Southeastern United States (Gainesville, Fla., 1996). 19. Mark Williams, ‘‘Growth and Decline of the Oconee Province,’’ in Hudson and Tesser, eds., Forgotten Centuries, 191.
Between Old World & New 75 personal power had limits. Regardless of their regional connections, leaders had to accommodate the interests of the commoners. Early French explor- ers of coastal Florida noted that, though council houses included an elevated seat for the chief, he still consulted with the members of his town before making decisions of any importance. Tribute, another marker of subordina- tion, also required careful management because overburdened tributaries might simply leave if tributary demands interfered excessively with their own subsistence. Ocute the chief might personify Ocute the town, but with- out a standing army or other bureaucratic institutions, he also possessed 20 very personal limits on his power. Amid intense internal and external competition for preeminence, south- eastern chiefdoms experienced volatile and sometimes short lives. Chief- doms dominated the central region of Georgia from the eleventh through the sixteenth centuries, for instance, but few lasted more than one hundred years. Internal rivalries most likely caused the demise of most of those chief- doms, but environmental stresses such as droughts could provide the nec- essary impulse for unrest. Regardless of the reasons, as chiefs lost access to reliable food stores, important esoteric knowledge, or rare goods, they be- came less valuable to their followers. Lacking leaders to coordinate the stor- age and distribution of surpluses or dissatisfied with those who remained in charge, townspeople abandoned their homes in favor of the protection of 21 still-extant chiefdoms or the resources available in less-populated regions. Soto’s chroniclers described signs of instability among the polities of the Oconee Valley in 1540. With mounds significantly smaller than those of their distant neighbors of Cofitachequi and Coosa, the Oconee chiefdoms evidently experienced intense political rivalries that periodically disrupted the valley. Precisely because mounds contained the remains of and the asso- ciations with earlier chiefs, successful claimants who challenged older lin- eages evidently sought to disassociate themselves from these constructions by moving their principal community to a new site or an abandoned site free from reminders of the discredited order. Ecological considerations might
20. René Goulaine de Laudonnière, Three Voyages, ed. and trans. Charles E. Ben- nett (Gainesville, Fla., 1975), 14; Alex W. Barker, ‘‘Powhatan’s Pursestrings: On the Meaning of Surplus in a Seventeenth Century Algonkian Chiefdom,’’ in Barker and Pauketat, eds., Lords of the Southeast, 61–80; Beck, ‘‘Consolidation and Hierarchy,’’ American Antiquity, LXVIII (2003), 645–655. 21. DePratter, Chiefdoms, 162; David J. Hally, ‘‘Platform-Mound Construction and the Instability of Mississippian Chiefdoms,’’ in Scarry, ed., Political Structure and Change, 92–127; David G. Anderson, The Savannah River Chiefdoms: Political Change in the Late Prehistoric Southeast (Tuscaloosa, Ala., 1994).
76 joseph hall also have influenced these decisions, as leaders and followers sought more 22 fertile soil for their crops. Whether or not he recognized the meaning of Oconee political ge- ography, Soto could not have helped but note how the opportunism of subordinates regularly strained the unequal bonds between leaders and fol- lowers. Before entering the valley, Soto learned from a neighboring and per- haps tributary leader that ‘‘a great lord lived on ahead; that his domain was called Ocute.’’ When he arrived at the Oconee town of Altamaha, though, Soto discovered that some thought less reverentially of Ocute’s influence. Upon meeting the imposing Spanish force, the cacique of Altamaha asked ‘‘to whom he had to give the tribute in the future, if he should give it to 23 the Governor [Soto] or to Ocute.’’ Refusing to confront Ocute or con- cede his own pretended supremacy, Soto shrewdly enjoined Altamaha to continue offering tribute to Ocute until Soto declared otherwise. Despite Altamaha’s implicit challenge to Ocute’s preeminence, Soto still considered Ocute the leader with the greatest influence, and he offered his gifts accord- ingly. Where the cacique of Altamaha received a silver-colored feather from the Spaniard, Soto offered Ocute a yellow satin hat and a shirt in addition 24 to a similar feather. Soto paid close attention to such hierarchies and instabilities in the mis- guided hope that they would help his search for a new Incan or Mexican empire. His failure and the repeated failures of his successors to extract riches from the interior condemned La Florida to a marginal place in Spain’s American empire. Nonetheless, Natives’ deep respect for the power of rare
22. Hally, ‘‘Platform-Mound Construction,’’ in Scarry, ed., Political Structure and Change, 112–113; Mark Williams and Gary Shapiro, ‘‘Mississippian Political Dynam- ics in the Oconee Valley, Georgia,’’ ibid., 147–148. 23. ‘‘Account by a Gentleman from Elvas,’’ ed. and trans. Robertson and Hann, in Clayton, Knight, and Moore, ed. and trans., De Soto Chronicles, I, 77; Rangel, ‘‘Ac- count of the Northern Conquest,’’ ed. and trans. Worth, ibid., 272. The tenuous nature of hierarchy even suffuses outsiders’ descriptions of the Oconee Valley polities: where most of Soto’s chroniclers emphasized Ocute’s preeminence in the valley, the admit- tedly taciturn Luís Hernández de Biedma made no distinction between the power of ‘‘Altapaha’’ and ‘‘other caciques, who were named Ocute and Cofaqui.’’ Of more recent vintage, one of the archaeologists most familiar with the Oconee Valley believes that the town of Cofaqui was the principal center during Soto’s visit in 1540. See Luys Her- nández de Biedma, ‘‘Relation of the Island of Florida,’’ ed. and trans. John E. Worth, in De Soto Chronicles, I, 229; Williams, ‘‘Growth and Decline,’’ in Hudson and Tesser, eds., Forgotten Centuries, 179. 24. Rangel, ‘‘Account of the Northern Conquest,’’ ed. and trans. Worth, in Clayton, Knight, and Moore, ed. and trans., De Soto Chronicles, I, 272.
Between Old World & New 77 goods would tie many southeastern societies, even if indirectly, to Span- ish colonial efforts. As Native peoples, especially those of the Florida and Georgia coasts, thwarted Spanish missionary and military impositions, they forced Spaniards to abandon the pretensions of the rigid rule of empire for the more carefully negotiated and personal forms of chiefly influence. By courting the allegiance of peoples near and far with gifts, Spaniards were offering something that Native leaders could use, and Spaniards were then able to evangelize tens of thousands of people from Saint Augustine north to the coastal province of Guale in Georgia and west to the powerful Apa- lachees of the Florida panhandle. More broadly and more significantly for the history of the Southeast, they also provided a new array of materials for reorganizing many uncolonized Indians’ politics and polities. Ironically, the very weakness that has convinced later historians of Spain’s regional ir- relevance is precisely what convinced leaders in Saint Augustine to pursue 25 policies that promoted regionwide consequences. These later Spanish successes first required a series of painful lessons in southeastern politics. When Pedro Menéndez de Avilés founded Saint Au- gustine in 1565, he and his royal sponsor, Philip II, focused their efforts on securing a strategic point along Spanish sea lanes. Menéndez was already a successful military leader and administrator, and he enjoyed support from Europe’s most powerful monarch, but the colony would flourish or flounder less on the dreams of two men and more on the very real and varied inter- ests of the new colony’s neighbors. Even the very act of seeking Native lead- ers as allies posed serious challenges. In lands stretching from the Atlan- tic to the Gulf coasts lived perhaps twenty-four thousand Timucuas whose chiefs exercised significant influence over the people of their town and who in turn acknowledged the power of one of several leaders. These paramount 26 chiefs struggled with one another for preeminence. Among these politi-
25. My history of the colony’s early years draws on the following works: Eugene Lyon, The Enterprise of Florida: Pedro Menéndez de Avilés and the Spanish Conquest of 1565–1568 (Gainesville, Fla., 1976); Paul E. Hoffman, A New Andalucia and a Way to the Orient: The American Southeast during the Sixteenth Century (Baton Rouge, 1990), esp. 169–290; Hoffman, Florida’s Frontiers, 51–82; Amy Turner Bushnell, Situado and Sabana: Spain’s Support System for the Presidio and Mission Provinces of Florida, Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History, no. 74 (Athens, Ga., 1994), 36–48. 26. John E. Worth, The Timucuan Chiefdoms of Spanish Florida, I, Assimilation, and II, Resistance and Destruction (Gainesville, Fla., 1998), I, 13–18, II, 2–6; John H. Hann, A History of the Timucua Indians and Missions (Gainesville, Fla., 1996), 73– 84, 257–261; Jerald T. Milanich, ‘‘Native Chiefdoms and the Exercise of Complexity
78 joseph hall cally diverse and linguistically related peoples were the Mocamas of the coast just north of Saint Augustine. Just to the north of the Mocamas lived the Guales. Unlike the more politically cohesive Timucuas, the Guale towns of the Georgia coast accorded a wavering allegiance to the paramount lead- ers of two or three towns and spoke a Muskogean language distinct from the Timucuan but related to those of inland peoples like the Altamaha. The peoples of the Deep South—even those immediately adjacent to the fledg- 27 ling colony—resisted a simple template. Spaniards nonetheless sought to impose one. In the five years follow- ing the establishment of Saint Augustine, Spanish soldiers, missionaries, and colonists experienced breathtakingly rapid success and failure. After wiping out the nascent French colony of Fort Caroline near today’s Jackson- ville, Florida, fortifying seven other harbors from Santa Elena near today’s Beaufort, South Carolina, south to the Florida Keys and then north along the Gulf Coast to Tampa Bay, and establishing a chain of forts from Santa Elena inland to the western slopes of the Appalachians, the colony suffered a series of local uprisings that destroyed nearly everything. By 1570, Span- iards in Saint Augustine and Santa Helena inhabited European islands in a sea of Indians who were at best mildly friendly and at worst openly hostile. Another revolt against the newly established Jesuit mission on the Chesa- peake in 1571 convinced the missionaries to abandon the colony, and many colonists followed suit after Santa Elena’s Guale and Escamaçu neighbors 28 overran Santa Elena in 1576. The template had been simple and the con- sequences, for Menéndez, simply devastating. When he died in Spain in 1574, the colony showed few prospects for success. La Florida lacked the ex-
in Sixteenth-Century Florida,’’ in Elsa M. Redmond, ed., Chiefdoms and Chieftaincy in the Americas (Gainesville, Fla., 1998). The number twenty-four thousand comes from Worth, Timucuan Chiefdoms, II, 6, but he acknowledges it as speculation ‘‘virtually in- capable of proof.’’ 27. Grant D. Jones, ‘‘The Ethnohistory of the Guale Coast through 1684,’’ in D. H. Thomas, G. D. Jones, R. S. Durham, and C. S. Larsen, eds., The Anthropology of St. Catherines Island, I, Natural and Cultural History, Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History, no. 55 (1978), 155–210; John E. Worth, The Struggle for the Georgia Coast: An Eighteenth-Century Spanish Retrospective on Guale and Mocama, Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History, no. 75 (Athens, Ga., 1995), 12. 28. Hudson, Juan Pardo Expeditions, 23–46, 175–176; Bushnell, Situado and Sa- bana, 38–41, 61–62; Hoffman, New Andalucia, 266; Hann, History of Timucua Indi- ans, 50–72; Luís Gerónimo de Oré, The Martyrs of Florida (1513–1616), ed. and trans. Maynard Geiger (New York, 1936), 33–38.
Between Old World & New 79 ploitable resources that would finance colonization on Spanish terms, and Natives throughout the region had no interest in promoting their own sub- jugation. As if to reinforce what was already painfully evident to La Florida’s offi- cials, in 1573 Philip II issued new policies that pressured his representa- tives to incorporate ‘‘unpacified’’ peoples into the empire through kindness rather than conquest. Such an unfunded mandate offered little help to the struggling colony, but a more significant shift came in 1593, when the king authorized La Florida’s governor to receive funds specifically to pay for gifts to visiting friendly caciques. By offering the ‘‘clothes and tools and flour’’ that Philip II stipulated, the governor would demonstrate not only his kind- ness but also his power. By 1597, that list had come to include hatchets and hoes; cloth of wool, linen, and a little silk; shirts, stockings, hats, glass beads, and even a pair of shoes. The Native dignitaries who received these small quantities of goods recognized them as unusual new equivalents for the copper ornaments, finely dressed skins, and shell beads that confirmed their high status and spiritual power. New goods soon began joining more 29 familiar ones in the internments of their dead possessors. Leaders not only recognized the power of these objects; they needed it. The first European diseases arrived in the Southeast no later than 1526, when Lucas Vázquez de Ayllón brought six hundred colonists to establish a short-lived and disease-ridden colony on the coast of South Carolina. As coastal and interior peoples acquired a taste for the pigs that escaped from the supply trains of this and other Spanish expeditions, they also encoun- tered new diseases that swine could transmit to humans. Archaeologists have not found mass graves that would suggest high and sudden mortality, but they have noticed that settlements diminished in number and size after 30 contact. In addition, by the end of the 1500s, inhabitants of one town near
29. Joseph del Prado to king, Dec. 30, 1654, AGI, SD 229; Francisco Mugado to king, July 27, 1597, ibid., SD 231; Weber, Spanish Frontier, 107; Vernon James Knight, Jr., Tukabatchee: Archaeological Investigations at an Historic Creek Town, El- more County, Alabama, 1984, Office of Archaeological Research, Alabama State Mu- seum of Natural History, University of Alabama Report of Investigations, no. 45 (Moundville, Ala., 1985), 169–185; Cameron B. Wesson, ‘‘Prestige Goods, Symbolic Capital, and Social Power in the Protohistoric Southeast,’’ in Wesson and Rees, eds., Between Contact and Colonies, 110–125; Hudson, Juan Pardo Expeditions, 138–140. 30. Ann F. Ramenofsky, Vectors of Death: The Archaeology of European Contact (Albuquerque, N.M., 1987), 55–63; Marvin T. Smith, Archaeology of Aboriginal Cul- ture Change in the Interior Southeast: Depopulation during the Early Historic Period (Gainesville, Fla., 1987), 60–85; Ramenofsky and Patricia Galloway, ‘‘Disease and the
80 joseph hall the Georgia coast began to decorate their pottery with an increasing num- ber of ceremonial motifs in a much ‘‘sloppier’’ manner than their prede- cessors. Less experienced potters, deprived of the benefits of their stricken elders, apparently sought to confront these invisible scourges and sustain 31 their societies as best as their craftswomanship would allow. Chiefs pursued remedies of a different sort. As new and powerful (if also tactless and sometimes ineffective) players in the Southeast, the Spanish deserved careful attention. Not only did they seem more resistant to these dangerous diseases, but they possessed new sources of power that perhaps could thwart future epidemics or at least mitigate the political and reli- gious instability that usually accompanied them. Acquiring these Spanish gifts might provide leaders with access to a new ceremonial power. Many also requested the powerful and unusual Franciscans who had replaced the frustrated Jesuits. In accepting missionaries, remarkable men who walked unarmed among unfamiliar peoples and enjoyed the respect of imposing governors and military men, Indian leaders were wisely allying with spiri- tual leaders who possessed access to important new sources of cosmologi- 32 cal power. In addition, by placing themselves strategically between their people and the powerful people of Saint Augustine, Indian leaders ensured that they would not lose influence to opportunistic rivals who might seek 33 out the Spanish ahead of them. This access came at a price. Native leaders visiting Saint Augustine to acquire gifts also participated in larger ceremonies that Spaniards under- stood as the Indians’ ‘‘rendering of obedience’’ to the Spanish king. Span- ish officials also expected these new subjects to submit to a new spiritual
Soto Entrada,’’ in Galloway, ed., The Hernando de Soto Expedition: History, Historiog- raphy, and ‘‘Discovery’’ in the Southeast (Lincoln, Neb., 1997). 31. Rebecca Saunders, Stability and Change in Guale Indian Pottery, A.D. 1300– 1702 (Tuscaloosa, Ala., 2000), 177. For a different example of stress on craft production possibly caused by disease, Marvin T. Smith notes the decline of craft specialization during the early seventeenth century. It could be that, as he surmises, diseases were disrupting chiefly hierarchies and the craftspeople they supported. It could also be that the arrival of Spanish goods supplanted these indigenous crafts. In either case, Span- ish goods perhaps caused and certainly filled a crucial gap in the iconography of power (Smith, Aboriginal Culture Change, 108–112). 32. Franciscans took pride in their ability to impress Native leaders, and later histo- rians consider it important to the Franciscans’ success in New Mexico as well as Florida. See Francisco de Marrón to king, Jan. 23, 1597, AGI, SD 235; Luís Gerónimo de Oré to king, [1617?], Santo Domingo, ibid.; Weber, Spanish Frontier, 115–116. 33. Worth, Timucuan Chiefdoms, I, 37–38.
Between Old World & New 81 monarch along with their temporal one. Spaniards could not compel Indian leaders to render obedience or seek conversion, but both such acts placed 34 Native leaders in a Spanish hierarchy that included Spaniards at the top. They acted on this assumption, too, with the governor approving the suc- cession of head caciques. Although no governor wanted to risk the hostility or instability that would accompany excessive interference, the governor’s supervisory role ideally reminded Natives of their new place in the devel- oping colonial system and helped ensure that loyal leaders supervised its development at the town and village level. Some Indians accepted this new relationship with alacrity: at Mission San Pedro in the Timucuan coastal province of Mocama, the leader known as Cacique Juan went so far as to expel those who refused to convert. Twenty-five years old, he had come of age familiar with Christian practice and might have owed some of his youth- 35 ful prominence to Spanish support. Others were less enthusiastic about any Spanish attempts at subordina- tion. A series of Indian revolts and reprisals over the course of the seven- teenth century made very clear that Indians and Spaniards occasionally 36 operated under divergent norms. The Guale revolt of 1597, which I dis- cuss in more detail below, provided Spaniards with the first lesson in this political reality. In many instances, these revolts might have been the prod- uct of Spaniards’ abusing an authority that Natives had conceded, but in other instances, Native Americans approached Spaniards and their goods with a sense not of submission but of entitlement. During the middle 1620s, when Governor Luís Rojas y Borja was trying to invigorate the colony’s re- gional influence through liberal gift giving, budget-conscious royal officials complained that he offered gifts of clothing and other items to all comers, regardless of their evangelical intentions or their rank. According to the offi- cials, such largesse actually weakened the colony because ‘‘today the Indi- 37 ans come for this clothing as if for tribute, and they say so.’’ This sense of entitlement to Spanish goods, and the belief that they con- stituted tribute rendered by a subordinate rather than gifts offered by a su- perior, suggests the complicated misunderstandings that surrounded these
34. Ibid., 36–43. 35. Consejo de Indias to king, June 20, 1596, Madrid, AGI, SD 6. Juan was twenty- six in 1597. See Hann, History of Timucua Indians, 150. 36. For some of the works that review parts or all of this history, see Worth, Timu- cuan Chiefdoms, II; Weber, Spanish Frontier, 141–145; Hoffman, Florida’s Frontiers, 122–147. 37. Francisco Ramírez, Juan de Cueva, and Francisco Menéndez Márquez to king, Jan. 30, 1627, AGI, SD 229.
82 joseph hall objects and the ways that Indians were incorporating them into their politi- 38 cal and ceremonial worlds on their own terms. It also suggests the ways that Indians understood Saint Augustine to be the center of a new chief- dom in the region, one to which they owed respect, but also one from which they could expect a political support commensurate with their allegiance to the Spaniards. After years of bitter lessons on the impotence of imposition, the governor who spearheaded this campaign of generosity in the 1590s, Gonzalo Méndez de Canzo, acknowledged Indian leaders’ needs, protesting to the king that ‘‘I spend much of my own resources on the Natives, which is necessary because they are poor people...inordertoattract them to 39 conversion and your royal service.’’ Whether he realized it or not, Méndez was describing himself as a new chief in the region. That he described his generosity in a letter pleading for a larger royal salary for his services sug- gests just how much he believed that the hierarchy of gifts continued east- ward across the Atlantic. The carefully reciprocal and intensely competitive relationships of chief- doms that Méndez intimated and many Indians experienced was easy for Spaniards to forget in the midst of a new string of successes following 1587. Thanks to the respect that royal officials showed to the Franciscans and that Indians showed to all Spaniards, it was easy to see why the custo- dian of the Franciscan mission, Francisco de Marrón, could claim in 1597 that the Indians thought of the missionaries as ‘‘gods on earth.’’ By that year, Franciscans could claim a decade of evangelizing in Mocama and two years in Guale. Months after Marrón had declared Franciscans’ apotheosis, Governor Méndez sent additional expeditions north, west, and south of the limits of colonial and evangelical control. The northerly embassy attempted to establish ties with Altamaha and Ocute, where Spaniards once again learned the importance of negotiation rather than imposition. Two Francis- cans, Fray Pedro de Chozas and Francisco de Veráscola, led the evangelical
38. Such misunderstandings over the meanings of European-Native relationships occurred everywhere, but they appear most compellingly in Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815 (Cam- bridge, 1991). One passage is particularly helpful by way of comparison. ‘‘Often, in the examples that follow, when the French sought the imposition of hard-and-fast rules, the Algonquians sought the ‘power’ that comes from knocking the order off balance, from asserting the personal, the human exception’’ (52). Although White is describ- ing Native polities significantly different from chiefdoms, the power of the person and the personal resonates in the history of southeastern Indians’ relations with the Span- ish during the decades that closed the sixteenth and opened the seventeenth centuries. 39. Méndez to king, Feb. 23, 1598, AGI, SD 224.
Between Old World & New 83 expedition north to the Oconee Valley early in the summer of 1597. Accom- panying them were Gaspar de Salas, a soldier and interpreter who spoke Guale, and thirty Indians, who could provide protection for the expedition. Chozas loaded them, as the Franciscan Alonso Gregorio de Escobedo put it in his epic poem, La Florida, ‘‘with Castillian blankets, with knives, fish hooks, and scissors, and with very fine glass beads, with sickles and cut- ting axes.’’ The party set out from the Guale mission of Tolomato, expect- ing that the people of Altamaha and Ocute ‘‘would know the power of our people and the little which they enjoyed in their western lands.’’ Chozas sup- plemented these material demonstrations with suitably dramatic preaching, and the formidable Veráscola further exhibited the power of the Spaniards and their god by successfully wrestling ‘‘chest to chest’’ many challeng- ers in the towns they visited. Escobedo was writing an epic of Franciscan achievement, and we should expect some exaggeration, but clearly he and his heroes knew that they needed to demonstrate to chiefs and their fol- lowers the material, physical, and cosmological power that resided in Saint 40 Augustine and across the ocean in Spain. Having ventured north to impress the supposedly benighted peoples of the Oconee Valley, the Spaniards for their part marvelled at what they saw. In 1597, Saint Augustine still struggled to feed itself; but even the poor food of that sandy outpost must have sounded good as the party of thirty-three spent seven days heading northwestward from Tolomato through uninhab- ited wilderness. The sight of the Oconee Valley with its populous villages and towns and fields filled with a ‘‘quantity of food’’ that included corn, 41 beans, grapes, and watermelons must have indeed been a feast for the eyes. One day after their arrival in the valley, they were in the town of Alta- maha, where Chozas met the members of the leading family in the coun- 42 cil house and presented to each a blanket. Impressed with the offer, the leaders granted his request to preach to the town. The following day, Cho-
40. Marrón to king, Jan. 23, 1597, AGI, SD 235; Alonso Gregorio de Escobedo, La Florida, excerpted in Atanasio López, ed., Relación histórica de la Florida, escrita en el siglo XVII, 2 vols. (Madrid, 1931), I, 27–28. For a summary of this entrada, see Worth, ‘‘Late Spanish Military Expeditions,’’ in Hudson and Tesser, eds., Forgotten Centuries, 105–108. For Salas’s linguistic abilities, see Maynard Geiger, The Franciscan Conquest of Florida (1573–1618) (Washington, D.C., 1937), 82–83. 41. Testimony of Gaspar de Salas, Feb. 2, 1600, AGI, SD 224, doc. 35. 42. Escobedo, La Florida, in López, ed., Relación histórica de la Florida, I, 28. Two lines (‘‘y luego se pusieron en presencia / de toda la familia endemoniada’’) suggest that Chozas first sought the approval of the members of Altamaha’s closely related elite be- fore meeting with the entire town.
84 joseph hall zas had ‘‘the king’’ place a cross in the center of the plaza, and then he and Veráscola called the community to meet inside the council house, where, after first beginning with a grave and prolonged silence, Chozas proceeded to instruct the people about the Christian faith. A sudden rain shower con- vinced his listeners of his spiritual power, and the town accepted baptism en masse and reciprocated with gifts to the Spaniards. In both acts, Alta- 43 mahas expressed their own desire to build a deeper relationship. Continuing inland one more day to Ocute, the visitors were again ‘‘well received.’’ They noted with surprise and hope that the women of Ocute wore shawls similar to those of New Spain. All seemed well, but as soon as they indicated a desire to continue farther on their journey, perhaps to determine the proximity of the other colony, the chief Ocute ‘‘obstructed them with much pleading and crying,’’ explaining that many of those farther inland still recalled Soto’s visit and hoped to kill some of those related to the ruth- less invader. The warm reception was cooling, and the missionaries failed to 44 convert anyone in Ocute. The situation became even more grim when, on their return through Altamaha, the formerly friendly chief suddenly seemed more interested in removing Chozas’s scalp. Chozas evidently possessed great power, and the chief had decided that the hair on his head—rather than the ideas in it—might improve Altamaha’s chances of winning an im- minent competition against another chief. Only a timely shot from Salas’s arquebus saved the missionary. Before hastily departing, though, Chozas still insisted on asking for burdeners to carry his goods because those who had accompanied him inland ‘‘had hid themselves in the wilds.’’ In addi- tion to refusing the request, the mico Altamaha bellowed threats forcefully enough to hasten Chozas and his companions on their way. They returned home by a different route, following settled areas and spending only two days crossing uninhabited lands, before arriving at the coast, not in Tolo- 45 mato, but farther south at San Pedro in Mocama. For Chozas, Veráscola, and Salas, the expedition had failed. They re- turned from the province they called La Tama with glorious accounts of conversions and tantalizing rumors of silver mines, but the obstructions of
43. Ibid., 28–30. 44. The reason for Ocute’s reticence is difficult to determine, but the best evidence comes from Escobedo. Although he mistranscribes Ocute as ‘‘Quaque,’’ he elliptically refers to Chozas’s failure there by listing ‘‘Quaque’’ along with ‘‘Tama’’ (alias Altamaha) and two towns of Fatufas and Usatipass, then saying that Chozas ‘‘converted three king- doms, but not the first’’ (ibid., 28–29). For the quotes about Ocute’s obstructionism, see testimony of Salas, Feb. 2, 1600, AGI, SD 224, doc. 35. 45. Escobedo, La Florida, in López, ed., Relación histórica de la Florida, I, 31, 32.
Between Old World & New 85 Oconee elites and brewing problems in Guale made this modest expedition the last of its size for decades to come. Far from Saint Augustine and its ambitions and preoccupations, Altamahas and Ocutes, and especially their leaders, had much more to look forward to. They had acquired items from the powerful new people of the coast, and perhaps the Spaniards’ ally and tributary, Juan of Tolomato, might return by way of the newly blazed trail 46 with more such items. For his part, Ocute could proudly reflect that he had maintained effective control over his subordinates and his guests. Alta- maha’s sudden interest in Chozas’s scalp probably had something to do with Ocute’s refusal to accept conversion, and the shift probably reassured the paramount leader in Ocute that the chief of Altamaha remained loyal to him. The Spaniards had visited without trying venture farther inland, and they had left respectful of but not angered by Ocute’s and Altamaha’s displays of independence. From Ocute’s town square, this new relationship looked promising indeed. Despite these positive developments, Oconee peoples’ hopes of deriving new benefits from Saint Augustine, whether via the hands of Franciscans, Guales, or others, took an unexpected turn not long after Chozas’s hasty de- parture. Late in September 1597, Guales revolted, destroying the missions, killing five Franciscans, and capturing a sixth. Despite Spaniards’ remark- able successes with promoting Native loyalties and conversions through gifts, old coercive habits died hard. Having stacked ample tinder by attack- ing important Guale traditions and restricting converts’ movements among the province’s towns, Franciscans then provided an incendiary spark by passing over Juan of Tolomato as principal mico of the province in order to appoint his more tractable uncle, Francisco. The outraged Juan ‘‘went into the interior among the pagans, without saying anything or without ob- taining permission as they were wont to do on other occasions.’’ After ‘‘a few days,’’ Juan returned to Tolomato with some of these inland support- ers (probably Guales who had fled the missions) and rallied Francisco and 47 other followers against the missionaries.
46. Juan probably shared these ambitions. Unlike the many Indian escorts who de- serted Chozas, Juan probably remained with the expedition—and he collected on this loyalty when he returned to Saint Augustine to request gifts from the governor for his service. He probably imagined that such loyalty would secure him similar Spanish gen- erosity in the future, a generosity he might share with trips inland along the new path from Tolomato to the Oconee Valley. See Alvárez de Castrillón to king, Sept. 14, 1597, AGI, SD 231. 47. Oré, Martyrs of Florida, ed. and trans. Geiger, 73. For summaries of the revolt, see Geiger, Franciscan Conquest, 86–115; Hoffman, Florida’s Frontiers, 82–86; Bush-
86 joseph hall Although not directly involved in the revolt, Oconee Valley peoples were never far from the minds of those who were. Juan’s initial foray inland sug- gested that the coastal Guales recognized the value of the interior, and Span- iards confirmed these perceptions when they responded to the revolt in Oc- tober by sailing along the coast to burn the insurgents’ cornfields and towns. The following spring, Governor Méndez met with Guale leaders to ran- som the captive Franciscan, offering axes, hoes, and blankets for his return. When the Guale leaders demurred, insisting on the return of some of their own sons who had been living in Saint Augustine for several years, the gov- ernor shifted tactics, becoming enraged and threatening to send for three hundred soldiers ‘‘and put them to the sword, and cut down all their maize 48 and food, and follow them as far as La Tama.’’ Guales promptly returned the missionary. Spaniards possessed unmistakable military power, but both they and Guales also recognized that the Oconee Valley’s peoples, how- ever distant, played a pivotal role; they could either be the refuge to which Guales might flee or the anvil against which Spaniards could crush them. Unfortunately for Méndez, his hammer was small and his anvil a figment of his rhetoric. The reality was more complex because the governor’s army was strong enough only to conduct coastal raids and because Altamahas had little incentive to undertake a military campaign for him. As a result, in addition to his strong words and a scorched-earth campaign against the coastal towns, he also used gifts of ‘‘tools, axes, and hoes’’ to entice some of the Guales’ old enemies, the Escamaçus from Santa Elena, just north along the coast from Guale, to resume their traditional hostilities. Spanish repri- sals and Escamaçu raids convinced many Guale leaders to visit Saint Au- gustine to renew their allegiance to the Spanish in early 1600, and the gov- ernor used these contacts to make new offers of gifts to those who visited. Some royal officials in the colony considered such gifts wasted on peoples whose ‘‘friendship is feigned,’’ and others worried that Méndez’s generosity would upset those who had remained loyal. The governor contented himself with this imperfect strategy because he had little choice. Despite his threats of fire and blood to the Guales, he acknowledged to the king that, because the rebels had retreated to lands so far from the coast, ‘‘there was no way that one could punish them there unless it were by the hand and order of the same Indians,’’ especially the newly loyal leader of the Guale town of Asao. Even the new friendship had its shortcomings, as the nominally paci- nell, Situado and Sabana, 60–66. For a documentary overview, see Quinn, ed., New American World, V, 69–92. For quote, see ibid., 69. 48. Quinn, ed., New American World, V, 87.
Between Old World & New 87 fied towns continued to defy Spanish authority by welcoming French trad- ers, and they would continue to do so for another three years. No Spaniard was foolish enough to think that Guales were ready to welcome new mis- 49 sionaries. Saint Augustine’s officials courted Altamaha alliance with gifts, but Oco- nee leaders did not pursue these objects or their purveyors blindly. If they were going to associate themselves with Spanish beads, cloth, or hoes, they also needed to be sure Spaniards showed themselves to be a formidable chiefdom in their own right. The Spaniards had proved to be powerful bene- factors during their visit inland during the summer of 1597. One year later, a royal official noted that the ‘‘inland Indians’’ probably approved that the governor was demanding greater tribute payments from those Indians who remained loyal. And yet, two months after that, as the governor sent six- teen soldiers to help defend the Mocama mission of San Pedro, the same official noted that the governor needed to send rations with these soldiers instead of expecting the Mocamas to feed them because ‘‘the inland Indians are watching to see how we aid our friends.’’ By exacting appropriate trib- ute for subordinate polities and providing necessary support for these same dependents, Spaniards could demonstrate their power—and the power of 50 their goods—to observant Altamahas.
