Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting 1994

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Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting_1994

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Afternoon Session - 1994 Meeting

BerkshireHathaway

Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger answer questions about Berkshire's investments in Salomon Brothers and Coca-Cola. (This session is audio only because a video recording is not available.)

1. No comment on Guinness investment 1.没有评论吉尼斯投资

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2 now.Well, I don't know where zone 2 is, but we'll — (laughs) WARREN BUFFETT：现在是第2区。好吧，我不知道2区在哪里，但我们会 - （笑）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Do you feel basically the same about your investment in Guinness now as when you made the investment, in terms of the company? 听众会员：就您在公司方面的投资而言，您现在对您在吉尼斯的投资感觉基本相同吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I wouldn't like to comment on anything that we own, in terms of how we rate them as desirability or anything.I mean, whether it’s Coke or Gillette or anything that — we made decisions at a given time, at a given price, which you can ﬁgure out by looking at our purchases. WARREN BUFFETT ：嗯，我不想评论我们拥有的任何东西，就我们如何评价它们的可取性或任何东西而言。我的意思是，无论是可乐还是吉列，还是其他任何东西 - 我们在特定时间以给定价格做出决定，你可以通过查看我们的购买来弄清楚。

But we may be buying or selling any of those securities right as we talk.And we simply don't think it's in the interest of Berkshire shareholders as a group to be talking about things that we could be buying or selling. 但是，正如我们所说，我们可能正在购买或出售任何证券。我们根本不认为这是一个集团谈论我们可以购买或出售的东西符合伯克希尔股东的利益。

2. World Book's sales slide: "I wish I knew the answer" 2. World Book的销售幻灯片：“我希望我知道答案”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK? WARREN BUFFETT：好吗？ AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, David Winters, from Mountain Lakes, New Jersey. 听众：嗨，大卫温特斯，来自新泽西州的Mountain Lakes。

Just wondering, World Book’s had a tough time lately, and I'm wondering if there's things you're doing to try to improve that. 只是想知道，World Book最近经历了一段艰难时期，我想知道你是否正在努力改善这一点。

And also, The Buffalo News has been fabulous.And I'm kind of wondering what's driving The Buffalo News? 此外，布法罗新闻一直很精彩。我有点想知道是什么推动了布法罗新闻？

WARREN BUFFETT: Buffalo News is doing what? WARREN BUFFETT：布法罗新闻正在做什么？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Fabulously. 观众成员：非常棒。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, it's doing well, right.Well, I would say you got to give credit Stan Lipsey — I'm not sure whether Stan's here right now, but — who's been running the News. WARREN BUFFETT：是的，它做得很好，对。好吧，我会说你得信任Stan Lipsey - 我不确定Stan 现在是否在这里，但是 - 谁一直在运行新闻。

World Book, in terms of unit sales — as we put in the report — have fallen off signiﬁcantly the last few years.It's actually surprising, in a sense, how well the proﬁts have held up because they've done a good job, a very good job, in that respect. 世界图书，就单位销售而言 - 正如我们在报告中所述 - 在过去几年中大幅下降。从某种意义上说，实际上令人惊讶的是，由于他们在这方面做得很好，做得很好，所以利润有多好。

And as we put in the report, we don't know the answer, precisely.We are, Ralph Schey is — has taken some actions — is taking some actions — that he thinks will improve the operations.Ralph's record as a manager is absolutely at the top of the list.I mean, it — I wrote about it in the 1992 report. 正如我们在报告中提到的那样，我们确切地知道答案。我们是，拉尔夫·谢伊 - 采取了一些行动 - 采取了一些行动 - 他认为这将改善行动。拉尔夫作为经理的记录绝对是最重要的。我的意思是，它 - 我在1992年的报告中写过它。

In 1993, Ralph did even better.I mean, it was a — fabulous.I think, probably, may have been 110 or so million pre-tax on 90-some million of average equity capital, or something of the sort.So it's a fabulous record. 1993年，拉尔夫做得更好。我的意思是，这太棒了。我认为，对于90-百万美元的平均权益资本，或者类似的东西，可能已经有110亿左右的税前税。所以这是一个非常棒的记录。

But Encyclopedia Britannica, as you probably know, ran at a loss last year.The encyclopedia business has been very — has been poor.Could be due to electronic competition, could be due to recruiting problems for salespeople.Obviously, it can be a combination of many factors. 但你可能知道，不列颠百科全书（Encyclopedia Britannica）去年亏损了。百科全书业务一直很差。可能是由于电子竞争，可能是由于招聘人员的问题。显然，它可以是许多因素的组合。

If we knew the answer, we'd have — you wouldn't be seeing those ﬁgures right now.But it is a top item of attention for Ralph.He takes anything that's not performing as well as before very seriously.And we will see what happens. 如果我们知道答案，我们就会 - 你现在不会看到这些数字。但这是拉尔夫最关注的项目。他认为任何表现都不如以前那么严重的表现。我们会看到会发生什么。

But I don't have a prediction on it.I wish I knew the answer.I don't see any variables to, in any intelligent way, tell you or — we put in the report the best we could do on that. 但我没有预测。我希望我知道答案。我没有看到任何变量，以任何聪明的方式告诉你或 - 我们在报告中尽我们所能做的最好。

The proﬁtability has, like I say, has been pretty good.But obviously, current trends of new sales will catch up with us at some point, unless we boost unit sales. 像我说的那样，盈利能力一直很好。但显然，除非我们提高销量，否则目前的新销售趋势将在某个时候赶上我们。

I don't think our market share, if you look at print encyclopedias, has fallen.But I can't be sure of that, but I think that's probably true.But there are an awful lot of encyclopedias going out there as part of a bundled product with computer sales. 如果你看一下印刷百科全书，我认为我们的市场份额已经下降了。但我不能确定，但我认为这可能是真的。但是，有大量的百科全书作为计算机销售捆绑产品的一部分出现在那里。

3. Breaking up Berkshire wouldn't help 打破伯克希尔无济于事

WARREN BUFFETT: How are we going to do this, is there? WARREN BUFFETT：我们怎么做，是吗？

VOICE: We got three now. 声音：我们现在有三个。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, I'll let you hand the mic to whomever, you — WARREN BUFFETT：好的，我会让你把麦克风交给任何人，你 -

VOICE: (Inaudible) three. 声音:(听不清）三。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Lee again, from Palo Alto.By Omaha standards you are a relatively young man. 观众成员：Lee再次来自Palo Alto。根据奥马哈的标准，你是一个相对年轻的人。

And every year, you point out that Berkshire’s size now precludes you from making the great, relatively small trades which made your reputation. 每年，你都会指出，伯克希尔的规模现在使你不能做出能够赢得声誉的伟大，相对较小的交易。

How much thought have you given to breaking up Berkshire into smaller entities? 你有多想过将伯克希尔分拆成更小的实体？

WARREN BUFFETT: How much what? WARREN BUFFETT：多少钱？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: How much thought have you given into breaking up Berkshire into smaller entities, which would allow you to make those nice, small, wonderful trades that you made from the beginning? 观众成员：你有多少想法将伯克希尔分解成更小的实体，这可以让你从一开始就做出那些美好，小巧，精彩的交易？

WARREN BUFFETT: It wouldn't do any good to break into smaller entities, because I'd still own, you know, we'd still have 10 billion-plus of capital to be responsible for, wherever it would be. WARREN BUFFETT：闯入较小的实体是没有任何好处的，因为我仍然拥有，你知道，无论在哪里，我们仍然有100亿美元的资本负责。

So, the — we could distribute it out to the shareholders, and let them make their own decisions, obviously.And any time we thought that we weren't going to get more than a dollar of value per dollar retained, that, obviously, would be the course to follow. 所以， - 我们可以将它分发给股东，让他们自己做出决定。任何时候我们都认为我们不会保留每美元超过1美元的价值，显然，这将是接下来的路线。

But there's no magic to creating multiple little — I mean, we could call Berkshire Two, Berkshire Three, Berkshire Four, but you still got the problem.There's $10 billion to invest, and it doesn't really solve anything. 但创造多个小小的东西并没有什么魔力 - 我的意思是，我们可以打电话给Berkshire Two，Berkshire Three，Berkshire Four，但你仍然遇到了问题。投资100亿美元，并没有真正解决任何问题。

Charlie, do you have any thoughts on that? 查理，你有什么想法吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, the — Berkshire is incredibly decentralized, in the — in terms of power and decisions resting in the operating divisions.In terms of the marketable securities, it's incredibly centralized. CHARLIE MUNGER ：不，伯克希尔在权力和决策方面处于非常分散的地位。就有价证券而言，它非常集中。

And so far, we have not had any big penalty from not being able to do the things that we did when we were young.Eventually we will reach the penalty. 到目前为止，我们没有受到任何重大的惩罚，因为我们不能做我们年轻时所做的事情。最终我们将达到惩罚。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I think we’re — there's no question we could earn higher percentage returns working with $100,000, though, than $10 billion.But, yeah — but it hasn't hurt us as much as we thought it would, as size has increased. WARREN BUFFETT：是的，我认为我们 - 毫无疑问，我们可以获得更高的回报百分比，而不是100 亿美元。但是，是的 - 但随着规模的增加，它并没有像我们想象的那样伤害我们。

But your universe of opportunity shrinks.But it shrinks no matter — I mean, you can set it up in 20 bank accounts or one bank account, but you still — the universe still has to ﬁt the 10 billion, in aggregate. 但是你的机会范围缩小了。但它无论如何都会缩小 - 我的意思是，你可以在20个银行账户或一个银行账户中设置它，但你仍然 - 宇宙仍然需要总计100亿。

4. "Absolutely sensational job" by General Dynamics management 4.通用动力公司管理层的“绝对耸人听闻的工作”

WARREN BUFFETT: Now, how are we doing this?Do we have another zone over there?Yeah. WARREN BUFFETT：现在，我们如何做到这一点？我们那边有另一个区吗？是啊。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Michael Bunyaner (PH), New York City. 观众成员：纽约市Michael Bunyaner（PH）。

Two questions.One, last year you discussed in your annual report your investment in General Dynamics.And you also gave your proxy to the company and its management.This year, it appears you have sold the stock. 两个问题。一，去年您在年度报告中讨论了您对通用动力的投资。您还将您的代理人交给了公司及其管理层。今年，看来你卖掉了股票。

WARREN BUFFETT: This year, what? 沃伦巴菲特：今年，什么？ AUDIENCE MEMBER: This year, it appears that you have sold the stock in General Dynamics. 观众成员：今年，您似乎已经在通用动力公司出售了该股票。

What has changed that you sold 20 percent of your stake?This is question number one, and I have number two. 你卖出20％的股份有什么变化？这是第一个问题，我有第二个问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: Probably inappropriate to be talking about what we're buying or selling, except to the extent that we make a public — have to make a public announcement, which, on something like General Dynamics, we've got 13G requirements if wechange by more than 5 percent. WARREN BUFFETT：谈论我们购买或出售的东西可能不合适，除非我们公开宣传 - 必须公开宣布，就像通用动力公司这样，我们有13G的要求，如果我们变化超过5％。

And we also have — as long as we own more than 10 percent — we have monthly reporting requirements under Form 4. 我们也有 - 只要我们拥有超过 10％ - 我们在表格4下有月度报告要求。

We think the management of General Dynamics has done an absolutely sensational job. 我们认为通用动力公司的管理层做了绝对耸人听闻的工作。

Obviously, also it isn't the kind of business, basically, that we have a 20-year view on, or something of the sort.So, it’s — the shareholders of General Dynamics have been extraordinarily well-served by the management of that company.And we’ve — we're thankful, because we prospered accordingly. 显然，基本上，这不是一种商业，我们有20年的观点，或类似的东西。因此，通用动力公司的股东得到了该公司管理层的极好服务。而且我们 - 我们很感激，因为我们相应地繁荣了。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: But should I take from this comment that you have changed your view about the business itself? 听众会员：但是，我应该从这条评论中了解到您已经改变了对业务本身的看法吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Pardon me? WARREN BUFFETT：请原谅我？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Should I take from your comment that you have changed your view about the business itself? 听众会员：我是否应该从您的评论中了解您已经改变了对业务本身的看法？

WARREN BUFFETT: No, no.I think you take my comments as saying just what I’ve said.(Laughs) WARREN BUFFETT：不，不。我想你的评论就像我说的那样。（笑）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: OK.(Laughter) 听众会员：好的。（笑声）

Question number two, could you tell me — 问题二，你能告诉我 -

WARREN BUFFETT: I think we want to give people a chance around the room, and then when, in the zone you're in, when a second question comes along, it will be ﬁne.But we want to get as many people in this hour as we can, because this is the hard core here. WARREN BUFFETT：我想我们想让人们有机会在房间里，然后在你所在的区域，当第二个问题出现时，它会没事的。但我们希望尽可能多的人在这个时间内获得，因为这是这里的核心。

5. No encouragement for short-term stockholders 5.不鼓励短期股东 WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1? WARREN BUFFETT：第1区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: It appeared to me that in 1993 the variation between the stock price for the high and the low was much greater than years in the past.Would you mind commenting on that? 观众成员：在我看来，在1993年，高价和低价的股价之间的差异远大于过去几年。你介意评论一下吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, there was more volatility in the price of Berkshire last year.And as I put in the annual report, the stock overperformed the business last year. 沃伦巴菲特：嗯，去年伯克希尔的价格波动更大。正如我在年度报告中提到的那样，该股票去年的业绩超过了该业务。

Now, over any 10 or 20 or 30-year history, every year the stock is going to perform a little differently, at least, from the business.I mean, it may slightly underperform, or slightly overperform. 现在，在任何10年，20年或30年的历史中，每年至少从业务开始，股票的表现会有所不同。我的意思是，它可能略微表现不佳，或稍微超出表现。

We would prefer that those variations be as small as possible.But there was more variability last year than historically's been the case.Although we've had one or two other — we had a few years like that.We — 我们希望这些变化尽可能小。但去年的变化幅度超过了历史上的变化。虽然我们有一两个 - 我们有几年这样的。我们 -

Our best way to handle that is to give all the information we can to shareholders and prospective shareholders, and follow policies that we think will induce the investment-oriented with long time horizons to join us, and not to encourage other people.But, occasionally — you know, we can't guarantee that result. 我们处理这一问题的最佳方式是向股东和潜在股东提供我们所能提供的所有信息，并遵循我们认为将引导投资导向并具有长期视野的政策加入我们，而不是鼓励其他人。但是，偶尔 - 你知道，我们不能保证结果。

One of the things that was interesting to me, I don't know whether it was three months ago or when, but I happened to be talking to the [NYSE] specialist, terriﬁc specialist, Jimmy Maguire.He had to leave, but he was here earlier in the session. 对我来说很有意思的事情之一，我不知道是在三个月前还是在三十个月之前，但我碰巧正在与[纽约证券交易所]专家，极好的专家Jimmy Maguire交谈。他不得不离开，但他早些时候在这里。

And I think, at the time, the stock was around 16,000 or something like that.And he had some rather signiﬁcant stop-loss orders on the books at 15-5, or thereabouts, involving some hundreds of shares. 我认为，当时股票大约是16,000或类似的东西。并且他在15-5或者左右的账簿上有一些相当重要的止损订单，涉及数百股。

And that to me is a signal that, you know, we have some people that are — in my view — are not really the kind of owners that we would like to attract.Because why somebody wants to put in an order to sell something for 15,500 that they don't want to sell at 16,000 is beyond me, but — (Laughter) 对我而言，这是一个信号，你知道，我们有一些人 - 在我看来 - 并不是我们想吸引的那种业主。因为为什么有人想订购15,500件他们不想以16,000卖出的东西超出了我，但是 - （笑声）

The idea of people using stop-loss orders with Berkshire, obviously — it tells me that we've got some people in that are using it as trading vehicle of some sort, or have some totally non- investment-type calculations in their mind.

显然人们使用伯克希尔的止损订单的想法 - 它告诉我，我们有一些人正在使用它作为某种交易工具，或者在他们的脑海中有一些完全非投资类型的计算。

I don't think we have very many of them.But obviously, if we have enough people like that, you will have a more volatile stock than if you have a whole bunch of people who look at it as something that they're going to hold for the rest of their life. 我不认为我们有很多。但很明显，如果我们有足够多的人这样，那么你的股票就会变得更加不稳定，而不是有一大群人把它看作是他们将要度过余生的东西。

And the stock did go down at that time and hit 15,500.And there were — that — I think it was close to 300 shares, which is 4 1/2 million dollars' worth of stock. 当时库存确实下降并达到15,500。而且 - 我认为它接近300股，这是价值4到30万美元的股票。

And somebody made a decision, apparently, that they — or some small number of people — made a decision that they wanted to sell something at 15,500 that they could have sold for 16,000.The lower it went, the better they liked it, apparently.I mean, the better they liked the sale.(Laughter) 显然，有人做出了一个决定，即他们 - 或者是少数人 - 做出了一个决定，他们想要出售15,500件他们本可以卖出16,000件的东西。它越低，他们就越喜欢它，显然。我的意思是，他们更喜欢这次拍卖。（笑声）

Which, you know, has always struck me as like having a house that you like, and you're living in, and, you know, it's worth $100,000 and you tell your broker, you know, if anybody ever comes along and offers 90, you want to sell it.I mean, it doesn't — (laughter) — make any sense to me. 你知道，这总是让我印象深刻，就像拥有一个你喜欢的房子，你住在那里，而且，你知道，它价值 10万美元你告诉你的经纪人，你知道，如果有人出现并提供90 ，你想卖掉它。我的意思是，它没有 - （笑声） - 对我有意义。

But it has — I would say that there's been some small — I think, relatively small — tendency for people to get — relatively few people — but to get more interested in the price of the stock in terms of — and thinking of it in termsof whether it's going to go up or down in the next six months, than might formerly have been the case. 但它有 - 我会说有一些小的 - 我认为，相对较小 - 倾向于人们 - 相对较少的人 - 但是对股票的价格更感兴趣 - 并且用它来思考它它是否会在未来六个月内上升或下降，而不是以前的情况。

I think we're unusually well-blessed in that respect, in that we've got people who basically want to own it for a very long time. 我认为我们在这方面非常幸运，因为我们有很多人基本上想要拥有它很长一段时间。

But to the extent that you get people who were owning it because they think the stock market's going to go up, or something of that sort's going to happen, that is not good news from our standpoint, and it will increase the volatility in it. 但是，如果你因为他们认为股票市场将会上涨，或者某种类似的事情将要发生而让你拥有它的人，从我们的角度来看，这不是好消息，而且会增加它的波动性。

We will do nothing to encourage that. 我们不会做任何事情来鼓励这一点。

6. Berkshire beneﬁts when the stock market falls 6.当股市下跌时，伯克希尔受益

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2? WARREN BUFFETT：2区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, Mr. Buffett, Steve Lang (PH) from Toronto. 观众：是的，巴菲特先生，来自多伦多的史蒂夫朗（PH）。 I was just curious about when you were saying that one of the best things that could happen to shareholders is the — the market goes down and you're able to buy good businesses at foolish prices. 我只是好奇当你说股东可能遇到的最好的事情之一就是 - 市场萧条，你能够以愚蠢的价格购买好的企业。

And then a little on, you were saying that we could judge your ability to do what it is that you feel you should be doing by how much cash you have in the account at any given point in time, and — 然后再说一点，你说我们可以判断你在任何特定时间点你在帐户中拥有多少现金的能力，你应该做的事情，并且 -

WARREN BUFFETT: By what? WARREN BUFFETT：通过什么？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: By the amount of cash that you have in the account.In other words, I guess, what you feel you're supposed to be doing is investing the cash in good businesses. 观众会员：您在账户中拥有的现金金额。换句话说，我想，你认为你应该做的就是把现金投入到好的企业中。

So I'm just wondering about that kind of dichotomy.Where does the cash come from if the market does go down, if you've been successful in your first ability?Would that be from the cash flow on the operations of the business from the float? 所以我只是想知道那种二分法。如果你的第一个能力成功，如果市场确实下跌，现金来自哪里？那会是来自浮动业务运营的现金流吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Is that —? 听众：那是 - ？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: So really, the success of the company then is, to some degree, the fact that you're able to dollar-cost average into the market on an ongoing basis?Is that right? 听众会员：那么，在某种程度上，公司的成功是否能够持续地将美元成本平均投入市场？是对的吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it isn't that precise.But A, we do generate cash in considerable amounts, so that we will not husband cash, simply because we think the market's going to go down, in order to buy something. WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，这不是那么精确。但是，A，我们确实会产生相当数量的现金，因此我们不会因为我们认为市场会下跌而不是为了买东西而现金。

But obviously, as cash comes in, we're always looking for things to do.And the cheaper that the market is generally, the more likely it is that we will ﬁnd something that we understand and that we like, and that the price will be attractive, and that we will do it. 但显然，随着现金的流入，我们总是在寻找可以做的事情。而且市场普遍越便宜，我们就越有可能找到我们理解和喜欢的东西，而且价格会很有吸引力，而且我们会这样做。

But it isn't like we can change around the whole portfolio then, because that doesn't gain us anything.I mean, we'd be selling things at lower prices to buy things at lower prices. 但这并不是说我们可以改变整个投资组合，因为这并没有给我们带来任何好处。我的意思是，我们会以较低的价格出售东西，以较低的价格购买东西。 But to the extent that we have net cash coming in — which we do, and which we will have — on balance, we're, you know, we're adding to our businesses at more attractive prices than would be the other case. 但是，如果我们有净现金 - 我们这样做，我们将拥有 - 平衡，我们，你知道，我们以比其他情况更具吸引力的价格增加我们的业务。

And it's no prediction on any given company.I mean, whether it's Gillette or Coke, or anything.It might be something we already own, it might be something we don't own.But we welcome the chance to buy more shares. 这对任何一家公司都没有预测。我的意思是，无论是吉列还是可乐，还是其他任何东西。它可能是我们已经拥有的东西，也可能是我们不拥有的东西。但我们欢迎有机会购买更多股票。

We're not wishing it on anybody.But if you asked us next month whether Berkshire would be better off if the whole stock market were down 50 percent or where it is now, we would be better off if it was down 50 percent, whether we had any cash on hand now or not, because we would be generating cash to buy things. 我们不希望任何人。但如果你下个月问我们，如果整个股市下跌50％或者现在的情况下伯克希尔会好一些，那么如果它下跌了50％我们会好一些，不管我们现在有没有现金因为我们会赚钱买东西。

7. Salomon's compensation: "Far from ideal" 萨洛蒙的赔偿：“远非理想”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3? WARREN BUFFETT：3区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Byron Ransdell (PH) from Raleigh, North Carolina.Thanks for your hospitality to this weekend. 听众：来自北卡罗来纳州罗利市的Byron Ransdell（PH）。感谢您对本周末的热情款待。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we thank you for coming, too. WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我们也感谢你的到来。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question concerns Salomon, Inc., and more speciﬁcally, Salomon Brothers.I know that you were on the board of directors, I think, from '87 to the current time.Very much interested in compensation there, and maybe on the compensation committee. 听众：我的问题涉及Salomon，Inc。，更具体地说是Salomon Brothers。我知道你从87 年到现在都是董事会成员。对那里的薪酬非常感兴趣，也许还有薪酬委员会。

Between 1987 and 1992, Salomon's ﬁnancial results were quite dismal in a very lumpy way, but overall, quite dismal. 在1987年至1992年间，所罗门的财务业绩非常惨淡，但总的来说，非常令人沮丧。

In your opinion, if the compensation had been rational during this time, would Salomon have shown results that would make it a quite decent business? 在您看来，如果在此期间赔偿是合理的，所罗门公司是否会显示出能够使其成为相当不错的业务的结果？

WARREN BUFFETT: Would Salomon — if the compensation — WARREN BUFFETT：所罗门 - 如果赔偿 -

CHARLIE MUNGER: If the past compensation — CHARLIE MUNGER：如果过去的赔偿 -

WARREN BUFFETT: — had been more rational — WARREN BUFFETT： - 更合理 - CHARLIE MUNGER: — decisions had been more rational, '87 to the current time, would Salomon have done better?Yeah, was that it? CHARLIE MUNGER： - 决定更加理性，到目前为止，所罗门已经做得更好了吗？是的，是吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, sir. 听众：是的，先生。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would — yeah, I would say that, if the present people and the present compensation philosophy — which allows for very large payments for very large results — I think the company would have done better, yeah. WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我会 - 是的，我会说，如果现在的人和目前的薪酬理念 - 允许非常大的结果付出非常大的代价 - 我认为公司会做得更好，是的。

It — you're going to see very big numbers paid in Wall Street.That's the nature of it.The trick is to pay them only when you're getting very big results for the owners.I mean, it — there's no way you're going to pay numbers that look like numbers in other industries, and get great results for owners. 它 - 你会看到在华尔街支付非常多的数字。这就是它的本质。诀窍是只有当你为业主获得非常大的结果时付钱。我的意思是，它 - 你不可能在其他行业支付看起来像数字的数字，并为业主取得好成绩。

But if you pay these big numbers, I think you should be getting very good results for owners. 但如果你支付这些大数字，我认为你应该为业主取得非常好的结果。

And there — the old system was not — I mean, it wasn't totally off the mark on that.But it was far from an ideal system, in my view. 那里 - 旧系统不是 - 我的意思是，它并没有完全脱离标记。但在我看来，它远非一个理想的系统。

8. Unlikely to write put options on Coca-Cola again 8.不太可能再次在可口可乐上写下看跌期权

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1? WARREN BUFFETT：第1区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Warren, I have one question. 听众：沃伦，我有一个问题。

Last year you were using Coca-Cola puts as a way to increase income, and conversely, if they were exercised, as a way of increasing your position.Do you still use puts in this type on investments you wish to add to? 去年你使用可口可乐套餐作为增加收入的方式，相反，如果他们被行使，作为增加你的头寸的一种方式。对于您希望添加的投资，您是否仍然使用此类型的看跌期权？

(BREAK IN RECORDING) （记录中的突破）

WARREN BUFFETT: — ﬁve million shares, as I remember, of Coke sometime in the early fall or thereby — I don't remember exactly — last year.And the puts, I think the premium was around 7 1/2 million dollars, and they were priced around 35. 沃伦·巴菲特： - 据我记得的那样， - 在初秋的某个时候或可能的时候 - 可靠的500万股 - 我记不清楚 - 去年。而看跌期权，我认为溢价约为750万美元，而它们的定价约为35美元。

We have not done that very often, and we're unlikely to do very much of it.For one thing, there are position limits on puts, which don't apply to us, but they apply to the brokers for which we do them.And those position limits were not clear before that.But we could probably write puts on that same amount by doing it through a bunch of different brokers. 我们没有经常这样做，我们不太可能做很多。一方面，看跌期权有头寸限制，不适用于我们，但它们适用于我们这样做的经纪人。那之前的那些位置限制并不清楚。但是我们可以通过一堆不同的经纪人来做相同数量的看跌期权。

It's not something we're really very likely to do.I was happy to do it, and in that particular case, we made 7 1/2 million dollars. 这不是我们真正非常可能做的事情。我很乐意这样做，在那个特殊情况下，我们赚了7到30万美元。

But we're better off, probably — if we like something well enough to write a put on it, we're probably better off buying the security itself, and particularly since we can't do it in the kind of quantities that really wouldmake it meaningful to Berkshire. 但是我们可能会更好 - 可能 - 如果我们喜欢写得好的东西，我们可能会更好地购买安全本身，特别是因为我们不能以真正的数量来做这件事。让它对伯克希尔有意义。

There are securities I would not mind writing puts for 10 million shares or something, but I — that probably — it's probably allowable for us to do it.It's not allowed — we'd probably have to do it through multiple brokers to get the job done. 有些证券我不介意为1000万股或者其他东西写点票，但我 - 可能 - 我们可能会这样做。这是不允许的 - 我们可能不得不通过多个经纪人来完成工作。

And on balance, I don't think it's as useful a way to spend my time as just looking for securities to buy outright. 总而言之，我并不认为将时间花在寻找证券来直接购买上是一种有用的方式。

Charlie, you have anything? 查理，你有什么？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. CHARLIE MUNGER：没有。

9. Don't believe reports on what we're buying or selling 9.不要相信我们买卖什么的报道

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2? WARREN BUFFETT：2区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, I'm from West Point.And my name is Rogers. 听众：巴菲特先生，我来自西点军校。而我的名字是罗杰斯。

A couple of months ago, there were stories in The World-Herald that Berkshire Hathaway had taken a large position in Philip Morris, and UST.But in your annual report, I don't see anything about that.Can you comment? 几个月前，“世界先驱报” 报道了伯克希尔哈撒韦公司在菲利普莫里斯和UST担任重要职务。但是在你的年度报告中，我没有看到任何相关内容。你能评论吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I would say, in the last two years maybe — I'm just approximating — I've probably seen reports in either The Wall Street Journal, or USA Today — maybe picked up by The Associated Press, or in TheHerald, but in papers of some signiﬁcance — I've probably seen stories that we were buying maybe any one of 10 companies in aggregate over that period of time.I would say a signiﬁcant majority were erroneous. WARREN BUFFETT：是的，我想说，在过去的两年里，也许 - 我只是近似了 - 我可能已经看过“华尔街日报”或“今日美国”的报道 - 可能是由美联社或在The先驱，但在一些有意义的论文中 - 我可能已经看到了我们在这段时间内总共购买的10家公司中的任何一家的故事。我想说绝大多数都是错误的。

We don't correct the erroneous ones, because if we don't correct the erroneous ones — if we correct the erroneous ones, and don't say anything about the correct ones, in effect we're identifying the correct ones, too. 我们不纠正错误的错误，因为如果我们不纠正错误的错误 - 如果我们纠正了错误的错误，并且没有说出正确错误的那些，实际上我们也正在识别错误的错误。

So we will never comment on those stories, no matter how ridiculous they are. 因此，无论这些故事多么荒谬，我们都不会评论这些故事。

And it's interesting because, you know, they keep getting printed.And frankly, from our standpoint, the fact that most of them are inaccurate is probably useful to us.We don't do anything to encourage it, but it — the fact that people are reading that we are buying A, B, C, or X, Y, Z when we aren't — you know, that's — I don'tthink people should be buying stocks because they're reading in the paper that we're buying something.But if they do, they may get cured of it at some point. 它很有趣，因为，你知道，它们一直在打印。坦率地说，从我们的角度来看，大多数都不准确的事实对我们来说可能是有用的。我们没有做任何事情来鼓励它，但事实上人们正在阅读我们正在购买A， B，C或X，Y，Z当我们不是 - 你知道，那是 - 我不我认为人们应该购买股票，因为他们正在阅读我们正在买东西的报纸。但如果他们这样做，他们可能会在某些时候得到治愈。

Maybe the newspapers will even get cured of writing the stories when they don't know, you know, what the facts are. 也许报纸甚至可以在他们不知道，事实是什么时知道这些故事。

But it's something we live with, and we'll probably continue to live with. 但这是我们生活的东西，我们可能会继续生活。

And I would say that based on history, if you read something about us buying or selling something, other than through reports we've ﬁled with the SEC or regulatory bodies, the chances are well over 50 percent — that I can tell you, basedon history, is correct — well over 50 percent that it's wrong. 我会说，基于历史，如果你读到关于我们购买或出售某些东西的东西，除了通过我们向美国证券交易委员会或监管机构提交的报告之外，我可以告诉你的机会超过50％。在历史上，是正确的 - 超过 50％，这是错误的。

10. Unlikely Berkshire will be a Dow or S&P 500 stock 10.伯克希尔不太可能成为道琼斯指数或标准普尔500指数的股票

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3? WARREN BUFFETT：3区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Do you expect that Berkshire will become one of the Standard & Poor 500 stocks, or a Dow Jones stock? 听众会员：您是否预计伯克希尔将成为标准普尔500股票或道琼斯股票？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think it's unlikely it ever becomes a Dow Jones stock. 沃伦巴菲特：嗯，我认为它不太可能成为道琼斯股票。

I don't know what the criteria are for the S&P 500. But I imagine there's some reason why we don't ﬁt.I don't know whether they have questions about number of shares outstanding or — I've never checked with S&P. 我不知道标准普尔500 指数的标准是什么。但我想有一些我们不合适的原因。我不知道他们是否对已发行股票的数量有疑问，或者 - 我从未向标准普尔公司查询过。

I wouldn't be surprised if we have the largest market capitalization of any company that isn't in the S&P, although I don't know that.But they may have some criteria that preclude Berkshire being part of it.

如果我们拥有不属于标准普尔指数的任何公司的最大市值，我不会感到惊讶，尽管我不知道。但他们可能有一些标准阻止伯克希尔参与其中。

I've always thought it would be very interesting, for those of you who like to think about such things, that if we were part of the S&P 500, and enough people became indexed so that 60 percent of the market was indexed, and ifCharlie and I wouldn't sell, which we wouldn't, it'd be an interesting proposition as to how the index funds would ever get their 60 percent if they tried to replicate the S&P. 我一直认为，对于那些喜欢考虑这些事情的人来说，如果我们是标准普尔500指数的一部分，并且有足够多的人被编入索引以便60％的市场被编入索引，并且如果查理和我不会出售，我们不会，如果他们试图复制标准普尔指数基金将如何获得60％的指数基金，这将是一个有趣的主张。

It’d be — I don't know whether they have rules even about concentration of ownership.That same line of thinking might have applied to Walmart, or some company. 它是 - 我不知道他们是否有关于所有权集中的规则。同样的想法可能适用于沃尔玛或某些公司。

Because just take the extreme example of a company that had 90 percent of its stock owned by one individual, and 12 percent of the money in the market were indexed, and the 90 percent wouldn't sell, it would bring back the Northern Paciﬁc Corneror something of the sort. 因为只举一个公司的一个极端例子，其中90％的股票由一个人拥有，并且市场上12％的资金被编入索引，而90％的股票不会出售，它将带回北太平洋角落或类似的东西。

In any event, I don't think that's going to be a problem.And I don't think we are going to end up being in either index, so — 无论如何，我认为这不会成为一个问题。而且我认为我们最终不会进入任何一个指数，所以 -

11. Diversify if you don't understand businesses 11.如果您不了解企业，请多元化

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, zone 1? WARREN BUFFETT：是的，1区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, my name is Aaron Morris (PH).I'm from California. 听众：巴菲特先生，我叫Aaron Morris（PH）。我来自加利福尼亚州。

What I wanted to know was how you think about how large a position you're willing to take in a given security, both in your case, where you have new cash coming in that you can invest, and in the case of an investor,where they have a ﬁxed amount of capital, and they're trying to decide what's the most (inaudible) security that they really love? 我想知道的是你如何看待你愿意在特定证券中持有多大头寸，在你的情况下，你有新的现金可以投资，而在投资者的情况下，他们有固定数量的资本，他们试图决定他们真正喜欢的最安全（听不清）的安全性是什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Charlie and I have — probably at our present size, we will never ﬁnd anything that we get as much money into as we want.Don't you think that's probably true, Charlie?If we really like it? 沃伦巴菲特：嗯，查理和我有 - 可能是我们目前的规模，我们永远找不到任何我们得到的东西。查理，难道你不认为这可能是真的吗？如果我们真的喜欢它？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I think that's quite likely. CHARLIE MUNGER：是的，我觉得很有可能。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, so we will probably never hit the limit.We would love to.We'd love to ﬁnd something we felt that strongly about, and occasionally we do.

