VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH PUTIN’S UNITED RUSSIA: THE HOW AND WHY OF RUSSIA’S NEW PARTY OF POWER
THESIS
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree Master of Arts in the Graduate
School of the Ohio State University
By
Daniel James Sell, B.A.
*****
The Ohio State University 2008
Thesis Committee: Approved By
Professor Trevor Brown, Adviser ______Adviser Professor David Hoffmann Slavic and East European Studies Graduate Program
Copyright by
Daniel James Sell
2008
ABSTRACT
This paper serves to study the new ‘party of power,’ United Russia, that has emerged in the Russian Federation with Vladimir Vladimorovich Putin as the head of this party. It will look at what exactly a party of power is, and how Putin was able to solidify power in the country in the office of the president and transfer this power to United Russia. This paper looks at factors, such as the fact that Russia has a hybrid regime in place, which made it possible for the party of power to emerge, thus providing a small roadmap on how to create a party of power. Finally, this paper shows areas where Putin and his party of power could lose strength and what might possibly happen in regards to the political situation in the country if this were to happen.
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Dedicated to my father
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I wish to thank my advisor, Trevor Brown, for support, encouragement, enthusiasm, flexibility in working long-distance on this project, and patience. Without his help, this thesis would not have been possible. I would also like to thank David
Hoffmann, who so graciously agreed to serve on my thesis defense committee.
I thank all of my family for all of the support they have given. However, certain members deserve to be singled out. My mom deserves much credit, as it was her that continued to push me to study harder. My mother-in-law also deserves credit for motivating me with her questions about when I would finally finish my thesis. Efim
L’vovich Sushin, my grandfather-in-law, significantly helped in the search for documents regarding United Russia and the political system in Russia.
Most important, I would like to thank my wonderful, patient, and understanding wife, Nelly. It was her who continued to motivate me when I did not want to work. She was there for the beginning and the end of this thesis, and never stopped being at my side when I needed help. Without her, I highly doubt this project would have ever been finished.
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VITA
December 20, 1982…………………………………Born – Royal Oak, Michigan, U.S.A.
2004…………………………………………………B.A. History, Capital University
FIELDS OF STUDY
Major Field: Slavic and East European Studies
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………ii Dedication………………………………………………………………………………...iii Acknowledgments…………………………………………………………………….….iv Vita………………………………………………………………………………………...v List of Figures…………………………………………………………………….……..viii
Chapters:
1. Introduction………………………………………………………………………..1
2. Party of Power: A Definition……………………………………………………...6
3. A Necessary Distinction: Party of Power vs. Ruling Party……………………...10
4. Level of Democracy’s Influence on the Political Situation……………………...12
5. Russia as a Hybrid Regime: The Reason for Varied Level of Russian
Democracy……………………………………………………………………….16
6. What Kind of Hybrid Regime has Been Implemented?…………………………19
6.1 Competitive Authoritarianism……………………………………………….18
6.2 Semi-Presidentialism………………………………………………………...24
7. Semi-Presidentialism’s Impact on Democracy…………………………………..29
8. Hybrid Regimes’ Allow Parties of Power to Grow……………………………...32
9. Why Chose a Party of Power to Solidify Control?………………………………36
10. Benefits of Hybrid Regimes When Choosing to Create a Party of Power………47
11. A Roadmap for Autocrats: How to Create a Party of Power ……………………54
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12. The Dangers of a Power Split and the World Financial Crisis ………………….61
13. Conclusion……………………………………………………………………….69
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………..73
vii LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
1 Freedom House rankings for Russia for the period 1991-2007………………….14
2 Rankings for Russia from the study Nations in Transit………………………….15
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Russia is the largest country in the world occupying a territory of 17,075,200 km2
(approximately 10,610,037 mi2). Russia, therefore, occupies approximately 3% of the
world’s territory. This seems like a small percentage, but Russia is about twice as large
as Canada and the United States, which are the second and third largest countries
respectively. It has borders with fourteen countries located in both Asia and Europe. A
country that occupies this much territory and has these unique borders should be a fairly interesting country, which is certainly the case with Russia.1
Any number of problems could arise when trying to rule such a vast and diverse country. In fact many problems have arisen, continue to face the country, and will most likely continue on for many more years. How is it possible to control a country that spans eleven time zones? This paper will focus on Russia’s new party of power, United
Russia, which President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin has created and used to rule the country. This paper will look at the question of how Putin has been able to create a
“party of power” in Russia and set himself up as the leader of this party. By tackling this issue, the levels of centralization in the government and politics in general will become
1 Information from this paragraph comes from, Central Intelligence Agency, “CIA Factbook,”
evident. We must look at how Putin has been able to center power around himself and the office of the president of the Russian Federation. It is also important to see where his popularity comes from and how it is rooted in the country. We must also look at what factors have enabled Putin to create a party of power, and, thus, why he chose this option for consolidating power. It will become apparent that Russia has a hybrid regime, which was an enabling factor in creating the party of power. It is also important to look at why
Putin chose this route over other methods of consolidating power. By looking at these topics, we will see how politics has been shaped in the last eight years, and how it will likely continue under the new president with Putin still in a position of power. This will make it possible to point to the future and create an idea of what the world should expect from Russia in the coming years.
In order to rule such a country as Russia, a large government is necessary. The chief of the state, or the president is the head of the executive branch. The head of the government, the prime minister, along with his deputy prime ministers and ministers of different ministries run the government. The legislative branch is called the Federal
Assembly (Federalnoe Sobranie) and is bicameral. It consists of the Federation Council
(Sovet Federatsii) and the State Duma (Gosudarstvennaya Duma). There is a large bureaucracy that is used to govern the eleven time zones it occupies, and consists of employees on every different level, i.e. federal, regional, county, etc.
This is at least what the country’s government looks like on paper. Anyone who studies Russia will undoubtedly know that the power structure is something quite different. During President Putin’s presidency, he began to form a much stronger and much more centralized bureaucracy. He has created a unique regime that is full of
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contradictions. The largest contradiction, which really is the cause of most of the others,
is that it is a “semiauthoritarian regime in democratic clothing,” as Ivan Krastev, the
editor of Foreign Policy’s Bulgarian edition, noted.2
Why should this current paper, along with thousands of other books and articles, be devoted to the study of the political situation in Russia? First of all, it is important to find out why such an odd contradiction has emerged in Russia. Once this is accomplished, it is possible to set out on the path to fix these problems. This is the only way that it will be possible to ensure that Russia has not just democratic clothing, but also something of a democratic foundation.
Secondly, world relations with Russia are sliding downhill. “Cooperation
[between Russia and the West] is becoming the exception, not the norm”3 was one such
warning that was given to the Council on Foreign Relations as early as 2006. Then, in
2007, Stephen Sestanovich noted in his testimony before the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, “Relations between Moscow and Washington are changing—and largely for
the worse. We need to understand how and why, and what to do about it.”4
These warnings are completely correct in noting that we need to understand how
and why these relations are sliding downhill before we can figure out how to fix this
problem. One way we can figure out how is to look at the overall political situation in
Russia. This will allow us to figure out what is taking place inside the country itself and
how it is affecting Russia’s standing in the world community.
2 Ivan Krastev, “What Russia Wants,” Foreign Policy, May/June 2008, 48. 3 Council on Foreign Relations, “Russia’s Wrong Direction: What the United States Can and Should Do,” Independent Task Force Report, no. 57 (2006), 4. 4 Stephen Sestanovich, House Foreign Affairs Committee, “Russian-American Relations: Problems and Prospects,” 110th Congress, First Session, May 17, 2007. 3
Thirdly, if we do not figure out why these relations are moving backwards, we
will not be able to fix the problem and we will risk moving towards Cold War II.
Sestanovich notes that calling the problem of relations with Russia a ‘new Cold War’ is
clearly wrong.5 As of the current moment, this is correct, however, this may not be sound
advice for much longer if the United States and the West in general do not find a way to
move closer to Russia and create better ties with the country. A friendlier Russia is
undoubtedly something that the global community desires.
By studying the political situation in Russia, it is possible to gain a better
understanding of the country in general and what is taking place there. Russia has a long
history of integrating daily life with politics which began in the Soviet Union. By better
understanding the political, and thus, daily life in Russia, it will be possible to look to the
future. Only by understanding politics, culture, and daily life in Russia can a country
begin to help repair any problems that Russia has. By studying the contradictions and
problems in Russia, it will become evident that Russia is not lost yet, but that it could be
if something is not done soon.
It is next to impossible to predict the future of a country, especially one like
Russia. It is so hard that some senior officials in the United States government did not
even make certain plans for the future, because they did not think it was possible Russia
and Putin would take certain actions.6 It is understood now that the Russian political
situation is so unstable that to attempt predicting the future will only turn out badly and
will leave people unprepared. Governments now must be prepared for anything to
5 Ibid. 6 Peter Baker, “U.S. Ends Attempt To Influence Russia,” The Saint Petersburg Times, 9 October 2007. 4
happen in Russia. However, by looking at the last eight years of Putin’s reign, it is possible to begin to understand what has happened in Russia and what the future might look like. This task is very important, because as Dimitry Trenin has noted, “Russia is too important to be ignored, neglected, or stereotyped.”7
7 Dmitri Trenin, “Russia Redefines Itself and Its Relations with the West,” The Washington Quarterly, 30:2, Spring 2007, 104. 5
CHAPTER 2
PARTY OF POWER: A DEFINITION
To begin with, we must first look at the term party of power and provide a
definition for this term. As this term goes hand in hand with the thesis of this paper, it is
important to make sure that it is sufficiently understood. Interestingly enough, the term
party of power was first used to talk about parties where Communist regimes were in power, such as the former USSR and China just to name a few. Parties, such as the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, were referred to as parties of power because they were the parties that were undoubtedly in full control of the political landscape of their respective countries. The Communist Party certainly yielded a very large role in the political situation in countries where it was in power.
More recently this term has been used to refer to parties in Asia, Latin and South
America, and the former Soviet Union, such as the Russian Federation. It is in these areas where delegative democracies have arisen according to Guillermo O’Donnell,
which refers to countries that have democratic tendencies, but do not have representative
democracies in the traditional sense. 8 This delegative aspect of such regimes that
O’Donnell has uncovered is one factor allowing such parties of powers to grow. Tatyana
8 Guillermo O’Donnell, “Delegative Democracy,” in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Platter (eds.), The Global Resurgence in Democracy, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 94-95. 6
Stanovaya, an expert with the Center of Political Technologies, has argued that
this phrase is used to describe the political party system and organization specifically in
the former Soviet Union.9 Such a narrow definition is most likely due to the popularity
of said term during the times of the Soviet Union and its growing popularity when
referring to United Russia in the Russian Federation. However, this does not mean that
such a term is insufficient for other areas of the world, such as Latin and South America,
Asia, and Africa.
The first modern party of power in Russia was created in 1993 and the movement
was called Choice of Russia. This movement united many of the democratic forces,
which emerged under the rule of Mikhail Gorbachev during glasnost and perestroika.
