Transatlantic relations – How to achieve more
Jaap Ora Director of Division, 2nd Political Department, MFA
Introduction This article will focus on relations between the European Union and the United States. The title refers to transatlantic relations, as this is what the EU-U.S. relationship is generally called in both offi cial and research discourse. In fact, EU-U.S. relations are only one element among the many interconnected links that form the relationship between Europe and North America in its entirety. These links include the security relationship of the North Atlantic Alliance; the co- operation between the EU and the United States, originally economic but increasingly expanding into other areas; the regional dimension where different formats of the U.S. and selected European countries add their value to the overall framework; and bilateral relations between individual European countries and the United States. The scale of transatlantic economic interdependence and the broad notion of security make it necessary to view these links in close connection and also make sure that these formats support each other. Estonia regards these links as essential for the politi- cal, economic and security interests of all participants. In this context, Estonia favours close EU-U.S. co-operation and has promoted its development since its accession to the European Union.
The EU-U.S. relationship has in recent years acquired increased prominence and signifi - cance. This increase has taken place not at the expense of the other formats mentioned above, but due to the wider scope of transatlantic co-operation and deepened EU in- tegration, which has allowed the EU-U.S. relationship to acquire more substance and weight. This article, examining the developments of EU-U.S. relations, is divided into two parts. The fi rst half looks at the characteristics of the EU-U.S. relationship and indi- cates measures that can be taken to further reinforce it. The second part examines some challenging areas of EU-U.S. co-operation, which are high priorities for Estonia, to see how they have developed during the last year and what are the future perspectives.
23 2010 ESTONIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS YEARBOOK
Two important institutional relationships As stated above, the countries of Europe and the United States are linked through two important institutional relationships, one involving NATO and the other the European Union. It is often said, notably in recent analyses, that the EU-U.S. relationship is underdeveloped and its full potential has not been utilised. It is understandable that the EU-U.S. co-operation mechanism is less mature than that of NATO. In NATO, the main transatlantic security institution, member states exercise the traditional form of allied co-operation. European countries, the U.S. and Canada sit around one table as equal individual members and make decisions based on a consensus. This means constant close communication between countries on both sides of the Atlantic. The Alliance focuses on a clearly defi ned range of issues. As the matters that the Alliance deals with concern the realm of ultimate security, fast and effi cient decision-making and an expecta- tion of the ability to gather around a joint cause is The EU-U.S. relationship is un- essential. The member states share not only the ex- derdeveloped and its full po- perience of facing a common threat, but also of the tential has not been utilised. successful adaptation to changed circumstances.
The EU-U.S. relationship, involving to a great extent the same countries, is remarkably different in many aspects. For a long time, defi ned by the nature of the European Com- munities, it was mainly a trade and economic relationship. This changed in the 1990s, as the EU started to develop closer integration in the security and defence sphere. As the EU is aiming for a common approach to security and defence matters, the notion of security itself is changing. Military defence remains at the core of national security concerns; developments in other areas have increasing implications for security. The EU has signifi cant capabilities in areas that are relevant to the notion of comprehensive security. If the transatlantic partners want to effectively address the consequences of the global economic crises or climate change, the EU-U.S. format is the most appropriate one. In many areas, such as addressing regional crises, combating terrorism or post- confl ict reconstruction, the EU and NATO share responsibilities.
Adaptation to new requirements As mentioned above, the scope and signifi cance of the EU-U.S. partnership is increas- ing. The areas where the EU has acquired more responsibility have truly strategic sig- nifi cance. Yet, as several transatlantic observers argue, the EU-U.S. relationship itself is not yet strategic1. In an effort to fi nd ways to adapt the relationship to the current challenges, the processes and politics of EU-U.S. relations are under scrutiny.
