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The London School of Economics and Political Science the Dominant Party System: Clientelism, Pluralism and Limited Contestabilit The London School of Economics and Political Science The Dominant Party System: Clientelism, Pluralism and Limited Contestability Aris Trantidis A thesis submitted to the European Institute of the London School of Economics for the degree of Master of Philosophy, London, April 2012 1 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 45.655 words. 2 Abstract The thesis extends the conceptual boundaries of authoritarianism to include dominant party systems that meet the procedural definition of democracy but exhibit low degrees of government contestability due to the extensive application of clientelism. The first part re-introduces Robert Dahl’s notion of ‘inclusive hegemony’ which encapsulates the stance of political pluralism on dominant party systems. The thesis develops two arguments in support of a Dahlian approach to dominant party systems. The normative argument discusses the associations between power, incentives, collective action and party organisation to indicate that, in the absence of physical coercion and intimidation, inclusive hegemony is a paradoxical outcome that can only be sustained by the application of a political strategy producing an effect on political behaviour similar to that of coercion. The discussion illustrates the practice of clientelism as the most pertinent explanatory variable. The second part develops a series of analytical arguments which update Dahl’s approach in order to meet the criterion set up by the contemporary literature for distinguishing between authoritarian and democratic dominant party systems, according to which the strategies and tactics associated with the establishment of a dominant party system determine the character of the regime. The set of argument addresses two questions: a) how clientelism can be causally associated with the rise and consolidation of an inclusive hegemony and b) whether clientelism is compatible with typical properties of democracy. The causal model presented indicates how clientelism affects political behaviour and overall competition. By incorporating agential and structural parameters it explains the consolidation of inclusive hegemonies. The same model provides the grounds for the formulation of two arguments on the democratic credentials of clientelism which allows the analysis to pass judgment on the character of inclusive hegemonies. 3 Acknowledgements I owe a great deal of gratitude to a number of people who have helped me overcome daunting difficulties and anxieties over an uneven period and have encouraged me to stand by my decision to attempt to make a small contribution to democratic theory. I particularly benefited from conversations with Prof. Mark Pennington, Dr. Steve Davies, Prof. Peter Boetke and Prof. Patrick Dunleavy. I owe my gratitude to Dr. Nigel Ashford, Prof. Panos Kazakos and Prof. Loukas Tsoukalis for their whole-hearted and consistent academic support. I owe a special thanks to Dr Françoise Boucek for our discussions of the latest developments in the literature on dominant party system and her useful comments on my paper on Clientelism and Development published as a University of Oxford Development Working Paper. I would like to thank my supervisor Professor Kevin Featherstone for his patience with the numerous drafts I have emailed him over time. I would also like to thank Col. Stergios Kazakis for allowing me to spend time on writing a part of the thesis during military service in Greece. Finally, I would like to acknowledge the financial support I received from the A.G. Leventis Foundation and the Tzirakian family in the early years of my research. Above all, I would like to thank my family whose unconditional support has made it possible for me to prepare for, embark on, and insist in following a challenging career path. 4 Table of Contents Chapter 1 Dominant party systems: conceptualisation, causality and implicit assumptions 8 1.1 Inclusive hegemony: problems of conceptualisation 8 1.2 Clientelism: conceptual and analytical problems 13 1.3. Contents of the thesis: analytical steps to theory development 17 Chapter 2 Understanding one-party dominance: A deontological defence of the pluralist framework 21 2.1 Introduction 2 1 2.2 Two bodies of literature 22 2.3 A defence of the pluralist approach to dominance 35 2.4 Final remarks 42 Chapter 3 The paradox of one-party dominance: social diversity, power resources and the state 44 3.1 Introduction 44 3.2 Historical accounts of democracy and democratisation: from social diversity to political competition 45 3.3 The concept of power: coercion, incentives and economic resources 50 3.4 Power and power resources 53 3.5 Power and the state 55 3.6 Final remarks 59 Chapter 4 Political Mobilisation and Interest Accommodation: How Clientelism Works 61 4.1 Introduction 61 4.2 Assumptions of a causal link between clientelism and electoral mobilisation 62 4.3 Empirical hints: post-communist transition and party competition 64 5 4.4 Preference formation, access to information and the recruitment of resources 66 4.5 Party organisation: clientelist incentives as a solution to the collective action problem 69 4.6 Interest accommodation and clientelist networks 74 4.7 Broader implications 77 4.8 Final remarks 78 Chapter 5 The link between clientelism and hegemony 81 5.1 Introductory comments 81 5.2 Clientelism and the party structure: monopoly control, range and areas of ‘exit’ 82 5.3 Assumptions and objections 90 5.4 Continuity and change: the role of agency 93 5.5 Continuity and change: structural constraints 96 5.6 Final remarks 99 Chapter 6 The authoritarian nature of inclusive hegemony: a note on clientelism 101 6.1 Introductory comments 101 6.2 Clientelism: legitimacy, consensus and particularistic politics 101 6.3 Clientelism as an illegitimate form of particularistic politics 110 6.4 Clientelism, exit and voice 113 6.5 Final remarks 115 Chapter 7 Conclusion: pluralism, dominance and political analysis 117 7.1 Summary of the analysis 117 7.2 Broader theoretical and epistemological implications 124 7.2.1 Structure and agency 124 7.2.2 Balance of power 126 7.3 Epilogue: implications for normative democratic theory 130 Bibliography 134 6 Tables Table 1: Election results of presidential elections by candidate in four post- communist countries: the incumbent versus the leader of the opposition 27 Table 2: Popularity of the incumbent in four post-communist regimes 28 Table 3: Causal model linking clientelism with inter-party competitiveness 76 Table 4: Types of clientelism and effect on the competitiveness of the party system 89 Table 5: Options and pay-offs for political parties in clientelism 93 7 Chapter 1 Dominant party systems: conceptualisation, causality and assumptions 1.1 Inclusive hegemony: problems of conceptualisation Dominant party systems cut across the boundaries between typical democracy and authoritarianism. The growing literatures on dominant party systems and semi- authoritarianism seek to address two fundamental questions: to classify dominant party systems along the typical conceptions of democracy and authoritarianism and to identify explanatory variables that can be associated with the rise and consolidation of dominant party systems. These two questions are interrelated. The nature of one-party dominance can only be assessed in full after the explanatory variables associated with the rise of party dominance are identified. Likewise, making hypotheses about possible explanatory paths cannot refrain from passing judgment on the character of the regime they produce. It is on this basis that the literature on dominant party systems has drawn a distinction between authoritarian and democratic dominant party systems. Following a Schumpeterian-procedural approach to democracy, it has been effortlessly concluded that dominant parties are authoritarian when tools such as physical violence, fraud and intimidation, are employed to distort the genuine representation of voters’ preferences, posing restrictions to public liberties that interfere in the way voters’ preferences are formed and represented in politics. However, the literature has remained inconclusive about dominant parties facing low degrees of political competition, which do not, however, pose any of these direct hindrances to political participation. In this type of party system the exposure of the dominant party to contestation is limited yet political dominance is achieved and maintained through practices that do not directly block political participation. This form of party dominance can be associated with Robert Dahl’s notion of ‘inclusive hegemony’ – a party system facing low degrees of contestability (1971:8, 34), based on his conception of democracy as polyarchy, which includes two dimensions, participation and contestation (Dahl, 1971:1-9). Low contestability refers to a state of affairs in which, despite the presence of elections open to all 8 parties, a party
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