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Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin's United Russia

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Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin's United Russia VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH PUTIN’S UNITED RUSSIA: THE HOW AND WHY OF RUSSIA’S NEW PARTY OF POWER THESIS Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University By Daniel James Sell, B.A. ***** The Ohio State University 2008 Thesis Committee: Approved By Professor Trevor Brown, Adviser _____________________________ Adviser Professor David Hoffmann Slavic and East European Studies Graduate Program Copyright by Daniel James Sell 2008 ABSTRACT This paper serves to study the new ‘party of power,’ United Russia, that has emerged in the Russian Federation with Vladimir Vladimorovich Putin as the head of this party. It will look at what exactly a party of power is, and how Putin was able to solidify power in the country in the office of the president and transfer this power to United Russia. This paper looks at factors, such as the fact that Russia has a hybrid regime in place, which made it possible for the party of power to emerge, thus providing a small roadmap on how to create a party of power. Finally, this paper shows areas where Putin and his party of power could lose strength and what might possibly happen in regards to the political situation in the country if this were to happen. ii Dedicated to my father iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I wish to thank my advisor, Trevor Brown, for support, encouragement, enthusiasm, flexibility in working long-distance on this project, and patience. Without his help, this thesis would not have been possible. I would also like to thank David Hoffmann, who so graciously agreed to serve on my thesis defense committee. I thank all of my family for all of the support they have given. However, certain members deserve to be singled out. My mom deserves much credit, as it was her that continued to push me to study harder. My mother-in-law also deserves credit for motivating me with her questions about when I would finally finish my thesis. Efim L’vovich Sushin, my grandfather-in-law, significantly helped in the search for documents regarding United Russia and the political system in Russia. Most important, I would like to thank my wonderful, patient, and understanding wife, Nelly. It was her who continued to motivate me when I did not want to work. She was there for the beginning and the end of this thesis, and never stopped being at my side when I needed help. Without her, I highly doubt this project would have ever been finished. iv VITA December 20, 1982…………………………………Born – Royal Oak, Michigan, U.S.A. 2004…………………………………………………B.A. History, Capital University FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: Slavic and East European Studies v TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………ii Dedication………………………………………………………………………………...iii Acknowledgments…………………………………………………………………….….iv Vita………………………………………………………………………………………...v List of Figures…………………………………………………………………….……..viii Chapters: 1. Introduction………………………………………………………………………..1 2. Party of Power: A Definition……………………………………………………...6 3. A Necessary Distinction: Party of Power vs. Ruling Party……………………...10 4. Level of Democracy’s Influence on the Political Situation……………………...12 5. Russia as a Hybrid Regime: The Reason for Varied Level of Russian Democracy……………………………………………………………………….16 6. What Kind of Hybrid Regime has Been Implemented?…………………………19 6.1 Competitive Authoritarianism……………………………………………….18 6.2 Semi-Presidentialism………………………………………………………...24 7. Semi-Presidentialism’s Impact on Democracy…………………………………..29 8. Hybrid Regimes’ Allow Parties of Power to Grow……………………………...32 9. Why Chose a Party of Power to Solidify Control?………………………………36 10. Benefits of Hybrid Regimes When Choosing to Create a Party of Power………47 11. A Roadmap for Autocrats: How to Create a Party of Power ……………………54 vi 12. The Dangers of a Power Split and the World Financial Crisis ………………….61 13. Conclusion……………………………………………………………………….69 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………..73 vii LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 1 Freedom House rankings for Russia for the period 1991-2007………………….14 2 Rankings for Russia from the study Nations in Transit………………………….15 viii CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Russia is the largest country in the world occupying a territory of 17,075,200 km2 (approximately 10,610,037 mi2). Russia, therefore, occupies approximately 3% of the world’s territory. This seems like a small percentage, but Russia is about twice as large as Canada and the United States, which are the second and third largest countries respectively. It has borders with fourteen countries located in both Asia and Europe. A country that occupies this much territory and has these unique borders should be a fairly interesting country, which is certainly the case with Russia.1 Any number of problems could arise when trying to rule such a vast and diverse country. In fact many problems have arisen, continue to face the country, and will most likely continue on for many more years. How is it possible to control a country that spans eleven time zones? This paper will focus on Russia’s new party of power, United Russia, which President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin has created and used to rule the country. This paper will look at the question of how Putin has been able to create a “party of power” in Russia and set himself up as the leader of this party. By tackling this issue, the levels of centralization in the government and politics in general will become 1 Information from this paragraph comes from, Central Intelligence Agency, “CIA Factbook,” <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html>. 