1 R.D. Asmus, “New purposes, New Plumbing. Rebuilding the Atlantic Alliance”, Eurasiascapes, Holidays (November/ December) 2008, retrieved 25 November 2009,
24 TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS – HOW TO ACHIEVE MORE 2010
President Barack Obama meeting with President Toomas Hendrik Ilves in the White House on 15 June 2009. Photo: Pete Souza, White House
Regarding the processes and mechanisms, it is im- portant to bear in mind the unique features that The EU calls the U.S. a “stra- make this relationship different from traditional tegic partner”, just as it calls institutional or state-to-state relations. First, in some of its other important in- contrast to NATO, where the transatlantic partners terlocutors. sit around one table, in EU-U.S. relations the part- ners, mostly the same countries, sit on opposite sides of the table. It means that there is no such experience of joint decision-making, and reaching binding agreements is more complicated. Decision-making is time-con- suming as intra-EU decisions have to be approved before the two parties – the EU and U.S. – can compare their positions. The U.S. is formally regarded as any other third country the EU does business with. The unique, qualitatively different nature of the transatlantic relationship is not refl ected in the offi cial arrangements. The EU calls the U.S. a “strategic partner”, just as it calls some of its other important interlocutors. But if, as argued above, the EU-U.S. partnership in all its closeness is actually not yet truly strategic, what should we say about the other partnerships with a similar label?
There is no easy way to compensate for this structural issue, and no major change is foreseen in the medium-term perspective. Yet it is possible to re-examine the co- operation mechanisms as they are, and update them according to contemporary needs. EU-U.S. co-operation mechanisms are based on the New Transatlantic Agenda
25 2010 ESTONIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS YEARBOOK
adopted in 1995. It means they have accommodated the changes brought by the Treaty of Maastricht, but not those of the Treaty of Nice, the Lisbon Treaty, or by the enlargement. The scope of co-operation has increased enormously, so it is important to ensure that the co-operation mechanisms, including preparations for the summits and the summits themselves, ministerial meetings, and dialogue at other levels refl ect this change.
Another important point is that the EU is not a state actor, and it does not perform tasks similar to In this situation, further strength- those of a state in a similar manner. We recognise ening of EU-U.S. co-operation that further strengthening of the common foreign needs several pillars. and security policy is needed and work to achieve that. Nevertheless, in the foreseeable future policy- making in the EU will remain different from that of a nation state. In terms of process, it is technically easier for the EU and the U.S. to co-operate on areas where member states have delegated their sovereignty fully or in part to the EU. This is refl ected in the institutionally more advanced frameworks, notably in the Transatlantic Economic Council to discuss further co-operation in this sphere or the recently established Energy Council. In the sphere of common foreign and security policy the situation is more sophisticated. At EU-U.S. meetings, the U.S. side can speak for the whole range of foreign policy, while the EU side has to take into account the intergovernmental nature of the common and foreign policy. EU-U.S. co-operation is similar to the character of the EU itself – not always spectacular or outwardly impressive, occasionally slow to take ef- fect, but where in place, deeply rooted and with lasting consequences. In this situation, further strengthening of EU-U.S. co-operation needs several pillars. First, expanding and reinforcing EU common policies and taking more responsibility for global affairs. This is an effort of a general nature which the EU is undertaking nonetheless. It is not an issue specifi c to the EU-U.S. relationship, but general progress in strengthening the EU common foreign and security policy would also be benefi cial in this context. Second, working closer together on areas where the EU already has a strong common policy – co-ordinating actions and working for achieving practical results. And third, further dialogue on fundamental issues – major developments in global security, joint principles, common goals and the means to achieve them.
Developments in 2009 and beyond The year began with the inauguration of the new U.S. president and ended with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Both sides of the Atlantic were determined to take advantage of this fresh start and fi nd ways to expand and deepen the relationship.