WARREN BUFFETT：是的，所以我们可能永远不会达到极限。我们很乐意。我们很想找到我们强烈关注的东西，偶尔也会找到。

But we won't get as much money into it as we would wish, or as if we were running a million dollars of our own money or some number like that, so — 但是，我们不会像我们希望的那样获得足够的资金，或者好像我们运行了一百万美元的自有资金或类似的数字，所以 -

We are willing to put a lot of money into a single security.When I ran the partnership, the limit I got to was about 40 percent in a single stock.I think Charlie, when you ran your partnership, you had more than 40 percent in — 我们愿意为单一证券投入大量资金。当我执行合作伙伴关系时，我获得的限制在单一股票中约为 40％。我认为查理，当你合作时，你有超过40％ -

CHARLIE MUNGER: Sure.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：当然。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: And we would do the same thing if we were running smaller partnerships, or our own capital were smaller and we were running that ourselves. WARREN BUFFETT：如果我们经营的是较小的合伙企业，或者我们自己的资本规模较小而我们自己也在运营，那么我们会做同样的事情。

Because, no, we're not going to do that unless we think we understand the business very well, and we think the nature of the business, what we're paying for it, the people running it, and all of that lead upto virtually no risk, and — 因为，不，我们不会这样做，除非我们认为我们非常了解业务，我们认为业务的性质，我们为此付出的代价，运营它的人，以及所有这些几乎没有风险， -

But you ﬁnd those things, occasionally.And we would put — assuming it were that much more attractive than the second, and third, and fourth choices — we would put a big percentage of our net worth in it. 但你偶尔会发现这些东西。而且我们会认为 - 假设它比第二，第三和第四选择更有吸引力 - 我们将把我们净资产的很大一部分放在其中。

We only advise you to do that — well, we probably don't advise you to do it all, maybe — but we would only advise you to do it, if you're doing it based on your conclusions about — your own ideas ofvalue, and something that you really feel you know enough to buy the whole business, if your funds were sufﬁcient, and it was being offered to you.You ought to really understand the business. 我们只建议你这样做 - 好吧，我们可能不会建议你这么做，也许 - 但我们只会建议你这样做，如果你是根据你的结论做的 - 你自己的想法价值，以及你真正感觉自己知道足以购买整个业务的东西，如果你的资金充足，并且它正在提供给你。你应该真正了解这项业务。

But people do that all the time, incidentally, in private businesses, which have got terrible prospects.I mean, they buy dry cleaning establishments, or ﬁlling stations, or whatever, and they put very high —franchises of some kind — they put a very high percentage of their net worth into something — a business that's very risky, basically.I mean, it — 但是，顺便提一下，人们在私营企业中这样做，这些企业的前景非常糟糕。我的意思是，他们购买干洗店，或加油站，或其他任何东西，并且他们投入了非常高的某种类型的特许经营权 - 他们将很高比例的净资产投入到某种东西中 - 基本上这是一项非常冒险的业务。我是认真的 -

People put all their money in a farm, you know.It's a business.It's subject to all kinds of business risk. 你知道，人们把所有的钱都放在农场里。这是一项业务。它受到各种商业风险的影响。 So it's not crazy, if you understand the business well, and if the price is sufﬁciently attractive, to put a very signiﬁcant percentage of your net worth in. If you don't understand businesses, then you're better off diversifying and fairly widelydiversifying. 所以，如果你了解业务，并且价格足够吸引人，你的净资产占很大比例，那就不是疯了。如果你不了解业务，那么你最好多元化并且相当广泛多样化。

Zone — go ahead.Sorry 区域 - 继续。抱歉

CHARLIE: Berkshire has a substantial shareholder whose father accumulated the original position, and when he died he left a very large estate, practically all of which was in two securities, Berkshire and one other outstanding company. 查理：伯克希尔有一个主要的股东，他的父亲积累了原来的职位，当他去世时，他留下了一个非常大的房产，几乎所有的房产都是两个证券，伯克希尔和另一个杰出的公司。

A bank was co-trustee.And the bank trust ofﬁcer said you've got to diversify this.And, you know, it was a very large estate. 银行是共同受托人。银行信托官员说你必须多元化这个。而且，你知道，这是一个非常大的庄园。

And the young man who was co-trustee with the bank said, "Well," he says, "you know, if my father believed the way you do, he might have been a trust ofﬁcer in a bank instead of — (laughter)— leaving this large estate."(Applause) 那位与银行共同受托的年轻人说：“好吧，”他说，“你知道，如果我父亲相信你的方式，他可能会成为银行里的信托官而不是 - （笑） - 离开这个大房子。“ （掌声）

And that young man holds the Berkshire to this day.And I suppose the bank is still giving the same advice.(Laughter) 那个年轻人至今仍持有伯克希尔。我想银行仍在提供同样的建议。（笑声）

12. We don't like to "give you our answers" on Coca-Cola 12.我们不喜欢在可口可乐上“给你我们的答案”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2? WARREN BUFFETT：2区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, this is Chuck Peterson (PH) from Omaha. 听众：巴菲特先生，这是来自奥马哈的查克彼得森（PH）。

And I was just wondering if you could comment on the Coca-Cola Company — you haven't really talked about it too much today — in regards to what you foresee over the next ﬁve years, the earnings per share growth, and where this growthis, perhaps, going to come from. 而我只是想知道你是否可以评论可口可乐公司 - 你今天没有真正谈论它 - 关于你未来五年的预测，每股收益的增长以及这种增长的方式也许，或许会来自。

WARREN BUFFETT: Was that the question, about the growth of Coke? WARREN BUFFETT：这是关于可口可乐增长的问题吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. CHARLIE MUNGER：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: You really have to come to your own conclusion. WARREN BUFFETT：你真的必须得出自己的结论。

Coca-Cola Company writes — their annual reports are extremely good.I mean, they're very informative.You know, you — 可口可乐公司写道 - 他们的年度报告非常好。我的意思是，它们非常有用。你了解你自己 - My guess is that, at least, if you read a few of the reports, you'd absolutely know as much about the Coca-Cola Company as I would. 我的猜测是，至少，如果您阅读了一些报告，您对我所知道的可口可乐公司一无所知。

But in the end, you have to make your own decisions about growth potential, proﬁtability potential, and all that. 但最终，你必须自己决定增长潜力，盈利潜力以及所有这些。

But the one thing I can assure you is that, probably, if you spend a relatively small amount of time on it, the facts that you will have available to you for making a decision on that question will be just as good, essentially, asthe facts you'd get if you'd worked at the Coca-Cola Company for 20 years, or if you were a food and beverage analyst in Wall Street or anything of the sort. 但是我可以向你保证的一点是，如果你花费相对较少的时间，你可以用来做出关于这个问题的决定的事实也同样好，基本上就像如果你在可口可乐公司工作了20年，或者你是华尔街的食品和饮料分析师或者其他类似的东西，你会得到的事实。

That's the kind of businesses we like to look at, are things that we think we can understand that way.And they're also businesses that, usually, I think you could understand that way. 这就是我们喜欢看的业务，我们认为我们可以通过这种方式理解这些业务。而且他们也是通常认为你能理解这种方式的企业。

But we don't like you to give you our answers.I mean, that would not be a good idea. 但是我们不希望你给我们答案。我的意思是，这不是一个好主意。

13. Allianz deal was "close to a wash" 安联的交易“接近洗漱”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3? WARREN BUFFETT：3区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: David — I'm sorry — David Swab (PH) from Austin, Texas. 观众：大卫 - 对不起 - 来自德克萨斯州奥斯汀的David Swab（PH）。

I have a question pertaining to the convertible bonds that were outstanding for about four years. 我有一个关于可转换债券的问题，这些债券已经发行了大约四年。

Any thoughts on, if you're a teacher, to grade if that was a good deal, bad deal, how the money was employed compared to the cost of getting out of the bonds?Any thoughts? 如果你是老师，任何想法，如果这是一个很好的交易，糟糕的交易，如何使用资金与退出债券的成本相比评分？有什么想法吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie what?Did you get that? WARREN BUFFETT：查理什么？你明白了吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: He wants to know if you think, in retrospect, your deal with Allianz was a good deal for Berkshire. CHARLIE MUNGER ：他想知道你是否认为，回想起来，你与安联的交易对伯克希尔来说是一笔好交易。

WARREN BUFFETT: No, I would say that if I knew everything at the time that we did the Allianz deal — which was a convertible shareholder coupon debenture — if I knew everything now — then — that I know now, would we have done it?Probably pretty close.We had relatively few bonds converted when we called — when he called them.And so — that — it really wasn't a negative in that sense. WARREN BUFFETT ：不，我会说，如果我知道我们做过Allianz交易时的所有事情 - 这是一个可转换的股东优惠券债券 - 如果我现在知道一切 - 那么 - 我现在知道了，我们会做到吗？可能非常接近。当我们打电话给他们时，我们转换的债券相对较少。所以 - 从那个意义上来说，它确实不是消极的。

But if we'd had more — we could have easily had a lot more converted.And that would not have been so good, obviously, if we'd ended up selling a lot of stock at 11,800 or whatever it was. 但如果我们有更多 - 我们可以很容易地转换更多。如果我们最终以11,800或者其他任何东西出售大量股票，那显然不会那么好。

It's very hard to measure exactly what we did with the 400 million or so that we took in at the time.So, money being fungible, separating that 400 million from other resources to measure the — what happened on the plus side from having the money — is hard to do. 我们很难准确衡量我们当时采用的4亿左右的情况。因此，金钱是可以互换的，将4亿美元与其他资源分开来衡量 - 从有钱的方面发生的事情 - 很难做到。

But my guess is, if you could play the whole hand over again, it probably was maybe a tiny minus to have issued them.What do you think, Charlie? 但是我的猜测是，如果你可以再玩一遍，那可能是一个很小的减去发布它们。你觉得怎么样，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: It's certainly close to a wash. CHARLIE MUNGER：这肯定接近于清洗。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Now, you could ask about USAir, and that is one we would have been well to duck.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER ：现在，你可以询问一下USAir，这是我们本来应该好好的。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: And I might say Charlie had nothing to do with that decision.(Laughter) He didn't even know about it till I did it.And when he knew about it, hmmm.(Laughter) 沃伦巴菲特：我可能会说查理与这个决定毫无关系。（笑声）在我做之前他甚至都不知道。当他知道这件事时，嗯。（笑声）

14. "Size is a disadvantage" in buying and selling 14.买入和卖出的“规模是一个劣势”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1? WARREN BUFFETT：第1区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, I'm Joe Sirdevan from Toronto. 听众：巴菲特先生，我是多伦多的Joe Sirdevan。

With respect to Berkshire's non-permanent, but large — and therefore, illiquid — holdings, what is your strategy for managing market impact on sales, given the intense scrutiny that Berkshire's under by the market? 关于伯克希尔的非永久性，但大型 - 因此，非流动性 - 持股，鉴于伯克希尔对市场的严格审查，您对管理市场对销售的影响的策略是什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: I didn't get that either.You get that? WARREN BUFFETT：我也没说。你明白了吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I'm not hearing that very well. CHARLIE MUNGER：我听不太清楚。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I don’t know whether you’re too close to the mic — we’re having a little trouble on that. WARREN BUFFETT：是的，我不知道你是否离麦克风太近了 - 我们在这方面遇到了一些麻烦。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Speak a little more slowly. CHARLIE MUNGER：说得慢一点。

WARREN BUFFETT: Or maybe the monitor can repeat that and — would you repeat the question? WARREN BUFFETT：也许显示器可以重复这一点 - 你会重复这个问题吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Sorry.Just with respect to Berkshire's large non-permanent holdings that are, therefore, illiquid, I'm just wondering what your strategy is for managing market impact when you do decide to sell portions of those holdings, given the intense scrutiny you're under? 听众会员：对不起。关于伯克希尔的大型非永久性持股，因此非流动性，我只是想知道当你决定出售部分持股时，你的策略是如何管理市场影响的，因为你受到了严格的审查？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, question about the things we might sell, and what's going to happen to the market when we sell them. WARREN BUFFETT：是的，关于我们可能销售的东西的问题，以及当我们出售它们时市场会发生什么。

That depends.I mean, it can be a very signiﬁcant impact.It can be a negligible impact. 那要看。我的意思是，这可能是一个非常重要的影响。这可能是一个微不足道的影响。

And it depends on market conditions, it depends on whether we might sell in a couple of large blocks to some institutions, it depends on — it could be, you know, there could be a tender off or something of the sort we would sell through.So, it's hard to measure. 这取决于市场条件，这取决于我们是否可以向一些机构出售几个大块，这取决于 - 它可能是，你知道，可能有一个投标或我们将通过销售的那种东西。所以，很难衡量。

But it is a disadvantage.Size is a disadvantage, you're absolutely correct in the basic point, both in buying and in selling.And we don't know any way around that. 但这是一个缺点。大小是一个缺点，你在购买和销售的基本点上都是绝对正确的。我们不知道有什么办法。

We allow for it, in terms of what we expect, you know, the kind of possibilities we need to see.And we do — we sell so infrequently, that it's not a crusher of a negative point, but it's a negative we have that you do not. 根据我们的预期，我们允许它，我们需要看到的那种可能性。而且我们这样做 - 我们卖得很少，这不是一个负面的破坏者，但是我们拥有你不做的消极。

15. No key man insurance for Buffett and Munger 15.巴菲特和芒格没有关键人物保险

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2? WARREN BUFFETT：2区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Anna (inaudible).I'm from Roanoke, Virginia. 观众：我的名字是安娜（听不清）。我来自弗吉尼亚州的罗阿诺克。

Does Berkshire Hathaway or any of its subsidiaries have key man insurance on you and Mr. Munger? 伯克希尔哈撒韦公司或其任何子公司是否为您和芒格先生提供重要人员保险？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Does Berkshire have key man insurance on — CHARLIE MUNGER：伯克希尔是否有关键的人保险 - WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, no.No. We have no life insurance, to my knowledge, on anyone except the maybe standard — the group life contracts people have.We have no key man insurance. WARREN BUFFETT：哦，不。没有。据我所知，除了可能的标准之外，我们没有人寿保险 - 人们拥有的团体生活合同。我们没有关键的人保险。

It really doesn't — it wouldn't be material. 它确实没有 - 它不会是物质的。

I mean, that if we have a market value of 18 billion or something like that, if it really didn’t — if it — a one — if it made a 1 percent difference, it'd be $180 million. 我的意思是，如果我们的市值达到180亿或类似的东西，如果它真的没有 - 如果它 - 一个 - 如果它产生1％的差异，它将是1.8亿美元。

And basically, the math of intelligently selling insurance is better than the math of intelligently buying insurance.(Laughter and applause) 基本上，智能销售保险的数学优于智能购买保险的数学计算。（笑声和掌声）

16. Guinness-VNMH restructuring was "logical" 16.吉尼斯 - VNMH重组是“合乎逻辑的”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3? WARREN BUFFETT：3区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, I'm Barry Siskind (PH) from Mesa, Arizona.Long-time admirer of yours.Question pertains to Guinness. 听众：巴菲特先生，我是来自亚利桑那州梅萨的Barry Siskind（PH）。你的长期崇拜者。问题与吉尼斯有关。

I remember reading in a publication I greatly respect, Outstanding Investor Digest by [editor] Henry Emerson in New York, that back in — I think it was '58 or '59, you made an investment in Cuba, decided to never to make aninvestment outside the United States again at that time. 我记得在一篇我非常尊重的出版物中阅读，纽约的[编辑] Henry Emerson的杰出投资者摘要，我想回到 - 我认为是'58或'59，你在古巴做了一笔投资，决定永远不做当时在美国以外再次投资。

Have subsequently invested in Guinness.I'm a fellow investor in Guinness.I've invested in Guinness for — and its sister company, Louis Vuitton Moët Hennessy — for over ﬁve years.And I'm very happy with those investments, by the way. 随后投资了吉尼斯。我是吉尼斯的投资人。我已经为吉尼斯投资了 - 以及它的姊妹公司路易威登 MoëtHennessy--已经有五年多了。顺便说一句，我对这些投资非常满意。

There's been a restructuring, as you know, of the Guinness-LVMH relationship, where Guinness no longer owns 24 percent of LVMH.Rather, it owns only its distilling, or I should say, alcoholic beverage-related businesses — 正如你所知，吉尼斯 - 路易斯安那州的关系正在进行重组，吉尼斯不再拥有24％的LVMH。相反，它只拥有其提炼，或者我应该说，与酒精饮料有关的业务 -

WARREN BUFFETT: The Moët Hennessy part. WARREN BUFFETT：Mo悦轩尼诗的一部分。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Right, the Moët Hennessy part. 观众成员：对，Mo悦轩尼诗的一部分。

The other parts of LVMH are showing better results these days, namely the Louis Vuitton luggage, as well as the Christian Dior perfume.They've also expanded into the newspaper business this past year, a business that you understand.

LVMH的其他部分现在显示出更好的效果，即Louis Vuitton行李箱以及Christian Dior香水。他们去年也扩展到了报业，这是你理解的业务。

Do you intend to look at the possibility, ﬁrst of all, of participating in those businesses that you no longer own now — with the restructured Guinness-LVMH deal — through some other form? 您是否打算首先考虑参与那些您不再拥有的业务的可能性 - 通过重组的Guinness-LVMH交易 - 通过其他形式？

And the second question relates to the currency risk inherent in the Guinness investment, having bought it at about $1.80, as you mentioned, pound sterling now down to about $1.48. 而第二个问题涉及吉尼斯投资所固有的货币风险，如你所说，以约1.80美元的价格买入，英镑现在下跌至1.48美元左右。

The cost of hedging foreign currency through the FX has diminished through the combination of lower interest rates in the U.K., and higher interest rates, most recently in the U.S., to just about zero. 通过英国较低的利率和最近在美国的较高利率（几乎为零）相结合，通过外汇对冲外汇的成本已经减少。

I take it we're all investors in companies, not speculators in currencies.So, the second part of the question is, do you intend to do anything about the currency risk portion of that investment? 我认为我们都是公司的投资者，而不是货币的投机者。那么，问题的第二部分是，您是否打算对该投资的货币风险部分采取任何措施？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well LVMH, which as you mentioned was 24 percent owned by Guinness — you know, that's one of thousands of securities that we could be a buyer or a seller of.So, I really don't want to comment on LVMH's speciﬁc attractiveness, or lack thereof. WARREN BUFFETT：LVMH，正如你所提到的，吉尼斯拥有24％的股份 - 你知道，这是我们可能成为买家或卖家的数千种证券之一。所以，我真的不想评论LVMH的具体吸引力或缺乏吸引力。

And Guinness, I think what Guinness did was quite logical.I mean, their interest in that operation was basically through the distribution advantages that it gave to Guinness's own brands around the world, to be hooked up with Moët Hennessy, and vice versa.So, I think what they did was logical. 而吉尼斯，我认为吉尼斯做的事情是合情合理的。我的意思是，他们对这项行动的兴趣基本上是通过它给全世界的吉尼斯自有品牌带来的分销优势，与Mo悦轩尼诗联系起来，反之亦然。所以，我认为他们所做的是合乎逻辑的。

You can — the question of the exchange rate and all of that — the exchange rate, in terms of what they got in the spirits business, versus what they gave up in the luggage business, as in Christian Dior and a few things.You can form your own opinion on that. 你可以 - 汇率问题和所有这些 - 汇率，就他们在烈酒业中所获得的，与他们在行李箱业务中所放弃的相比，如Christian Dior和一些事情。你可以对此形成自己的看法。

But I think the logic was sound.But in terms of whether we want to be in LVMH by itself, that's like any other security, which we really can't answer. 但我认为逻辑是合理的。但就我们是否希望自己在 LVMH中而言，这就像任何其他安全性一样，我们实际上无法回答。

17. Berkshire doesn't hedge currencies 17.伯克希尔不对冲货币

WARREN BUFFETT: Second question related to — WARREN BUFFETT：第二个问题涉及 - CHARLIE MUNGER: Hedging. CHARLIE MUNGER：对冲。

WARREN BUFFETT: Hedge.Yeah, the hedging of currency — WARREN BUFFETT：对冲。是的，货币对冲 -

CHARLIE MUNGER: Do we hedge? CHARLIE MUNGER：我们对冲吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: The answer to that is we don't.And Coca-Cola, as I mentioned, gets 80 percent of their earnings from a variety of currencies, the yen and the mark being two very important ones.They're going to be getting a very high percentage ﬁve years from now, 10 years from now. WARREN BUFFETT：答案是我们不这样做。正如我所提到的，可口可乐从各种货币中获得80％的收益，日元和商标是两个非常重要的货币。从现在起10年后，他们将在五年后获得很高的比例。

They do certain currency transactions, but it's a practical matter.If you own Coca-Cola, you own a bunch of foreign bonds with coupons on them, denominated in local currencies, that go on forever. 他们做某些货币交易，但这是一个实际问题。如果你拥有可口可乐，你就拥有一堆外国债券，上面有优惠券，以当地货币计价，永远持续下去。

Now, should you try and engage in currency swaps on all those coupons — you don't know what those coupons are yet, because you don't know how much they're going to earn in Japan or Germany, but you do know it'sgoing to go on for decades, and it's — they're going to be very signiﬁcant sums. 现在，如果您尝试在所有优惠券上进行货币掉期 - 您还不知道这些优惠券是什么，因为您不知道他们将在日本或德国赚多少钱，但您确实知道这是将持续数十年，而且 - 它们将是非常重要的数额。

Should you try and engage in a whole bunch of currency swaps to go on out and convert all that stream into dollars or anything? 你是否应该尝试进行一大堆货币掉期交易并将所有流转换成美元或任何东西？

We basically don't think it's worth it.We don't think our opinion on currencies is any good.We don't think — we think the market probably know — well, we know it knows as much about it — it probably knows more about currencies, but it — we don't know — we do not know more than the market does aboutcurrencies. 我们基本上认为这不值得。我们认为我们对货币的看法没有任何好处。我们不认为 - 我们认为市场可能知道 - 嗯，我们知道它对此了解得多 - 它可能对货币有更多了解，但它 - 我们不知道 - 我们不知道市场对此有何了解货币。

So there are costs to hedging.And even though interest rate structures may cause the curve to look ﬂat going out forward, so that, in effect, there's no contango on it, there's still the cost — there are costs in it.Now, it's a relatively efﬁcient market, so that they're not huge. 因此，套期保值需要付出代价。即使利率结构可能导致曲线向前看变平，因此，实际上，它没有任何正交值，仍然存在成本 - 其中存在成本。现在，它是一个相对有效的市场，因此它们并不庞大。

But we see no reason to incur those costs with what we regard as a — totally, a 50-50 proposition.And it really doesn't go out that far anyway.I mean, we could do it for a couple of years. 但是我们认为没有理由用我们认为的 - 完全是50-50的命题来承担这些成本。无论如何它真的不会走得那么远。我的意思是，我们可以做几年。

But if you take that — the way we look at businesses, being the discounted ﬂow of future cash out between now and Judgment Day, we can't really hedge that kind of a risk anyway.We could keep rolling hedges, but there's a cost to it that we don't want to incur.

但是，如果你采取这种方式 - 我们看待企业的方式，即从现在到审判日之间的未来现金折扣流，我们无论如何都无法真正对冲那种风险。我们可以继续滚动对冲，但是我们不想承担它的成本。

We don't — we wouldn't worry a whole lot about whether some portion of our earnings, whether it's from Guinness, whether it's from Coke, whether it's from Gillette, are denominated at some mixture of marks, and pounds, and yen,and dollars, or whether they're all in dollars. 我们不会 - 我们不会担心我们的一部分收入，无论是来自吉尼斯，是否来自可口可乐，是否来自吉列，都是以某种商标，英镑和日元计价的，和美元，或者他们是否都是美元。

We'd slightly prefer if it were all in dollars, but we don't lose sleep over the fact that it may be coming from a mix of currencies like that.We wouldn't like it, in terms of, obviously, some very weak currencies. 我们稍微倾向于它是否都是美元，但我们不会因为它可能来自这样的货币组合而失眠。显然，我们不会喜欢一些非常弱的货币。

18. Insurance intrinsic value far exceeds book value 18.保险内在价值远远超过账面价值

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1? WARREN BUFFETT：第1区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Lawrence Grawning (PH), Mill Valley, California. 观众成员：劳伦斯格拉文（PH），加利福尼亚州米尔谷。

On page 13 of the annual report, in — talking about the insurance operation, you say that it possesses an intrinsic value that exceeds its book value by a "large amount — larger, in fact, than is the case at any other Berkshire business." 在年度报告的第13页，谈到保险业务，你说它拥有的内在价值超过其账面价值“大量 - 实际上比任何其他伯克希尔业务的情况都要大。 “

To reﬁne an earlier question that was asked, could you tell me whether you mean that it is larger in — by a percentage or in absolute dollars, that is — 为了完善先前提出的问题，您能否告诉我您是否意味着它更大 - 按百分比或以绝对美元计算，即 -

WARREN BUFFETT: By absolute dollars.And — WARREN BUFFETT：绝对美元。而且 -

AUDIENCE MEMBER: That's what you're referring to? 听众会员：那就是你所指的？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, by absolute — it's very hard to stick a percentage ﬁgure on the insurance business, because we have so much capital in there that — WARREN BUFFETT：是的，绝对 - 在保险业务中保持一个百分比很难，因为我们在那里拥有如此多的资本 -

And then — and we have other businesses.I think that the — we've got businesses with a book value of in the tens of millions that are worth in the many hundreds of millions.So, you couldn't apply that to the insurance company (Inaudible).So, it's absolute dollars. 然后 - 我们还有其他业务。我认为 - 我们的企业账面价值数以千万计，价值数亿美元。因此，您无法将其应用于保险公司（听不清）。所以，这是绝对的美元。

But in terms of absolute dollars, we think the excess of intrinsic value over carrying value — at least I do — is substantially greater for the insurance business than any other business we own. 但就绝对美元而言，我们认为保险业务的内在价值超过账面价值（至少我所做的）超过我们拥有的任何其他业务。 Charlie, do you have any — 查理，你有什么 -

CHARLIE MUNGER: No — CHARLIE MUNGER：不 -

WARREN BUFFETT: — thoughts on that? WARREN BUFFETT： - 想一想吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: — that's exactly right. CHARLIE MUNGER： - 这是完全正确的。

19. No concerns on Coca-Cola succession 19.不关心可口可乐的继承

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Joe Little (PH), Vancouver, Canada. 听众：Joe Little（PH），加拿大温哥华。

Does the management succession issue for the top job at Coca-Cola concern you? 可口可乐最高职位的管理层继任问题是否与您有关？

WARREN BUFFETT: Management picture, you'd do what with the —? WARREN BUFFETT：管理图片，你用 - 做什么？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: The management succession issue over the next several years. 听众会员：未来几年的管理层继任问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, yeah. WARREN BUFFETT：哦，是的。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: The top job.Does that concern you? 听众会员：最重要的工作。这关系到你了吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: At Coca-Cola — WARREN BUFFETT：在可口可乐公司 -

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah. 听众会员：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: I think any announcement that — from that would come with — from Coca- Cola. WARREN BUFFETT：我认为可以从可口可乐那里宣布 - 从那时起 - 。

CHARLIE MUNGER: He said do you like it? CHARLIE MUNGER：他说你喜欢吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Does it concern you? 听众会员：这与您有关系吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Does it concern you? CHARLIE MUNGER：你关心吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, I'm not concerned at all, no.No, Coca-Cola is very well managed. (Laughs) WARREN BUFFETT：哦，我根本不关心，不。不，可口可乐管理得很好。（笑） 20. Salomon CEO's $24M bonus target "hellishly hard to hit" 20.所罗门首席执行官的2400万美元红利目标“难以击中”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3? WARREN BUFFETT：3区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Chris Stavrou (PH) from New York. 听众：来自纽约的Chris Stavrou（PH）。

According to the latest Salomon Brothers proxy, if [Chairman and CEO] Deryck [Maughan] earns 30 percent on allocated equity of Salomon Brothers, provided that that's at least 10 percent above the return for competitors, he could earn a bonus of $24 million. 根据最新的所罗门兄弟代理人，如果[董事长兼首席执行官] Deryck [Maughan]在所罗门兄弟的分配股权上获得30％的收益，只要它比竞争对手的回报高出至少10％，他就可以获得2400万美元的奖金。

My question is whether that return number is reduced by a charge for preferred dividends? 我的问题是，对于优先股股息，这个回报数是否减少了？

WARREN BUFFETT: I, Charlie, do you remember on the comp committee —? WARREN BUFFETT：我，查理，你还记得在委员会 - ？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I can't remember the detail on that. CHARLIE MUNGER：我不记得那个细节了。

WARREN BUFFETT: I think the equity — I — my — I'm fairly sure, but I'm not positive, that the equity ﬁgure would include our preferred, but not non-convertible preferreds. WARREN BUFFETT：我认为股权 - 我 - 我 - 我相当肯定，但我不是肯定的，股权数字将包括我们的首选，但不是不可兑换的首选。

And it would apply to the earnings applicable to the — to our preferred plus common, but not — but it would be after dividends on non-convertible preferred. 它将适用于 - 适用于我们的首选加上共同的收益，但不适用 - 但它将是在不可转换优先股的股息之后。

But I, you know, I'm not on the comp committee, and I have not read the description that carefully. 但是，我知道，我不在comp委员会，而且我没有仔细阅读这些描述。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I am, and I can't remember.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，我是，我不记得了。（笑声）

But I will tell you, one thing I do remember about that, and that is a target which would be one — would be hellishly hard to hit. 但是我会告诉你，有一点我记得那件事，那就是一个目标 - 一个人会很难被击中。

WARREN BUFFETT: It'd be unbelievable.I mean — 沃伦巴菲特：这真是令人难以置信。我的意思是 -

CHARLIE MUNGER: That's is, you're talking about Babe Ruth — CHARLIE MUNGER：就是这样，你在谈论Babe Ruth -

WARREN BUFFETT: Squared. WARREN BUFFETT：平方。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, doing 150 home runs in a season instead of a — if that happens, you'll be very glad to pay the money.(Laughter)

CHARLIE MUNGER：是的，在一个赛季而不是一个赛季做150次本垒打 - 如果发生这种情况，你会很乐意付钱。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Very.Under either calculation, yeah.It really — but it, you know, I'm glad it's there.(Laughs) WARREN BUFFETT ：非常。在任何一种计算下，是的。它真的 - 但它，你知道，我很高兴它在那里。（笑）

I hope Deryck's paying attention to it. 我希望Deryck能够关注它。

21. Salomon is a "better company than it was some years back" 萨洛蒙是一个“比几年前更好的公司”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1? WARREN BUFFETT：第1区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, I’m Chris Davis again, from New York. 观众成员：嗨，我是来自纽约的克里斯戴维斯。

I wanted to ask if you — I feel there's such a huge discrepancy between the valuation of some of your holdings versus others, in terms of the market valuation, in terms of price-to-earnings, price-to- book. 我想问你是否 - 我认为你的一些持股与其他持股的估值在市场估值方面，在市盈率，价格与账面价值方面存在巨大的差异。

In your opinion, do the growth prospects of Salomon Brothers, or the quality — or your anticipation of your ability to clip the coupons at Salomon Brothers — justify such a dramatic discount to the growth prospects of Coca-Cola or Gillette, in terms of ourability as Berkshire shareholders to clip those coupons? 在您看来，所罗门兄弟的增长前景，或者您对所罗门兄弟公司优惠券能力的预期，以及我们对可口可乐或吉列的增长前景的大幅折扣是合理的。能否像伯克希尔股东一样削减这些优惠券？

And if you could explain, or perhaps share your thoughts on why the market perception, if it is — justiﬁes that distinction? 如果你可以解释，或者可能分享你对市场认知的看法，如果是 - 证明这种区别是正确的吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I'm not sure I can answer that question without getting into a discussion of the relative merits of the two companies — or the three companies — you mentioned, at these prices, but — WARREN BUFFETT ：是的，我不确定如果不以这些价格讨论两家公司（或三家公司）的相对优点，我不能回答这个问题，但是 -

Salomon and Coca-Cola are obviously very different kinds of businesses, or Salomon and Gillette.And Charlie and I do our best to try to understand the businesses. 所罗门和可口可乐显然是非常不同的企业，或所罗门和吉列。查理和我尽力尝试了解这些业务。

Obviously, it's easier to understand the future of a Coca-Cola than it is a Salomon.But that doesn't mean it's a better buy. 显然，理解可口可乐的未来比所罗门更容易。但这并不意味着它更好买。

And what you see at any given time in our holdings is partly the historical accident, even, of when we bought, and when we had money available, and all that.But it reﬂected an afﬁrmative decision at that point, obviously. 你在我们所持有的任何特定时间看到的部分是历史性事故，甚至是我们买的时候，以及当我们有钱的时候，以及所有这些。但它显然反映了那时的肯定决定。 Our guess would be that the — you know, we would feel reasonably good about anything that we owned, in terms of the price at which we bought it, and the facts at the time we bought it.And the facts change over time. 我们的猜测是 - 你知道，我们在购买它的价格和我们购买它时的事实方面对我们拥有的任何东西感觉相当不错。事实随着时间的推移而变化。

Salomon, I think, is a better company now than it was some years back.But it's still in a business that’s — can be very volatile, and it has a small amount — as does any investment banking ﬁrm and as any commercial banking ﬁrm — of systemic risk.I mean, you can't get rid of that. 我认为，所罗门公司现在比几年前更好。但它仍处于一项业务中 - 可能非常不稳定，并且它的数量很少 - 与任何投资银行公司和任何商业银行公司一样 - 存在系统性风险。我的意思是，你无法摆脱它。

Charlie, you want to? 查理，你想要吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, I've got nothing to add. CHARLIE MUNGER：不，我没有什么可补充的。

22. Calculating intrinsic value 22.计算内在价值

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2? WARREN BUFFETT：2区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you.Sean Barry, Regina, Canada. 听众会员：谢谢。 Sean Barry，加拿大里贾纳。

Mr. Buffett, you've indicated that most of us in this room could acquire a lot of the information that you and Charlie acquire through the annual reports.Yet you both also indicated that the GAAP rules, a lot of times, leave a little to be desired. 巴菲特先生，您已经表示，我们这个会议室的大多数人都可以通过年度报告获得您和查理获得的大量信息。然而，你们两人也表示，GAAP规则很多时候都有一些不足之处。

Could you perhaps give an indication as to how you and Charlie come up with the economic value, or the intrinsic value, of the businesses that you ﬁnally decide to invest in?And a little bit about the process that you go through with that?Thank you. 您是否可以指出您和查理如何提出您最终决定投资的业务的经济价值或内在价值？还有一点关于你经历过的过程？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the — in the 1992 annual report, we discuss that a fair amount. WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，在1992年年度报告中，我们讨论了相当数量的问题。

But the economic value of any asset, essentially, is the present value, the appropriate interest rate, of all the future streams of cash going in or out of the business. 但是，任何资产的经济价值，实质上都是进出业务的所有未来现金流的现值，即适当的利率。

And there are all kinds of businesses that Charlie and I don't think we have the faintest idea what that future stream will look like.And if we don't have the faintest idea what the future stream is going to look like, we don't have the faintest idea what it's worth, now.Now that — 查理和我认为，各种各样的企业都不认为我们对未来的流将会是什么样子。如果我们不了解未来的流将会是什么样子，那么我们现在对于它的价值并不是最微弱的想法。现在 -

So, if you think you know what the price of a stock should be today, but you don't think you have any idea what the stream of cash will be over the next 20 years, you've got cognitive dissonance, I guess,is what they call it.(Laughter) The —

所以，如果你认为你知道今天股票的价格应该是多少，但是你认为你不知道未来20年的现金流会是什么，那么你认为，我认为你会有认知失调，就是他们所说的。（笑声） -

So we are looking for things where we feel — fairly high degree of probability — that we can come within a range of looking at those numbers out over a period of time, and then we discount them back. 因此，我们正在寻找我们感觉到的事情 - 相当高的概率 - 我们可以在一段时间内查看这些数字，然后我们将它们折回。

And we are more concerned with the certainty of those numbers than we are with getting the one that looks absolutely the cheapest, but based upon numbers that we don't have any — we don’t have great conﬁdence in. 而且我们更关心的是这些数字的确定性，而不是我们获得看起来绝对最便宜的数字，但基于我们没有任何数字的数字 - 我们没有很大的信心。

And that's basically what economic value is all about. 这基本上就是经济价值所在。

The numbers in any accounting report mean nothing, per se, as to economic value.They are guidelines to tell you something about how to get at economic value. 任何会计报告中的数字本身对经济价值都没有任何意义。它们是指导您如何获得经济价值的指南。

But they don't tell you anything.It — there are no answers in the financial statements.There are guidelines to enable you to figure out the answer.And to figure out that answer, you have to understand something about business. 但他们没有告诉你任何事情。它 - 财务报表中没有答案。有一些指导方针可以帮助您找到答案。要想出答案，你必须了解一些关于商业的事情。

You don't have to understand a lot about mathematics.I mean, the math is not complicated.But you do have to understand something about the business. 你不必了解很多关于数学的知识。我的意思是，数学并不复杂。但你必须了解有关业务的一些事情。

But that's the same thing you would do if you were going to buy an apartment house, or a farm, or any other small business you might be interested in. 但是，如果您打算购买公寓，农场或任何其他您可能感兴趣的小企业，那么您将会这样做。

You would try to ﬁgure out what you are laying out currently, and what you are likely to get back over time, and how certain you felt about getting it, and how it compared to other alternatives.That's all we do, we just do it with large businesses, basically. 您将尝试弄清楚您目前正在布置的内容，以及您可能会随着时间的推移得到什么，以及您对获得它的感觉如何，以及它与其他替代方案相比如何。这就是我们所做的一切，基本上我们只是通过大型企业来做。

The accounting ﬁgures are very helpful to us, in the sense that they generally guide us to what we should be thinking about. 会计数字对我们非常有帮助，因为它们通常指导我们应该思考的内容。

And of course, if we ﬁnd numbers where it looks like people are taking the most optimistic interpretation of things that they can under GAAP and all of that, we get very worried about people who look like they massage the numbers in any way.And there are plenty of people that do. 当然，如果我们发现数字似乎人们对GAAP和所有这些事情采取最乐观的解释，我们会非常担心那些看起来像是以任何方式按摩数字的人。并且有很多人这样做。

23. Growth alone doesn't make a company a good investment 23.仅靠增长并不能使公司成为一项良好的投资 WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3? WARREN BUFFETT：3区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'm Howard Bask (PH).I'm from Kansas City. 听众：我是Howard Bask（PH）。我来自堪萨斯城。