Boris Yeltsin was able to use this movement as the ideological foundation for his new
system, and he found a great deal of support from this newly created union of democratic
forces. However, over time political parties and movements that were created started
becoming less ideological. As Stanovaya has noted, “Parties of power later became
increasingly less ideological, more administrative and less independent politically. In
other words, the phenomenon turned into a tool for the political management of the party
system.”10 Therefore, the parties stopped providing an ideology, which the common
citizen could relate to, and began simply providing support for the party controlled by the
administration. It is important to note that these first parties of power were not very
strong. For example, Yeltsin’s Choice of Russia was only able to gather 15% of the vote
9 Tatyana Stanovaya, “What is Russian party of power?,” GlobalSecurity.org, RIA Novosti, June 14, 2005. 10 Ibid. 7
in parliamentary elections in 1993.11 Similar trends continued throughout the first decade of the Russian Federation.
Grigorii Golosov, the author of Political Parties in the Regions of Russia:
Democracy Unclaimed, agrees with Stanovaya’s ideas, but he has taken his definition of
party of power somewhat further. Golosov wrote:
The parties of power are not parties in power. Throughout the 1993-2003 period, Russia's presidents were not members of any parties, and the same applies to the majority of other senior officials within the federal executive. Rather, the parties of power were electoral vehicles. The specific purpose pursued by them is to bring to the national legislature politicians who are loyal to the federal executive. The ultimate rationale for their existence is therefore to provide the executive with certain levels of legislative support without sharing power or responsibility.12
Golosov is absolutely correct that these parties of power are not in power, and this
definition is right on when speaking about the party United Russia. Even today the main
political figures in Russia, such as Putin and Medvedev, are not official members of the
party of power. Therefore, the people creating the ideology for the parties and
controlling them are not party members, meaning that the main political players in the
country are simply controlling these parties. As Golosov has pointed out, these parties
are only artificial parties since they do not provide any legitimate political philosophy for
the country to follow. Instead, they simply work as electoral vehicles, which are able to
ensure that the members of the political elite have enough support to accomplish their
own aims, goals, and projects.
11 Ibid. 12 Grigorii Golosov, Political Parties in the Regions of Russia: Democracy Unclaimed, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004), 29-30. 8
Using both Stanovaya’s and Golosov’s definitions, we are able to come up with a suitable definition for the term party of power. For the purposes of this paper, a party of power is defined as follows:
A party, which provides administrative support to the political elite and has fairly little political independence. In this manner it is used as a political tool for managing the party system. It represents the interests of the authorities. The political elite are not necessarily members of the party, although this is not a prerequisite. The parties are vehicles providing loyal members in the national legislature and legislative support. The parties share very little, or at times no power or responsibility with the political elite.
Throughout this paper, it will become quite evident that this definition is perfect for explaining how United Russia works and for describing its role in the Russian political system.
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CHAPTER 3
A NECESSARY DISTINCTION: PARTY OF POWER VS. RULING PARTY
At no time should readers become confused and fall into the trap of believing that a party of power is simply a ruling party. These two terms refer to two different types of parties. However, these two types of parties do have many similarities. As Stanovaya noted, the main difference between a party of power and a ruling party is that “the decision-making nucleus remains outside the party”13 when referring to parties of power.
As previously mentioned, Putin and Medevev are not members of United Russia. These are the main people who control the ideology of the party and control its main functions.
Therefore, it is quite clear that the decision-making nucleus remains outside of the party.
Upon taking a closer look at the situation, it is evident that the decision-making nucleus is dominated so severely by Putin that even other parties and politicians hardly participate in running the government, especially when speaking about the ideology and the course of the country. The problem is that the government, including the State Duma, has essentially promised to simply follow the whims and desires of Putin. As Nabi
Abdullaev noted, “The government and Duma’s promise to follow a set of policies called
Putin’s Plan reveals the importance of Putin’s role at the top of the power vertical.”14
13 Stanovaya. 14 Nabi Abdullaev, “How Vladimir Putin Put the Kremlin Back On Top,” Saint Petersburg Times, 5 February 2008. 10
Putin’s place at the top of this power vertical gives him an excellent vantage point from
which he can dominate the course of the country.
Putin’s plan sheds light onto the situation regarding how decisions regarding the
future course of the country are made. Putin’s Plan, or Plan Putina in Russian, is a plan
that has been created to tackle social, economic, and military problems along with the
problem, according to some peoples’ opinion, of Russia’s deteriorated status in the world
community. According to a brochure, which I received from supporters of United Russia
shortly before the State Duma elections in December 2007, Putin’s Plan is a “victory for
Russia. It is a continuance of the move towards the best. It is success for every citizen of
the country.”15 Putin’s Plan also comes with slogans such as “We believe in Russia! We
believe in ourselves!”16
With political propaganda such as this, it is not hard to understand why people do
believe that Putin’s Plan is good for the country. However, it does not explain why he
has been able to convince the majority of politicians and bureaucrats in the country to
believe in it and follow it without any resistance. The best explanation for this is the
removed decision-making nucleus. The nucleus has gone from simply being removed from the party to being removed from society and people in general. It is now placed solely in Putin’s hands. This removal of the nucleus is a very important distinction for a party of power. Stanovaya’s idea on the displacement of the decision-making nucleus in
parties of power is so important that it should in fact be added to the definition of a party
of power provided in this paper.
15 “Plan Putina,” political brochure handed out by United Russia, 2007. 16 Ibid. 11
CHAPTER 4
LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY’S INFLUENCE ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION
Let us take the example of United Russia and Putin’s Plan and compare it with the political party situation in the United States, which is undoubtedly a country with a very hearty democratic tradition. By using such a comparison and taking into consideration the overall democratic situation in these two countries, it is understandable why there are differences and why parties of power are able to arise in a country like Russia but not in the United States.
Would it be possible for such a plan to work in the United States? Most any rational person would say that, at least at the given moment and not any time in the foreseeable future, such a plan would not be successful. Simply looking at the heated debate that raged between Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton, the two most successful candidates for the Democratic Party nomination for the president of the United States in
2008, it is apparent that this sort of plan would not work. Each politician put forth his or her own ideas and opinions on issues. Of course these ideas often were quite similar at times, but it was still possible to separate the two candidates. Both candidates had websites and brochures with fancy slogans and inspiring quotations, but citizens, especially our top politicians and leaders, stop to question whether they are accurate and do not simply take the candidates’ word for it.
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What is the difference between these two countries then that allows for such a
difference? The difference undoubtedly lies in the overall level of democracy and the
governmental structures which have arisen in these countries. As Phillippe C. Schmitter
and Terry Lynn Karl have noted, “Democracy does not consist of a single unique set of institutions. There are many types of democracies, and their diverse practices produce a similarly varied set of effects.”17 It is extremely hard to say exactly what democracy
entails, and to give a one hundred percent flawless definition of democracy is impossible.
However, despite the difficulties of flawlessly defining democracy, it is evident
that the United States is much more democratic than Russia. Simply looking at statistics
and rankings from Freedom House, an organization that works to rate countries based on
political rights and civil liberties18, it is evident that there are different levels of
democracy. In the last ranking produced in 2007, Freedom House provided the United
States with a 1 for both political rights and civil liberties, while Russia received a 6 for
political rights and a 5 for civil liberties.19 Therefore, the United States falls into the
category ‘Free’ and Russian falls into the category ‘Not Free’ according to Freedom
House.
Figure 1 on page 14 shows the rankings for the Russian Federation since 1991,
which is when the Russian Federation first appeared after the collapse of the Soviet
17 Phillippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “What Democracy Is…And Is Not,” in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Platter eds., The Global Resurgence of Democracy, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 50. 18 Rankings are on a scale from 1 to 7, with one being the best ranking, and 7 being the worst ranking. Based on these numerical rankings, countries are then put into one of three groups, Free, Partly Free, or Not Free. 19 Freedom House, “Freedom in the World Historical Rankings,”
Union. Figure 2 on page 15 is a chart with rankings in different areas from the study entitled Nations in Transit, also produced by Freedom House, which is meant to show a comparative and comprehensive outlook on reform in the former Communist states of the
Soviet Union. These rankings show a disturbing trend for the Russian Federation, as they have continued to worsen in the years since Russia became an independent country.
These numbers correspond with the United States Agency for International Aid’s
(USAID) belief that “Russia’s transition to democracy is far from complete”20 and imply that the level of Russian democracy is still lacking in certain aspects.
7 6 5 4 Political Rights 3 Civil Liberties 2 1 0 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
Figure 1 – Freedom House rankings for Russia for the period 1991-200721
20 United States Agency for International Aid, “USAID/Russia Strategy Statement,”
NIT Ratings 1997 1998 1999 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 National N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.75 6.00 Governance Electoral 3.50 3.50 4.00 4.25 4.50 4.75 5.50 6.00 6.25 Process Civil Society 3.75 4.00 3.75 4.00 4.00 4.25 4.50 4.75 5.00 Independent 3.75 4.25 4.75 5.25 5.50 5.50 5.75 6.00 6.00 Media Local N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.75 5.75 Governance Judicial N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.25 5.25 Framework and Independence Corruption N/A N/A 6.25 6.25 6.00 5.75 5.75 5.75 6.00 Democracy N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.61 5.73 Rating
Figure 2 – Rankings for Russia from the study Nations in Transit22
22 These rankings are on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being the best score, and 7 being the worst score. Freedom House, “Nations in Transit Country Report: Russia,”
CHAPTER 5
RUSSIA AS A HYBRID REGIME: THE REASON FOR VARIED LEVEL OF RUSSIAN DEMOCRACY
Where do these apparent differences between the hearty democracy in the United
States and the low-level democracy in Russia come from? This difference comes from
the systems of government that have arisen in these separate countries. The United States
has a very strong history and tradition of a successful presidential system and is in fact
“the only presidential democracy with a long history of constitutional continuity,”23 while
Russia has become a sort of hybrid system.
As Larry Diamond has noted, “Virtually all hybrid regimes in the world today are
quite deliberately pseudodemocratic,”24 which is a result of the fact that“the existence of
formally democratic political institutions, such as multiparty electoral competition, masks
(often, in part, to legitimate) the reality of authoritarian domination.”25 This is exactly
how the situation in Russia has begun to look. Timothy J. Colton and Cindy Skach, who
are leaders in the discussion on hybrid regimes, have noted that the Russian political
system
23 Juan J. Linz, “The Perils of Presidentialism,” in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Platter eds.. The Global Resurgence of Democracy, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 124-125. 24 Larry Diamond, “Thinking About Hybrid Regimes,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 2, April 2002, 24. 25 Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America, (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1989), xviii. 16
can best be termed hybrid because it has both elements of authoritarian rule and
liberalism.26 It is possible to say that certain democratic institutions, such as elections,
exist in Russia. However, these institutions are often flawed or have been created as a
façade to show that there is democracy in the country.
There were many complaints about the fairness and validity of both the State
Duma elections in 2007 and the presidential elections in 2008. Several international
observers, along with many foreign ministers of foreign countries, criticized the Duma
elections and said that they were unfair and undemocratic.27 Numbers, which were reported from certain areas of Russia during the presidential elections, have also come under scrutiny because of anomalies and irregularities in the voter turnout and actual amount received by Medvedev.28
These problems can be explained by the fact that Russia is a “semiauthoritarian
regime in democratic clothing”29 according to Ivan Krastev. However, Krastev has
seemed to travel too far into the future. Currently, Russia is simply at the phase where the
democratic institutions, such as elections, “begin to ring hollow” because Russia is in a
situation “where power remains undivided, authoritarian elements linger, and civil
society is weak.”30 While Krastev seems to have overstepped in his description of
26 Timothy J. Colton and Cindy Skach, “The Russian Predicament,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 16, No. 3, July 2005, 114. 27 David Nowak, “Observers Criticize ‘Managed Elections’,” The Moscow Times, 4 December 2007. 28 Nabi Abdullaev, “Election Numbers Questioned,” Saint Petersburg Times, 15 April 2008. 29 Krastev, 48. 30 Lilia Shevtsova, “Russia's Hybrid Regime,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 12, No. 4, October 2001, 66. 17
Russia’s regime, he could prove to be more accurate in the future if Russia continues down the path portrayed by their Freedom House rankings and the democratic institutions stop only beginning to ring hollow, but stop ringing at all.