49. Bartolomé de Argüelles to king, Aug. 3, 1598, Feb. 20, 1600, AGI, SD 229; Alonso de Alas to king, Jan. 12, 1600, ibid.; Alonso de Cano to king, Feb. 23, 1600, ibid.; testimony of Gonzalo Méndez de Canzo to king, Nov. 27, 1601, ibid., SD 224, doc. 41; Joseph M. Hall, Jr., ‘‘Making an Indian People: Creek Formation in the Colo- nial Southeast, 1590–1735’’ (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 2001), 87–93; Bush- nell, Situado and Sabana, 66. Hoffman describes the Spanish response as ‘‘swift, brutal, prolonged, and effective in restoring Spanish control in Guale,’’ and Bushnell shares a similar assessment of the Spanish military response. Although scorched-earth tactics played an important role in ending the revolt, Spaniards could not have pacified the province without the assistance of Indians who exacted their own concessions, such as a reduction in tribute or, as I describe below, Spanish gifts. See Hoffman, Florida’s Fron- tiers, 83; Bushnell, Situado and Sabana, 66. 50. Argüelles to king, Aug. 3, 1598, AGI, SD 229. Argüelles’s statement is difficult to parse, but it offers intriguing insight into the politics of power, gifts, and tribute. It reads, ‘‘Les alço El dho gobernador el tributo y aunque no era de mucha ynportancia parece que era una manera de Reconocimiento con lo qual se ganaba opinion con los de la tierra adentro q no estiman en mas de quanto ben que a cada uno se le tributa.’’ I translate the passage literally as ‘‘The said governor raised their tribute and although it was not of much importance, it seems that it was a form of acknowledgment [of au- thority] with which we gained [a good] opinion from those from the inland who do not esteem those except according to how much they exact as tribute.’’
88 joseph hall Although Méndez probably did not decide to provision the San Pedro garrison, he was doing his best to convince inland peoples like the Altama- has that his friendship could be of great service to them. Not surprisingly, he also had need of their friendship. As he had already acknowledged to the king, Indians would be crucial to suppressing the last of the insurgents, and Altamaha assistance would prevent Francisco, Juan, and their follow- ers from fleeing further inland. As the Spaniards well knew, gifts would make this alliance possible, but to distribute these gifts, Governor Méndez enlisted the help of two Christian chiefs from Mocama, the coastal province just south of Guale. The two Mocamas, Cacique María of the mission town of Nombre de Dios and Cacique Juan of San Pedro, received gifts valued at 350 ducats—roughly the equivalent of three years’ pay for a common sol- dier—to take ‘‘into the interior land to the caciques with whom they have contact.’’ Offering such gifts to their friends, the Christian leaders could also explain that all who joined the Spaniards could expect similar generosity from His Majesty. Such generosity might encourage recalcitrant Guales to reciprocate with allegiance rather than continued hostility. If not, then per- haps by attracting other interior peoples like the Altamahas, the governor could expand the mission system and simultaneously pressure Guales from 51 the south and interior. Spaniards could not have guessed the result. Nor could they control it. By placing colonial policy in Native hands, La Florida’s royal and religious officials initiated a series of changes that enabled Indian peoples to ad- just to colonial neighbors on indigenous terms. No longer orchestrating the ceremonies of ‘‘rendering obedience’’ in the course of presenting their gifts, Spaniards were supplying Native leaders with valuable items that they then introduced to the southeastern political economy on their terms. Although we know little about Cacique María’s ambitions, Cacique Juan clearly molded Spanish interests to fit his own. In 1598, two years before his generous gift to Juan, Governor Méndez had noted approvingly that ‘‘he spends himself into poverty giving gifts to other caciques to bring them to 52 our obedience.’’ Although Spaniards doubtless approved of such gener- osity in the service of their temporal and divine monarchs, Juan also had more personal interests in mind. Some time before receiving the governor’s
51. Méndez to king, Feb. 23, 28, 1600, AGI, SD 224, 229, doc. 35. Between 1583 and 1723, soldiers were paid 115 ducats a year (Bushnell, Situado and Sabana, 45). 52. Méndez to king, Feb. 23, 1598, AGI, SD 224, doc. 31. Among the beneficiaries of his largesse were the Spaniards themselves, who by 1595 had apparently received some nine thousand reales’ worth of supplies from the cacique and his people. See San Miguel, Early Florida Adventure Story, trans. Hann, 7.
Between Old World & New 89 gifts in 1600, he requested Méndez to appoint him head cacique of Guale. Perhaps the Mocama leader hoped that his growing influence among Span- iards and Indians would enable him to capitalize on the apostasy of Guale’s most recent head cacique. The governor balked at the request, but what is significant is that Spaniards were placing gifts in the hands of Native inter- 53 mediaries who had their own interests at heart. Altamahas—especially their mico Altamaha—used this influx of gifts to restructure their polity. Gifts probably arrived from Juan of San Pedro, with Juan directly or indirectly sending them up the same path that Chozas and others had followed back from the Oconee three years earlier. Although there is no documentation of these gift exchanges, evidence of their conse- quences appears in the shifting political fortunes of Altamaha in the Oconee Valley. In 1540, Altamahas owed some allegiance to Ocute’s chief, and as Fray Chozas knew, Ocute still influenced the actions of its downriver tribu- tary as late as 1597. Despite this long-standing relationship, Altamahas had evidently severed ties with Ocute by 1601, when they joined Guales and a number of other peoples in a final, decisive attack on the remaining Guale recalcitrants. The next year, another Spanish visitor noted Altamahas’ in- dependence and perhaps rising prominence when he referred to it as ‘‘the capital of the province.’’ Such success, though, came at the price of hos- tility with Ocute: when the visitor expressed interest in continuing north- ward toward Ocute, his hosts urged him to reconsider ‘‘so that they might 54 not kill him.’’ With a warning that mirrored the one Ocute issued to Cho- zas and his companions, Altamahas proclaimed a new line of independence and even hostility in the Oconee Valley. The Spaniards’ influence on this new political situation probably owed something to the gifts that came from Juan and traveled the well-populated route from San Pedro. Whether or not Juan could claim credit for this success, Ocutes themselves recognized and resented this new Spanish influence in their valley. The struggles among elites masked more fundamental shifts among the
53. Governor Méndez feared that Guale resistance to a Mocama leader would ‘‘un- dercut what I have done with so much work to attract and reduce the province [to Span- ish allegiance].’’ Juan apparently did not respond to the rejection before he died later that year, perhaps from disease. See Méndez to king, Feb. 28, June 26, 1600, AGI, SD 224, docs. 35, 36. 54. Testimony of Juan de Lara in ‘‘Información de orden de Su Majestad sobre el estado general de las provincias de la Florida y si conviene o no desmantelar el fuerte de San Agustín,’’ Sept. 3–9, 1602, AGI, SD 2533, excerpted and translated in Worth, ‘‘Late Spanish Military Expeditions,’’ in Hudson and Tesser, eds., Forgotten Centuries, 109.
90 joseph hall general population of the Oconee Valley. Spanish gifts might have pro- moted a new Altamaha independence, but they apparently did not halt the decline of elite power. That Spaniards placed these goods in the hands of leaders probably encouraged southeastern elites to draw upon these new re- sources in a time of political flux, but the results did not always favor chiefs’ authority. One suggestive clue appears in 1604, when Governor Pedro de Ibarra met Altamahas in Guale and gave only passing mention to the ‘‘ca- cique of La Tama.’’ Rather than the head of the famed inland province, he appeared in a list as one of many other dignitaries welcoming Ibarra. Per- haps Spanish contact with Altamaha had become routine, or perhaps the visiting cacique was not the mico of Altamaha but one of his subordinate oratas. Regardless, the lack of emphasis suggests that this leader was not 55 as powerful as his Spanish title suggested. Archaeology confirms a power shift that the documents can only suggest. For more than a century before Cacique Juan or any other emissaries ventured with gifts from Saint Au- gustine, the Altamahas, Ocutes, and their neighbors were abandoning their towns, dispersing their homes throughout the valley. By 1580, valley resi- dents no longer used their mounds, and the fact that Fray Chozas met with Altamaha leaders in a council house suggests that the decisions of individual chiefs were becoming increasingly communal. In other words, Altamaha leaders probably sought Spanish goods not just to escape Ocute’s influence but also to maintain their own influence over an increasingly segmented 56 population. In some respects, the new strategies worked. Following the turn of the century, at a time when many interior populations were consolidating dwin- dling communities at the fall line frontiers between piedmonts and coastal plains, Oconee peoples were also relocating. Although many peoples moved in order to build new communities at locations that afforded the greatest op-
55. ‘‘Relación del viage que hizo el señor Pedro de Ibarra, gobernador y capitán gen- eral de la Florida, á visitar los pueblos indios de las provincias de San Pedro y Guale,’’ in Manuel Serrano y Sanz, ed., Documentos históricos de la Florida y la Luisiana, siglos XVI al XVIII (Madrid, 1913), 183–184. 56. People began moving into scattered farmsteads in the second half of the fifteenth century, probably as a result of relative peace and the growing population that accom- panied it. Although such population dispersal likely did not induce people to aban- don the mounds, it certainly exacerbated the mounds’ declining role toward the end of the century. See Mark Williams, ‘‘Chiefly Compounds,’’ in J. Daniel Rogers and Bruce D. Smith, eds., Mississippian Communities and Households (Tuscaloosa, Ala., 1995); James W. Hatch, ‘‘Lamar Period Upland Farmsteads of the Oconee River Val- ley, Georgia,’’ ibid., 135–155.
Between Old World & New 91 portunities for subsistence, some residents of the Oconee Valley were actu- ally moving downstream of the fall line to the coastal plain. They now in- habited lands less ecologically diverse and less agriculturally fertile than their former homes, but they had much easier access to the respected cloth- ing, beads, and tools from Saint Augustine. Like other inland peoples, they once again began settling in more nucleated towns rather than dispersed farmsteads, and this shift might have been a product of their mico’s rising authority. The mico might have sought additional Spanish support for his precarious position as an independent leader by requesting Franciscans at the short-lived mission of Santa Isabel, which was founded by 1616 along the Altamaha River and lasted at least another two decades. Depopulation from epidemics could have just as easily caused a dwindling population to seek the mutual protection of towns and the spiritual protection of Fran- ciscans. Whether dealing with the problems of leadership or depopulation, 57 some Indians were looking to Saint Augustine for solutions. Altamahas did not pursue this strategy alone. In 1612, Governor Fer- nández de Olivera claimed that unnamed southeastern Natives’ widespread interest in trade and missionaries signified both ‘‘God’s miraculous work’’ and the influence of the gifts and aid the governor offered to those who came. The most significant sign of this attractive power was that ‘‘[Some] have arrived here from the very Cape of Apalachee and from much fur- ther away. They assured me that they have been walking for two and a half months and that all along the way they have had safe passage and warm re- ception knowing that they come here.’’ Seven decades after the Apalachees of the Florida panhandle had hounded Soto’s forces out of their province, their descendants were joining others to seek Spanish friendship and trade goods. More strikingly, other peoples were journeying eastward perhaps 58 five hundred miles to do so. Gifts and the power that they conferred and
57. Smith, Aboriginal Culture Change, 77–80; Smith, ‘‘Aboriginal Population Movements in the Postcontact Southeast,’’ in Ethridge and Hudson, eds., Transforma- tion, 10–12; Williams, ‘‘Growth and Decline,’’ in Hudson and Tesser, eds., Forgotten Centuries, 191–193; Mark Williams, personal communication, May 13, 2004. So little is known about the Pine Barrens site and the Santa Isabel mission that any conclusions must be tentative. See Frankie Snow, ‘‘Pine Barrens Lamar,’’ in Mark Williams and Gary Shapiro, eds., Lamar Archaeology: Mississippian Chiefdoms in the Deep South (Tuscaloosa, Ala., 1990), 82–89; Oré, Martyrs of Florida, ed. and trans. Geiger, 129, 135 n. 22; Worth, Timucuan Chiefdoms, I, 73; Worth, ‘‘The Timucuan Missions of Spanish Florida and the Rebellion of 1656’’ (Ph.D. diss., University of Florida, 1992), 68–69,76n.14. 58. Fernández de Olivera to king, Oct. 13, 1612, AGI, SD 225, doc. 4. According to
92 joseph hall confirmed gradually insinuated themselves into the power structures of a variety of peoples beyond the echoes of Spaniards’ cannon or the peal of their mission bells. Unfortunately for the Altamahas, or at least for our history of them, Oli- vera’s news also represented a shift in Spanish interest. Beginning in 1607, Spaniards directed their evangelical and diplomatic efforts to the lands west of Saint Augustine. The very fact that the Santa Isabel mission remains poorly understood and lacks almost any documentation attests to their de- clining interest in the lands north and west of Guale. Altamahas and mis- sionaries continued to express intermittent hopes for a mission on the Oco- 59 nee, but this, too, ceased after 1636. Increasingly silent documents should not distract us from what was al- ready under way in the Georgia interior. Altamaha leaders and followers were drawing on Spanish goods to shape their own struggles for survival, prominence, and cosmological order. In these efforts lie clues to the ways that Indians were laying the political and ceremonial groundwork for the more trying challenges that would appear later in the century. A number of scholars have pointed out that, in the interval between contact and coloni- zation, southeastern societies adjusted to the idea of Europeans before they had to confront the reality of the newcomers. As one china box suggests and as the larger history of the Oconee Valley confirms, this interval provided more than just time. Spanish gifts to indigenous leaders replaced or augmented the rare and prestigious objects that held together many southeastern political and cos- mological orders. The diseases and violence that accompanied the arrival of colonists had posed serious challenges to these orders. In the wake of these disruptions, chiefs struggled to maintain the populations and cosmic harmony that would build the inspiring mounds and maintain the crucial food surpluses. So, too, did skilled craftspeople lose the time and the exper- tise to endow their pottery, shells, deerskins, or copper with the powerful designs that leaders and followers both needed for social stability. In the midst of these crises—some grave, some merely troubling—chiefs also rec-
Amy Turner Bushnell, traveling the 150 miles between Saint Augustine and the center of the province of Apalachee took roughly fifteen days. The cape, today’s Cape Saint George, is located where the Apalachicola River empties into the Gulf of Mexico and would probably have been about another week’s travel distant. Two and a half months’ travel could mean that the visitors had arrived from a location as much as four times farther away than Apalachee (Bushnell, Situado and Sabana, 114). 59. Luís Gerónimo de Oré to king, [1617?], Santo Domingo, AGI, SD 235; Lorenzo Martínez to king, Oct. 22, 1636, ibid.; Hoffman, Florida’s Frontiers, chap. 5.
Between Old World & New 93 ognized some of the opportunities that accompanied the Europeans. Span- iards, lacking the authority to impose a colonial order, provided gifts that enabled leaders to salvage some of their own influence. As leaders and fol- lowers must have recognized, axes and hoes did not carry indigenous de- signs; glass beads did not come from the traditionally sacred sites of the coast. These new objects coming from Saint Augustine did, however, enjoy a prominence of their own that could compensate for and perhaps replace older items and older symbols. Furthermore, by focusing their gift giving and diplomacy on chiefs, Spaniards inadvertently ensured that the people who most needed these objects actually got them. These same leaders then incorporated the new items relatively smoothly into older ceremonies and distribution networks. Thus, by 1630, Spanish beads were arriving in towns as far west as Alabama and as far north as Tennessee. So too, in 1621, china boxes were joining shell gorgets on long journeys from Guale to the Poto- 60 mac. And English gifts were heading south. In 1633, an Escamaçu ventured south along the coast to a Guale mission to report that the English had established a colony in his province, that ‘‘the English were giving away gifts of tools and other things,’’ and, more troubling, ‘‘that they gave away 61 more [than the Spaniards].’’ The lack of any further documentation on the matter suggests that the Escamaçu was grossly mistaken about English settlement activities, but he probably made no mistake about the English objects. Indians throughout much of the Southeast had been exchanging in- digenous objects for centuries and Spanish goods for decades. That James- town, Virginia, was a new source of rare objects should hardly surprise. Like the Spanish, the English also sought to maintain a fragile colonial foothold with gifts to powerful neighbors, first with the Powhatans and 62 then, as relations with the Powhatans soured, with their principal rivals. As the Escamaçu made clear in 1633, these localized efforts also had far- reaching consequences. The Escamaçu’s additional claim that the English offered their goods on better terms also foreshadowed a radical transfor- mation of the exchanges that brought these goods from European ships into Native hands. The consequences became clearest a half-century later.
60. Smith, Aboriginal Culture Change, 46–51; Knight, Tukabatchee, 107. 61. Order of Sergeant Major Eugenio de Espinosa to Sergeant Major Antonio He- rrera López y Mesa, Sept. 9, 1633, enclosed in ‘‘Relation of Merits of Antonio Herrera López y Mesa,’’ Apr. 22, 1649, AGI, Indiferente General 114, doc. 23. 62. Potter, ‘‘Early English Effects,’’ in Wood, Waselkov, and Hatley, eds., Powha- tan’s Mantle, 154–160.
94 joseph hall As the later colony of South Carolina expanded its trade inland during the 1670s and 1680s, English emissaries regularly offered rare goods (includ- ing firearms) to broad segments of the male population. The exchange of gifts among elites had become the exchange of goods between traders. Had elites not already adjusted to the growing presence of European items during the previous century, the sudden availability of these presti- gious objects could have promoted a form of inflation catastrophic to Native notions of authority. Natives’ ability to maintain many precontact structures of influence, however attenuated, likely owed much to the gradual tran- 63 sition that Spaniards initiated. Spaniards hardly orchestrated their colo- nial efforts with this transition in mind, but they clearly provided Natives near to and far from the missions not just time but resources to reorganize their societies. Chozas’s evangelical campaign and Méndez’s need for help against the Guales introduced Oconee peoples to new items for their politi- cal struggles. The close of these evangelical and diplomatic overtures, how- ever, marked not an end but a beginning. The inter-Indian exchanges that had explicitly begun with Juan of San Pedro and María of Nombre de Dios only continued. The consequences were broad, but not all experienced them the same way. The same gifts that promoted Altamaha’s authority did so in part at the expense of the formerly paramount Ocute. After 1659, as Altama- has, Ocutes, and other peoples suffered increasing violence and upheaval with the beginning of English-sponsored slave raids, the Altamahas be- came the heart of a new, confederated people known as the Yamasees. Alta- mahas could not have attributed their town’s prominence among the late- seventeenth-century Yamasees entirely or even primarily to Spanish goods and the political changes that they facilitated. The prominence that Alta- maha elites did retain in the early part of the century, though, at least helped the efforts of their descendants to take a leading role in addressing the crises that accompanied the slave raiders. Similar patterns would also en- able the descendants of other chiefdoms to contemporaneously assemble the larger confederacies known as the Catawbas, Creeks, Cherokees, Choctaws,
63. Worth, ‘‘Spanish Missions,’’ in Ethridge and Hudson, eds., Transformation, points out the importance of Spanish colonial policies for the maintenance of precon- tact hierarchies in the missions. This study of Altamaha’s fortunes suggests that some of the same materials that supported the power of Christian chiefs might have also sta- bilized the uncertain footing of their unconverted neighbors. On the growing presence of European goods in southeastern graves, see Wesson, ‘‘Prestige Goods,’’ in Wesson and Rees, eds., Between Contact and Colonies.
Between Old World & New 95 and Chickasaws. Still-powerful leaders, wielding new icons of prestige, re- 64 assembled a new political order from the remains of the old. Europeans’ arrival in North America, which the Spanish initiated, fre- quently appears in the scholarship as the beginning of a cataclysm. It was. Ruthlessly torturing Natives in their quests for indigenous empires, in- advertently more destructive and disruptive thanks to the pathogens they left behind, early Spanish conquistadors introduced Native Americans to new forms of power and brutality. Although chiefdoms certainly suffered for the arrivals of Soto and other, less-belligerent visitors, to imagine chief- doms’ collapse as an immediate consequence is to exaggerate Europeans’ ability to project their influence (and their microbes) throughout the re- gion. It also exaggerates Natives’ inability to ask the questions that would enable them to address these new challenges. What is most important to note, though, is that Altamahas, Ocutes, and—as Governor Olivera’s letter suggests—countless other peoples were answering some of these questions with Spanish goods in the first decades of the seventeenth century. Peoples to the north of the missions did not flock to Saint Augustine in similarly noteworthy numbers, but they, too, appreciated the power of things from Acana Echinac. Indeed, they incorporated these goods into age-old and fre- quent contests for influence within and among their polities. These goods and this political competitiveness endowed Native societies with a flexibility that would serve them well amid the crises that accompanied colonial com- petition after 1607.
64. Hall, ‘‘Making an Indian People,’’ 200–206. Vernon James Knight, Jr., ‘‘The Formation of the Creeks,’’ in Hudson and Tesser, eds., Forgotten Centuries, 385–386, points out that ‘‘the resilience of the local chiefdoms’’ in some parts of what would later be the Creek Confederacy played crucial roles in the consolidation of the larger network of alliances.
96 joseph hall James D. Rice escape from tsenacommacah chesapeake algonquians and the powhatan menace QW
One of the best-known images of life in early Virginia, frequently re- printed in textbooks, popular histories, and scholarly monographs, depicts a malevolent-looking Indian named Iopassus as he attempts to lure Poca- hontas into the hands of the English captain Samuel Argall. Iopassus, the brother of the powerful weroance (chief) of the Patawomeck nation (and a tribute-paying subordinate of Pocahontas’s father, Powhatan), holds behind him a copper pot given him by Argall, while his wife cradles a cask and some trade beads under her right arm. Pocahontas is clearly uneasy about boarding Argall’s ship, and with good reason: as most American schoolchil- dren know, Iopassus succeeded in luring Pocahontas into English captivity. This 1617 engraving by the Frankfurt-born artist Georg Keller, originally an illustration for a German translation of Ralph Hamor’s True Discourse of the Present State of Virginia, adorns countless modern retellings of Poca- hontas’s capture, typically over a caption such as ‘‘Pocahontas being per- suaded to board the English ship before her capture’’ or ‘‘Iapassus and his 1 wife persuade Pocahontas to visit Captain Argall’s ship.’’
Thanks to Kathleen Bragdon, J. Frederick Fausz, Joshua Piker, Stephen Potter, and participants in the Toronto Area Early Canada /Colonial North America Seminar for their comments on earlier drafts of this essay. Thanks also to Dennis Blanton, Keith Egloff, Stuart Fiedel, and Alice Kehoe for their guidance in matters archaeological, to Christian Feest, Laura Rice, and Jeffrey Ruggles for their help in tracing the history of Georg Keller’s print, and to Joseph Miller, Helen Rountree, Timothy Shannon, Mar- garet Holmes Williamson, and Cynthia Van Zandt for their generous and helpful ad- vice. 1. Christian F. Feest, ‘‘The Virginia Indian in Pictures, 1612–1624,’’ The Smith- sonian Journal of History, II (1967), 13–17. The most commonly reprinted version of the engraving is a copy made by Johann Theodore de Bry in 1618. The examples of modern captions are from Karen Ordahl Kupperman, Indians and English: Facing Off plate 1. Anglo-Powhatan relations, 1613–1614, according to Georg Keller. By Johann Theodore de Bry after Georg Keller. Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, Virginia
Only rarely, however, does the modern-day caption make any reference to the rest of the engraving. Although it is often cropped to exclude every- thing except the exchange between Pocahontas, Iopassus, and Iopassus’s wife, in the original engraving that scene occupies only the lower left corner of the image. From there, the story continues, unfolding in a zigzag course from the foreground on the lower left to the far background at the upper edge of the print. In the following scene, which Keller placed to the right of and behind Iopassus’s wife, Pocahontas boards Argall’s boat together with Iopassus and his spouse. They then sit down to dinner at Argall’s table, at which point Pocahontas is seized and taken prisoner. Next, English ships come to a Powhatan village to negotiate Pocahontas’s return. The discus- in Early America (Ithaca, N.Y., 2000), viii, 209; and Philip L. Barbour, Pocahontas and Her World: A Chronicle of America’s First Settlement in Which is Related the Story of the Indians and the Englishmen...(Boston, 1970), xvi.
98 james d. rice sions are not going well: smoke and flames billow from the village because the Indians have attacked the English negotiators and the English have re- sponded by sacking and plundering the Powhatans’ town and fields. The engraving then chronicles a series of negotiations in 1614 that led to the end of a five-year war between Powhatan’s people and the Jamestown colonists. Seventeenth-century viewers, guided by the text of Ralph Hamor’s first- hand narrative, would have read the entire image from beginning to end, and they would have recognized the story of Pocahontas’s captivity as but a single element in a broader narrative encompassing the history of Anglo- Powhatan relations up to 1614. And on a deeper level, they would have taken in the artist’s potent, highly compressed representation of all colonial rela- tions, in which the Natives are innately treacherous, yet simpleminded (why else would Iopassus ask so for little in return for so great a prize as Poca- hontas?), and Indians’ and Europeans’ interests are utterly irreconcilable. The image’s potency derives in large part from its simplicity, and that simplicity is, in turn, the result of Keller’s decision to gloss over some poten- tially messy distinctions between different times, places, and Indian nations. One does not learn from this image, for example, that Argall captured Poca- hontas on the Potomac River in 1613, whereas the conflict in the background took place a year later and eighty miles away, on the Pamunkey River. Nor does one learn that the 1614 battle did not involve the Patawomecks (who had delivered Pocahontas to Argall in the first place) or that Iopassus’s people had ample reason to dislike Powhatan. Had Keller drawn such dis- tinctions, it would have been harder to portray Iopassus as treacherous and simpleminded. But at the same time, a more complex portrayal would have obscured some essential truths contained in the engraving: for example, that a great many Europeans were truly convinced that Indians were in- herently duplicitous, and that Europeans’ and Native Americans’ interests were indeed ultimately irreconcilable. In short, the image is so compelling precisely because it oversimplifies what was, in fact, a complex set of colo- nial encounters in the Chesapeake region. Modern writers such as J. Frederick Fausz, Frederic Gleach, Karen Or- dahl Kupperman, Martin Quitt, Helen Rountree, E. Randolph Turner III, and Margaret Holmes Williamson have created a genuine renaissance of scholarship on seventeenth-century Virginia. Collectively, these authors have made it nearly impossible to tell a story about early Jamestown that does not take Powhatan culture into account. Like Georg Keller, they have arrived at their best insights, not by trying to tell the whole story, but rather by going directly to the heart of the matter, to the deepest insights about how Europeans and Native Americans—so startlingly different in their very
Escape from Tsenacommacah 99 conceptions of the universe—struggled to assimilate their new awareness of each other into their existing worldviews. For these writers, the heart of the matter is to be found in Anglo-Powhatan relations; thus ‘‘the Powhatans’’’ experiences are treated as normative, as central to the story or analysis, whereas other Native groups are considered part of the ‘‘Powhatan fringe.’’ It follows logically from this that the geographical center of the action was in the Powhatan (and Virginia) heartland, along the James and York rivers. Because a focus on Anglo-Powhatan relations requires the presence of the English, most writers take as their starting point the arrival of Europeans (though an opening chapter may address the state of Native America on the eve of contact). And since the central problem is to understand how such radically different people responded to encounters with each other, ‘‘cul- ture’’ and ‘‘colonialism’’ are the key concepts; significantly, these concepts lead those who wield them to privilege analysis over narrative and structure over events. In short, modern scholars have, like Keller, collapsed time and space in order to produce accounts of early Virginia that speak powerfully 2 to their contemporaries.
2. This is not to say that modern writers invariably stay within these boundaries, but these are the norms. E. Randolph Turner III’s writings, for example, focus on de- velopments long before 1571, but he emphasizes cultural analysis and is Powhacentric. Helen Rountree sometimes subordinates analysis to narrative, but most of her publica- tions are Powhacentric and begin with the arrival of Europeans. J. Frederick Fausz’s focus on politics, tendency toward narrative, and sensitivity to geography make him a model for the kind of approach I take in this essay—though he, too, picks up the story with the arrival of Europeans. Stephen Potter’s impressive work on the Potomac River is a rare departure from the Powhacentric norm, though he does not employ narra- tive. See Edwin Randolph Turner III, ‘‘An Archaeological and Ethnohistorical Study on the Evolution of Rank Societies in the Virginia Coastal Plain’’ (Ph.D. diss., Pennsyl- vania State University, 1976); Helen C. Rountree, The Powhatan Indians of Virginia: Their Traditional Culture (Norman, Okla., 1989); Rountree, Pocahontas’s People: The Powhatan Indians of Virginia through Four Centuries (Norman, Okla., 1990); Roun- tree and Thomas E. Davidson, Eastern Shore Indians of Virginia and Maryland (Char- lottesville, Va., 1997); Rountree and Turner, Before and after Jamestown: Virginia’s Powhatans and Their Predecessors (Gainesville, Fla., 2002); J. Frederick Fausz, ‘‘Merg- ing and Emerging Worlds: Anglo-Indian Interest Groups and the Development of the Seventeenth-Century Chesapeake,’’ in Lois Green Carr, Philip D. Morgan, and Jean B. Russo, eds., Colonial Chesapeake Society (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1989), 47–98; Stephen R. Potter, Commoners, Tribute, and Chiefs: The Development of Algonquian Culture in the Potomac Valley (Charlottesville, Va., 1993). See also Frederic W. Gleach, Powhatan’s World and Colonial Virginia: A Conflict of Cultures (Lincoln, Neb., 1997); Margaret Holmes Williamson, Powhatan Lords of Life and Death: Command and Consent in Seventeenth-Century Virginia (Lincoln, Neb., 2003); Karen Ordahl Kupperman, Set-
100 james d. rice Yet this impressive body of recent scholarship misses much of the story —or, more properly, stories—of which Jamestown, and Powhatan, were only a part. Just as the attention lavished on colonial societies has left, until lately, little room for the Native peoples of the Chesapeake, so, too, do studies focusing on the Powhatans far outnumber those focusing on the non-Powhatans who made up the majority of the Chesapeake’s Native population. We need to explore more fully the Native American Chesapeake beyond the Powhatan core; to expand our view to encompass the fifteenth century, the fourteenth century, and even earlier eras; to apply the ethno- graphic insights we’ve gained since the 1980s to the study of Algonquian political and diplomatic history; and to integrate those ethnographic in- sights into narratives. Then we might gain new insights into some particu- larly compelling questions: who had the power to make things happen in early-seventeenth-century Virginia? How did the specific features of Algon- quian political culture structure relations between different polities in the region? What calculations guided Native leaders’ interactions with other Indian and English people? And why were so many Indian leaders willing to help the Jamestown colonists? The short answer to this bundle of questions is that Indian political his- tories, and particularly the histories of Powhatan’s enemies and his more re- luctant subjects, are the key to understanding colonial encounters in early Virginia. The rise of chiefdoms in the centuries preceding 1607 produced a political order and a regional diplomatic configuration to which the small, troubled Jamestown colony was forced to adapt. This was no static struc- ture. Paramount chiefdoms, in particular, had a dramatic and surprisingly brief history—so brief, in fact, that many people could recall a time when things had been very different. They keenly remembered when Tsenacom- macah, the territory encompassed by Powhatan’s paramount chiefdom, was limited to parts of the upper James and Pamunkey rivers. This historical memory, together with certain deep-seated habits of mind rooted in Algon- quian cosmology and political culture, created widespread resentment of the expansionist chief Powhatan. Thus many people in the early seventeenth century regarded Powhatan, and not the English, as the primary menace
tling with the Indians: The Meeting of English and Indian Cultures in America, 1580– 1640 (New York, 1980); Michael Leroy Oberg, Dominion and Civility: English Imperi- alism and Native America, 1585–1685 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1999); Martin D. Gallivan, James River Chiefdoms: The Rise of Social Inequality in the Chesapeake (Lincoln, Neb., 2003); and James Axtell, ‘‘The Rise and Fall of the Powhatan Empire,’’ in Axtell, Natives and Newcomers: The Cultural Origins of North America, 233–258 (Oxford, 2001).
Escape from Tsenacommacah 101 to their independence. They viewed the troubled relations between Powha- tan and the Jamestown colonists as an opportunity to cast off the Powhatan yoke and to escape from Tsenacommacah.