When you are estimating a growth rate on a company (inaudible), a very predictable company, I imagine you apply a big margin of safety to it.What kind of rate do you generally apply?I mean, high single digits? 当你估计一家公司（听不清）的增长率时，一个非常可预测的公司，我想你应用了一个很大的安全边际。您通常适用什么样的费率？我的意思是，高位数？

WARREN BUFFETT: In the margin of safety, or — WARREN BUFFETT：在安全范围内，或 -

AUDIENCE MEMBER: What kind of growth rate would you, on a predictable company, might you — 听众会员：对于一家可预测的公司，您可能会达到什么样的增长率？

WARREN BUFFETT: We are willing to — WARREN BUFFETT：我们愿意 -

AUDIENCE MEMBER: — stab at? 听众： - 刺伤？

WARREN BUFFETT: — buy companies that aren't going to grow at all. WARREN BUFFETT： - 购买根本不会增长的公司。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: OK. 听众会员：好的。

WARREN BUFFETT: It — assuming we get enough for our money when we do it.So, it — we are not looking — we are looking at projecting numbers out, as to what kind of cash we think we'll get back over time. WARREN BUFFETT ：我们假设在我们这样做的时候能够获得足够的资金。所以，它 - 我们不看 - 我们正在考虑预测数字，以及我们认为随着时间的推移会得到什么样的现金。

But you know, would you rather have a savings — if you're going to put a million dollars in a savings account, would you rather have something that paid you 10 percent a year and never changed, or would you rather have something that paidyou 2 percent a year and increased at 10 percent a year?Well, you can work out the math to answer those questions. 但是你知道，你宁愿有一笔积蓄吗 - 如果你要在储蓄账户上投入一百万美元，你宁愿买一些东西每年支付10％并且从未改变，或者你愿意付出一些代价你一年2％，一年增长10％？好吧，你可以算出数学来回答这些问题。

But you can certainly have a situation where there's absolutely no growth in the business, and it's a much better investment than some company that's going to grow at very substantial rates, particularly if they're going to need capital in order to grow. 但是你肯定会遇到业务绝对没有增长的情况，而且它的投资要比一些公司以更高的利率增长，特别是如果它们需要资金才能增长。

There's a huge difference in the business that grows and requires a lot of capital to do so, and the business that grows, and doesn't require capital. 业务增长巨大，需要大量资金，而且业务增长，不需要资金。 And I would say that, generally, ﬁnancial analysts do not give adequate weight to the difference in those.In fact, it's amazing how little attention is paid to that.Believe me, if you're investing, you should pay a lot of attention to it. 我会说，一般来说，金融分析师并没有充分考虑这些差异。事实上，很少有人关注它。相信我，如果你投资，你应该多关注它。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I agree with that.But it's fairly simple, but it's not so simple it can all be explained in one sentence.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：我同意这一点。但这很简单，但并不是那么简单，只能用一句话来解释。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Our — some of our best businesses that we own outright don't grow.But they throw off lots of money, which we can use to buy something else.And therefore, our capital is growing, without physical growth being in the business. WARREN BUFFETT：我们 - 我们直接拥有的一些最好的业务不会增长。但他们甩掉了很多钱，我们可以用来买别的东西。因此，我们的资本正在增长，没有实体增长。

And we are much better off being in that kind of situation [than] being in some business that, itself, is growing, but that takes up all the money in order to grow, and doesn't produce at high returns as we go along.A lot of managements don't understand that very well, actually. 我们在这种情况下会好得多[比]在某些业务本身正在增长，但是为了增长而占用所有资金，并且随着我们的发展而不会产生高回报。实际上，很多管理人员都不太了解这一点。

24. Capital allocation shouldn't be delegated 24.不应授权资本分配

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1? WARREN BUFFETT：第1区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Byron Wien from New York. 听众：来自纽约的Byron Wien。

You said that you decentralized the operating decisions, but centralized the capital allocation decisions. 您说您分散了运营决策，但集中了资本分配决策。

What kind of staff do you have in Omaha to help you with the capital allocation decisions and the stock selection decisions you make?Or do you and Charlie do that, pretty much, by yourselves? 您在奥马哈拥有哪些员工来帮助您完成资本分配决策和您做出的选股决策？或者你和查理这样做，几乎是你自己呢？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we don't have any staff to help us on it.I mean, basically we tell them to mail all the money to Omaha — (laughter) — and then when we get there, we put our arms around it.(Laughs) WARREN BUFFETT ：是的，我们没有任何工作人员来帮助我们。我的意思是，基本上我们告诉他们把所有的钱都邮寄给奥马哈 - （笑声） - 然后当我们到达那里时，我们搂着它。（笑）

And we allocate all the capital ourselves.I mean, that is our job. 我们自己分配所有资金。我的意思是，这是我们的工作。

And we don't feel we should delegate, I mean, we wouldn't do it anyway.Our personalities aren't such that we would delegate our — allocating our own money to someone — letting somebody else allocate our own money. 而且我们觉得我们不应该委托，我的意思是，我们不会这样做。我们的个性不是这样，我们会委托我们 - 将自己的钱分配给某人 - 让其他人分配我们自己的钱。

But we feel that's our job.And it's interesting, and we’ve — I've written about this in the past — that that's an important job for most managements.There's some companies where it's not, but it’s a — it usually is a very important job for most managements. 但我们觉得这是我们的工作。这很有趣，而且我们 - 我过去曾经写过 - 这对大多数管理层来说都是一项重要的工作。有些公司不是，但它是 - 对大多数管理层来说，这通常是一项非常重要的工作。

And if you take a CEO that's in a job for 10 years, and he has a business that earns, say, 12 percent on equity, and he’s — and he pays out a third, that means he's got 8 percent per year of equity.I mean, when you think of his tenure in ofﬁce, how much capital he's allocated, it's an enormous factor over time. 如果你担任一个已经工作了 10年的首席执行官，并且他的公司能够获得12％的股权收益，而且他是 - 并且他支付了三分之一，这意味着他每年获得8％的股权。我的意思是，当你想到他在任期间，他分配了多少资金时，随着时间的推移，这是一个巨大的因素。

And yet, probably relatively few chief executives are either trained for, or are selected on, the basis of their ability to allocate capital.I mean, they get there through other routes. 然而，可能相对较少的首席执行官要么接受培训，要么根据其分配资本的能力进行选择。我的意思是，他们通过其他途径到达那里。

So, I've said it's like somebody playing the piano all their life, and then getting to Carnegie Hall and they hand him a violin.I mean, it is a different function than most — than the route — than the functions that exist along the routes to the CEO's job at most companies. 所以，我说这就像有人一生弹钢琴，然后到卡内基音乐厅，他们递给他一把小提琴。我的意思是，与大多数公司的首席执行官工作路线中存在的职能相比，它与大多数职能不同。

And so many CEOs, when they get there, think they can solve it by either having a staff that does it, or by hiring consultants, or whatever it may be. 许多首席执行官，当他们到达那里时，他们认为他们可以通过雇佣员工或聘请顾问或其他任何人来解决问题。

And in our view, that is — and that's a terrible mistake, because it’s — it is, if not the key function of the CEO, it's one of two or three key functions at say 80 or 90 percent of all companies. 在我们看来，这是 - 这是一个可怕的错误，因为它是 - 如果不是首席执行官的关键职能，它是所有公司80％或90％的两个或三个关键职能之一。

And if you can't do it yourself, you're going to make a lot of mistakes.You may make a lot of mistakes even if you do it yourself.But if you — 如果你不能自己做，那你就会犯很多错误。即使你自己犯了错误，也可能犯很多错误。但如果你 -

You know, you wouldn't want anybody in any other position of that importance in the company essentially saying, "I don't know how to do this, so I'm going to have somebody else do it," when it's their keyresponsibility.But that's the way it works in business. 你知道，你不会希望任何人在公司的任何其他重要位置基本上说，“我不知道怎么做，所以我会让别人去做，”这是他们的关键责任。但这就是它在商业中的运作方式。

And Charlie and I take responsibility for all capital allocation decisions, other than just, sort of, routine expenditures at the operating businesses.And we don't get into those at all. 查理和我负责所有资本分配决策，而不仅仅是经营业务的常规支出。而且我们根本没有进入那些。

I mean, if our managers are spending three or four million dollars a year on machinery — or if one of them is, I mean — on machinery, equipment, plants, new leases — we have no review process on that.We don't have a staff at headquarters.We don't waste the time to do that.

我的意思是，如果我们的管理人员每年在机器上花费三四百万美元 - 或者其中一个是我的意思 - 在机械，设备，工厂，新租赁上 - 我们没有审查过程。我们总部没有工作人员。我们不浪费时间去做那件事。

We think those people know how to allocate the money that relates to the actual operations of their business.We think, in terms of the capital that is generated above that, that that's our job. 我们认为这些人知道如何分配与其业务的实际运营相关的资金。我们认为，就上面产生的资本而言，这就是我们的工作。

Charlie, anything —? 查理，什么 - ？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I would say we have practically nobody at headquarters in Omaha.One of the reasons Warren shines up so well is, you know, he's being compared to practically nobody. (Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER ：我想说我们在奥马哈的总部几乎没有人。沃伦如此出色的原因之一是，你知道，他与几乎没有人相提并论。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I might say if — one interesting — when we're having this meeting, for example, I think there's one person there in the ofﬁce.I mean, the rest of them are down here helping on the meeting.I mean, it — WARREN BUFFETT：我可能会说 - 如果有一个有趣的话 - 当我们举行这次会议时，我认为办公室里有一个人。我的意思是，其余的人都在这里帮忙开会。我是认真的 -

CHARLIE MUNGER: Here we are, Warren and I are selling candy and encyclopedias, and so forth.The chief ﬁnancial ofﬁcer of Berkshire Hathaway is handling the microphones.I mean, this makes Southwest Airlines look like they don't understand — CHARLIE MUNGER：我们在这里，Warren和我正在销售糖果和百科全书，等等。伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的首席财务官正在处理麦克风。我的意思是，这使得西南航空看起来像他们不明白 -

WARREN BUFFETT: Cost control.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：成本控制。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: — cost accounting, yeah.It's a very old-fashioned place. CHARLIE MUNGER： - 成本核算，是的。这是一个非常老式的地方。

And by the way, speaking of hawking our merchandise, if any of you have safety deposit boxes full of Berkshire Hathaway certiﬁcates, and have children or grandchildren who don't have World Book in print in the house, you are making a very serious error. 顺便说一句，谈到摆卖我们的商品，如果你们中的任何一个人的保险箱里装满了伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的证书，并且孩子或孙子孙女在家中没有印刷世界图书，你就会犯一个非常严重的错误。

That is a marvelous thing for — to have in the house with — 这是一个了不起的事情 - 在房子里有 -

WARREN BUFFETT: And the discount only applies — WARREN BUFFETT：折扣仅适用 -

CHARLIE MUNGER: — full of young people. CHARLIE MUNGER： - 充满了年轻人。

WAWRREN BUFFETT: The discount only applies today — (laughs) — incidentally.I think that's right. WAWRREN BUFFETT：折扣仅适用于今天 - （笑） - 顺便说一下。我认为这是对的。 CHARLIE MUNGER: It is.That is, it may not be selling too well because of the current vogue for encyclopedias on computers.And by the way, those encyclopedias that are available are inferior compared to World Book, which is very user-friendly for children, and I like it that way myself.And — CHARLIE MUNGER：是的。也就是说，由于目前计算机上百科全书的流行，它可能卖得不太好。顺便说一下，与World Book相比，那些可用的百科全书都是劣质的，这对儿童来说非常人性化，我自己也喜欢这样。而且 -

WARREN BUFFETT: We — WARREN BUFFETT：我们 -

CHARLIE MUNGER: That is one product you really ought to buy. CHARLIE MUNGER：这是你真正应该购买的产品。

WARREN BUFFETT: We both use it, personally.I mean, I keep a set at the ofﬁce, and a set at home.And I — WARREN BUFFETT ：我们都亲自使用它。我的意思是，我在办公室里放了一套，在家里放了一套。和我 -

CHARLIE MUNGER: I give away more of that product — CHARLIE MUNGER：我赠送更多的产品 -

WARREN BUFFETT: — I use it a lot. WARREN BUFFETT： - 我经常使用它。

CHARLIE MUNGER: — than other product that Berkshire Hathaway makes in any subsidiary.It's a perfectly fabulous human achievement.To edit a thing, to — that user friendly, with that much wisdom encapsulated.It is a — it's a fabulous thing. CHARLIE MUNGER： - 比Berkshire Hathaway在任何子公司生产的其他产品。这是一项非常棒的人类成就。要编辑一个东西，那个用户友好，用那么多的智慧封装起来。这是一个 - 这是一个神话般的事情。

25. Keynes: Great "wisdom" about investing 25.凯恩斯：关于投资的伟大“智慧”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2? WARREN BUFFETT：2区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: (Inaudible) from Houston, Texas.From time to time, you have quoted John Maynard Keynes, the British economist. 观众成员:(听不清）来自德克萨斯州休斯顿市。你不时引用英国经济学家约翰梅纳德凯恩斯的话。

So, I would assume that you have read the investment writings very extensively.What are two or three investment lessons, in your opinion, one can learn from that economist? 所以，我认为你已经非常广泛地阅读了投资着作。在您看来，您可以从经济学家那里学到两三个投资课程吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I forget which, I think it's chapter eight of “The General Theory,” do you remember Charlie?Or is it chapter — WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我忘记了哪一个，我认为这是“一般理论”的第八章，你还记得查理吗？或者是章节 -

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. CHARLIE MUNGER：没有。 WARREN BUFFETT: There's one chapter in “The General Theory” that relates to markets, and the psychology of markets, and the behavior of market participants and so on, that probably is, aside from Ben Graham's two chapters, eight and 20, in “The Intelligent Investor” — I think you'll ﬁnd you'll get as much wisdom from reading that as anything written in investments.And you'll know it when you see it in “The General Theory.” 沃伦·巴菲特：“一般理论”中有一章与市场，市场心理，市场参与者的行为等有关，除了本格雷厄姆的两章，八和二十章，“智能投资者“ - 我认为你会发现你从阅读中获得的知识与投资中的任何内容一样多。当你在“通论”中看到它时，你就会知道它。

It's a chapter that jumps out to you about securities and so on.And I — could be chapter eight, but I may be wrong on that.But I would recommend reading that. 这是一章向您介绍证券等等。我 - 可能是第八章，但我可能错了。但我建议阅读。

Keynes and Graham, from vastly different starting points, came to the same conclusion at about the same time in the '30s, as to the soundest way to invest over time.They differed some on their ideas on diversiﬁcation.Keynes believed in diversifying far less than did Graham. 来自不同起点的凯恩斯和格雷厄姆在30年代的同一时间得出了相同的结论，这是最长久的投资方式。他们对多样化的看法有所不同。凯恩斯相信多元化的程度远远低于格雷厄姆。

But Keynes started off with the wrong theory, I would say, in the '20s and essentially tried to predict business cycles in markets, and then shifted to fundamental analysis of businesses in the '30s, and did extremely well. 但是，凯恩斯在20世纪20年代开始用错误的理论开始，基本上试图预测市场中的商业周期，然后转向30年代对企业的基本分析，并且做得非常好。

And about the same time, Graham was writing his ﬁrst material.I think Janet Lowe, in her book on Ben Graham, actually has a little correspondence that took place between Keynes and Ben.So I would advise you to read that. 大约在同一时间，格雷厄姆正在写他的第一部材料。我认为Janet Lowe在她关于Ben Graham的书中，实际上在凯恩斯和Ben之间发生了一些信件。所以我建议你阅读。

And there's some letters of his that he — of Keynes' — that he wrote to co-trustees of life insurance societies, and colleges, and so on, that I think you'd ﬁnd interesting, too. 还有他的一些信件 - 凯恩斯 - 他写给人寿保险协会和大学的共同受托人等等，我认为你也会感兴趣。

Mon, Apr 25 1994 • 1:00 PM

Morning Session - 1994 Meeting

BerkshireHathaway

Warren Buffett explains why it may not be evident that a reinsurance company is "swimming naked" until the "tide goes out." Buffett also argues for a "steeply progressive" consumption tax and calls derivatives a dangerous combination of "ignorance and borrowed money."

1. Bigger meeting venue needed next year 1.明年需要更大的会议地点

WARREN BUFFETT: Put this over here. WARREN BUFFETT：把它放在这里。

CHARLIE MUNGER: CHARLIE MUNGER：

WARREN BUFFETT: Am I live yet?Yeah. WARREN BUFFETT：我活着了吗？是啊。

Morning. 早上。

AUDIENCE: Morning. 听众：早上好。

WARREN BUFFETT: We were a little worried today because we weren't sure from the reservations whether we can handle everybody, but it looks to me like there may be a couple seats left up there. WARREN BUFFETT：我们今天有点担心，因为我们不确定是否可以处理所有人，但在我看来可能会有几个座位留在那里。

But I think next year, we're going to have to ﬁnd a different spot because it looks to me like we're up about 600 this year from last year, and to be on the safe side we will seek out a larger spot. 但我认为明年我们将不得不寻找一个不同的位置，因为它看起来像我们今年从去年开始增加了大约 600个，为了安全起见，我们将寻找更大的位置。

Now, there are certain implications to that because, as some of the more experienced of you know, a few years ago we were holding this meeting at the Joslyn Museum, which is a temple of culture. (Laughter) 现在，对此有一些影响因为，正如一些经验丰富的人所知，几年前我们在乔治林博物馆举行了这次会议，这是一座文化殿堂。（笑声）

And we've now, of course, moved to an old vaudeville theater.And the only place in town that can hold us next year, I think, is the Ak-Sar-Ben Coliseum where they have keno and racetracks. (Laughter) 当然，我们现在搬到了一个古老的杂耍剧院。我认为，明年唯一可以容纳我们的地方是Ak-Sar-Ben Coliseum，他们有基诺和赛马场。（笑声）

We are sliding down the cultural chain — (laughter) — just as Charlie predicted years ago.He saw all this coming.(Laughter) 我们正在滑落文化链 - （笑声） - 正如查理多年前预测的那样。他看到了这一切。（笑声）

2. Buffett loses "Miss Congeniality" title to Munger 巴菲特失去了对芒格的“Miss Congeniality”称号

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie — I have some rather distressing news to report.There are always a few people that vote against everyone on the slate for directors and there’s maybe a dozen or so people do that.And then there are others that single shot it, and they pick out people to vote against.

WARREN BUFFETT：查理 - 我有一些相当令人痛苦的消息要报道。总有一些人投票反对董事的每一个人，并且可能有十几个人这样做。然后还有其他人单枪，他们挑选人投票反对。

And, this will come as news to Charlie, I haven’t told him yet.But he is the only one among our candidates for directors that received no negative votes this year.(Applause). 而且，这将成为查理的新闻，我还没有告诉他。但他是我们今年未获得负面投票的董事候选人中唯一一位。（掌声）。

Hold it — hold it.No need to applaud. 握住它 - 抓住它。无需鼓掌。

I tell you, when you lose out the title of Miss Congeniality to Charlie, you know you’re in trouble. (Laughter) 我告诉你，当你失去了查理小姐的称号时，你知道你遇到了麻烦。（笑声）

3. Meeting timetable 3.会议时间表

WARREN BUFFETT: Now, I'd like to tell you a little bit how we’ll run this.We will have the business meeting in a hurry with the cooperation of all of you, and then we will introduce our managers who are here, and then we will have a Q&A period. WARREN BUFFETT：现在，我想告诉你一些我们将如何运行它。我们将在各位的合作下赶紧召开商务会议，然后我们将介绍我们在这里的经理，然后我们将有一个问答期。

We will run that until 12 o'clock, at which point we’ll break, and then at 12:15, if the hardcore want to stick around, we will have another hour or so until about 1:15 of questions. 我们将运行到12点，此时我们将打破，然后在12点15分，如果硬核想要留下来，我们将再过一个小时左右直到大约1:15的问题。

So, you're free to leave, of course, any time and I've pointed out in the past that it's much better form if you leave while Charlie is talking rather than when I'm talking, but — (Laughter) 所以，你当然可以随时离开，我曾经在过去指出，如果你在查理谈话时离开而不是在我说话的时候表现更好，但是 - （笑声）

Feel free anytime, but you can — if you're panicked and you're worried about being conspicuous by leaving, you will be able to leave at noon. 随时随地都可以随意，但是你可以 - 如果你感到恐慌并且担心离开会引人注目，你可以在中午离开。

We will have buses out front that will take you to the hotels or the airport or to any place in town in which we have a commercial interest.(Laughter) 我们将在前面提供公共汽车，将您带到酒店或机场或我们有商业利益的城镇的任何地方。（笑声）

We encourage you staying around on that basis. 我们鼓励您在此基础上待在这里。

4. Berkshire directors introduced 伯克希尔董事介绍

WARREN BUFFETT: Let's have the — let's get the business of the meeting out of the way.Then we can get on to more interesting things. WARREN BUFFETT：让我们拥有 - 让我们开始讨论会议的业务。然后我们可以开始更有趣的事情。

I will ﬁrst introduce the Berkshire Hathaway directors that are present in addition to myself and — 我将首先介绍除了我自己以外的伯克希尔哈撒韦导演和 - First of all, there’s Charlie, who is the vice chairman of Berkshire, and if the rest of you will stand. 首先，有查理，他是伯克希尔的副主席，如果你们其他人都会站起来的话。

We have Susan T. Buffett, Howard Buffett, Malcolm Chase III, and Walter Scott Jr. And that's it. (Applause) 我们有Susan T. Buffett，Howard Buffett，Malcolm Chase III和Walter Scott Jr.就是这样。（掌声）

5. Meeting quorum 5.满足法定人数

WARREN BUFFETT: Also with us today are partners in the ﬁrm of Deloitte and Touche, our auditors, Mr. Ron Burgess and Mr. Craig Christiansen (PH). WARREN BUFFETT：今天与我们合作的还有Deloitte和Touche 公司的合伙人，我们的审计师Ron Burgess先生和Craig Christiansen先生（PH）。

They are available to respond to appropriate questions you might have concerning their ﬁrm's audit of the accounts of Berkshire. 他们可以回答您对公司审计伯克希尔账户的适当问题。

Mr. Forrest Krutter, secretary of Berkshire.He will make a written record of the proceedings. 伯克希尔市委书记Forrest Krutter先生。他将以书面形式记录诉讼程序。

Mr. Robert M. Fitzsimmons has been appointed inspector of election at this meeting.He will certify to the count of votes cast in the election for directors. Robert M. Fitzsimmons先生已被任命为本次会议的选举检查员。他将证明在董事选举中投票的票数。

The named proxy holders for this meeting are Walter Scott Jr. and Marc D. Hamburg. 本次会议的指定代理人是Walter Scott Jr.和Marc D. Hamburg。

Proxy cards have been returned through last Friday representing 1,035,680 Berkshire shares to be voted by the proxy holders as indicated on the cards.That number of shares represents a quorum and we will therefore directly proceed with the meeting. 代理卡已于上周五返回，代表1,035,680股伯克希尔股票，由代理持有人投票，如卡上所示。该数量的股票代表法定人数，因此我们将直接进行会议。

We will conduct the business of the meeting and then adjourn to the formal meeting — and then adjourn the formal meeting.After that, we will entertain questions that you might have. 我们将开展会议的工作，然后休会到正式会议 - 然后休会正式会议。在那之后，我们将接受您可能遇到的问题。

First order of business will be a reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders. 第一项业务是阅读上次股东大会的会议记录。

I recognize Mr. Walter Scott Jr. who will place a motion before the meeting. 我承认将在会议前提出议案的沃尔特斯科特先生。

WALTER SCOTT: I move that the reading of the minutes of the last meeting of the shareholders be dispensed with. 沃尔特斯科特：我提议暂停阅读上次股东大会会议记录。

WARREN BUFFETT: Do I hear a second? WARREN BUFFETT：我听到第二个吗？

VOICES: Seconded. 声音：借调。 Motion has been moved and seconded.Are there any comments or questions?Hearing none, we will vote on the motion by voice vote.(Laughter) 动议已被移动和借调。有任何意见或问题吗？听不到，我们将通过声音投票对议案进行投票。（笑声）

All those in favor say aye. 所有赞成的人都说赞成。

VOICES: Aye. 声音：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Opposed?The motion is carried and it’s a vote. WARREN BUFFETT：反对？动议获得通过，这是投票。

Does the secretary have a report of the number of Berkshire shares outstanding entitled to vote and represented at the meeting? 秘书是否有报告称伯克希尔有权投票并有权在会议上投票？

FORREST KRUTTER: Yes, I do.As indicated in the proxy statement that accompanied the notice of this meeting that was sent by ﬁrst class mail to all shareholders of record on March 8, 1994, being the record date for this meeting, there were 1,177,750 shares of Berkshire common stock outstanding, witheach share entitled to one vote on motions considered at the meeting.Of that number, 1,035,680 shares are represented at this meeting by proxies returned through last Friday. FORREST KRUTTER：是的，我知道。 1994年3月8日（即本次会议的记录日期），通过一等邮件向所有记录股东发送本次会议通知的代理声明中所示，伯克希尔普通股有1,177,750股，每股有权就会议审议的议案进行一票表决。其中，1,035,680股股份在本次会议上由上周五返回的代理人出席。

6. Directors elected 6.董事当选

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you.We will proceed to elect directors. WARREN BUFFETT：谢谢。我们将继续选举董事。

If a shareholder is present who wishes to withdraw a proxy previously sent in and vote in person, he or she may do so. 如果股东在场，希望撤回之前发送的代理人并亲自投票，他或她可以这样做。

Also, if any shareholder that’s present has not turned in a proxy and desires a ballot in order to vote in person, you may do so. 此外，如果在场的任何股东没有上交代理并希望投票以便亲自投票，您可以这样做。

If you wish to do this, please identify yourself to meeting ofﬁcials in the aisles who will furnish a ballot to you. 如果您希望这样做，请表明您自己要与过道的官员会面并向您提供选票。

Would those persons desiring ballots please identify themselves so that we may distribute them? Just raise your hand. 那些希望投票的人是否应该表明自己，以便我们分发它们？举手

I now recognize Mr. Walter Scott Jr. to place a motion before the meeting with respect to election of directors. 我现在承认小沃尔特斯科特先生在会议前就选举董事提出议案。

WALTER SCOTT: I move that Warren Buffett, Susan Buffett, Howard Buffett, Malcolm Chase, Charles Munger, and Walter Scott be elected as directors.

沃尔特斯科特：我动议沃伦巴菲特，苏珊巴菲特，霍华德巴菲特，马尔科姆蔡斯，查尔斯芒格和沃尔特斯科特当选为董事。

WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second? WARREN BUFFETT：还有一秒吗？

VOICE: Seconded. 声音：借调。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s been moved and seconded that Warren E. Buffett, Susan T. Buffett, Howard G. Buffett, Malcolm G. Chase III, Charles T. Munger, and Walter Scott Jr. be elected as directors. WARREN BUFFETT：已经动议并借调Warren E. Buffett，Susan T. Buffett，Howard G. Buffett， Malcolm G. Chase III，Charles T. Munger和Walter Scott Jr.当选为董事。

Are there any other nominations?Is there any discussion?Motions and nominations are ready to be acted upon. 还有其他提名吗？有没有讨论？动议和提名随时可以采取行动。

If there are any shareholders voting in person, they should now mark their ballots and allow the ballots to be delivered to the inspector of elections. 如果有任何股东亲自投票，他们现在应该标记他们的选票，并允许将选票交给选举检查员。

Seeing none, will the proxy holders please also submit to the inspector of elections the ballot voting the proxies in accordance with the instructions they have received. 如果没有，请代理人还请向选举检查员提交根据他们收到的指示投票代理人的选票。

Mr. Fitzsimmons, when you're ready you may give your report. 菲茨西蒙斯先生，当你准备好了，你可以提出你的报告。

ROBERT FITZSIMMONS: My report is ready.The ballot of the proxy holders received through last Friday cast not less than a 1,035,407 votes for each nominee. ROBERT FITZSIMMONS：我的报告准备好了。通过上周五收到的代理人的投票，每位被提名人投票不少于1,035,407票。

That number far exceeds a majority of the number of all shares outstanding and a more precise count cannot change the results of the election. 这个数字远远超过所有已发行股票的大部分，更准确的数字不能改变选举结果。

However, the certiﬁcation required by Delaware law regarding the precise count of the votes, including the votes cast in person at this meeting, will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting. 但是，特拉华州法律要求的关于准确计票的证明，包括亲自参加本次会议的投票，将由秘书提供，并附上本次会议的会议记录。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Mr. Fitzsimmons. WARREN BUFFETT：谢谢Fitzsimmons先生。

Warren E. Buffett, Susan T. Buffett, Howard G. Buffett, Malcolm G. Chase III, Charles T. Munger, and Walter Scott Jr. have been elected as directors.(Applause) Warren E. Buffett，Susan T. Buffett，Howard G. Buffett，Malcolm G. Chase III，Charles T. Munger和Walter Scott Jr.当选为董事。（掌声）

7. Formal meeting adjourns 7.正式会议延期 WARREN BUFFETT: Does anyone have any further business to come before this meeting before we adjourn? WARREN BUFFETT ：在我们休会之前，有没有人在本次会议之前有任何进一步的业务？

If not, I recognize Mr. Walter Scott Jr. to place a motion before the meeting. 如果没有，我会认出Walter Scott Jr.先生在会议前提出议案。

WALTER SCOTT: I move the meeting be adjourned. 沃尔特斯科特：我推动会议休会。

WARREN BUFFETT: Second? WARREN BUFFETT：第二个？

VOICES: Seconded. 声音：借调。

The motion to adjourn has been made and seconded.We will vote by voice.Is there any discussion?If not, all in favor say aye? 暂停动议已经作出并借调。我们将通过声音投票。有没有讨论？如果不是，所有人都赞成说？

VOICES: Aye 声音：是的

WARREN BUFFETT: Opposed say no, the meeting is adjourned.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：反对说不，会议休会。（笑声）

It’s democracy in Middle America.(Laughter) 这是中美洲的民主。（笑声）

8. Berkshire managers introduced 8.伯克希尔经理介绍

WARREN BUFFETT: Now, I'd like to introduce some of the people that make this place work to you.And if you would hold your applause until the end because there are quite a number of our managers here. WARREN BUFFETT ：现在，我想介绍一些让这个地方为您服务的人。如果你持续到掌声，直到最后，因为我们的经理人数众多。

I'm not sure which ones for sure are here, some of them may be out tending the store as well. 我不确定哪些肯定在这里，其中一些可能也在出售商店。

But, ﬁrst of all, from Nebraska Furniture Mart, Louie, Ron, and Irv Blumkin.I'm not sure who's here, but would you stand please, any of the Blumkins that are present? 但是，首先，来自内布拉斯加州的家具市场，路易，罗恩和Irv Blumkin 。我不确定是谁在这里，但是你会不会对任何存在的Blumkins感到满意？

OK, we've — looks like Irv.I can't quite see it. 好吧，我们 - 看起来像Irv。我看不太清楚。

From Borsheims, is Susan Jacques here?Susan?There she is.Susan had a record day yesterday.She just — (applause) — Susan became CEO just a few months ago and she’s turning in records already.Keep it up.(Laughter) 来自Borsheims的苏珊雅克在这儿吗？苏珊？她在这里。苏珊昨天有一个创纪录的日子。她只是 - （掌声） - 苏珊在几个月前成为了首席执行官，而且她已经成为了记录。保持。（笑声） And from Central States Indemnity, we have the Kizers.I'm not sure which ones are here, but there's Bill Sr., Bill Jr., John, and Dick. 从中央国家赔偿，我们有Kizers。我不确定哪些人在这里，但是有比尔老，小比尔，约翰和迪克。

Kizers, stand up.I think I can see him — John. Kizers，站起来。我想我能看见他 - 约翰。

Don Wurster from National Indemnity. Don Wurster来自National Indemnity。

Rod Eldred from the Homestate Companies. 来自本土公司的Rod Eldred。

Brad Kinstler from Cypress, our worker's comp company. 来自Cypress的Brad Kinstler，我们的工人公司。

Ajit Jain, the big ticket writer in the East. Ajit Jain，东方的大票作家。

And Mike Goldberg, who runs our real estate ﬁnance group and also generally oversees the insurance group.Mike. 还有Mike Goldberg，他负责管理我们的房地产金融集团，并且还负责监管保险集团。麦克风。

Gary Heldman from Fechheimers. 来自Fechheimers的Gary Heldman 。

Chuck Huggins from See’s, the candy man. 来自See's的Chuck Huggins，糖果男。

Stan Lipsey from the Buffalo News. 来自布法罗新闻的Stan Lipsey。

Chuck’s been with us, incidentally, twenty-odd years.Stan’s been working with me for well over 25 years. Chuck 和我们在一起，顺便说一下，二十多年。斯坦一直与我合作超过25年。

Frank Rooney and Jim Issler from H.H. Brown. 来自H.H.Brown的Frank Rooney和Jim Issler。

Dave Hillstrom from Precision Steel. 来自Precision Steel的Dave Hillstrom 。

Ralph Schey from Scott Fetzer. Scott Fetzer的Ralph Schey。

Peter Lunder, who is with our newest acquisition, Dexter Shoe.And Harold Alfond, his partner, couldn’t be with us because his wife is ill. Peter Lunder是我们最新收购的Dexter Shoe 。而他的伴侣Harold Alfond因为妻子生病而无法和我们在一起。

And ﬁnally, the manager that’s been with Charlie and me the longest, Harry Bottle from K&W.Harry, you here?There’s Harry. 最后，与查理和我一起经理的经理来自K＆W的最长的Harry Bottle。哈利，你呢？哈利。

Harry saved our bacon back in 19 — what?— 62 or so, when in some mad moment I went into the windmill business.And Harry got me out of it.(Laughter)

哈利在19岁时救了我们的培根 - 什么？ - 62岁左右，在某个疯狂的时刻，我进入了风车业务。哈利让我离开了。（笑声）

That's our group of managers and I appreciate it if you give them a hand.(Applause) 这是我们的经理人团队，如果你帮助他们我会很感激。（掌声）

9. Midwest Express adding ﬂights to Omaha 9.中西部快线增加飞往奥马哈的航班

WARREN BUFFETT: I have one piece of good news about next year for you. WARREN BUFFETT：明年有一条关于你的好消息。

In addition to moving to larger quarters, they're going to add nonstop air service from New York, Washington, and Los Angeles here in the next few months, Midwest Express. 除了搬到更大的区域外，他们还将在未来几个月内在中西部快运公司增加纽约，华盛顿和洛杉矶的直达航空服务。

So, I hope they do very well with it and I hope that makes it easier for you to get into town. 所以，我希望他们能很好地利用它，我希望你能更容易进入城镇。

10. Q&A logistics 10.问答物流

WARREN BUFFETT: Now, in this — for the next two hours and 15 minutes or so, we'll have a session where we will take questions. WARREN BUFFETT：现在，在接下来的两个小时15分钟左右的时间里，我们将举行一个会议，我们将会提出问题。

We have seven zones, three on the main ﬂoor.We’ll go start over there with zone one and work across. 我们有7 个区，主楼有3个。我们将从第一区开始，并开始工作。

On the main ﬂoor, if you'll raise your hand, the person who is handling the mic will pass it to you and we'll try to not repeat any individual in any one zone till everyone in that zone has had a chance to askone question.So, after you've been on once, let other people get a shot. 在主楼层，如果你举手，那么处理麦克风的人会把它传递给你，我们会尽量不在任何一个区域重复任何个人，直到该区域的每个人都有机会问一个问题。所以，在你上过一次之后，让其他人得到一个机会。

When we move up to the loge, we have one person there and in the case — and then we have three in the balcony, which is essentially full now. 当我们向上移动时，我们在那里有一个人，在这种情况下 - 然后我们在阳台上有三个人，现在基本上已经满了。

And we would, up there, we would appreciate it if you would you leave your seat and go to the person with the mic.It’ll be a little easier in both the loge and the balcony to handle it that way. 我们会在那里，如果你要离开座位然后带着麦克风去找我们，我们会很感激。在loge和阳台上以这种方式处理它会更容易一些。

And if you'll go a little ahead of time, that way if there's a line of two or three you can you can line up for questions in both the loge and balcony. 如果你提前一点，那么如果有一两条或三条线，你可以在loge和阳台上排队等候问题。

So, whatever you’d care to ask.If you want an optimistic answer you'll, of course, direct your question to Charlie.If you’d like a little more realism you'll come to me and — (laughter).