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CHAPTER 6
WHAT KIND OF HYBRID REGIME HAS BEEN IMPLEMENTED?
Many different terms have come about to determine differing hybrid regimes.
This paper will talk about two of the most useful terms that have emerged and which can be used to describe Russia. The first term is competitive authoritarianism, which can be found in both presidential and parliamentary governments and deals with democracy levels in general. The second term is semi-presidential, which covers presidential systems and is important for understanding what system has developed in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Competitive Authoritarianism
Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way have tackled the issue of competitive authoritarianism because of its importance in understanding the overall political situation in much of Africa, post-communist Eurasia, and Latin America. They believe that many countries in these three regions began to “combine democratic rules with authoritarian governance.”31 This idea corresponds with the ideas on hybrid regimes and Russia presented earlier in this paper. The issue of competitive authoritarianism became so important because scholars often treated the regimes in these three regions as “incomplete
31 Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 2, 51. 19
or transitional forms of democracy.”32 Levitsky and Way also pointed out that “in many cases these expectations (or hopes) proved overly optimistic.”33 Any expectations for Russia as a country transitioning to democracy have certainly come under scrutiny.
No longer can Russia be seen as a transitional country as it was in the 1990s. Russia is one of the many countries in Africa and the former Soviet Union that Levitsky and Way noted have “either remained hybrid or moved in an authoritarian direction.”34 It can certainly be argued that Russia is one of the countries that moved in this authoritarian direction.
It was because of the countries like Russia that Levitsky and Way believed it was important to begin looking at the idea of competitive authoritarianism. If these countries did not turn out as everyone expected or hoped, then a new way of defining them must be created since they are no longer countries performing the transition to full-scale democracy. Levitsky and Way claim that there are four minimum criteria which all modern democratic regimes meet:
1) executives and legislatures are chosen through elections that are open, free, and fair; 2) virtually all adults possess the right to vote; 3) political rights and civil liberties, including freedom of the press, freedom of association, and freedom to criticize the government without reprisal, are broadly protected; and 4) elected authorities possess real authority to govern, in that they are not subject to the tutelary control of military or clerical leaders.35
The fact that a regime violates these criteria frequently and seriously is what makes them competitive authoritarian regimes. Such regimes are not completely authoritarian,
32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid., 53. 20
because they have certain democratic institutions and characteristics, and they are not completely democratic, because they have frequent violations of the four criteria for democracies.
According to Levitsky and Way’s definition, it is possible to title Russia as a competitive authoritarian regime. Violations of these four fundamental criteria for democracies can be found in Russia frequently enough. However, some of these criteria are in fact satisfied in Russia. Violations have occurred and continue to occur in regards to the first and third criteria while the second and fourth remain fairly in tact in Russia.
Elections are regularly held when they should be according to the Constitution of the Russian Federation. However, these elections are not always open, free, and fair.
The Duma elections in 2007 and the situation that developed with elections observers is a prime example of this problem. The government tried very hard to restrict the amount of election observers who would be allowed to come to Russia for the elections so that there would be less criticism of the Russian elections. Much of the criticism revolving around elections observers came when Russia decided to limit the number of elections observers allowed to come to represent the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) and to limit the time they could be in the country. The spokeswoman for OSCE noted that this was the first time such a situation has occurred and stated, “That is unprecedented and will affect our ability to do our work in a serious and meaningful way.”36 It seems as though Russia indeed wanted to affect the ability of this organization to work. If there were no problems in the country related to elections, then the government would not have taken such measures against an organization that is seen as
36 “Russia Limits OSCE Observers,” The Saint Petersburg Times, 2 November 2007. 21
one of the best in the promotion of democracy throughout the world. Once the observers
did manage to come and take part in the elections, they noted that the elections were “not
held on a level playing field.”37
Not all of the civil liberties mentioned in the third criteria are broadly protected in
Russia. The freedom of the press is the largest problem that Russia has in respect to civil
liberties. The Russian government constantly harasses the press despite Section 5 of
Article 29 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation stating, “The freedom of mass
communication shall be guaranteed. Censorship shall be banned.”38 The Representative
on Freedom of the Media, Miklós Haraszti, for the OSCE noted that there were 8
significant instances of the government harassing media outlets just in October and
November 2007 before the Duma elections.39 Also according to the OSCE, “The state-
funded media failed to offer a balanced and objective coverage of the relevant political subjects and parties”40 during the campaign for Duma elections.
Problems also occur in Russia regarding freedom of association, despite Section 1
of Article 30 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation stating, “Everyone shall have
the right to association.”41 Also, Article 31 of the Constitution states, “Citizens of the
Russian Federation shall have the right to assemble peacefully, without weapons, hold
37 “Russian Duma elections ‘not held on a level playing field’, say parliamentary observers,” Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly. 38 Constitution of the Russian Federation, art. 29, sec. 5. 39 Miklós Haraszti, “Cases of media freedom violations during the electoral campaign to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, 2007,” Organization for Security and Co- operation in Europe. 40 Ibid. 41 Constitution, art. 30, sec. 1. 22
rallies, meetings and demonstrations, marches and pickets.”42 The government has the
ability to decide who receives permits for rallies, protests, etc. This enables them to keep
strict control over such activities. Such an example of repressing the freedom of
association occurred right after the Duma elections. A rally in Saint Petersburg was
scheduled for 4 December 2008 in order to protest purported violations during the Duma
elections. The leaders of the rally even received a permit for the event, but during the
rally police showed up and arrested eleven protestors. The reason for the arrests was
cited that the chief of the Committee for Law, Public Order and Security, who had
originally provided the permit for the rally, called on the day of the rally and said that he
had not permitted it.43
While Russia has problems with these two criteria, the remaining two are fairly
well supported in Russia. Virtually all adults in Russia do posses the right to vote. As
long as you are a citizen of the Russian Federation and above the age of eighteen, you are
entitled to vote in elections. According to the Constitution, only those citizens who are
“recognized by court as legally unfit, as well as citizens kept in places of confinement by
a court sentence”44 are unable to vote. Also, the politicians and leaders that these people elect are not subject to the control of the military. In fact, for Putin this has never been a problem due to his years served in the State Committee for Security (KGB).
Therefore, while there are certain violations in Russia, there are also certain criteria which are fulfilled in Russia. In fact, violations occur in relation to only two of
42 Constitution, art. 31. 43 Sergey Chernov, “Small Election Protest Squashed by Riot Police,” The Saint Petersburg Times, 4 December 2007. 44 Constitution, art. 32, sec. 3. 23
the criteria, which means that Russia could be considered as a half-democracy since they
fulfill 50% of the criteria for modern democracies. Due to the fact that certain countries,
such as Russia, fulfill certain criteria but not other criteria, Levitsky and Way noted,
“Competitive authoritarianism must therefore be distinguished from unstable, ineffective,
or otherwise flawed types of regimes that nevertheless meet basic standards of
democracy.”45 Despite Russia allowing certain violations to occur, the country does meet other certain basic standards of democracy. On the one hand Russia cannot be called fully authoritarian, but on the other hand it cannot be called fully democratic, which is why Russia can be placed in the group of competitive authoritarian countries.
Semi-Presidentialism
While the term competitive authoritarianism can be used to describe Russia in terms of the level of democracy in the country, it does little to describe the governmental system. Of course the government is at least partly responsible for the violations which occur in the country, especially when they are supported by state authorities. The term semi-presidential will help to describe the governmental system much better. This term is very important for a discussion on Russia because of the fact that such a system was chosen instead of a purely parliamentary system or purely presidential system.
Maurice Duverger coined the term semi-presidentialism in order to exaplin the situation occurring in France with the Fifth Republic. Duverger noted, “There are in fact three type of semi-presidential regimes: the president can be a mere figurehead, or he
45 Levitsky and Way, 53. 24
may be all-powerful or again he can share his power with parliament.”46 In the case of
Russia, the president was an all-powerful body while President Putin was in office, and in fact remains that way. However, this could likely change to the situation described where the president shares his power with the parliament in the future with former President
Putin as the new prime minister.
Duverger outlined very useful criteria for defining a semi-presidential system. He wrote:
A regime is considered semi-presidential if: (1) the president of the republic is elected by universal suffrage, (2) he possesses quite considerable powers; (3) he has opposite him, however, a prime minister and ministers who possess executive and governmental power and can stay in office only if the parliament does not show its Opposition to them.47
While this was the first definition that was popularly accepted, newer, and, thus, perhaps more modern definitions have developed. One such example was provided by
Gianfranco Pasquino when he wrote:
My opinion is that a system must be considered semi-presidential if (1) the president of the Republic is directly or indirectly elected by a popular vote; (2) the president of the Republic has the power to appoint a Prime Minister and, within limits, to dissolve Parliament; (3) the Prime Minister is subject to an implicit or explicit confidence vote by Parliament.48
Pasquino claimed that these changes were made because “a competitive diarchy is not an essential and unavoidable feature of semipresidential systems” and would only be present
46 Abstract of Maurice Duverger, “A new political system model: Semi-presidential government,” European Journal of Political Research, 8, 1980, in “Nominations and Reflections: A new political system,” European Journal of Political Research 31, 1997, 125. 47 Maurice Duverger, “A new political system model: Semi-presidential government,” European Journal of Political Research, 8, 1980, 166. 48 Gianfranco Pasquino, “Nomination: Semi-presidentialism: A political model at work,” in “Nominations and Reflections,” 130. 25
when the president and prime minister come from different parties, which in turn creates
a power struggle.49 Both sets of criteria actually work when considering Russia, and
neither one should be considered as better than the other.
When looking at Duverger’s criteria, it is quite evident that Russia is in fact a
semi-presidential country. First, the president is elected by universal suffrage since all
citizens over the age of eighteen have the right to vote. Second, the Russian presidency
involves quite a considerable number of powers. In fact, Colton and Skach noted, “If we
measure the de jure powers of the presidents in Russia, the French Fifth Republic, and
Weimar Germany, the Russian president is constitutionally almost twice as powerful as
the president of the Fifth Republic, and at least one-third more powerful than was the
Weimar president.”50 These numbers are based on Mathew Soberg Shugart and John M.
Carey’s assessment of presidential powers with Colton and Skach’s additional
calculations for emergency powers. Some of the main powers the president has are “the
power to dissolve the lower house, the State Duma, for cause; a monopoly over all
ministerial appointments other than that of the prime minister; a nearly unrestricted right
to emit decrees; and immunity of the presidential establishment and the bureaucracy to
legislative oversight.”51 This is quite a significant list of very important powers held by
the president. The third criterion is also fulfilled in Russia since there are ministers and a
49 Ibid., 131. 50 Timothy J. Colton and Cindy Skach, “Semi-Presidentialism in Russia and Post- Communist Europe: Ameliorating or Aggravating Democratic Possibilities?”, in Working Group II “Constitutional and Institutional Mechanisms to Avoid Ruptures and Paralysis,” presented at the III General Assembly of the Club of Madrid, 11. Using a modified version of the Shugart/Carey Index of presidential power to compare these countries, France’s president receives a score of 13, Weimar’s president receives a score of 17, and Russia’s (1993) president receives a score of 26. 51 Ibid., 12. 26
prime minister opposite the president and their power is intricately tied to the fact that
parliament does not show opposition to them. In Russia the case is even worse since the
party of power, United Russia, has such a strong majority in the Parliament. Also, with
Putin’s direct control over United Russia, an opposition strong enough is unlikely to be shown towards the prime minister and ministers of the Duma any time soon. This is even
more so the case now as Putin is the new prime minister.