Two summits took place during the year. At the fi rst one, on 5 April, all the EU heads of state or government participated. The meeting allowed for the initial political contact
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and exchange of views on the most pressing issues, including the economic and fi nan- cial crisis, Afghanistan, and climate change. For the U.S. president, the summit was part of his European tour that also included a NATO summit, a G-20 meeting in London, and, notably, a visit to Turkey. The traditional summit, with the Swedish presidency, Commis- sion President and High Representative on the EU side, initially planned for June, took place on 3 November in Washington. The summit covered a broad range of global and regional issues. The main practical results of the summit were achieved in the areas of development co-operation and co-operation in the sphere of energy.
Some of the areas of EU-U.S. co-operation, which are particularly high also on Esto- nia’s agenda – Afghanistan, energy, development co-operation, and transformation in countries east of the EU – are analysed in more detail below.
Signifi cant developments took place regarding international co-operation in Afghanistan. In March 2009, President Obama laid out his new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and in a speech on 1 December he specifi ed the ways the strategy will be implemented. The EU shares with the United States the understanding that in order to achieve progress in Afghanistan, military and civilian measures and close attention to Pakistan are all cru- cial. On 27 October, the EU announced a plan for strengthening action in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The plan focuses on areas where additional efforts are necessary and where the EU can offer added value, fi rst of all increasing the civilian capacity of the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The stronger EU involvement builds on the heavy transatlantic interaction that has taken place in the form of the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force). Although the most diffi cult and dangerous part of the activities in Afghanistan are on the shoulders of the (NATO) military, it is appropriate for the EU to treat the question of Afghanistan with the same urgency. European soldiers are risking their lives, and the security implications of instability in Afghanistan are felt across the transatlantic space with no institutional distinction. Afghanistan remains the biggest transatlantic challenge and close EU-NATO-U.S. co-operation is essential in order to succeed.
Another area where Estonia supports strong transatlantic co-operation is the engage- ment in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood. The ultimate goal would be to achieve the same level of transformation in the economy and governance of these countries as we have seen in most of Europe. On the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, we can speak about the impressive results of transformation and reform in Europe. Yet it is justifi ed to speak of a “Europe whole and free” in its genuine meaning, and of a stable foundation for Europe’s future, only if Eastern European countries who aim for Euro-Atlantic integration and thorough domestic reforms have been successful.
The EU has a well-structured instrument to support reform processes in partner countries in the form of the Eastern Partnership. Although limited in its scope and
27 2010 ESTONIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS YEARBOOK
immediate ambitions, it has great potential for effi cient co-operation in many areas crucial for the development of partnership countries. The Eastern Partnership has so far no direct instrument for involving transatlantic partners, but the goals of the Eastern Partnership – stability, promotion of democratic values, rule of law and good governance – are important also for the U.S., which supports them in its own activi- ties. Co-ordination between the EU and the U.S. is essential. Positive conditionality and the application by the EU and U.S. of as similar as possible criteria to evaluate progress send a clear signal to the Eastern Partnership countries and help them focus their efforts. In addition, the EU and U.S. co-operation in grassroots diplomacy is highly desirable, as it helps to ensure public support and ownership in the reforms.
There are several fundamental issues of a strategic nature – starting from confl ict resolution and ending with the right of each country to choose its security solu- tion – where it is diffi cult to imagine a durable solution without U.S. participation. Therefore, the renewed commitment of the Obama administration to helping these countries, supported by high-profi le diplomacy including the visit of Vice President Joseph Biden this summer to Georgia and Ukraine, is highly welcome.
From Estonia’s point of view, several areas of hori- zontal transatlantic co-operation have developed in From Estonia’s point of view, a favourable direction. One of these areas is develop- several areas of horizontal trans- ment co-operation, where we have seen a careful atlantic co-operation have deve- but determined start towards closer EU-U.S. dia- loped in a favourable direction. logue and co-operation. The EU and the U.S. are the largest donors of the world, together accounting for 85 percent of all offi cial development aid.2 It is for the benefi t of both sides to closely discuss and co-ordinate the application and management of resources as well as the principles and desired results of development assistance. A strong foundation for this is created by the close value systems of the EU and the United States. Achieving sustainable economic, political and social development is not only for the benefi t of the target coun- tries but also for the donors themselves. In particular, successful development co-opera- tion will ease the requirement for managing security issues in the target regions, which are also very often on the shoulders of the EU and the U.S. as major global actors.
