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The Importance of Western Balkans in Transatlantic Relations Transatlantic Relations and the Impact on the Western Balkans by Si

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The Importance of Western Balkans in Transatlantic Relations Transatlantic Relations and the Impact on the Western Balkans by Si The Importance of Western Balkans in Transatlantic Relations Transatlantic Relations and the Impact on the Western Balkans By Sinan Geci1 Abstract The transatlantic relations, namely the cooperation between Western European countries and the United States, have made a tremendous impact on the Western Balkan countries and their Euro-Atlantic future. The cooperation and normalization relations among the former Yugoslav republics and democratic reforms within these countries would not have been achieved without the incentives and the direct involvement of both the European Union countries and the United States. A few of the Western Balkan countries (Slovenia and Croatia) have joined the European Union and most of them the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Nonetheless, the full normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo and attaining a legally binding agreement seems so close, yet it is too far. The facilitating role of the European Union is crucial, but the involvement of the US role remains vital as the EU has been proven to be inept in imposing agreements in the Western Balkans. Other actors are intermingling with the Euro-Atlantic future of the Western Balkans as well as complicating the relations amongst the countries in the region and the West. Keywords: the Western Balkans, the European Union, NATO, the United States of America, Dayton, Rambouillet, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Russia, Serbia, Turkey. 1 Ph.D. student, Doctoral School of Military Sciences; National University of Public Service; Budapest ; Hungary; e- mail: [email protected] Introduction The Western Balkans2 has been a focus of Western Europe in light of the conflicts for centuries, but in particular, in the late 20th and early 21st century. The primary concern has been its proximity to Western Europe and any instability in the Balkans impacts the western world and its allies. More significantly, the Western Balkans has also drawn the attention of the countries across the Atlantic, notably, the United States. The 1990s developments in the Western Balkans had required the intervention of the United States numerous times mostly due to the hesitation and lack of political will of Western Europe to put a halt of conflicts in the region, right on Western Europe’s backyard. The EU and the USA have had their agreements and disagreements but have continued to maintain relatively excellent cooperation. The transatlantic relations are commonly known in Europe as the relationship and the cooperation between the EU on one side and the USA and Canada across the Atlantic. The highlight of this relationship mainly emphasizes, and most talked about, the affiliation between the EU and the USA. The transatlantic partners share common democratic values and try to promote these values beyond their regions. Despite recent disagreements, namely during the current USA administration, the EU and the USA continue to cooperate in many areas of shared interest. Major key players in the region There are numerous key players that try and shape the future of the Western Balkans. The European Union as its closest in proximity is naturally the largest partner in support of the 2 The EU and the European Parliament consider the Western Balkans of the countries consisting of: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia, the Republic of North Macedonia. “the Western Balkans.” The European Parliament. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/168/the-western-balkans. (accessed: 02.02.2019). integration paths of the Western Balkans and reaffirms this support throughout the years. Despite some setbacks and growing Euro- skepticism among some WB countries, the European Council explicitly supports the European perspective and has confirmed it through many initiatives and the Strategy of 2018.3 Along the same line as the EU is the United States which promotes the development and democratization of the WB. The US would prefer to see a stable region with a clear perspective towards the Euro-Atlantic integration. As recently as summer 2017, the US has made it clear, when the US Vice President Mike Pence, declared that the future of the WB is not towards the east but towards the opposite side while pointing out the adversaries that challenge the western perspective of the region. Particularly, Mr. Pence publically indicated the destructive Russian role in the region.4 Just the opposite effort is coming from Russia. Historically, Russia has had close Slavic and Orthodox bond with certain parts and countries in the WB. The Russian role in the Western Balkans is enormous as these states are weak and score high on corruption index which has created an opportunity for other players to afflict the region. In fact, in the Concept of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, the Balkan region is given a strategic focus, noting that “the Balkan region is of great strategic importance to Russia, including its role as a major transportation and infrastructure hub used for supplying gas and oil to European countries.”5 However, this strategic focus is not as economic as much as political. The attempted 3 “Strategy for the Western Balkans.” European Commission. February 2019. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/news/strategy-western-balkans-2018-feb-06_en. (accessed: 02.03.2019). 4 Chan, Sewell, “Mike Pence, in Montenegro, Assures Balkans of U.S. Support.” New York Times. Aug. 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/02/world/europe/pence-montenegro-markovic-nato.html?_r=0. (accessed: 01.02.2019). 5 “Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. February 2013. http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/- /asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/122186. (accessed: 20.03.2019). coup in Montenegro on the eve of its NATO membership demonstrated that Russia is anti- political forces that pursue NATOP membership.6 It is no coincidence that Russia will continue to manipulate and get its hand deep and dirty to destabilize and prevent further NATO expansion towards the WB region; hence, challenging the Euro-Atlantic future of the region. Historically speaking, another major actor focusing on WB is Turkey. Keeping in mind that for the 15th till the 19th century the Ottomans were in the Balkan region, today Turkey will attempt to return attention to some of these “territories” as part of its natural sphere of influence. Since Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the current President of Turkey, has been in power, Turkey has invested considerably in the WB - from aid, infrastructure, religious monuments restorations and promoting trade- gaining not only economic but also political influence in the region. Turkey has enhanced its presence in the region thus, increasing its political authority. For instance, in light of the attempt to overthrow the government in 2016, Ankara has blamed Fetullah Gulen, an imam living in the US, for the coup and has taken extreme measures against all those associated with his movement. The WB countries have been a target to this pressure and asked to hand in those who Ankara thinks associate with Fetullah Gulen.7 Although it distinguishes from the Russian role in the region, Turkey is criticized for its pressure on the WB, and its interests and ambitions in the region have grounded some worries in the EU capitals. Both the US and the EU wish to see a more progressive and democratized Western Balkans. The WB must not fall under the Russian or Turkey influence; thus, they must pursue and align their domestic reforms in conformity with EU standards and adopt and pursue a foreign policy in accordance with the EU policy. Notably, the President of France, Emmanuel Macron, stated 6 Maza, Cristina. “Exclusive: Russian Military Spies Backed Attempt to Assassinate Leader of Montenegro, Report Says.” Newsweek. July 2018. https://www.newsweek.com/exclusive-russian-military-spies-backed-attempt- assassinate-leader-montenegro-1007324. (accessed: 15.02.2019). 7 Weise, Zia. “Turkey’s Balkan Comeback.” Politico. May 2018. https://www.politico.eu/article/turkey-western- balkans-comeback-european-union-recep-tayyip-erdogan/. (accessed: 02.03.2019). while addressing the Members of European Parliament in Strasbourg in 2018, “I don’t want a Balkans that turns toward Turkey or Russia....”8 This is a warning sign for WB countries to move faster towards Europe. Viewpoints of some key players European Union The European Parliament considers that the EU and the USA cooperate well in security matters. In particular, this collaboration is evident through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and “effective practical cooperation has been developed between NATO and missions deployed under the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in theaters such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Horn of Africa.”9 The position of the European Union towards the Western Balkans is a very EU centric and at the same time the very languid and the bureaucratic culture within the EU intuitions is introduced and keeps implementing its integration process of the WB countries in a plodding pace. This is on the contrary to the dynamic developments in the region and the leisurely approach of the EU towards the WB might backfire and the daily rhetoric in the region, one country against the other could accelerate to a level that may be harmful and undermine years of efforts to stabilize and democratize the region. United States 8 Radosavljevic, Zoran and Sam Morgan. “The Brief – Macron pulls the Balkan rug” Euractiv. April 2018. https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/the-brief-macron-pulls-the-balkan-rug/. (accessed: 12.03.2019). 9 “Transatlantic relations: USA and Canada.” European Parliament. 2018. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/174/transatlantic-relations-usa-and-canada. (accessed: 18.02.2019). The United States, on the other hand, is more prone to a dynamic approach. So dynamic is the US approach that it might even be addressed at a close observation that the US in recent years is seeking a quick fix in the Western Balkans.
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