所以，无论你想问什么。如果你想要一个乐观的答案，你当然会把你的问题直接提交给查理。如果你想要更现实一点，你会来找我 - （笑）。

11. Derivatives: dangerous combination of "ignorance and borrowed money" 11.衍生品：“无知和借钱”的危险组合

WARREN BUFFETT: Let's start over in zone 1. WARREN BUFFETT：让我们从1区开始吧。

Sometimes we can't see too well from up here, but — 有时我们从这里看不太清楚，但是 -

In fact, I can't even see the monitor right now, but do we have one over there? 事实上，我现在甚至都看不到显示器，但我们在那边有吗？

And if you’ll identify yourself by name and your hometown, we'd appreciate it. 如果你通过名字和家乡来表明自己，我们会很感激。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Michael Mullen (PH) from Omaha. 听众：我的名字是来自奥马哈的迈克尔马伦（PH）。

Would you comment on the use of derivatives?I noticed that Dell computer stock was off 2 1/2 points Friday with the loss of derivatives. 你会评论衍生品的使用吗？我注意到戴尔计算机股票周五因衍生品的损失而下跌了2 1/2点。

WARREN BUFFETT: Question is about derivatives.We have in this room the author of the best thing you can read on that.There was an article in Fortune about a month ago or so by Carol Loomis on derivatives, and far and away it's the best article that has been written. WARREN BUFFETT：问题是衍生品。我们在这个房间里有你能读到的最好的东西的作者。大约一个月前，Carol Loomis在衍生品上发表了一篇关于财富的文章，这篇文章是最好的文章。

We also have some people in the room that do business in derivatives from Salomon. 我们房间里也有一些人从萨洛蒙做衍生品业务。

And it's a very broad subject.It — as we said last year, I think someone asked what might be the big ﬁnancial story of the '90s and we said we obviously don't know, but that if we had to pick a topic that it could well be derivatives because theylend themselves to the use of unusual amounts of leverage and they're sometimes not completely understood by the people involved. 这是一个非常广泛的主题。它 - 正如我们去年所说的那样，我想有人问过90年代可能是什么大财务故事，我们说我们显然不知道，但如果我们不得不选择一个主题，它很可能是衍生品，因为它们有助于使用不寻常的杠杆，有时人们并不完全理解它们。

And any time you combine ignorance and borrowed money — (laughter) — you can get some pretty interesting consequences.(Laughter) 任何时候你把无知和借来的钱结合起来 - （笑声） - 你可以得到一些非常有趣的结果。（笑声）

Particularly when the numbers get vague.And you've seen that, of course, recently with the recent Procter and Gamble announcement. 特别是当数字变得含糊不清时。当然，你最近看到了宝洁公司最近的公告。

Now, I don't know the details of the P&G derivatives, but I understand, at least from press reports, that what started out as interest rate swaps ended up with P&G writing puts on large quantities of US and, I think, one othercountry's bonds.And any time you go from selling soap to writing puts on bonds, you've made a big jump.(Laughter) 现在，我不知道宝洁衍生品的细节，但据我所知，至少从新闻报道来看，最初的利率掉期最终导致宝洁的写作投放了大量的美国，我认为，另外一个国家的债券。无论你何时从卖肥皂到写作债券，你都会大放异彩。（笑声）

And it — the ability to borrow enormous amounts of money combined with a chance to get either very rich or very poor very quickly, has historically been a recipe for trouble at some point. 而且它 - 能够借入巨额资金并且很快就能获得非常富裕或非常贫穷的机会，在历史上一直是困难的一个方法。

Derivatives are not going to go away.They serve useful purposes and all that, but I'm just saying that it has that potential.We've seen a little bit of that. 衍生品不会消失。他们提供了有用的目的和所有这些，但我只是说它具有这种潜力。我们已经看到了一点点。

I can't think of anything that we've done that would — can you think of anything we do that approaches derivatives, Charlie?Directly? 我想不出我们已经做过的任何事情 - 你能想到我们做的任何接近衍生物的事情吗，查理？直？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. (Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：不。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I may have to cut him off if he talks too long.(Laughter) 沃伦巴菲特：如果谈的时间过长，我可能不得不把他砍掉。（笑声）

Is there anything you would like to add to your already extensive remarks?(Laughter) 您有什么想要添加到您已经广泛的评论中吗？（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. (Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：不。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. WARREN BUFFETT：好的。

12. Berkshire participated in Cap Cities stock buyback 12.伯克希尔参与Cap Cities股票回购

WARREN BUFFETT: In that case we’ll go to zone 2. (Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：在那种情况下，我们将前往2区。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Hugh Stevenson (PH).I’m a shareholder from Atlanta. 听众：我叫休·史蒂文森（PH）。我是亚特兰大的股东。

My question involves the company's investment in the stock of Cap Cities.It's been my understanding in the past that that was regarded as one of the four, quote unquote, "permanent" holdings of the company. 我的问题涉及该公司对Cap Cities股票的投资。过去我的理解是，这被认为是该公司的四个引用不引用的“永久性”持股之一。

So I was a little bit confused by the disposition of one million shares.Could you clarify that?Was my previous misunderstanding — was my previous understanding incorrect?Or has there been some change or is there a third possibility? 所以我对一百万股的处置感到有些困惑。你能澄清一下吗？我之前的误解 - 我以前的理解是不正确的？或者有一些变化还是有第三种可能性？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we have classiﬁed the Washington Post Company and Cap Cities and GEICO and Coke in the category of permanent holdings.And —

WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我们已将华盛顿邮报公司和Cap Cities以及GEICO和Coke归类为永久性持股。而且 -

But in the case of three of those four, The Washington Post Company, I don't know, maybe seven or eight years ago, GEICO some years back, and now Cap Cities, we have participated in tenders where the company has repurchased shares. 但就华盛顿邮报公司中的三个，我不知道，也许七八年前，几年前GEICO，现在是Cap Cities，我们参与了公司回购股票的招标。

Now the ﬁrst two, the Post and GEICO, we participated proportionally.That was not feasible, and incidentally, not as attractive taxwise anymore. 现在前两个，邮政和GEICO，我们按比例参加。这是不可行的，顺便说一句，不再具有吸引力的税收。

The 1968 Tax Act changed the desirability of proportional redemptions of shares, from our standpoint.That point has been missed by a lot of journalists in commenting on it, but it just so happens that the commentary that has been written has been obsolete, in some cases, by six or seven years. 从我们的角度来看，1968年的税法改变了比例赎回股票的可取性。许多记者在评论这一点时都错过了这一点，但事实上，已经写好的评论在某些情况下已经过时了六到七年。

But, we did participate in the Cap Cities tender offer, just as we did in the Post and GEICO. 但是，我们确实参与了Cap Cities的收购要约，就像我们在邮政和GEICO所做的那样。

We still are, by far, the largest shareholder of Cap Cities.We think it's a superbly run operation in a business that looks a little tougher than it did 15 years ago, but looks a little bit better than it did 15 months ago. 到目前为止，我们仍然是Cap Cities的最大股东。我们认为这是一项运营良好的业务，看起来比15年前更加艰难，但看起来比15个月前好一点。

Charlie, you have anything? 查理，你有什么？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Uh, no.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：呃，不。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: He’s thinking it over now though before — (Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：他现在已经考虑过了 - （笑声）

13. Unlikely we'd buy company with no current cash ﬂow 13.我们不太可能在没有现金流的情况下购买公司

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3. WARREN BUFFETT：第3区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning.My name is Howard Bask (PH) and I’m from Kansas City.And I've got a theoretical value question for you. 听众：早上好。我的名字是Howard Bask（PH），我来自堪萨斯城。而且我有一个理论价值问题。

If you were to buy a business and you bought it at its intrinsic value, what's the minimum after-tax free cash ﬂow yield you’d need to get? 如果您要购买一家企业，而您是按照其固有价值购买的，那么您需要获得的最低税后自由现金流收益是多少？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, your question is if we were buying all of a business and we're buying at what we thought was intrinsic value, what was the minimum — WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，你的问题是，如果我们购买了所有的业务，我们购买的是我们认为的内在价值，最低价是什么 -

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Correct. 观众：正确。

WARREN BUFFETT: — present earning power or what the present — the minimum discount rate of future streams? WARREN BUFFETT ： - 目前的盈利能力或现在 - 未来流的最低贴现率？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: No, what's the minimum current after-tax free cash ﬂow yield you’d… 听众会员：不，你现在的最低税后自由现金流收益是多少......

WARREN BUFFETT: We could conceivably buy a business — I don't think we would be likely to — but we could we could conceivably buy a business that had no current after-tax cash ﬂow.But, we would have to think it had a tremendous future. WARREN BUFFETT：我们可以想象地买入一家企业 - 我认为我们不太可能 - 但我们可以想象，我们可以买到一家没有当前税后现金流的企业。但是，我们必须认为它有一个巨大的未来。

But we would not ﬁnd — obviously the current ﬁgures, particularly in the kind of businesses we buy, tend to be representative, we think, of what's going to happen in the future. 但我们不会发现 - 显然，目前的数据，特别是我们所购买的商业数据，往往具有代表性，我们认为，将来会发生什么。

But that would not necessarily have to be the case.You can argue, for example, in buying stocks, we bought GEICO at a time when it was losing signiﬁcant money.We didn't expect it to continue to lose signiﬁcant money. 但这不一定是这种情况。例如，你可以争辩说，在购买股票时，我们在失去大笔资金的时候买入了 GEICO。我们没想到它会继续亏损。

But if we think the present value of the future earning power is attractive enough compared to the purchase price, we would not be overwhelmed by what the ﬁrst year’s ﬁgure would be. 但如果我们认为未来盈利能力的现值与购买价格相比具有足够的吸引力，我们就不会被第一年的数字所淹没。

Charlie, you want to add to that? 查理，你想补充一点吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah.We don't care what we report in the ﬁrst year or two of — after buying anything. CHARLIE MUNGER：是的。我们不关心我们在购买任何东西后的第一年或第二年报告的内容。

AUDIENCE MEMBER OFF MIC: (INAUDIBLE) on average over the years (INAUDIBLE). 观众成员关闭MIC：多年来（听不清）平均值（听不清）。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would say that in a world of 7 percent long-term bond rates that we would certainly want to think we were discounting future after-tax streams of cash at at least a 10 percent rate. 沃伦巴菲特：嗯，我想说，在长期债券利率为7％的世界里，我们当然希望我们以至少10％的利率对未来的税后现金流进行贴现。

But that will depend on the certainty we feel about the business.The more certain we feel about a business, the closer we are willing to play it. 但这取决于我们对业务的确定性。我们对企业的感觉越确定，我们就越愿意发挥它。 We have to feel pretty certain about any business before we're even interested at all.But there are still degrees of certainty, and — 在我们对所有事情感兴趣之前，我们必须对任何业务感到非常肯定。但仍有一定程度的确定性，并且 -

If we thought we were getting a stream of cash over the next 30 years that we felt extremely certain about, we would use a discount rate that would be somewhat less than if it was one where we thought we might get some surprises in ﬁve or 10years — possibility existed.Charlie? 如果我们认为我们在未来30年内获得了一笔我们非常肯定的现金流，那么我们会使用比我们认为可能会在5或10中出现意外的折扣率更低的折扣率。年 - 可能性存在。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add. CHARLIE MUNGER：没有什么可补充的。

14. Insurance business intrinsic value is well above book value 14.保险业务的内在价值远高于账面价值

WARREN BUFFETT: OK.Zone 4. WARREN BUFFETT：好的。 4区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Maurus Spence from Omaha, Nebraska. 听众：来自内布拉斯加州奥马哈市的Maurus Spence。

You've made comments on several occasions about the intrinsic business value of the insurance operations.And in this year's report you state that the insurance business possesses an intrinsic value that exceeds book value by a large amount, larger, in fact, than is the case at any Berkshire — other Berkshire business. 您已经多次就保险业务的内在商业价值发表评论。在今年的报告中，您指出保险业务的内在价值实际上超过账面价值，实际上比任何伯克希尔伯克郡的其他业务都要大。

I was wondering if you would explain in greater detail why you believe that to be true. 我想知道你是否会更详细地解释为什么你认为这是真的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I — it's very hard to quantify, as we've said many times in the report.But, I think that it's clear that even taking fairly pessimistic assumptions, that the excess of intrinsic value over carrying value is higher, by some margin, for the insurance business. 沃伦巴菲特：嗯，我 - 很难量化，正如我们在报告中多次说过的那样。但是，我认为很明显，即使采取相当悲观的假设，对于保险业务而言，内在价值超过账面价值的超出部分也会更高。

And I think that the table in the report that shows you what our cost to float has been over the years, and also what the trend of float has been over the years, would, unless you thought that table had no validity for the future,I think that that table would tend to the point you in the direction of saying the insurance business does have a very significant excess of intrinsic value over carrying value. 而且我认为报告中的表格显示了我们多年来的浮动成本，以及多年来浮动的趋势，除非您认为该表对未来无效，我认为那个表格倾向于指向保险业务确实具有非常显着超过内在价值而非账面价值的方向。

Very hard number to put something on.But — and you don't want to extrapolate that table out.But I think that table shows that we started with maybe 20 million of float and that we're up to something close to three billion of float.And that that float has come to us at a cost that's extremely attractive, on average, over the years. 很难打上一些东西。但是 - 你不想推断那张桌子。但我认为该表显示我们开始时可能有2000万浮动，而且我们的浮动数量接近30亿。而这种浮动已经给我们付出了代价，平均而言，这些年来非常具有吸引力。 And just to pick an example, last year, when we actually had an underwriting profit, the value of that float was something over $200 million.And that figure was a lot bigger than it was 10 years ago or 20 years ago. 仅举一个例子，去年，当我们实际获得承保利润时，该浮动的价值超过2亿美元。这个数字比10年前或20年前要大得多。

So that's — that is a stream — last year was unusually favorable, but that is a — that's a very signiﬁcant stream of earnings, and it's one we feel we have reasonably good prospects in. So we feel very good about the insurance business. 所以 - 这是一个流 - 去年非常有利，但这是一个非常重要的收入来源，而且我们认为我们有相当好的前景。所以我们对保险业务感到非常满意。

15. Why Berkshire doesn't split its stock 15.为什么伯克希尔不分割其股票

WARREN BUFFETT: OK.Zone 5? WARREN BUFFETT：好的。 5区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Cy Rademacher (PH) from Omaha. 听众：我的名字是来自奥马哈的Cy Rademacher（PH）。

Is there any point at which your stock would rise to the point where you might split the stock? 您的股票有没有上升到可能分割股票的程度？

WARREN BUFFETT: Surprise, surprise.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：惊喜，惊喜。（笑声）

I think I'll let Charlie answer that this year.(Laughs) 我想我今年会让查理回答这个问题。（笑）

He's so popular with the shareholders that I can afford to let him take the tough questions. (Laughter) 他在股东中如此受欢迎，我可以让他承担起他提出的棘手问题。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think the answer is no.(Laughter and applause) CHARLIE MUNGER：我认为答案是肯定的。（笑声和掌声）

I think the idea of carving ownerships in an enterprise into little, tiny $20 pieces is almost insane.And it's quite inefﬁcient to service a $20 account and I don't see why there shouldn't be a minimum as a condition of joining some enterprise.Certainly we’d all feel that way if we were organizing a private enterprise. 我认为将企业所有权雕刻成微小的20美元的想法几乎是疯狂的。服务20美元的帐户效率很低，我不明白为什么不应该将最低限度作为加入某个企业的条件。当然，如果我们组建私营企业，我们都会有这种感觉。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we would not carve it up in $20 units. WARREN BUFFETT：是的，我们不会以20美元为单位进行雕刻。

We find it very — it's interesting because every company finds a way to fill up its common shareholder list.And you can start with the As and work through to the Zs and you’ll — every company in the New York Stock Exchange, one way or another, has attracted some constituency of shareholders. 我们发现它非常有趣 - 因为每家公司都找到了填补其共同股东名单的方法。你可以从As开始，一直到Zs，你会 - 纽约证券交易所的每一家公司都以某种方式吸引了一些股东选区。 And frankly, we can't imagine a better constituency than is in this room.I mean, we have — we don't think we can improve on this group, and we followed certain policies that we think attracted certain types of shareholders and actually pushed away others. 坦率地说，我们无法想象一个比这个房间更好的选区。我的意思是，我们有 - 我们认为我们不能改善这个群体，我们遵循某些政策，我们认为这些政策吸引了某些类型的股东并实际上推翻了其他股东。

And that is part of our eugenics program here at Berkshire.(Laughter) 这是我们伯克希尔优生学项目的一部分。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, just look around this room and as you mingle with one another.This is a very outstanding group of people.And why would anybody want a different kind of a group? CHARLIE MUNGER：是的，只要看看这个房间，你就会互相交流。这是一群非常杰出的人。为什么有人想要一个不同类型的团体呢？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, if we cause — if we follow some policies that cause a whole bunch of people to buy Berkshire for the wrong reason, the only way they can buy it is to replace somebody in this room, or in this larger metaphorical room, of shareholders that we have. WARREN BUFFETT：是的，如果我们引起 - 如果我们遵循一些政策导致一大群人出于错误的原因购买伯克希尔，那么他们购买它的唯一方法就是替换这个房间里的某个人，或者在这个更大的隐喻房间里我们拥有的股东。

So someone in one of these seats gets up and somebody else walks in. The question is do we have a better audience? 因此，其中一个座位中的某个人站起来，其他人也会进来。问题是我们是否有更好的受众？

I don't think so.So I think that — I think Charlie said it very well. 我不这么认为。所以我认为 - 我认为查理说得很好。

16. Buffett is keeping his private jet 巴菲特正在保留他的私人飞机

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6. WARREN BUFFETT：第6区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, my name is Rob Na (PH) and I'm from Omaha, Nebraska. 听众：巴菲特先生，我叫Rob Na（PH），我来自内布拉斯加州的奥马哈。

My question is, given the recent announcement of Midwest Express and their nonstop jet service between East and West Coasts, will this cut down on your use of "The Indefensible?"(Laughter) 我的问题是，鉴于最近宣布的Midwest Express及其在东海岸和西海岸之间的直达飞机服务，这会减少你对“不可原谅的人”的使用吗？（笑声）

And will you use more commercial air travel? 你会使用更多的商业航空旅行吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: This is a question planted by Charlie.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：这是Charlie种下的问题。（笑声）

I think you should know, I take it to the drugstore at the moment, and I — (Laughter) 我想你应该知道，我现在把它带到药店，我 - （笑声）

No, it’s just a question when I start sleeping in it at the hangar. 不，当我开始在机库里睡觉时，这只是一个问题。

Nothing will cut back on "The Indefensible."It’s being painted right now, but I told them to make it last a long time. 什么都不会削减“不可原谅的”。它正在被绘制，但我告诉他们要持续很长时间。

Charlie, though, was pointing out the merits of other kinds of transportation last night at the meeting of our managers.He might want to repeat those here. 不过，查理昨晚在我们的经理会议上指出了其他类型交通工具的优点。他可能想在这里重复一遍。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I just pointed out that the back of the plane arrived at the same time as the front of the plane, invariably.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，我刚刚指出，飞机的后部与飞机的前部同时到达，总是如此。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: He's even more of an authority on buses, incidentally, if anybody has his — (Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：他甚至更像是公共汽车的权威，顺便说一下，如果有人有他的话 - （笑声）

17. Buffett's next goal in life 17.巴菲特人生的下一个目标

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 7. WARREN BUFFETT：第7区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, my name's Allan Maxwell from Omaha.I've got two questions. 听众：巴菲特先生，我的名字来自奥马哈的Allan Maxwell。我有两个问题。

What is your next goal in life now that you're the richest man in the country? 既然你是这个国家最富有的人，你现在的下一个目标是什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: That's easy.It’s to be the oldest man in the country.(Laughter and applause) WARREN BUFFETT：这很简单。它将成为该国最年长的人。（笑声和掌声）

18. "Two yardsticks" for judging management 18.判断管理的“两个尺度”

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Secondly, you talk about good management with corporations and that you try and buy companies with good management. 听众会员：其次，你谈到与公司的良好管理，你试图购买管理良好的公司。

I feel that I have about as much chance of meeting good managers, other than yourself, as I do bringing Richard Nixon back to life. 我觉得除了你自己以外，我有很多机会与优秀的经理人会面，因为我让理查德尼克松重新焕发活力。

How do I, as an average investor, ﬁnd out what good management is? 作为普通投资者，我如何找出良好的管理方法？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think you judge management by two yardsticks. 沃伦巴菲特：嗯，我认为你用两个尺度判断管理层。

One is how well they run the business and I think you can learn a lot about that by reading about both what they've accomplished and what their competitors have accomplished, and seeing how they have allocated capital over time. 一个是他们经营业务的情况，我认为你可以通过阅读他们已经完成的事情和他们的竞争对手所取得的成就，以及了解他们如何随着时间的推移分配资金来学到很多。

You have to have some understanding of the hand they were dealt when they themselves got a chance to play the hand. 当他们自己有机会发挥作用时，你必须对他们被处理的手有一些了解。 But, if you understand something about the business they're in — and you can't understand it in every business, but you can ﬁnd industries or companies where you can understand it — then you simply want to look at how well they have beendoing in playing the hand, essentially, that's been dealt with them. 但是，如果你了解他们所处的业务 - 你无法在每个业务中理解它，但你可以找到你能理解它的行业或公司 - 那么你只想看看它们的表现如何从根本上讲，他们已经处理了这些事情。

And then the second thing you want to ﬁgure out is how well that they treat their owners.And I think you can get a handle on that, oftentimes.A lot of times you can't.I mean it — they’re many companies that obviously fall in — somewhere — in that 20th to 80th percentile and it's a little hard to pick out where they do fall. 然后你要弄清楚的第二件事就是他们如何对待他们的主人。而且我认为你可以经常对此进行处理。很多时候你不能。我的意思是 - 他们是很多公司，显然属于某个地方 - 在某个地方 - 在20到80％的百分位数，并且有点难以找出它们落在哪里。

But, I think you can usually figure out — I mean, it's not hard to figure out that, say, Bill Gates, or Tom Murphy, or Don Keough, or people like that, are really outstanding managers.And it's not hard to figure out who they're working for. 但是，我认为你通常可以搞清楚 - 我的意思是，不难想象，比如比尔盖茨，汤姆墨菲，或者唐科夫，或者像这样的人，都是非常出色的经理人。而且要弄清楚他们为谁工作并不难。

And I can give you some cases on the other end of the spectrum, too. 我也可以在频谱的另一端给你一些案例。

It's interesting how often the ones that, in my view, are the poor managers also turn out to be the ones that really don't think that much about the shareholders, too.The two often go hand in hand. 有趣的是，在我看来，那些糟糕的经理人往往也是那些真正对股东没有太多考虑的人。这两者经常齐头并进。

But, I think reading of reports — reading of competitors’ reports — I think you'll get a ﬁx on that in some cases.You don't have to — you know, you don't have to make a hundred correct judgments in this business or 50 correct judgments.You only have to make a few.And that's all we try to do. 但是，我认为阅读报告 - 阅读竞争对手的报告 - 我认为在某些情况下你会得到一个解决方案。您没有必要 - 您知道，您不必在此业务中做出正确的判断，也不必做出正确的判断。你只需要做一些。这就是我们所做的一切。

And, generally speaking, the conclusions I've come to about managers have really come about the same way you can make yours.I mean they come about by reading reports rather than any intimate personal knowledge or — and knowing them personally at all. 而且，一般来说，我对管理者的结论实际上与你的结论相同。我的意思是他们通过阅读报告而不是任何亲密的个人知识或 - 并且完全了解他们而来。

So it — you know, read the proxy statements, see what they think of — see how they treat themselves versus how they treat the shareholders, look at what they have accomplished, considering what the hand was that they were dealt when they took over comparedto what is going on in the industry. 所以 - 你知道，阅读代理声明，看看他们的想法 - 看看他们如何看待自己与他们如何对待股东，看看他们已经完成了什么，考虑他们在接手时所处理的是什么这个行业正在发生什么。

And I think you can ﬁgure it out sometimes.You don't have to ﬁgure out very often. 我想你有时可以搞清楚。你不必经常弄清楚。

Charlie? 查理？ CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add. CHARLIE MUNGER：没有什么可补充的。

19. How Berkshire keeps great managers 19.伯克希尔如何留住优秀的经理人

WARREN BUFFETT: Ok, we're back to zone 1. WARREN BUFFETT：好的，我们回到了1区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi there.My name is Lee.I'm from Palo Alto, California. 观众：你好。我叫李。我来自加利福尼亚州的帕洛阿尔托。

In meeting Ajit Jain, I've been very impressed over the years.And I think I even met his parents once they came from India. 在会见Ajit Jain的过程中，这些年来我印象非常深刻。我想，一旦他们来自印度，我甚至会遇到他的父母。

Please comment on your deepest impressions of his personality and managerial skills, and also how you go about exactly keeping somebody who has such ﬁne skills within the fold.He might go to Walt Disney someday and, you know, pull down 200 million. 请评论你对他的个性和管理技巧的最深刻的印象，以及你如何准确地保持那些拥有如此优秀技能的人。有一天他可能去沃尔特迪斯尼，你知道，他会减少2亿。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if he gets offered 200 million — (laughs) — we may not compete too vigorously at that level.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：好吧，如果他获得了2亿美元 - （笑） - 我们可能不会在那个级别上过于激烈地竞争。（笑声）

We basically try to run a business so that — Charlie and I have two jobs.We have to identify and keep good managers interested after we’ve ﬁgured out who they are. 我们基本上试图经营一家公司，以便 - 查理和我有两份工作。在我们弄清楚他们是谁之后，我们必须确定并保持优秀的经理人的兴趣。

And that often is a little different here, because I would say a majority of our managers are ﬁnancially independent, so that they don't go to work because they are worried about putting kids through school or putting food on the table.So they have to have some reason to go to work aside from that. 这在这里往往有点不同，因为我会说我们的大多数经理都在经济上独立，所以他们不去上班，因为他们担心让孩子上学或者把食物放在桌面上。因此他们必须有一些理由去除此之外的工作。

They have to be treated fairly in terms of compensation, but they also have to ﬁgure it is better than playing golf every day or whatever it may be. 他们必须在赔偿方面得到公平对待，但他们也必须认为这比每天打高尔夫球或其他任何方式更好。

And, so that's one of the jobs we have and we basically attack that the same way — we look at what they do the same way we look at what we do. 而且，这是我们所拥有的工作之一，我们基本上以同样的方式进行攻击 - 我们看待他们的工作方式与我们看待我们的工作方式相同。

We've got a wonderful group of shareholders.Before I ran this, I had a partnership.I had a great group of partners.And essentially, I like to be left alone to do what I did.I like to be judged on the scorecard at the end of the year rather than on every stroke, and not second guessed in a way that was inappropriate. 我们有一群很棒的股东。在我这样做之前，我有了合作伙伴关系。我有一大群合作伙伴。基本上，我喜欢独自去做我做的事情。我喜欢在年底时在记分卡上进行评判而不是每次中风，而不是以不合适的方式猜测。

I like to have people who understood the environment in which I was operating. 我喜欢让人们理解我所处的环境。

And so the important thing we do with managers, generally, is to ﬁnd the .400 hitters and then not tell them how to swing, as I put in the report. 因此，我们与管理人员一样重要的事情就是找到.400的击球手，然后不要告诉他们如何挥杆，就像我在报告中所说的那样。

The second thing we do is allocate capital.And aside from that, we play bridge.(Laughter) 我们做的第二件事是分配资金。除此之外，我们还扮演桥梁。（笑声）

Pretty much what happens at Berkshire. 几乎在伯克希尔发生的事情。

So, with any of the managers you might name here, we try to make it interesting and fun for them to run their business.We try to have a compensation arrangement that's appropriate for the kind of business they’re in. 因此，对于您可能在此命名的任何经理，我们会尝试让他们有趣和有趣地开展业务。我们尝试制定适合其所从事业务的薪酬安排。

We have no company-wide compensation plan.We wouldn't dream of having some compensation expert or consultant come in and screw it up.(Laughter) 我们没有全公司的薪酬计划。我们不会梦想让一些薪酬专家或顾问进来搞砸了。（笑声）

We try to — some businesses require a lot of capital that we're in, some require no capital.Some are easy businesses where good proﬁt margins are a cinch to come by, but we're really paying for the extra beyond that.Some are very tough businesses to make money in. 我们试图 - 一些企业需要我们所拥有的大量资金，有些企业不需要资金。有些是简单的业务，其中良好的利润率很快就会到来，但我们真的为此付出额外的代价。有些是赚钱的非常艰难的企业。

And it would be crazy to have some huge framework that we try to place everybody in that — where one size would ﬁt all. 拥有一些我们试图将每个人都置于其中的庞大框架将是疯狂的 - 一个尺寸适合所有人。

People, generally, are compensated relating in some manner that relates to how their business does as opposed to — there's no reason to pay anybody based on how Berkshire does, because no one has responsibility for Berkshire except for Charlie and me. 一般来说，人们以某种方式得到补偿，这与他们的业务如何相关 - 而没有理由根据伯克希尔的方式支付任何人，因为除了查理和我之外，没有人对伯克希尔负责。

And we try to make them responsible for their own units, compensated based on how those units do. 我们试图让他们对自己的单位负责，并根据这些单位的方式进行补偿。

We try to understand the businesses they’re in, so we know what the difference between a good performance and a bad performance — 我们试图了解他们所处的业务，因此我们知道良好业绩与糟糕业绩之间的区别 -

And that's about — that's how we work with people. 这就是 - 这就是我们与人合作的方式。

We've had terriﬁc luck over the years in retaining the managers that we wanted to retain.I think, largely, it's because — particularly if they sell us a business — to a great extent, the next day they're running it just as they were the day before.And they're having as much fun running their business as I am running Berkshire. 多年来，我们在保留我们想要保留的经理方面运气不错。我认为，在很大程度上，这是因为 - 特别是如果他们向我们出售业务 - 在很大程度上，第二天他们就像前一天那样运营它。而且，在我经营伯克希尔公司的过程中，他们拥有尽可能多的乐趣。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I've got nothing to add, but I think that concept of treating the other fellow the way you'd like to be treated if the roles were reversed — it's so simple, when you stop to think about it,but — CHARLIE MUNGER ：嗯，我没有什么可补充的，但我认为如果角色被颠倒了，就像对待你想要对待的方式一样对待其他人的概念 - 这很简单，当你停下来思考它时，但是 -

It's a rare evening when Ajit and Warren aren't talking once on the phone.It's more than a business relationship, at least it seems that way to me. 这是一个难得的夜晚，当时阿吉特和沃伦没有通过电话交谈。这不仅仅是一种商业关系，至少对我来说似乎是这样。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, it is.It will stay that way, too. WARREN BUFFETT：是的，好吧，是的。它也将保持这种状态。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And by the way, we like our businesses — our relationships — to be more than a business relationship CHARLIE MUNGER：顺便说一句，我们喜欢我们的业务 - 我们的关系 - 不仅仅是一种商业关系

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie and I are very — we basically — it's a luxury but it's a luxury that we should try to nurture — we get to work with people we like.And it makes life a lot simpler. WARREN BUFFETT：Charlie和我非常 - 我们基本上 - 这是一种奢侈品，但它是我们应该努力培养的奢侈品 - 我们可以与我们喜欢的人合作。它让生活变得更加简单。

It probably helps in that goal of being the oldest living American, too.(Laughter) 它可能有助于成为最古老的美国人的目标。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, and we tend to like people we admire.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：是的，我们倾向于喜欢我们钦佩的人。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, who do we like that we don't admire, Charlie?(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：是的，我们喜欢谁，我们不欣赏，查理？（笑声）

Start naming names.These people have names.(Laughter) 开始命名名称。这些人有名字。（笑声）

20. Guinness hurt by weak demand for scotch 由于对苏格兰威士忌的需求疲软，吉尼斯受到伤害

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2. WARREN BUFFETT：第2区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Peter Bevelin from Sweden. 观众：我的名字是来自瑞典的Peter Bevelin。

How do you perceive Guinness long-term, economics growth-wise? 你如何看待吉尼斯长期的经济增长？ WARREN BUFFETT: Fitz — would you repeat that please, Fitz.What was it?What ﬁrm growth- wise? WARREN BUFFETT：Fitz - 你能再说一遍，Fitz。它以前如何？什么坚定的增长明智？

VOICE: Guinness. 声音：吉尼斯。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Guinness. 观众成员：吉尼斯。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, Guinness. WARREN BUFFETT：哦，吉尼斯。

I'm not as much of an expert on Guinness' products as Charlie is. 我不像查理那样是吉尼斯产品的专家。

CHARLIE MUNGER: We approved that.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：我们批准了。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: You didn't hear him.He said, "I approved that." WARREN BUFFETT：你没有听到他的声音。他说，“我批准了。”

I made the decision to buy Guinness and Guinness has — it's down somewhat from — actually, the price in pounds is about the same but the pound is at about $1.46 or -7 against an average of $1.80-something, so we've had asigniﬁcant exchange loss on that. 我做出了购买吉尼斯和吉尼斯的决定 - 它有点下降 - 实际上，以磅为单位的价格大致相同，但是英镑兑美元汇率约为1.46美元或-7，平均价格为1.80美元左右，所以我们有一个对此造成重大汇兑损失。

The — Guinness' — despite the name — you know, the main product, of course, is scotch.And that's where most of the money is made, although they make good money in brewing. - 吉尼斯 - 尽管有名字 - 你知道，主要产品当然是苏格兰威士忌。这就是大部分资金的来源，尽管他们在酿造方面赚了不少钱。

But, distilling is the main business.And, you know, the usage of scotch, particularly in this country, the trends have not been strong at all, but that was true when we bought it, too. 但是，提炼是主要业务。并且，你知道，苏格兰威士忌的使用，特别是在这个国家，趋势并不强烈，但是当我们购买它时也是如此。

There are some countries around the world where it's grown and there are certain countries where it's a huge prestige item. 世界上有一些国家的地方已经成长，而且在某些国家，这是一个巨大的威望项目。

I mean, in certain parts of the Far East, the more you pay for scotch, the better you think people think of you.Which I don't understand completely, but I hope it continues.(Laughter) 我的意思是，在远东的某些地方，你为苏格兰威士忌付出的钱越多，你认为人们对你的看法就越好。我完全不理解，但我希望它继续下去。（笑声）

But — the scotch — worldwide scotch consumption has not been anything to write home about. 但是 - 世界各地苏格兰威士忌苏格兰威士忌的苏格兰威士忌消费并不值得回味。

Guinness makes a lot of money in the business.But, I would not — I don't see anything in the — in published history that would lead you to believe that the growth prospects, in terms of physical volume, are high for scotch. 吉尼斯在这项业务上赚了不少钱。但是，我不会 - 在发布的历史中看不到任何内容会让您相信，就物理量而言，增长前景对于苏格兰威士忌来说是很高的。 The — Guinness itself, the beer, actually has shown pretty good growth rates in some countries.Actually, from a very tiny base in the U.S. as well. - 吉尼斯本身，啤酒，在一些国家实际上已显示出相当不错的增长率。实际上，来自美国的一个非常小的基地。

But, they will have to do well in distilling or — I mean that will govern the outcome of Guinness. 但是，他们必须在提炼方面做得好或者 - 我的意思是这将决定吉尼斯的结果。

I think Guinness is well run and it's a very important company in that business.But, I wouldn't count on a lot of physical growth. 我认为吉尼斯很好，这是该公司非常重要的公司。但是，我不会指望大量的身体增长。

Charlie, what — any consumer insights? 查理，什么 - 任何消费者见解？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. (Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：不。（笑声）

21. Why Berkshire will be OK if Buffett dies suddenly 21.如果巴菲特突然去世，为什么伯克希尔会好的

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3. WARREN BUFFETT：第3区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, my name is Arthur Coleus (PH) from Canton, Massachusetts. 听众：巴菲特先生，我叫马萨诸塞州坎顿的亚瑟库莱斯（PH）。

And I'd like to know how you'd respond to the question that my associates ask me when they say that Berkshire Hathaway has been a good investment up to now, but what happens to your investment if, God forbid, something happens to Mr. Warren Buffett? 而且我想知道当你说Berkshire Hathaway到目前为止是一项很好的投资时，你会如何回答我的同事问我的问题，但是如果上帝保佑先生有什么事情发生，你的投资会怎样？。沃伦·巴菲特？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I'm glad you didn't say Charlie Munger.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我很高兴你没有说Charlie Munger。（笑声）

No, there — Berkshire will do just ﬁne.We've got a wonderful group of businesses. 不，那里 - 伯克希尔会做得很好。我们有一群精彩的企业。

I've told you the two things I do in life.And, in terms of the managers we have, you have to come in and really want to mess it up, I would think.And we don't have anybody like that, in terms of succession plans at Berkshire. 我告诉过你我生活中做的两件事。而且，就我们所拥有的经理而言，你必须进来并且真的想把它搞砸，我想。就伯克希尔的继任计划而言，我们没有这样的人。

And then there's the question of allocation of capital.And, you could do worse than just adding it to some of the positions that we already had. 然后是资本分配问题。并且，你可以做的更糟糕，而不仅仅是将它添加到我们已经拥有的一些职位上。