Histories More than thirty thousand Native people lived in the Chesapeake region when the Jamestown colonists arrived. Most were broadly Algonquian in culture, though the Susquehannocks were Iroquoian, and the piedmont Monacans and Manahoacs were likely Siouan. The majority lived within chiefdoms, a type of political hierarchy in which hereditary rulers com- manded tribute, coordinated foreign policy, and served as vital intermedi- aries between humans and the spiritual world. Moreover, by the late six- teenth century, an increasing number of people found themselves living within paramount chiefdoms, which were comprised of multiple chiefdoms owing tribute (and varying degrees of obedience) to a chief of chiefs such as Powhatan. The circumstances that gave rise to these Algonquian chiefdoms, and historical memories of the tumultuous sixteenth century, profoundly 3 shaped each nation’s relations with outsiders in the seventeenth century. Before about 1300 c.e., the peoples of the Chesapeake were accustomed 4 to a relatively egalitarian social, religious, and political order. In the three centuries after 1300, however, most local societies created ever more hierar- chical systems, with the majority of the population submitting themselves to village and even paramount chiefs. At least five fundamental and thoroughly interrelated forces led the inhabitants of Chesapeake in this direction: ac- celerating population growth, an increasing dependence on agriculture, the onset of the Little Ice Age, intensifying competition for prime village loca- tions, and a marked increase in both warfare and long-distance trade. Chesapeake societies began to experiment with maize by at least 900 c.e. Although they were slow to integrate it into their annual subsistence cycle, maize was a seductive plant, calorie rich and not overly labor inten- sive. It grew especially well during the consistently warm centuries between about 900 and 1300 c.e., which are often labeled ‘‘the Medieval Optimum.’’ The more the peoples of the Chesapeake experimented with agriculture, the more their grain-fed populations grew, so much so that by 1300 it was
3. The Patuxent River nations and possibly the Monacans and Mannahoacs formed confederacies, but not paramount chiefdoms. 4. The key word here is ‘‘relatively.’’ As Gallivan notes, ‘‘Ethnographies of sup- posedly egalitarian hunter-gatherer and peasant communities demonstrate that true equality may be a social impossibility’’ (Gallivan, James River Chiefdoms, 45).
102 james d. rice becoming increasingly difficult for the region’s enlarged populations to sus- tain themselves by fishing, gathering, and hunting alone. By the fourteenth century, beans and squash supplemented the maize crop, providing more dietary diversity, greater security against crop failures, and more calories, while also reducing the need for hoeing weeds (spreading vines suppressed their growth) and extending the life of fields (beans helped to fix nitrogen in the soil). Thus communities modified their ways to more fully incorpo- rate cultivated plants into their annual subsistence cycles: they altered their ceramic technologies and settlement patterns and became noticeably more 5 insular and territorial.
5. For general treatments, see Bruce D. Smith, ‘‘Origins of Agriculture in East- ern North America,’’ Science, CCXLVI (1989), 1566–1571; and Linda S. Cordell and Bruce D. Smith, ‘‘Indigenous Farmers,’’ in Bruce G. Trigger and Wilcomb E. Wash- burn, eds., The Cambridge History of the Native Peoples of the Americas, I, North America (New York, 1996), part 1, 234–250. On experimentation with cultigens in the Chesapeake region, see Paul Randolph Green, ‘‘Forager-Farmer Transitions in Coastal Prehistory’’ (Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina, 1987), 1–9, 26–31; Dennis C. Curry and Maureen Kavanagh, ‘‘The Middle to Late Woodland Transition in Mary- land,’’ North American Archaeologist, XII (1991), 6–7, 21–26; Laurie Cameron Stepo- naitis, ‘‘Prehistoric Settlement Patterns in the Lower Patuxent Drainage’’ (Ph.D. diss., SUNY-Binghamton, 1986), 2, 269–276, 287–288; Joan Walker and Glenda Miller, ‘‘Life on the Levee: The Late Woodland Period in the Northern Great Valley of Vir- ginia,’’ in Theodore Reinhart and Mary Ellen Hodges, eds., Middle and Late Woodland Research in Virginia: A Synthesis (Courtland, Va., 1992), 166–170; William Gardner, Lost Arrowheads and Broken Pottery: Traces of Indians in the Shenandoah Valley (Ma- nassas, Va., 1986), 77–79; Potter, Commoners, Tribute, and Chiefs, 91–100, 138–145, 170–173, esp. 144–145; Michael John Klein, ‘‘An Absolute Seriation Approach to Ce- ramic Chronology in the Roanoke, Potomac, and James River Valleys, Virginia and Maryland’’ (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 1994), 70; John P. Hart, David L. Asch, C. Margaret Scarry, and Gary W. Crawford, ‘‘The Age of the Common Bean (Phaseolus Vulgaris L.) in the Northern Eastern Woodlands of North America,’’ An- tiquity, LXXVI (2002), 377–383. On settlement patterns and ceramic technologies, see Walker and Miller, ‘‘Life on the Levee,’’ in Reinhart and Hodges, eds., Middle and Late Woodland Research in Virginia, 168–170; Curry and Kavanagh, ‘‘Middle to Late Woodland Transition,’’ North American Archaeologist, XII (1991), 3–28; Potter, Com- moners, Tribute, and Chiefs, 138–145, 170–173 (esp. 144–145); J. Sanderson Stevens, ‘‘Examination of Shepard and Potomac Creek Wares at a Montgomery Complex Site (44LD521),’’ Journal of Middle Atlantic Archaeology, XIV (1998), 95–126; Klein, ‘‘An Absolute Seriation Approach,’’ 22–28, 70; R. Michael Stewart, ‘‘Prehistoric Settlement and Subsistence Patterns and the Testing of Predictive Site Location Models in the Great Valley of Maryland’’ (Ph.D. diss., Catholic University of America, 1980), 384; Stewart, Prehistoric Farmers of the Susquehanna Valley: Clemson Island Culture and
Escape from Tsenacommacah 103 But in a singularly unhappy coincidence, accelerating population growth and a deepening commitment to agriculture after 1300 c.e. coincided with the onset of the Little Ice Age, a centuries-long phase in which tempera- 6 tures averaged several degrees cooler than in the thirteenth century. Cooler the St. Anthony Site (Bethlehem, Conn., 1994), 11–13, 186. On cultural insularity and declining long-distance trade, see Melburn D. Thurman, ‘‘A Cultural Synthesis of the Middle Atlantic Coastal Plain, Part I: ‘Culture Area’ and Regional Sequence,’’ Jour- nal of Middle Atlantic Archaeology, I (1985), 7–32; Stewart, ‘‘Catharsis: Comments on Thurman’s Coastal Plain Synthesis,’’ Journal of Middle Atlantic Archaeology, III (1987), 111–124; Potter, Commoners, Tribute, and Chiefs, 77–81, 100, 114–122, 141–145; Gardner, Lost Arrowheads, 83–85; Curry and Kavanaugh, ‘‘Middle to Late Woodland Transition,’’ North American Archaeologist, XII (1991), 10–16, 22–25; Klein, ‘‘An Abso- lute Seriation Approach,’’ 26, 85–86; Green, ‘‘Forager-Farmer Transitions in Coastal Prehistory,’’ 106, 143; Frederic W. Gleach, ‘‘A Rose by Any Other Name: Questions on Mockley Chronology,’’ Journal of Middle Atlantic Archaeology, IV (1988), 85–98; Lewis Binford, ‘‘Archaeological and Ethnohistorical Investigations of Cultural Diver- sity and Progressive Development among Aboriginal Cultures of Coastal Virginia and North Carolina’’ (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1964), 485; Steponaitis, ‘‘Pre- historic Settlement Patterns,’’ 2. 6. Concerns about global warming have inspired an explosion of research on cli- mate history, which has largely confirmed the existence of both the Medieval Optimum and the Little Ice Age while also complicating earlier portrayals of the Little Ice Age as a relatively uniform cold snap. Current research on climate change points to switch- ing mechanisms connected to oceanic currents (and to the associated atmospheric cir- culation patterns). The best known of these are the ENSO phenomenon, which en- compasses the El Niño and La Niña events that can alternately drown and parch such far-flung places as California and Peru; and the jet stream, relative to which the Chesa- peake occupies a transitional position. The Little Ice Age, then, was characterized, not by numbing cold, year after year, but rather by a greater tendency toward switching mechanisms that, when activated, caused lower average temperatures and short grow- ing seasons. Thus even in the midst of the Little Ice Age, some years were hot and dry; others were warm and wet; and still others were cold and wet. The problem was that people couldn’t be content with having good harvests in some years or even in most years; they needed to be able to feed themselves every year. Historians have just begun to take advantage of the new climate research. Though scholars often cite David W. Stahle et al., ‘‘The Lost Colony and Jamestown Droughts,’’ Science, CCLXXX (1998), 564–567, there is much more still to absorb. Good entry points into this literature include H. H. Lamb, Climate, History, and the Modern World, 2d ed. (New York, 1995); Brian Fagan’s adroit popularization, The Little Ice Age: How Climate Made History, 1300–1850 (New York, 2000); and Thomas Cronin, Principles of Paleoclimatology (New York, 1999). For studies specific to the Chesapeake region, see Debra A. Willard, Thomas M. Cronin, and Stacey Verardo, ‘‘Late-Holocene Cli- mate and Ecosystem History from Chesapeake Bay Sediment Cores, USA,’’ The Holo-
104 james d. rice temperatures translated into significantly shorter growing seasons: in the uplands of the interior and to the north and the west of the Chesapeake region, the growing season frequently dropped below the minimum 120 days required for maize, making such places particularly susceptible to 7 crop failures and lowered yields. Groups in central New York and on the upper Susquehanna River, who had also committed themselves to agri- culture, were particularly hard-hit by the changing climate. In response, many groups gravitated to lower latitudes and elevations—and often into 8 the Chesapeake region. Once they arrived in the Chesapeake, migrants from the north and west gravitated toward a few vital enclaves of rich, well- cene, XIII (2003), 201–214; Grace Brush, ‘‘Natural and Anthropogenic Changes in Chesapeake Bay during the Last 1000 Years,’’ Human and Ecological Risk Assessment, VII (2001), 1283–1296; John Kutzbach and Thompson Webb III, ‘‘Climate and Cli- mate History in the Chesapeake Bay Region,’’ in Philip D. Curtin, Grace S. Brush, and George W. Fisher, eds., Discovering the Chesapeake: The History of an Ecosystem (Baltimore, 2001); United States Geographical Service, ‘‘Effects of Climate Variability and Human Activities on Chesapeake Bay and the Implications for Ecosystem Resto- ration,’’ U.S.G.S. Fact Sheet FS–00–116 (Reston, Va., 2000); and Dennis B. Blanton, ‘‘Drought as a Factor in the Jamestown Colony, 1607–1612,’’ The Journal of the Society for Historical Archaeology, XXXIV (2000), 74–81. 7. Victor A. Carbone, ‘‘Environment and Prehistory in the Shenandoah Valley’’ (Ph.D. diss., Catholic University of America, 1976); Dean R. Snow, The Iroquois (Cam- bridge, Mass., 1994), 22, 33; Green, ‘‘Forager-Farmer Transitions in Coastal Prehis- tory,’’ 139–143; Steponaitis, ‘‘Prehistoric Settlement Patterns,’’ 287–288; Potter, Com- moners, Tribute, and Chiefs, 100–102; Curry and Kavanagh, ‘‘Middle to Late Woodland Transition,’’ North American Archaeologist, XII (1991), 24. 8. It is hard to say exactly who migrated where, for archaeological evidence is no- toriously unhelpful on this score. It is easier to spot an intrusive culture than to iden- tify its source and easier to note a group’s disappearance than to pinpoint its desti- nation. See Irving Rouse, Migrations in Prehistory: Inferring Population Movement from Cultural Remains (New Haven, Conn., 1986). The general trend of migrations, though, was clearly down the latitudes and downward in altitude, sloping along to- ward warmer weather and fertile soils. See Green, ‘‘Forager-Farmer Transitions in Coastal Prehistory,’’ 53, 104–106, 139–143; Potter, Commoners, Tribute, and Chiefs, 119– 161; Stewart, Prehistoric Farmers, 26–27, 188, 194–197, 200–202; Barry Kent, Susque- hanna’s Indians (Harrisburg, Pa., 1984), 14–21; Gardner, Lost Arrowheads, 79–89; Stevens, ‘‘Examination,’’ Journal of Middle Atlantic Archaeology, XIV (1998), 110, 122– 123; Dennis B. Blanton, Stevan C. Pullins, and Veronica L. Deitrick, The Potomac Creek Site (44ST2) Revisited, Virginia Department of Historic Resources Research Report, no. 10 (Richmond, Va., 1999); Snow, Iroquois, 19–20, 26–46; John P. Hart, ‘‘Maize, Matrilocality, Migration, and Northern Iroquoian Evolution,’’ Journal of Ar- chaeological Method and Theory, VIII (2001), 151–182.
Escape from Tsenacommacah 105 drained soils along major waterways, setting off an intensifying competition for these prime village locations. Whole new villages sprang up, particularly 9 near the fall line and in the piedmont and interior valleys. Paradoxically, population growth turned out to be part of the solution to the problems cre- ated by population growth. A community that controlled good farmland, fishing places, and gathering places could feed growing populations and thus produce more warriors to defend its privileged location. Not coinci- dentally, a number of villages in the western and northern reaches of the Chesapeake region sprouted palisades, a substantial commitment of labor and resources that would only make sense when the inhabitants were under 10 constant threat of attack. Yet palisades were not enough to save the communities that lay in the path of raiders from the north. The Little Ice Age had forced the proto- Iroquoian peoples who remained in modern-day New York into increas- ingly compact and populous agricultural settlements situated on relatively warm bottomlands, where they gradually consolidated into a smaller num- ber of ever larger and better-defended villages. The transition did not go smoothly: the Iroquois Great League of Peace and Power (the Five Nations) was intended to bring an end to a maelstrom of fifteenth and early-sixteenth- century warfare between these northern villages, in which (according to oral tradition) ‘‘feuds with brother nations, feuds of sister towns and feuds of families and of clans made every warrior a stealthy man who liked to kill.’’ The Great League resolved many of these feuds, establishing peace
9. E. Randolph Turner III, ‘‘The Virginia Coastal Plain during the Late Woodland Period,’’ in Reinhart and Hodges, eds., Middle and Late Woodland Research, 106–108; Walker and Miller, ‘‘Life on the Levee,’’ ibid.; Curry and Kavanagh, ‘‘Middle to Late Woodland Transition,’’ North American Archaeologist, XII (1991), 18–24; Blanton, Pul- lins, and Deitrick, Potomac Creek Site Revisited; Green, ‘‘Forager-Farmer Transitions in Coastal Prehistory,’’ 139–143; Kavanagh, Archaeological Resources of the Monocacy River Region, Frederick and Carroll Counties, Maryland, Maryland Geological Survey, Division of Archaeology File Report no. 164 (Crownsville, Md., 1982), 79–81. 10. Blanton, Pullins, and Deitrick, Potomac Creek Site Revisited; Richard Dent, Chesapeake Prehistory: Old Traditions, New Directions (New York, 1995), 250–251; Walker and Miller, ‘‘Life on the Levee,’’ in Reinhart and Hodges, eds., Middle and Late Woodland Research, 167, 172–182; Gardner, Lost Arrowheads, 88–90; Stevens, ‘‘Examination,’’ Journal of Middle Atlantic Archaeology, XIV (1998), 123; Kavanagh, Resources, 77–82; Potter, Commoners, Tribute, and Chiefs, 130–131, 147–148, 153–155; Klein, ‘‘An Absolute Seriation Approach,’’ 114–115; Stewart, Prehistoric Farmers, 201– 205; and Stewart, ‘‘Clemson’s Island Studies in Pennsylvania: A Perspective,’’ Penn- sylvania Archaeologist, LX (1990), 97.
106 james d. rice between the Five Nations and fusing them into a loose polity by the middle of the sixteenth century, but the cultural imperatives that inspired Iroquois men to go to war each summer continued unabated. Five Nations warriors therefore redirected their efforts outward, placing neighboring peoples not 11 included in the league under tremendous pressure. The Susquehannocks were especially hard-hit, so much so that, after about 1525, they moved from their homeland on the upper Susquehanna River to the lower Susquehanna River, with some continuing southward in the late sixteenth century to establish palisaded villages on the upper Poto- mac. Their presence made the Chesapeake interior a very dangerous place indeed. Susquehannock warriors harassed their neighbors; and what was worse, those who were unfortunate enough to live in the Shenandoah Valley or western Maryland were caught in a deadly crossfire between the Five Na- tions and the Susquehannocks. Most abandoned their villages during the course of the sixteenth century, transforming their former homelands into a vast hunting ground and war zone. Those who remained in the Shenan- doah Valley built palisades and otherwise mobilized for war. Even after the Potomac River Susquehannocks relocated to the lower Susquehanna River in the early seventeenth century, Iroquoian raiders—Five Nations, Susque- hannocks, and a people known to Chesapeake Algonquians as the Massa- womecks—continued to harass the northern and western Chesapeake. By 1608, the rivers on the Western Shore north of the Patuxent River had been abandoned, as had virtually all of the roughly ten thousand square miles of 12 the Potomac basin above the fall line.
11. Arthur C. Parker, The Constitution of the Five Nations; or, The Iroquois Book of the Great Law, New York State Museum Bulletin, no. 184 (Albany, N.Y., 1916), 16–17 (quotation); William N. Fenton, The Great Law and the Longhouse: A Political History of the Iroquois Confederacy (Norman, Okla., 1998); Daniel K. Richter, The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1992), chap. 2. 12. On the Susquehannocks’ ordeals, see Daniel K. Richter, ‘‘War and Culture: The Iroquois Experience,’’ William and Mary Quarterly, 3d Ser., XL (1983), 528– 559; Kent, Susquehanna’s Indians, 15–18. On their sojourn in the Potomac basin, see Janet G. Brashler, ‘‘A Middle 16th Century Susquehannock Village in Hampshire County, West Virginia,’’ The West Virginia Archaeologist, XXXIX (1987), 1–30; Robert D. Wall, ‘‘Late Woodland Ceramics and Native Populations of the Upper Potomac Val- ley,’’ Journal of Middle Atlantic Archaeology, XVII (2001), 15–37; Wall and Heather Lapham, ‘‘Material Culture of the Contact Period in the Upper Potomac Valley: Chronological and Cultural Implications,’’ Archaeology of Eastern North America, XXXI (2003), 151–177. Wall’s work suggests that the Susquehannocks came from the
Escape from Tsenacommacah 107 The thirty-plus Algonquian nations below the fall line withstood the mi- grations and warfare of the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries by consolidating authority in the hands of hereditary chiefs who could exact tribute, send men to war, discipline their subjects, and coordinate the resis- tance against northern raiders and rival claimants to their homelands. Over the course of the sixteenth century, a hierarchy of places and rulers emerged around the rim of the bay. On the lowest level were hamlets without heredi- tary rulers. Such hamlets paid tribute to a nearby village whose weroance appointed a ‘‘lesser king’’ to each dependent settlement. Increasingly dur- ing the sixteenth century, the weroance was, in turn, subject to a paramount 13 chief who ruled a number of village /hamlet clusters. lower Susquehanna in the late sixteenth century and remained on the upper Potomac into the early seventeenth century. Not coincidently, radiocarbon dates at sites in west- ern Maryland and the lower Shenandoah Valley reveal a distinct gap in the sixteenth century: villages occupied in earlier centuries yield a sharply declining number of dates after 1500. See Hettie L. Boyce and Lori A. Frye, Radiocarbon Dating of Archeological Samples from Maryland (Baltimore, 1986), 8, 10–11, 19–29, 44; Donna C. Boyd and C. Clifford Boyd, ‘‘Late Woodland Mortuary Variability in Virginia,’’ in Reinhart and Hodges, eds., Middle and Late Woodland Research, 252–253; Dent, Chesapeake Prehis- tory, 256–257, 262; Walker and Miller, ‘‘Life on the Levee,’’ in Reinhart and Hodges, eds., Middle and Late Woodland Research, 175–182; Kavanagh, Resources, 52, 75–82; Potter, Commoners, Tribute, and Chiefs, 175–176; R. Michael Stewart, ‘‘Early Archeo- logical Research in the Great Valley of Maryland,’’ Maryland Archeology, XXXIII (1997), 1–44; Joan W. Chase, ‘‘A Comparison of Signs of Nutritional Stress in Prehis- toric Populations of the Potomac Piedmont and Coastal Plain’’ (Ph.D. diss., American University, 1988), 60. For accounts of Susquehannock and Massawomeck raiders, see Kent, Susquehanna’s Indians, 17–19, 311–319; Andrew White, ‘‘A Briefe Relation of the Voyage unto Maryland’’ (1634), in Clayton Colman Hall, ed., Narratives of Early Maryland, 1633–1684 (New York, 1910), 74, 89; John Smith, The Proceedings of the English Colonie in Virginia since Their First Beginning from England in the Yeare of Our Lord 1606, till This Present 1612 ...(1612),inPhilip L. Barbour, ed., The Com- plete Works of Captain John Smith (1580–1631), 3 vols. (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1986), I, 230–232; Smith, The Generall Historie of Virginia, New-England, and the Summer Iles ...(1624),ibid., II, 105–106, 119, 165, 170–172, 176; Smith, A Map of Virginia ... (1612), ibid., I, 149–150, 166; ‘‘Instructions to Sir Thomas Gates,’’ in Barbour, ed., The Jamestown Voyages under the First Charter, 1606–1609, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1969), I, 237; Henry Spelman, ‘‘Relation of Virginea,’’ in Edward Arber, ed., Travels and Works of Captain John Smith, President of Virginia, and Admiral of New England, 1580–1631 (Edinburgh, 1910), cv–cvi. 13. Smith, Map of Virginia, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, I, 147–148; George Percy, ‘‘Observations Gathered out of a Discourse of the Plantation of the Southerne
108 james d. rice According to Piscataway oral tradition, the first paramount chief in the region likely emerged on the Potomac River some thirteen generations be- fore 1634 (probably somewhere between 1440 and 1530) when ‘‘there came a King from the Easterne Shoare.’’ Called the tayac, he and his succes- 14 sors expanded Piscataway influence all along the Potomac. By the mid- sixteenth century, however, an even more powerful chief was consolidat- ing his hold over a half-dozen subordinate weroances near the falls of the James and Pamunkey rivers. The man commonly known today as Pow- hatan inherited these chiefdoms sometime in the 1560s or 1570s; over the next few decades, according to Indian accounts, another two dozen Algon- quian nations had ‘‘bene either by force subdued unto him, or through feare yielded’’ to this charismatic leader. By 1607, Powhatan was collecting trib- ute from nearly all of the Algonquian nations in Virginia below the fall line, from the Nansemond River to the south bank of the Potomac, and he was still adding to Tsenacommacah when the Jamestown colonists arrived. The Kecoughtans, a prosperous nation of about one thousand, fell to Powhatan in the late 1590s, while the Chesapeakes were destroyed and their territory colonized by Powhatan loyalists within a year or two of 1607. And in the fall of 1608, Powhatan showed Jamestown colonists a string of two dozen fresh Piankatank scalps, bragging that he had scattered the survivors and
Colonie in Virginia by the English, 1606,’’ in Alexander Brown, The Genesis of the United States: A Narrative of the Movement in England, 1605–1616, Which Resulted in the Plantation of North America by Englishmen ...(NewYork,1890),I,158–161; Wil- liam Hand Browne et al., eds., Archives of Maryland, 72 vols. (Baltimore, 1883–1972), XV, 251 (hereafter cited as Arch. Md.); Rountree, Powhatan Indians, 117. 14. Not all chiefs were men, but the means of succession—from the oldest brother to the youngest, then to the oldest sister, then to her sons—meant that few chiefs were women. The dates suggested here for the origins of the tayac’s paramount chiefdom coincide with both the formation of the Iroquois League and with the archaeological evidence of increasingly hierarchical societies on the inner coastal plain. James H. Mer- rell calculated an average of nine years in office for each tayac, based on the average tenure between 1634 and 1700, which yielded a founding date of 1534. But Merrell as- sumed that exotic, European-introduced epidemics struck the Piscataways in the six- teenth century, an assumption for which there is as yet no solid evidence. Merrell was also deliberately conservative in his assessment so as not to exaggerate the paramount chiefdom’s antiquity, so 1534 should be taken as the latest likely date for the beginning of the tayac’s’ paramount chiefdom. It is possible that other paramount chiefdoms pre- ceded this one; this is simply the earliest for which we have evidence. See Browne et al., eds., Arch. Md., III, 403 (quotation); Merrell, ‘‘Cultural Continuity among the Piscata- way Indians of Colonial Maryland,’’ WMQ, 3d Ser., XXXVI (1979), 551.
Escape from Tsenacommacah 109 replaced them with the ‘‘remayne’’ of the recently conquered Kecoughtans. Powhatan had even begun to extend his influence to the lower Eastern Shore, though he had not yet incorporated the nations there into Tsenacom- 15 macah. Powhatan’s paramount chiefdom, then, was still a work in progress when the Jamestown colonists arrived on the scene. Most people were well aware that Powhatan’s chiefdom was not the only game in town; they knew of the independent Chickahominies, living in the heart of Tsenacommacah with- out being part of it, the Piscataway tayac’s paramount chiefdom on the north bank of the Potomac, or the piedmont confederation of Monacans and Mannahoacs. In nearly every village, there were people who could re- member when they had become a part of Powhatan’s chiefdom. Thus those who had voluntarily joined with Powhatan to avoid some greater threat knew that they could always recalculate their chances of surviving outside of Tsenacommacah.Those who had been conquered by Powhatan or ‘‘through feare yeilded’’ could remember a time when they had neither paid tribute to Powhatan nor done his bidding; they, too, had every reason to seek op- portunities to regain their independence. And of course those who lived un- comfortably close to the edges of Tsenacommacah were anxious to retain their independence. In short, many Algonquian weroances had an interest in diminishing Powhatan’s power and influence.
Structures One might reasonably ask what it means to call these polities ‘‘chiefdoms’’ and why it matters. What difference did it make that Chesapeake Algonqui- ans had organized themselves into chiefdoms rather than fashioning them- selves into bands, tribes, or states? And what did the specific features of Algonquian chiefdoms have to do with diplomatic relations in the contact era? In fact, the particulars of Algonquian political culture did much to de- termine the up-and-down fortunes of the Jamestown colony. If we are to appreciate the logic that guided the Chesapeake nations’ varied responses to the English presence, it is critical that we first understand the spiritual sources of all power in the Algonquians’ world, as well as the cosmological vision that explained and sustained chiefly authority—and, above all, that
15. William Strachey, The Historie of Travell into Virginia Britania (1612), ed. Louis B. Wright and Virginia Freund, Works Issued by the Hakluyt Society, 2d Ser., no. 103 (London, 1953), 43–45 (quotation), 57 (quotation), 63–69, 104–105, 108; Smith, Map of Virginia, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, I, 147, 173, 178. On Powhatan’s multiple names, see Williamson, Powhatan Lords, 56–57, and Gleach, Powhatan’s World, 32–33.
110 james d. rice we grasp the utter inseparability of spiritual power, trade, diplomacy, and 16 chiefly authority. We might begin by contrasting chiefdoms with other forms of political organization. Tribal societies, for example, are generally egalitarian. Age and sex place some limits on a person’s power, but otherwise anyone with sufficient personal charisma and achievements can exercise leadership. Whoever can lead may lead, for there is no fixed limit on the number of people who can serve a given function. Shamans, for instance, thrive if they seem to do good work, not because they’ve been initiated into an exclusive priestly caste. In contrast, chiefdoms limit the number of people who may exercise authority, and they vest some key leadership positions with an au- thority independent of the charisma and achievements of the officeholder. A priest, for example, possesses authority because he’s been consecrated, and not simply because he attracts a following. Although a little charisma never hurts, a chief has authority by virtue of his birth. Chiefly authority is based on commoners’ acceptance of his legitimate sovereignty, not just on 17 the chief’s ability to persuade and inspire his people. Chiefs in the Chesa- peake region used their authority to exact tribute, compel men to go to war, and order executions—all of which marked a real departure from tribal poli- tics, in which tribute was virtually unknown, waging policy-driven wars re- quired an almost impossible degree of consensus, and no one person could order an execution. Yet chiefdoms were also fundamentally unlike a modern nation-state; they lacked bureaucracies, centralized record keeping, police, 18 courts, standing armies, and other trappings of modern nation-states.