Pasquino’s criteria are also fulfilled when speaking about Russia. The first
criterion is similar to Duverger’s first and has already been touched upon. However, it
should be noted that Pasquino stresses the fact that the president is elected by popular
vote. This is important for Russia because of the corruption in the voting process. While
universal suffrage is important, the fact that the president is popularly voted for, despite
any election fraud, is very important. Second, the president has the power to appoint the
prime minister and can dissolve parliament. In fact, President Putin used this power
several times, and even President Medvedev used this power recently to appoint Putin.
Pasquino’s third criterion is once again similar to Duverger’s third criterion. Officially, as a result of the political system, the prime minister is subject to a confidence vote.
However, as noted earlier, this is unlikely to be a problem in the near future with the leader of the party of power serving as the prime minister.
As mentioned earlier, both definitions can be applied to Russia. However, for this paper, Pasquino’s definition is more useful since a power struggle in Russia between the president and prime minister does not exist. The two leaders in Russia magnificently coexist in peace in the political system due to the fact that former President Putin chose
27
President Medvedev, who in turn chose Putin to be the new prime minister. Also,
Pasquino’s definition has been modernized since the time when Duverger created his definition.
28
CHAPTER 7
SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM’S IMPACT ON DEMOCRACY
Now that there is a description of a semi-presidential system, it is important to look at how these criteria impact the overall levels of democracy in Russia. As Colton and Skach have noted, “In many countries, the promise of semipresidentialism turned rapidly into the predicament of semipresidentialism, as this constitutional framework began to pose serious design dilemmas and to facilitate democratic backsliding rather than democratic consolidation.”52 As they continued their explanation, they noted that
“Russia has become a prime example of this trend” due to the fact that they have hybrid elements of authoritarianism and liberalism which is left from the 1980s and 1990s.53
The largest problem that Russia’s semi-presidentialism faces right now is that it is stuck somewhere between authoritarianism and democracy, and it can be argued that it is closer to authoritarianism than democracy at the current moment. Returning once again to Krastev’s idea from earlier, Russia is simply wearing democratic clothing, but this is only to hide its true semi-authoritarian beliefs. Shevtsova has also noted this trend in
Russia. She wrote, “In this limitation democracy, formal institutions that appear
52 Colton and Skach, “The Russian Predicament,” 114. 53 Ibid. 29
democratic conceal a system that is at once authoritarian, oligarchic, and bureaucratic to
the point of paralysis.”54
Perhaps the area of democracy that semi-presidentialism in Russia has affected
most is that of political parties. Political parties are one of the most important parts of
mature democracies. In fact, Peter Burnell noted, “Political parties are crucial for long-
term political development in emerging democracies” and “political parties are central to
representative democracy and to the process of democratization.”55 This idea is interesting for Russia because Russia is still in the process of democratization, so without good political parties that work properly, moving further towards democracy will not be possible. As Anatol Lieven, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, noted, “Russia now has no modern mass democratic parties, and without them, any democracy is likely to be a sham.”56 Lieven’s ideas here correspond
exactly to those of Shevtsova and Krastev when they indicated that Russia is only a
democracy in disguise.
This is only one example of where the semi-presidential system has adversely
affected the level of democracy in Russia. It is just one of the few reasons why Linz
wrote, “One cannot help tentatively concluding that in many other societies (other than
the US) the odds that presidentialism will help preserve democracy are far less
favorable.”57 The odds for presidentialism in any form to help preserve democracy are
54 Lilia Shevtsova, “Think Again:Vladimir Putin,” Foreing Policy, January/February 2008, 34. 55 Peter Burnell, “Why Parties Matter,” Westminster Foundation for Democracy, 1-5. 56 Anatol Lieven, “The Essential Vladimir Putin,” Foreign Policy, January/February, 2006, 73. 57 Linz, “The Perils,” 141. 30
even lower when you combine the faults of semi-presidentialism in Russia with those
problems inherent in Russia due to the competitive authoritarian regime which has grown
there. The problems from both of these systems together are quite a burden on the level of democracy in Russia, and they will continue to allow parties of power to remain in control of the country.
31
CHAPTER 8
HYBRID REGIMES ALLOW PARTIES OF POWER TO GROW
While hybrid regimes certainly impact the level of democracy in a country, making it less likely that a full-fledged democracy will be able to grow in a country, these regimes also have certain advantages which make it more likely that a party of power will be able to grow. As noted previously, the level of democratic parties in Russia is quite low, and the parties that can be found in Russia do not always uphold strong democratic ideals. Part of the definition of a party of power was that the party was in place in order to provide administrative support to the political elite and has fairly little political independence. As a result of the semi-presidential system and competitive authoritarian regime in Russia, the growth of political parties truly devoted to democratic growth is lacking. It would be almost impossible to use a truly democratic party as the basis for creating a party of power. Once again, this is evident when looking at the example of the
United States, where it would be impossible for the president to use one of the two existing parties to found a party of power. Therefore, the erosion of the party system in
Russia, which is created by these hybrid regimes, helps facilitate the growth of a party of power.
32
United Russia is being used in Russia in order to manage the party system and represent the interests of the authorities, which are two main factors of the definition of a party of power. Since the hybrid regimes in Russia are serving as a democratic disguise for the real authoritative feelings evident in the country, the leaders of United Russia have been able to control the party system. This is perhaps most evident in the last few years when several pro-Kremlin, and thus pro-United Russia, parties have emerged. This is the problem that Sestanovich has referred to as the “Kremlin’s invent-your-own- opposition strategy.”58 The most popular of these parties, is Just Russia (Spravedlivaya
Rossiya), which was sponsored by the Kremlin in order to create more political competition. Upon closer look though, many of the members of this party came from the ranks of United Russia, and the political platform of Just Russia is quite similar to that of
United Russia. Such pro-Kremlin parties have begun working with United Russia, only to further control over the system and the majority in the Parliament.
The idea that United Russia, along with its friendly opposition parties, has a strong control over the Duma is beginning to undermine one of the main ideas of semi- presidentialism. This idea that the president has opposite him a prime minister and elected officials is beginning to erode. While there are ministers and a prime minister opposite the president, they are not serving as any form of opposition. Instead, they are all united for one goal, which is to provide loyal members in the national legislature and legislative support, which are also important parts of the party of power definition. This
58 Stephen Sestanovich, “Putin’s Invented Opposition,” Journals of Democracy, Vol. 18, No. 2, April 2007, 123. 33
is most likely why Russia has also been termed as a super-presidential system instead of
simply semi-presidential.
The problems with elections that have emerged in Russia are due to the
competitive authoritarian regime since such a regime does not have any problems
influencing the outcomes of elections. As previously noted, the problems regarding
elections in Russia are quite low in comparison to other countries, but they nevertheless
exist. United Russia has been able to use its solidified position in all branches of the
government to influence the outcome of elections. Without the problems inherent in these hybrid regimes, this would not be possible.
Even though Russia has a mixed system, or semi-presidential system, which involves elements from both presidential and parliamentary systems, one must look at the
differences between presidential and parliamentary systems in general. As M. Steven
Fish noted, “The evidence shows that the presence of a powerful legislature is an
unmixed blessing for democratization.”59 A powerful legislature is not something that
can be found in the semi-presidential system in Russia. Some powers seem to be moving
to the executive branch now that Putin is the Prime Minister. However, such strength of
the legislature resulting from Putin’s presence is not the type of strength that Fish is
referring to here. In the case of Russia, power is simply getting mixed between
Medvedev and Putin and the offices of the president and prime minister. This lack of a
strong parliament directly affects the level of democracy in a given country. According
59 M. Steven Fish, “Stronger Legislatures, Stronger Democracies,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 17, No. 1, January 2006, 5. 34
to Fish’s study, Russia had one of the worst scores from Freedom House and one of the weakest parliaments.60
While these problems in Russia are not unique to the country itself, they are spurred by the lack of fully democratic institutions that have grown as a result of the hybrid systems in Russia. Both competitive authoritarian regimes and semi-presidential systems seem to produce rigidity in the political situation in a country, which was used in
Russia to found United Russia as the party of power. The strongest reason for this problem is the already faulty party system that has grown as a result of the political situation in Russia. Getting rid of the competitive authoritarian regime, which allows for the opposition and press to be harassed, and the semi-presidential system, which has suppressed full potential growth of political parties seen more commonly in parliamentary systems, would certainly help the situation in Russia.
60 Ibid. 35
CHAPTER 9
WHY CHOSE A PARTY OF POWER TO SOLIDIFY CONTROL?
An interesting question can be raised when studying leaders who decide to
consolidate control in a certain country. There are many different ways to gain control
over a country, such as using the military, strengthening the functions of the legislative leaders, etc., so why did President Putin chose to build a party of power in order to gain control instead of some other method?
First, it is important to note that Russia already had a long history of parties of power. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union could certainly be called a party of
power, especially as it was the only party allowed. However, as mentioned earlier,
United Russia is not the first modern party of power in Russia. Choice of Russia united
many democratically oriented parties, unions, and leaders together under one banner.
Many of these groups were created during the years of perestroika and glasnost during
Gorbachev’s rule. Yeltsin was able to use this newly created group of democratically oriented people to support his cause, and Choice of Russia became the ideological foundation for Yeltsin’s new system and ideas.
Also quite important in this equation, is that President Putin was specifically chosen by President Yeltsin to fulfill the powers and obligations of the Russian president
36
starting on 31 December 1999 before being elected president in March 2000. Before
Putin became the temporary president, he worked his way up in the Yeltsin regime and
was made prime minister. Therefore, Putin had seen first hand how Yeltsin’s party of
power, Choice of Russia, was able to give him the power needed to solidify control in the
country which was lacking in the days of turmoil in the early and mid 1990s. While this party began to falter and Yeltsin had many problems with maintaining his solidified control, Putin had seen what a party of power could do for the ruler of the country. This
is undoubtedly where he gained his views on Russian parties of power.
It is important to look at what Putin was trying to accomplish at the beginning of
his presidency. According to Fish, “Putin’s political project stands on four pillars:
centralizing state power, formulating a practical ideology, restoring state control of
communication, and structuring political competition.”61 By looking at these four pillars,
it is possible to understand why Putin chose to create a party of power in order to help
accomplish these four goals.
First, centralizing state power was very important for President Putin. The
problem of decentralization began under Yeltsin. Matthew Hyde in his article on
Puntin’s reforms noted, “Decentralisation is recognised to play an important part in the
transition to democracy and the development of market economies.”62 However, many
people began to see that decentralization in Russia had actually begun to go to far. In
61 M Steven Fish, “Putin's Path,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 12, No. 4, October 2001, 72. 62 Matthew Hyde, “Putin's Federal Reforms and Their Implications for Presidential Power in Russia,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 53, No. 5., July 2001, 719 37
fact, Aleksei Ryabov stated, “The power of regional leaders has grown to such an extent
that it significantly impedes the implementation of presidential policy.”63
Therefore, Putin had no choice but to move away from Yeltsin’s polices of
decentralization and begin to centralize power once again in the office of the presidency.