The ownership is — if I die tonight, the ownership structure does not change.So, you've the same large block of stock that has every interest in having good successor management as I would. 所有权是 - 如果我今晚死，所有权结构不会改变。所以，你有同样大块的股票，我们有兴趣拥有良好的继任管理。 I mean, there’s no — there would be no greater interest.And it is not a complicated business.I mean, you ought to worry more about, if you own Microsoft, about Bill Gates, I think, or something of the sort. 我的意思是，没有 - 没有更大的兴趣。这不是一项复杂的业务。我的意思是，你应该更加担心，如果你拥有微软，关于比尔盖茨，我认为，或类似的东西。

But, this place is, you know, we've got a group down here that are running these.You didn’t see me out at Borsheims selling any jewelry the other day.I mean, that's somebody else's job.So, I — it is not — it's not very complicated. 但是，这个地方，你知道，我们在这里有一个团队正在运行这些。前几天你没有在Borsheims看到我出售任何珠宝。我的意思是，这是别人的工作。所以，我 - 它不是 - 它不是很复杂。

Incidentally, I think I'm in pretty good health.I mean this stuff (Coca-Cola) will do wonders for you if you'll just try it.(Laughter) 顺便说一句，我觉得我身体健康。我的意思是这个东西（可口可乐）会为你做奇迹，如果你只是尝试它。（笑声）

Charlie, do you want to add anything as the —? 查理，你想添加任何东西 - ？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah.I think the prospects of Berkshire would be diminished — obviously diminished — if Warren were to drop off tomorrow morning.But it would still be one hell of a company and I think it would still do quite well. CHARLIE MUNGER：是的。我认为，如果沃伦明天早上放弃，那么伯克希尔的前景将会减弱 - 显然会减少。但它仍然是一个公司的地狱，我认为它仍然会做得很好。

I used to do legal work, when I was young, for Charlie Skouras.I heard him once say, my business, which was movie theaters like this one, was off 25 percent last year, and last year was off 25 percent from the year before, and that was off 25 percent from the year before, and then hepounded the table and he'd say, "But it's still one hell of a business." 我小时候曾为查理斯库拉斯做法律工作。我听过他曾经说过，我的公司，就像这样的电影院，去年下降了25％，去年比前一年减少了25％，比去年下降了25％，然后他砸桌子，他说，“但它仍然是一个企业的地狱。”

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s not a formula we want to test, incidentally. WARREN BUFFETT：顺便说一句，这不是我们想要测试的公式。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, no.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：不，不。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: It is one hell of a business that we've got here.I mean — and if you saw what happened at Berkshire headquarters, you would not worry as much.There's very little going on there that contributes to things.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：我们来到这里是一件令人生畏的事。我的意思是 - 如果你看到伯克希尔总部发生的事情，你就不用担心了。那里的事情几乎没有什么贡献。（笑声）

We’re, right now, at our peak of activity.This is it. 我们现在正处于活动高峰期。就是这个。

22. Easy answer: no reverse split, either 22.答案很简单：没有反向分裂

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4. WARREN BUFFETT：第4区。 AUDIENCE MEMBER: First of all, my name is Al Martin (PH) and my wife Terry (PH) is here with me.And I appreciate the invitation to attend this meeting. 观众：首先，我的名字是Al Martin（PH），我的妻子Terry （PH）和我在一起。我很高兴有机会参加这次会议。

I was a little bit dubious and quite excited at that game Saturday night.I didn't know which side was going to throw the game to the other one.But I did ﬁnd out at the end. 星期六晚上我对这场比赛感到有点怀疑和兴奋。我不知道哪一方会把游戏扔给另一方。但我确实在最后发现了。

The ﬁrst question, actually, was somewhat answered, but not fully.Has the board considered a reverse split?My experience has been that — 实际上，第一个问题有所回答，但并不完全。董事会是否考虑过反向拆分？我的经验是 -

WARREN BUFFETT: Would you like to make that a motion?There was a motion for a reserve — reverse split.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：你想提出动议吗？有一个保留动议 - 反向拆分。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I would say a two-for-one because if it were three or four-for-one I might end up with no shares.Or fractional shares. 观众成员：我会说一对一，因为如果是三对一，我最终可能没有股票。或分数份额。

But, anyway, my experience has been that all of the stocks that have split have gone down in the next two or three months or the next two or three years, including one which you are drinking, which is a ﬂat Coke. 但是，无论如何，我的经验是，所有已经分裂的股票在接下来的两三个月或接下来的两三年内都会下跌，包括你正在饮用的一种，这是一种扁平的可乐。

Also, I have observed Merck over the last several years to be hitting a low, which split three-for- one. 此外，我观察到默克在过去几年中达到了低点，即三分为二。

So, I think that, you know, the reasons for splitting stocks are to make it affordable.I found that every stock I ever bought was never affordable.I found the reason I bought it was because I couldn't afford not to buy it. 因此，我认为，分裂股票的原因是让它变得可负担得起。我发现我买过的每一只股票都买不起。我发现我买它的原因是因为我买不起它。

So that's a different philosophy, I guess, as somewhat shared indirectly with the boards running the stock. 我猜这是一种不同的哲学，因为它与运行股票的董事会间接分享。

The second question, which is — has to do with — 第二个问题是 - 与 - 有关 -

WARREN BUFFETT: Hope it’s as easy as the ﬁrst question.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：希望它和第一个问题一样简单。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well, I didn't want to wait for an answer of the ﬁrst question for that reason, because it could be complicated and confusing and so forth. 观众成员：嗯，我不想因为这个原因等待第一个问题的回答，因为它可能是复杂和令人困惑的等等。

23. Hillary Clinton's success as commodities trader 23.希拉里克林顿作为商品交易员的成功 AUDIENCE MEMBER: The second question has to do with, could the board consider looking into a commodity broker, or a lawyer, or both, that could take action similar to Hillary Clinton’s? 观众成员：第二个问题与此有关，董事会是否可以考虑调查可能采取与希拉里克林顿相似的商品经纪人或律师，或两者兼而有之？

I think, you know, making your net worth go up by a factor of ﬁve overnight is more than enticing.Some of us might even want to wait for ten months to get a 100-to-1 return on the money. 我想，你知道，让你的净值在一夜之间上升五倍不仅仅是诱人的。我们中的一些人甚至可能想等待十个月才能获得100比1的回报。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I want to say — I want to say to you, when I saw that 530 percent in one day, it — Charlie has never done that for us. WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我想说 - 我想告诉你，当我在一天内看到530％时，它 - 查理从来没有为我们这样做过。

I mean — (laughter) — it really caused me to reassess succession plans at Berkshire.(Laughter) 我的意思是 - （笑声） - 这真的让我重新评估了伯克希尔的继任计划。（笑声）

And Hillary may be free in a few years.(Laughter and applause) 希拉里可能在几年内自由。（笑声和掌声）

I hope you're applauding over her coming to Berkshire, not — but I’ll leave that up — (Laughter) 我希望你为她来伯克郡而鼓掌，不是 - 但我会把它留下来 - （笑声）

OK, that was their second question.(Laughs) 好的，这是他们的第二个问题。（笑）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: That was my second question. 听众：这是我的第二个问题。

Of course, in my experience, it's been that most of us have thought through this situation and I guess it's pretty speculative, but I found out that the rules and laws that are made for trading are interpreted rather than enforced.And I think that applied to this particular case, so let's go on to the third question.(Laughter) 当然，根据我的经验，我们大多数人都已经考虑过这种情况，我认为这是相当投机的，但我发现交易的规则和法律是解释而不是强制执行。我认为这适用于这个特殊情况，所以让我们继续讨论第三个问题。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Alright.They're getting easier.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：好的。他们变得越来越容易。（笑声）

24. Blue Chip Stamps is a disaster under Buffett and Munger 24.蓝筹邮票是巴菲特和芒格的灾难

AUDIENCE MEMBER: This one is real easy.My wife was a collector of Blue Chip stamps for many, many years.And she brought some stamps with her.What should she do with them? 观众成员：这个真的很容易。我妻子多年来一直是蓝筹邮票的收藏家。她带了一些邮票。她应该怎么做？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that — we can give you a deﬁnitive answer to that.Charlie and I entered the trading stamp business to apply our wizardry to it in what, 1969 or so, Charlie? WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，那 - 我们可以给你一个明确的答案。查理和我进入了交易邮票业务，以便在1969年左右的时间里将我们的魔法运用到它，查理？ CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. CHARLIE MUNGER：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: We were doing what then, about 110 million? WARREN BUFFETT：那时我们做了大约1.1亿？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, it went up to 120. CHARLIE MUNGER：不，它上升到120。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK.And then we arrived on the scene and we're going to do what, about 400,000 this year? WARREN BUFFETT ：好的。然后我们到达了现场，我们将要做什么，今年约40万？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. CHARLIE MUNGER：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：是的。（笑声）

That shows you what can be done when your management gets active.(Laughter) 这表明了当您的管理层变得活跃时可以做些什么。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: We have presided over a decline of 99 1/2 percent.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：我们主持了99％的下降。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.Yeah.But, we're waiting for a bounce — (Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：是的。是啊。但是，我们正在等待反弹 - （笑声）

I would say this.The trading stamp business, as those of you who have followed all know, it only works because of the ﬂoat. 我会说这个。交易印花业务，就像那些跟踪所有人都知道的那样，它只会因为浮动而起作用。

I mean, there — a very, very high percentage of the stamps in the '60s were cashed in. We have some years that we've gone up to 99 percent, I believe — we sampled the returns — because they were given out insuch quantity. 我的意思是，在那里 - 60年代的邮票中有非常非常高的百分比被兑现。我相信，我们有几年时间已达到99％ - 我们对收益进行了抽样调查 - 因为它们是在这样的数量。

But, our advice to anyone who has stamps is to save them because they're going to be collector's items, and besides if you bring them to us we have to give you merchandise for them. 但是，我们对任何有邮票的人的建议是拯救他们，因为他们将成为收藏家的物品，而且如果你把它们带给我们，我们必须为他们提供商品。

Tell her to keep them.They'll do nothing but gain in value over years.(Laughter) 告诉她保留它们。除了多年来，他们什么都不做，只能获得价值。（笑声）

25. Stock split wouldn't raise long-term average price 25.股票分割不会提高长期平均价格

WARREN BUFFETT: Going back, incidentally, to your point on the split. 沃伦巴菲特：顺便说一句，回到你的观点。

I think most people think that the stock would sell for more money split. 我认为大多数人都认为股票会卖出更多的钱。 A, we wouldn’t necessarily think that was advisable in the ﬁrst place. 答：我们不一定认为这是可行的。

But we — in the second place, we don't think it would necessarily be true over a period of time. 但是我们 - 在第二位，我们认为在一段时间内它不一定是真的。

We think our stock is more likely to be rationally priced over time following the present policies than if we were to split it in some major way. 我们认为，按照现行政策，我们的股票更有可能在一定时间内合理定价，而不是以某种主要方式将其分割。

And we don't think the average price would necessarily be higher.We think that the volatility would probably be somewhat greater, and we see no way that volatility helps our shareholders as a group. 我们认为平均价格不一定会更高。我们认为波动性可能会有所增加，我们认为波动性无法帮助我们的股东作为一个整体。

26. Fed Chairman Greenspan's actions are "quite sound" 26.美联储主席格林斯潘的行动“相当健全”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5. WARREN BUFFETT：第5区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I am Peg Gallagher from Omaha. 观众：我是来自奥马哈的Peg Gallagher。

Mr. Buffett, are you interested in inﬂuencing Mr. Greenspan at the Fed to stop raising interest rates? 巴菲特先生，您是否有兴趣影响格林斯潘在美联储停止加息？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I wouldn’t have any inﬂuence with him.He was on the board of Cap Cities some years ago and I know him a bit.But I don't think anyone would have any inﬂuence with Mr. Greenspan on that point. WARREN BUFFETT：好吧，我不会对他产生任何影响。几年前他是Cap Cities的董事会成员，我对他有所了解。但我认为格林斯潘先生在这一点上不会有任何影响力。

But, I generally think that his actions have been quite sound during his period as Fed chief. 但是，我一般认为他在担任美联储主席期间的行为非常合理。

I mean, it's part of the job of the Fed, as Mr. Martin said many years ago, was to take away the punchbowl at the party, occasionally.And that's a very difﬁcult, difﬁcult policy to quantify working with markets day-by-day. 我的意思是，这是美联储工作的一部分，就像多年前马丁先生所说的那样，偶尔会在聚会上拿走拳头。这是一个非常困难，困难的政策，可以量化每天与市场合作。

And, of course, it's always been the job of the Fed, basically, to lean against the wind.Which, of course, means if the wind changes, you fall ﬂat on your face.But that's another question. 而且，当然，基本上，美联储的工作始终是靠风。当然，这意味着如果风改变，你就会平躺在脸上。但这是另一个问题。

But the — I don't — I think what he has done is probably been somewhat appropriate.I think he's probably been surprised, a little bit, as to what has happened with long-term rates as he's nudged up short-term rates. 但是 - 我不 - 我认为他所做的事情可能有点合适。我认为他可能会对长期利率发生的事情感到惊讶，因为他推动了短期利率。 I think he was hoping that — this is just a guess on my part — that action, sort of early in the cycle on the short-term rate front, would — might make people feel more conﬁdent about the longer-term rates and therefore thatthe yield curve would ﬂatten some.I don't know that.And, he may have been a little surprised on that. 我认为他希望 - 这只是我的一个猜测 - 这种行动，就像短期利率方面的周期那样，可能会让人们对长期利率更有信心，因此收益率曲线会使一些人变平。我不知道。并且，他可能对此感到有些惊讶。

But it's not an easy job he has.So, I would not second guess him myself. 但这不是一件容易的事。所以，我不会再猜测他自己。

Charlie, how do you feel about him? 查理，你觉得他怎么样？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Fine.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：很好。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Greenspan is safe.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：格林斯潘很安全。（笑声）

27. Don't pay attention to what people say about stocks 27.不要注意人们对股票的看法

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6. WARREN BUFFETT：第6区。

MILLER: Mr. Buffett, I'm Lee Miller (PH) from St Louis. 米勒：巴菲特先生，我是圣路易斯的李米勒（PH）。

There was an article in the April 18th Barron’s that attempted to calculate the value behind each Berkshire Hathaway share. 4月18日Barron的一篇文章试图计算每个Berkshire Hathaway股票背后的价值。

I'm sure you have some views on that and I’d be very interested in your perspective on that issue. 我相信你对此有一些看法，我对你对这个问题的看法非常感兴趣。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, there was an article about a week or so ago in Barron's.The same fellow wrote an article about four years ago reaching pretty much the same conclusion, and I hope he hasn't been short in between, but the — (Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：是的，大约一周前在巴伦的一篇文章中有一篇文章。同一个人写了一篇关于四年前的文章得出了几乎相同的结论，我希望他之间并不缺乏，但是 - （笑声）

I would say this.It is not the way I would calculate the intrinsic value of Berkshire. 我会说这个。这不是我计算伯克希尔内在价值的方式。

But everyone in securities markets make choices on that.Every day somebody sells a few shares of Berkshire and someone sell — buys — and, you know, they are probably coming to differing opinions about valuation. 但证券市场的每个人都在做出选择。每天都有人出售伯克希尔的一些股票，有人出售 - 购买 - 而且，你知道，他们可能会对估值产生不同的看法。

I would say that I found it strange that apparently he forgot we were in the insurance business, but that — that's not — (Applause). 我会说我觉得很奇怪，显然他忘了我们在保险业，但那 - 那不是 - （掌声）。

It really doesn't make any difference.I mean, what — we don't pay any attention to what people say about Coca-Cola stock or Gillette stock or any of those things.

它确实没有任何区别。我的意思是，我们不关注人们对可口可乐股票或吉列股票或任何这些东西的看法。

I mean, on any given day, two million shares of Coca-Cola may trade.That's a lot of people selling, a lot of people buying.If you talk to one person, you’d hear one thing, and you’d talk to another — you really should not make decisions in securities based on what other people think. 我的意思是，在任何一天，200万股可口可乐可能会交易。那是很多人在卖，有很多人在买。如果你和一个人交谈，你会听到一件事，而你会与另一个人交谈 - 你真的不应该根据其他人的想法做出证券决策。

If you're doing that, you should think about doing something else, because it's — 如果你这样做，你应该考虑做别的事情，因为它是 -

A public opinion poll will just — it will not get you rich on Wall Street.So you really want to stick with businesses that you feel you can somehow evaluate yourself. 民意调查只是 - 它不会让你在华尔街富裕。所以你真的想坚持你认为可以以某种方式评估自己的企业。

And, I don't think — I mean Charlie and I, we don't read anything about what business is going to be — the economy is going to do, or the market's going to do, or what anybody — 而且，我不认为 - 我的意思是查理和我，我们没有读到任何关于业务将会是什么 - 经济将要做什么，或市场将要做什么，或任何人 -

Anytime I see some article that says, you know, these analysts say this or that about some business, it just — it doesn't mean anything to us. 任何时候我看到一些文章说，你知道，这些分析师说这个或那个关于某个企业，它只是 - 它对我们没有任何意义。

You cannot get rich with a weather vane. 你不能用风向标来致富。

28. Judge bank stock buybacks on case-by-case basis 28.根据具体情况判断银行股票回购

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 7. WARREN BUFFETT：第7区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'm Edward Barr from Lexington, Kentucky, and I'd like to ask, given the amount of capital in the banking industry, do you think that more banks should be buying back signiﬁcant amounts of their stock, like SunTrust,versus just the token amounts that they're buying back or just the authorized amounts? 观众：我是来自肯塔基州列克星敦的爱德华巴尔，我想问一下，鉴于银行业的资金数额，你认为更多的银行应该回购大量的股票，比如SunTrust，与他们买回的代币金额或仅仅是授权金额相比？

And then also, related question in banking.Are they — are banks too focused on goodwill amortization when declining to buy other banks for cash, thereby using purchase accounting versus the normal practice in the industry of pooling accounting even when the stock they issue may be depressed or undervalued? 还有银行业的相关问题。他们 - 银行是否过于专注于商誉摊销而拒绝购买其他银行的现金，从而使用购买会计与会计行业的正常做法，即使他们发行的股票可能会被抑制或低估？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the ﬁrst question about the capital in the industry — that — you really have to look at that on a bank-by-bank basis and there is a lot more repurchasing of shares by banks taking place.

WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，关于行业资本的第一个问题 - 你必须在逐个银行的基础上看待这个问题，并且银行正在进行更多的股票回购。

You mentioned SunTrust, but National City is — they bought it back, I think, 5 percent of their — National City of Cleveland — bought back 5 percent of their stock in the ﬁrst quarter. 你提到SunTrust，但是National City是 - 他们买回来了，我认为，他们5％的 - 克利夫兰国家城市 - 在第一季度买回了他们5％的股票。

There's much more repurchasing going on, and that's simply a judgment call by management that — as to the level of capital they need going forward, and what level of capital enables them to earn the return on equity that they think appropriate and whether they — whatthey feel like paying for their own shares. 还有更多的回购正在进行，而这仅仅是管理层的判断 - 关于他们需要向前发展的资本水平，以及什么样的资本水平使他们能够获得他们认为合适的股本回报以及他们是什么他们觉得要为自己的股票买单。

So, I think you have to look at that on case-by-case. 所以，我认为你必须根据具体情况来看待它。

We certainly like it, if we were to own a bank, we would — or own shares in a bank — we would like the idea of the bank repurchasing its stock at a price that we thought was attractive.We would think that they probably knew more about their own bank than some other bank they were going to buy and that if the numbers are right, it's an attractive way to use capital. 我们当然喜欢它，如果我们拥有一家银行，我们会 - 或者拥有一家银行的股票 - 我们希望银行以我们认为具有吸引力的价格回购其股票的想法。我们认为他们可能比他们要购买的其他银行更了解他们自己的银行，如果数字合适，那么这是一种有吸引力的资金使用方式。

29. We don't pay attention to accounting of a transaction 29.我们不注意交易的会计处理

WARREN BUFFETT: Your second question about goodwill amortization and purchase accounting versus pooling: we care not — at Berkshire, it absolutely makes no difference to us what accounting treatment we get on something.We are interested in the economics of a transaction. WARREN BUFFETT：关于商誉摊销和购买会计与汇集的第二个问题：我们不关心 - 在伯克希尔，对我们来说，我们对某些事情的会计处理绝对没有区别。我们对交易的经济学感兴趣。

Some banks — some businesses generally, most businesses perhaps — prefer pooling because they don't like to take a goodwill amortization charge. 一些银行 - 通常是一些企业，大多数企业可能 - 更喜欢汇集，因为他们不喜欢收取商誉摊销费用。

We think our shareholders are smart enough, particularly if we make it clear to them — the accounting consequences — we think they're smart enough to look through to the economic reality of what Berkshire's businesses are all about. 我们认为我们的股东足够聪明，特别是如果我们向他们明确表示 - 会计后果 - 我们认为他们足够聪明，可以了解伯克希尔公司业务的经济现实。

And I think that some managements sell short their own ownership group by doing various kinds of ﬁnancial acrobatics in order to have the charges come in a certain way rather than, as you point out, often they might be better off buying for cash rather than usingtheir own stock as currency, but they may prefer to use their own stock because they avoid goodwill charges. 而且我认为一些管理人员通过各种金融杂技来卖空他们自己的所有权集团，以便以某种方式收取费用，而不是如你所指出的那样，通常他们可能会更好地购买现金而不是使用他们自己的股票作为货币，但他们可能更愿意使用他们自己的股票，因为他们避免商誉费用。 We've written a few things on goodwill in the past and past annual reports that might get to that subject. 我们在过去和过去可能涉及该主题的年度报告中写了一些关于善意的事情。

We don't care what accounting — we sort of rewrite the accounting for any business that we're looking at, because in our heads we want to have, in effect, a standardized way of looking at businesses. 我们不关心什么是会计 - 我们有点重写我们正在考虑的任何业务的会计，因为在我们的头脑中，我们希望实际上有一种标准化的方式来看待业务。

And if one company goes through pooling transactions and another goes through purchase transactions, we're going to recast them in our own minds so that there is comparability. 如果一家公司通过汇集交易而另一家公司通过购买交易，我们将在我们自己的脑海中重塑它们，以便具有可比性。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, the published accounting results are in accordance with standard convention and they’re a place to start economic analysis.The ﬁgures are frequently quite silly on a functional basis.I'm not criticizing accounting conventions except for some.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：是的，公布的会计结果符合标准惯例，它们是开始经济分析的地方。这些数字在功能基础上经常非常愚蠢。除了一些以外，我不批评会计惯例。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: But, I think it's just a place to start thinking about economic reality. CHARLIE MUNGER：但是，我认为这只是一个开始考虑经济现实的地方。

By their nature, they can't tie perfectly — they can't even tie very well — to economic reality. 就其本质而言，他们无法与经济现实完美结合 - 甚至不能很好地结合在一起。

WARREN BUFFETT: We regard it is a negative when we ﬁnd a management that's preoccupied with accounting considerations.But, we ﬁnd it so frequent that we can't afford to use it as a total exclusionary factor. WARREN BUFFETT ：当我们找到一个专注于会计考虑因素的管理层时，我们认为这是一个负面因素。但是，我们发现它如此频繁，以至于我们无法将其用作完全排他性因素。

It really surprises me how many managements focus on accounting, and the time they spend on it, the — it's really unproductive. 令我惊讶的是，有多少管理人员专注于会计，以及他们花在上面的时间，这真的没有效益。

If you ﬁnd a management that doesn't care about the accounting but does explain to you in clear terms what's going on, I think you should regard that as a plus in owning a security. 如果您发现管理层不关心会计，但确实以明确的方式向您解释发生了什么，我认为您应该将此视为拥有证券的一个优点。

30. Buffett praises new Salomon Brothers management 30.巴菲特称赞所罗门兄弟的新管理层

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1. WARREN BUFFETT：第1区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, my name is Bill Ackman.I'm from New York City.And my question relates to the appeal of Salomon Brothers as an investment. 听众：巴菲特先生，我的名字叫比尔阿克曼。我来自纽约市。我的问题与所罗门兄弟作为投资的吸引力有关。

You talked earlier about leverage and the dangers of leverage.Salomon is a business which is levered 30-to-1, which has very narrow margins, and earns a relatively modest return on equity, in light of the amount of leverage that they use.What is the appeal of the business to you? 您之前谈过杠杆率和杠杆率的危险性。所罗门是一家以30比1杠杆化的业务，其利润率非常低，并且根据他们使用的杠杆数量，获得相对适度的股本回报。这项业务对您有什么吸引力？

WARREN BUFFETT: We have here today the chief executive of Salomon, Inc., the parent company, and also the chief executive of Salomon Brothers, the investment banking arm. WARREN BUFFETT：我们今天在这里担任母公司Salomon，Inc。的首席执行官，以及投资银行部门Salomon Brothers的首席执行官。

And, I would say one of the things we — Charlie and I — feel extraordinarily good about are the two fellows that are running that operation.They did an exceptional job under extraordinarily difﬁcult circumstances, as did John Macfarlane, who's also here today. 并且，我会说我们 - 查理和我 - 感觉非常好的事情之一是正在运行该操作的两个人。他们在非常困难的情况下做了出色的工作，约翰麦克法兰也是如此，他今天也在这里。

The three of them — I mentioned four people in the annual report — and Salomon wouldn't be here today without those three.And it wouldn't be the company in the future that it's going to be without them.They did an absolutely fabulous job. 其中三个 - 我在年度报告中提到了四个人 - 如果没有这三个人，所罗门就不会在这里。并且未来的公司不会没有它们。他们做了绝对出色的工作。

It's the sort of business that, as you point out, uses a lot of leverage.It doesn't — in one way it doesn't use as much as it looks like and in another way it uses even more than it looks like. 正如您所指出的那样，这种业务使用了很多杠杆。它不会 - 在某种程度上它不会像它看起来那么多，并且以另一种方式使用它甚至比看起来更多。

But — it — the test will be: A, whether they control that business in a way that that leverage does not prove dangerous, and secondly, what kind of returns on equity they earn while using it. 但是 - 它 - 测试将是：A，他们是否以某种方式控制该业务，而这种方式不会证明是危险的;其次，他们在使用它时获得的股本回报率是多少。

You certainly should expect to earn somewhat higher returns on equity when you are necessarily exposed to a small amount of systemic risk and signiﬁcant amounts of borrowed money, than you would in a business that's an extremely plain vanilla business. 当你必然面临少量的系统性风险和大量借入资金时，你肯定会期望获得更高的股本回报率，而不是一个非常普通的商业企业。

But, I don't know whether you've met Bob and Deryck, but, I think you'd feel better about having a leverage in their hands than about any other hand you can imagine. 但是，我不知道你是否遇到了Bob和Deryck，但是，我认为你手上的杠杆比你想象的任何其他手更好。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Why don't we have those three gentlemen stand up? CHARLIE MUNGER：为什么我们不让这三位先生站起来？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, you ought to give them a hand. 沃伦巴菲特：是的，你应该帮助他们。 CHARLIE MUNGER: They really have done a job for Berkshire in this last year. CHARLIE MUNGER：去年他们真的为伯克希尔做过一份工作。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I’ll lead the applause for them.Where are they?There they are. (Applause). WARREN BUFFETT ：是的，我会为他们带来掌声。他们在哪？他们在那里。（掌声）。

I mentioned this before, but it's worth mentioning again.Deryck took on the job of being the operating head of Salomon Brothers on what, August 18th, 1991. 我之前提到过这一点，但值得一提。 1991年8月18日，Deryck担任所罗门兄弟公司的运营负责人。

He didn't know what — he couldn't know what he was getting into, exactly.He — two months later or three months later, we’d never had a conversation about compensation.He did not ask me for Berkshire, or my, guarantee for indemniﬁcation because he was walking in not knowing legal problems.We didn't know what we would ﬁnally uncover. 他不知道什么 - 他完全不清楚他到底发生了什么。他 - 两个月后或三个月后，我们从来没有谈过赔偿问题。他没有问我伯克希尔或我的赔偿保证，因为他不知道法律问题。我们不知道我们最终会发现什么。

And he worked incredible hours to keep that place together, which was not easy. 他花了不可思议的时间把这个地方放在一起，这并不容易。

Bob Denham, I called — I guess on the 23rd or so, 20th.I called him on a Friday.I got home on a Saturday, the 24th of August. 鲍勃德纳姆，我打电话 - 我想在23日左右，20日。我星期五打电话给他。我于8月24日星期六回到家。

He was living a nice pleasant peaceful life in California.And had a ﬁrst class law ﬁrm, a good group of clients, wife had a good job there. 他在加利福尼亚过着愉快宁静的生活。并拥有一流的律师事务所，一群优秀的客户，妻子在那里做得很好。

And I told him I was in a mess and there wasn't any second choice and three days later he was back in New York and living in a small apartment in Battery City and handling the general counsel's job at Salomon. 我告诉他我一团糟，没有任何第二选择，三天后他回到纽约，住在炮台城的一个小公寓，处理总法律顾问在所罗门的工作。

They found John Macfarlane on that Sunday, on the 18th.I think he was running a triathlon or something. 18日，他们在那个星期天找到了John Macfarlane。我认为他正在参加铁人三项比赛。

Not a practice that Charlie and I follow, but, ah — (Laughter) 不是查理和我跟随的练习，但是啊 - （笑声）

And he was yanked from that and came down, and I think John was over in New Jersey, but he holed up in the Downtown Athletic Club.And it was his job to keep funding what was then $150 billion balance sheet during a period when people right and left were canceling. 他从那里被猛拉下来，我认为约翰在新泽西州已经结束了，但他躲在市中心体育俱乐部。在人们左右取消的时期，他的工作是继续为当时的1500亿美元资产负债表提供资金。

It’s not because we weren't a good credit, but because they just didn't want to have anything to do with us for a while. 这不是因为我们不是一个好的功劳，而是因为他们只是暂时不想与我们有任何关系。 And the World Bank and the State of Texas pension fund and CalPERS, all these people were shutting off funding at a time — and funding in a business is — gentleman just indicated — is the lifeblood of an enterprise like Salomon. 而世界银行和德克萨斯州的养老基金和CalPERS ，所有这些人一次都在关闭资金 - 而一个企业的资金 - 绅士刚刚指出 - 是像萨洛蒙这样的企业的生命线。

And so those three deserve an enormous hand by — really by the Salomon shareholders — but by this group in turn because we have an important investment.So I thank them publicly.(Applause) 所以这三个人应该得到一个巨大的帮助 - 实际上是所罗门的股东 - 但这个群体反过来因为我们有一项重要的投资。所以我公开感谢他们。（掌声）

31. Wesco sold small savings and loan as regulations tightened after crisis 31.随着危机后收紧监管，Wesco出售了小额储蓄和贷款

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2. WARREN BUFFETT：第2区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Kelly Ranson from San Antonio, Texas. 听众：我是来自德克萨斯州圣安东尼奥市的Kelly Ranson。

And I wondered if you could comment on the Mutual Savings and Loan.There was just a footnote that the deposits have been assumed by a federal savings bank. 我想知道你是否可以评论相互储蓄和贷款。只有一个脚注，存款由联邦储蓄银行承担。

And also, what about the annual report for Wesco Financial that I know it used to be in the annual report for Berkshire.Just wondered if you could comment on that, please. 此外，我所知道的Wesco Financial的年度报告在伯克希尔的年度报告中也是如此。我想知道你是否可以对此发表评论。

WARREN BUFFETT: The question is about — we — our 80 percent-owned subsidiary Wesco Financial sold its ownership in Mutual Savings and Loan of Pasadena last year.I'll let Charlie comment on that. WARREN BUFFETT ：问题在于 - 我们 - 我们80％的子公司Wesco Financial去年出售了其在 Pasadena的Mutual Savings and Loan中的所有权。我会让查理对此发表评论。

And then the second question is about the Wesco report, which is available to any Berkshire shareholder simply by writing Wesco.But, we found that the stapling problems and other things made it a little difﬁcult to keep adding that every year to the report.So, now we just — we make it available to anyone who would, at Berkshire, who would like to have it. 然后第二个问题是关于Wesco报告，只需写Wesco即可向任何伯克希尔股东提供。但是，我们发现装订问题和其他因素使得每年在报告中添加这些问题变得有点困难。所以，现在我们只是 - 我们让任何想要在伯克希尔拥有它的人都可以使用它。

But Charlie, want to comment on the sale of Mutual? 但查理，想评论出售Mutual？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes.The savings and loan business became very much more heavily regulated after the huge nationwide collection of scandal and insolvency and so on. CHARLIE MUNGER：是的。在全国范围内收集大量丑闻和破产等后，储蓄和贷款业务受到更严格的监管。

And meanwhile, we had a very small savings and loan association.And the combination of the new regulation, and the fact that it was a very small part of our operation, made us decide that we were better off without it.