The EU-U.S. Summit in November 2009 agreed to reinvigorate development dialogue and co-operation. The partners decided to re-launch the high-level Consultative Group on development and also to hold annual ministerial level meetings. Throughout the year, there has been a dialogue about identifying priorities for joint work. Estonia is ready to participate in transatlantic development co-operation and to utilise its own
2 D.S. Hamilton and F.G. Burwell (lead authors), „Shoulder to Shoulder: Forging a Strategic U.S.-EU Partnership“, p. 54.
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comparative advantages for this purpose. These comparative advantages include its recent successful transition experience and close knowledge of countries currently going through economic and political reforms. In particular, Estonia is prepared to share its experience in the successful application of IT solutions for the benefi t of good governance and accessible public services. Both areas previously analysed in this article – Afghanistan and Eastern Europe – are suitable locations for Estonia’s contribution to transatlantic development co-operation. Estonia has been dedicating a considerable share of its development co-operation resources to Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. For Estonia, Afghanistan is increasingly not only a military but also a civilian and development co-operation project. In particular, Estonia has been involved in the development of the health care sector in Helmand Province in southern Afghanistan.
In the sphere of energy, a substantial step towards closer co-operation was made through the estab- Estonia strongly welcomes more lishment of the EU-U.S. Energy Council. The coun- structured and deeper energy cil, working at the ministerial level but delegating co-operation with the United tasks to working groups, was offi cially launched States. at the November 2009 summit. The council will study diversifi cation of energy resources and will also discuss the promotion of stable, transparent and non-discriminatory global mar- kets. These two measures have an important role in increasing global energy secu- rity. The council will also address co-operation with third countries. Estonia strongly welcomes more structured and deeper energy co-operation with the United States. It demonstrates the appreciation of both sides that their energy-related concerns are closely interlinked. Co-operation with the United States helps to promote additional sources of energy for Europe. Co-operation is also important for the modernisation of gas transmission systems and the adaptation of market-based energy sector prin- ciples in key transit countries. The focus of the Energy Council on cleaner technolo- gies is also welcome, especially as it can potentially contribute to the development of cleaner technologies for indigenous energy resources, like Estonia’s signifi cant oil shale resource.
Conclusion Europe and the United States are close partners to each other. The transatlantic rela- tionship is based on a strong foundation of values. Close economic integration, total aggregate share in the world economy, and roles in major global and regional affairs form a shared transatlantic agenda. This agenda is addressed through various formats most suitable for particular issues, but at the same time it is in the interests of both partners to have a comprehensive view of the common challenges, combining the benefi ts of multilateral EU-U.S. and NATO co-operation with that of a regional and bilateral approach.
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EU-U.S. co-operation has in recent years obtained wider scope and signifi cance. Never- theless, we all know that there is much more potential in this co-operation and we should aim to make it more productive and effective. Certainly a stronger CFSP will make EU-U.S. co-operation stronger. But this fact is so obvious that it is barely worth mentioning. Equally obvious is that this process will take a long time. In the mean- time, there are other ways to reinforce and develop our co-operation. There are al- ready areas where the EU countries agree among themselves and where the EU and U.S. have developed a meaningful dialogue. In these areas it is important to achieve closer practical co-operation and co-ordination so that each side’s efforts are mutually reinforcing. To complement this practical co-operation there should be an ongoing dialogue on fundamental global issues, in order to have a close strategic outlook and be well prepared to address common challenges. It is not enough to see each other as partners, however good, sitting at opposite sides of the table. The EU and U.S. should feel more and more as though they are sitting around a common table.
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