Nikolai Petrov noted, “Since the beginning of 2000 there has been a dramatic increase in
measures designed to restore central power.”64 This program began in 2000 and continued throughout Putin’s presidency. His new policies included creating seven
federal districts and providing them each with presidential representatives, reforming
how the Federal Council was formed, and passing legislation which stated governors
would be appointed by the president instead of elected by popular vote.
This idea of recentralizing state power conforms quite nicely with the reasons
why a party of power is created. A party of power should provide administrative support
to the political elite and has fairly little political independence, and parties of power are
vehicles for providing loyal members in the national legislature and legislative support.
This is exactly what Putin was trying to accomplish when he began his reforms to
recentralize state power. In fact, Yury Luzhkov, the Mayor of Moscow said, “The
general purpose of all these measures is to concentrate power in the president’s hands.”65
By appointing people who are loyal to United Russia, Putin has been able to provide this
administrative support and loyalty in the legislature which is inherent in a party of power.
63 Aleksei Ryabov, “The Presidential Elections and The Evolution of Russia's Political System (an Attempt at a Political Forecast)”, Briefing Papers, Moscow Carnegie Centre, 2, 2, February 2000. 64 Nikolai Petrov, 'Federalizm po-rossiiski', Pro et Contra, 5, 1, Winter 2000. 65 Nabi Abdullaev, “How Vladimir Putin Put Kremlin Back On Top,” Saint Petersburg Times, 5 February 2008. 38
Also, according to the definition of a party of power, such a party shares very little, or at times no power or responsibility with the political elite. This creation of a loyal power structure has also been successful in accomplishing this. The fact that everyone is tied to United Russia means that they are reliant on the support provided by
United Russia. Therefore, rulers in the regions who are not in the political elite significantly rely on the support of United Russia, which in turn relies on the support of the political elite.
Since the fourth pillar of Putin’s project is closely related to the first, we will next look at this pillar. These ideas regarding centralization of state power are closely related to the fourth pillar of Putin’s project. By centralizing state power and providing many loyal politicians in the legislature and regional districts, Putin has successfully been able to structure political competition in Russia. In essence, if a politician wants to be successful, he should be a part of United Russia in order to receive the support provided by this party and the political elite involved with United Russia. At a minimum, politicians should belong to one of the pro-Kremlin political parties, such as Just Russia.
These parties also reap many of the benefits provided by United Russia, since they work hand in hand to accomplish the goals set out by the political elite of the country.
This idea of structuring the political system has also been helped by the fact that a party of power shares very little, or at times no power or responsibility with the political elite. Putin has been successful in separating the political elite, such as himself and other key players, from United Russia itself. It is worth remembering once again that for a long time Putin was not even a member of United Russia. Despite this, United Russia has sought to give Putin the newly created position chairman of the party. As Guy
39
Faulconbridge noted, “There is a precedent for leadership of a party, rather than any state position, providing the lever of power in Russia. For much of the 20th century, the leader of the Soviet Communist party held sway over state institutions.”66 Putin is simply continuing in the tradition of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union where the General
Secretary of the party was the one leading the country. Much like the present situation in
Russia, in the Soviet Union the party itself was actually quite separated from the political elite.
Putin’s second pillar of forming a practical ideology has been touched upon already, but it is important to see how it fits in with the party of power idea as well. As mentioned, Putin created his own plan, which states the ideology that United Russia will follow. Posters boasting Putin’s Plan could be seen all over the city during the Duma elections in 2007, and even Medvedev supported the plan during the presidential campaign. In essence, this plan also became his platform during the campaign. No one even bothered to change the name. When Medvedev was campaigning for president, he said, “All this is Vladimir Putin’s strategy. I will be guided by this strategy, if I am elected president.”67 There can be no clearer proof that Putin has been successful in creating an ideology that everyone in the party of power follows.
Referring back to the definition of a party of power, such a party represents the interest of the authorities. In this case, United Russia represents the interests of Putin by unabashedly supporting his plan. Putin has made sure his interests and plan coincide with
66 Guy Faulconbridge, “United Russia Seeks Putin as Chairman,” Saint Petersburg Times, 15 April 2008. 67 Oleg Shchedrov, “Putin To Be PM in Future Government,” The Saint Petersburg Times, 18 December 2007. 40
those of United Russia and the Kremlin. Then United Russia is able to make sure that
such ideas and plans are followed throughout the country. As Andrew Konitzer and
Stephen K. Wegren noted, United Russia “uses its party organizations to enforce the
Kremlin's interests across the federation.”68 Nabi Abdullaev noted that by becoming
more powerful, the Kremlin is more capable of acting, but this has come at a price. He
noted that according to politicians and political analysts, “the whole state machinery has
been modeled to serve the Kremlin rather than to develop the country.”69 Even Viktor
Alksnis, a deputy in the Duma for eight years who lost his seat because of election
reforms backed by the Kremlin, noted, “the whole state machinery works to ensure the
results that the Kremlin wants.”70
First, Putin was able to create a plan that many people like and are willing to
follow. Then by adding the support of politicians who are loyal to United Russia, Putin
was able to succeed in making his plan the working ideology of the party, the Kremlin,
and the country as a whole. His success in this matter was directly influenced by the
legislative and administrative support and the loyalty that Russia’s party of power
provides.
The last pillar of Putin’s plan pertains to restoring state control of communication.
This pillar is also intricately tied in with a party of power. Putin has been able to use the
loyal administrative support and politicians to further his goals of restoring state control over the mass media. As was previously mentioned, the government constantly harassed
68 Andrew Konitzer and Stephen K. Wegren, “Federalism and Political Recentralization in the Russian Federation: United Russia as the Party of Power,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Vol. 36, No.4, 504. 69 Nabi Abdullaev, “How Vladimir Putin.” 70 Ibid. 41
media outlets throughout the election season in 2007-2008. However, the program
against mass media began well before this. By 2003, Putin was able to bring all national
television networks under state control. This was accomplished by placing people loyal
to Putin and United Russia in positions of responsibility in these national networks. In
other cases, state run companies simply forced these national television networks to sell,
thus bringing them under the control of loyal state-run enterprises. The end result of the
campaign against television channels was that the three most important federal channels,
Pervy (First), Rossiya (Russia), and NTV are “fully loyal to the Kremlin” according to
Andrei Richter, director of the Media and Law Institute.71
Taking over the national television networks and harassing newspapers was not
enough for the Kremlin though. Officials even began to target the Internet, which was
the only sphere of mass communication that is lacking regulation. Without any
legislation it is seen as “an island of freedom of speech.”72 On March 13, 2007, President
Putin signed Federal Decree No. 4313, which merged the Federal Service for Compliance
with the Legislation in Mass Media Cultural Heritage Protection (Rosookhrankultura)
and the Federal Service for Communications Control (Rossvyaznadzor) into one agency
under the title Federal Surveillance Service for Mass Media, Communications, and
Cultural Heritage (Rossvyazokrankultura).73 The merge was made because
Rosookhrankultura issued and revoked broadcasting licenses and Rossvyaznadzor issued
technical licenses for the transfer of data. Now both of these spheres will be under the
71 Floriana Fossato, “Russia: Media Decree Targets Internet, Digital TV,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 28 March 2007. 72 Ibid. 73 The Decree was published 15 March 2007 in Rossijskaja Gazeta. 42
control of one group, making it much easier to control each aspect of mass media and
communications at one time.
Such an all-encompassing program could not have been accomplished without the
help of people loyal to the party of power and Putin. Interestingly enough, Boris
Boyarskov, the new leader of Rossvyazokrankultura, was asked to occupy the position by
Medvedev. It is evident that the political elite had a certain plan in mind and
methodically went about accomplishing their goals. President Putin accomplished the
goal of making the media “uniformly favorable”74 to the Kremlin and United Russia. In
essence, “the Kremlin has managed to subvert the media's ability to act as a monitor and
check on state power.”75
By creating a party of power, President Putin has been able to accomplish the four
pillars of his project quite easily. Success was accomplished through the support that the
party, legislature, and politicians provided via the party of power. The question raised
earlier as to why Putin would want to choose this option for consolidating power over
another option is easily answered. By creating a party of power, Putin ensured that he
had people loyal to him everywhere throughout the Russian Federation. This was so
important, because as Sestanovich noted, “From his first day in office, it was clear that he
saw his job as cleaning up the mess that Yeltsin had left behind.”76 In essence, too many
people had been able to build their own centers of power as a result of Yeltsin’s
74 Freedom House, “Country Report: Russia,”
presidency. This was not suitable for Putin since he could not even get rid of Yeltsin’s
chief of staff when he became president.77
Putin decided that the best way for accomplishing his goals was to restore top-
down rule, which was so common during the Soviet Union. As Sestanovich noted, “Now,
as Putin set out to deal with the problems on his list, it became clear that he intended to
provide the same one-note solution for each of them. Restoring top-down authority—
what he called “the vertikal of power”—meant strengthening the state bureaucracy,
curtailing the independence of those who had acquired some measure of it in the 1990s,
and installing the president’s own people in their place.”78 By implementing such a plan
it meant that there would be loyal United Russia members in every branch of the
government, including the military and the judiciary. Putin was able to ensure loyalty
from the courts by installing party members who would continue to support the party of
power and Putin. Putin was even able to ensure loyalty from the military, intelligence,
and law enforcement branches by placing his co-called siloviki in important positions.
According to Ian Bremmer and Samuel Charap, “The word ‘siloviki’ is derived from the
phrase silovye struktury (force structures), a reference to the armed services, law
enforcement bodies, and intelligence agencies that wield the coercive power of the
state.”79 This meant that these siloviki were able to provide the support of such agencies.
Also, Putin’s background in the KGB was a factor ensuring that he had the support
necessary in these agencies.
77 Ibid. 78 Ibid., 34. 79 Ian Bremmer and Samuel Charap, “The Siloviki in Putin’s Russia: Who They Are and What They Want,” The Washington Quarterly, 30:1, Winter 2006-07, 86. 44
While the possibility exists to use other means of consolidating power, such as
strengthening and controlling the military, judiciary, and bureaucracy, such ideas did not
fully fit in with Putin’s plans. He was interested in consolidating power in the office of
the presidency by using his party of power to provide him with support and implement
the four pillars of his plan mentioned above. These other means of consolidating power
also had their own problems.
First, the problem with increasing the power of the judiciary is that, according to
Guillermo O’Donnell, “The whole state apparatus and its agents are supposed to submit
to the rule of law.”80 This meant that even the most minor violation by the government
should be avoided as a result of the judiciary’s power. It would also mean that the judiciary could become quite strong and gain more control than the president himself.