与此同时，我们有一个非常小的储蓄和贷款协会。新法规的组合，以及它只是我们运作的一小部分这一事实，使我们决定在没有它的情况下我们会变得更好。

That does happen from time to time in Berkshire.We do exit once in a while. 伯克希尔不时发生这种情况。我们偶尔退出一次。

And, by the way, we would reserve the right to change our mind.I always liked Lord Keynes when he said that he got new facts or new insights, why he changed his mind and then he'd say, what do you do?So we changed our mind. 顺便说一下，我们保留改变主意的权利。我总是喜欢凯恩斯勋爵，他说他得到了新的事实或新的见解，为什么他改变主意然后他会说，你做了什么？所以我们改变了主意。

WARREN BUFFETT: They start — they asked our directors at Mutual to start going to school on Saturday, didn't they, Charlie?Or something?I think that helped change our mind about Mutual. WARREN BUFFETT：他们开始 - 他们要求Mutual的董事周六开始上学，不是吗，查理？或者其他的东西？我认为这有助于改变我们对Mutual的看法。

CHARLIE MUNGER: There's a time to vote with your feet.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：有时间用脚投票。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: And even your wallet. WARREN BUFFETT：甚至还有你的钱包。

32. Shoe industry is tough, but Dexter has great managers 鞋业很艰难，但德克斯特有很棒的经理人

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3. WARREN BUFFETT：第3区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: (Inaudible) Chicago.Can you speak to some of the economic characteristics of the shoe industry that allow the business to be proﬁtable and, in your view, attractive? 听众:(听不清）芝加哥。您能谈谈鞋业的一些经济特征，这些特征使企业能够盈利，并且您认为有吸引力吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: I didn’t hear that.Did you hear that, Charlie? WARREN BUFFETT：我没有听到。你听到了吗，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: He wanted you to comment on the merits of the shoe industry. CHARLIE MUNGER：他想让你评论鞋业的优点。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think our feelings for the shoe industry are very clear from what’s been happening the last few years. WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我认为我们对鞋业的感受与过去几年的情况非常清楚。

We think it's a great business to be in as long as you're in with Frank Rooney and Jim Issler and Peter Lunder and Harold Alfond.Otherwise, it hasn't been too good. 我们认为，只要你和Frank Rooney，Jim Issler以及Peter Lunder和Harold Alfond在一起，这是一件好事。否则，它并不太好。

The — we have a couple of extraordinary shoe operations, but they're not extraordinary because we get our leather from different steers or anything of the sort. - 我们有一些非凡的鞋子操作，但它们并不是非凡，因为我们从不同的阉牛皮或任何类型的皮革中获取皮革。

It's — we have two companies, really three now that Lowell's been brought in, too, but that have truly extraordinary records.I think those same managements would have been enormous successes in any business they'd gone into. 它是 - 我们有两家公司，现在真的有三家公司也被引入了Lowell，但这些公司确实有非凡的记录。我认为，这些管理层在他们所从事的任何业务中都会取得巨大成功。

But, they have gone into the — they are in the shoe business and the companies earn unusual returns on equity.They earn unusual returns on sale.They've got terriﬁc trade reputations. 但是，他们已经进入了 - 他们从事鞋业，公司获得了不寻常的股本回报。他们在销售中获得不寻常的回报他们的商业声誉很高。

And I think that to the extent we can ﬁnd ways to expand in the shoe business while employing those managements, we’ll be very excited about doing so. 我认为，在使用这些管理的同时，我们可以找到扩大鞋业的方法，我们会非常高兴这样做。

It isn't because we think that the shoe industry is any cinch, you know, per se, or anything of the sort.But we've got a lot of talent employed in the shoe business and whenever we've got talent we like to try and ﬁgure out a way to give them as big a domain as we can. 这并不是因为我们认为制鞋业本身就是任何一种，或者说是什么。但是我们在鞋业中雇用了很多人才，每当我们有人才时，我们都想尝试找出一种方法，让他们尽可能地拥有自己的领域。

And it's not inconceivable that we would expand the shoe business, perhaps even signiﬁcantly over time. 而且，随着时间的推移，我们会扩大鞋业，这也许是不可想象的。

33. Buffett on investing in tobacco companies 33.巴菲特投资烟草公司

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4. WARREN BUFFETT：第4区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah, thanks Mr. Buffett.My name is Stewart Hartman from Sioux City.After the brevity of the last question from section 4, I'll try to be extremely brief. 听众会员：是的，谢谢巴菲特先生。我的名字是来自Sioux City的Stewart Hartman 。在第4节的最后一个问题简短之后，我会尽量简短。

The — given the scrutiny that the tobacco business is going under right now, number one, what do you see as the business prospects for those huge cash cows?And, at any point, would that be attractive to you given their liability? - 鉴于烟草业务目前正在进行审查，排名第一，您认为这些巨额现金奶牛的业务前景如何？并且，在任何时候，鉴于他们的责任，这会对你有吸引力吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: The question is about the future of the tobacco business? WARREN BUFFETT：问题是关于烟草业务的未来？

I don't — I probably know no more about that then you do because it's fraught with questions that relate to societal attitudes and you can form an opinion on that just as well as I could. 我不知道 - 我可能不知道你那么做，因为它充满了与社会态度有关的问题，你可以尽我所能地形成一个意见。

But, I would not like to have a signiﬁcant percentage of my net worth in the tobacco business myself, but — 但是，我不希望自己在烟草业务中拥有很大比例的净资产，但是 -

They may have better futures than I envision.I don't really think that I have special insights on that. 他们可能有比我想象的更好的未来。我真的不认为我对此有特别的见解。 Charlie, you —? 查理，你 - ？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. CHARLIE MUNGER：没有。

WARREN BUFFETT: You have to come to a conclusion as to how society is going to want to treat — and the present administration for that matter.And the economics of the business may be ﬁne, but that doesn't mean it has a great future. WARREN BUFFETT：你必须得出社会将要如何对待的结论 - 以及现在的行政当局。业务的经济状况可能还不错，但这并不意味着它有一个美好的未来。

34. "Hard to argue with the market" 34.“很难与市场争论”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5. WARREN BUFFETT：第5区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'm Harriet Morton from Seattle, Washington. 观众：我是来自华盛顿州西雅图的哈丽特莫顿。

I'm wondering, when you are considering an acquisition, how you look at the usefulness of the product? 我想知道，当你考虑收购时，你如何看待产品的实用性？

WARREN BUFFETT: In looking at any business? WARREN BUFFETT：看看任何业务？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. 听众会员：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.Well, obviously we look at what the market says is the utility.And the market has voted very heavily for Dexter Shoe, just to be an example. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。好吧，显然我们看看市场所说的效用。市场已经为Dexter Shoe投了很多票，只是作为一个例子。

I don't know many how many pairs of shoes they were turning out back in 1958 or thereabouts, but year after year, people have essentially voted for the utility of that product. 我不知道他们在1958年左右出现了多少双鞋，但是年复一年，人们基本上都投票支持该产品的实用性。

There are 750 million or so 8-ounce servings of one product or another from the Coca-Cola Company consumed every day around the world.And there are those of us who think the utility is very high.I can't make it through the day without a few.But there are other people that might rate it differently. 世界各地每天消耗的可口可乐公司每种产品有7.5亿份左右的8盎司。还有我们这些人认为效用非常高。没有几个，我无法完成这一天。但是还有其他人可能会对它进行不同的评价。

But essentially, people are going to get thirsty and if this is the way they take care of their thirst better than — and they prefer that to other forms — then I would rate the utility high of the product.But, I think it's hard to argue with the market on that. 但基本上，人们会口渴，如果这是他们更好地照顾他们的口渴的方式 - 并且他们更喜欢其他形式 - 那么我会认为产品的效用很高。但是，我认为很难与市场争论。

I mean, people — some people may think that, you know, listening to a rock concert is not something of high utility.Other people might think it's terriﬁc. 我的意思是，人们 - 有些人可能会认为，听一场摇滚音乐会并不具有很高的实用性。其他人可能认为这很棒。

And so, we would judge that — I don't think we would come to an independent decision that there was some great utility residing in some product that had been available to the public for a long time, but that the public and not endorsed inany way. 因此，我们会判断 - 我认为我们不会做出一个独立的决定，认为某些产品长期存在于公众面前有很大的效用，但公众并没有认可无论如何。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think that's right.But, that's averaged out. CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，我认为这是对的。但是，这是平均的。

We’re in a bunch of high-utility products.I mean, nurses’ shoes, work shoes, casual shoes.We don't have a lot of, what, Italian pumps?(Laughter) 我们在一堆高效实用的产品中。我的意思是，护士的鞋子，工作鞋，休闲鞋。我们没有很多，什么，意大利泵？（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Don't rule it out, Charlie.We may be here next year defending it.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：不要排除它，查理。我们明年可能会在这里为它辩护。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, right, well. CHARLIE MUNGER：是的，对，好吧。

No, I’m just saying, if you judge the existing portfolio as indicating what the future's likely to be like, why — 不，我只是说，如果你判断现有的投资组合表明未来可能是什么样的，为什么 -

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, certainly a lot of essentials were sold out of Borsheims yesterday. WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，当然很多必需品昨天都卖掉了Borsheims。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes.(Laughter and applause) CHARLIE MUNGER：是的。（笑声和掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I hear my family clapping. WARREN BUFFETT：我听到家人鼓掌。

35. No question from zone 6 35.第6区没有问题

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6. WARREN BUFFETT：第6区。

VOICE: We have no question up here. 声音：我们在这里毫无疑问。

36. Insurers have "head in the sand" on catastrophes 36.保险公司在灾难中“陷入困境”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, zone 7. WARREN BUFFETT：好的，7区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Mr. Berkshire, uh, Buffett.(Laughter) 观众：早上好，伯克希尔先生，呃，巴菲特。（笑声） WARREN BUFFETT: I have a niece here who has a son named Berkshire so it — WARREN BUFFETT：我这里有一个侄女，他的儿子名叫伯克希尔，所以 -

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'm Chris Blunt (PH) from Omaha. 听众：我是来自奥马哈的Chris Blunt（PH）。

My ﬁrst question is, in years past, we've had samples of various products.When are we going to have some Guinness? 我的第一个问题是，在过去几年中，我们已经有各种产品的样品。我们什么时候会有一些吉尼斯？

WARREN BUFFETT: Some what now? WARREN BUFFETT：现在有些什么？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Guinness samples? 观众会员：吉尼斯样品？

WARREN BUFFETT: (Laughs) WARREN BUFFETT :(笑）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: And my second question is, in light of the multiple disasters that have taken place in LA, has that had any impact on the cats for Berkshire? 观众：我的第二个问题是，鉴于洛杉矶发生的多次灾难，这对伯克希尔的猫有什么影响？

WARREN BUFFETT: On our super-cat business? WARREN BUFFETT：关于我们的超级猫业务？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. 听众会员：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: The LA earthquake, which is originally — I believe the ﬁrst estimate of insured damage was a billion-ﬁve, which struck us as kind of ludicrous, but has now escalated. WARREN BUFFETT：最初的洛杉矶地震 - 我相信保险损失的第一次估计是十亿 - 五，这让我们感到有点可笑，但现在已经升级了。

The last ofﬁcial estimate, the one we use that’s a trigger in our policies, I think is either 4.5 billion or 4.8 billion.But it's going to be higher than that. 最后的官方估计，我们使用的那个是我们政策的触发器，我认为是45亿或48亿。但它会高于那个。

Our losses are fairly minor.If it gets to eight billion of insured damage, that would trigger another policy or two.But, I would say that the LA quake — which did considerably more damage, I think, than people would have anticipated from a 6.7 for various reasons having to do with how quakes operate — that quake is not going to turn out to be of anyreal — it's not the kind of super-cat that a 15 or $20 billion hurricane which hit Florida or Long Island or New England would be. 我们的损失相当小。如果它获得80亿保险损失，那将引发另一项或两项政策。但是，我想说洛杉矶地震 - 我认为，它造成了相当大的破坏，人们会因为各种原因从6.7中预测到与地震有关的地震 - 这次地震不会变成任何地震真实的 - 这不是超级猫的那种飓风袭击佛罗里达州或长岛或新英格兰的15或 200亿美元的飓风。

That’s the kind of — we could lose — or we could pay out — 6 or $700 million in sort of a worst case super-cat.Now our total premiums this year might be, say, 250 million or something in that area. 这就是那种 - 我们可能输掉 - 或者我们可以支付 - 6亿或7亿美元的最糟糕的超级猫。现在我们今年的总保费可能是2.5亿或者那个地区的东西。

So one super-cat in the wrong place would produce — and there could be more than one — could produce, we’ll say, a $400 million or thereabouts underwriting loss from that business. 因此，一个错误地方的超级猫会产生 - 而且可能不止一个 - 可以产生，我们会说，这笔业务可能会产生4亿美元或附近的承保损失。

The LA quake is peanuts on that scale, but it wouldn't have taken a whole lot more in terms of numbers on the Richter scale, if it happened to have an epicenter where it did, and be of the type that it was, relativelyshallow, that we could have had that sort of thing happen. 洛杉矶地震就是那种规模的花生，但就里氏数量来说，如果它碰巧有一个震中所在的地方就不会花费更多的东西，并且它的类型就是相对的。浅，我们本可以发生这种事情。

I think that the insurance industry has vastly underestimated — maybe not now, but up till a few years ago — the full potential of what a super-cat could do.But Hurricane Andrew and the LA quake may have been something of a wake-up call. 我认为保险业已经大大低估了 - 可能不是现在，但直到几年前 - 超级猫可以做的全部潜力。但安德鲁飓风和洛杉矶地震可能是一个警钟。

They were far from a worst-case situation.A really big Type Five hurricane on Long Island would end up leaving a lot of very major insurance companies in signiﬁcant trouble. 他们远非最糟糕的情况。长岛上一场非常大的五级飓风最终将使许多非常重要的保险公司陷入重大困境。

We deﬁne our losses — essentially, 700 million sounds like a lot of money.It is a lot of money.But, there are limits on our policies.That is not true of people that are just writing the basic homeowners or business.Those losses could go off the chart. 我们定义了我们的损失 - 基本上，7亿听起来像很多钱。这是很多钱。但是，我们的政策有限制。对于那些只是写基本房主或商业的人来说，情况并非如此。这些损失可能会脱离图表。

There were certain companies in the LA quake that thought they had a — what they call a "probable maximum loss" for California quakes.And the LA quake, which was far from the worst case you can imagine, turned out to far exceed those probable maximum losses. 洛杉矶地震中有一些公司认为他们有一个 - 他们称之为加州地震的“可能的最大损失 ”。洛杉矶地震远远超出了你能想象到的最糟糕的情况，结果远远超过了可能的最大损失。

So, I think the industry has had, and may still have, its head in the sand a little bit, in terms of what can happen, either in terms of a quake in California or, more probably, in terms of a hurricane along theEast Coast. 因此，无论是在加利福尼亚州的地震方面，还是在沿着飓风方面，飓风方面，我认为该行业在可能发生的事情方面已经并且可能仍然存在。东海岸。

So far this year we're in reasonable shape, but that doesn't mean much because, by far, the larger exposure is in hurricanes and essentially 50 percent of the hurricanes hit in September.And about — I think it's about 15 percent would be in August.Close to 15 percent in October.So you have 80 percent, roughly, in those three months and there's a little tail on both sides. 今年到目前为止，我们处于合理的状态，但这并不意味着什么，因为到目前为止，更大的风险是飓风，而9月份飓风的影响基本上是50％。而且 - 我认为大约15％将在8月份。 10月接近15％。因此，在这三个月里你大约有80％，双方都有一点尾巴。

But that's when you ﬁnd out whether you've had a good or bad year in the super-cat business, basically. 但是，当你发现自己在超级猫业中是否有好坏时，基本上就是这样。

It's a business we like at the right rates because there are very few people who can afford to write it at the level that the underlying company, the reinsured companies, need it.And we're in a position, if the rates are right, to do signiﬁcant business. 这是一项我们喜欢的合适价格的业务，因为很少有人能够负担得起在基础公司（再保险公司）需要的水平上编写业务。如果利率合适，我们就能做出重要的业务。 Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add. CHARLIE MUNGER：没有什么可补充的。

37. Book recommendations 37.书籍建议

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1, WARREN BUFFETT：第1区，

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Clayton Riley (PH) from Jacksonville, Florida. 听众：来自佛罗里达州杰克逊维尔的Clayton Riley（PH）。

This is a little different than all the other questions, but what were the three best books you read last year outside of the investment ﬁeld?Why don’t — even one will do. 这与所有其他问题略有不同，但去年你在投资领域之外阅读的三本最佳书籍是什么？为什么不 - 甚至一个人都会这样做。

WARREN BUFFETT: I'll give you — I’ll tout a book ﬁrst that I've read but that isn't available yet.But it will be in September. WARREN BUFFETT：我会给你的 - 我会先读一本我读过的书，但现在还没有。但它将在九月。

The woman who wrote it, I believe, is in the audience and it's Ben Graham’s biography, which will be available in September, by Janet Lowe.And I've read it and I think those of you who are interested in investments, for sure, will enjoy it.She’s done a good job of capturing Ben. 我相信，写这篇文章的女性是在观众中，这是本·格雷厄姆的传记，将于九月份由珍妮特· 洛伊（Janet Lowe）提供。而且我已经阅读过了，我认为那些对投资感兴趣的人肯定会喜欢它。她在抓住Ben方面做得很好。

One of the books I enjoyed a lot was written also by a shareholder who is not here because he's being sworn in, I believe today or tomorrow, maybe tomorrow, as head of the Voice of America. 我非常喜欢的一本书也是由一位不在这里的股东撰写的，因为他正在宣誓就职，我相信今天或明天，也许是明天，作为美国之音的负责人。

And that's Geoff Cowan’s book, which is on "The People v. Clarence Darrow."It's the story of the Clarence Darrow trial for, essentially, jury bribery in Los Angeles back around 1912, when the McNamara brothers had bombed the LA Times. 那是Geoff Cowan的书，上面写着“The People v.Clarence Darrow”。这是克拉伦斯达罗试验的故事，主要是在1912年左右洛杉矶的陪审团贿赂，当时麦克纳马拉兄弟轰炸了洛杉矶时报。

It's a fascinating book.Geoff uncovered a lot of information that the previous biographies of Darrow didn't have.I think you'd enjoy that. 这是一本引人入胜的书。杰夫发现了许多以前的达罗传记所没有的信息。我想你会喜欢的。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I very much enjoyed Connie Bruck’s biography Master of the Game, which was a biography of Steve Ross, who headed Warner and later was, what, co-chairman of Time Warner. CHARLIE MUNGER ：嗯，我非常喜欢康妮布鲁克的传记大师，这是史蒂夫罗斯的传记，他领导华纳，后来成为时代华纳的联合主席。 WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, he’s a little more than co-chairman.(Laughs) WARREN BUFFETT：是的，他比联合主席多一点。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, and — she's a very insightful writer and it's a very interesting story. CHARLIE MUNGER：是的，而且 - 她是一位非常有见地的作家，这是一个非常有趣的故事。

I am rereading a book I really like, which is Van Doren's biography of Benjamin Franklin, which came out in 1952, and I'd almost forgotten how good a book it was.And that's available in paperback everywhere.We’ve never had anybody quite like Franklin in this country.Never again. 我正在重读一本我非常喜欢的书，这是范多伦在1952年出版的本杰明富兰克林的传记，我几乎忘记了这本书有多好。这在各地都有平装本。在这个国家，我们从未有过像富兰克林那样的人。再也不。

WARREN BUFFETT: He believed in compound interest, too, incidentally, as you may remember. (Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：顺便提一下，他也相信复利，你可能还记得。（笑声）

What did he — he set up those two little funds, one in Philadelphia, one in Boston? 他做了什么 - 他设立了这两个小资金，一个在费城，一个在波士顿？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Right. CHARLIE MUNGER：对。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, to demonstrate the advantages of compound interest.I think that's the part Charlie's rereading.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：是的，要证明复利的优势。我认为那是查理重读的部分。（笑声）

38. Nike and Reebok 38.耐克和锐步

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2. WARREN BUFFETT：第2区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you for teaching me — teaching so much to all of us about business.My name is Mike Assail (PH) from New York City. 听众会员：感谢您教我 - 为我们所有人讲授生意。我的名字是来自纽约市的Mike Assail（PH）。

You mentioned earlier that Berkshire’s shoe business was great, but that other shoe businesses were not so good. 你之前提到伯克希尔的鞋业很棒，但其他鞋业并不是那么好。

What are the uncertainties of the global brand leaders that Berkshire seems to like?They like Coke and Gillette.The global brand leaders in the shoe business being Nike and Reebok. 伯克希尔似乎喜欢全球品牌领导者的不确定性有哪些？他们喜欢可口可乐和吉列。鞋业的全球品牌领导者是耐克和锐步。

What are their uncertainties, in terms of long-term competitive advantage, business economics, consumer behavior, and the other risk factors that you mentioned in the annual report this year? Thank you. 在长期竞争优势，商业经济学，消费者行为以及您今年年度报告中提到的其他风险因素方面，他们的不确定性是什么？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: So, you're really asking about the future prospects of Nike and Reebok? WARREN BUFFETT：那么，您真的在询问耐克和锐步的未来前景吗？

Yeah.I don't know that much about those businesses.We do have one person in this audience, at least, who owns a lot of Reebok.

是啊。我对这些业务知之甚少。我们确实在这个观众中有一个人，至少他拥有很多锐步。

But I am not expressing a negative view in any way on that.I just — I don't understand that — I don't understand their competitive position and the likelihood of permanence of their competitive position over a 10 or 20 year period as well as I think I understand the position of Brown and Dexter. 但我并没有以任何方式表达负面看法。我只是 - 我不明白 - 我不理解他们的竞争地位以及他们在10年或20年期间保持竞争地位的可能性以及我认为我理解布朗和德克斯特的立场。

That doesn't mean I think that it's inferior.Doesn't mean I think that we've got better businesses or anything. 这并不意味着我认为它是劣等的。并不意味着我认为我们有更好的业务或任何东西。

I think we've got very good businesses.But I — I'm not — I haven't done the work and I'm not sure if I did the work I would understand them. 我认为我们的业务非常好。但我 - 我不是 - 我没有完成工作，我不确定我是否做了我理解他们的工作。

I think they are harder to understand, frankly, and to develop a ﬁx on, than our kinds.But, they may be easier for other people who just have a better insight into that kind of business. 我认为，坦率地说，他们更难理解，并且比我们的种类更难以理解。但是，对于那些只是更好地了解这类业务的人来说，它们可能更容易。

39. "You don't have to do exceptional things to get exceptional results" 39.“你不需要做出特殊的事情来获得特殊的结果”

WARREN BUFFETT: Some businesses are a lot easier to understand than others.And Charlie and I don't like difﬁcult problems.I mean, we — if something is hard to ﬁgure, you know, we’d rather multiply by three than by pi.I mean it's just easier for us.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：有些企业比其他企业更容易理解。查理和我不喜欢困难的问题。我的意思是，我们 - 如果有什么事情难以理解，你知道，我们宁愿乘以三而不是pi。我的意思是它对我们来说更容易。（笑声）

Charlie, you have any —? 查理，你有什么 - ？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, that is such an obvious point.And yet so many people think if they just hire somebody with the appropriate labels they can do something very difﬁcult.That is one of the most dangerous ideas a human being can have. CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，这是一个非常明显的观点。然而，如此多的人认为，如果他们只是雇用一个拥有适当标签的人，他们就可以做一些非常困难的事情。这是人类可以拥有的最危险的想法之一。

All kinds of things just intrinsically create problems.The other day I was dealing with a problem and I said, this thing — it's a new building — and I said this thing has three things I've learned to fear: an architect, a contractor, and a hill.(Laughter) 各种各样的东西本质上都会产生问题。有一天我正在处理一个问题而且我说，这件事 - 这是一幢新建筑 - 我说这件事有三件让我学会害怕的事情：建筑师，承包商和山丘。（笑声）

And — if you go at life like that, I think you, at least, make fewer mistakes than people who think they can do anything by just hiring somebody with a label. 并且 - 如果你像那样去生活，我认为你至少比那些认为他们可以通过雇用带有标签的人做任何事情的人犯的错误更少。 WARREN BUFFETT: We don't comment — excuse me, go ahead. WARREN BUFFETT：我们不予置评 - 请原谅，继续吧。

CHARLIE MUNGER: You don’t have to hire out your thinking if you keep it simple. CHARLIE MUNGER：如果你保持简单，你就不必考虑你的想法。

WARREN BUFFETT: You don't have to do — we've said this before — but you don't have to do exceptional things to get exceptional results. WARREN BUFFETT：您不必这样做 - 我们之前已经说过 - 但您不必做出特殊的事情就可以获得非凡的效果。

And some people think that if you jump over a seven-foot bar that the ribbon they pin on you is going to be worth more money than if you step over a one-foot bar.And it just isn't true in the investment world, at all. 而且有些人认为，如果你跳过一个7英尺长的酒吧，那么他们钉在你身上的缎带比你跨过一英尺的酒吧更有价值。而在投资领域根本就不是这样。

So, you can do very ordinary things.I mean, what is complicated about this?But, you know, we're $3 billion pretax better off than we were a few years ago because of it. 所以，你可以做很普通的事情。我的意思是，这有什么复杂的？但是，你知道，由于这个原因，我们的税前收入比几年前好30亿美元。

There’s nothing that I know about that product, or its distribution system, its ﬁnances, or anything, that, really, hundreds of thousands — or millions — of people aren't capable of, that they don't already know.They just don't do anything about it. 关于那个产品，或者它的分销系统，它的财务状况，或者其他任何东西，我真的不知道，他们还不知道，这些东西真的是数十万甚至数百万人无法做到的。他们只是对此无所作为。

And similarly, if you get into some complicated business, you can get a report that's a thousand pages thick and you got Ph.D.s working on it, but it doesn't mean anything. 同样地，如果你进入一些复杂的业务，你可以得到一个厚达一千页的报告，你有博士学位，但这并不意味着什么。

You know, what you've got is a report but you don't — it — you won't understand that business, what it's going to look like in 10 or 15 years. 你知道，你得到的是一份报告，但你没有 - 它 - 你不会理解这项业务，它会在10年或15年后看起来像什么。

The big thing to do is avoid being wrong.(Laughter) 最重要的是避免错误。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: There are some things that are so intrinsically dangerous.Another of my heroes is Mark Twain, who looked at the promoters of his day and he said, "A mine is a hole in the ground owned by a liar."(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：有些事情本质上是危险的。我的另一位英雄是马克吐温，他看着他那个时代的推动者，他说：“我的是一个骗子所拥有的地洞。” （笑声）

And that's the way I've come to look at projections.I mean, basically, I can remember, Warren and I were offered $2 million worth of projections once in the course of buying a business and the book was this thick. 这就是我看待预测的方式。我的意思是，基本上，我记得，在购买一家公司的过程中，沃伦和我获得了价值200万美元的预测，这本书很厚。

WARREN BUFFETT: For nothing. WARREN BUFFETT：什么都没有。 CHARLIE MUNGER: And, if we were given it for nothing, and we wouldn’t open it. CHARLIE MUNGER：而且，如果我们一无所获，我们就不会打开它。

WARREN BUFFETT: We almost paid 2 million not to look at it.(Laughter) 沃伦巴菲特：我们几乎要付200万不要看它。（笑声）

It’s ridiculous.I do not understand why any buyer of a business looks at a bunch of projections put together by a seller or — 这太荒谬了。我不明白为什么任何一家企业的买家都会看到卖家组成的一堆预测或 -

CHARLIE MUNGER: Or his agent. CHARLIE MUNGER：或他的经纪人。

WARREN BUFFETT: — or his agent. WARREN BUFFETT： - 或他的经纪人。

I mean, it — you can almost say that it's naive to think that that has any utility whatsoever.We just are not interested. 我的意思是，它 - 你几乎可以说，认为它有任何实用性是天真的。我们只是不感兴趣。

If we don't have some idea ourselves of what we think the future is, to sit there and listen to some other guy who's trying to sell us the business or get a commission on it tell us what the future's going to be — it —like I say, it's very naïve. 如果我们不了解我们对未来的看法，那就坐在那里听一些其他人试图向我们出售业务或获得佣金告诉我们未来会是什么 - 它 - 就像我说的，这很天真。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, and ﬁve years out. CHARLIE MUNGER：是的，还有五年了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.We had a line in the report one time, "Don't ask the barber whether you need a haircut."And — (laughter) — it's quite applicable to projections of — by sellers — of businesses. WARREN BUFFETT ：是的。我们在报告中有一句话，“不要问理发师你是否需要理发。”并且 - （笑） - 它非常适用于 - 卖家 - 对企业的预测。

40. Cutting USAir's costs will be "enormously tough" 削减USAir的成本将“非常艰难”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3. WARREN BUFFETT：第3区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, Greg Elright (PH) from Washington, DC. 听众：来自华盛顿特区的巴菲特先生，Greg Elright（PH）。

In the last year, United Airlines and Northwest have resolved some of their ﬁnancial problems by moving ownership over to the employees. 去年，联合航空公司和西北航空通过将所有权转移给员工解决了一些财务问题。

With USAir’s current positions — uh, problems — what do you see as occurring with USAir and do you see any movement toward employee ownership?And how will that affect Berkshire's interest in the company? 随着USAir目前的职位 - 呃，问题 - 您认为与USAir有什么关系，您是否看到了员工所有权的变化？这将如何影响伯克希尔对公司的兴趣？

WARREN BUFFETT: USAir has a cost structure which is non-viable in today's airline business.Now that, in an important way, involves its labor cost, but it involves other things, too.But it certainly involves its labor costs. WARREN BUFFETT：USAir 的成本结构在当今的航空业务中是不可行的。现在，以一种重要的方式，涉及其劳动力成本，但它也涉及其他事项。但它肯定涉及其劳动力成本。

And they've stated this publicly.And I think — and they have — they are talking with their unions about it and they're talking with other people about other parts of their cost structure. 他们已经公开表明了这一点。我认为 - 他们有 - 他们正在与他们的工会讨论这个问题，而且他们正在与其他人谈论他们成本结构的其他部分。

And I think you'll just see what unfolds in the next relatively few months, because there isn’t any question that the cost structure is out of line.I think the cost structure could be brought into line.But whether it will be brought into line or not is another is another question. 而且我认为你会看到在接下来的几个月里会发生什么，因为毫无疑问，成本结构是不合时宜的。我认为可以将成本结构纳入考虑范围。但是，它是否会成为另一个问题是另一个问题。

And, looking backwards, the answer is not to get into businesses that need to solve problems like that.It’s to — but — that was a mistake I made. 而且，向后看，答案不是进入需要解决这类问题的企业。这是 - 但是 - 这是我犯的错误。

And I think in Seth Schoﬁeld you've got a manager who understands that business extremely well, who probably is as — in my view, anyway — is as well regarded and trusted by people who are going to have to make changes as anyone could bein that position.But that may not be enough.I mean that — there's enormous tensions when you need to take hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollars out of the cost structure of any business. 而且我认为在Seth Schoﬁeld，你有一位非常了解这项业务的经理，在我看来，他可能也是如此 - 无论如何，这些人都必须做出改变，因为他们必须做出改变。在那个位置。但这可能还不够。我的意思是 - 当您需要从任何业务的成本结构中获取数亿和数亿美元时，存在巨大的紧张局势。

And when you need cooperative action, all by various groups, each one of which feels that maybe they're having to give a little more than some other group, and understandably feels that way, you know that is an enormously tough negotiating job. 当你需要合作行动时，所有人都会受到各种团体的欢迎，他们每个人都认为他们可能需要比其他一些团体更多一点，并且可以理解的是，你知道这是一项非常艰难的谈判工作。

I think Seth is as well-equipped for that as anyone.But I would not want to — you know, I cannot predict the outcome. 我认为Seth和其他人一样装备精良。但我不想 - 你知道，我无法预测结果。

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, do you —? WARREN BUFFETT：查理，你呢？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if I were a union leader, I would give Seth whatever he wants because he's not the kind of a fellow who would ask for more than he needs.And, it's perfectly obvious that’s the correct decision on the labor side.But whether the obvious will be done or not is in the lap of the gods. CHARLIE MUNGER：好吧，如果我是工会领导人，我会给Seth任何他想要的东西，因为他不是那种要求超出他需要的人。并且，很明显，这是劳动方面的正确决定。但是，显而易见的事情是否会在神的圈中。

WARREN BUFFETT: It's a lot of people with a lot of different motivations and, I mean, those are really tough questions.I mean, we — Charlie and I've been involved in that sort of thing a few times and frequently it works out, but it's not preordained. WARREN BUFFETT：很多人有很多不同的动机，我的意思是，这些都是非常棘手的问题。我的意思是，我们 - 查理和我曾经多次参与过这类事情并经常发挥作用，但这并不是预先确定的。 41. We're "not in any hurry" to retire 我们“不急”退休

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4. WARREN BUFFETT：第4区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Sheldon Scizick (PH) from Chicago, Illinois.I have two questions. 听众：我的名字是来自伊利诺伊州芝加哥的Sheldon Scizick（PH）。我有两个问题。

The ﬁrst one is concerning Mr. Munger.We know what Mr. Buffett's retirement plans are.I was wondering what yours — your plans for the future concerning Berkshire are? 第一个是关于芒格先生。我们知道巴菲特的退休计划是什么。我想知道你的是什么 - 你对伯克希尔的未来计划是什么？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I have always preferred the system of retirement where you can't quite tell from observing from the outside whether the man is working or retired.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：我一直偏爱退休制度，你无法从外面观察这个人是在工作还是退休。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: He does it well, too.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：他也做得很好。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: You know, a problem in many businesses, particularly the more bureaucratic ones, is that your employees retire, but they don't tell you.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：你知道，许多企业的问题，特别是官僚主义的问题，是你的员工退休，但他们没有告诉你。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I think I can speak for Charlie on this one. WARREN BUFFETT：我想我可以在这个问题上为查理发言。

Charlie and I are not in any hurry to retire.He's trying to outlast me, actually.(Laughter) 查理和我并不急于退休。实际上，他试图比我更长寿。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. 听众会员：谢谢。

42. Berkshire sold some Cap Cities shares in tender offer 42.伯克希尔以收购要约出售了一些Cap Cities股票

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My second question is, I was just curious why you sold a portion of Cap Cities? 观众成员：我的第二个问题是，我只是好奇为什么你卖掉一部分Cap Cities？

WARREN BUFFETT: We thought that — we thought it was a good idea for Cap Cities to have a tender offer.They had cash that we thought that they could not use in any — they were not likely to be able to use — in a better way than repurchasing their own shares because they do have some very good businesses. WARREN BUFFETT：我们认为 - 我们认为对Cap Cities来说是个好主意。他们有现金，我们认为他们不能使用 - 他们不太可能使用 - 以比回购自己的股票更好的方式，因为他们确实有一些非常好的业务。

They, and we, felt that a tender offer would not be successful, in terms of attracting a number of shares unless Berkshire were tendering.We felt the price was reasonable to tender at.

他们和我们认为，除非伯克希尔公司招标，否则在收购大量股票方面收购要约不会成功。我们认为价格是合理的。

It turned out that the business was getting stronger during that period and various things were happening in media, so there were only 100,000 shares or so tendered outside of our million.That isn't necessarily what we thought was going to happen going in, but that is what happened. 事实证明，在此期间业务变得越来越强大，媒体也发生了各种各样的事情，因此只有100,000 股或者超过百万股。这不一定是我们认为会发生的事情，但这就是发生的事情。

It's acceptable to us, but that doesn't mean that it was the desired outcome.We would not have tendered all of our shares or anything of the sort. 这对我们来说是可以接受的，但这并不意味着它是理想的结果。我们不会提交我们所有的股票或任何类似的东西。

We want to remain a substantial shareholder of Cap Cities.We've always — most of the time we favored Cap Cities buying in its stock and it's bought in a fair amount of stock since the ABC merger took place in 19 — started in 1986. 我们希望继续成为Cap Cities的主要股东。我们总是 - 大部分时间我们都赞成Cap Cities购买其股票，并且自1986年ABC合并发生以来，它已经在相当数量的股票中购买 - 始于1986年。

43. Structured settlements business isn't big, but is "perfectly satisfactory" 43.结构性定居点业务不大，但“完全令人满意”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5. WARREN BUFFETT：第5区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning.My name is Matt Voke (PH).I'm from Omaha. 听众：早上好。我的名字是Matt Voke（PH）。我来自奥马哈。

In last year's meeting you made reference to structured settlements.I was wondering, how is that business progressing for you? 在去年的会议上，你提到了结构化的解决方案。我想知道，你的业务进展如何？

WARREN BUFFETT: Question's about the structured settlement business, which is a business in which Berkshire guarantees, in effect, an annuity to some claimant of another — usually — of another insurance company, who suffered an injury and instead of getting a lump sum now wantsto get a stream of payments over many years in the future, sometimes going out 75 years. WARREN BUFFETT：关于结构性结算业务的问题，伯克希尔实际上向另一家保险公司的某些索赔人保证年金 - 通常是另一家保险公司，他们受了伤，而不是现在想要一次性付款在未来多年获得一笔付款，有时会超过75年。

We have set up a life company to do that business.We formerly did it all through our property- casualty companies.And, we have done some business, but it's not been a big business yet, and it may never be a big business. 我们成立了一家生活公司来做这项业务。我们以前通过我们的财产保险公司做到了这一切。而且，我们已经做了一些业务，但它还不是一项大生意，它可能永远不会是一项大生意。

It's a perfectly satisfactory business, but it's not an important item at present in the analysis of Berkshire's value. 这是一项非常令人满意的业务，但目前在分析伯克希尔的价值方面并不是一个重要的项目。

Are you getting — having a problem with sound out there on this or no?Just — no? 你有没有 - 在这个或没有声音问题？就是不行？ 44. No comment on Wrigley 44.对箭牌没有评论

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6. WARREN BUFFETT：第6区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is David Samra.I’m from San Francisco, California. 听众：我的名字是David Samra。我来自加州旧金山。

In your annual report, I noticed you mention Wrigley as being a company that has worldwide dominance, somewhat like Coca-Cola and Gillette.And, was curious to know if you had looked at the company in any detail.And, if so, whether or not — if you decided not to invest, what were the reasons why? 在你的年度报告中，我注意到你提到瑞格利是一家拥有全球统治地位的公司，有点像可口可乐和吉列。而且，很想知道你是否已经详细查看了公司。如果是这样，是否 - 如果你决定不投资，原因是什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we wouldn’t want to comment on a company like that because we might or might not be buying it.We might or might not be selling it.We might or might not buy or sell it in the future.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT ：嗯，我们不想对这样的公司发表评论，因为我们可能会或可能不会购买它。我们可能会或可能不会出售它。我们将来可能会或可能不会购买或出售它。（笑声）

And, since it falls under that narrow deﬁnition of things that we don't talk about — 而且，因为它属于我们不谈论的那些狭隘的定义 -

It's a good illustration of a company that has a high market share worldwide, but you can understand the Wrigley Company just as well as I can.I have no insights in the — into the Wrigley Company that you wouldn't have and I don't — I wouldn't want to go beyond that in giving you our evaluation of the company. 这是一家在全球拥有较高市场份额的公司的良好例证，但您可以尽我所能了解箭牌公司。我对箭牌公司没有任何见解，你不会有我不会 - 我不想超越这一点来给你我们对公司的评价。

I hate to disappoint you on those, but on speciﬁc securities, we are not too forthcoming sometimes. 我不想让你失望，但对于特定的证券，我们有时并不太乐观。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I'm good at not being forthcoming.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：我很擅长不来。（笑声）

45. "No speciﬁc desire" to buy companies in certain parts of the world 45.“没有特别的愿望”来购买世界某些地方的公司

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 7. WARREN BUFFETT：第7区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, Kathleen Ambrose (PH) from Omaha. 听众：巴菲特先生，来自奥马哈的凯瑟琳安布罗斯（PH）。

I have a question regarding global diversification.Just in general, what do you look for in a company and, if so, as far as Europe or Latin America, if you'd like to be specific? 我有一个关于全球多样化的问题。总的来说，你在公司中寻找什么，如果是这样的话，就欧洲或拉丁美洲而言，如果你想要具体的话？ WARREN BUFFETT: The question is about global diversification. WARREN BUFFETT：问题是关于全球多样化。

All we want to be in is businesses that we understand, run by people that we like, and priced attractively compared to the future prospects. 我们想要的就是我们理解的业务，由我们喜欢的人经营，与未来前景相比具有吸引力。

So, there is no speciﬁc desire to either be in the rest of Europe, or the rest of the world, or Far East, or to avoid it. 因此，没有特别的愿望要么在欧洲其他地区，或世界其他地方，或远东，或避免它。

It's simply a factor that — it’s not a big factor.There may be more chances for growth in some countries. 这只是一个因素 - 它不是一个重要因素。一些国家可能有更多的增长机会。