16. Strachey, Historie of Travell, ed. Wright and Freund, 57. The theoretical lit- erature on chiefdoms is impressive and ever growing. See, for example, Morton H. Fried, The Evolution of Political Society: An Essay in Political Anthropology (New York, 1967); Elsa M. Redmond, ed., Chiefdoms and Chieftaincy in the Americas (Gainesville, Fla., 1998); Timothy Earle, ed., Chiefdoms: Power, Economy, and Ideology (Cambridge, 1991); and esp. Earle, How Chiefs Come to Power: The Political Economy in Prehis- tory (Stanford, Calif., 1997). Each of these works is broadly comparative; all but one is global in scale. 17. Elsa M. Redmond, ‘‘The Dynamics of Chieftaincy and the Development of Chiefdoms,’’ in Redmond, ed., Chiefdoms and Chieftaincy, 1–13; Earle, ‘‘Chiefdoms in Archaeological and Ethnohistorical Perspective,’’ Annual Review of Anthropology, XVI (1987), 279–308. 18. Tribute: Spelman, ‘‘Relation,’’ in Arber, ed., Travels and Works of Captain John Smith, cxii–cxiii; John Smith, A True Relation ...(1608),inBarbour, ed., Works of Smith, I, 69; Smith, Map of Virginia, ibid., 158–159, 169, 174; Strachey, Historie of Travell, ed. Wright and Freund, 87. Initiated wars: ibid., 44, 54, 104. Ordered exe-
Escape from Tsenacommacah 111 All power, authority, and legitimacy had its origins in the world of the spirits. The creator Ahone was ‘‘the good and peceable’’ god, the ultimate source of manit (spiritual power) and ‘‘the giver of al the good things.’’ Ahone was too awesome for humans to really know. He took a hands-off ap- proach, leaving humans ‘‘to make the most of their free will and to secure as many as they can of the good things that flow from him.’’ Therefore, ‘‘it was to no purpose either to fear or worship him.’’ Instead, Ahone had an- other spirit, Okeus, to deal directly with humans; Okeus was ‘‘always busy- ing himself with our affairs and frequently visiting us, being present in the air, in the thunder, and in the storms.’’ A morally neutral spirit with whom Algonquians needed to maintain a right relationship, Okeus ‘‘expected ado- ration and sacrifice.’’ On the whole, though, he served as a guardian who spoke directly to priests and taught humans how to live: how to dress, how to wear their hair, how to cultivate plants, and to otherwise ‘‘fashion them- 19 selves’’ according to his will. On a day-to-day basis, however, Algonquians had less to do with Okeus than they did with quiyoughcosughs, a broad term encompassing a veri- table host of lesser gods—including their weroances and priests. As em- bodiments of quiyoughcosughs, chiefs and priests straddled the already in- distinct, porous frontier connecting humans and spirits. Only they could enter the sacred precincts of the quioccasan, or temple. Only they went on to the lair of the Great Hare after they died, lived a full life there, then returned to this world. While on this earth, quiyoughcosughs maintained contact with their fellow spirits; and while away from earth, they served as 20 intercessors on behalf of their living relatives. But priests and chiefs were
cutions: Spelman, ‘‘Relation,’’ cxi; Strachey, Historie of Travell, 77. See also White, ‘‘Briefe Relation of Maryland,’’ in Hall, ed., Narratives of Early Maryland, 26. 19. Strachey, Historie of Travell, ed. Wright and Freund, 88–103 (quotations); Smith, Map of Virginia, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, I, 169 (quotation); White, ‘‘Briefe Relation of Maryland,’’ in Hall, ed., Narratives of Early Maryland, 44–45; ‘‘A Relation of Maryland,’’ ibid., 88 (quotation); ‘‘Occurants in Virginia’’ (1619), in Samuel Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus; or, Purchas His Pilgrimes ...,20vols.(1625;rpt.Glas- gow, 1905–1907), XIX, 118; Spelman, ‘‘Relation,’’ in Arber, ed., Travels and Works of Captain John Smith, cv. 20. William White, ‘‘Fragments Published before 1614,’’ in Barbour, ed., Jamestown Voyages, I, 149–150; Smith, Map of Virginia, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, I, 169– 170; Smith, Proceedings of the English Colonie, ibid., 170; Strachey, Historie of Travell, ed. Wright and Freund, 77, 88, 94–95, 100–103; Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, XIX, 954; Spelman, ‘‘Relation,’’ in Arber, ed., Travels and Works of Captain John Smith, xv. Piscataway oral tradition describes the dead as intercessors for the living. See Gabri-
112 james d. rice only part of this pantheon of quiyoughcosughs; according to one Algon- quian, ‘‘there are many of them of the same nature,’’ and ‘‘there are tutelar deities in every town.’’ Manit was incarnate in many things, as John Smith observed: ‘‘All things that were able to do them hurt beyond their preven- tion, they adore with their kinde of divine worship; as the fire, water, light- 21 ning, thunder, our ordinance, peeces, horses, etc.’’ Relations between flesh-and-blood quiyoughcosughs mirrored those be- tween the greater gods. Ahone created order and stability, whereas Okeus, assigned to deal with humans, held out the threat of war and famine. Like Ahone, weroances and paramount chiefs served as sources of order and sta- bility within their communities. Primarily concerned with mediating be- tween more powerful spiritual beings and their own people, each hereditary chief delegated Okeuslike external relations such as war and diplomacy to an external chief, normally a relative who was a lesser chief in his own right. The Patawomeck weroance, for example, deputized his brother Iopassus (chief of a Patawomeck hamlet) to deal with outsiders, while Opechanca- nough, not his elder brother Powhatan, normally came forward to negotiate 22 with the Virginia colonists. Chiefly lineages emphasized their foreign origins in order to demon- strate that they were part of a universal spiritual order rather than local par- venus. The brother of the Piscataway tayac recalled that their line of chiefs began with ‘‘a King from the Easterne Shoare.’’ Similarly, Powhatan was born an outsider to all but a half-dozen of the thirty-plus chiefdoms he ac- quired during his lifetime, and oral tradition consistently maintained that 23 his predecessor came from the West Indies or the Southwest. Yet with-
elle Astra Tayac, ‘‘‘To Speak with One Voice’: Supra-Tribal American Indian Collec- tive Identity Incorporation among the Piscataway, 1500–1998’’ (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1999), 54, 75. 21. Smith, Map of Virginia, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, I, 169. 22. Smith, True Relation, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, I, 65; Smith, Generall Historie, ibid., II, 156, 243–244, 268; Spelman, ‘‘Relation,’’ in Arber, ed., Travels and Works of Captain John Smith, cii–civ; [Ralph] Hamor, A True Discourse of the Present Estate of Virginia, and the Successe of the Affaires There till the 18 of June, 1614 (Lon- don, 1615), rpt. in Virginia: Four Personal Narratives (New York, 1972), 4–6; Strachey, Historie of Travell, ed. Wright and Freund, 46, 101; ‘‘Letter of Sir Samuel Argoll,’’ in Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, XIX, 91–93; Williamson, Powhatan Lords, 95–123, 132–133; Gleach, Powhatan’s World, 28–36. 23. Browne et al., eds., Arch. Md., III, 402–403 (quotation); Robert Beverley, The History and Present State of Virginia, ed. Louis B. Wright (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1947), 61; Hamor, True Discourse, rpt. in Virginia, 13; Earle, ‘‘Chiefdoms in Perspective,’’
Escape from Tsenacommacah 113 out a continuing stream of evidence that they possessed unusual spiritual power, exogamous chiefly lineages would have been little more than pushy outsiders. Priests, bound in a deeply symbiotic relationship with chiefs, pro- vided that evidence. Through rituals, images, architecture, clothing, and bodily markings, priests constantly reminded people of the hereditary and personal spiritual power of chiefs. Priests also tended temples containing sacred images, the bodies of deceased chiefs, and the stored wealth of the 24 current chief. Although ordinary people could not match the spiritual potency of chiefs and priests, almost anyone could forge some connection with the spirits through rituals, sacrifices, smoking, and dreaming. Indeed, such connec- tions were critical to success in life. Ordinary people constantly tended to their relations with the spirits who inhabited their world. They routinely sacrificed the ‘‘first fruits of their Corne, and of that which they get by hunt- ing and fishing.’’ Tobacco and other sacred objects opened paths of commu- nication at such moments. Ordinary people also offered tobacco and other goods ‘‘when they returne from the warrs, from hunting, and upon many other occasions,’’ and after their customary morning bath. Dreams also con- 25 nected humans and spirits. For young men, however, there was no substi- tute for a successful huskanaw, a rigorous coming-of-age ritual reserved for the‘‘choicestandbriskest...andsuch only as have acquired some treasure by their travels and hunting.’’ A young man who successfully completed the huskanaw established a personal relationship with a spirit who would henceforth serve as a source of power and wisdom, not to mention help him to fight, hunt, and fish better. Having emerged from the ceremony forti- fied with the power of their tutelatory spirit, they had much to offer their
Annual Review of Anthropology, XVI (1987), 299; Redmond, ‘‘Introduction,’’ in Red- mond, ed., Chiefdoms and Chieftaincy, 10–12. 24. Smith, Map of Virginia, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, I, 169–170, 173; Spel- man, ‘‘Relation,’’ in Arber, ed., Travels and Works of Captain John Smith, civ–cv; Stra- chey, Historie of Travell, ed. Wright and Freund, 88–89. 25. White, ‘‘Briefe Relation of Maryland,’’ in Hall, ed., Narratives of Early Mary- land, 45, 88 (quotation); Smith, Map of Virginia, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, I, 170–171 (quotation); Smith, True Relation, ibid., 59; Smith, Generall Historie, ibid., II, 124–125; Tayac, ‘‘‘To Speak with One Voice,’’’ 75; Spelman, ‘‘Relation,’’ in Arber, ed., Travels and Works of Captain John Smith, cv; Strachey, Historie of Travell, ed. Wright and Freund, 97–98, 123; White, ‘‘Fragments,’’ in Barbour, ed., Jamestown Voyages, I, 150; Stanley Pargellis, ed., ‘‘An Account of the Indians in Virginia,’’ WMQ, 3d Ser., XVI (1959), 232–233, 235–236; ‘‘Annual Letters of the Jesuits’’ (1639), in Hall, ed., Narratives of Early Maryland, 124–126.
114 james d. rice weroance and their community. A few became priests or conjurors. Others, having ritually ‘‘died’’ to their families in the course of the huskanaw, were ‘‘qualified...equally and impartially to administer justice, without having respect either to friend or relation.’’ The weroance selected his ‘‘best trusted Councellors and Freindes’’ from this class of men, consulting them before 26 making important decisions. People could improve their access to spiritual power if they possessed copper, shell beads, or other potent objects. Such items permitted spiritu- ally gifted users to more readily invoke and more fully employ the power of spiritual beings. These things were literally otherworldly: in Native tradi- tions throughout the eastern woodlands, they were represented as gifts from guiding spirits. As such, they formed connecting links through which spiri- tual power and guidance could flow, allowing their users to boost their own power and well-being. The specific uses to which they were put depended upon their color—the reddest copper was especially prized, as were particu- larly white or dark beads—and upon the ceremonies in which they were 27 used. In very concrete ways, copper and beads were the keys to power. In fact, one can trace the flow and exercise of power by following the tran- sit of beads and copper through networks of trade, tribute, and gifting. Each of these networks tended to funnel spiritually potent items through the region’s weroances and paramount chiefs. Like chiefly lineages, the most spiritually potent trade goods came from the outside: copper came from the Great Lakes region, whereas the best shell beads came from the Eastern Shore. They tended to accumulate in the hands of chiefs, who were already presumed to possess spiritual power and thus had the authority to regulate
26. Susan Myra Kingsbury, ed., The Records of the Virginia Company of London, 4 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1906–1935) (hereafter cited as RVC), III, 438; Samuel Pur- chas, Purchas His Pilgrimes ...,3ded.(London,1617),955;Spelman, ‘‘Relation,’’ in Arber, ed., Travels and Works of Captain John Smith, cv–cvi; White, ‘‘Briefe Relation of Maryland,’’ in Hall, ed., Narratives of Early Maryland, 85; Pargellis, ‘‘Account of the Indians,’’ WMQ, 3d Ser., XVI (1959), 234–235; White, ‘‘Fragments,’’ in Barbour, ed., Jamestown Voyages, I, 147–149; Strachey, Historie of Travell, ed. Wright and Freund, 58, 85–86, 98–100, 104 (quotation); Smith, Map of Virginia, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, I, 171–172; White, ‘‘Briefe Relation,’’ 43, 45; Hamor, True Discourse, rpt. in Virginia, 6; Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, XIX, 93; Beverley, History, ed. Wright, 84, 108–109 (quotation), 115; and Gleach, Powhatan’s World, 38–43. 27. Gleach, Powhatan’s World, 56–59; Christopher L. Miller and George R. Hamell, ‘‘A New Perspective on Indian-White Contact: Cultural Symbols and Colonial Trade,’’ Journal of American History, LXXIII (1986), 311–328; George E. Lankford, ‘‘Red and White: Some Reflections on Southeastern Symbolism,’’ Southern Folklore, L (1992), 53–80; Williamson, Powhatan Lords, 247–254.
Escape from Tsenacommacah 115 long-distance trade. Chiefs traded directly with outsiders for these goods 28 and attempted (with partial success) to monopolize the trade. But even trade goods acquired by ordinary people were subject to regular demands for tribute, which also channeled them into chiefs’ hands. Consequently, weroances and paramount chiefs accumulated tremendous stores of valued goods, some of which was conspicuously displayed as a reminder of chiefly 29 legitimacy. Smart chiefs, however, also gave away much of their wealth. Gifts con- jured up a general sense of indebtedness on the part of recipients, and such obligations could be called in at important moments to gain support for the chiefs’ decisions. Yet gift giving was not necessarily a coercive or even cal- culated act; it could just as easily be conceived of as a way of maintaining a sense of reciprocity and balance within a relationship. Indeed, a weroance who gratefully accepted a gift of copper from Powhatan might soon after- ward turn around and offer copper as tribute to Powhatan—an act more consistent with the cultivation of reciprocity than with the cold calculation of debts owed. Moreover, when a chief distributed copper to his clients, the reddish metal identified its recipients with the spiritual sources of au- thority, power, and influence. Thus copper was not used to ‘‘wage’’ hireling weroances and war leaders, as the English thought, but rather to enhance the spiritual power they needed if they were to command respect at home 30 and to succeed in war abroad.
28. William Wallace Tooker, ‘‘On the Meaning of the Name Anacostia,’’ American Anthropologist, VII (1894), 389–393; Philip L. Barbour, ‘‘The Earliest Reconnaissance of Chesapeake Bay Area: Captain John Smith’s Map and Indian Vocabulary,’’ Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, LXXIX (1971), 296; Strachey, Historie of Travell, ed. Wright and Freund, 46, 56–57, 107, 132; Smith, True Relation, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, I, 59, 69, 81; Smith, Map of Virginia, ibid., 160, 166, 173–174; Smith, Proceedings of the English Colonie, ibid., 242, 247; Hamor, True Discourse, rpt. in Vir- ginia, 4–6; ‘‘Letter of Sir Samuel Argoll,’’ in Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, XIX, 91– 93; Boyd and Boyd, ‘‘Mortuary,’’ in Reinhart and Hodges, eds., Middle and Late Wood- land Research, 256–257. 29. Strachey, Historie of Travell, ed. Wright and Freund, 56–57, 61, 63, 87, 107; White, ‘‘Briefe Relation,’’ and ‘‘Letters of the Jesuits,’’ in Hall, ed., Narratives of Early Maryland, 43, 125, 127; Spelman, ‘‘Relation,’’ in Arber, ed., Travels and Works of Cap- tain John Smith, cv, cxii–cxiii; Smith, True Relation, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, I, 69, 81, 93; Smith, Generall Historie, ibid., II, 201; Smith, Map of Virginia, ibid., I, 173–174; Percy, ‘‘Observations,’’ in Brown, Genesis of the United States, I, 12–15; Tayac, ‘‘‘To Speak with One Voice,’’’ 63; Potter, Commoners, Tribute, and Chiefs, 170–173. 30. Strachey, Historie of Travell, ed. Wright and Freund, 68–69 (quotation), 104,
116 james d. rice Long-distance trade, tribute, and the ethic of gifting merged almost seamlessly into diplomacy. The Native peoples of the Chesapeake expected the exchange of goods between chiefs to take the form of mutual gener- osity rather than competitive bargaining, especially when the diplomatic stakes were high. More than mere goods were exchanged in such encoun- ters. When John Smith’s men reconnoitered the Chesapeake Bay in 1608, each nation they came upon wanted to exchange presents ‘‘to expresse their loves.’’ The English party, for example, gave the Massawomecks two bells in order to establish peaceable relations, while the Tockwoghs and Susque- hannocks gave gifts to Smith to pave the way for an attempt at enlisting the English as allies against the Massawomecks. Gifting in a diplomatic setting created a sense of reciprocity that made peaceable relations possible. That the goods exchanged normally included copper and beads should serve as a reminder that diplomacy constituted an encounter not just between humans but also between the spiritual beings from which the participants derived 31 their power. In sum, chiefs were generalists: unlike more specialized priests, warriors, or political advisors, chiefs took the lead in religious, military, political, eco- nomic, and diplomatic affairs. Because they combined spiritual, military, and economic power, chiefs could hold their own against fellow elites whose sources of power were more narrowly defined. By 1607, virtually every Al- gonquian nation in the Chesapeake region had institutionalized the position of weroance. A hereditary chief’s authority and power were now as much ascribed as achieved, rooted as much in his right to command as in his per- sonal characteristics. Chiefly power and authority were now of a piece with the very structure of the universe: the weroance, Ahone, the outer chief, Okeus, the priest, the shaman, the quiyoughcosugh, the warrior, and the commoner all had their place within the cosmos and in society. Yet each source of chiefly power—spiritual, military, and economic—could cut both ways, either working to consolidate the chief’s rule or to undermine it. An individual weroance had access to spiritual power independent of his para-
107, 114; Spelman, ‘‘Relation,’’ in Arber, ed., Travels and Works of Captain John Smith, cvi–cxiii. 31. Smith, Proceedings of the English Colonie, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, I, 228, 231–232 (quotation). On trade, gifting, power, and diplomacy, see James Axtell, The Invasion Within: The Contest of Cultures in Colonial North America (New York, 1985), 88–89; Peter Burke, History and Social Theory (Ithaca, N.Y., 1992), 70–73; and Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815 (New York, 1991), 103, 180–182.
Escape from Tsenacommacah 117 mount chief’s connections to the spirit world; the warriors who deferred to a chief could also turn on him; and the inherently decentralized nature of ex- change networks made them impossible to fully control. Since no weroance or paramount chief could monopolize power, there remained a real tension between the way things were supposed to work (from a chief’s perspective) and the way things actually did work. This tension helps to explain why early-seventeenth-century Algonquian political life and diplomacy was so 32 complicated, fluid, and diverse. The cosmology that structured and sustained chiefdoms did much to determine the course of Anglo-Indian relations after 1607. To begin with, chiefdoms had a longer history in the region than did paramount chiefdoms. The difference between (on the one hand) the century or two of chieftaincy in an Algonquian town and (on the other hand) ten or twenty years of pay- ing tribute to Powhatan created a gap into which the English could easily slide; people who were ideologically committed to their own weroance’s sacred lineage but who merely acquiesced in Powhatan’s rule were perfectly willing to consider working with the English to rid themselves of Powha- tan. For, notwithstanding the accumulation of power in Powhatan’s hands, the Chesapeake was actually composed of a number of local power cores; each weroance, including Powhatan’s thirty-plus tributary chiefs, remained the head of a distinct nation. The existence of multiple power cores, each with its own semidivine chiefly lineage, created a complex diplomatic configuration in the Chesa- peake region. This presented the English with a plethora of diplomatic pos- sibilities: English observers noted with keen interest the ‘‘many severall na- tions of sondry Languages, which envyron Powhatans Territories.’’ To the south, on Albemarle Sound, lay Algonquian nations that were independent of Powhatan, whereas the Monacans and Mannahoacs, who lived in the Virginia piedmont, were ‘‘deadly enemyes ever unto Powhatan.’’ With the exception of the two southernmost chiefdoms, the Eastern Shore nations showed no interest in developing closer relations with the paramount chief. Just across the Potomac River from Powhatan’s northernmost tributary na- tions lay the Piscataway tayac’s paramount chiefdom, and above them were the resolutely independent chiefs of the Patuxent River. Beyond them, of course, lay the Massawomecks and Susquehannocks, people of modest con- cern to those living in the Powhatan core area but of intense interest to the 33 northern Chesapeake nations.
32. Earle, How Chiefs Come to Power, 4–14. 33. Strachey, Historie of Travell, ed. Wright and Freund, 49 (quotation); Kings-
118 james d. rice The concentration of authority in the hands of chiefs, together with the practice of delegating external relations to an outer chief such as Iopassus or Opechancanough, simplified diplomatic relations and rendered their proto- col at least superficially comprehensible to Europeans. Englishmen found this much easier than dealing with more egalitarian societies. Later gen- erations of English colonists, for example, were confused when the diffu- sion of power among the Iroquois made it difficult to come to an agreement that was binding upon even a single community, let alone the League as a 34 whole. In contrast, when a weroance or outer chief in the Chesapeake re- gion committed to an exchange or an alliance, the odds were good that his community would comply with the terms of the pact. Finally, the utter inseparability of spiritual power, tribute, copper and beads, chiefly legitimacy, long-distance trade, and diplomacy inadvertently played into English hands. The tribute system put surplus corn—of which the English were often desperately in need—into the hands of chiefs, whereas the English could lay their hands on vast quantities of copper and glass beads. The resulting trade instantly made the English major players in the region’s diplomacy, despite their small numbers and military weakness. An influx of spiritually potent goods from this new source could be used to strengthen a weroance’s position, both within his nation and in diplomatic affairs. In Algonquian eyes, the English trade created a sense of reciprocity that would ensure the newcomers’ friendship. English copper and beads, as well as more mundane items such as metal tools, also made the newcomers sufficiently useful that they need not be killed or left to starve. It gave at least some Native people a good reason to keep the English around.
Calculations But how did all of this work out in practice? How did the rise of chief- doms, Algonquians’ historical memories, and Algonquian cosmology and political structure enter into the calculations of specific weroances who won- dered how they might best exploit the English presence at Jamestown? The Chesapeake’s diplomatic configuration was so complex, and the histo- ries of the region’s dozens of nations so diverse, that the arrival of the En- glish at Jamestown meant something different to each weroance and his people. No two nations’ interests, geographies, or histories were alike, and bury, ed., RVC, III, 17–20; Smith, True Relation, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, I, 55, 67; Smith, Proceedings of the English Colonie, ibid., 236; Smith, Map of Virginia, ibid., 148–150, 165–166, 173, 230–232. 34. A major theme in Richter, Ordeal of the Longhouse.
Escape from Tsenacommacah 119 each weroance’s calculations were thus based on a unique formula. The weroances’ initial responses to the English presence were strikingly varied and fluid; there were no two-sided Anglo-Indian relations but rather an in- tricate web of relations encompassing dozens of nations with hundreds of ‘‘sides.’’ Thus to understand why the establishment of Jamestown had such a dramatic effect on the Native peoples of the Chesapeake, we must view the English from the perspective of the region’s lesser weroances. Weroances and leading elders among the Quiyoughcohannocks, Chicka- hominies, Accomacks, and Patawomecks (to cite but four examples) had to begin by discerning the ways in which Powhatan and the English dealt with each other—but only in order to calculate how they might assimi- late the Powhatans and English into their own diplomatic strategies. Keep- ing track of Anglo-Powhatan relations was not an easy task, for each party pursued multiple diplomatic strategies. Powhatan, for example, alternated between trying to absorb, kill, and coexist with the English. At first, the small, disease-ridden colony at Jamestown seemed to pose little danger to Powhatan’s people, and the colonists’ willingness to trade their fine, red- dish copper and smooth glass beads seemed to recommend them. Thus Powhatan initially tried to integrate the colonists into his chiefdom, with their leaders serving as subordinate weroances. As John Smith understood it, his four-week captivity among the Powhatans in December 1607 culmi- nated in a ceremony designed to make the Jamestown colony a new tribu- tary nation within Tsenacommacah. Powhatan gave Smith a new territory (called ‘‘Capahowasicke’’), a new name, and a fictive kinship to the great weroance to mark his new status, and he expected that his new English subjects would henceforth offer him regular tribute such as ‘‘hatchets... 35 bells, beads, and copper.’’ At the ceremony’s conclusion, wrote Smith, Powhatan ‘‘proclaimed me a werowanes of Powhatan’’ and directed that ‘‘all 36 his subjects should so esteeme’’ the Jamestown colonists as ‘‘Powhatans.’’
35. The Complete Works of Captain John Smith suggests this interpretation (Smith, Generall Historie, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, II, 148 n. 4, 151 [quotation]), and J. Frederick Fausz commits himself to this interpretation in his doctoral dissertation (Fausz, ‘‘The Powhatan Uprising of 1622: A Historical Study of Ethnocentrism and Cultural Conflict’’ [Ph.D. diss., College of William and Mary, 1977], 237–238). See also Gleach, Powhatan’s World, 109–122. 36. Smith, True Relation, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, I, 67 (quotation), and see 57, 73–75; Smith, Proceedings of the English Colonie, ibid., 248; Smith, Generall Historie, ibid., II, 152. Christopher Newport was to be the ‘‘great Werowance’’ who tended primarily to internal affairs, whereas Smith was to serve as his external chief.
120 james d. rice But Smith proved a wayward weroance. He failed to move the colony from Jamestown to Capahowasick, he spent the summer of 1608 reconnoitering the Chesapeake Bay in a transparent attempt to formulate an independent English foreign policy, and he forcibly extracted corn from his fellow Pow- 37 hatan weroances. By 1609, Powhatan had apparently given up hope of incorporating the English into Tsenacommacah. He henceforth treated the English as interlopers—as potentially useful people, but as outsiders none- theless. He and his successor Itoyatin alternated between enmity and amity toward the English: from 1609 to 1614, and again in 1622, they chastised the English by withholding corn, killing livestock, and attacking colonial settlements; whereas, between wars, the paramount chief sanctioned exten- 38 sive trade with the colonists. The English, too, pursued more than one diplomatic strategy. As April Hatfield has noted, some thought it best to follow the Spanish example by ‘‘appropriating Powhatan’s paramount chiefdom’’ and making it their own. Thus the English consistently described the boundaries of Virginia as cor- responding to those of Tsenacommacah. Thus Christopher Newport coun- tered Powhatan’s ritual incorporation of the English into Tsenacommacah with a coronation ceremony designed to reduce Powhatan to a vassal of James I. Thus the English repeatedly asserted their willingness to join Pow- hatan’s people in attacking their mutual enemies. And thus Thomas Dale asserted in 1611 that a victory over Powhatan would force the paramount chief ‘‘to accept of a well liked condition of life with us,’’ bringing all of Tsenacommacah into the English fold and paving the way for the conquest 39 of ‘‘the neighbor Salvadges.’’ More often, however, the colonists sought to ally themselves with Pow- hatan’s enemies. Smith discussed an alliance with virtually everyone he en- countered during his 1608 reconnaissance of the bay, and Deputy Gover-
Smith deliberately led Powhatan to believe that the English had accepted their tribu- tary status by delivering the tribute (True Relation, 73–75). 37. Smith, Generall Historie, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, II, 191; Smith, Pro- ceedings of the English Colonie, ibid., I, 220. 38. J. Frederick Fausz, ‘‘Patterns of Anglo-Indian Aggression and Accommodation along the Mid-Atlantic Coast, 1584–1634,’’ in William W. Fitzhugh, ed., Cultures in Contact: The Impact of European Contacts on Native American Cultural Institutions, A.D. 1000–1800 (Washington, D.C., 1985), 235–252. 39. April Lee Hatfield, ‘‘Spanish Colonization Literature, Powhatan Geographies, and English Perceptions of Tsenacommacah /Virginia,’’ Journal of Southern History, LXIX (2003), 245–282; Brown, Genesis of the United States, I, 503 (quotation).
Escape from Tsenacommacah 121 plate 2. Selected Algonquian Nations in the Chesapeake Bay Region, ca. 1608. Drawn by Rebecca L. Wrenn nor Thomas Gates’s 1609 instructions from the Virginia Company made this strategy explicit. Gates was advised to consider reseating the colony on the Choanoke River, ‘‘under the proteçion of a wiroane called Gepano- con enemy to Powhaton.’’ If he stayed at Jamestown, Gates was to ‘‘make freindeship’’ with the nations ‘‘that are farthest from you and enemies unto those amonge whom you dwell.’’ Such people, not having had much con- tact with the English, would be particularly impressed with the newcomers’ copper and beads; ‘‘with those you may hold trade and freindeship good Cheape.’’ With Powhatan under attack from the enemies who ‘‘environed’’ him, the English could then liberate ‘‘all other his weroances...fromthe Tirrany of Powhaton.’’ Gates’s successor, the Lord de la Warr, was given the same instructions, which the secretary of the colony, William Strachey, wholeheartedly endorsed: ‘‘There was never any Invasion, Conquest, or Far off-plantacion that had successe without some partie in the place itself or neere it.’’ People who had but recently been absorbed into Powhatan’s chief- dom, Strachey thought, ‘‘maie peradventure be drawne from him for some 40 rownd Rewardes and a plentifull promise of Copper.’’ While English and Powhatan leaders tried out their various diplomatic strategies, other chiefs considered the advantages to be gained from the ever-changing Anglo-Powhatan relationship. Even the Quiyoughcohan- nocks, living on the James River in the very heart of Tsenacommacah, toyed with the idea of an English alliance. Though the Quiyoughcohannocks had joined a combined Powhatan force that attacked Jamestown within days 41 of the colonists’ arrival in 1607, they also had reason to resent Powhatan. They were not among the six nations originally inherited by Powhatan and thus retained memories of their incorporation into Tsenacommacah. More- over, their weroance, Pepiscunimah, had recently run afoul of Powhatan. Pepiscunimah had lured away ‘‘a Chief woman’’ from Powhatan’s brother Opechancanough, upon which Powhatan installed one of his own sons (still
40. Kingsbury, ed., RVC, III, 17–20 (quotation), 29; Strachey, Historie of Travell, ed. Wright and Freund, 106–108 (quotation); Smith, Proceedings of the English Colonie, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, I, 224–233. 41. [Gabriel Archer?], ‘‘A Relatyon...Written...byaGentoftheColony...,’’ May 21–June 21, 1607, in Barbour, ed., Jamestown Voyages, I, 97–98; Percy, ‘‘Obser- vations,’’ in Brown, Genesis of the United States, I, 136–137, 143; Edward Maria Wing- field, ‘‘A Discourse of Virginia,’’ 1608, in Barbour, ed., Jamestown Voyages, I, 216. The Quiyoughcohannocks were also known to the English as the Topahannocks and Rappa- hannocks; sorting out these references from the other Topahannocks and Rappahan- nocks (on the Rappahannock River) requires careful attention to context.
Escape from Tsenacommacah 123 a child) in Pepiscunimah’s place and banished the former weroance to a small, dependent hamlet. (Pepiscunimah retained some of his influence, however, not least because his brother Choapock served as a chief advisor 42 to the new weroance.) Given this recent history, it should come as no surprise that the Qui- youghcohannocks grew closer to the English after 1609 even though their putative ruler Powhatan was by then at war with the colonists. The Qui- youghcohannocks sent a guide to accompany an English expedition in search of the lost colonists of Roanoke, hinted that they might be recep- tive to Christianity, and regularly sent gifts to the president of the James- town colony. And although Powhatan directed his weroances to try to starve out the colonists between 1609 and 1614, Smith noted that the ‘‘weero- ance [of?] the Quiocqua[ha]nocks did a[ll]wayes at o[ur] greatest nee[de] supply us w[ith] victualls.’’ Choapock and Pepiscunimah urged the Qui- youghcohannocks to forever ‘‘keepe good qu[iet] with the English,’’ which they apparently did even when the colonists established a settlement in 43 the Quiyoughcohannock homeland. Although the Quiyoughcohannocks never quite crossed the line to place themselves in outright opposition to Powhatan, neither did they show much eagerness to join Powhatan in di- 44 rect opposition to the English. Yet there was no simple correspondence between resisting Powhatan and aiding the English. Take, for example, the independent Chickahomi- nies, whose homeland lay in the very center of the Powhatan core area. Though they paid some sort of tribute to Powhatan and occasionally agreed to ‘‘helpe him in his Warrs’’ on an ad hoc basis, they had already held off Powhatan for more than thirty years by the time the English arrived and were still governed by a council of their own elders. It helped that the Chickahominies, ‘‘a warlick and free people,’’ could field three hundred warriors, far more than all but a handful of nations in the region and as many as Powhatan’s three brothers combined could muster from their home 45 villages. Since trade and diplomacy were so thoroughly intertwined, we can use
42. Strachey, Historie of Travell, ed. Wright and Freund, 64–65. 43. Smith, Proceedings of the English Colonie, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, I, 265–266; Smith, True Relation, ibid., 34n–35n (quotation); Strachey, Historie of Travell, ed. Wright and Freund, 64–65, 101. 44. Not, at least, until 1622, when the remnants of the Quiyoughcohannocks appar- ently joined in the Powhatans’ surprise attacks against the English. See Fausz, ‘‘Pow- hatan Uprising,’’ 362, 375. 45. Strachey, Historie of Travell, ed. Wright and Freund, 68–69.
124 james d. rice the Chickahominies’ willingness to trade with the English as a rough index of their willingness to act independently of Powhatan. In the fall of 1607, the English, mere days from starvation, canvassed their neighborhood for people willing to trade corn. Most of the weroances they approached dragged their feet, offering but little to the worried colonists. The Kecough- tans contributed just sixteen bushels of corn, and the Paspaheghs a mere ten or twelve. The Chickahominies, however, traded hundreds of bushels to Smith’s trading party, which had to make three trips to carry it all to 46 Jamestown. Yet each of Smith’s trips up the Chickahominy River yielded a smaller quantity of corn, suggesting that he had imposed too much on his potential allies. When Smith returned in December 1607, he was captured by large party that included both Chickahominies and Powhatan’s outer 47 chief, Opechancanough. Throughout 1608, the Chickahominies edged closer to Powhatan, hold- ing secret talks with the paramount chief in the spring and refusing to trade corn to the English in the fall. (The English forced them to trade any- 48 way.) The Chickahominies had only to look to their closest neighbors, the Paspaheghs, to see where an expanded English presence along the James River might lead. The Jamestown colonists’ treatment of their Paspahegh hosts was truly vile: they destroyed Paspahegh crops and dwellings, killed dozens of people and chased the survivors into the woods, and cut off a Paspahegh emissary’s hand. They captured a wife of the weroance, threw her children into the river and shot ‘‘owtt their Braynes in the water,’’ and finally ended her agony by taking her into the woods and putting her to the 49 sword. Nothing in this series of events suggested that the English would make good neighbors. Thus when war between the English and Powhatans broke out in 1609, the Chickahominies could be found squarely on Powha- tan’s side (though still not in his chiefdom). Resolutely self-governed even as they cleaved to Powhatan’s foreign pol- icy, the Chickahominies hastened to make a separate peace with the En- glish as soon as they learned of the end of the war in 1614; according to this
46. Smith, True Relation, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, I, 39–41; Smith, Pro- ceedings of the English Colonie, ibid., 212. 47. Smith, True Relation, ibid., 45–47, 91; Smith, Proceedings of the English Colonie, ibid., 212–213. 48. Smith, Proceedings of the English Colonie, ibid., 239, 259–260; Smith, True Re- lation, ibid., 91. 49. George Percy, ‘‘‘A Trewe Relacyon’: Virginia from 1609 to 1612,’’ Tyler’s Quar- terly, III (1921–1922), 271–272 (quotation); Smith, Generall Historie, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, II, 236.
Escape from Tsenacommacah 125 agreement, the Chickahominies were to provide the English with corn each 50 year. In 1616, however, the thin facade of peaceable Anglo-Chickahominy relations began to crumble. The English killed a dozen Chickahominies in a dispute over that year’s tribute, a tragedy that Opechancanough skill- 51 fully exploited to draw the Chickahominies even closer to the Powhatans. The episode forced the Chickahominies to take stock of their relations with neighboring peoples, and their deliberations yielded a clear decision to re- affirm their alliance with Powhatan. One band of Chickahominy warriors became ‘‘Runnagados’’ who attacked English outposts in 1617, whereas the majority of the nation remained outwardly at peace with the English until the moment the Chickahominies joined in the Powhatans’ massive sur- prise attacks of March 22, 1622. The Chickahominies cooperated with the Powhatan war chief Opechancanough and fought alongside the Pamunkeys (the core nation of Tsenacommacah) until the bitter end, enduring En- glish attacks against their crops, food stores, and homes as late as 1627. The Chickahominies once again followed Opechancanough into the Third Anglo-Powhatan War in 1644. Although retaining some degree of political autonomy throughout (in 1632 they signed another peace treaty indepen- dently of the Pamunkeys), after the 1616 disaster they never deviated from 52 the Powhatans’ foreign policy. Thus even in the heart of Tsenacommacah, some Algonquian leaders gave serious consideration to how their interests might be served by the English newcomers. Ultimately, however, the Jamestown colonists were of little help to reluctant Powhatans who lived in the core of Tsenacommacah. Not even the Chesapeakes and Piankatanks, who had been so brutally sub- jugated by Powhatan, were able to exploit the English to gain a degree of independence from the paramount chief. But what about the many people who lived at a safer remove from Powhatan and the English? Might they find the English more useful than the Chickahominies and Quiyoughcohan-
50. Smith, True Relation, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, I, 91–93; Smith, Proceed- ings of the English Colonie, ibid., 239; Smith, Generall Historie, ibid., II, 246; Hamor, True Discourse, rpt. in Virginia, 14. 51. Smith, Generall Historie, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, II, 256–257; Kings- bury, ed., RVC, IV, 117–118. 52. Smith, Generall Historie, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, II, 264–265, 291 (quo- tation), 318; Kingsbury, ed., RVC, III, 245, IV, 9, 250; H. R. McIlwaine, ed., Minutes of the Council and General Court of Colonial Virginia [1622–1632, 1670–1676] (Rich- mond, Va., 1924), 480; William Waller Hening, The Statutes at Large, Being a Collec- tion of All the Laws of Virginia from the First Session of the Legislature, in the Year 1619 (Richmond, Va., 1809–1823), I, 287, 293.