This is exactly what Alexis de Tocqueville noted when he commented that at times judges sometimes contradict the ideas and policies of officials in the government.81
Second, the danger with solely using the military, law enforcement agencies, and
intelligence branches to consolidate control was that the support that they already had
from the nation could collapse. The siloviki had gained a great deal of popularity and
support in their battle against the oligarchs, who had been portrayed as stealing from the
nation and its citizens. However, as Sestanovich noted, “It would not take much for the
voters to come to see the siloviki…as little different from the rascals whom they claim to
80 Guillermo O’Donnell, “Why the Rule of Law Matters,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 15, No. 4, October 2004, 36. 81 Guillermo O’Donnell, “The Judiciary and the Rule of Law,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2000, 26. 45
have thrown out—self-interested, predatory, and above the law.”82 Lastly, the problem with using the bureaucracy was that many institutions were quite weak which meant that they were “more readily suppressed by local authorities or corrupted by wealthy businessmen.”83 Using the bureaucracy would actually come into play later after Putin was able to build his party of power and ensure that he had loyal party members throughout the country and in these weak institutions.
Therefore, while Putin had other means of consolidating power, using one of them solely over creating a party of power had their flaws. Creating a party of power was the best option at the time because it provides loyal servants throughout the political structure, which was undoubtedly what Putin was counting on when he chose to move in this direction. A party of power is the most efficient option for establishing control throughout many agencies and branches of the government simultaneously. By choosing this method, it ensured that all bases would be covered, which in turn ensures that if one area of control falters a little there are other people to help pick up the slack and bring back control.
82 Sestanovich, “Force,” 40. 83 Ibid., 34. 46
CHAPTER 10
BENEFITS OF HYBRID REGIMES WHEN CHOOSING TO CREATE A PARTY OF POWER
Hybrid regimes certainly have several benefits that make the choice of creating a
party of power beneficial. The benefits that are gained from a competitive authoritarian
regime are not theoretical like the benefits offered by a mixed semi-presidential regime.
However, they are nonetheless quite important. The fact that competitive authoritarian
regimes are not against minor elections fraud means that it is easier to establish a base of
support in the legislature and throughout the country when elections are held. This
certainly influences the party of power’s ability to create the administrative and
legislative support that is an inherent defining characteristic of a party of power.
Secondly, the fact that such regimes are at times willing to repress freedom of
association, freedom of press, and the freedom to criticize the government, which
happens quite often in Russia, also helps the party of power to be formed. First, such a
party is able to use its administrative support via loyal members of the party to control
state media outlets, thus giving them the control needed to harass and suppress these freedoms. Second, they are able to use the control over the media outlets to make sure that people have little information about such repression that might occur in a given country.
47
While these characteristics of a competitive authoritarian regime are significant in
creating a party of power, there are no theoretical grounds for such benefits. These
benefits only result from the will of the leader of the regime to use such methods of
repression, such as election fraud and media harassment. If the leader does not have the desire to use such benefits of a competitive authoritarian regime, then they will be lacking. However, there are certain theoretical benefits that are inherent in a mixed regime, such as the semi-presidential regime in Russia, which cannot be found in purely presidential or parliamentary systems, or are at least less significant in such systems.
Therefore, it is important to now look at some of the discussions about presidential versus parliamentary systems, and what type of benefits and challenges are inherent in these systems.
As James McGregor noted in his article on presidencies in Europe, “In most cases in Europe the main executive power lies with the prime minister and the government, whose appointments are confirmed by the legislature.”84 Many countries in Europe have
chosen the parliamentary route, and those that do have presidents are mainly figureheads
and have little powers. Obviously this would be a large setback for Putin if there were
simply a parliamentary system, or if the Russian presidency was as limited as it is in
many European countries, as he is the president. The semi-presidential system in Russia
has the benefit of not being hindered by a strong prime minister and a strong legislature.
Since these areas of the Russian government are not very strong, it is easier to employ the
strategy of filling the legislature with members loyal to the party of power and it is easier
84 James McGregor, “The Presidency in East Central Europe,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Research Report, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1994, 23. 48
to use these loyal members for the administrative support which the party of power is
reliant upon.
McGregor also noted, “The authority to appoint officials to high office is one of
the most influential powers that a president has.”85 This is another benefit that can be
seen in the semi-presidential system in Russia, as this is one benefit the president has.
The president of Russia, whether it was Putin or Medvedev, has used this power several times. Even President Yeltsin used this power quite efficiently. The presidents are even able to appoint people to such high positions as that of prime minister, which Medvedev took advantage of just in 2008.
This is obviously another benefit that is available in the semi-presidential system in Russia. It is also a very important benefit for those who wish to create a party of power, as one of the goals is once again to provide a party that is there to serve the goals of the political elite and serve as administrative support in the legislature. Therefore, if a politician begins to move away from the party of power, the president has the ability to remove said person and place a more loyal person in this position. In general, the best way to keep loyal politicians in office is for the leader of the party of power, in this case
President Putin, to have the ability to appoint and remove leaders in significant positions of power, such as the office of the prime minister.
As Donald L. Horowitz noted when he compared democratic systems, “In presidential systems, moreover, government and opposition frequently cooperate in the
85 Ibid., 26. 49
legislative process.”86 This is another benefit that Russia’s party of power receives as a result of the mixed regime in Russia. This cooperation is much harder to find in purely parliamentary systems where competition is fierce and coalitions are often required to pass legislation. This cooperation that is evident in the presidential system helps parties
of power since one function of a party of power is the administrative support it provides
for the political elite. Therefore, this element of the presidential system helps to even
further engrain the administrative support provided by the party of power in the political
system.
Horowitz also noted, “In theory, it is easier to remove a parliamentary
government in the middle of its term than it is to remove a president.”87 This is one of
the benefits in the mixed Russian system regarding parliamentary elements. Once again,
the main purpose of a party of power, and thus the elected officials from such party, is to
provide support to the political elite and to approve their plans and ideology. Since it is
much easier to remove a parliamentary government, this benefits the elite in a country. If
the parliament begins to move away from the party of power and the political elite, they
can simply be removed and new elections may be held in order to produce a more loyal
parliamentary government.
In his discussion on parliamentary and presidential systems, Linz noted, “A
parliamentary regime in the strict sense is one in which the only democratically
legitimate institution is parliament; the government’s authority is completely dependent
86 Donald L. Horowitz, “Comparing Democratic Systems,” In Larry Diamond and Marc F. Platter (eds.), The Global Resurgence of Democracy, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 145. 87 Ibid., 148. 50
upon parliamentary confidence,” and “in presidential systems an executive with
considerable constitutional powers is directly elected by the people for a fixed term and is
independent of parliamentary votes of confidence. He is not only the holder of executive
power but also the symbolic head of state.”88 First of all, by having a mixed regime, the idea that parliament is the only legitimate institution has been removed. This was a benefit for President Putin when he created his party of power since he served as the president, meaning that it was very important for this institution to also have a significant meaning. This is where the idea, which comes from presidential systems, that the people elect a president with strong constitutional powers is very beneficial.
Now in Russia, the mixed system provides for a parliament that is not fully able to do what it is intended to do, and has lost much of its authority as a result of the strong post of the president. The Russian system has allowed President Putin to use the strong constitutional powers to further his grasp on the control of the political situation in
Russia. As is evident, the semi-presidential system creates a lot of ambiguity, because the legislature is not able to do what it is suppose to effectively as a result of the strong president. By having a strong president in such a mixed regime, he also undermines the idea that parliamentary votes of confidence are needed, because he has his own strength and is not dependent upon the legislature.
This ambiguity in the Russian system is once again beneficial for the growth of a party of power. The president is able to use his already strong position to further consolidate even more power. The inherent ambiguity also enables the elite to simply manipulate the legislature and use it as the administrative support needed for the party of
88 Linz, “The Perils,” 125. 51
power. Putin would be seriously hindered in either a pure presidential or a pure
parliamentary system, as this beneficial ambiguity would be lacking.
One last important benefit that Linz noted was that in a presidential system the
president has a “strong claim to democratic legitimacy.”89 This is a significant benefit
that Putin has used tremendously throughout his presidency. Putin has been able to use
this democratic legitimacy to become a very popular ruler in Russia. In turn, he has used
this popularity and democratic legitimacy to influence the legitimacy of his plan for the
country and the legitimacy of United Russia. Such legitimacy is not often found in a truly parliamentary system where success is more intimately linked with cooperation.
When speaking about the benefits of hybrid regimes when choosing to create a party of power, an oddity of the Russian experience arises. In general it would be much easier for the leader to form a unified legislative coalition in a much more pure system than in the Russian system with a dual executive structure. In a more pure system Putin would much more easily be able to reward loyal members and would not have to rely on a loyal prime minister. In fact there have been problems with the loyalty of Putin’s prime ministers, which has forced him to change his prime minister on several occasions.
However, Putin has been very successful in using the ambiguity that arises in the dual executive system to his advantage. So far there have been no major problems revolving around the Russian dual executive system, but this does not mean that this trend will continue. A possible split in the new system, where Putin is the prime minister and Medvedev is the president, could in fact cause serious problems which would call into question Putin’s ability to successfully manage the dual executive system.
89 Ibid., 126 52
Therefore, it is important to look at what might happen if there is a significant split between Medvedev and Putin, which would cause a split in the dual executive system and could cause the growth of a large rift in the party of power. This oddity, which has arisen in Russia, merely further proves that anything could happen in the realm of Russian politics. Russia’s system could in effect be seen as a new type of hybrid system which has managed to solve the problem of the dual executive at least for the time being.
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CHAPTER 11
A ROADMAP FOR AUTOCRATS: HOW TO CREATE A PARTY OF POWER
Creating a party of power is significantly beneficial to the process of consolidating power. Therefore, knowing this, how is it possible to create a party of power? By looking at how President Putin was able to create his party of power, it becomes more apparent how to create a party of power. It is important to note that Putin
had many preconditions for the construction of a party of power already on his side,
which made it much easier to create his party of power. Nonetheless, it is possible to say
what certain steps can be taken in order to found a solidified party of power.
First, it is important to remember that there has been a long tradition of parties of
power in Russia. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union could be considered the first
such party, as it fulfills the criteria outlined in the definition of a party of power.
Academics have noted that there was an influx of liberal ideas throughout the years when
Gorbachev and Yeltsin were in office, but they also point out that with the rise of Putin,
many of these values disappeared and there was a move back to the old Soviet system.
As Shevtsova noted, Russia “has undoubtedly preserved elements of the previous
political system, including the domination of the executive branch, ‘top-down
54
government,’ and personalistic leadership, with the president playing the role of ‘elected monarch’.”90
The first modern party of power, Choice of Russia, also played an important role for Putin. He began his career in politics in Moscow with President Yeltsin, and he undoubtedly saw the benefits that a party of power provided to the leader. As previously mentioned, Choice of Russia was created to serve as the base for ideological support for
President Yeltsin. Despite many setbacks along the way, President Yeltsin succeeded in using this party of power to gather enough support to be elected president. Such a situation must have had a great impact on Putin’s thinking and, therefore, significantly influenced him when deciding on how to consolidate power.
This tradition of already having previously established parties of power is significant for two reasons. First, as is evident with Putin, such previous parties serve as an educational model of how to successfully organize a new party of power. Without such models, it might be hard to create a party that is fit for a given country or situation.
Second, people grew accustomed to the presence of parties of power throughout the
Soviet Union and the Yeltsin era. This meant that the nation was hardly aware of another way of political life. In fact, a liberal and open political system might just seem significantly strange to the average Russian since they have spent so much time living under parties of power.