We — 80 percent of Coca-Cola's earnings, roughly, will come from outside the United States.Eighty percent of Guinness’s earnings will come from outside the United States, but they’re domiciled outside the United States, whereas Coca-Cola is domiciled here. 我们 - 可口可乐公司80％的收入大致来自美国以外的地区。吉尼斯百分之八十的收入将来自美国以外的地区，但它们的居住地位于美国境外，而可口可乐的收入则来自美国。

Certainly, in many cases, there are markets outside the United States that have way better prospects for growth than the U.S. market would have, but they probably have some other risks to them that this market may not have. 当然，在许多情况下，美国以外的市场有比美国市场更好的增长前景，但他们可能还有一些其他市场可能没有的风险。

But, we, you know, we like the international prospects, obviously, of a company like Coke.We like the international prospects of a company like Gillette.Gillette earned 70 percent of its money outside this country. 但是，我们，你知道，我们喜欢可口可乐这样的公司的国际前景。我们喜欢像吉列这样的公司的国际前景。吉列在这个国家以外赚了70％的钱。

So, if you look — on a look-through basis — Coke — we might this year get something like $150 million of earnings, indirectly, for Berkshire's interest from the rest of the world just through Coca- Cola alone. 所以，如果你看一下 - 可见 - 可口可乐 - 今年我们可能会间接地通过可口可乐公司从伯克希尔的利益中获得1.5亿美元的收益。

But, we don't make any speciﬁc — we don't think in terms of, I like this region so I want to be there or something of a sort. 但是，我们没有具体说明 - 我们没有考虑，我喜欢这个地区所以我想要在那里或某种类型。

It’s something that's speciﬁc to the companies we're looking at, then we'll try to evaluate that. 这是我们正在关注的公司所特有的，然后我们会尝试对此进行评估。

Coke is expanding in China.Well, it — you know — I think that — I forget what they showed last year, maybe 38 percent growth, or something like that, in cases.Maybe — 可口可乐正在中国扩张。嗯，它 - 你知道 - 我认为 - 我忘了他们去年所展示的，可能是38％的增长，或类似的情况。也许 -

It's nice to have markets like that that are relatively untapped. 拥有相对未开发的市场真是太好了。

Actually, Gillette is expanding in China in a big way and the Chinese don't shave as often.And more of them are what they call "dry shavers" than "wet shavers" there, which is electric shavers. 实际上，吉列正在中国大举扩张，中国人不会经常刮胡子。其中更多的是他们所谓的“干式剃须刀”而不是“湿式剃须刀”，那就是电动剃须刀。

But you know, maybe we could stick something in the Coke that would — (laughter) 但是你知道，也许我们可以在可口可乐中添加一些东西 - （笑声）

Maybe a little synergy at Berkshire, ﬁnally.Who knows? 最后，伯克希尔可能会有一点协同作用。谁知道？

46. Hurricanes are bigger insurance risk than riots 46.飓风比骚乱的保险风险更大

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1. WARREN BUFFETT：第1区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning.I'm Marshall Patton (PH) from Bandera, Texas. 听众：早上好。我是来自德克萨斯州班德拉的Marshall Patton（PH）。

And back to the insurance losses.What is the comparison between natural disasters, such as the earthquake, and so on, and the LA riots? 并回到保险损失。地震等自然灾害与洛杉矶骚乱之间的比较是什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I'm not sure what the connection — WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我不确定连接是什么 -

They, you know, they obviously can both lead to super-cats that we insure against, because if there is enough insured damage, it's likely to trigger a payment under some of our policies. 他们，你知道，他们显然都可以导致我们投保的超级猫，因为如果有足够的保险损失，它可能会触发我们的一些政策下的付款。

It would take some really big riot damage to get to our levels, because normally we don't kick in now until an event gets up to at least, you know, $5 billion or so of insured damage under a very large majority of our policies. 要达到我们的水平会受到一些非常大的骚乱伤害，因为通常我们现在不会开始，直到事件达到至少，你知道，在我们绝大多数政策下，保险损失达到50亿美元左右。

Something like a quake causes a fair amount of damage that is not insured, because of the extent that it's highways and things of that sort, public buildings.A lot of that is not insured. 像地震这样的东西会导致相当大的损失，而不是保险，因为这是公路建筑的高速公路和类似的东西。其中很多都没有投保。

But you get interesting questions on this.Usually we insure an event, but what's an event?If you go back to the riots that occurred after Martin Luther King was shot, you had riots in dozens of cities. 但是你会对此提出有趣的问题。通常我们会为活动投保，但是什么是活动？如果你回到马丁路德金被枪杀后发生的骚乱，你就会在几十个城市发生骚乱。

Is that one event or is that a multiple number of events?I mean, it was started by different people, but maybe arising from a common cause.Some of those things aren't actually very well-defined, even after hundreds of years of insurance law and custom, the experience of that.But I would say that rioting is very unlikely to get to a level that triggers our policy. 是一个事件还是多个事件？我的意思是，它是由不同的人开始的，但可能是由一个共同的原因引起的。即使经过数百年的保险法和风俗习惯，其中一些事情实际上并没有很明确的定义。但我会说骚乱不太可能达到触发我们政策的水平。 The big risks we face are quake and hurricanes, and hurricanes are a more significant risk than quake.They call them typhoons in the Pacific Ocean. 我们面临的巨大风险是地震和飓风，飓风比地震更具风险。他们称他们为太平洋的台风。

But floods, tremendous damage from floods last year.But basically there's not a lot of private flood insurance bought, so the insured losses do not get large. 但洪水，去年洪水造成的巨大破坏。但基本上并没有购买很多私人洪水保险，因此保险损失并不大。

Just watch the Weather Channel.(Laughter) 只需看天气频道。（笑声）

47. Why we have no short-term opinion on stocks 47.为什么我们对股票没有短期意见

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2. WARREN BUFFETT：第2区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Diane West (PH) from Corona Del Mar, California. 听众：来自加利福尼亚州Corona Del Mar的Diane West（PH）。

I know, Mr. Buffett, that you said that you don't read what other people say about the market or the economy, but do either you or Charlie have an opinion about how you think things are going to go? Are you bullish or bearish? 我知道，巴菲特先生，你说过你没有读过其他人对市场或经济的看法，但你或者查理对你认为事情的发展方向有看法吗？你看涨还是看跌？

WARREN BUFFETT: You may have trouble believing this, but Charlie and I never have an opinion about the market because it wouldn't be any good and it might interfere with the opinions we have that are good.(Laughter) 沃伦巴菲特：你可能很难相信这一点，但查理和我从来没有对市场有任何意见，因为它不会有任何好处，它可能会干扰我们的好意见。（笑声）

If we're right about a business, if we think a business is attractive, it would be very foolish for us to not take action on that because we thought something about what the market was going to do, or anything of that sort. 如果我们对一个企业是正确的，如果我们认为一个企业是有吸引力的，那么对我们不采取行动将是非常愚蠢的，因为我们想到市场将会做什么，或者任何类似的东西。

Because we just don't know.And to give up something that you do know and that is proﬁtable for something that you don't know and won't know because of that, it just doesn't make any sense to us, and it doesn't really make any differenceto us. 因为我们只是不知道。并放弃你所知道的东西，这对于你不知道但不会因此而知道的东西是有利可图的，它对我们没有任何意义，并没有什么区别对我们

I mean, I bought my ﬁrst stock in, probably, April of 1942 when I was 11. And since then, I mean, actually World War II didn't look so good at that time.I mean, the prospects, they really didn't.I mean, you know, we were not doing well in the Paciﬁc.I'm not sure I calculated that into my purchase of my three shares.(Laughter) 我的意思是，我买了我的第一支股票，可能是1942年4月我11岁。从那时起，我的意思是，实际上第二次世界大战当时看起来并不那么好。我的意思是，前景，他们真的没有。我的意思是，你知道，我们在太平洋地区表现不佳。我不确定我在购买三股股票时的计算方法。（笑声）

But I mean, just think of all the things that have happened since then, you know?Atomic weapons and major wars, presidents resigning, and all kinds of things, massive inﬂation at certain times.

但我的意思是，只要想想从那以后发生的所有事情，你知道吗？原子武器和主要战争，总统辞职，以及各种事情，特定时期的大规模通货膨胀。

To give up what you're doing well because of guesses about what's going to happen in some macro way just doesn't make any sense to us.The best thing that can happen from Berkshire's standpoint — we don't wish this on anybody — but is that over time is to have markets that go down a tremendous amount. 放弃你正在做的事情，因为猜测将会以某种宏观的方式发生什么，这对我们没有任何意义。从伯克希尔的角度来看，最好的事情就是这样 - 我们不希望任何人这样做 - 但随着时间的推移，市场会出现大幅下跌。

I mean, we are going to be buyers of things over time.And if you're going to be buyers of groceries over time, you like grocery prices to go down.If you're going to be buying cars over time, you like car prices to go down. 我的意思是，随着时间的推移，我们将成为买家。如果你随着时间的推移成为杂货买家，你会喜欢杂货价格下跌。如果你随着时间的推移购买汽车，你会喜欢汽车价格下跌。

We buy businesses.We buy pieces of businesses: stocks.And we're going to be much better off if we can buy those things at an attractive price than if we can't. 我们买商家。我们购买的商品：股票。如果我们能以有吸引力的价格购买这些东西，那么我们将会好得多。

So we don't have any fear at all.I mean, what we fear is an irrational bull market that's sustained for some long period of time. 所以我们根本没有任何恐惧。我的意思是，我们担心的是一个持续很长一段时间的非理性牛市。

You, as shareholders of Berkshire, unless you own your shares on borrowed money or are going to sell them in a very short period of time, are better off if stocks get cheaper, because it means that we can be doing more intelligent things on yourbehalf than would be the case otherwise. 你作为伯克希尔的股东，除非你用借来的钱拥有你的股票，或者打算在很短的时间内卖掉它们，如果股票价格变得更便宜，你会更好，因为这意味着我们可以做更多智能的事情。代表不是这样的情况。

But we have no idea what — and we wouldn't care what anybody thought about it.I mean, most of all ourselves.(Laughter) 但是我们不知道是什么 - 而且我们不会在乎任何人的想法。我的意思是，最重要的是我们自己。（笑声）

Charlie, do you have anything? 查理，你有什么事吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. I think the — if you're agnostic about those macro factors and therefore devote all your time to thinking about the individual businesses and the individual opportunities, it's just, it's a way more efﬁcient way to behave, at least withour particular talents and lacks thereof. CHARLIE MUNGER：不，我认为 - 如果你对这些宏观因素不可知，因此把所有时间都花在思考个体业务和个人机会上，那就是，这是一种更有效的行为方式，至少与我们的特殊才能和缺乏。

WARREN BUFFETT: If you're right about the businesses, you'll end up doing ﬁne. WARREN BUFFETT：如果你对这些企业是正确的，你最终会做得很好。

We don't know, and we don't think about when something will happen.We think about what will happen.It's fairly, it's not so difficult to figure out what will happen.It's impossible, in our view, to figure out when it will happen.So we focus on what will happen. 我们不知道，我们不会考虑什么时候会发生什么。我们考虑会发生什么。这是公平的，要弄清楚会发生什么并不是那么困难。在我们看来，我们不可能弄清楚它何时会发生。所以我们关注将要发生的事情。 This company in 1890 or thereabouts, the whole company sold for $2,000.It's got a market value now of about 50-odd-billion, you know? 该公司于1890年左右在全公司售出2000 美元。现在它的市场价值约为50亿亿，你知道吗？

Somebody could've said to the fellow who was buying this in 1890, you know, "You're going to have a couple of great World Wars, and you know, you'll have the panic of 1907, all these things will happen. And wouldn't it be a better idea to wait?"(Laughter) 有人可以对那些在1890年买这个的人说过，你知道，“你将会有一些伟大的世界大战，你知道，你会有1907年的恐慌，所有这些都会发生那等待不是更好的主意吗？“ （笑声）

We can't afford that mistake, basically.Yeah. 基本上我们承担不起这个错误。是啊。

48. We'd rather buy an entire company, but stocks offer more bargains 我们宁愿买一整套公司，但股票提供更多便宜货

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3. WARREN BUFFETT：第3区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, last year — I'm Tim Medley from Jackson, Mississippi — last year the question was asked about your preference for purchasing entire businesses versus parts of public companies. 观众：巴菲特先生，芒格先生，去年 - 我是来自密西西比州杰克逊的蒂姆梅德利 - 去年有人询问你是否愿意购买整个企业与部分上市公司。

You mentioned you prefer to buy private businesses because of the tax advantages and your attraction to the people in those businesses. 你提到你更喜欢购买私人企业，因为税收优惠和你对这些企业的人们的吸引力。

Are you ﬁnding today that there are better purchases within the private market versus in the public securities market? 您今天发现私人市场和公共证券市场的购买量是否更好？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would answer that no. WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我会回答不。

We do not — we very seldom ﬁnd something to buy on a negotiated basis for an entire business.We have certain size requirements.A big limiting factor is it has to be something we can understand.I mean, that eliminates 95 percent of the businesses. 我们不这样做 - 我们很少在谈判的基础上为整个企业找到要买的东西。我们有一定的尺寸要求。一个很大的限制因素是它必须是我们能够理解的东西。我的意思是，这消除了95％的业务。

And we don't pay any attention to them, but we get lots of proposals for things that just are totally outside the boundaries of what we've already said we're interested in. 我们并没有对它们给予任何关注，但是我们得到了许多建议，这些建议完全超出了我们已经说过我们感兴趣的范围。

We prefer to buy entire businesses, or 80 percent or greater interest in businesses, partly for the tax reasons you mentioned, and frankly, we like it better.We just, it's the kind of business we would like to build if we had our absolute druthers on it. 我们更倾向于购买整个企业，或80％或更高的企业利益，部分原因是您提到的税收原因，坦率地说，我们更喜欢它。我们只是，如果我们有绝对的笨蛋，那就是我们想要建立的那种业务。

Counter to that is we can usually get more for our money in wonderful businesses, in terms of buying little pieces of them in the market, because the market is far more inefﬁcient in pricing businesses than is the negotiated market. 与此相反的是，我们通常可以在精彩的业务中获得更多的资金，在市场上购买其中的一小部分，因为市场在定价业务方面的效率低于谈判市场。

You're not going to buy any bargains, and I mean, you shouldn't even approach the idea of buying a bargain in a negotiated purchase. 你不打算购买任何便宜货，我的意思是，你甚至不应该在谈判购买时购买便宜货。

You want to buy it from people who are going to run it for you.You want to buy it from people who are intelligent enough to price their business properly, and they are.I mean, that's the way things are. 你想从想要为你运行它的人那里购买它。你想从聪明到足以为他们的业务定价的人那里购买它，而且他们是。我的意思是，事情就是这样。

The market does not do that.The market — in the stock market, you get a chance to buy businesses at foolish prices, and that is why we end up with a lot of money in marketable securities. 市场不这样做。市场 - 在股票市场上，你有机会以愚蠢的价格购买商业，这就是为什么我们最终会在有价证券中获得大量资金。

If we absolutely had our choice, we would own a group of — we would own three times the number of businesses we own outright. 如果我们完全有自己的选择，我们将拥有一组 - 我们拥有的公司数量是我们拥有的公司数量的三倍。

We're unlikely to get that opportunity over time, but periodically we'll get the chance to ﬁnd something that ﬁts our test. 我们不太可能随着时间的推移获得这个机会，但我们会定期找到适合我们测试的东西。

And in between we will, when the market offers us the right prices, we will buy more, either businesses we already own pieces of, or we'll buy one or two new ones.Something's usually going on. 在我们之间，当市场为我们提供合适的价格时，我们会购买更多，我们已经拥有的商品，或者我们会购买一两个新商品。通常会发生一些事情。

There are tax advantages to owning all of them, but that's more than offset by the fact that you'll never get a chance to buy the whole Coca-Cola Company or the whole Gillette company. 拥有所有这些都有税收优惠，但这远远超过了你永远不会有机会购买整个可口可乐公司或整个吉列公司的事实。

I mean, businesses like that, sensational businesses, are just not available.Sometimes you get a chance to make a sensible purchase in the market of such businesses. 我的意思是，像这样的企业，耸人听闻的企业，只是没有。有时您有机会在此类业务的市场中进行明智的购买。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think that's exactly right.And if you stop to think about it, if a hundred percent of a business is for sale, you've got — the average corporate buyer is being run by people who have the mindset of people buying with somebody else's money.And we have the mindset of people buying with our own money. CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，我认为这是完全正确的。如果你停下来思考它，如果百分之百的业务是出售的，你就得到了 - 一般的公司买家是由那些有人用他人的钱购买的心态的人经营的。我们有自己用自己的钱购买的心态。 And there's also a class of buyers for a hundred percent of businesses who are basically able and assured ﬁnancial promoters.I'm talking about the leveraged buyout funds and so on. 而且，对于百分之百的基本能干且有保证的金融推动者的企业，也有一类买家。我在谈论杠杆收购基金等等。

And those people tend to have the upside, but not the downside, in the private arrangements they've made with their investors.And naturally, they tend to be somewhat optimistic. 而这些人在他们与投资者的私人安排中往往具有上行空间，但不具有下行空间。当然，他们往往有些乐观。

And so we have formidable competition when we try and buy a hundred percent of businesses. 因此，当我们尝试购买百分之百的企业时，我们就会面临巨大的竞争。

WARREN BUFFETT: Most managers are better off, in terms of their personal equation, if they're running something larger.And they're also better off if they're running something larger and more proﬁtable. 沃伦·巴菲特：就他们的个人方程而言，大多数经理人的状况都比较好，如果他们的经营规模更大的话。如果他们运行更大，更有利可图的东西，他们也会变得更好。

But the ﬁrst condition alone will usually leave them better off.We're only better off if we're running something that's more proﬁtable.We also like it if it's larger, too. 但单独的第一个条件通常会让他们变得更好。如果我们运行更有利可图的东西，我们才会变得更好。我们也喜欢它，如果它也更大。

But our equation, actually, our personal equation is actually different than a great many managers in that respect.Even if that didn't operate, I think most managers psychically would enjoy running something larger.And if you can pay for it with other people's money, I mean, that gets pretty attractive. 但实际上，我们的等式，在这方面，我们的个人等式实际上与许多管理者不同。即使这不起作用，我认为大多数管理者在心理上会喜欢运行更大的东西。如果你可以用其他人的钱来支付它，我的意思是，它变得非常有吸引力。

You know, how much would — and let's just say you're a baseball fan — well, how much would you pay to own whatever your hometown, the Yankees? 你知道，多少会 - 而且只是说你是一个棒球迷 - 好吧，你愿意为你的家乡洋基队付出多少钱？

You might pay more if you were writing a check on someone else's bank account than if you were writing it on your own.It's been known to happen.(Laughter) 如果你在别人的银行账户上写支票，你可能会支付更多费用，而不是你自己写的。众所周知，这种情况会发生。（笑声）

And in corporate America, animal spirits are there.And those are our competitors on buying entire businesses.In terms of buying securities, most managers don't even think about it. 在美国公司，动物精神就在那里。这些是我们购买整个业务的竞争对手。在购买证券方面，大多数经理甚至都没有考虑过。

It's very interesting to me, because they'll say that — they'll have somebody else manage their money in terms of portfolio securities.Well, all that is is a portfolio of businesses. 这对我来说非常有趣，因为他们会说 - 他们会让其他人在投资组合证券方面管理他们的钱。嗯，所有这一切都是一系列的业务。

And I'll say, "Well, why don't you pick out your own portfolio?"And they'll say, "That's much too difﬁcult." 我会说， “好吧，你为什么不挑选自己的投资组合呢？”他们会说，“这太难了。” And then some guy will come along with some business that they never heard of a week before and give them some ﬁgures and a few projections, and the guy thinks he knows enough to buy that business.It's very puzzling to me sometimes. 然后有些人会带来他们一周前从未听说过的一些事情并给他们一些数据和一些预测，而这家伙认为他已经足够了解这项业务。有时对我来说非常令人费解。

49. Revealing Wesco's estimated intrinsic value was a "quirk" 49.揭示Wesco估计的内在价值是一个“怪癖”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4. WARREN BUFFETT：第4区。

Could you hold it a little closer to you?I can't hear too well. 你能把它靠近你吗？我听不太清楚。

It's hard to hear.Is the mic on there? 很难听到。那边的麦克风？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: It's on. 听众会员：现在开始了。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, I can hear that ﬁne. WARREN BUFFETT：好的，我能听到这么好。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Let's try it one more time.Dan Raider (PH) — 观众成员：让我们再试一次。 Dan Raider（PH） -

WARREN BUFFETT: Got it. 沃伦巴菲特：明白了。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: — San Mateo, California.This is a question for Mr. Munger. 听众： - 加利福尼亚州圣马特奥市。这是芒格先生的问题。

In your most recent letter to shareholders in Wesco's annual report, you calculated the intrinsic value of Wesco at about $100 per share, and compared that to the then-current market price of Wesco of about $130 per share. 在您最近在Wesco年度报告中给股东的信中，您计算了Wesco的每股约100美元的内在价值，并将其与Wesco当时的市场价格（每股约130美元）进行了比较。

In the same letter, you stated that it was unclear whether at then-current market prices Berkshire or Wesco presented a better value to prospective purchasers. 在同一封信中，您表示目前尚不清楚Berkshire或Wesco当时的市场价格是否为准买家提供了更好的价值。

In light of that, would you compare the intrinsic value of Berkshire to its current market price? 有鉴于此，您能否将伯克希尔的内在价值与其当前的市场价格进行比较？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, the answer to that is no.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，答案是否定的。（笑声）

Berkshire has never calculated intrinsic value per share and reported it to the shareholders, and Wesco never did before this year. 伯克希尔从未计算过每股的内在价值并向股东报告，而Wesco从未在今年之前做过。

We changed our mind at Wesco because we really thought some of the buyers had gone a little crazy, and a lot of things were being said to prospective shareholders that, in our opinion, were unwise. 我们在W esco改变了主意，因为我们真的认为一些买家有点疯狂，而且我们认为很多事情正在向潜在股东说，这是不明智的。

And we don't really like attracting — even though we've had nothing to do with it — we don't like attracting people in at high prices that may not be wise. 而且我们并不喜欢吸引人 - 即使我们与之无关 - 我们也不喜欢以高价吸引人们，这可能并不明智。

So we departed from our long precedent, and we did in the Wesco report make an estimate of intrinsic value per share. 所以我们偏离了我们的长期先例，我们在Wesco报告中做了每股内在价值的估计。

But we're not changing the general policy.That was just a one-time quirk. 但我们并没有改变一般政策。那只是一次性的怪癖。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, and also I think it's true that the Wesco intrinsic value per share can be estimated by anyone within fairly close limits. WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，而且我认为Wesco 的每股内在价值可以在相当接近的范围内由任何人估算。

It just isn't that complicated because there aren't a number of businesses there that have values different than carrying values, or where they are, they're all footnoted, in terms of numbers. 它并不复杂，因为那里没有一些企业的价值与承载价值不同，或者它们在哪里，它们都是数字方面的脚注。

So it would be almost impossible to come up with numbers that are signiﬁcantly different than the number Charlie put in there. 所以几乎不可能提出与查理在那里的数字明显不同的数字。

Berkshire has assets that, number one of which would be the insurance business, that it's clear have very signiﬁcant excess values, but one person might estimate those at maybe three times what somebody else would estimate them at.That's less true of our other businesses, but it's still true in a way, so that Berkshire's range would be somewhat greater. 伯克希尔拥有的资产，其中第一个将是保险业务，显然有非常显着的超额价值，但一个人估计可能是其他人估计的三倍。对于我们的其他业务而言，情况并非如此，但在某种程度上它仍然是正确的，因此伯克希尔的范围会更大一些。

And as Charlie — we basically — we don't want to disappoint people, but we also don't want to disappoint ourselves.But we have our own yardsticks for what we think is doable. 而作为查理 - 我们基本上 - 我们不想让人失望，但我们也不想让自己失望。但我们有自己的标准，我们认为可行。

We try to convey that as well as we can to the people who are partners in the business, and I think that we saw some things being published about Wesco that simply might have led to, and probably did lead to, some expectations that simply weren't consonant with our own personal expectations.And that leaves us uncomfortable. 我们尽力向业务合作伙伴传达这一点，我认为我们看到了一些关于Wesco的事情，这些事情可能导致了，并且可能导致了一些简单的期望。符合我们个人的期望。这让我们感到不舒服。

50. Risk is "inextricably wound up" in how long an asset is held 50.资产持有多长时间，风险“不可避免地结束”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5. WARREN BUFFETT：第5区。 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, my name is Charles Pyle (PH) from Ann Arbor, Michigan. 观众：您好，我的名字是来自密歇根州安娜堡的查尔斯派尔（PH）。

I'd like to ask you to expound on your view of risk in the ﬁnancial world, and I ask that against the background of what appear to be a number of inconsistencies between your view of risk and the conventional view of risk. 我想请你阐述一下你对金融界风险的看法，并且在你的风险观和传统的风险观之间看起来有些不一致的背景下我要问你。

I mention that in a recent article you pointed out inconsistency in the use of beta as a measure of risk, which is a common standard. 我在最近的一篇文章中提到，你指出使用beta作为衡量风险的不一致性，这是一个共同的标准。

And I mention that derivatives are dangerous, and yet you feel comfortable playing at derivatives through Salomon Brothers.And betting on hurricanes is dangerous, and yet you feel comfortable playing with hurricanes through insurance companies. 而且我提到衍生品是危险的，但你通过所罗门兄弟（Salomon Brothers）玩衍生品你感觉很舒服。投注飓风是危险的，但你通过保险公司玩飓风感觉很舒服。

So it appears that you have some view of risk that's inconsistent with what would appear on the face of it to be the conventional view of risk. 因此，您似乎对风险的看法与传统的风险观点不一致。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we do deﬁne risk as the possibility of harm or injury.And in that respect we think it's inextricably wound up in your time horizon for holding an asset. WARREN BUFFETT：我们确实将风险定义为伤害或伤害的可能性。在这方面，我们认为在您持有资产的时间范围内，这是不可避免的。

I mean, if your risk is that you're going — if you intend to buy XYZ Corporation at 11:30 this morning and sell it out before the close today, I mean, that is, in our view, that is a very riskytransaction.Because we think 50 percent of the time you're going to suffer some harm or injury. 我的意思是，如果你的风险是你要去的话 - 如果你打算今天早上11:30买XYZ公司并在今天收盘前把它卖掉，我的意思是，在我们看来，这是一个非常危险的交易。因为我们认为50％的时间你会遭受一些伤害或伤害。

If you have a time horizon on a business, we think the risk of buying something like Coca-Cola at the price we bought it at a few years ago is essentially, is so close to nil, in terms of our perspective holding period.But if you asked me the risk of buying Coca-Cola this morning and you're going to sell it tomorrow morning, I say that is a very risky transaction. 如果你有一个时间跨度的业务，我们认为，就我们的观点持有期而言，以我们几年前购买的价格购买可口可乐之类的东西的风险基本上是接近于零。但如果你问我今天早上买可口可乐的风险，你明天早上要卖掉它，我说这是一个非常冒险的交易。

Now, as I pointed out in the annual report, it became very fashionable in the academic world, and then that spilled over into the ﬁnancial markets, to deﬁne risk in terms of volatility, of which beta became a measure. 现在，正如我在年度报告中指出的那样，它在学术界变得非常流行，然后渗透到金融市场，以波动性来定义风险，其中beta成为一种衡量标准。

But that is no measure of risk to us.The risk, in terms of our super-cat business, is not that we lose money in any given year.We know we're going to lose money in some given day, that is for certain.And we're extremely likely to lose money in a given year. 但这不是衡量我们风险的标准。就我们的超级猫业而言，风险并不是我们在任何一年都会亏钱。我们知道在某一天我们会亏钱，这是肯定的。而且我们极有可能在某一年亏钱。 Our time horizon of writing that business, you know, would be at least a decade.And we think the probability of losing money over a decade is low.So we feel that, in terms of our horizon of investment, that that is not a risky business.And it's a whole lot less risky than writing something that's much more predictable. 我们写这个行业的时间跨度至少会持续十年。我们认为十年来亏钱的可能性很低。因此，就我们的投资范围而言，我们认为这不是一项有风险的业务。与编写更具可预测性的东西相比，它的风险要小得多。

Interesting thing is that using conventional measures of risk, something whose return varies from year to year between plus-20 percent and plus-80 percent is riskier, as deﬁned, than something whose return is 5 percent a year every year. 有趣的是，使用传统的风险衡量标准，每年的回报率在-20％到80％之间变化的风险高于每年5％的回报率。

We just think the ﬁnancial world has gone haywire in terms of measures of risk. 我们只是认为金融世界在风险衡量方面已经失控。

We look at what we do — we are perfectly willing to lose money on a given transaction, arbitrage being an example, any given insurance policy being another example.We are perfectly willing to lose money on any given transaction. 我们看看我们做了什么 - 我们完全愿意在特定交易中赔钱，套利就是一个例子，任何给定的保险单都是另一个例子。我们完全愿意在任何特定交易中赔钱。

We are not willing to enter into transactions in which we think the probability of doing a number of mutually independent events, but of a similar type, has an expectancy of loss.And we hope that we are entering into our transactions where our calculations of those probabilities have validity. 我们不愿意进行这样的交易，在这些交易中，我们认为进行一系列相互独立的事件的概率，但类似的事件，都有预期的损失。我们希望我们进入我们的交易，我们对这些概率的计算是有效的。

And to do so, we try to narrow it down.There are a whole bunch of things we just won't do because we don't think we can write the equation on them. 为此，我们尝试缩小范围。我们不会做很多事情，因为我们认为我们不能在它们上面写出等式。

But we, basically, Charlie and I by nature are pretty risk-averse.But we are very willing to enter into transactions — 但是，基本上，我们查理和我本质上都是非常规避风险的。但我们非常愿意进行交易 -

We, if we knew it was an honest coin, and someone wanted to give us seven-to-five or something of the sort on one flip, how much of Berkshire's net worth would we put on that flip? 我们，如果我们知道它是一个诚实的硬币，并且有人想在一次翻转时给我们七到五或类似的东西，那么伯克希尔的净值是多少呢？

Well we would — it would sound like a big number to you.It would not be a huge percentage of the net worth, but it would be a signiﬁcant number.We will do things when probabilities favor us. 好吧，我们会 - 听起来像是一个很大的数字。它不会占净资产的很大比例，但这将是一个重要的数字。当概率有利于我们时，我们会做事。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, we, I would say we try and think like Fermat and Pascal as if they'd never heard of modern ﬁnance theory. CHARLIE MUNGER：是的，我们，我会说我们像Fermat和Pascal一样思考，好像他们从未听说过现代金融理论。 I really think that a lot of modern ﬁnance theory can only be described as disgusting.(Laughter) 我真的认为很多现代金融理论只能被描述为恶心。（笑声）

51. Buffett favors a "steeply progressive" consumption tax 51.巴菲特赞成“急剧增加”的消费税

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6. WARREN BUFFETT：第6区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, I'm Paul Miller (PH) from Kansas City, Missouri.I've got two questions. 观众：早上好，我是来自密苏里州堪萨斯城的Paul Miller（PH）。我有两个问题。

First, not too long ago, I believe it was Fortune Magazine that ran an article regarding personal tax rates. 首先，不久前，我相信“财富”杂志发表了一篇关于个人税率的文章。

And at the risk of misquoting you, my recollection is that you favored higher personal rates, rates even higher than those proposed by those in Washington. 而且有可能误导你，我的回忆是你偏爱更高的个人利率，甚至高于华盛顿人提出的比率。

The second question is, I've heard Berkshire Hathaway referred to as nothing more than a high- priced rich man's mutual fund.Would you care to comment on that also? 第二个问题是，我听说Berkshire Hathaway被称为高价富人的共同基金。你也愿意对此发表评论吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, on tax rates, if you ask me what I personally favor, I personally favor a steeply progressive consumption tax. WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，就税率问题而言，如果你问我个人喜欢什么，我个人赞成大幅累进的消费税。

That has a little more attention being paid to it now, although the "steeply progressive" might be modiﬁed by most of the advocates of the consumption tax, maybe to "mildly progressive" or something of the sort. 现在对此有了更多的关注，尽管消费税的大多数倡导者可能会修改“陡进”，也许是“温和进步”或类似的东西。

There's a Nunn-Domenici proposal along that line, and there are other people that are talking about it more.It may be examined by the new Kerrey-Danforth Commission, of which we've got a member in the audience. 沿着那条线有一个 Nunn-Domenici提案，还有其他人正在谈论它。它可以由新的Kerrey-Danforth委员会审查，我们在其中有一名成员。

But I believe, in one way or another, I believe in progressive taxes.So I am not shocked in terms of my own situation, and I don't think Charlie is particularly, about having a progressive income tax. 但我相信，无论如何，我相信累进税。因此，就我自己的情况而言，我并不感到震惊，而且我不认为查理特别关注累进所得税。

Although, like I say, I think society would run better over time if it were a progressive consumption tax instead. 虽然，就像我说的那样，我认为如果是累进消费税，社会会随着时间的推移而变得更好。

Do you want the comment on the tax situation, Charlie? 查理，你想要对税收情况发表评论吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think there is a point at which income taxes become quite counterproductive if their progression is too high.But I don't think we're there yet.

CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，我认为，如果他们的进展过高，那么所得税就会适得其反。但我不认为我们还在那里。

WARREN BUFFETT: We think — at least I think — I'm extraordinarily well treated by this society, and I think most people with high incomes are.I think if you transported most of them to Bangladesh or Peru or something, they would ﬁnd out how much of it is them and how much is the society. WARREN BUFFETT：我们认为 - 至少我认为 - 我对这个社会的待遇非常好，我认为大多数收入高的人都是。我想如果你将他们中的大部分运到孟加拉国或秘鲁或其他地方，他们会发现它们有多少，社会有多少。

And I think there's nothing better than a market system, in terms of motivating people and in terms of producing the goods and services that the society wants. 我认为，就激励人们和生产社会所需的商品和服务而言，没有比市场体系更好的了。

But I do think it gets a little out of whack, in terms of what the productivity may be of an outstanding teacher compared to somebody who is good at ﬁguring out the intrinsic value of businesses. 但我确实认为，与善于发现企业内在价值的人相比，优秀教师的生产力可能会有所不同。

I don't have a better system on the income side, but I think society should ﬁgure out some way to make those who are particularly blessed, in a sense, that have talents that get paid off enormously in a market system, to give backa fair amount of that to the society that produces that. 我在收入方面没有一个更好的制度，但我认为社会应该找到一些方法来让那些在某种意义上特别有福的人能够在市场体系中获得巨额回报，给予回报相当于产生这一点的社会的相当数量。

52. Berkshire isn't a "rich man's mutual fund" 52.伯克希尔不是“富人的共同基金”

WARREN BUFFETT: The question about Berkshire being I think it was, was it rich man's mutual fund or something like that? 沃伦·巴菲特：关于伯克希尔的问题我认为是，那是富人的共同基金还是那样的？

We don't look at it that way at all.We look at it as a collection of businesses, and ideally we would own all of those businesses. 我们根本不这么看。我们将其视为一系列业务，理想情况下我们将拥有所有这些业务。

So it's, to the extent that a mutual fund owns stock in a lot of companies and diversiﬁes among businesses and we try to own a lot of businesses ourselves, I guess that's true.But I guess you could say the same thing of General Electric, or an operation like that. 因此，如果一个共同基金拥有很多公司的股票并且在企业之间实现多元化并且我们自己尝试拥有很多业务，我想这是真的。但我想你可以说是通用电气的同样的东西，或者类似的操作。

We are more prone to buy pieces of businesses than the typical manager, but we are trying to do, in a sense, the same thing Jack Welch is trying to do at General Electric, which is try to own a number of ﬁrst-class businesses. 我们比典型的经理更容易购买商品，但从某种意义上说，我们正试图做的事情与杰克韦尔奇在通用电气公司试图做的事情相同，后者试图拥有一些一流的企业。

He gets to put the imprint of his own management, which I think is very good, on those businesses, and we are more hands-off, both in the businesses we own outright and in the ones that we own pieces of. 他将自己的管理层（我认为非常好）的印记放在这些业务上，而且我们更直接，无论是在我们完全拥有的业务还是我们拥有的业务中。

But we're going at it the same way.And General Electric has been very successful under Jack's leadership, and doing it his way.