126 james d. rice nocks had? For weroances in the eastern and northern reaches of Tsenacom- macah, this was a question well worth exploring.
The Accomack and Occohannock nations together formed a mini– paramount chiefdom in their own right, with a combined population of per- haps a thousand. Their location on the lower Eastern Shore put them out of reach of the Massawomecks and Susquehannocks, and their immediate neighbors on the Eastern Shore apparently posed no expansionist threat (their neighbors’ attention tended to be directed toward the north and the west rather than to the southern tip of the Eastern Shore). But rather than live in total isolation, the Accomacks and Occohannocks developed close ties with Powhatan. They might have had little choice, for Powhatan was rapidly expanding his chiefdom to the east between 1590 and 1610, reach- ing Kecoughtan (almost directly across the fifteen-mile-wide bay from Ac- comack) in 1597. Soon Powhatan claimed the Accomacks and Occohan- nocks as his subjects. This was probably an exaggeration on Powhatan’s part, since he made this claim while attempting to impress upon the En- glish the wisdom of accepting him as their paramount chief, but the East- ern Shore weroances nevertheless had good reason to desire close relations with Powhatan. The Eastern Shore, Powhatan said, provided him a regular tribute in shell beads—probably the relatively rare and sought-after wam- pumpeake, which was made from shells that were far more common on the Eastern Shore than to the west. In exchange, Powhatan could provide the Eastern Shore weroances with copper and poccune (a plant used to make a red dye), neither of which was readily available on the Eastern Shore. The resulting trade was likely beneficial to the lower Eastern Shore chiefs and Powhatan alike, for each gained access to spiritually potent goods that con- 53 ferred power on those who possessed them. In short, in 1608, the Accomacks and Occohannocks were merely pro- spective (or, at most, recent and incomplete) additions to Tsenacommacah.
53. Smith, True Relation, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, I, 69; Smith, Map of Vir- ginia, ibid., 150; Smith, Generall Historie, ibid., II, 168; Strachey, Historie of Travell, ed. Wright and Freund, 57, 68, 104–105; Rountree and Davidson, Eastern Shore Indi- ans, 30–31, 45, 48–49. Eastern Shore shell beads were still being traded to the Western Shore in the 1680s, according to naturalist John Banister in ‘‘Of the Natives,’’ in Joseph Ewan and Nesta Ewan, eds., John Banister and His Natural History of Virginia, 1678– 1692 (Urbana, Ill., 1970), 373. The trade in copper is a reasonable inference based on what Powhatan had to offer in return. So, too, is the trade in poccune, which Eastern Shore Indians still got from the Western Shore as late as 1681 (Browne et al., eds., Arch. Md., XV, 369).
Escape from Tsenacommacah 127 There is no evidence that they were particularly oppressed by Powhatan and no indication that the Eastern Shore weroances bore a personal grudge against the paramount chief, as the Quiyoughcohannocks did. But they also had more and better opportunities than most Chesapeake nations to form an English alliance. They had likely been among the first to encounter Eu- ropean sailors during the sixteenth century, and the Roanoke colonists had 54 mapped the lower Eastern Shore in 1585. Moreover, English seagoing ves- sels could navigate the open waters of the Chesapeake Bay more easily than could Powhatans in dugout canoes. The trip was well worth an English cap- tain’s trouble, for the Accomacks often had large surpluses of corn to trade and were willing to exchange it for English trade goods that surpassed Pow- hatan’s offerings. Perhaps this explains why the Accomacks and Occohannocks gave John Smith a friendly reception during his June 1608 reconnaissance of the bay, despite the fact that Anglo-Powhatan relations were very tense at that mo- ment. The English ‘‘were kindly intreated’’ at Accomack; the weroance there, Smith judged, ‘‘was the comliest proper civill Salvage wee incoun- 55 tred.’’ Similarly, when Captain Samuel Argall set out to explore the East- ern Shore in 1613 (in the middle of an Anglo-Powhatan war), he found a ‘‘great store of Inhabitants, who seemed very desirous of our love...whom 56 I found trading with me fore corne, whereof they had great store.’’ Nor did the Accomacks turn against the English after 1616, when seventeen men assigned to a saltworks at Smith Island set up a fishing camp on the main- 57 land, very close to the main Accomack village. A rare conflict on the Eastern Shore in 1619 provides a glimpse into the
54. David Beers Quinn, ed., The Roanoke Voyages, 1584–1590: Documents to Illus- trate the English Voyages to North America under the Patent Granted to Walter Raleigh in 1584, I, Works Issued by the Hakluyt Society, 2d Ser., nos. 104–105 (London, 1955), 245–246. 55. Smith, Proceedings of the English Colonie, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, I, 220, 224–225 (quotation). 56. Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, XIX, 92. 57. Kingsbury, ed., RVC, III, 116, 253, 279–280; John Rolfe, ‘‘Virginia in 1616,’’ Virginia Historical Register, I (1848), 100, 106; Joe Jones, Additional Archaeological Survey and Artifact Survey, the Arlington Site (44NH92) (Williamsburg, Va., 2001), 4, 39; Darrin Lowery, Archaeological Survey of the Chesapeake Bay Shorelines Associated with Accomack County and Northampton County, Virginia, March 2001, MSS, Virginia Department of Historic Resources, Richmond, Va., 96. The fishing camp might have been seasonal, as according to Rolfe, they fished in the spring and fall.
128 james d. rice complex calculations of interest on the part of the Accomacks, Powhatan, and the English. Agents of Captain John Martin went to trade that sum- mer with the Accomacks, ‘‘with whom,’’ according to the governor, ‘‘wee were in league and peace.’’ The men had trouble finding anyone willing to trade for corn, possibly because it was still early in the summer (a time when food was at its scarcest). Fortunately (or so they thought), Martin’s men came upon ‘‘a Canoa coming out of a creeke,’’ loaded with corn. When the Indians refused to trade, the Englishmen took the canoe by force, ‘‘measur- ing out the corne with a baskett they had’’ and ‘‘giving them satisfaction in copper beades and other trucking stuffe.’’ The outraged Accomacks could have complained directly to the English governor, which would have im- plied the Accomacks’ independence from the Powhatans. Instead, they ap- pealed to Opechancanough, signaling to the colonists that they could not count on the Accomacks to choose them over Powhatan’s successor Itoya- tin. The English, who were simultaneously embroiled in a dispute with the Chickahominies over a similar incident, were well aware of the stakes: after Opechancanough took the Accomacks’ complaint to Jamestown, the gover- nor asked the newly established Virginia Assembly to sanction Martin for fear that ‘‘such outrages as this might breede danger and loss of life to others 58 of the Colony.’’ After this incident, however, the Accomacks and Occohannocks turned their backs on the Powhatans for good. Thomas Savage, the colonists’ best translator and a former protégé of Powhatan, had established a regular trade on the Eastern Shore by 1620. He proved so successful that he soon cut Opechancanough out of the Eastern Shore trade. Savage further embar- rassed Opechancanough by outmaneuvering thirteen Pamunkey warriors in a skirmish with just four Englishmen while a hundred ‘‘Easterlings’’ looked on. The ‘‘Easterlings,’’ according to the Accomack weroance, ‘‘derided’’ the Pamunkeys for their inept performance. Enraged, Opechancanough tried to have Savage killed, but the ‘‘laughing king’’ of the Accomacks exposed the plot. Later in 1620, the Accomack weroance solidified the English alli- ance by permitting Virginia Secretary John Pory to settle twenty men near 59 his main town and allowing another new plantation nearby. Given these
58. Kingsbury, ed., RVC, III, 157 (quotation), IV, 515 (quotation); H. R. McIlwaine, ed., Journals of the House of Burgesses of Virginia, 1619–1658 /59 (Richmond, Va., 1915), 5 (quotation). 59. Smith, Generall Historie, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, II, 288–290 (quota- tion); Kingsbury, ed., RVC, I, 340, 343–344, 349, III, 585, 641, 705, IV, 585.
Escape from Tsenacommacah 129 overtures, it is not surprising that Opechancanough met with a brisk re- fusal in 1621 when he dispatched gift-bearing messengers to enlist the Ac- comack weroance in a plan to poison the English. Instead, the Accomacks leaked news of the Powhatans’ impending surprise attack against the En- glish, forcing Opechancanough to delay his plans until the following year. The rupture was now complete: Pory reported that ‘‘they on the West [the Powhatans]’’ would have liked to ‘‘invade’’ the lower Eastern Shore, except 60 that they lacked ‘‘Boats to crosse the Bay.’’ The Accomacks declined to join in the Powhatan uprising of 1622, choos- ing instead to trade corn to the English throughout the ten-year Anglo- Powhatan War. So firm was the alliance that Governor George Yeardley took refuge on the lower Eastern Shore for six weeks during the summer of 1622, and there was some talk of moving the entire colony there. But Vir- ginia’s leading men were anxious not to impose too much on the Accomacks and Occohannocks: they continued to chastise Captain Martin for allow- ing his men to steal corn on the Eastern Shore, they closely regulated trade with the Eastern Shore nations, and as late as 1625 they discouraged settlers from taking up additional territory on the Eastern Shore. Consequently, the handful of English settlers on the Eastern Shore placed little pressure on the Accomacks. Only nine men lived on Pory’s plantation in January 1622, and only fifty-three English settlers lived on the Eastern Shore in 1625. The English alliance had allowed the ‘‘Easterlings’’ to assert their independence, at least for the time being—though ultimately, of course, they were over- whelmed by the slow but inexorable spread of the English population on 61 the lower Eastern Shore. No one, however, enjoyed more success at using the English as a pawn in their own diplomacy than did the Patawomecks. The Patawomecks were among the most numerous and powerful people in the Chesapeake region, but their location near the frontier of settlement on the Potomac River left them exposed to attacks from all directions. The expansionist Piscataway tayac controlled the north bank of the river, directly across from the Patawo- mecks; the dreaded Massawomecks regularly swept down the Potomac
60. Kingsbury, ed., RVC, III, 556, IV, 10; Smith, Generall Historie, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, II, 290–291 (quotation), 298. 61. Kingsbury, ed., RVC, III, 116, 656–657, 696–697, 705–707, IV, 10–11, 61, 73, 275–276, 515, 559; McIlwaine, ed., Minutes of the Council, 48–50, 156; Smith, Gen- erall Historie, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, II, 311; ‘‘Muster of the Inhabitants of Virginia, 1624 /25,’’ in Annie Lash Jester, Adventures of Purse and Person: Virginia, 1607–1625 (Princeton, N.J., 1956), 68–71.
130 james d. rice River to attack villagers there; and the Susquehannocks attacked upward from the mouth of the river. Clearly, it was in the best interests of the Poto- mac River nations to coordinate their wars and diplomacy against these multiple threats. One possibility was to join the tayac’s paramount chief- dom, but the Piscataways and Patawomecks, roughly equal in resources and power, had long been competitors; could one truly accept subjugation at the 62 hands of the other? Powhatan offered another option. Shortly before the arrival of the En- glish, all but one of the nations on the south bank of the Potomac began paying tribute to Powhatan. Powhatan paid regular visits to collect trib- ute and reinforce his authority; he directed the overall diplomatic policy of the Patawomecks and their south-bank neighbors and served as a counter- weight against the Piscataway tayac. At the same time, the eighty miles be- tween the Patawomecks and Powhatan’s home village prevented Powhatan from meddling much in the Patawomecks’ everyday affairs. Thus Powha- tan offered protection, but at a price that the Patawomecks were willing, for the moment, to pay. Indeed, the price was lower than it was for people living closer to the Powhatan heartland: Powhatan’s inability to maintain close surveillance over the Patawomecks, the Patawomecks’ military power, and Powhatan’s need to cultivate Patawomeck goodwill so as to maintain them as a buffer on his northern frontier all combined to make Powhatan’s hold over the Patawomecks very tenuous indeed. To reassert their indepen- dence, the Patawomecks needed just one good ally, one solid trading part- ner who would enable them to defend themselves without seeking shelter under Powhatan or the Piscataway tayac. From the moment of John Smith’s 1608 entrada up the Potomac, it ap- peared that the Patawomecks had found their ally in the English. Although Smith frankly admired the Spanish way of subjugating Indians and thought the Patawomecks ‘‘generally perfidious,’’ he nevertheless recognized that the Patawomecks’ and Virginians’ mutual antipathy to Powhatan con- strained both parties to ‘‘a kinde of constancy.’’ Thus the Patawomecks, warned of Smith’s approach by emissaries of Powhatan, followed the letter of Powhatan’s instructions by ambushing Smith’s party—and then immedi- ately violated the spirit of those instructions by setting aside their weapons and welcoming the English. At Patawomeck, Smith met the weroance’s brother and outer chief, Iopassus, who permitted the visitors to travel throughout the Patawomeck homeland. Thus began a mutually beneficial
62. Browne et al., eds., Arch. Md., III, 402–403.
Escape from Tsenacommacah 131 (though often rocky) relationship that allowed the Patawomecks and En- 63 glish alike to operate ever more independently of Powhatan. The Patawomeck weroance fairly leaped to cultivate the English as allies when the First Anglo-Powhatan War broke out in the fall of 1609. Part of Powhatan’s strategy was to cut off Jamestown’s food supplies, and he soon had the colonists teetering on the brink of starvation. The Patawomecks, however, defied Powhatan’s trade embargo by selling the captain of an En- glish ship as much corn as he could carry—and this despite an ugly inci- dent in which the English cut off ‘‘towe of the Salvages heads.’’ (The ship sailed directly to England without delivering the food, consigning many of the colonists to death in the famous ‘‘starving time,’’ but that was hardly the Patawomecks’ fault.) A few months later, the Patawomeck weroance again defied Powhatan, this time by helping a young man named Henry Spelman to escape from Powhatan’s household. Later in 1610, Iopassus handed Spel- man over to Captain Samuel Argall and again traded a boatload of corn to the English. Iopassus filled Argall’s ships with another 1,100 bushels of corn in 1612, then delivered Pocahontas into Argall’s hands in 1613—an act that 64 eventually brought the war to an end. The Patawomecks and English had relatively little contact during the peace that followed Pocahontas’s 1614 marriage to John Rolfe, but Iopas- sus was poised to renew the alliance when Anglo-Powhatan relations wors- ened at the end of the decade in the wake of Pocahontas’s death in 1617 and Powhatan’s in 1618. (Powhatan’s younger brother Itoyatin became the new permanent chief, and Opechancanough remained the outer chief.) In Sep- tember 1619, Iopassus surprised the English by appearing unannounced in Jamestown, ostensibly to ask that ‘‘2 shipps might be speedyly to Patawa- mack where they should trade for greate stoore of corne.’’ Iopassus also sur- prised the governor by insisting that he dispatch an Englishman to accom- pany him back to Patawomeck by an overland route—a troublesome and inefficient way of traveling in the Tidewater region. Still another surprise awaited the two English ships that arrived at Patawomeck in October: there was no corn to be had! Angered, the two English captains acquired their corn mainly ‘‘by force from Jupasons [Iopassus’s] Country who deceyved them.’’ Then, despite the fact that Iopassus had clearly duped the English
63. Smith, Generall Historie, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, II, 316 (quotation); Smith, Proceedings of the English Colonie, ibid., I, 226–227, 232. 64. Percy, ‘‘Trewe Relacyon,’’ Tyler’s Quarterly, III (1921–1922), 265–269 (quota- tion); Spelman, ‘‘Relation,’’ in Arber, ed., Travels and Works of Captain John Smith, ciii–civ; Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, XIX, 89, 91–92; Smith, Generall Historie, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, II, 236, 243–244.
132 james d. rice in some way, and although the English had just taken the Patawomecks’ corn, Iopassus ‘‘made a firme peace againe’’ just before the English ships 65 departed in late November. Iopassus’s strange behavior makes better sense when understood in the context of 1619—a year, according to English leaders, of increasingly ‘‘doubtful times between us and the [Powhatan] Indians.’’ The Governor’s Council noted in October that Opechancanough had ‘‘stood aloofe upon termes of dout and Jealousy’’ of late and that he ‘‘would not be drawne to 66 any treaty at all.’’ Amid this uncertainty, Iopassus’s 1619 mission to James- town stands out as a dashing and rather daring declaration of independence. By traveling overland through the heart of Itoyatin’s paramount chiefdom, with English emissaries in tow, Iopassus clearly signaled that the Patawo- mecks could make their own deals with the English. Yet Iopassus’s initiative amounted to more than a change of masters; he also made fools of the En- glish, thus indicating the Patawomecks’ independence of both of the pow- 67 ers to their south. The Patawomecks’ greatest opportunity, however, came on March 22, 1622, when Powhatan warriors struck almost simultaneously against settle- ments all along the James River. Seizing the colonists’ own weapons and tools, the Powhatans cut, bludgeoned, and speared the woefully unprepared settlers to death. They killed more than a quarter of the English popula- tion in the space of a few hours, without ‘‘sparing eyther age or sexe, man, woman or childe.’’ At least 347 colonists died, and survivors reported that 68 the attackers mutilated English corpses. Henry Spelman learned of the attacks while trading at Chicacoan, on the south bank of the Potomac near the river’s mouth. One of Spelman’s acquaintances there told him that Opechancanough had tried and failed to enlist the Chicacoans in the March 22 attack, but that the Wicocomocos,
65. Smith, Generall Historie, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, II, 268; Kingsbury, ed., RVC, III, 244–247 (quotations). 66. Sickness had swept through the English settlements that summer, weakening the colonists’ ability to withstand an attack despite considerable migration from En- gland in the previous eighteen months. At the same time, a terrible epidemic among the Powhatans reminded them of the costs of hosting the English. The colony’s first- ever representative assembly met that summer and passed several acts betraying their nervousness about Indian relations. See Kingsbury, ed., RVC, III, 152, 161–175, 220, 228, 246; McIlwaine, ed., Journals of the House of Burgesses, 15 (quotation). 67. Kingsbury, ed., RVC, III, 244–245; Rountree, Pocahontas’s People, 70. 68. Edward Waterhouse, A Declaration of the State of the Colony and Affairs in Vir- ginia (London, 1622), 13–20.
Escape from Tsenacommacah 133 who lived at the end of the peninsula formed by the Potomac and Rappa- hannock rivers, had agreed to support Opechancanough’s plans. Spelman, accompanied by another ship captained by Raleigh Croshaw, sailed directly to Wicocomoco. The Wicocomocos denied any complicity with Opechanca- nough, and they agreed to provide enough corn to fill Spelman’s pinnace. 69 Spelman returned to Jamestown, while Croshaw went on to Patawomeck. Croshaw arrived in Patawomeck at a delicate moment. The Patawomeck weroance had not yet committed himself to either side in the new Anglo- Powhatan war. Now he ‘‘earnestly entreated’’ Croshaw ‘‘to be his friend, his countenancer, his Captaine and director against the Pazaticans [on the Rappahannock River], the Nacotchtanks, and Moyaons [Piscataways] his mortall enemies.’’ In exchange, he implied, the Patawomecks might serve the English cause ‘‘as an opposite to Opechancanough.’’ Croshaw sent his ship back to Jamestown after finishing his trading, but he stayed behind at 70 Patawomeck to keep an eye on the situation. Shortly after Croshaw’s ship left, messengers from Opechancanough appeared at Patawomeck. They bore two baskets of beads—an impressive gift—and bragged of the Pow- hatans’ successful exploits of March 22. The Patawomeck weroance, they suggested, should kill his English guests. The weroance considered his po- sition for two days, then decided to remain on the fence. The English, he announced, ‘‘were his friends, and the Salvage Emperour Opitchapam now called Toyatan [Powhatan’s successor], was his brother.’’ He refused to ac- 71 cept the beads. When Captain Ralph Hamor sailed to the Potomac in May 1622, he joined Croshaw in trying to persuade the Patawomecks to commit to an En- glish alliance. The weroance, however, held out for direct military assistance from the English in the Patawomecks’ own conflicts along the Potomac River. He told Croshaw and Hamor that he had no corn to spare, but that ‘‘the Nacotchtanks and their confederats had, which were enemies both to him and them.’’ If the English wished to ‘‘fetch’’ the corn at Nacotchtank (at modern-day Washington, D.C.), he would provide ‘‘40. or 50 choise Bow- men to conduct and assist them.’’ Hamor agreed to the scheme. The Patawo- mecks and English sailed upriver and laid waste to the Nacotchtanks, kill- ing numerous villagers and driving the rest into the woods. Taking as much corn and loot as they could carry, and ‘‘spoiling the rest,’’ they returned in triumph to Patawomeck. Hamor went on to Jamestown, but Croshaw de-
69. Smith, Generall Historie, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, II, 304–313. 70. Ibid., 305. 71. Ibid., 308–309.
134 james d. rice cided to stay at least through the coming harvest, when he would procure 72 much-needed corn for Jamestown. The arrival of another English ship in late July or early August 1622 set in motion a chain of events that threatened to destroy the renewed Patawomeck-Virginia alliance. Captain Isaac Madison had been commis- sioned to assist the Patawomeck weroance against ‘‘our enemies, and to de- fend them and theire Corne to his uttmost power.’’ Just as Madison’s ship arrived at Patawomeck, Croshaw received an urgent letter from his wife, a prisoner of Opechancanough on the Pamunkey River. Croshaw hastily de- parted for Jamestown to help arrange her release. This left the inept Cap- 73 tain Madison in charge of trade and diplomacy on the Potomac. Madi- son relied heavily upon Robert Poole, an often troublesome interpreter who quickly made himself unpopular with the Patawomecks. The inexperienced and ill-advised Madison almost immediately committed the blunder of trad- ing with the Piscataways, enemies to the Patawomecks; given the close as- sociation between Algonquian trade and Algonquian diplomacy, this must 74 have made the Patawomeck weroance very apprehensive. Amid all of this uncertainty, a fugitive weroance who had recently been ‘‘beat out of his Country’’ by the Nacotchtanks took refuge at Patawomeck. The chief, most likely from a Tauxenent town near the falls of the Potomac, ‘‘professed much love to the Patawomeks’’ but, in fact, bore a grudge against the Patawomeck weroance for not coming to his aid against their mutual Nacotchtank enemy. Shortly after arriving at Patawomeck, the ‘‘expulsed King’’ told Poole that the Patawomeck weroance and his ‘‘great Conjurer’’ were plotting with Opechancanough to kill the Englishmen at Patawo- 75 meck. The day after the rumor of a Patawomeck plot reached Madison’s ears, a shallop from Jamestown brought a message requesting that some Patawomeck ‘‘great men’’ come to Jamestown. The Patawomecks refused, and Madison suddenly went berserk. He locked the weroance, his son, and four other Patawomeck men inside the English stronghouse where they had been meeting, and ‘‘setting upon the towne with the rest of his men, slew thirty or forty men, women and children.’’ The survivors took refuge in the woods. After the killings, Poole and Madison accused the weroance of plot- ting with Opechancanough, which the weroance immediately recognized as
72. Ibid., 309. 73. Ibid., 309–310 (quotation, with emphasis added); Kingsbury, ed., RVC, III, 654. 74. Smith, Generall Historie, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, II, 310–312. 75. Ibid.
Escape from Tsenacommacah 135 a rumor designed to break up the Patawomeck-English alliance. But Madi- son, dissatisfied with the weroance’s explanation, abandoned Patawomeck 76 and carried his hostages back to Jamestown. Experienced Potomac River hands such as Spelman, Hamor, and Croshaw were all in Jamestown when Madison arrived with his prisoners, and they quickly convinced Governor Wyatt that Madison had blundered. Wyatt hastily commissioned Hamor to return the prisoners to their home on the Potomac, but the damage was al- 77 ready done. Although the future of the Patawomeck alliance seemed doubtful in the fall of 1622, the summer’s trade and diplomacy on the Potomac (and the Eastern Shore) had at least bought the English time to develop a strategy for repaying the Powhatans. The strategy that emerged was cold, calculat- ing, and devastatingly effective. At first, the colonists held back: ‘‘to lull them the better in securitie,’’ the Virginians deliberately ‘‘sought no revenge till thier Corne was ripe.’’ Then, throughout the fall and early winter of 1622–1623, Englishmen attacked villages from the Rappahannock to the Nansemond rivers, timing their raids to ‘‘surprize their Corne.’’ Governor Wyatt’s instructions to his officers and his reports to the Virginia Company emphasized corn over conquest, and when he reckoned up his military as- sets, he counted men who were ‘‘serviceable for Caryinge of Corne’’ as well 78 as fighters. Even diplomacy pointed toward ecological warfare: the En- glish agreed to a truce in the spring of 1623, all the while planning to re- 79 sume their attacks after the corn ripened. The announcement of the spring 1623 Anglo-Powhatan truce coincided with an attempt at making amends with the Patawomecks. Spelman arrived on the Potomac in March and immediately set to trading. On March 27, he went ashore at Nacotchtank—the same town that the Patawomecks and En- glish had sacked in 1622. Suddenly, a flotilla of canoes appeared, so swiftly overtaking and overwhelming Spelman’s party that the English managed to fire only a single shot. Some of the canoes raced for the larger English ship, whose skeleton crew frantically raised the sails just in time to outpace their pursuers. As they sped away, the survivors ‘‘heard a great brute amongst the Salvages a shore, and saw a man’s (Spilman’s) head throwne downe the banke,’’ then retrieved and displayed on a pole. All told, the Nacotchtanks
76. Ibid., 312–313. 77. Ibid., 314; Kingsbury, ed., RVC, III, 697. 78. Kingsbury, ed., RVC, III, 678–679, IV, 6–7, 9, 10, 12 (quotation); Smith, Gen- erall Historie, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, II, 314–315 (quotation), 318. 79. Kingsbury, ed., RVC, II, 482, IV, 37, 71, 89, 98–99, 102.
136 james d. rice killed twenty men, took prisoner a boy named Henry Fleet, and captured 80 guns, armor, and swords. A Patawomeck-English rapprochement followed quickly on the heels of Spelman’s death at Nacotchtank. Opechancanough agreed to meet Cap- tain William Tucker at Patawomeck in May 1623, apparently confident that Madison’s rampage there in the summer of 1622 had rendered the Patawo- mecks neutral or hostile to the English. The Patawomecks, however, had lured Opechancanough into a trap: after the negotiations, Captain Tucker provided poisoned drinks to toast the accord, then fired on the deathly ill Powhatan delegates. Some of the English took scalps, and Tucker bragged 81 (mistakenly) of killing Opechancanough. Although the Patawomecks’ willingness to conspire against Opechanca- nough was encouraging to the English, the Virginians had yet to make full reparations for Madison’s murders and kidnappings of the previous sum- mer. Indeed, the plot to poison Opechancanough had simply put the En- glish further in debt to the Patawomecks. Making amends would require a grand gesture, which Governor Wyatt performed in the fall of 1623. As soon as the English harvest had been secured, Wyatt personally led a ninety- man force to the Potomac River. Wyatt, anxious to ‘‘settle the trade with our freends,’’ still did not know who had killed Spelman, but for diplomacy’s sake, he accepted the Patawomecks’ manifestly false assertion that the Pis- cataways had done the deed. Together, bragged Wyatt, the English and Patawomecks attacked the Piscataways, ‘‘putt many to the swoorde,’’ and 82 took ‘‘a marvelous quantetie of corne.’’ Now reconciled with the English, the Patawomecks finally agreed to sup- port an attack against the Pamunkeys, the core nation in Itoyatan’s para- mount chiefdom—‘‘not only to asiste us in that revenge, but to accompeny
80. Ibid., IV, 61, 89; Smith, Generall Historie, in Barbour, ed., Works of Smith, II, 319–321 (quotation). 81. Kingsbury, ed., RVC, II, 478, 483, IV, 102, 221–223 (quotation), 234, 250, 261; Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies (London, 1860), II, 48, III, 69; ‘‘Lord Sackville’s Papers Respecting Virginia, 1613–1631,’’ American His- torical Review, XXVII (1922), 507. 82. Kingsbury, ed., RVC, II, 478, IV, 221, 250–251, 292, 399–400, 450–451 (quota- tion). Henry Fleet, the boy taken captive in the incident, later revealed that it had taken place at Nacotchtank (which the Patawomecks and English had sacked in the summer of 1622), but he remained a captive until 1627 and thus could not explain things to Governor Wyatt. See Fleet, ‘‘A Brief Journal of a Voyage in the Barque ‘Warwick’ to Virginia,’’ in Edward D. Neill, ed., The Founders of Maryland as Portrayed in Manu- scripts, Provincial Records, and Early Documents (Albany, N.Y., 1876), 25.
Escape from Tsenacommacah 137 us and bee our guides in a warr against the Pomunkeys.’’ Defeating the Pamunkeys would guarantee the Patawomecks’ recently won independence from Itoyatan and make it harder for Opechancanough to retaliate against them for their role in his poisoning in the spring of 1623. It is not clear what role the Patawomecks actually played, but in a decisive battle in the summer of 1624, an English force confronted the Pamunkey warriors while an equal number of Virginians took advantage of the diversion by laying waste to the Pamunkeys’ fields. When the Pamunkey warriors finally real- ized how much damage the English had done, they ‘‘gave over fightinge and dismayedly, stood most ruthfully lookinge one while theire Corne was Cutt downe.’’ For the first time, the English clearly had the upper hand in Tsena- 83 commacah. Yet Virginia’s leaders deliberately prolonged the war for an- other eight years after the climactic victory of 1624. Year after year, the Vir- ginians inflicted light casualties and took large quantities of grain. Periodic truces and aborted peace treaties encouraged the Powhatans to plant more 84 food, which the English took as booty when the peace invariably failed. The Patawomecks, however, took no part in these raids, for as far as they were concerned, the English alliance had already served its purpose. Under the cover of the war, the Patawomecks had fully detached themselves from Tsenacommacah and struck major blows against the Piscataway tayac and his Nacotchtank clients. The fundamental rhythms of their lives remained unchanged: Patawomeck villagers followed the same annual round of sea- sonal work and social life as they had before the war, and they followed the same steps through the life cycle. The old rules still governed the workings of political systems, intercultural trade, and warfare. Above all, the Patawo- mecks still controlled their own territory: the nearest tobacco plantation was as yet nearly a hundred miles to the south. This post-independence dis- engagement between the Patawomecks and Jamestown was a mutual af- fair. After 1624, the English returned to their habitual focus on Powhatan’s
83. Kingsbury, ed., RVC, IV, 450–451 (quotation), 507–508 (quotation). 84. Ibid., 568–569; McIlwaine, ed., Minutes of the Council, 151, 172, 184, 483–484. As early as December 1622, John Martin circulated a manuscript on ‘‘the manner howe to bringe in the Indians into subjection without makinge an upper exterpation of them.’’ This system of ‘‘harshe visitts’’ and ‘‘feede fights’’ especially served the interests of Vir- ginia’s elites, who used the spoils of battle to consolidate even more power and wealth in their hands. See Kingsbury, ed., RVC, III, 704, IV, 507; J. Frederick Fausz and John Kukla, ‘‘A Letter of Advice to the Governor of Virginia, 1624,’’ WMQ, 3d Ser., XXXIV (1977), 127; Fausz, ‘‘Patterns of Anglo-Indian Aggression,’’ in Fitzhugh, ed., Cultures in Contact, 225–268; and Fausz, ‘‘Merging and Emerging Worlds,’’ in Carr, Morgan, and Russo, eds., Colonial Chesapeake Society, 47–98.
