Transatlantic Relations – How to Achieve More
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Transatlantic relations – How to achieve more Jaap Ora Director of Division, 2nd Political Department, MFA Introduction This article will focus on relations between the European Union and the United States. The title refers to transatlantic relations, as this is what the EU-U.S. relationship is generally called in both offi cial and research discourse. In fact, EU-U.S. relations are only one element among the many interconnected links that form the relationship between Europe and North America in its entirety. These links include the security relationship of the North Atlantic Alliance; the co- operation between the EU and the United States, originally economic but increasingly expanding into other areas; the regional dimension where different formats of the U.S. and selected European countries add their value to the overall framework; and bilateral relations between individual European countries and the United States. The scale of transatlantic economic interdependence and the broad notion of security make it necessary to view these links in close connection and also make sure that these formats support each other. Estonia regards these links as essential for the politi- cal, economic and security interests of all participants. In this context, Estonia favours close EU-U.S. co-operation and has promoted its development since its accession to the European Union. The EU-U.S. relationship has in recent years acquired increased prominence and signifi - cance. This increase has taken place not at the expense of the other formats mentioned above, but due to the wider scope of transatlantic co-operation and deepened EU in- tegration, which has allowed the EU-U.S. relationship to acquire more substance and weight. This article, examining the developments of EU-U.S. relations, is divided into two parts. The fi rst half looks at the characteristics of the EU-U.S. relationship and indi- cates measures that can be taken to further reinforce it. The second part examines some challenging areas of EU-U.S. co-operation, which are high priorities for Estonia, to see how they have developed during the last year and what are the future perspectives. 23 2010 ESTONIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS YEARBOOK Two important institutional relationships As stated above, the countries of Europe and the United States are linked through two important institutional relationships, one involving NATO and the other the European Union. It is often said, notably in recent analyses, that the EU-U.S. relationship is underdeveloped and its full potential has not been utilised. It is understandable that the EU-U.S. co-operation mechanism is less mature than that of NATO. In NATO, the main transatlantic security institution, member states exercise the traditional form of allied co-operation. European countries, the U.S. and Canada sit around one table as equal individual members and make decisions based on a consensus. This means constant close communication between countries on both sides of the Atlantic. The Alliance focuses on a clearly defi ned range of issues. As the matters that the Alliance deals with concern the realm of ultimate security, fast and effi cient decision-making and an expecta- tion of the ability to gather around a joint cause is The EU-U.S. relationship is un- essential. The member states share not only the ex- derdeveloped and its full po- perience of facing a common threat, but also of the tential has not been utilised. successful adaptation to changed circumstances. The EU-U.S. relationship, involving to a great extent the same countries, is remarkably different in many aspects. For a long time, defi ned by the nature of the European Com- munities, it was mainly a trade and economic relationship. This changed in the 1990s, as the EU started to develop closer integration in the security and defence sphere. As the EU is aiming for a common approach to security and defence matters, the notion of security itself is changing. Military defence remains at the core of national security concerns; developments in other areas have increasing implications for security. The EU has signifi cant capabilities in areas that are relevant to the notion of comprehensive security. If the transatlantic partners want to effectively address the consequences of the global economic crises or climate change, the EU-U.S. format is the most appropriate one. In many areas, such as addressing regional crises, combating terrorism or post- confl ict reconstruction, the EU and NATO share responsibilities. Adaptation to new requirements As mentioned above, the scope and signifi cance of the EU-U.S. partnership is increas- ing. The areas where the EU has acquired more responsibility have truly strategic sig- nifi cance. Yet, as several transatlantic observers argue, the EU-U.S. relationship itself is not yet strategic1. In an effort to fi nd ways to adapt the relationship to the current challenges, the processes and politics of EU-U.S. relations are under scrutiny. 