但我们也是以同样的方式去做。在杰克的领导下，通用电气一直非常成功，并按照自己的方式行事。

We think, in terms of what we bring to the game, and the problems of putting money to work all the time, that our own system will work best for us. 我们认为，就我们带给游戏的内容以及将钱投入工作的问题而言，我们自己的系统将最适合我们。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I've got nothing to add to that. CHARLIE MUNGER：是的，我没有任何补充。

53. Don't need interest rate outlook to value companies 53.对价值公司不需要利率前景

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1. WARREN BUFFETT：第1区。

CHRISTOPHER DAVIS: Hello, I'm Christopher Davis from New York City. 克里斯托弗戴维斯：你好，我是来自纽约市的克里斯托弗戴维斯。

I'm interested in that many of the holdings of Berkshire are in industries that are perceived as interest rate-sensitive industries, including Wells Fargo, Salomon, Freddie Mac, even GEICO.And yet you have an admitted sort of ambivalence towards interest rates or changes in interest rates. 我感兴趣的是伯克希尔的许多股票都被认为是对利率敏感的行业，包括富国银行，萨洛蒙，房地美甚至是GEICO。然而，你对利率或利率变化有一种承认的矛盾心理。

And it therefore seems that you don't feel that those changes affect the fundamental attractiveness of those businesses. 因此，您似乎并不认为这些变化会影响这些企业的基本吸引力。

I thought maybe you could share your thoughts on what you see in these businesses that the investment community as a whole is ignoring. 我想也许你可以分享一下你对这些企业所看到的看法，而整个投资界都忽视了这些看法。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the value of every business, the value of a farm, the value of an apartment house, the value of any economic asset, is 100 percent sensitive to interest rates, because all you are doing in investing is transferring some moneyto somebody now in exchange for what you expect the stream of money to be, to come in, over a period of time.And the higher interest rates are, the less that present value is going to be. WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，每个企业的价值，农场的价值，公寓的价值，任何经济资产的价值，都对利率100％敏感，因为你在投资方面做的只是转移一些钱现在换一个人来换取你期望在一段时间内流入的资金流。利率越高，现值就越低。

So every business, by its nature, whether it's Coca-Cola or Gillette or Wells Fargo, is in its intrinsic valuation, is a hundred percent sensitive to interest rates. 因此，无论是可口可乐，吉列还是富国银行，其每一项业务的内在估值都是百分之百对利率敏感。

Now, the question as to whether a Wells Fargo or a Freddie Mac or whatever it may be, whether their business gets better or worse internally, as opposed to the valuation process, because of higher interest rates, that is not easy to ﬁgure. 现在，关于Wells Fargo或Freddie Mac或其他方面的问题，无论他们的业务在内部是好还是坏，而不是估值过程，因为利率较高，这是不容易想象的。

I mean, GEICO, if they write their insurance business at the same underwriting ratio — in other words they have the same loss and expense experience relative to premiums — they benefit by higher interest rates, obviously, over time, because they're a floatbusiness, and the float is worth more to them. 我的意思是，GEICO ，如果他们以相同的承保比率编写他们的保险业务 - 换句话说，他们与保费相比具有相同的损失和费用经验 - 显然，随着时间的推移，他们受益于更高的利率，因为他们是一个浮动商业，浮动对他们来说更有价值。

Now, externally, getting back to the valuation part, the present value of those earnings also becomes less then. 现在，从外部回到估值部分，这些收益的现值也变得不那么重要了。

But the present value of Coke's earnings becomes less in a higher interest rate environment. 但在更高的利率环境下，可口可乐公司的收益现值变得更少了。

Wells Fargo, it's — whether they earn more or less money under any given interest rate scenario is hard to ﬁgure.There may be one short-term effect and there may be another long-term effect. 富国银行，它是 - 在任何给定的利率情况下，他们是否赚取更多或更少的钱是很难想象的。可能会产生一种短期影响，可能会产生另一种长期影响。

So I do not have to have a view on interest rates — and I don't have a view on interest rates — to make a decision as to an insurance business, or a mortgage guarantor business, or a banking business, or something of thesort, relative to making a judgment about Coke or Gillette. 因此，对于保险业务，抵押担保人业务，银行业务或其他事项，我不必对利率 - 我对利率没有看法 - 有任何看法。相对于对可口可乐或吉列的判断而言。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I've got nothing to add. CHARLIE MUNGER：我没有什么可补充的。

54. "Retroactive" insurance is small part of our business 54.“追溯”保险是我们业务的一小部分

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone two? WARREN BUFFETT：第二区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, I'm Benjamin Baron (PH) from New York. 听众：你好，我是来自纽约的Benjamin Baron（PH）。

Could you speak about your insurance business a little bit?And especially the retroactive policies you've been writing. 你能谈谈你的保险业务吗？尤其是你一直在撰写的追溯政策。

WARREN BUFFETT: Can we speak about the — you say the reinsurance business? WARREN BUFFETT：我们可以谈谈 - 你说再保险业务吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Retroactive — CHARLIE MUNGER：追溯 -

WARREN BUFFETT: I heard the retroactive part, but the ﬁrst part. WARREN BUFFETT：我听到了追溯部分，但第一部分。

BENJAMIN BARON: The reinsurance and the retroactive, and also the market in Bermuda and how you see it as one of your potential markets. BENJAMIN BARON：再保险和追溯，以及百慕大的市场以及您如何将其视为您的潜在市场之一。 WARREN BUFFETT: I think the retroactive market is, what's called "retroactive insurance," has been pretty well eliminated by developments in accounting. WARREN BUFFETT：我认为追溯市场，即所谓的“追溯保险 ”，已经被会计发展很好地消除了。

So I would not expect us to really have any volume in retroactive-type policies. 所以我不希望我们在追溯型政策中真正拥有任何数量。

Now, when we write workers' comp with a policy holder dividend, in effect that's a retroactive policy.But that's a relative — that's small part of Berkshire's business. 现在，当我们用保单持有人的股息编写工人保险时，实际上这是一个追溯政策。但这是亲戚 - 这只是伯克希尔公司业务的一小部分。

Did I answer what you were driving at there? 我是否回答了你在那里开的车？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: (Inaudible) 听众:(听不清）

WARREN BUFFETT: Pardon me? WARREN BUFFETT：请原谅我？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: (Inaudible) 听众:(听不清）

WARREN BUFFETT: Did you get that, Charlie? 沃伦巴菲特：你明白了吗，查理？

55. "You don't ﬁnd out who's been swimming naked until the tide goes out" 55.“在潮水退去之前你还没发现谁一直在裸泳”

CHARLIE MUNGER: Just comment on the development of the insurance business in Bermuda. CHARLIE MUNGER：请评论百慕大保险业务的发展。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, Bermuda is simply a, you know, a new competitor.They're not so new, I mean, there've been companies in Bermuda before. WARREN BUFFETT：哦，百慕大只是一个新的竞争对手。他们不是那么新，我的意思是，之前在百慕大有过公司。

But in the last 15 months, 18 months, maybe there's been 4 billion-plus raised.And because, for tax reasons — maybe other reasons as well, but certainly for tax reasons — that capacity has been concentrated in Bermuda-based, Bermuda-domiciled reinsurers. 但在过去15个月，18个月里，也许有40亿多人上调。而且，由于税收原因 - 也许还有其他原因，但肯定是出于税收原因 - 这种能力主要集中在百慕大的百慕大注册再保险公司。

But essentially there's no great difference between that type of competition and other reinsurers competition, except for the fact that that capacity is new and the money's just been raised, and so there may be some greater pressure on the managers of those businesses to go out andwrite business promptly than on somebody that's been around for 50 years. 但基本上这种类型的竞争与其他再保险公司的竞争并没有太大的区别，除了这种能力是新的并且资金刚被提高的事实，因此这些企业的管理者可能会面临更大的压力。写作业务的时间要快于那些已经存在50年的人。

But it's no plus for us any time new capacity enters any business that we're in, and that certainly goes for the reinsurance business.

但是，只要新的产能进入我们所处的任何业务，这对我们来说都没有任何好处，而且肯定适用于再保险业务。

Reinsurance business, by its nature, will be a business in which some very stupid things are done en masse periodically.I mean, you can be doing dumb things and not know it in reinsurance, and then all of a sudden wake up and ﬁnd out, you know, the money is gone. 就其本质而言，再保险业务将是一项业务，其中一些非常愚蠢的事情定期进行。我的意思是，你可以做一些愚蠢的事情，而不是在再保险中知道它，然后突然醒来发现，你知道，钱已经消失了。

And it's what people have found out — and I used that line in the report a year ago — it's what people have found out that were speculating on bonds with (inaudible) margins recently, that, you know, you don't ﬁnd out who'sbeen swimming naked until the tide goes out.And — (laughter) — essentially that's what happens in reinsurance.You don't, you really don't ﬁnd out who's been swimming naked until the wind blows at them. 而这正是人们发现的 - 我在一年前的报告中使用了这一行 - 这是人们发现最近推测的（听不到）边际债券，你知道，你不知道谁是谁一直裸泳，直到潮水退去。并且 - （笑） - 基本上就是再保险所发生的事情。你不这样做，你真的不知道是谁一直在游泳，直到刮风。

56. When cash "piles up," it's not through choice 现金“堆积”，这不是通过选择

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3. WARREN BUFFETT：第3区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'm Whitney Anderson (PH) from Miami, Florida.And my question is, right now, we are reading about various analysts and how you should, in their individual opinion, adjust your more cash, more stocks, more bonds because of … 听众：我是来自佛罗里达州迈阿密的惠特尼安德森（PH）。而我的问题是，现在，我们正在阅读各种分析师，以及在个人看来，你应该如何调整更多的现金，更多的股票，更多的债券......

How does Berkshire Hathaway feel about times of relative ﬁnancial insecurity?Do you arrange for more cash reserves looking forward to a time when you might be able to buy?Or do you go along your path? Berkshire Hathaway 如何看待相对财务不安全的时期？您是否安排了更多的现金储备，期待您可以购买的时间？或者你沿着你的路走？

WARREN BUFFETT: I think the question is do we sort of get into asset allocation by maintaining given levels of cash, depending on some kind of outlook or something of the sort? WARREN BUFFETT：我认为问题是我们是否通过维持给定的现金水平来进入资产配置，这取决于某种前景或类似的东西？

We don't really think that way at all.If we have cash, it's because we haven't found anything intelligent to do with it that day, in the way of buying into the kind of businesses we like. 我们根本不这么认为。如果我们有现金，那是因为我们当天没有找到任何与它有关的东西，以购买我们喜欢的那种业务的方式。

And when we can't ﬁnd anything for a while, the cash piles up.But that's not through choice, that's because we're failing at what we essentially are trying to do, which is to ﬁnd things to buy, and — 当我们暂时找不到任何东西时，现金堆积如山。但这不是通过选择，那是因为我们在实际上正在尝试做的事情上失败，那就是找到要买的东西，并且 -

We make no attempt to guess whether cash is going to be worth more three months from now or six months from now or a year from now. 我们没有试图猜测从现在起三个月或现在或一年后的六个月现金是否值得更多。 So it is — you will never see — we don't have any meetings of any kind anyway at Berkshire, but we would never have an asset allocation meeting.We would — (laughter) — keep looking.I mean, Charlie's looking, I'm looking.Some of our managers are looking. 所以它是 - 你永远不会看到 - 我们在伯克希尔没有任何类型的会议，但我们永远不会有资产配置会议。我们会 - （笑） - 继续寻找。我的意思是，查理在看，我在看。我们的一些经理正在寻找。

We're looking for things to buy that meet our tests, and if we showed no cash or short-term securities at year-end, we would love it, because it would mean that we'd found ways to employ the money in waysthat we like. 我们正在寻找符合我们测试要求的东西，如果我们在年底没有显示现金或短期证券，我们会喜欢它，因为这意味着我们已经找到了以各种方式使用这些资金的方法我们喜欢。

I think I would have to admit that if we have a lot of money around, we are a little dumber than usual.I mean, it tends to make you careless. 我想我必须承认，如果我们有很多钱，我们比平常有点笨。我的意思是，它往往会让你不小心。

And I would say that the best purchases are usually made when you have to sell something to raise the money to get them, because it just raises the bar a little bit that you jump over in the mental decisions. 而且我会说，最好的购买通常是在你必须卖东西以筹集资金来获得它们的时候，因为它只是提高了你在心理决策中跳过的一点点。

But we have, I don't know what we'll show, but certainly well over a billion dollars of cash around, and that's not through choice.That is a — you can look at that as an index of failure on the part of your management. 但我们有，我不知道我们会展示什么，但肯定超过十亿美元现金，而这不是通过选择。这是一个 - 您可以将其视为管理层失败的指标。

And we will be happy when we can buy businesses, or small pieces of businesses, that use up that money. 当我们可以购买那些用完这笔钱的企业或小型企业时，我们会很高兴。

57. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as investments 57. Fannie Mae和Freddie Mac作为投资

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4. WARREN BUFFETT：第4区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Gentlemen, my name is Richard Sercer from Tucson, Arizona. 听众：先生们，我的名字是来自亚利桑那州图森市的Richard Sercer。

I understand that 40 percent of all home mortgages have been securitized by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the duopoly. 据我所知，所有房屋抵押贷款中有40％是由双寡头房利美（Fannie Mae）和房地美（Freddie Mac）证券化的。

I would, at the risk of asking you for a projection, since you've talked about projections before, I'd be interested in understanding what you think will happen to that market share over time for this duopoly.Thank you. 我会冒着要求您进行预测的风险，因为您之前已经谈过预测，我有兴趣了解您认为随着时间推移这个双寡头的市场份额会发生什么。谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the answer to that doesn't involve much of a prediction.That market share is essentially certain to go up. WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，答案并不涉及很多预测。市场份额基本上肯定会上升。 That doesn't mean that those are wonderful businesses to buy, but the market share is essentially certain to go up because the economics that those two entities possess, compared to other ways of intermediating money between investors and people who want to borrow, no oneelse has those economics. 这并不意味着那些是很好买的企业，但市场份额基本上肯定会上升，因为这两个实体拥有的经济学，与投资者和想要借款的人之间的其他中介方式相比，没有人否则就有那些经济学。

So what holds the share of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae down is the fact that they are only allowed to loan roughly $200,000 on any mortgage.That's a limiting factor.It's probably been a good thing for them that it has been a limiting factor, but they are shut out of part of the market. 因此，Freddie Mac和Fannie Mae的股票下跌是因为他们只能在任何抵押贷款上贷款约20万美元。这是一个限制因素。对他们而言，这可能是一件好事，它已成为一个限制因素，但他们被排除在市场的一部分之外。

But the market that they are in, they essentially have economics that other people can't touch for intermediating money, including the savings and loan business that we were in. 但是他们所处的市场，他们基本上拥有其他人无法接触的经济学，包括我们所处的储蓄和贷款业务。

We had a business that intermediated money, went out and got it from depositors and lent it to people who wanted to borrow on a home. 我们有一家公司介入资金，出去从存款人处获得并借给那些想在家里借钱的人。

Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae do it the same way.They don't do it exactly the same way, but they perform the same function.And they could do it so much more cheaply than we could do it by having branches or anything of the sort and paying the insurance fee we paid. Freddie Mac和Fannie Mae也是这样做的。他们没有完全相同的方式，但他们执行相同的功能。他们可以通过拥有分支机构或任何类似的东西并支付我们支付的保险费，以比我们更便宜的方式做到这一点。

They're going to get the business.They should get the business.And so their market share will grow. 他们将获得业务。他们应该得到生意。他们的市场份额将会增长。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think that's right.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，我认为这是对的。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: You're doing great.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：你做得很好。（笑声）

58. Increased information speed doesn't affect our decisions 58.提高信息速度不会影响我们的决定

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5. WARREN BUFFETT：第5区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, I'm Sarah Pruitt (PH) from Milwaukee, Wisconsin. 听众会员：早上好，我是来自威斯康星州密尔沃基市的Sarah Pruitt（PH）。

And I wondered if you feel that the speed with which information is available and disseminated today has affected your business-buying decision process.And do you believe that speed has caused you to miss opportunities? 我想知道您是否认为今天提供和传播信息的速度已经影响了您的业务购买决策流程。你相信速度会让你错过机会吗？ WARREN BUFFETT: Question about seas expanding? WARREN BUFFETT：关于海洋扩张的问题？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. Does the speed of information today affect our decision-making process? CHARLIE MUNGER：不会。今天的信息速度是否会影响我们的决策过程？

WARREN BUFFETT: No, we — I would say that we perform about like we were doing 30 or 40 years ago. WARREN BUFFETT：不，我们 - 我会说我们表现得和30或40年前一样。

I mean — (laughter) — we read annual reports. 我的意思是 - （笑） - 我们阅读年度报告。

It isn't the — the speed of information really doesn't make any difference to us.It's the processing and ﬁnally coming to some judgment that actually has some utility, that is, that it's a judgment about the price of a business or a part of a business, a security, versus what it's essentially worth. 它不是 - 信息的速度对我们没有任何影响。这是处理，并最终得出一些实际上具有一些效用的判断，即它是对企业或部分企业，安全性以及其实质价值的判断。

And none of that involves anything to do, really, with quick information.It involves getting good information. 这些都不涉及任何事情，真的，快速的信息。它涉及获得良好的信息。

But usually that — it's not — we're not looking for needles in haystacks or anything of the sort.You know, we like haystacks, not needles, basically.And we want it to shout at us. 但通常情况下 - 它不是 - 我们不是在干草堆或任何类型的东西中寻找针头。你知道，我们基本上喜欢干草堆，而不是针。我们希望它对我们大喊大叫。

And I would say that, well, virtually everything we've done has been reading public reports, and then maybe asking questions around to ascertain trade positions or product strengths or something of that sort. 我会说，好吧，几乎我们所做的一切都是阅读公开报告，然后可能会提出问题来确定交易头寸或产品优势或类似的东西。

But we never have to — we can make decisions very fast.I mean, we get called on a business — or we can make up our mind whether we're interested in two or three minutes.That takes no time.We may have to do a little checking on a few things subsequently. 但我们从来没有 - 我们可以非常快速地做出决定。我的意思是，我们被召集到一个企业 - 或者我们可以决定我们是否对两三分钟感兴趣。这需要时间。我们可能不得不稍后检查一些事情。

But we don't need to get — I can't think of anything where we really need lots of price data or things like that extremely fast to make any decisions. 但我们不需要 - 我无法想到任何我们真正需要大量价格数据的事情，或者做出任何决定的事情。

We've got good management information systems in our operating businesses, but that's just another — that's a question of keeping inventories where they should be and all of that sort of thing. 我们在运营业务中拥有良好的管理信息系统，但这只是另一个 - 这是一个将库存保持在应有的位置以及所有这些问题的问题。

I don't think the invest — I think you could be in someplace where the mails were delayed three weeks, and the quotations were delayed three weeks, and I think you could do just ﬁne in investing. 我不认为投资 - 我认为你可能会在邮件被推迟三周的地方，并且报价推迟了三周，我认为你可以做得很好投资。 59. Why a stock buyback is unlikely 59.为什么股票回购不太可能

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6. WARREN BUFFETT：第6区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: James Pan (PH), New York City.I have a two-parter question. 观众成员：James Pan（PH），纽约市。我有两个问题。

One, do you think the stock price of Berkshire Hathaway is trading within 15 percent of its intrinsic value currently? 一，您认为伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的股票价格目前在其内在价值的15％以内吗？

And two, if you think Berkshire Hathaway is undervalued with the amount of cash you have on your balance sheet, would you consider a buyback? 还有两个，如果你认为伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的资产负债表上的现金数量被低估了，你会考虑回购吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: The answer about a buyback is that we generally have felt that market conditions that would make Berkshire attractively priced is probably going to make other things even more attractively priced, because we think our shareholders are more rational than the shareholders of many companies. 沃伦·巴菲特：关于回购的答案是，我们一般认为，使伯克希尔定价具有吸引力的市场条件可能会让其他东西的价格更具吸引力，因为我们认为我们的股东比许多公司的股东更理性。

It's more likely that we will ﬁnd some wonderful business at a silly price than we will ﬁnd Berkshire at a silly price as we go along.So — (applause) that tends to eliminate repurchases. 我们更有可能以愚蠢的价格找到一些精彩的业务，而不是像我们一样，我们会以愚蠢的价格找到伯克希尔。所以 - （掌声）往往会消除回购。

But it doesn't rule them out, but it explains why the circumstances will not arise very often where repurchases would make good sense. 但它并不排除它们，但它解释了为什么情况不会经常出现在回购很有意义的地方。

60. Why we don't estimate our intrinsic value 60.为什么我们不估计我们的内在价值

WARREN BUFFETT: In terms of giving you a number on intrinsic value, I don't want to spoil your fun.I mean, you really should work that one out for yourself.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：在给你一个关于内在价值的数字方面，我不想破坏你的乐趣。我的意思是，你真的应该为自己解决这个问题。（笑声）

Charlie is the expert on intrinsic — 查理是内在的专家 -

Do you have any comment for him, Charlie? 查理，你对他有什么评论吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, your attitude on that subject reminds me of a famous headmaster who used to address the graduating class every year.And he'd say, "You know," he says, "Five percent of you people are going to end up criminals."And he says, "I know exactly who you are."(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，你对这个问题的态度让我想起了一位着名的校长，他每年都会在毕业班上讲话。而且他会说，“你知道，”他说，“你们中有百分之五的人会结束犯罪分子。”他说，“我确切地知道你是谁。” （笑声）

And he said, "But I'm not going to tell you, because it would deprive your lives of a sense of excitement."(Laughter) 他说，“但我不会告诉你，因为这会让你的生活失去兴奋感。” （笑声）

If you stop to think about it, the companies that constantly told their shareholders what the intrinsic value was were the real estate holding companies in corporate form. 如果你不再考虑它，那些不断告诉股东内在价值的公司是以公司形式存在的房地产控股公司。

And I must say, that the amount of folly and misbehavior that crept into that process was disgusting.We would be just associating with a bad group if we were to change our ways. 而且我必须说，悄悄进入这个过程的愚蠢和不端行为的数量令人作呕。如果我们要改变我们的方式，我们只会与一个坏团体联系。

WARREN BUFFETT: Bill Zeckendorf Sr. I think was probably the ﬁrst one to do that, with Webb and Knapp back in the late '50s.I still have those annual reports.And he would announce, you know, like, to eight decimal places what the intrinsic value of Webb and Knapp was.And he did it right till the day they ﬁled for Chapter 11. (Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：Bill Zeckendorf Sr.我认为可能是第一个这样做的人，Webb和Knapp早在50年代就回来了。我还有这些年度报告。他知道，就像Webb和Knapp的内在价值一样，小数点后八位。直到他们申请第11章的那天他才做到这一点。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: I remember that well, because somebody said that he fell into bankruptcy.And somebody else said, "How can you fall off a pancake?"(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：我记得很清楚，因为有人说他陷入了破产。还有人说，“你怎么能从煎饼上掉下来？” （笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Beware of people that give you a lot of numbers about their businesses.I mean, in terms of projections or valuations or that sort of thing. WARREN BUFFETT：谨防那些能为您提供大量有关其业务的人员。我的意思是，就预测或估值或那种事情而言。

We try to give you all of the numbers that we would use ourselves in making our own calculations of value. 我们试图向您提供我们将自己用于计算价值的所有数字。

We really — if you read the Berkshire reports, you essentially — you have all the information that Charlie and I would use in making a decision about the security. 我们真的 - 如果您阅读伯克希尔报告，基本上 - 您拥有查理和我将用于做出安全决策的所有信息。

And if there's anything really lacking in that respect, you know, we would actually — we would truly appreciate hearing from you, because we want to have that kind of information in the report.But then we want you to make the calculation. 如果在这方面确实缺乏任何东西，你知道，我们实际上 - 我们真的很感谢你的回复，因为我们希望在报告中提供这类信息。但是我们希望你进行计算。

But we've stuck, I mean, that material, for example, on the ﬂoat in the insurance business, we consider that quite relevant, obviously, because we use up almost a page printing it.It's pretty serious stuff at Berkshire.(Laughter) 但是，我的意思是，我的意思是，例如，保险业务中的浮动资料，我们认为非常相关，显然，因为我们几乎用了一页打印它。在伯克郡，这是非常严肃的事情。（笑声）

But that is relevant.I mean, your interpretation may be different than mine or Charlie's, but those are important numbers. 但那是相关的。我的意思是，你的解释可能与我的或查理的解释不同，但这些都是重要的数字。

And we could give you a lot of baloney about satisﬁed policyholders, you know, in Lincoln, Nebraska.It wouldn't tell you a thing about what the company's worth — and have pictures of them, and happy, you know, receiving the check from the agent and all of that.(Laughter) 你知道，在内布拉斯加州的林肯市，我们可以给你很多关于满意保单持有人的蠢货。它不会告诉你关于公司价值的事情 - 并且有他们的照片，并且很高兴，你知道，接受代理商的支票和所有这些。（笑声）

We're not going to do that. 我们不打算这样做。

61. Buffett on Peter Lynch 61.巴菲特对彼得林奇

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1. WARREN BUFFETT：第1区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mike Macy (PH) from Indianapolis. 听众：来自印第安纳波利斯的Mike Macy（PH）。

I have really enjoyed reading your annual letters and your annual report, and I've gone back and read all of the older ones, too.They're terriﬁc. 我非常喜欢阅读你的年度信件和年度报告，而且我已经回去阅读所有旧的信件了。他们太棒了。

I have also enjoyed reading the two books by Peter Lynch, and I see a lot of commonalities between the two of you, the way you think, your philosophy, et cetera. 我也非常喜欢阅读彼得林奇的两本书，我看到你们俩之间有很多共同点，你的思维方式，你的哲学等等。

I'd certainly appreciate it if you'd make a few comments on what you think of Peter Lynch, the things he says in his two books, and the advice that he gives to investors.Thank you. 如果你对彼得林奇的看法，他在两本书中所说的话，以及他给投资者的建议，你会发表一些评论，我当然感激不尽。谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I know Peter.I don't know him well, but we've played bridge together in Omaha as a matter of fact. 沃伦巴菲特：嗯，我认识彼得。我不太了解他，但事实上我们在奥马哈一起打过桥。

I like him personally, and obviously he has an outstanding record.And he has written those two books, which have been bestsellers, about his investment philosophy.I don't really have anything — you know, I'm not going to embroider on his. 我个人喜欢他，显然他有出色的记录。他写了两本关于他的投资理念的畅销书。我真的没有任何东西 - 你知道，我不会去绣他的。

There's certainly a fair amount of overlap.There's some difference. 肯定存在相当多的重叠。有一些区别。

Peter, obviously, likes to diversify a lot more than I do.He owns more stocks than the names of companies I can remember.I mean, but that's Peter.(Laughter) 显然，彼得比我更喜欢多样化。他拥有的股票多于我记忆中的公司名称。我的意思是，但那是彼得。（笑声）

And, you know, I've said in investing, in the past, that there's more than one way to get to heaven.And there isn't a true religion in this, but there's some very useful religions. 而且，你知道，在过去的投资中，我曾说过，有不止一种方式可以进入天堂。在这里没有一个真正的宗教，但有一些非常有用的宗教。

And Peter's got one, and I think we've got one that's useful, too.And there is a lot of overlap. 彼得有一个，我想我们也有一个有用的。而且有很多重叠。 But I would not do as well if I tried to do it the way Peter does it, and he probably wouldn't do as well if he tried to do it exactly the way I'd do it. 但是，如果我按照彼得的方式做到这一点，我也不会做得那么好，如果他试图按照我的方式做到这一点，他可能也不会这样做。

I like him personally very much.He's a high-grade guy. 我非常喜欢他。他是一个高级的人。

62. We'll only write insurance when prices make sense 价格合理时，我们只会写保险

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2. WARREN BUFFETT：第2区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, my name is Dave Lankes (PH).I'm a senior editor at Business Insurance Magazine. 听众：巴菲特先生，芒格先生，我叫戴夫兰克斯（PH）。我是商业保险杂志的高级编辑。

A two-part question for you.Can you explain a little bit regarding your primary insurance operations?What drove up written premiums by more than 50 percent last year, and if you expect that to continue this year? 一个由两部分组成的问题。你能解释一下你的主要保险业务吗？去年将书面保费提高了50％以上，如果你希望今年继续这样做？

And then regarding your earlier comments on the stupid things reinsurers can do en masse, can you explain what potential pitfalls that the new cat facilities in Bermuda will have to avoid that you feel Berkshire Hathaway won't fall into? 然后关于你之前关于再保险公司可以集体做的愚蠢事情的评论，你能否解释一下百慕大的新猫设施可能会避免你认为Berkshire Hathaway不会陷入的潜在陷阱？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the first question about our primary insurance figures, you'll find it way in the back someplace.But they're a little distorted because we bought Central States Indemnity, what would it be, late in the year '92.So there's a lot more premium volume in there for Central States in '93 than there was in '92. WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，关于我们的主要保险数据的第一个问题，你会在某个地方找到它的方式。但他们有点歪曲，因为我们买了中央国家赔偿，那将是什么，在92年末。因此，93年中央国家的保费量远高于92年。

Our basic — National Indemnity's basic insurance, which is commercial, auto, and general liability, premium volume was fairly ﬂat, the Homestate operation fairly ﬂat, Cypress up somewhat.But those numbers were not anything like the changes — 我们的基本 - 全国赔偿的基本保险，即商业，汽车和一般责任，保费量相当平稳，Homestate运营相当平稳，赛普拉斯有所上升。但这些数字并不像变化那样 -

So our business last year, pro forma for including Central States Indemnity for all of '92, would not have shown a dramatic change.There really hasn't been much happening in our primary business, except that it's been run, it's done very well, but it is not growing or exploding.And that's true this year as well as last year. 因此，去年我们的业务，包括92年中央国家赔偿的备考，不会有显着的变化。在我们的主要业务中确实没有发生太多事情，除了它已经运行，它已经做得很好，但它没有增长或爆炸。这一年和去年都是如此。

It's a good business.And it could grow in certain kinds of markets very substantially, but it is not growing in this market, and it did not grow last year, although its underwriting was very good.

这是一件好事。它可以在某些类型的市场中大幅增长，但它并没有在这个市场上增长，并且去年没有增长，尽管它的承销非常好。

In the reinsurance business, I think, essentially, the difference in our reinsurance business from many others, you know — it doesn't include them all in a place like Bermuda — is essentially the difference that may exist in our operations and securities versus otherpeople. 在再保险业务中，我认为，基本上，我们的再保险业务与其他许多业务的差异，你知道 - 它不包括所有在百慕大这样的地方 - 基本上是我们的运营和证券可能存在的差异与其他人。

We will offer reinsurance at any time in very large quantities at prices we think make sense.But we won't do business if we don't think it makes sense, just like we will buy securities, to the extent of the cash we have available, if they make sense.But we have no interest in being in the stock market per say just to be in it.We want to own securities that make sense to us. 我们将以我们认为合理的价格随时提供大量再保险。但是，如果我们不认为这是有意义的，就像我们将购买证券一样，只要我们有现金，如果它们有意义，我们就不会做生意。但我们没有兴趣进入股票市场。我们希望拥有对我们有意义的证券。

I think for most managements, if the only thing they're in is the reinsurance business, they may like it better when prices make sense, but they will, I think they will be prone to do quite a bit of business when prices don't make sense as well, because there's no alternative, except to give the money back to the owners.And that is not something that most managements, you know, do somersaults over.(Laughter) 我认为对于大多数管理人员来说，如果他们唯一能做的就是再保险业务，他们可能会在价格合理时更喜欢它，但他们会这样做，我认为当价格不上时他们会做很多事情。也没有意义，因为没有其他选择，除了把钱还给业主。而且，对于大多数管理人员来说，这不是翻筋斗的事情。（笑声）

So, I think we are in a favored position, essentially being — having the ﬂexibility of capital allocation that lets us take the lack of business with a certain equanimity that most managements probably can't, because of their sole focus on the business. 因此，我认为我们处在一个受欢迎的位置，实质上是 - 具有资本配置的灵活性，这使得我们可以通过大多数管理层可能无法做到的一定程度的平衡而缺乏业务，因为他们只关注业务。

Rates will get silly, in all likelihood, after a period when nothing much happens, when you've had a couple of years of good experience. 在经历了几年没有多少经历的时期之后，利率很可能会变得愚蠢。

We price to what we think is exposure.We don't price to experience.I mean, the fact that there was no big hurricane last year — I forget the name of the one that was coming in at North Carolina and then veered out essentially — but to us, it has nothing to do with the rates next year whether thathurricane actually came in in a big way or veered out into the Atlantic again.I mean, we are pricing to exposure. 我们定价我们认为是曝光。我们没有经验的价格。我的意思是，去年没有大飓风的事实 - 我忘记了北卡罗来纳州的一个名字，然后基本上转向了 - 但对我们来说，它与明年的费率无关飓风实际上是以很大的方式进入或再次转向大西洋。我的意思是，我们定价曝光。

And everyone says that, but the market tends to price and respond to experience, and generally to recent experience.That's why all the retrocessional operations in London, you know, in the spiral, went busted, because they priced, in our view, they priced to experience rather than to exposure. 每个人都这么说，但市场倾向于定价和回应经验，而且往往是最近的经验。这就是为什么在伦敦，所有在伦敦进行的专业运作都被破坏了，因为在我们看来，他们定价是为了体验而不是曝光。

It's very hard not to do that, to be there year after year with business coming by and investors expecting this of you and not do that. 很难不做到这一点，年复一年，随着业务的到来，投资者期待你这样做，而不是那样做。 But we will never knowingly do that.We may get inﬂuenced subconsciously in some way to do that, but we will not do that any more than we will accept stock market norms as being the proper way for us to invest money and equities. 但我们永远不会故意这样做。我们可能会以某种方式潜意识地影响到这一点，但我们不会这样做，只会接受股票市场规范作为我们投资金钱和股票的正确方式。

Basically, when you lay out money or accept insurance risks, you really have to think for yourself.You cannot let the market think for you. 基本上，当你存钱或接受保险风险时，你真的必须自己思考。你不能让市场为你思考。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I think Berkshire is basically a very old-fashioned kind of a place.And it tries to exert discipline to stay old-fashioned. CHARLIE MUNGER：是的，我认为伯克希尔基本上是一个非常老式的地方。它试图发挥纪律，保持老式。

And I don't mean old-fashioned stupid, I mean, you know, the eternal verity, so to speak, basic mathematics, you know, basic horse sense, basic fear, basic discriminations regarding human nature, all very old-fashioned.And if you just do that with a certain amount of discipline, I think it's likely to work out quite well. 我并不是说老式的愚蠢，我的意思是，你知道，永恒的真理，可以说，基本的数学，你知道，基本的马感，基本的恐惧，对人性的基本歧视，都是非常老式的。如果你只是通过一定程度的纪律来做到这一点，我认为它可能会很好地解决。

63. Praise from Sandy Gottesman 63.桑迪戈特斯曼的赞美

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3. WARREN BUFFETT：第3区。

DAVID GOTTESMAN: David Gottesman from New York. DAVID GOTTESMAN：来自纽约的David Gottesman。

It's no wonder that this meeting draws stockholders from all over the country.And despite the talk about age today, I'm happy to say this meeting gets better every year. 毫无疑问，这次会议吸引了全国各地的股东。尽管今天有关于年龄的讨论，但我很高兴地说这次会议每年都会变得更好。

Berkshire stands unique in American business as a company whose name has become synonymous with management excellence. 伯克希尔作为一家公司，在美国业务中独树一帜，其名称已成为卓越管理的代名词。

Unlike many American corporations, we, as stockholders, don't have to worry about reorganizations, large write-offs, massive restructurings, overstated earnings, and overpaid executives with strategic visions. 与许多美国公司不同，作为股东，我们不必担心重组，大额注销，大规模重组，夸大的收益以及具有战略愿景的高薪管理人员。

Instead, year in and year out, we enjoy the beneﬁts of the common sense and brilliance of Charlie and Warren.(APPLAUSE) 相反，年复一年，我们享受查理和沃伦的常识和才华所带来的好处。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: What did you say your name was?(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：你说你的名字是什么？（笑声） DAVID GOTTESMAN: I want to add to that, to say nothing of your good humor. DAVID GOTTESMAN：我想补充一点，更不用说你的幽默了。

It's easy to take such consistently outstanding results for granted, but we in this room are the direct beneﬁciaries of their efforts. 很容易将这种一贯出色的结果视为理所当然，但我们在这个会议室中是我们努力的直接受益者。

By our presence here today, we show our appreciation to them for their exceptional performance.But we can also demonstrate in another way.I would like to suggest we give them a rousing hand of applause for a job well done.Thank you.(APPLAUSE) 通过我们今天的出席，我们对他们的出色表现表示赞赏。但我们也可以用另一种方式证明。我想建议我们给他们一个热烈的掌声，为一份出色的工作做好准备。谢谢。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you.That was Sandy Gottesman.We've worked together for 30-odd years, and he's ﬁnally got that down.I appreciate that, Sandy.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：谢谢。那是Sandy Gottesman。我们共同工作了30 多年，他终于搞定了。我很欣赏，桑迪。（笑声）

64. Brief adjournment 64.简短休会

WARREN BUFFETT: With that, we will adjourn.And anyone who wants to stay around, we'll reconvene in 15 minutes, and then we'll be here till about 1:15. WARREN BUFFETT：有了这个，我们将休会。任何想要留在身边的人，我们将在15分钟内重新召开，然后我们将在这里待到大约1:15。

Mon, Apr 25 1994 • 9:00 AM