138 james d. rice chiefdom; not until 1629, when George Calvert began scouting the north- ern Chesapeake for a potential new colony, did the Patawomecks again at- tract much attention from the English. This disengagement between the English and most of the Native peoples of the Chesapeake Bay region was reflected in the dearth of engravings and other images of Virginia Indians after 1624. Europeans were treated to quite an array of visual representations of Indians in the critical years of 1585–1624, including John White’s drawings based on his experiences at the aborted colony at Roanoke, Theodore de Bry’s engravings based on those drawings, a broadside advertising a lottery to raise money for the Vir- ginia Company, an engraving of Pocahontas in English clothing, and vari- ous illustrations in the writings of Captain John Smith. In contrast, only a handful of new images were produced after 1625. Reflecting the declin- ing need to understand the complex diplomatic configuration of the Chesa- peake Bay region, these post–1624 images were noticeably more generic and stereotyped than their predecessors: ethnographic details specific to Virginia grew scarce, and none contained anything like the narrative and 85 historical specificity of Georg Keller’s 1617 engravings. The English habit of worrying primarily about the Powhatans and only secondarily about other Indian nations has persisted down to the present day. Early English observers were deeply impressed by the extent of Powha- tan’s power, which extended into Jamestown itself. Consequently, their re- ports had to focus on Powhatan in order to provide the information needed if the English were to survive in the heart of Tsenacommacah. Historical accounts of Virginia’s Native peoples have generally followed suit, going along with the main flow of information from English writers such as Wil- liam Strachey and John Smith. Modern scholars, however, need not per- petuate this Powhacentric worldview. If read against the grain and com- bined with archaeological evidence (and a few precious snippets of oral tradition), the classic eyewitness accounts from Jamestown can help us to understand how the rise of chiefdoms and paramount chiefdoms in the cen- turies preceding 1607 produced historical memories, a common Algonquian political culture, and a regional diplomatic configuration that profoundly shaped subsequent Anglo-Indian relations. If read with an appreciation of the polycentric nature of Native American politics on the eve of coloniza- tion, then these familiar sources yield more complex stories than can be found in tales featuring only the Powhatans and the English as protago-
85. Feest, ‘‘Virginia Indian in Pictures,’’ Smithsonian Journal of History, II (1967), 1–30.
Escape from Tsenacommacah 139 nists. In a polycentric account of the contact era, it is impossible to sustain the fiction that places beyond the Powhatan core area were merely smaller stages on which the larger story of Anglo-Powhatan relations was played out; instead, they emerge as distinctive places with stories of their own and as vital centers of action that played unique and formative roles in the his- tory of seventeenth-century Virginia. If we moderns read the sources in full awareness that the inhabitants of Quiyoughcohannock, Accomack, and Patawomeck each regarded their homeland as the center of the universe rather than as part of a borderland, or fringe area, then we, too, might es- cape from Tsenacommacah and begin to see early Virginia with a newly in- dependent vision.
140 james d. rice part two africa and the atlantic QW This page intentionally left blank E. Ann McDougall the caravel and the caravan reconsidering received wisdom in the sixteenth-century sahara QW
The image of a plucky, seaworthy caravel that epitomizes the fifteenth- and early-sixteenth-century beginnings of the Atlantic world seems far removed from that of the Sahara’s centuries-old camel caravan, rhythmically mean- dering its way across desert sands. But in the course of the next century or so, both image and reality became intertwined along a dynamic West African frontier stretching from modern-day Morocco to Senegambia. The economic, political, and cultural dynamics generated by this frontier inter- section varied in nature and impact, affecting the development of both the Atlantic and Sahara in different ways, at different times, through to at least the late nineteenth century. However, it was during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries that both worlds took on characteristics that set the context for these later relationships. This essay explores the role of the cara- vel and the caravan in this process—as it shaped both the writing of its his- 1 tory and the unfolding of history itself. The chronological parameters historians place upon ‘‘moments’’ in his- tory quite literally define the content of that history. In this case, the years 1550–1624 derive from the history of a people and a place far removed from the Sahara, its Atlantic littoral, and its neighbors—namely, Jamestown, Vir- ginia, and its inhabitants. What using this era as a lens through which to
The author would like to thank the conference organizers for the invitation and support to participate in what was a very stimulating intellectual endeavor. In addition, thanks to the University of Alberta, Support for the Advancement of Scholarship Endowment Fund, for its generous and ongoing support of my research and conference activity. 1. It is my intent to show readers how important the history of the writing of history actually is in shaping what we conceive of as knowledge. Just as this volume challenges conceptions of the Atlantic world, I am taking this opportunity to challenge one that has dominated almost all discussion of Saharan-Atlantic relations in this region. view this part of West Africa will produce is uncertain at best, problem- atic at worst, for it is not consistent with extant African historiography and marginalizes by exclusion critical contextual developments of the earlier fif- teenth century and the later seventeenth. That said, sometimes precisely this kind of reformatting reveals aspects of development hitherto obscured or distorted and brings into one discussion elements previously addressed 2 only in discrete discourses. The effort in this volume can only explore those aspects and elements deriving from the Saharan side of things; however, it is fair to say that the conversations generated by the conference’s probing 3 of the Atlantic world have influenced revisions to this exploration. I genu- inely hope that, in turn, drawing the Sahara into the discussion of the Atlan- tic world will provoke further reflection of interacting influences (historio- 4 graphic and historical) among Africanist and non-Africanist scholars alike. Even among Africanists, the Sahara is largely invisible. It tends to be relegated into North Africa, where it disappears, and it is excluded from the dominant ‘‘sub-Saharan Africa’’ paradigm that shapes the field. In Middle Eastern Studies, it is (at best) the periphery of the Maghreb and the Medi- 5 terranean. The situation was not so different in the fifteenth century, when interest in the desert interior was, for the most part, mediated by northern concerns. Not unlike the Atlantic itself, the Sahara appeared on pictorial maps as a kind of ‘‘ocean’’ around which (or at least to the north and south of
2. One example of such a discourse is the metaphor reflected in the title of this paper. As we will see below, the ‘‘caravel versus caravan’’ imagery has been used extensively both in early modern and modern West African historiography; as such, it is readily recognizable to Africanists. It seems, however, to be a concept new to those who study the Atlantic world. Other examples are the discourses generated (respectively) within the worlds of Middle Eastern and African studies—the tendency of scholars to speak of ‘‘sub-Saharan’’ Africa further exacerbates the discrete nature of discussions that often overlap in terms of subject and geography. 3. In particular, extensive discussions of cultural meetings on the margins of the At- lantic world raised new questions about comparable approaches to the Saharan frontier. They may well provide a needed counterbalance to the ‘‘dichotomous’’ and ‘‘conflic- tual’’ conceptual models currently prevailing in the historiography (for example, James Webb, Jr., and Omar Kane, discussed below). 4. By ‘‘the Sahara,’’ I mean as distinct from Morocco. Although Morocco (in par- ticular the Sa’adien dynasty that had roots in the south, in the so-called pre-Saharan region) might have seen the Sahara as an extension of its territories, the Sahara was an entity distinct unto itself, engaging (or not) with the Atlantic world on its own terms. 5. Under the Middle East Studies Association’s geographical regions of expertise, for example, only one country (Sudan) that can truly claim to be Saharan (other than those that border the Mediterranean) is included.
144 e. ann mcdougall which) various peoples and cultures existed, and across which commodities 6 of value were transported, in this case, by turbaned Bedouin on camelback. On the southern shores, those commodities included manufactured goods (cloth, paper, metal goods) and salt; on the northern, ostrich feathers, wax, slaves, and gold. Morocco was one of those regions whose southern realms bordered the Sahara and whose northern shores opened onto the Mediter- ranean. As a receptor of trans-Saharan goods—especially gold—Morocco was an irresistible target for its close neighbor Portugal. The initial conquest in 1415 was of Morocco’s northern port of Ceuta: occupation of the city, the Portuguese assumed, would bring control of Saharan wealth. But, as Vin- cent Cornell puts it so evocatively, soon ‘‘that dream of easy riches became an expensive nightmare.’’ Portuguese policy thereafter aimed more at seek- ing West African gold through interception and diversion: interception of the Saharan trade on the Atlantic coast (first the northern coast through the towns of Safi and Azemmour, then the western Atlantic at the trading post of Arguin), and diversion ‘‘at source’’ (with São Jorge da Mina on the Gold Coast intended to divert gold to the coastal rather than the desert trade). This shift in policy shaped relations with Morocco significantly: much sub- sequent attention was given to producing and assuring regular access to grain and cloth specifically intended for the African gold trade, as well as assuring that other goods in demand south of the desert were supplied through Moroccan commercial connections:
Just as they reactivated the medieval exchange loop based on the trade in grain between Morocco and the Iberian peninsula, the Portuguese also attempted to take over the trans-Saharan trade routes that went through Morocco by diverting caravan traffic from Fez to the Atlantic coast.... By thus making Morocco the linchpin of two highly profitable commer- cial circuits (grain, leather, wax, fish and medicinal herbs flowing north to the Iberian Peninsula; woven goods, copper, horses, and salt flow- ing south to sub-Saharan Africa) the Portuguese were able to reap high 7 short-term profits.
This Portuguese influence in northern towns and surrounding plains had effected major economic and social change. So when, in the 1490s, Portu-
6. See the famous Catalan Atlas of 1375 (http://www.the153club.org/africa1.html). 7. Vincent J. Cornell, ‘‘Socioeconomic Dimensions of Reconquista and Jihad in Mo- rocco: Portuguese Dukkala and the Sadid Sus, 1450–1557,’’ International Journal of Middle East Studies, XXII (1990), 379–418, esp. 380–392 (quotations on 381, 389).
The Caravel & the Caravan 145 gal established a trading factory at the southern location of Santa Cruz in an attempt to cut off Spanish competition (and exploit the fertile agricul- tural region of the Sus), the move drew strong opposition from those local clans that did not wish to lose their own power. The south was home to Sufi Muslim clerical groups who resented the invasive presence of the infi- dels. They quickly exploited traditional alliances to generate a centralized, powerful resistance. This process (spanning the first few decades of the six- teenth century), which involved declaring loyalty to a strong, secular mili- tary leader, was the origin of the Sa’adien state. It was also a catalyst for war with the north (still to some extent under the control of the royal Merinid family established in Fez). In economic terms, it generated investment in 8 the region’s sugar industry in order to provide payment for arms. In 1541, the Portuguese enclave of Santa Cruz was conquered and renamed Agadir. This meant that, on the eve of the period we are looking at here, southern Morocco, under the leadership of the new Sa’adien dynasty, was pursuing 9 its own, independent ‘‘Atlantic policy’’ through the port of Agadir. For its ruler, Muhammed al-Shaykh, the nearby Sahara was critical to sustaining the economy that would support that policy. Consequently, it is not surpris- ing that Morocco and Moroccans are, from the outset, part of this Saharan story. But as the Saharan version of that story begins, the Sahara becomes more than Portugal’s competitor and Morocco’s periphery—it emerges as a world unto itself.
Historiography: Caravel vs. Caravan The extent to which historians understand the early history of the Sahara bordering the Atlantic is literally dependent upon the caravel and the cara- van, although not in that order. It was the camel caravans from the ninth and tenth centuries onward, or rather the merchants who captained those ‘‘ships of the desert,’’ who delivered to the Mediterranean and the Near East information about the flora, fauna, geography, and ethnology of the Afri-
8. Cornell, ‘‘Reconquista and Jihad,’’ International Journal of Middle East Studies, XXII (1990), 380–407. Cornell traces the growth of the sugar industry on 403–404. Contrary to assumptions that slave labor was involved and that this industry was tied into the Saharan trade through the importation of labor, Cornell argues convincingly for wage labor and a ‘‘latifundia’’ organization. 9. Atlantic contacts were now England, France, and the Netherlands rather than Portugal or Spain; in Cornell’s words, the economic policy was an adaptation of tra- ditional political alliances in that it leapfrogged hostile states (in this case, the Iberian Peninsula). See ibid., 401.
146 e. ann mcdougall plate 1. Tuareg salt caravan, Timbuktu-Gao region, Mali, 1978–1979. Photo by author
10 can Sahara and its ‘‘sub’’-regions. That knowledge, rendered intelligible at the time to a wide, Islamic, Arabic-speaking world by a range of authors (some of whom wrote from firsthand experiences, others of whom compiled secondhand evidence), found its way in part into Europe through the cos- 11 mopolitan scholarship of Muslim Spain. The ‘‘medieval Arabic’’ view of the Sahara was predicated on the understanding that a river (or other large body of flowing water) linked the Atlantic to the Nile and that rich sources 12 of gold lay beyond it. From the ninth century onward, some Africans (both
10. ‘‘Ships of the desert’’: A. G. Hopkins, An Economic History of West Africa (Lon- don, 1973). 11. Among the better-known examples of the former are Ibn Batutta (fourteenth century) and Leo Africanus (sixteenth century); of the latter, Ibn Hawqal (wrote 988), Al-Bakri (wrote 1068), and Al-Idrisi (wrote 1154). According to N. Levtzion and J. F. P. Hopkins: ‘‘Al-Idrisi is perhaps the best known in Europe of all Arab geographers, no doubt because an abridgement of his work was printed in Rome as early as 1592, thus being one of the first Arabic books ever printed’’ (Levtzion and Hopkins, eds., Corpus of Early Arabic Sources for West African History [Cambridge, 1981], 104). 12. John Thornton, Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400– 1800, 2d ed. (Cambridge, 1998), 19. The Senegal, Gambia, Niger, and Benue rivers
The Caravel & the Caravan 147 in and to the south of the Sahara) were understood to be converting to Islam. Of interest to most writers in this Arabic-speaking, Muslim world was what these realities meant for commerce, as represented by the cara- vans that facilitated the exchange of goods and information in all directions 13 along Saharan trade routes. When Henry the Navigator launched the Portuguese caravel upon the Atlantic Ocean, leaving the familiar waters off northern Morocco and the Canary Islands, he challenged the Muslim, Arab (and Arabic) monopoly on knowledge of the Sahara as surely as he challenged the commerce of its caravan ‘‘ships.’’ In effect, the first arena of interaction between what would become the Atlantic and Saharan worlds was intellectual. What early Afri- canists and leading European historians long regarded as the first written records of African history, the accounts of Portuguese voyages along the West African Atlantic coast, brought a radically different perspective to 14 understanding the Sahara. Ironically, the underlying interests of the Por- tuguese were similar to those of their predecessors: assessing the poten- tial for the spread of religion (in this case, Christianity) and the trade in gold. The information about the Sahara and its peoples that now filtered through the Portuguese lens was acquired initially from coastal raids (ran- dom kidnappings of Saharans along the coast) and subsequently from ex- were conflated into one ‘‘Nile of the Blacks.’’ The origin of this appears to have been the above-mentioned Al-Idrisi in his twelfth-century text. Much influenced by the Ptole- maic geographical tradition, he tried to fit new information emanating from travelers in the Sahara and Sudan into the existing conceptual framework. Consequently, he pos- tulated a divided Nile, one flowing north into Egypt, the other across the Sudan. And as in Egypt, he imagined that all major towns must lie along the river. 13. See annotations of texts like Al-Bakri’s and Al-Idrisi’s (as above) in Levtzion and Hopkins, Corpus. 14. African historians (like most others, until recently) sought out the written record before the oral. There has long been a kind of divide, however, between those who study Africa through the written records in European languages and those who do so using Arabic accounts (and usually have a primary interest in Islam, not Africa per se). Only recently has this begun to change as new generations of Africanists acquire Arabic as an African language. The shorthand ‘‘Portuguese’’ refers to most fifteenth- and sixteenth-century voy- ages, even though several were captained by Venetian and Genoan personnel. The par- allels with transatlantic voyages are reflected in a discourse that refers to this as ‘‘the Portuguese discovery of Africa’’ (J. Suret-Canale, ‘‘The Western Atlantic Coast, 1600– 1800,’’ in J. F. A. Ajayi and Michael Crowder, eds., A History of West Africa, I[Lon- don, 1971], 387–440, esp. 387).
148 e. ann mcdougall changes at the trading factory of Arguin and along the extensive Senegam- 15 bian coast. In 1487, Portugal decided to extend its efforts at interception by pene- trating the Saharan world itself: a second trading factory was established in the oasis of Wadan (in the central Mauritanian region of Adrar). We know 16 little about the venture, other than that it survived for only a few years. Presumably, Portugal undertook this enterprise based on information that, in this major salt entrepôt, the gold and slaves crossing the desert were di- vided into cargoes destined either for Arguin or (north) for the Barbary 17 Coast. The intent was most probably to influence more slave trade to flow toward the former. It was this knowledge, highlighting the operations of the gold, salt, and slave trades, as well as information about tribal participa- tion in commerce and conflict between indigenous clerics (zawaya) and im- migrant Arab warriors (hassan), that formed the base of European under- 18 standing from the sixteenth century onward. And it was this knowledge that shaped the perceptions of the new Atlantic competitors, the Dutch, the 19 French, and the British, in the centuries of Atlantic competition to follow. The failure of the Wadan venture had both real and symbolic import. Realistically, it meant that Portuguese (and later other European) efforts to
15. This became the equivalent of firsthand knowledge, especially as compared to information filtering through Moroccan multilayered sources. 16. Duarte Pacheco Pereira, Esmeraldo de situ orbis, ed. and trans. George H. T. Kimble, Works Issued by the Hakluyt Society, 2d Ser., no. 79 (London, 1937), 75. Local tradition claims they were driven out; Pereira speaks of the ‘‘hostile reception’’ by the local people, eventually forcing them to leave. No year is given for the closure of the fort. See also Abdel Wedoud Ould Cheikh, ‘‘Nomadisme, Islam et pouvoir politique dans la société maure pre-colonial (XIe siècle–XIXème siècle)’’ (Ph.D. diss., L’Université René Descartes—Paris V, 1995), 70, 89. 17. G. R. Crone, ed. and trans., The Voyages of Cadamosto and Other Documents on Western Africa in the Second Half of the Fifteenth Century, Works Issued by the Hak- luyt Society, 2d Ser., no. 80 (London, 1937), 17–22. 18. Information was supplied by Cadamosto (fifteenth century) and Valentin Fer- nandes and Duarte Pacheco Pereira (early sixteenth century). See discussion in E. A. McDougall, ‘‘The Question of Tegaza and the Conquest of Songhay: Some Saharan Considerations,’’ in Le Maroc et l’Afrique subsaharienne aux débuts des temps mod- ernes, Institute des Etudes Africaines, Colloque International, Marrakech, 1992 (Rabat, 1995), 251–282, esp. 256–257. 19. Succinct accounts of the emergence of this competition are Boubacar Barry, Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade (Cambridge, 1998), 36–54; and Thornton, Africa and Africans, 13–71.
The Caravel & the Caravan 149 physically integrate Atlantic and West African networks (commercial and cultural) subsequently focused on the more southerly, sahelian regions of 20 the Senegal and Gambia rivers. Indeed, historians discussing the making of the Atlantic world and the role of Greater Senegambia overlook entirely 21 this early effort to include the Sahara. Symbolically, however, the Wadan failure marks a moment now lost to history, when interests generated by the growth of Atlantic trade sought deliberately to incorporate those of the western Sahara, to make the western Sahara a part of the Atlantic world, not merely a periphery through the mediation of Morocco. Failure meant that the caravel and the caravan each continued to carve out, thereafter, its own distinctive reality. Historians, however, like to think linearly, chronologically. They seek to construct ‘‘the narrative,’’ the story that brings parallel worlds into a single universe. It is not surprising, therefore, that they have knitted medieval
20. This does not mean that they ceased to appreciate the importance of the coastal island factory of Arguin. It continued to be the focus of rivalry for control between the Portuguese, Dutch, and French over the next couple of centuries (Barry, Senegambia, 46–48). Nor was Morocco overlooked, but its role in European affairs was changing. 21. For example, see Philip D. Curtin, in his influential Economic Change in Precolo- nial Africa: Senegambia in the Era of the Slave Trade (Madison, Wis., 1975), 61:
The Portuguese, as the leading alien power on the African coast, were not interested in controlling local competition so much as they were in keeping other Europeans out of their private commercial preserve. They therefore seized and fortified offshore islands, not coastal enclaves. Their three strongpoints of the late fifteenth century were Arguin Island, some 500 kms north of the Senegal [River], the Cape Verde Islands, 800 kms due west, and Elmina far away on the Gold Coast. Portuguese went ashore to trade, but they did so under the peaceful conditions of a nonmilitar- ized trade diaspora. With the exception of the brief attempt to seize a post at the mouth of the Senegal about 1490, the Europeans remained a set of enclaved mer- chant communities on the African Mainland. The first attempts to switch to trading post empire came only with the mid-seventeenth century.
Barry outlines the activities of the Portuguese during this era similarly, noting failed attempts to build forts in the Senegal River estuary and on the Gambia River; he makes no mention of the failure to penetrate inland over the desert route from Arguin in spite of discussing the activities and ultimate decline of Arguin itself (Senegambia, 40–41). John Thornton’s masterful Africa and Africans also omits any reference to this venture in his discussion of Portuguese early trade organization (see esp. 58, 59). Although both Curtin and Barry include consideration of the Sahara and Arguin in their conceptual- ization of Senegambia—for Barry, the region’s northern frontier is explicitly marked by Arguin (46)—Thornton makes no mention of either; his Africa is clearly sub-Saharan, his Africans exclusive of Saharans.
150 e. ann mcdougall ‘‘views from the caravan’’ and observations from the voyages of discovery together sequentially. The image of the caravan and the caravel symbol- izes economic competition, social friction, and ultimately (in the late seven- teenth century) military conflict. Gradually, a new paradigm emerged that 22 began, in turn, to shape how we would look at this region of West Africa. Ironically, this symbolism, and the subsequent intellectual discourse it generated, had its roots not in the writing of African history but in Vito- rino Magalhães-Godinho’s seminal work on Portuguese economic history, L’Economie de l’empire portugais, that appeared in 1969. It was in his analy- sis of the impact of early Portuguese trade along the western Atlantic coast of Africa that the metaphor of an Atlantic ‘‘caravel commerce brutally elimi- nating the caravan trade of the desert’’ first came into play. French scholar Jean Devisse took issue with this argument in his own influential work on trans-Saharan trade routes in 1972. But in suggesting that the model fell down on grounds that the Atlantic competition developed trade in different commodities than the Saharan—Godinho’s focus on gold as ‘‘the’’ measure of the success, he argued, obscured important changes occurring in the na- ture of Saharan traffic—he inadvertently reinforced the model defined by 23 the imagery’s ‘‘competition.’’ The imagery itself was put front and center first by Senegalese histo- rian Boubacar Barry. He used it to shape both his regional study of Sene- gal’s Waalo (1972) and his later magnum opus on Greater Senegambia (1988). In the former, he characterized the late-seventeenth-century war that straddled southwestern Mauritania and riverine Senegal (known from the Senegalese side as the War of the Marabouts and in Mauritania as the Shurr Bubba war) as an ideological (religious) and military extension of the antagonism that had emerged between coastal European commerce and trans-Saharan trade. Saharan groups of zawaya and hassan were the pro- tagonists in this lengthy conflict; Barry argues that the former fought in de- fense of the traditional Saharan-based commerce, whereas the latter sought to benefit from the new Atlantic opportunities. Mauritanian scholar Abdel Wedoud Ould Cheikh notes that Barry took this war, considered formative
22. Constructing the medieval ‘‘view from the caravan’’ was greatly facilitated by the appearance of two collections of annotated translations: Joseph Cuoq’s Recueil des sources arabes concernant l’Afrique occidentale du VIIIe au XVIe siècle: (Bilād al-Sūdān) (Paris, 1975); and Levtzion and Hopkins’s Corpus. 23. Vitorino Magalhães-Godinho, L’Economie de l’empire portugais aux XVe et XVIe siècles (Paris, 1969), 181–188; Jean Devisse, ‘‘Routes de commerce et échanges en Afrique occidentale en relation avec la Méditerranée,’’ Revue d’histoire economique et sociale, L (1972), 357–397, esp. 387.
The Caravel & the Caravan 151 in the making of Senegambia, ‘‘to be the political and military outcome of the antagonism between two types of trade, between the champions of cara- 24 vans and of caravels.’’ In his later work, Barry continued to draw upon this imagery to articu- late the significance of the challenge posed by the bourgeoning Atlantic trade (first in gold, then in slaves) to Saharan desert commerce in general. Arguing that it was only by ‘‘opening out onto the Atlantic seaboard’’ that Senegambia came to play a significant regional role, he went on to under- score the import of this development: ‘‘Strictly speaking, the Sahara did not really become a desert until Atlantic fleets supplanted its camel caravans. This vast turnabout totally ruined the trans-Saharan trading system as from [sic] the fifteenth century.’’ More specifically among the Europeans, it was
[the Portuguese whose] impact was the most spectacular. The seacoast became, from then on, the leading front for acculturation. The settle- ment of the Portuguese at Arguin around 1445 was the first victory of the caravel over the caravan. Its consequence was the rerouting of trade cir- cuits towards the Atlantic....Because of the steady decline of the trans- Saharan trade, the entire southern region of the country now known as Mauritania, beginning from Arguin, came within the orbit of Senegam- 25 bia, attracted by the Atlantic trading system.
Henceforth, that region would be driven by Senegambia’s political econ- omy. The Atlantic world’s overshadowing of the Sahara, Barry argues, cli- maxed in the late-seventeenth-century Shurr Bubba war that was critical 26 to the shaping of both Mauritania and Senegal. In the wake of Barry’s argument, there have been some challenging variations on this caravel-versus-caravan theme. Ould Cheikh’s as-yet- unpublished thesis poses directly the question of the impact of the cara- vel on the caravan, engaging in an extensive discussion with Godinho and Barry that draws heavily on Saharan sources. In effect, he fleshes out De- visse’s early work to look more closely at the commodities that supported Sa-
24. Boubacar Barry, Le royaume du Waalo, 1659–1859: Le Sénégal avant la conquête (Paris, 1972); Barry, La Senegambie du XVe au XIXe siècle: Traite negrière, Islam et conquête coloniale (Paris, 1988); Abdel Wedoud Ould Cheikh, ‘‘Herders, Traders, and Clerics: The Impact of Trade, Religion, and Warfare on the Evolution of Moorish So- ciety,’’ in John G. Galaty and Pierre Bonte, Herders, Warriors, and Traders: Pastoralism in Africa (Boulder, Colo., 1991), 199–218, esp. 205–206 (emphasis added). 25. Barry, Senegambia, 5, 15, 36–37 (emphasis added); ‘‘as from’’ is a translation awkwardness repeated throughout the book. 26. Ibid., 50–54.
152 e. ann mcdougall haran trade—drawing heavily on my own work to magnify the special role of salt in that commerce. He also expands Devisse’s analysis to consider which Saharan groups were involved in managing that trade over time. The lon- gevity of the regionally based commerce and organization argues strongly against the hypothesis that ‘‘the Atlantic commerce marked the ruin of the trans-Saharan commerce.’’ Provocatively, he suggests that the opposite may well hold, that the fifteenth-century development of several Saharan mar- ket centers like Wadan, Shinqit, and Tishit (all were well-watered oases, sources of dates and grain, termini of trans-Saharan trade routes in what is today Mauritania) indicates that the installation of the Portuguese co- incided with a growing importance of the caravan that continued until the 27 late seventeenth century. Omar Kane, a senior Senegalese historian, draws a very different picture of the competitive interests involved that nevertheless relates to the evolu- tion of the caravel-caravan model. He shifts attention away from gold and salt, Atlantic and Saharan interests, and focuses instead on the slave trade. Where others see the slave trade gradually becoming a factor in the so- called caravel-caravan competition, Kane argues that, in these early days, it was Moroccan interests in trading and raiding for slaves, not Atlantic in- fluence, that dominated trans-Saharan trade and shaped Senegambia. For Kane, the Moroccan state was the principal ‘‘manager’’ of sub-Saharan slave raiding, and the desert populations were but manipulated extensions of Mo- roccan policy. Leaving aside for the moment the extent to which one can legitimately speak of unified Moroccan state interests during this era and the degree to which they were themselves also tied to the Atlantic world, one can infer from Kane that the caravan remained the dominant commer- cial factor in the region. But because it served interests both external and detrimental to the integrity of the Sahara, he argues, it weakened the re- 28 gion’s ability to resist later incorporation into the Atlantic world. Kane’s analysis becomes even more relevant to our discussion when con-
27. Ould Cheikh, ‘‘Nomadisme, Islam et pouvoir politique,’’ I, esp. chap. 1, 70–107; he labels this medieval phase in the trans-Saharan trade ‘‘The Age of Salt’’ (62). See also Elizabeth Ann McDougall, ‘‘The Ijil Salt Industry: Its Role in the Pre-colonial Economy of the Western Sudan’’ (Ph.D. diss., University of Birmingham, 1980), 70– 87, esp. 85. Cornell gives further support to this argument, as will be discussed below. 28. Omar Kane, ‘‘Les relations entre le Maroc et les états riverains du fleuve Séné- gal de la fin du XVe au milieu du XVIIIe siècle,’’ in Le Maroc et l’Afrique subsahari- enne, 25–46, esp. 26–28. On the unified Moroccan state interests and their ties to the Atlantic world, see Cornell’s article ‘‘Reconquista and Jihad,’’ International Journal of Middle East Studies, XXII (1990).
The Caravel & the Caravan 153 sidered along with James Webb, Jr.’s Desert Frontier. Webb picks up on the central dynamic of slaving in the Senegal region, affirming Morocco’s role, while also acknowledging Saharan commerce in gold, gum, and salt. But he situates his argument firmly in opposition to Barry’s conclusions about the growing Atlantic trade. He argues instead that the measure of competition should be slaves and that the Saharan trade in this commodity was more important than the Atlantic one, even into the eighteenth century. Conse- quently, when Webb offers a critique of Barry’s version of the Shurr Bubba war, he argues that ‘‘the number of slaves sold into the Atlantic slave trade was a very small percentage of those sold into the desert and across the desert to North Africa’’; therefore, there is no justification for an analysis rooted in one group’s defense of the caravan against the threat of the cara- vel. During the period under consideration here, the caravan continued to dominate the economy of the Senegambian region; the Atlantic world had not yet found inroads into it, even though both the Atlantic and Senegam- 29 bia were defined increasingly by slaving and the slave trade.
In Search of a Saharan World: The Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries This historiographical introduction to an era Ould Cheikh once referred to as ‘‘these ‘dark ages’ of western Saharan history’’ allows us to focus the remainder of this essay on questions central to that history and to its re- lation with the emerging Atlantic world. Where exactly did the frontier lie between the Atlantic and Saharan worlds? What were the contours of the latter? The caravel-caravan paradigm follows the Senegambian coast geographically, sometimes extending as far north as Arguin but often stretching only as far as the Senegal River; as mentioned above, it peaks chronologically with the war of Shurr Bubba in the 1670s, ultimately focus- ing attention on southwestern Mauritania and the lower Senegal River re- gion. But the continued interest of European powers in controlling Arguin and the significance of the growing salt trade to the trans-Saharan com- merce draws us into the Sahara of the Mauritanian Adrar, source of its own desert salt (Ijil) and location of the earliest Portuguese attempt at an in-
29. James L. A. Webb, Desert Frontier: Ecological and Economic Change along the Western Sahel, 1600–1850 (Madison, Wis., 1995), 34, and see esp. the chapters ‘‘The Southwestern Frontier’’ (32–35) and ‘‘The Horse and Slave Trade’’ (82–90). Kane’s ‘‘Les relations entre le Maroc et les états riverains,’’ in Le Maroc et l’Afrique subsahari- enne, although appearing simultaneously with Desert Frontier, was originally presented at a conference in Marrakech in 1992.
154 e. ann mcdougall land presence (Wadan). Following the development of that commerce, then, takes us, not southwest toward the war of the marabouts and the establish- ment of Europeans on the Senegal (as the historiography would have it), but southeast, into the market region of the upper Senegal and its relatively 30 unknown hinterland, the Tagant-Hodh. What role should be assigned to the Moroccans and Saharans with whom these Europeans interacted? Is the emphasis on slave raiding and trading illuminating (or even legitimate)? Again, this perception of Moroccan ac- tivity and impact has been shaped by the view from the caravel, so to speak —literally by sources generated from and pertaining to Senegambia and the question of Atlantic-Saharan competition. But if we are drawing on the conceptual innovation suggested by this conference in exploring as many realities as possible being created around the margins of the Atlantic world, we should be doing the same with its Saharan counterpart. From this per- spective, as suggested in the introduction, Morocco and Moroccans con- stitute facets of the Saharan world as much as the Mediterranean. Clearly they were contributing to the dynamics of the desert, deliberately, in an at- tempt to shape its reality. But what reality, exactly? Morocco itself remained another frontier linking the Saharan and Atlantic worlds throughout the period we are examining here. This context is significant in understanding the nature of Morocco’s Saharan activities in the sixteenth and early seven- teenth centuries. Similarly, it shapes how Moroccans saw themselves vis-à- vis ‘‘Saharans.’’ In the Saharan world of the late sixteenth and early seven- teenth centuries, did Moroccans and Saharans generate the same kind of cultural and social hybrids we saw emerging in the Atlantic world? Can we see comparable economic partnerships and networks, drawing on increas- ingly large human, cultural, and geographical hinterlands? It is too am- bitious to think we can satisfactorily answer these questions in the pages that remain. However, we can glimpse the potential for pushing them fur-
30. Ould Cheikh, ‘‘Herders, Traders, and Clerics,’’ in Galaty and Bonte, Herders, Warriors, and Traders, 202. See Barry’s explicit identification of Arguin as marking the northern frontier of greater Senegambia (Senegambia, 37); Curtin’s implicit inclusion of desert regions as developed in his chapter ‘‘Religion and Political Change’’ (Economic Change in Precolonial Africa, 46–58); Suret-Canale’s statement that the Senegal River marked the ‘‘natural boundary’’ of the region (‘‘Western Atlantic Coast,’’ in Ajayi and Crowder, eds., History of West Africa, I, 387); and Thornton’s exclusion of anything ‘‘Saharan’’ in the African part of the Atlantic world (Africa and Africans, 13–71). Saint Louis was established by the French on the small island strategically located at the mouth of the Senegal River in 1659; the Dutch had occupied the island of Gorée just off the coast of today’s Dakar in 1621.