Therefore, having such a tradition will make it significantly easier for a ruler to create a new party of power. If such a tradition is lacking, it will most likely be harder to create such a party. However, in cases regarding countries that are transitioning to
90 Lilia Shevtsova, “Russia's Hybrid,” 67. 55
democracy, the lack of such a tradition will not be as important, because such countries may not have any tradition of political parties or any memories about political parties will be poor, so people will be more willing to go along with such a newly-founded party. In countries with strong histories and traditions relating to political parties, creating a party of power is sure to be difficult. Of course, parties that over the years dominate the political situation in a given country grow in such countries, but this does not mean that they have become parties of power.
Second, being the handpicked successor as Putin was is certainly a plus. In 1999,
President Yeltsin resigned and appointed Putin to fulfill the duties and obligations of the office of the president. This made it very easy for him to win his first election in 2000.
As Dimitry Furman, a senior researcher at the Institute of Europe of the Russian
Academy of Sciences, noted, the succession between Yeltsin and Putin “is even more direct than that between Lenin and Stalin.”91 This is so important because despite
Yeltsin’s many faults, he was still seen as the leader of the democratic forces that came to power in 1991 and freed Russia from the Soviet Union. For many people, Putin was the future of the country because Yeltsin handpicked him.
The fact that Yeltsin handpicked Putin meant that Putin had a certain amount of credibility when he first started. This was extremely important for his cause as he rose to political fame quite quickly and not many people previously knew of him or knew what his ideas and philosophies on certain issues were. This did not matter as much since he received this credibility by being handpicked by the president. Putin was also able to then use this credibility and turn it into support from many of the same people who
91 Dmitry Furman, “Leave and Make Room,” Novaya Gazeta, 7 June 2004. 56
supported Yeltsin. Along with the tradition of parties of power, being handpicked made
it much easier to create his own party of power on the basis of the remnants of Yeltsin’s
structure.
Third, the extreme popularity of Putin also affected his ability to create a party of
power. As Shevstova noted, “Putin is the only real actor in Russia…All authorities in
Russia wait for Putin to make a decision.”92 This has led to the emergence of a cult of
personality surrounding Putin. Sarah Mendelson, the Director of the Human Rights and
Security Initiative and a senior fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, pointed out that the main problem is that “political
competition has been replaced by the personage of Vladimir Putin.”93
This cult of personality has begun to manifest itself in several different ways. In
November 2007, people throughout Russia’s eleven time zones gathered to show their support for President Putin. They were calling for him to stay on as a leader after the parliamentary and presidential elections regardless of the title he chose.94 While it is not
important for some people what title Putin would chose, other people began to think of
titles that could be proposed to President Putin. For instance, Abdul-Khakim Sultygov,
United Russia’s coordinator of policies on interethnic and interreligious relations, decided that Putin should be formalized as a National Leader after his second presidential
term, which would include creating a Civil Council in order to define the position of
92 Shevtsova, “Think Again,” 38. 93 Sarah E Mendelson, “Dreaming of a Democratic Russia,” American Scholar, Winter 2008. 94 Mansur Mirovalev, “Supporters Call For President To Stay On,” The Saint Petersburg Times, 16 November 2007. 57
National Leader. 95 According to Sultygov, “This will guarantee the continuation of
Putin’s policies, while the council would become a permanent body through which the
National Leader would guide Russia and its political elites.”96
Such rallies and ideas show that some sort of a cult of personality is growing
around Putin. Along with such ideas, Putin’s approval ratings remain extremely high.
According to VCIOM, the Russian Public Opinion Research Center, Putin’s “image
maintains an astonishing stability.”97 Such success and approval from the population makes it very easy to create a party of power. A party of power should create an ideology for the party to follow, and when this ideology is based on a plan, such as
Putin’s Plan, and a strong cult of personality, it is almost impossible to stop such a party and political ideology. Therefore, the more successful and well liked a leader is, the easier it is for such a leader to create a party of power.
Perhaps the most important tool for an autocrat to create a party of power is the constitution of the given country. This was certainly an important factor for President
Putin. As McGregor noted, “The constitution is the starting point for assessing the role of the institution in a political system.”98 By looking at the Russian constitution it is
quite apparent that it influenced Putin’s ability to form a party of power due to the fact
that it provided the president with a strong power base. According to Olga
Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White, “The Russian system has been based on the
95 Nabi Abdullaev and Francesca Mereu, “Drive Starts for ‘National Leader’,” The Saint Petersburg Times, 9 November 2007. 96 Ibid. 97 “Vladimir Putin: A Politician and a Person,” Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM), Press Release No. 785, 05 October 2007. 98 McGregor, 31. 58
powerful executive presidency that was established by the 1993 Constitution.”99 The strengthening of the Russian presidency began with Yeltsin, and in 1993, Yeltsin was able to appropriate many powers that eluded him previously. These powers included:
an end to the legislative presidium and the strong parliamentary chairmanship; the power to dissolve the lower house, the State Duma, for cause; a monopoly over all ministerial appointments other than that of the prime minister; a nearly unrestricted right to emit decrees; and immunity of the presidential establishment and the bureaucracy to legislative oversight.100
This list is quite impressive and gave the president the significant powers that Putin
enjoyed when he was creating his party of power.
Such powers provided for by a constitution enable any autocrat to succeed in
accomplishing many tasks, such as creating a party of power. The most important power
that Putin had was the monopoly over all ministerial appointments. This ensured that he
was able to install politicians who were loyal to United Russia, and this idea of loyalty
and administrative support is key to understanding why and how a party of power
develops. Also, getting rid of strong members of parliament was key in the creation of
the party of power. Even if the chairman of the parliament were of the same party, he
would still have significant powers and could pose a threat to the leader. By removing
this position, President Putin had unprecedented control of both the executive and
legislative, with little or no opposition against presidential consolidation of power.
This should serve as a roadmap for any autocrat who desires to create a party of
power. The given autocrat can do nothing about whether or not there was a tradition of
99 Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White, “Inside Putin’s Court: A Research Note,” Europe-Asia Studies, 57:7, 2005, 1065. 100 Colton and Skach, “Semi-Presidentialism in Russia,” 12. 59
such parties before his party of power. However, it should be noted that this makes it much easier to accomplish the formation of a party of power. Secondly, it could be a much harder road if the autocrat does not have the support of a member of the previous political elite. Thus, if the autocrat is stealing power from someone, there is a better chance that he will fail in creating a party of power, as there could be a much stronger base of political opposition than what Putin faced. Third, having a cult of personality is inherently helpful when an autocrat wants to create a party of power. If people adore the leader, they will be more likely to follow a party of power and the members of such a party will also be more likely to continue to support the party and the leader. Finally, the most important factor is the constitution. The more powers the autocrat has according to the constitution of the country, the better. If strong powers are already prescribed in a constitution, then the leader’s actions will seem more legitimate, whereas, if he pursues actions not provided for in the constitution, he could face much stronger political opposition from the public and other politicians.
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CHAPTER 12
THE DANGERS OF A POWER SPLIT AND THE WORLD FINANCIAL CRISIS
Throughout this paper a great deal of emphasis has been placed on how powerful the party of power is in Russia and how powerful Putin’s dual executive system is. This is because United Russia and the Russian political system at the present moment in fact are quite powerful. However, there is certainly a chance that the dual executive system in
Russia could suffer a splinter, which could result in one of the leaders gaining more power than the other. This has especially been the case in such systems throughout
Europe and the former Soviet Union in the past years. Many former Soviet Union countries have seen either their president or prime minister gather more control and move the country away from a dual executive system. Such splinters result from both the prime minister and the president trying to gain more control.
Such a split could result in serious damage being inflicted on the party of power in Russia. At present, the power that United Russia has is mainly a result of the power that Putin has accumulated and shared with the party. However, if there was a major split between Medvedev and Putin, it could result in a major split in United Russia, with each leader taking their supporters in different directions. Such a split could in fact be brewing right now in Russia.
61
There is a long history of competing factions in the Kremlin, which is the main
reason why a split could be brewing. The two main factions in the Kremlin, the more
liberal group, called the technocrats, with Medvedev as their unofficial leader, and the
siloviki with Putin as their leader, have been consistently vying for ultimate power in the
Kremlin. This battle came to a head during the presidential elections when there was
much discussion about whether Putin would chose Medvedev or Sergei Ivanov, a
prominent siloviki, as his successor. When Putin chose Medvedev as his candidate, many
said this was a signal to the siloviki that they had gained too much power, and that Putin
wanted to use Medvedev as a counterbalance to their growing influence in the country.101
After only a few months in his new office, Medvedev is already starting to show signs of possible unhappiness with Putin and some of his ideas. There is one main area where this split is seen to be brewing, and it revolves around views on the Russian economy and the government’s economic policy. Medvedev is seen as a liberal politician for Russia when speaking about the economy, and he has proved that he is sincerely interested in developing a much more western form of capitalism in the country.102 On
the other hand, the siloviki “promote the continued consolidation of political and
economic power within a highly centralized state.”103 Dmitriy Oreshkin believes that
“the moment has come when the divergence in values between Putin’s group and
Medvedev’s group has clearly manifested itself.”104
101 Leonid Radzikhovsky, “Medvedev Is Doomed by Weak Links to FSB,” The Moscow Times, 18 December 2007. 102 “TNK-BP, Mechel, Putin and Medvedev,” Kremlinology, 05 August 2008. 103 Bremmer and Charap, 88-89. 104 “Russian Right Wing Works to Split Medvedev From Putin,” Workers Revolutionary Party, 07 August 2008. 62
The main conflict over the economic policy to be used in Russia came to a head in
the last few months in relation to the company Mechel, which deals with oil, coal, and
metals. Such a company is an important one because all oil, coal, and metals are
considered areas of national and strategic importance, which means there are much
stricter regulatory controls over such companies. Putin attacked Mechel’s owner, Igor
Zyuzin, for alleged price-fixing and selling his products abroad for lower rates than in the
Russian domestic market. This attack had instantaneous effects and the Russian stock
market saw a drop of thirty-three percent in one day with almost $60 billion in losses.105
Immediately after Putin made these allegations, law enforcement agencies opened up
criminal investigations in order to find out if any laws had in fact been broken. This type
of strong-handed rule is exactly what the siloviki want when dealing with the economy.
On the very same day that Putin made these comments, Medvedev made a few of
his own remarks, which could hardly have been more different. Medvedev said, “We’ve
had enough of inspections and all sorts of raids at the instigation of commercial entities.
In general, both our law enforcement agencies and state institutions should stop terrifying
businesses.”106 This has been seen as a direct remark aimed at the comments Putin made
about Mechel. As Boris Nemtsov noted, “What [Medvedev] said is correct from the
perspective of economics.”107 Medvedev’s comments are aimed at creating a much more
liberal form of capitalism, which is supported by his group in the Kremlin, that would
105 “TNK.” 106 Brian Whitmore, “Is a Medvedev-Putin Split Brewing?,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 08 July 2008. 107 Ibid. 63
help Moscow become a major business capital of the world, such as New York and
London.
This has so far been a small clash between the two leaders, but nonetheless it is a
significant one. There have been many doubts as to whether it is really Putin or
Medvedev who is running the country. In fact this issue was underscored during the
Russian-Georgian conflict when it was Putin who went to the conflict area instead of
Medvedev who is in charge of military forces. As Anya Ardayeva noted, this shows
“who holds the real balance of power in the Kremlin.”108 In fact, according to a poll
conducted by the independent Levada Center, “36 percent of Russians see Putin as the
country’s most powerful figure as compared to only 9 percent for Medvedev.”109
While such a clash is not immediately dangerous for the party of power and the power structure in the Kremlin, and despite things having calmed down in recent weeks, this could be the first sign of Medvedev showing a certain amount of independence.