1 evident. We must look at how Putin has been able to center power around himself and the office of the president of the Russian Federation. It is also important to see where his popularity comes from and how it is rooted in the country. We must also look at what factors have enabled Putin to create a party of power, and, thus, why he chose this option for consolidating power. It will become apparent that Russia has a hybrid regime, which was an enabling factor in creating the party of power. It is also important to look at why Putin chose this route over other methods of consolidating power. By looking at these topics, we will see how politics has been shaped in the last eight years, and how it will likely continue under the new president with Putin still in a position of power. This will make it possible to point to the future and create an idea of what the world should expect from Russia in the coming years. In order to rule such a country as Russia, a large government is necessary. The chief of the state, or the president is the head of the executive branch. The head of the government, the prime minister, along with his deputy prime ministers and ministers of different ministries run the government. The legislative branch is called the Federal Assembly (Federalnoe Sobranie) and is bicameral. It consists of the Federation Council (Sovet Federatsii) and the State Duma (Gosudarstvennaya Duma). There is a large bureaucracy that is used to govern the eleven time zones it occupies, and consists of employees on every different level, i.e. federal, regional, county, etc. This is at least what the country’s government looks like on paper. Anyone who studies Russia will undoubtedly know that the power structure is something quite different. During President Putin’s presidency, he began to form a much stronger and much more centralized bureaucracy. He has created a unique regime that is full of 2 contradictions. The largest contradiction, which really is the cause of most of the others, is that it is a “semiauthoritarian regime in democratic clothing,” as Ivan Krastev, the editor of Foreign Policy’s Bulgarian edition, noted.2 Why should this current paper, along with thousands of other books and articles, be devoted to the study of the political situation in Russia? First of all, it is important to find out why such an odd contradiction has emerged in Russia. Once this is accomplished, it is possible to set out on the path to fix these problems. This is the only way that it will be possible to ensure that Russia has not just democratic clothing, but also something of a democratic foundation. Secondly, world relations with Russia are sliding downhill. “Cooperation [between Russia and the West] is becoming the exception, not the norm”3 was one such warning that was given to the Council on Foreign Relations as early as 2006. Then, in 2007, Stephen Sestanovich noted in his testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, “Relations between Moscow and Washington are changing—and largely for the worse. We need to understand how and why, and what to do about it.”4 These warnings are completely correct in noting that we need to understand how and why these relations are sliding downhill before we can figure out how to fix this problem. One way we can figure out how is to look at the overall political situation in Russia. This will allow us to figure out what is taking place inside the country itself and how it is affecting Russia’s standing in the world community. 2 Ivan Krastev, “What Russia Wants,” Foreign Policy, May/June 2008, 48. 3 Council on Foreign Relations, “Russia’s Wrong Direction: What the United States Can and Should Do,” Independent Task Force Report, no. 57 (2006), 4. 4 Stephen Sestanovich, House Foreign Affairs Committee, “Russian-American Relations: Problems and Prospects,” 110th Congress, First Session, May 17, 2007. 3 Thirdly, if we do not figure out why these relations are moving backwards, we will not be able to fix the problem and we will risk moving towards Cold War II. Sestanovich notes that calling the problem of relations with Russia a ‘new Cold War’ is clearly wrong.5 As of the current moment, this is correct, however, this may not be sound advice for much longer if the United States and the West in general do not find a way to move closer to Russia and create better ties with the country.
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