The Caravel & the Caravan 155 ther and thereby decrease our obsession with the carvel-caravan competi- tion that has dominated the discourse to date. It has long been my contention that the development of the Sahara’s salt industries underpinned growth in desert social, economic, religious, and political life. What we know of the history of the Ijil industry supports that contention. The medieval ‘‘salt network’’ our Portuguese sources drew at- tention to had already given rise to its own commercial language, azayr (a mixture of Saharan Berber and Sahelian Soninke), and provided a skeletal frame for cultural and religious interaction spanning the desert edge. A class of specialized traders converted Ijil and other desert salts into the wealth needed to support a growing stratum of indigenous, Islamic scholars by the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. By the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, they and their hundreds of students (telamidh) followed the proliferation of salt markets springing up along the desert edge. Tinigi was home to the Tajakant, a clan said to be descended from the famed Almoravids; the town seems to have given way in importance in the fifteenth century to nearby Shinqit, where other clerical clans established themselves. Wadan, so in- hospitable to the Portuguese, welcomed more of the same, including the famous Aqit family, who, in the course of the sixteenth and seventeeth cen- turies, became prominent scholars in both Timbuktu and Morocco. Other salt-trading centers like Tishit and Walata attracted learned emigrants from declining centers of the former sahelian Ghana empire. All of them nurtured scholars—teachers, qadis (judges), grammarians, calligraphers—who, in turn and in time, drifted back south. Some, like migrants from Tishit dur- ing precisely the era that interests us here, moved into the Togba region of the western Tagant-Hodh; others moved toward the Senegal River. Many of these scholars and their families were, like their places of origin, directly associated with the trade and marketing of salt. This is epitomized in the probably apocryphal but oft-cited oral tradition from Shinqit: ‘‘‘One Day’ it is said, ‘a caravan of 32000 loaded camels left Shinqit with salt: 20000 belonging to its inhabitants, 12000 to the inhabitants of Tishit. The entire caravan was sold in Zara [in the Tagant] and the people with one accord 31 wondered which of the two towns was the more prosperous.’’
31. McDougall, ‘‘Ijil Salt Industry,’’ 88–93; McDougall, ‘‘The View from Awda- ghust: War, Trade, and Social Change in the Southwestern Sahara, from the Eighth to the Fifteenth Century,’’ Journal of African History, XXVI (1985), 1–31, esp. 27–28 for azayr; McDougall, ‘‘Salts of the Western Sahara: Myths, Mysteries, and Historical Sig- nificance,’’ International Journal of African Historical Studies, XXIII (1990), 231–257, esp. 241–251 (there were many forms of salt available); McDougall, ‘‘The Economics of Islam in the Southern Sahara: The Rise of the Kunta Clan,’’ Asian and African Studies,
156 e. ann mcdougall Two of these many clans are of particular interest to us. The Tajakant, mentioned above, were widely influential through the networks established by their clerics and telamidh. They were also known for their fifteenth- century prosperity (contemporary with that of Wadan), based on the mar- keting of salt and slaves. In the sixteenth century, they dispersed from the Adrar. Some moved to the southeast into the Tagant-Hodh and established Togba as their capital. It is said that, on their arrival, the resident warrior clan in the region demanded a fee for the right to settle: ‘‘one young female slave and 4 ozs of gold for every house built.’’ This tradition, possibly apoc- ryphal, suggests a continuing Tajakant involvement in the trade for slaves and gold, replicating their earlier commercial interests in Tinigi and sug- 32 gesting continued access to the Adrar’s salt. The second clan of interest is the Kunta. Contrary to its own latterly constructed tradition of origin that claims a fifteenth-century influence in the western Sahara, it likely emerged as a recognized zawaya clan from the Adrar’s Tajakant dispersal during the sixteenth century. Its so-called ‘‘founder’’ originated from Tinigi and is said to have had long-standing commercial relations with eastern Mauritania, where he owned date palm groves in the salt market of Tishit. Around the beginning of the sixteenth century, he is said to have moved to Walata, where he knew fame as both trader and cleric. Upon his death in 1515, he became the ‘‘patron saint’’ of travelers to Walata; mentioned among those seeking his spiritual approval were merchants from Ijil as well as southern Morocco, Tuat (an area of extensive oases in what is today southern Algeria), and the eastern mine of Tegaza (to the north of Timbuktu). Toward the end of the century, the Kunta are said to have replicated the Tajakant dispersal. Although the par- allels are a bit too similar for historical comfort, it seems that the Kunta split their clients and tributaries between themselves. Over the seventeenth century, one of these groups moved permanently into the Tagant, leaving one family in the Adrar (Wadan) and another in southwest Brakna. This distribution of the Kunta positioned them well, as the earlier dispersal had done for the Tajakant, to build on the salt trade from Ijil along the east- west interregional exchange bordering the sahel and to tap into north-south 33 trans-Saharan networks with which they intersected.
XX (1986), 45–60; McDougall, ‘‘The Quest for ‘Tarra’: Toponymy and Geography in Exploring History,’’ History in Africa, XVIII (1991), 271–289, esp. 276 n. 38; see also Ould Cheikh, ‘‘Nomadisme, Islam et pouvoir politique,’’ 71–72. 32. McDougall, ‘‘Quest for ‘Tarra,’’’ History in Africa, XVIII (1991), 278. 33. McDougall, ‘‘Ijil Salt Industry,’’ 81–98, draws heavily on Aziz A. Batran, ‘‘Sidi
The Caravel & the Caravan 157 The stories of the Tajakant and the Kunta draw us into a larger sixteenth- century Sahara where we encounter both Moroccan interests and a compet- ing salt industry. When they dispersed from the Adrar, the Tajakant also moved north to Tinduf. The town was well placed to channel the trans- Saharan commerce into Moroccan territories: northwest to the rich agricul- tural Sus (discussed earlier as a terrain of conflict between the Portuguese and the incipient Sa’adien state), north to the Dra’a valley (heartland of the Sa’adi interests), and northeast to the luxurious oases of the Tafilelt (also a frequently contested resource between Moroccan competitors for power). Similarly, it served as a staging post for caravans traveling south into the Sahara, both toward the Adrar and the middle Niger. The Tajakant became recognized masters of the trade between southern Morocco and the Adrar, thereby also becoming valuable to Sa’adien rulers. Togba remained patched into the interregional salt network as well, as is evidenced by vestiges of azayr (probably via the migrations from Tishit) in the region. This net- work operated east-west along the desert edge, with its eastern terminus at Timbuktu, and intersected with the trans-Saharan trade whose north- ern termini were under Moroccan control. The Kunta also had a second distinct group that settled to the north, nomadizing between the Atlantic coastal hinterland and Tuat. This group established a number of scholarly communities (zawiya) and from there launched trading activities between Tuat and southern Morocco. This group began to drift south toward the middle Niger in the seventeenth century, at which point they also were re- 34 portedly involved with the Timbuktu commerce in Tegaza salt. As these Saharan clerical and merchant diasporas were reaching north and northeast into Moroccan spheres of influence, the southern Sa’adien state was also reaching well into the Sahara. Beginning around 1540, rulers began launching various efforts to acquire revenue from the desert salt 35 mines of Tegaza and Ijil. What is important to note is that those efforts al-Mukhtar al-Kunti and the Recrudescence of Islam in the Western Sahara and the Middle Niger, c. 1750–1811’’ (Ph.D. diss., University of Birmingham, 1971), for the analysis of early Kunta genealogy. 34. McDougall, ‘‘Quest for ‘Tarra,’’’ History in Africa, XVIII (1991), 278; McDou- gall, ‘‘Ijil Salt Industry,’’ 81–98, esp. 88–93; McDougall, ‘‘Economics of Islam,’’ Asian and African Studies, XX (1986), 50–52. Tinduf lies just south of the southern Moroc- can Dra’a region, the Dra’a being the extensive wadi extending from the inland Sahara in an east-southwest direction all the way to the Atlantic that supported hundreds of date-palm oases. 35. McDougall, ‘‘The Question of Tegaza,’’ in Le Maroc et l’Afrique subsaharienne,
158 e. ann mcdougall involved simple requests to the Sudanese Muslim ruler of the large, sub- Saharan empire of Songhay for the right to tax production and trade, the offer of gifts in exchange for that right, shows of force expressed by military expeditions (two of which passed by way of the Adrar—one of which was likely targeting Ijil itself), and outright annexation of Tegaza in the 1550s 36 and again in the 1580s. In each of the latter two cases, occupation was short-lived but did involve the presence of Moroccans as ‘‘agents’’ of the em- 37 peror and tax collectors. Other mines in the Tegaza-Tawdeni plains were brought into production as a response to the Moroccan presence, and these, in turn, affected the local economy, but we know little more about exactly how Saharan traders like the Tajakant and Kunta responded to these efforts in this early phase. Finally, at some point during the century, the Moroc- cans established a garrison in Shinqit as a consequence of an alliance with a local clerical clan—presumably this venture was in some fashion related to interest in (if not control over) the nearby mine of Ijil; it was later used as a base from which to launch the slave raids Kane spoke of in the seven- teenth century. What other functions it served, what other Moroccan per- sonnel were posted there, and when it was abandoned is all information we lack—information nonetheless critical to really understanding the nature of 38 the cultural frontier that might have been developing, however fleetingly. In 1591, Morocco surpassed the goal of controlling Tegaza’s wealth by staking claim to the Songhay Empire itself; as part of the conquest, Mo- rocco occupied Timbuktu. Tradition recounts an ‘‘oath swearing’’ carried but see esp. ‘‘Appendix 1: A Chronology of Pre-conquest Relations,’’ 273–277 (page 278 was not printed; page 277 ends in mid-sentence). 36. I have argued for an association between the expedition and an interest in exer- cising some form of control over Ijil on largely circumstantial evidence (ibid., 253–255). Cornell states categorically that the Moroccan sultan Muhammed al-Shaykh sought to reestablish the trans-Saharan trade network that had been disrupted by Portuguese and Bedouin raids since 1517 and as part of this goal took control of the Ijil mine. He sees the subsequent taking over of the Tegaza mines in 1556–1557 as a similarly motivated action (‘‘Reconquista and Jihad,’’ International Journal of Middle East Studies, XXII [1990], 401–402, 415 nn. 78–79). 37. This occurred first in 1556–1557, later in 1583–1584; neither appears to have been long-lived. 38. McDougall, ‘‘Quest for ‘Tarra,’’’ History in Africa, XVIII (1991), 277. The alli- ance and garrison are rarely discussed; it is interesting that Cornell makes no reference to them in his discussion of Ijil (see n. 36, above). See ‘‘Epilogue: The Eighteenth Cen- tury’’ (below) for reference to a Kunta response to the situation in the Tegaza-Tawdeni plains.
The Caravel & the Caravan 159 out according to the organization of established merchant quarters: the first day concerned ‘‘foreigners’’ from the Fezzan (southern, modern-day Libya) 39 and Tuat; the second, merchants from Walata, Wadan, and ‘‘the West.’’ Interesting as they are, these urban-based affiliations obscure the clan con- nections—the ‘‘dispersals,’’ scholarly networks, and commercial diasporas that linked, rather than separated, the markets, oases, and zawiya of the desert. These ‘‘itinerants’’ included clerics and merchants from southern Morocco, especially from the Dra’a region. And that demographic profile gave definition to a late-sixteenth-century Sahara that was clearly contested territory between those who lived and worked within its environs, as well as with and between those on its northern and southern ‘‘shores.’’ This Sahara was seen as a great source of wealth to all who could negotiate its terms.
In Search of the Saharan World: The Seventeenth Century Unfortunately, the first half of the seventeenth century remains largely silent in terms of internally generated voices. However, there are a few that emerge later in the 1600s from a variety of sources—Moroccan, Saharan, and Euro- pean, written and oral—that both individually and collectively articulate the nature of the Saharan world that had emerged by this time. They give us every reason to believe our sense of a dynamic society and economy continu- ing to flourish on the margins of the Atlantic in the early part of the century. Speaking most directly to this is the 1690 account of one Cornelius Hodges. An employee of the English Royal African Company, he had a goal ‘‘to reach the gold-mines and slave-markets [of the interior], and thus to enable his company to frustrate the French in their attempt to tap the sources of labour-supply,’’ the inland slave trade. Although he personally never reached the sought-after markets, an expedition of his men did. Ac- cording to his report, they were directed to a large town named ‘‘Tarra,’’ ‘‘verry neare as bigg as the Citty of London with the walls...[in] the Moores Countrey,’’ said to be ‘‘the only mart for slaves in all those western parts of Affrica.’’ Although there is still uncertainty about Tarra’s exact loca- tion, its commercial structure was well described: any merchants carrying European goods, wishing to purchase slaves here, had first to ‘‘turn’’ their goods into cloth and with the cloth purchase the ‘‘Salt of the Moores who bring it above 1100 miles on Camells and will Truck it for no othr soart of commodities than Cloathes, Gold and Slaves.’’ After acquiring the salt, mer- chants could ‘‘truck it for slaves,’’ Hodges went on to explain, ‘‘wch is the
39. Elizabeth Hodgkin, ‘‘Social and Political Relations on the Niger Bend in the Seventeenth Century’’ (Ph.D. diss., Birmingham University, 1987), 479.
160 e. ann mcdougall Reason that many times before they can dispatch the goods of 4 or 5 slaves that it costs them 1/2 as much for Lodging and Provisions. But it goes with 500 ozs of gold, pays no customes and may turne it into what commodity he pleaseth, In less than two Dayes If he pleaseth.’’ Tarra was a desertside mar- ket, where the demands of Saharans for cloth, gold, and slaves intersected with those of sub-Saharans for salt, structuring commercial transactions in such a way as to make penetration by Europeans and European goods dif- 40 ficult. At least, this was how it appeared from the point of view of Atlantic inter- ests. We actually have several additional Saharan perspectives on Tarra, one provided by oral tradition that is inadvertently enriched by Hodges, one by a locally generated source in which the town is called ‘‘Zarra,’’ and a third derived from archaeological information on the region. According to tradition, the Tajakants’ dispersal that effectively allowed their traders and transporters to exploit trade in salt, slaves, and gold between Morocco and the Tagant-Hodh culminated toward the late seventeenth century in an im- portant wedding. The emperor of Morocco (since 1649 under the new Ala- wite dynasty) gave his daughter in marriage to the Tajakant chief of Togba, thereby staking (or confirming) a familial claim to influence, if not direct political power, in the area. It is said that initial Tajakant acceptance of local warrior overlordship had given way to a refusal to make the annual slave gold payments, and that the emperor had subsequently placed a military 41 force at his son-in-law’s disposal to battle these overlords and their allies. In 1690, Hodges’s men recounted that, three days after their arrival in Tarra, some ‘‘40,000 horsemen and camels [arrived] to Lay siege to It. The Emperour Drew his forces up and incamped without the towne to receive them there.’’ This ‘‘siege’’ has been characterized as typical of Morocco’s slave raids into Senegambia. But given the history of relations between Mo- rocco, the Tajakant, and the commerce of the region, another interpretation
40. Thora G. Stone, ‘‘The Journey of Cornelius Hodges in Senegambia, 1689–90,’’ English Historical Review, XXXIX (1924), 89–95, esp. 89, 92–93. See also McDougall, ‘‘Quest for ‘Tarra,’’’ History in Africa, XVIII (1991), 273. The English Royal African Company was founded in 1672 following on the heels of the unsuccessful Company of Royal Adventurers Trading to Africa that had established itself in the River Gambia in 1661 for pursuing the trade in slaves. 41. Mohammed el-Chennafi, ‘‘Sur les traces d’Awdagust: Les Tagdāwəst et leur an- cienne cité,’’ in D. Robert, S. Robert, and J. Devisse, eds., Tegdaoust I, tome I: Recher- ches sur Aoudaghost (Paris, 1970), 101. With no exact date known, we can only surmise that the emperor in question was either Mulay Mohammed al-Rashid (1664–1672) or Mulay Ismail (1672–1727).
The Caravel & the Caravan 161 plate 2. The Saharan World, 15th–17th Centuries. Drawn by Rebecca L. Wrenn suggests itself. Tradition also tells us that the battle against the Tajakants’ enemies involved a joint Tajakant-Moroccan force, personally led by the Tajakant chief. We are also told he died and was buried in Togba ca. 1690– 1691. I have suggested elsewhere the possibility that Hodges’s men actually witnessed the battle in which the Tajakant chief resisted his overlords, as- sisted by the sultan’s army, and lost his life. This must remain conjecture at present, but from the perspective of the regional political economy, the likelihood that this siege was a slave raid of any kind appears unlikely. In- deed, Hodges’s men were drawn into assisting ‘‘the Moores’’: ‘‘It pleased
162 e. ann mcdougall God to give them such good success, they being all very good firemen, that the Emperor attributed the victory and safeguard of his countrey wholely to Mahamit.’’ Clearly, Moroccans saw this region, its commerce, and the Taja- kant as constituting their world, and the Saharan Tajakant acknowledged this perspective while simultaneously seeking to increase their own power vis-à-vis neighboring clans. And although all this seems to have constituted a historical moment that was not repeated, for that moment, the Atlantic world was truly drawn into that of the Sahara, not merely as observer but 42 as participant in the victory. I have, in the past, postulated that Tarra might, in fact, have been Togba, but a mid-to-late-seventeenth-century Saharan document called a nawazil eliminates that possibility. Although compiled and recorded later in Walata, this document consists of about 240 questions put to a learned Adrar scholar over a period of many years before 1696 (the date of his death). The ques- tions are posed by Saharans from the Adrar, as well as from far away— the Tagant-Hodh, Timbuktu, southern Morocco, the Sudan in general. Al- though it covers many subjects, one of the two largest groups of questions concerns commerce, and half of these are either directly related to salt trans- actions or use salt to illustrate the issue at hand. In discussing how these merchants should conduct their commerce in order to be consistent with the laws of Islam, the texts reveal that the major salt markets between the Adrar and Tagant-Hodh were Shinqit, Togba, and a place called ‘‘Zara.’’ The last was unquestionably the principal entrepôt for the salt commerce from the Adrar, the source of the ‘‘salt of the Moores’’ referred to by Hodges; it was also almost certainly Tarra. This salt passed through Togba on occasion, confirming that Zara /Tarra and Togba were indeed independent markets. The nawazil also confirms that there were several different salts traveling in these desert edge networks, one of which came from Awlil, a medieval coastal mine of uncertain location. There are several possible places to the north of the Senegal River where salt formed by evaporating seawater in large depressions could have been removed in blocks (as was Awlil salt); and, of course, we have no way of knowing for sure that it was the same Awlil last mentioned in twelfth-century Arabic accounts. But the reference, suggesting that ‘‘bars’’ of salt from Ijil and Awlil were being traded in the
42. Stone, ‘‘Journey of Hodges,’’ English Historical Review, XXXIX (1924), 93; Curtin, Economic Change in Precolonial Africa, 51; el-Chennafi, ‘‘Sur les traces d’Awda- gust,’’ in Robert, Robert, and Devisse, eds., Tegdaoust I, 106 n. 2; McDougall, ‘‘Quest for ‘Tarra,’’’ History in Africa, XVIII (1991), 279, in the context of a larger discussion of Tarra’s identity.
The Caravel & the Caravan 163 same markets at a time when this part of the Senegambian coast was fully incorporated into the Atlantic economy, confirms the continuing existence of a commercial frontier bordering both Atlantic and Sahara. And, at least in this case, the frontier was characterized by market dynamics firmly rooted 43 in Saharan networks and Islamic exchange practices. It also appears to have been centered firmly in the Mauritanian Tagant- Hodh, a region about which we know far too little, other than that it had once housed a famous medieval trans-Saharan market called Awdaghust. Awdaghust appears to have declined considerably with the growing pros- perity of the salt markets of the Adrar-Tagant (Shinqit, Wadan, Tishit, Wa- lata) and the contemporaneous development of the middle Niger salt in- dustry. However, archaeological work in this area published in the 1980s records a seventeenth-century revival of Awdaghust, presumably tied to the emergent economy we have been describing. In addition, more sites have been located near the Wadi Togba that seem to have been agricultural cen- ters (two of them boasted grain silos that could have stored twenty to thirty tons of grain); other evidence argues that the region also became a cen- ter of cotton cloth manufacture about the same time. We also know of sev- eral additional migrations of Saharan clans from Wadan (including another Kunta family) into the Tagant during this same century. The date palm oases and scholarly centers they built reflected, as well as contributed to, the healthy prosperity of the larger regional economy. The difficulties encoun- tered by European traders in penetrating the Tarra market were in fact the consequence of a whole economic system supported by a very widespread 44 religious, cultural, and commercial Saharan diaspora. Three letters provide a final glimpse into this world; they were written
43. McDougall, ‘‘Quest for ‘Tarra,’’’ History in Africa, XVIII (1991). Muhammed bin al-Muktar Bel-La’mash al-Shanqiti (d. 1696), ‘‘Nawazil,’’ MS no. 5742, al-Khizana al-Hassaniyya, microfilm, Archives Royales, Rabat, Morocco. Thanks to Mohamed Lahbib Nouhi for his generous assistance. Zara /Tarra: see McDougall, ‘‘A Qadi from Shingit and the Question of Salt: The Nawazil of Mohammed bin al Mukhtar bin La’amech (Late 17th C.),’’ paper presented at the African Studies Association meeting, Philadelphia, November 11–14, 1999. For a discussion of Awlil as a medieval source, see ibid.; and McDougall, ‘‘Salts of the Western Sahara,’’ International Journal of Afri- can Historical Studies, XXIII (1990), 241–242. 44. McDougall, ‘‘View from Awdaghust,’’ Journal of African History, XXVI (1985); Denise Robert-Chaleix, ‘‘Fusaioles décorées du site de Tegdaoust,’’ in Tegdaoust III, recherches sur Aoudaghost: Campagnes 1960–65, enquêtes générales (Paris, 1983), 510–512; see also McDougall, ‘‘The Ijil Salt Industry’’; and with reference to an even broader set of migrations, see Webb, Desert Frontier, 50–53.
164 e. ann mcdougall by the Moroccan emperor to his son, then governor of the Saharan regions 45 Wadi Dra’a and Tafilelt, between 1692 and 1699. Although they may seem to be as unrelated to the Atlantic world as our medieval camel caravans ap- peared to be, when understood in the context of the Sahara we have been revealing, they become important insights into its dynamics and contours. The emperor refers to the lands now governed by his son—the Saharan hin- terland—as the traditional ‘‘heartland’’ of the empire, one whose resources, especially the caravans arriving regularly from the Sudan, should allow for 46 the building-up of a significant power base. The letter continues:
An effective governor would have written to the Arabs of al-Gebla [the Trarza, Brakna of southern Mauritania] and of Teghaza and the Kings of Sudan and would have addressed all of these countries and planted spies in all of these directions such that you know every tribe and its intentions and every leader and his situation. And if you saw anyone of the Arabs of these areas go astray, you would bide your time, and then you would chose the right opportunity and take him to task wherever he might be. Had you done this all the Arabs would have come to respect and fear you and had you established yourself in that manner they would have sent presents to you and they would have come to visit you and you would have had the right or the ability to do to any of them near or far, what you wanted. And as a result everyone would know your name, and they would send delegations to where ever you are and your country would become prosperous, you would be able to make the caravan routes safe and [collect appropriate taxes].
At this moment, about a century after Morocco’s conquest of the region, the emperor’s specific Saharan concern was Tegaza and the failure of his rep- resentative there to collect the required salt taxes. He gave explicit instruc- tions as to what his son should say in the letter that he, in turn, was sup- posed to send with the emperor’s emissary to the mine. He was to threaten the Tegaza agent with replacement unless the overdue taxes were delivered immediately, and he was to outfit his father’s emissary with twenty of his 47 own best camels. This order was not to be questioned.
45. Letters from Moulay Ismail (sultan of Morocco) to his son, al-Mamoun, gover- nor of Tafilelt and Dra’a, 1692, 1699, and n.d., in ‘‘Notes from Mohamed al-Gharbi, Rio Oro’’ (As-supiya al-hamra wa wadi dhahab dar al Kibab) (Casablanca, n.d.), 217–243. 46. One that could be supported by an army, as his ancestors had done (ibid., 228– 229.) 47. Ibid, 241–243.
The Caravel & the Caravan 165 Apart from providing insight into the stormy relationship between the emperor and his son, this correspondence reveals the continuing centrality of the Sahara to the Moroccan political economy, specifically the importance 48 of trans-Saharan trade and the salt mines of Tegaza. It also reveals how Saharans—the ‘‘Arabs’’ of the letters—were regarded by the Moroccan state as subjects to be kept in line and from whom gifts were to be received. It is perhaps notable that none were referred to from the Adrar or Tagant-Hodh as needing such ‘‘close observation,’’ a reflection (one might postulate) of the close ties and important commercial connections the state had already established with the prominent zawiya families of these regions. Geographi- cally, this perception pushes the Saharan world, viewed from Morocco as a kind of natural extension of its territories in familial, political, and eco- nomic terms, from the Adrar, Brakna (‘‘al-Gebla’’), and Tagant-Hodh into the Azawad north of Timbuktu (Tegaza) and as far north as the extensive oases of Tafilelt and Tuat. Delineating the contours of this world were the western and eastern salt networks rooted in Ijil and Tegaza, respectively— networks that might have intersected in some of the same markets in the southern desert edge and certainly drew on some of the same Saharan clan diasporas as transporters and traders. This Sahara was very much the preoccupation of a Moroccan state seek- ing legitimacy in Islam among clerical desert zawaya and establishing its heartland among the Arabs, who could assure access to, and protection of, desert resources. As allies were cultivated, family connections cemented through marriage, and representatives of the state settled in various Saha- ran markets to collect taxes (and assure supplies of slaves), distinctions be- 49 tween being Moroccan and being Saharan surely blurred. Not, as Kane would argue, because the Saharans were simple extensions of Morocco’s slave-raiding interests but because identities—cultural and political—were refashioned continuously as the Saharan economy drew people from its mar- gins and simultaneously extended its commercial tentacles into an increas- ingly larger domain. It was along these dynamic margins that European
48. Mentioned specifically is the son’s inability to deliver information about rebel- lious Arabs, to keep track of what the people of Tafilelt owed in taxes, and to deal with loyal Jewish families who had served well the Crown (ibid., 232–233). 49. In 1679, Emperor Mulay Ismail married the daughter of the emir of Brakna while touring in Mauritania. It is said that all the warrior emirs renewed their allegiance to him at this time (Kane, ‘‘Les relations entre le Maroc,’’ in Le Maroc et l’Afrique sub- saharienne, 27).
166 e. ann mcdougall interests (first Portuguese, later French and English) articulated themselves 50 and the Atlantic world began to make itself felt in the Sahara.
Epilogue: The Eighteenth Century A letter from the governor of the French Fort Saint Joseph (on the Senegal River) to the director of the Compagnie des Indes (ca. 1732) reported that the merchants were complaining that the ‘‘Moors’’ were taking all the gold and cloth of the upper Senegal region in exchange for their (Saharan) salt. The frontier with which the Atlantic world continued to interact was itself evolving. But whereas the caraval was by this time unquestionably shaping the history of Senegambia, the caravan apparently still frustrated European 51 interests therein. Moreover, its continued commercial strength reflected the development of a Saharan world in which desert politics, economics, and religion continued to generate a powerful attraction for Saharans, including 52 Moroccans, who wrestled each other for control. Negotiations over whose
50. It is ironic that Kane and Webb, who portray this complexity of relations as sets of dichotomies, also provide the best evidence for an argument to the contrary (see ibid., 26–28; Webb, Desert Frontier, ‘‘The Southwestern Frontier’’). One example is the oft- cited story of the emir of Trarza who traveled to Morocco to seek assistance in his war with the Brakna in the early eighteenth century. In addition to the military support, he received gifts from the Moroccan emperor—a copper drum, white turban, and white trousers—that have since become symbols of emiral authority in Trarza. This is as clear a melding of the cultural and political, reflecting a particular historical moment as one could imagine (Webb, Desert Frontier, 40 n. 56). The gum trade also began in the early 1600s at Arguin but only became significant during the latter part of the century. Although it does not feature prominently as part of an analysis focusing on the period 1550–1624, it added an important element to that frontier between the Atlantic and Saharan worlds by the eighteenth century (see Barry, Senegambia, 68, and Webb, Desert Frontier, ‘‘The Trade in Gum Arabic,’’ 97–131, for further discussion of the nature of that role). 51. Governor of Fort Saint Joseph cited in McDougall, ‘‘The Question of Tegaza,’’ in Le Maroc et l’Afrique subsaharienne, 270 n. 75. I take issue here with Barry’s con- clusion (reiterated in the introduction to his section on the eighteenth century) that ‘‘from this time on, Senegambia became the natural outlet from most of western Sudan toward the Atlantic. This redirection of trade routes toward the sea signaled the final victory of the caravel over the caravan. It also marked the definitive decline of the trans- Saharan trade’’ (Senegambia, 57). 52. Michel Abitbol eloquently explained one of the region’s driving dynamics when he concluded that ‘‘Islam and commerce became in the eyes of the eighteenth-century sultans, the best ‘tools’ for penetrating [the Mauritanian Sahara and Sahel], as effective as they were peaceful in nature’’ (‘‘Le maroc et le commerce transsaharien du XVIIe
The Caravel & the Caravan 167 Sahara this was to be were not yet over. In a letter believed to have been written between 1760 and 1790 from a Kunta shaykh (Sidi al-Mukhtar al- Kabir) to the Moroccan sultan, the shaykh alludes to earlier letters sent by 53 the Sultan to his Moroccan representative at the salt mine of Tegaza. They had apparently instructed the representative to collect taxes from everyone extracting Tegaza’s salt. ‘‘Everyone’’ included the Kunta. The shaykh ob- jected, first, because his respected zawiya family should not be required to submit to the authority of a mere qaid (that is, a layperson, uneducated and ‘‘without value’’)—in this case, a direct challenge to the religious legiti- macy of the Moroccan ruler; and second, because the sultan had no right to charge fellow Muslims for accessing salt. According to ancient traditions, the shaykh claimed, ‘‘water, fire, pasture and salt should be free to all.’’ Both aspects of the complaint drew on religious authority and juxtaposed it to secular power, the inference being, of course, that the former should hold sway in this instance. At stake were wealth and status: whose was to char- acterize the Saharan world? A final glimpse of these dynamics, generated by a local tradition often relegated to myth, offers yet another insight into how they were operating in the mid-eighteenth century. It is said that, in 1766–1767, a Kunta shepherd from Wadan was led by a giant lizard to the Ijil saline; it then disappeared into the middle of the sebkha, and salt was discovered. Some versions of this tale continue by saying that the Kunta kept this a secret for a long time because the mine lay close to wells dug by another tribe from southern Morocco, and therefore, by Islamic law, be- longed to them. Eventually, the Kunta chief bought the wells, thereby gain- ing the right to exploit the surrounding lands and the resources lying be- neath them (another reference to religious law). When the previous owners discovered this deceit, they appealed to the local emir to annul the purchase. The Kunta took the case to the sultan of Morocco, who in turn issued a cer- tificate that the deal had been made in good faith and that the Kunta were indeed the new proprietors of Ijil. Apart from casting some doubt on inter- pretations that might have had the Moroccan sultan controlling the mine from the sixteenth century, this account affirms the complexity of power as it was exercised and understood in the eighteenth-century Sahara. The intersection of politics, economics, and religion in this world was still one of siècle au debut du XIXème siècle,’’ Revue de l’occident musulman et de la méditerranée, XXX (1980), 5–19, esp. 9. 53. A partial copy of this letter was obtained in Nouakchott, Mauritania, and made available to me by Mohamed Lahbib Nouhi.