Yulia Latynina asked the question towards the beginning of the presidential elections,
“How long will it take Medvedev to realize that he really isn’t bound to Putin?”110
Perhaps this is his moment to rise and show that he is independent from Putin, but this will be very hard considering that Putin’s popularity ratings continue to remain extremely high. Also, as Whitmore has noted, “Attacking a rich coal and steel tycoon will prove popular with the public.”111 One of Putin’s claims to fame was his attack on certain
108 Anya Ardayeva, “Medvedev or Putin: Who Holds Real Power in Russia?,” Voice of America, 16 October 2008. 109 Whitmore. 110 Yulia Latynina, “Keeping Medvedev on a Short Leash,” The Saint Petersburg Times, 14 December 2007. 111 Whitmore. 64
oligarchs throughout his presidency, and such moves remain popular with the average
Russian. Therefore, as a result of popularity ratings and the public’s opinion, it is hard to
see how Medvedev will really be able to significantly break away from Putin and United
Russia any time soon. However, with a financial crisis affecting the world economy right now, Medvedev could be provided with the opportunity sooner than expected.
The current financial crisis is hurting almost every country throughout the world,
but it is having a significant effect on countries with emerging economies, such as Russia.
This is especially the case since Russia’s stock market has plummeted by around two-
thirds in the past six months.112 With stock market results such as these, it is hard to
understand why the prime minister would attack one of the largest companies in the
country, causing losses around $60 billion for the company and the stock market. Such
moves by the prime minister have made people start to think about his reasoning. Igor
Yurgens, an advisor to Medvedev, noted, “It is not correct to destroy your own stock
market.”113 There is certainly no need to take such debilitating measures when stock
markets around the world are being poorly affected by the financial crisis.
Russia has recently begun to face the fact that it is a country that is quite reliant
on oil and gas. In 2007, oil, fuel, and gas consisted of 65% of Russia’s main exports.114
Russia has in essence become a “petro-state,” which is defined as “oil-rich countries,
plagued by weak institutions, a poorly functioning public sector, and a high concentration
112 Clifford J. Levy, “Stock Slump Imperils Putin’s Effort to Pump Up Russian Wealth, and His Legacy,” New York Times, 13 October 2008. 113 “TNK.” 114 Economist Intelligence Unit, “Factsheet,” Economist, 14 October 2008. 65
of power and wealth.”115 This is becoming quite a large problem for Russia since the
economic situation in the world has created a lower demand for oil, thereby pushing oil
prices to quite low levels. Crude oil prices have now hit low levels of around $68 per
barrel.116 Such a low level is beginning to make many worry in Russia due to the fact that
when the state budget was created for the upcoming year, the price of $70 per barrel was
used in order to estimate revenues to the state during the upcoming year.117 Therefore,
with the price of oil per barrel, Russia will be operating a budget deficit for the 2009
financial year. While the two-dollar difference that has emerged is quite small, especially
for a country with $600 billion in currency reserves and another $200 billion in
stabilization funds118, this problem could become even worse if the price of oil continues
to drop in the future.
Such problems could also affect the political power Putin and United Russia have
gathered. As Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss have noted, Putin is so beloved because during his reign “the economy has flourished and the average Russian is living better than ever before.”119 However, as Clifford J. Levy noted, “Putin is facing a threat
to his legacy of bringing growth, stability and a renewed swagger to [Russia].”120 Putin’s legacy is facing problems because Putin and Medvedev “have built their popularity on
115 Moisés Naím, “Russia’s Oily Future,” Foreign Policy, January/February 2004. 116 Tom Sellen, “Commodities Take Hit in Month,” Wall Street Journal, 1 November 2008. 117 “Russian Duma holds budget hearing as oil slide threatens funding basis,” Russia Today, 17 October 2008. 118 Economist Intelligence Unit, “Financial first aid in Russia,” Economist, 31 October, 2008. 119 Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, “The Myth of the Authoritarian Model: How Putin’s Crackdown Holds Russia Back,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2008. 120 Levy. 66
delivering steadily improving living standards to Russians” and “any reverse could unravel the political system they have created.”121 All of these remarks and predictions are correct. The Russian people have become more accustomed to living a much better life, which can be noted in any major European travel destination where more and more
Russians are appearing.
While it is apparent that a reverse of the improved economic situation could have a large impact on the political strength of Putin, Medvedev, and United Russia, it is hard to say who it would impact the most. Putin certainly stands to lose a lot in this situation after making the remarks about Mechel, which lost the country a large amount of money and standing in the world financial market. However, Putin has already taken steps to counteract this potential problem. The Kremlin has been able to take much of the focus away from the financial crisis and any problems it has created in Russia through the state control over the major television broadcasting channels.122 Putin has also been able to play the problem off by accusing the United States of being the source of all of the financial and economic problems. He stated, “Everything that is happening in the economic and financial sphere has started in the United States.”123 The Kremlin has also gained a lot of respect for promising approximately $200 billion in aid for banks and companies, which are hurting as a result of the crisis.124
While the Kremlin has been able to promise much help to the business sector, the situation with the average Russian citizen could be much worse. With the problem of a
121 “Kremlinomics,” Economist, 16 October 2008. 122 Levy. 123 Philippe Naughton, “Vladimir Putin lashes US for economic failures,” Times Online, 1 October 2008. 124 “Kremlinomics.” 67
budget deficit in 2009 already on the horizon, many projects and aid for the average
citizen could be cut in order to bring state spending in line with the 2009 budget. The
first projects to go may be many of the national projects in the areas of public health
service, education, residential construction, and agriculture. Such projects were created
by President Putin in 2005 and were managed by Medvedev until he was elected
president. It was specifically the success that the government, and in specific Putin and
Medvedev, had when implementing these national projects that helped the nation’s trust in the government and power to grow.125
If such economic and financial turmoil continues to hurt the Russian economy and
budget, the nation could lose this newfound trust in the government. The first to be
blamed would undoubtedly be Putin and Medvedev, thus affecting their power along with
the strength of their political party, United Russia. While they have taken steps to defray
some of the flack from this problem, they will not be able to dodge the bullet forever if
the problems continue to worsen. The Kremlin is also lucky that it has such large amount
of currency reserves and stabilization money at their disposal. However, this money will
not last forever and it will only help to cushion the economic fall. Such problems could
also further the gap between Medvedev and Putin on economic issues, making it much
more possible to see the power split mentioned earlier.
125 Roy Medvedev, Dmitry Medvedev – Prezident Rossijskoj Federatsii, (Moscow: Vremya, 2008), 49. 68
CHAPTER 13
CONCLUSION
Parties of power are unique to areas where emerging democracies are abundant, such as Latin and South America, Africa, Asia, and the former Soviet Union, and it should, therefore, come as no surprise that the Russian Federation has provided one of the most vivid examples of such a party. Russia’s United Russia also idyllically shows how a party of power should work. United Russia has become a party with little political independence, which represents the interests of the political elite, and which serves as a vehicle for loyal support in the national legislature, and provides administrative support, which is exactly what was laid out in the definition of a party of power provided in this paper.
Russia is a country hindered by a hybrid regime. This has resulted from the fact that the regime in Russia is pseudodemocratic, which means that democratic institutions mask the real authoritarian powers in the country. Russia has become a competitive authoritarian country, meaning that traditional democratic rule has been combined with authoritarian governance. In such a regime, the minimum criteria that every democracy must fulfill are violated. Such violations have enabled Putin to establish his party of power and to continue the process of consolidating power in Russia.
69
Russia is also unique in the fact that it has a semi-presidential political system,
which entails characteristics from both purely presidential and purely parliamentary
systems. This semi-presidential system has provided Putin with many benefits that have enabled him to create his party of power. In fact, the competitive authoritarian regime and semi-presidential system in Russia made it simple for him to choose this route on his path to consolidate party as a result of the benefits provided. Also, by creating such a party of power, it is much easier to control other areas of power, such as the judicial body and the military, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies. By supplying these other branches with loyal party members, Putin has been able to ensure control over said branches.
What can be learned from looking at Putin’s presidential terms and his consolidation of presidential and personal power? In general, Putin has started Russia down a path that is reminiscent of the Soviet times, and is a very scary one if it gets out of hand, which is not entirely out of the question with the rise of a strong nationalistic movement growing in the country. This growing form of nationalism in Russia has even been compared to the growth of fascism in Germany.126 Putin and Russia provide
examples of some of the most imminent problems facing the democratic world at the
moment. Understanding how these problems in this paper have occurred is a step
towards fixing the problems regarding democracy in Russia. If the world were to be
successful in solving the problems with democracy in Russia, it could serve as a model
for other countries in the process of democratization.
126 Pierre Hassner, “Russia’s Transition to Autocracy,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 19, No. 2, April 2008, 9. 70
An unstable and unfriendly Russia is not simply a problem for the United States,
but it is a problem which directly affects the stability and democracy that many people in
the world have worked hard and made significant sacrifices to achieve. Therefore, every
attempt should be made to help increase the levels of democracy in Russia, because
democratic governments “are more likely than despotic regimes to promote international prosperity and stability.”127
This paper has shown that one of the main problems in Russia that enabled Putin
to create a party of power was the mixed semi-presidential regime. This problem is
extremely hard to solve, as it would involve amendments to the Russian Constitution.
The largest hope for such a change is in the form of some reformer, who is willing to
build a proper parliamentary or presidential regime, gaining popularity in Russia.
Whether a parliamentary or presidential system were to be chosen is not as important as
simply getting rid of the mixed system in Russia. There has been much debate on which
system is better for democratizing countries, and, therefore, shall not be considered here.
It is simple enough to note than ridding Russia of the mixed system is a move towards a
better democracy in Russia.
Such reformers, who would be willing to change the political situation in Russia,
are unlikely to be found any time soon in a country that has the problems that Russia does
with political parties. Therefore, much focus should be aimed at reforming the party
system in Russia. As Burnell noted, “Political parties are crucial for long-term political
127 Jennifer Windsor, “Advancing the Freedom Agenda: Time for a Recalibration?,” The Washington Quarterly, 29:3, Summer 2006, 22. 71
development in emerging democracies.”128 The important influence political parties have
on political and democratic development in a country should not be forgotten. Support for
the growth of democracy would take strong dedication from the elite, and such support is
unlikely to be found in Russia with the flawed party system. Thus, any aid efforts to
reform Russian politics would do well to begin with the party system in Russia.
While the battle for higher levels of democracy in Russia will be a long up-hill
one, there is still reason to not completely lose hope. As some academics have noted,
there is reason to believe that Russia is not yet a lost cause since “in Russia today, all
major actors demonstrate an interest in the institutions of democracy.”129 While this interest may be quite small, it is something that world powers should not forget when dealing with Russia. It is simple to view Russia as a failure in the move towards a new worldly democratic society, but this view is wrong. This paper is only one step in understanding the problems in Russia. Albeit, the problems addressed in this paper surrounding Putin’s cult of personality and his party of power are some of the most significant for building a strong democracy in Russia. With the proper formula, Russia could change, but it is only with support and understanding from world powers, not harassment and isolation, and a newfound dedication to developing the party structure that Russia will be able to make this change.
128 Burnell, 1. 129 Michael McFaul, “Russian Democracy Still Not a Lost Cause,” The Washington Quarterly, 23:1, 163. 72
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