1 R.D. Asmus, “New purposes, New Plumbing. Rebuilding the Atlantic Alliance”, Eurasiascapes, Holidays (November/ December) 2008, retrieved 25 November 2009, <http://www.gmfus.org//doc/AsmusAmericanInterest.pdf>; D.S. Hamilton and F.G. Burwell (lead authors), “Shoulder to Shoulder: Forging a Strategic U.S.-EU Partnership”, Johns Hopkins University Center for Transatlantic relations, pg. 9, retrieved 2 December 2009, <http://transatlantic. sais-jhu.edu/bin/c/s/us-eu_report_fi nal.pdf>. 24 TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS – HOW TO ACHIEVE MORE 2010 President Barack Obama meeting with President Toomas Hendrik Ilves in the White House on 15 June 2009. Photo: Pete Souza, White House Regarding the processes and mechanisms, it is im- portant to bear in mind the unique features that The EU calls the U.S. a “stra- make this relationship different from traditional tegic partner”, just as it calls institutional or state-to-state relations. First, in some of its other important in- contrast to NATO, where the transatlantic partners terlocutors. sit around one table, in EU-U.S. relations the part- ners, mostly the same countries, sit on opposite sides of the table. It means that there is no such experience of joint decision-making, and reaching binding agreements is more complicated. Decision-making is time-con- suming as intra-EU decisions have to be approved before the two parties – the EU and U.S. – can compare their positions. The U.S. is formally regarded as any other third country the EU does business with. The unique, qualitatively different nature of the transatlantic relationship is not refl ected in the offi cial arrangements. The EU calls the U.S. a “strategic partner”, just as it calls some of its other important interlocutors. But if, as argued above, the EU-U.S. partnership in all its closeness is actually not yet truly strategic, what should we say about the other partnerships with a similar label? There is no easy way to compensate for this structural issue, and no major change is foreseen in the medium-term perspective. Yet it is possible to re-examine the co- operation mechanisms as they are, and update them according to contemporary needs. EU-U.S. co-operation mechanisms are based on the New Transatlantic Agenda 25 2010 ESTONIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS YEARBOOK adopted in 1995. It means they have accommodated the changes brought by the Treaty of Maastricht, but not those of the Treaty of Nice, the Lisbon Treaty, or by the enlargement. The scope of co-operation has increased enormously, so it is important to ensure that the co-operation mechanisms, including preparations for the summits and the summits themselves, ministerial meetings, and dialogue at other levels refl ect this change. Another important point is that the EU is not a state actor, and it does not perform tasks similar to In this situation, further strength- those of a state in a similar manner. We recognise ening of EU-U.S. co-operation that further strengthening of the common foreign needs several pillars. and security policy is needed and work to achieve that. Nevertheless, in the foreseeable future policy- making in the EU will remain different from that of a nation state. In terms of process, it is technically easier for the EU and the U.S. to co-operate on areas where member states have delegated their sovereignty fully or in part to the EU. This is refl ected in the institutionally more advanced frameworks, notably in the Transatlantic Economic Council to discuss further co-operation in this sphere or the recently established Energy Council. In the sphere of common foreign and security policy the situation is more sophisticated. At EU-U.S. meetings, the U.S. side can speak for the whole range of foreign policy, while the EU side has to take into account the intergovernmental nature of the common and foreign policy. EU-U.S. co-operation is similar to the character of the EU itself – not always spectacular or outwardly impressive, occasionally slow to take ef- fect, but where in place, deeply rooted and with lasting consequences. In this situation, further strengthening of EU-U.S. co-operation needs several pillars. First, expanding and reinforcing EU common policies and taking more responsibility for global affairs. This is an effort of a general nature which the EU is undertaking nonetheless. It is not an issue specifi c to the EU-U.S. relationship, but general progress in strengthening the EU common foreign and security policy would also be benefi cial in this context. Second, working closer together on areas where the EU already has a strong common policy – co-ordinating actions and working for achieving practical results. And third, further dialogue on fundamental issues – major developments in global security, joint principles, common goals and the means to achieve them.