168 e. ann mcdougall uncertainty—but it was clearly not a world subsumed into the Atlantic hin- terland. Not unlike the dynamics unfolding in the rapidly evolving Atlantic world, even a century after the mid-sixteenth– early-seventeenth-century era, the long-term consequences of early Atlantic-Saharan interactions were 54 far from clear, far from inevitable.
54. D. Brosset, ‘‘La saline d’Idjil,’’ Bulletin du comité de l’Afrique français, renseigne- ments coloniaux, XLIII (1933), 259–265 (for the legend, see 259–260); Lt. Berges, ‘‘Salines: Etude sur la Sebkha d’Idjil,’’ unpublished paper, Département de Géologie et des Minières, Nouakchott, Mauritania, n.d. For a discussion of the legend and its vari- ous versions, see E. Ann McDougall, ‘‘Snapshots from the Sahara: ‘Salt,’ the Essence of Being,’’ in David Mattingly et al., eds., The Libyan Desert: Natural Resources and Cultural Heritage, Society for Libyan Studies, monograph no. 6 (London, 2006), 295– 303. See also footnote 36, above.
The Caravel & the Caravan 169 David Northrup the gulf of guinea and the atlantic world QW
In August 1553, Captain Thomas Windham set sail from Portsmouth for the Gulf of Guinea, the middle section of the Atlantic coast of sub-Saharan Africa, below the western bulge the Portuguese called Upper Guinea and above the coast of what they called Angola (West Central Africa). This pio- neering English trading expedition had been carefully organized to gain a share of the trade established by Portuguese mariners during the previous century, and its two ‘‘goodly ships’’ were laden with bolts of woolen and linen cloth, iron bars, brassware, and other small items. Windham called first at the Gold Coast on the western shores of the Gulf of Guinea, where he was successful in exchanging some of his cargo for 2,400 ounces of gold, despite having to stay clear of the main trading sites that the Portuguese had established and fortified. Unsatisfied with this cargo of gold, however, the captain had forced his Portuguese guide to conduct them five hundred miles eastward in search of other goods from the kingdom of Benin in the western Niger Delta. When palace officials in Benin learned of the arrival of Windham’s ships, they dispatched messengers to the port town, who escorted the English merchants and their Portuguese guide to the capital, also known as Benin. In an audience chamber off one of the many courtyards of his sprawling palace, the oba (ruler) welcomed the visitors. Addressing them in Portu- guese, a language he had learned from missionaries as a child, the oba asked their purpose in coming to his kingdom. When the English explained their interest in purchasing a large quantity of Benin’s pungent pepper, which the Portuguese had been sending to Europe for several decades, the oba arranged for the visitors to inspect some sacks of peppercorns stored in a nearby warehouse. In short order, eighty casks of pepper were loaded aboard the English ships anchored offshore. The oba’s eagerness to open trade with a new European country was evi- dent not just in these actions but as well in his offer to sell some pepper on credit, repayable on the next voyage, should the English lack sufficient trade goods. Yet in his hospitality toward the English, the oba was not ne- glectful of what he would receive in return, for the English account says he instructed his commercial agents to assess the quality of the goods the English had brought. Negotiations were successfully completed for the En- glish to purchase a large quantity of pepper, but the commercial success of the expedition came at a high cost. Windham and 100 of the 140 men on the ships perished of tropical diseases while at Benin or after the precipi- tous departure in a single ship. The health risks of the Niger Delta led the English to center their early West African trade on the healthier Gold Coast 1 and even more in Senegambia. The details of Windham’s voyage should make it clear that Africans were able to deal with Europeans from positions of strength and understanding in the mid-sixteenth century and needed no persuasion to enlarge their At- lantic trade. The reasons for African interest and for their trading skills are not hard to find. Whereas, for the English, 1553 marked the beginning of a risky new trading venture in tropical Africa, for the Africans of the Gulf of Guinea, it marked the opening of a third period in their commercial ex- changes with distant lands. African encounters with the English between the mid-sixteenth and mid-seventeenth centuries—and with the Dutch and French, who soon joined them—were built upon several decades of Atlan- tic exchanges with the Portuguese. Before that, there had been several cen- turies of commercial and cultural interactions among the peoples in the hin- terland of the Gulf of Guinea and between them and the other regions of Africa extending all the way to the Mediterranean. A review of the two prior phases will enable one to see the period after 1550 in its African historical context.
Trade before the Opening of the Atlantic Long-distance trade in West Africa has a long history. Even if some of the history cannot be fully documented, exchanges of local surpluses between different ecological zones and of unevenly distributed minerals must have existed for a considerable time. A startling archaeological discovery pro- vides a convenient point from which to begin the analysis of the centuries before the opening of the Atlantic. From two sites excavated in 1959 in the
1. Richard Eden’s memoir of Thomas Windham’s voyage to Guinea and Benin, in John William Blake, ed. and trans., Europeans in West Africa, 1450–1560 (London, 1942), 314–320. For a broader treatment of the English at Benin, see A. F. C. Ryder, Benin and the Europeans, 1485–1897 (London, 1969), 76–84.
The Gulf of Guinea & the Atlantic World 171 village of Igbo-Ukwu, due east of Benin City on the other side of the Niger River, came dramatic evidence of concentrated wealth and long-distance trade that dated to the ninth century. More than seven hundred metal ob- jects survived a millennium of concealment in the earth. Iron objects had been degraded by their long burial, but a number of well-preserved, large objects in bronze provide evidence of great artistic skill and technical cast- ing ability as well as a wide network of trade. Analysis of the mixture of metals in the castings conclusively linked them to sites in the Benue River valley 200 miles to the northeast. The subsequent development of the artis- tic and technological skills evident at Igbo-Ukwu can be traced through other copper-based castings from Benin and from Ife and other Yoruba sites northwest of Benin that are now displayed in museums throughout the world. These objects also confirm an even broader range of trade, since the copper alloys used in them have a distinctively different composition from those at Igbo-Ukwu. The most likely sources for these ores are in the Sa- hara. It has also been argued that some of the 165,000 beads in various ma- terials recovered from Igbo-Ukwu were made in India and the Mediterra- 2 nean. Other details of trading activities before the opening of the Atlantic can be inferred from descriptions by early Portuguese visitors. The ready mar- ket that the Portuguese found on the Gold Coast for cloth, beads, slaves, and other items from Benin and adjacent areas strongly suggests that such a trade had been conducted before the arrival of the first Europeans, through the intercoastal lagoons and creeks that connect these two distant locations. In addition, early Portuguese accounts appear to confirm that trade goods were already moving up and down the lower Niger River in giant canoes through networks of regularly spaced markets. Some form of this trading 3 system must have existed as far back as the time of Igbo-Ukwu. No speculative guesses are necessary when it comes to explaining the an- tiquity of gold trade from West Africa. Both Muslim and European sources attest to the prominence of gold in the trade across the Sahara and to its im- portance in the rise of the giant and wealthy medieval African states of the western Sudan. At least from 1415, the Portuguese were well aware that the
2. Thurstan Shaw, Igbo-Ukwu: An Account of Archaeological Discoveries in Eastern Nigeria (London, 1970); Peter Garlake, Early Art and Architecture of Africa, Oxford History of Art (London, 2002), 117–139. 3. David Northrup, Trade without Rulers: Pre-colonial Economic Development in South-eastern Nigeria (Oxford, 1978), 22–29.
172 david northrup sources of the gold lay below the Sahara, and getting access to it was a major reason their ships sailed south along the Atlantic coast of Africa. The gold fields in the hinterland of the Gold Coast became part of this trading sys- tem from about 1000. The rapid growth of the gold exports from the Gold Coast via the Atlantic after 1480 (examined below) shows the existence of 4 surplus production that could be diverted to new markets. Another piece of evidence for the importance of trade to the north comes from the trans- formation of the name of the Portuguese main outpost on the Gold Coast. The Portuguese named the coastal fort they erected in 1482 São Jorge da Mina, which was commonly shortened to Mina in early documents. How- ever, by the seventeenth century, European accounts were identifying it as Elmina, not, it would seem, as the result of some corruption of a Romance language, but because to local Africans, mina (the mine) sounded like the Arabic el mina (the port). The influence of Arabic this far south confirms the strength of the trading connections to the north. Finally, the existence of regional currencies demonstrates that the trade of coastal West Africa before the opening of the Atlantic was not confined to limited luxury goods but permeated general activities. A trading cur- rency based on the shell of the cowrie, a tropical marine gastropod found in the Indian Ocean, became established in the western Sudan through the trans-Saharan trade at least by the eleventh century and gradually spread southward. The evidence is too slender to confirm that the shell currency at Benin was based on Indian Ocean cowries instead of an Atlantic shell, as was the case at the Kingdom of Kongo farther south along the coast, but the former possibility is consistent with the fact that the demand for cow- rie shells at Benin was so great that, by about 1540, the kingdom was im- porting vast quantities of them from the Portuguese, whose ships carried them from the Indian Ocean as ballast. In parts of West Africa, cowries and gold functioned as dual currencies with fixed rates of exchange. Gold Coast Africans calculated values using standardized weights of gold, the earliest of which were based on weights used in the distant trading cities of Jenne 5 and Timbuktu in the western Sudan.
4. This evidence is summarized by E.W. Bovill, The Golden Trade of the Moors, 2d ed. (London, 1968), 79–119. 5. Marion Johnson, ‘‘The Cowrie Currencies of West Africa,’’ Journal of African History, XI (1970), 17–49; Ray A. Kea, Settlements, Trade, and Politics in the Seven- teenth-Century Gold Coast (Baltimore, 1982), 186–193; Ryder, Benin, 60–61.
The Gulf of Guinea & the Atlantic World 173 The Opening of the Atlantic The arrival of the Portuguese opened a new link in this commercial chain. It seems instructive that the three West African coasts that attracted the great- est amount of European trade before 1650—Senegambia, the Gold Coast, and the Niger Delta—were locales that already had strong long-distance trading connections to the interior. Africans in these coastal areas were most prepared to respond to new trading connections, and such African re- sponses shaped the patterns of trade at least as much as did the activities of the Europeans. It may also be instructive (though beyond the scope of this essay) that West Central Africa, where trade grew fastest and became the 6 most disruptive, had no such long-distance connections. For Africans along the Gulf of Guinea, the Atlantic brought a number of advantages they were eager to exploit—and a minimum of risks. Although the goods that came via the Atlantic were not essentially different from what they already possessed, these new sources were potentially cheaper, since they avoided the heavy carriage costs and many middlemen of the overland trade. Ships were also capable of providing more abundant quantities of sought-after items, whether rare and precious or commonplace. The Por- tuguese records make it plain that, once Africans recovered from the alien appearance of their unexpected visitors from the sea, they quickly moved to encourage European contacts and to keep the visitors under control. The Portuguese request to establish their first official trading post on the Gold Coast in 1482 provides a clear example of this dual strategy. As the Portuguese account relates, the local ruler showed a strong apprecia- tion of the advantages of making his territory the site of a fixed trading post and a realistically low assessment of the dangers that might result from this new connection. The local delegation processed to the place of negotia- tions dressed in their best attire and accompanied by music. In response to the Portuguese spokesman’s request for permission to erect a trading struc- ture near the coast, the chief (whose name, the Portuguese recorded, was Caramansa) welcomed them, noting how superior these well-dressed offi- cial delegates appeared compared to the few scruffy Portuguese freebooters who had preceded them. Caramansa archly suggested that any attempts at high-handed dealings would be incompatible with the aristocratic status of such men as these, but he went on to warn that, should they or future Por- tuguese be tempted to try any improper tactics, he had only to withdraw a
6. For some discussion, see David Northrup, Africa’s Discovery of Europe, 1450– 1850 (New York, 2002), 53–54.
174 david northrup short distance to deprive them of access to the gold they sought. Trouble emerged almost immediately when Portuguese workmen began clearing the site before Caramansa had received the rich present he required for allowing a foreign presence on his soil. The leaders of the expedition moved quickly to provide him with Moroccan cloths, brass basins and bracelets (manillas), and other cloths, and they were careful to compensate local Africans for any 7 damage they did to existing dwellings. In short order, São Jorge da Mina became the Portuguese headquarters on the Gold Coast, but Europeans continued to receive sharp reminders when they neglected to respect their hosts. In 1570, in retaliation for a Por- tuguese attack, an alliance of two African communities captured and killed over three hundred Portuguese at Mina, decorating the grave of an African king with the skulls of fifty of them. Eight years later, another Gold Coast community avenged Portuguese violence by seizing the Portuguese outpost at Accra, razing it to the ground, and killing its inhabitants. Africans had reason to be as mindful of restoring good relations as they were in defending against European aggression. A Dutch account by Pieter de Marees relates that, after a group of Dutchmen on another part of the Gold Coast in 1598 had disregarded African warnings not to cut branches in a sacred grove, a group of villagers chased the Dutch away by force and killed and beheaded one of them. The next day, inhabitants of the village brought the man who had done the beheading to the Dutch and decapitated him in recompense. ‘‘From this one can see,’’ de Marees observes, ‘‘how 8 eager they were to maintain their friendship with the Dutch.’’ The kingdom of Benin had responded to the first official Portuguese con- tacts in 1486 in a welcoming way and with a degree of sophistication be- fitting so powerful a kingdom. After listening to the request for trade, the oba dispatched the head of his port town to Lisbon, where, Portuguese ac- counts say, the ambassador made a very favorable impression:
This ambassador was a man of good speech and natural wisdom. Great feasts were held in his honour, and he was shown many of the good things of these kingdoms. He returned to his land in a ship of the king’s, who at his departure made him a gift of rich clothes for himself and his wife;
7. Ruy de Pina’s chronicle of King João II, in Blake, ed. and trans., Europeans in West Africa, 70–78. 8. Pieter de Marees, Description and Historical Account of the Gold Kingdom of Guinea (1602), ed. and trans. Albert van Dantzig and Adam Jones (Oxford, 1987), 44– 97, quotation on 83.
The Gulf of Guinea & the Atlantic World 175 and through him he also sent a rich present to the king of such things as 9 he understood he would greatly prize.
There is no record of exactly what the ambassador reported upon his re- turn to Benin, but his impressions of Portugal were clearly positive enough for Benin officials to engage in significant trade with Portugal, while taking great care to turn this new relationship to their advantage. In a custom that became widespread along the Gulf of Guinea, visiting ships had to make rich gifts to the ruler and other officials to ‘‘open’’ the markets. In 1522, for example, officers of the Portuguese vessel São Miguel presented the oba with 20 ounces of coral, 4 Indian caps, and 10.5 yards of red satin. By that date, three other Benin officials had been assigned to handle the Atlan- tic trade, and each of them also received a customary gift consisting of 20 yards of cloth. The kingdom additionally collected tribute from neighbor- ing African states that wished to remain on good terms with their powerful neighbor. In the total context of Benin’s commercial activities, the Portu- guese trade was modest in importance, but it provided useful and attractive 10 items. By 1550, the Gulf of Guinea’s connection to the Portuguese was past its peak, as the Portuguese focused their attention on the expanding trades of Angola and the Indian Ocean. The fading of the once-flourishing Por- tuguese trades made West Africans eager to open new relations with the other European nations that were beginning to penetrate the Portuguese monopoly. As illustrated earlier by the account of the oba of Benin’s recep- tion of English merchants in 1553, the experience Africans had gained in dealing with the Portuguese made them well prepared to do so from posi- tions of understanding and strength. For their part, the new northern European visitors had much to learn about their African trading partners. Although ethnocentrism inevitably colored their understanding, their accounts of what they saw do not display the racial bias that would distort accounts from centuries later. Unlike the piratical approach John Hawkins would adopt in Upper Guinea, these prac- tical men were concerned to establish trading relations that were profitable and long-term. A revealing example of this strategy and the reasons for it comes from a member of a prominent London merchant family, John Lok, who led a trading expedition to the Gold Coast in 1554. In his account of the expe-
9. Ruy de Pina’s chronicle of King João II, in Blake, ed. and trans., Europeans in West Africa, 78–79. 10. Ryder, Benin, 32–75, 164–168, 295–306.
176 david northrup dition, written for the benefit of others in England, he stressed the wealth of Gold Coast Africans, who adorned themselves with ivory and gold. He also noted that they were very skilled traders, a point that the Dutch com- mented on in detail a half-century later. De Marees emphasized that African traders were adept in detecting any attempt to defraud them and noted how particular they were in their preferences for goods brought from Europe: ‘‘When we have brought them things they did not like, they have mocked us in a scandalous way.’’ Lok returned to England from a second voyage to the Gold Coast with five African men whom he set to learning English so that they might serve future English merchants as interpreters. At least three of these men later became brokers and intermediaries in the trade on the Gold 11 Coast, roles that Africans would dominate for the next three centuries. However, the English lacked the resources to establish an important trad- ing settlement on the Gold Coast until the 1630s, by which time they had been surpassed by the Dutch. Having initially failed to capture the Portu- guese castle at Mina, the Dutch set up their first permanent Gold Coast settlement, Fort Nassau, in 1612. Whether through better connections or as a result of other circumstances, the annual exports of gold expanded in 1618 to three times what they had been in the later sixteenth century. In 1637, 12 they seized Elmina for good. Relations at Benin followed a similar pattern, though Europeans there were even more subordinate since the powerful kingdom did not permit them to erect any outposts on its territory. For their part, Europeans were impressed with Benin not just because of the commercial possibilities of the kingdom’s pepper (Piper guineense), its cotton textiles, and its ivory, but also because of its striking capital city, its large palace complex, and its artisans’ great skill. Many sixteenth- and seventeenth-century visitors com- mented extensively on Benin’s capital city, which was surrounded by a mas- sive earthen wall five or six miles in circumference and pierced at intervals by large gates fashioned from the trunk of a single tree. From the gates, broad streets ran in straight lines across the city, intersecting at right angles. Dutch accounts deemed the thirty main streets to be as wide as the great avenues of Amsterdam. Within the city, the houses of ordinary citizens had
11. Richard Eden’s account of John Lok’s voyage to Mina, 1554–1555, in Blake, ed. and trans., Europeans in West Africa, 326–346; Peter Fryer, Staying Power: The History of Black People in Britain (London, 1984), 5–7; de Marees, Description, 54; P. E. H. Hair and Robin Law, ‘‘The English in Western Africa to 1700,’’ in Nicholas P. Canny, ed., Oxford History of the British Empire, I, The Origins of Empire: British Over- seas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century (Oxford, 1998), 250–255. 12. Kea, Settlements, 192–194.
The Gulf of Guinea & the Atlantic World 177 earthen walls and thatched roofs, which European observers considered airy and very pleasant. Their walls and floors were polished ‘‘as smooth and 13 even as any plastered wall in Holland and as shining as a looking-glass.’’ The city’s notables lived within the palace complex, which was a veri- table city in itself, said by the Dutch to be easily as big as the town of Haar- lem. A German account of 1603 estimated the palace precincts were as large as the entire city of Tübingen and compared the size and ceremony of the oba’s annual public procession on horseback through the city to a papal ap- pearance in Rome in a jubilee year. The palace complex was enclosed by a second set of earthen walls. Between the many structures inside ran ‘‘beau- tiful long galleries about as big as the Exchange at Amsterdam.’’ The pil- lars of the galleries were covered with bronze castings of scenes from the kingdom’s history. A Spanish account judged the representations of men, animals, and birds on the brass plaques to be as finely worked as if they had been made with an engraving tool by a Spanish silversmith. Today, ex- amples of these plaques, removed during the British expedition of 1897, are prized collections of the Metropolitan Museum, the British Museum, and 14 other collections. In addition to their praise of Benin’s city planning, architecture, and bronze casting, European visitors commented favorably on the quality of Benin’s cotton textiles (blue or blue with white stripes), stone beads, woven baskets and mats, as well as pottery. A late-sixteenth-century English ac- count lauded the skill of Benin’s ivory carvers, who made spoons adorned with depictions of fowl and wild animals. In addition, the kingdom’s armor- ers made swords, spears, arrowheads, shields, and bows. Some Europeans brought examples of these objects back home as curiosities, along with sou- venirs of Benin’s musical instruments (horns, drums, and flutes). Nor were the skills of Benin’s farmers confined to the cotton they grew for the local textile industry and the peppercorns they grew for export. Benin’s farmers also raised yams, oranges, plantains and bananas (which, an English ac- count explained, resembled cucumbers), along with hot peppers, palm oil, 15 and palm wine.
13. Newly translated from the Dutch account of Olfert Dapper (1668) in Thomas Hodgkin, ed., Nigerian Perspectives: An Historical Anthology, 2d ed. (Oxford, 1975), 159–161. 14. Andreas Josua Ultzheimer, translated in Basil Davidson, African Civilization Revisited: From Antiquity to Modern Times (Trenton, N.J., 1991), 235–236; Alonso de Sandoval, De instauranda Aethiopum salute: El mundo de la esclavitud negra en Amé- rica (Bogotá, 1956), 78–79, a reissue of Sandoval’s 1627 work. 15. James Welch, ‘‘A Voyage to Benin beyond the Countrey of Guinea...inthe
178 david northrup The tone of these European accounts is reminiscent of the awestruck ac- counts early European visitors wrote of the empires and cities of Asia. To be sure, the earthen walls of the palace complex in Benin were worlds apart from the precincts of the Forbidden City of Beijing. However, in many ways, Benin was perceived as closer to that world than to the Native American nations of the Chesapeake and New England. Nevertheless, the size of Benin’s capital, its palace complex, and its elabo- rate bureaucratic governance were unique in coastal West Africa. Elsewhere along the Gulf of Guinea, centralized political institutions were hard to find until well after 1650. So it is all the more remarkable that the small com- munities on the Gold Coast and east of Benin, which were often little more than clusters of a few neighboring villages, were also so successful in deal- ing with Atlantic traders. As has been seen, minor rulers on the Gold Coast proved adept at supplying gold for export, driving hard bargains, and de- fending their rights against Europeans. Two factors worked to the advan- tage of these small polities. First, although there is little direct evidence of the particulars of their political and social structures, it is clear that even small-scale societies possessed sufficient internal organization to put for- ward a united front and maintain reasonable order in commercial relations. Second, their political fragmentation was balanced by the widespread trad- ing networks and the professional traders who plied them. It is notable that, despite their intense interest in gaining direct access to the gold exported from the Gold Coast, the Portuguese and northern Europeans were abso- lutely unable to penetrate inland or even to learn with any degree of accu- racy how far the gold deposits were from the coast. The small-scale societies, rather than centralized monarchies, were also characteristic of other parts of the Gulf. The coast between the Gold Coast and Benin attracted only a few European visitors before 1600, but there- after, the local ports began to rise in importance and eventually became known as the Slave Coast. To the east of Benin, along the Bight of Biafra, political and social organization were similarly fragmented, but it, too, proved capable of considerable involvement in the Atlantic trade after 1650. Any penetration inland by Europeans was effectively blocked until after 1800. Although contemporary European accounts are quite clear on the bal-
Yeere 1588,’’ in Richard Hakluyt, ed., The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques, and Discoveries of the English Nation ...,8vols.(London,1927),IV,295–297;D.R., ‘‘A Description and Historical Declaration of the Golden Kingdom of Guinea...,’’in Samuel Purchas, comp., Purchas His Pilgrimage ...,4thed.(London,1626), 716.
The Gulf of Guinea & the Atlantic World 179 ance of mutual interests that existed, it is necessary to emphasize this point because older historiographies continue to influence popular understanding of these relations. After the rise of European imperial power in the nine- teenth century, it became common to rewrite the histories of earlier inter- actions in Africa in terms of heroic and all-powerful Europeans and weak and inept Africans. This tradition survives in a curious way. Much as Marx wrote that he had found Hegel standing on his head and turned him right side up, neo-Marxist champions of Africa turned the pro-imperial argu- ment upside down: Africans became more central to the story but primarily as victims subordinate to all-powerful Europeans, who were now villains rather than heroes. No work did more to spread this revisionist message than How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, published in 1972 by the Afro- Guyanese scholar Walter Rodney and still widely read. This angry and tendentious work projected the unhappy situation of colonial and postcolo- nial Africa backward through the centuries. The earlier the era being dis- cussed, the more distortion his simple message of inequality seemed to in- troduce. Fortunately, modern historians of Africa and the Atlantic have moved back to reading the influence of Africa in a more balanced matter. Much of this work has focused on the era after 1650, when slaves dominated Africa’s exports, a factor that creates its own problems. A few brave souls have tackled the earlier period, notably Basil Davidson in his pioneering first edition of The African Slave Trade (1961) and, more recently, John Thorn- ton in Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400–1680 (1992). These works effectively challenged readers to contemplate an At- lantic world in which Africans and Europeans had different strengths but worked out mutually satisfactory relationships that endured for centuries 16 until interrupted by the New Imperialism of the late nineteenth century.
Africa’s Imports and Exports Although older accounts of Africa’s involvement in Atlantic trade tended to concentrate on what Africans exported, modern historians of Africa have found that goods they chose to import provide even more insight into their engagement with the Atlantic. For the most part, as Thornton has argued, the imports were nothing new, consisting of the kinds of goods that Africans
16. Davidson’s book first appeared in Britain under the title Black Mother; a revised edition appeared from Atlantic Monthly Press in 1980. Thornton subsequently pub- lished a second edition (1998) with Cambridge University Press that included a new chapter taking parts of the story as far as 1800.
180 david northrup were already producing themselves—textiles, metals, and items of personal adornment. However, two things made the imports particularly desirable: they included novel designs and materials and they were attractively priced. One his first voyage to West Africa in 1555, William Townsend noted that the more important men at the western end of the Gold Coast wore locally made cloth wrapped around their middles and locally made cloth caps, whereas some of their servants wore smaller waist cloths and simpler caps. He indicated that their ropes and fishing lines were made from the backs of trees and that they possessed very finely made iron hooks, fish- hooks, ‘‘darts,’’ and much larger double-sided ‘‘daggers’’ with finely curved edges. A half-century later, de Marees also noted that Gold Coast Africans were ‘‘very clever at making weapons’’ as well as skilled using them, a point 17 he illustrated by recounting their military success against the Portuguese. After some hard bargaining, Townsend’s African partners agreed to ex- change some of their gold for English cloth, brass basins, and other small items. Two-thirds of the items Gold Coast Africans bought from the Dutch between 1593 and 1607 were also textiles. That Gold Coast Africans im- ported textiles in such quantities from the Atlantic (both European-made and made elsewhere in Africa) clearly did not reflect their inability to pro- duce such goods themselves. Two other factors point to the logic of this de- mand. First, the demand for cloth was highly elastic, especially when the price was attractive. Second, European cloths were novelties; their wool, linen, and silk fibers were not those used by West African weavers, and most of the forty different designs, colors, and textures that the Dutch fur- nished were particularly novel. Sometimes novelty commanded a premium price, as in the case of luxurious textiles and clothing intended for the elite, but most of the cloths were intended for a broader market where they had to compete with African-made textiles for attention and price. After textiles, metals and metalware had the next largest share of the trade goods brought by the Dutch. Although this category included basins, buckets, pots, and pans made of copper or tin that were high-priced counter- parts to African vessels made of pottery, wood, or gourds, most of the metal goods were also aimed at a broader market. Some were fabricated tools and weapons (axes, hatchets, spades, knives) of familiar and unfamiliar designs, but it is notable that iron bars constituted the greatest share of metal im- 18 ports. Iron smelting was widespread in sub-Saharan Africa and had been around since remote antiquity, so the high demand for iron bars (and cop-
17. De Marees, Description, 92. 18. Kea, Settlements, 207–209.
The Gulf of Guinea & the Atlantic World 181 per rods in some places) strongly suggests that these imports were desired to supplement an inadequate supply and that the cost of European-made metals was part of the attraction. Skilled African blacksmiths found new employment in turning the iron into familiar goods. The Atlantic traders also brought a number of goods that were inno- vations in the West African market. American tobacco, introduced by the Portuguese, found a ready market on the Gold Coast by the mid-1600s. A German observer reported both men and women were great smokers and carried tobacco in little bags around their necks ‘‘as if it were a precious jewel.’’ The Portuguese also supplied small quantities of firearms, and Afri- can pressures on Dutch traders led them to sell muskets to some Gold Coast communities in sufficient quantities in the early seventeenth century that, with some training by Dutch and Portuguese instructors, some Africans became adept in their use. However, the Dutch suspended these firearm 19 sales until 1660, so such weapons had little impact until the 1700s. By the mid-seventeenth century, some Africans on the Gold Coast, both men and women, had acquired a taste for another novelty, distilled spirits in the form of French brandy, although neither Dutch gin nor English gin was yet found desirable. All of these products would greatly expand in volume in the centuries after 1650, but none was yet a significant import. There is little reason to think that the growth of Atlantic imports di- minished existing African production of cloth or metals. As later European accounts attest, West Africans continued to produce their own textiles and metalware for several centuries while supplementing them with additional supplies and novel designs from abroad. In the seventeenth century, for ex- ample, Benin continued to weave its own cotton textiles and to export this highly prized cloth via the Dutch, who resold them on the Gold Coast, where the Portuguese had found a ready market for Benin cloth in the pre- vious century. Between 1644 and 1646, the Dutch purchased at least six- teen thousand Benin cloths, and a single English vessel is known to have loaded some four thousand pieces of the prized cloth. It is not clear whether the extensive transshipments of locally made beads from Benin to the Gold 20 Coast also continued past the early Portuguese period.
19. Otto Friedrich von der Groeben, translated in Adam Jones, Brandenburg Sources for West African History, 1680–1700 (Stuttgart, 1985), 25; R. A. Kea, ‘‘Fire- arms and Warfare on the Gold and Slave Coasts from the Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Centuries,’’ Journal of African History, XII (1971), 185–213; Kea, Settlements, 154–163. 20. Duarte Pacheco Pereira, Esmeraldo de situ orbis: Côte occidentale d’Afrique du sud moroccain au Gabon, ed. and trans. Raymond Mauny (Bissau, 1956), 134, 138, 146; Ryder, Benin, 93–95; Kea, Settlements, 216, 234.
182 david northrup It also seems that the Atlantic trade of this period produced only incre- mental alterations in established African trading relations. The significant quantities of gold exported the first two centuries of the Atlantic trade obvi- ously represented a new outlet for local miners and merchants, one that brought in attractive new trade goods. Because shipping costs via the ocean would have been much lower than those occasioned by the sending of gold northward and the receiving of similar trade goods overland from the Medi- terranean, the terms of the new Atlantic trade were probably very attractive to Gold Coast Africans. However, if the opening of Atlantic trade provided new outlets for gold, there is no evidence that it seriously diminished older overland trading networks in this period. Rather, the Atlantic became an additional link in the already existing chain of relationships. As the actions of the oba of Benin in 1553 vividly illustrate, Africans on the Gulf of Guinea were eager sellers in that trade and had numerous com- modities to offer. The next English expedition to Benin, in 1588, brought home pepper, ivory, palm oil, cotton cloth, and bark cloth. Pepper remained Benin’s principal export to the English (and to the Dutch, who displaced them in the 1590s), along with some ivory and, as already seen, consider- able quantities of cottons and akori beads intended for resale on the Gold Coast. As Asian supplies of pepper became more abundant by the 1630s, the Dutch purchased less from Benin, but strong demand for the kingdom’s 21 cotton cloth and beads on the Gold Coast made up the difference. Benin’s exports were very largely produced locally and were under close direction of the state, but the gold exported from the Gold Coast, the most valuable export of this period from the entire Gulf of Guinea, was imported from some distance inland and thus passed through a number of hands on its way to the many outlets on the Atlantic. Between 1601 and 1636, the Gold Coast exported an average of 32,000 ounces of gold a year into the At- lantic. At century’s end, it was considerably higher. Another valuable export was ivory (about 160,000 pounds a year in 1601–1636). Although records for this period are fragmentary, inanimate goods constituted about 95 per- cent of the value of exports from the Gulf of Guinea and Upper Guinea in 22 1623–1632, the rest being made up of slaves.
21. Ryder, Benin, 76–98. 22. Calculated from Ernst van den Boogaart, ‘‘The Trade between Western Africa and the Atlantic World, 1600–1690: Estimates of Trends in Composition and Value,’’ Journal of African History, XXXIII (1992), 372–377. See also David Eltis, ‘‘The Rela- tive Importance of Slaves and Commodities in the Atlantic Trade of Seventeenth- Century Africa,’’ Journal of African History, XXXV (1994), 237–249. Boogaart esti- mated that slaves represented 27 percent of the value of Atlantic Africa’s exports in
The Gulf of Guinea & the Atlantic World 183 table 1. Estimated Volume of the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1500–1700 (in thousands) West Upper Gulf of Central Guinea Guinea Africa Total