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CEPS Policy Brief Policy Studies No Centre for European CEPS Policy Brief Policy Studies No. 81/August 2005 Parties of Power as Roadblocks to Democracy The cases of Ukraine and Egypt Madalena Resende & Hendrik Kraetzschmar* Introduction Both Ukraine and Egypt are going through critical political transformations. Whilst in post-Orange Political parties are the backbone of any revolution Ukraine, the pro-Yushchenko coalition is now functioning representative democracy. They are attempting to reproduce its victory over Kuchma’s the agents that compete in the political arena for oligarchs in the 2006 parliamentary election, there are public office by offering programmatic signs in Egypt that rising domestic and international alternatives to voters. It is not surprising pressures for change are finally being met by government therefore that an analysis of countries that have efforts to reform the political system. To be sure, serious failed to democratise shows political parties differences exist between these two countries in the depth suffering from a severe pathology that renders and pace of political change. In the aftermath of the them weak institutions. In both the eastern and Orange revolution, Ukraine is taking its first tentative the southern neighbourhood of the EU, a type steps towards democratic consolidation with crucial of party has emerged, the ‘party of power’ constitutional issues being discussed. During the Orange characterised by its dependence on the state, revolution, profound changes were introduced to the the absence of ideology and the linkage with institutional environment, affecting the electoral system specific sectoral groups. Examples of such and the balance between presidential and parliamentary parties can be found in Ukraine during the powers. Because these changes were imposed by the reign of President Kuchma and in present-day outgoing elite, the current government questions their Egypt. legitimacy and is presently discussing how to settle these The ideological weakness of parties of power crucial questions (see Yushchenko, 2005). The ruling and their dependence on the state is both a elite’s constitutional choices will be of paramount symptom and a cause of the failure of importance for the development of political parties and, democratic consolidation. Because they ultimately for the democratisation of Ukraine. prevent the emergence of a multi-party system In Egypt, by contrast, mounting pressures for change on based on competing ideological-programmatic the eve of crucial presidential and parliamentary election Thinking ahead for Europe currents, these parties and their legacies should this year have so far failed to produce real changes to the be seen as an important stumbling block in the political status quo. Nevertheless, it is clear that domestic transition towards and consolidation of demands for reform, which have gained momentum in democracy. This paper attempts a summary recent months, probably pose the most serious political analysis of the phenomena, suggesting that an challenge to the legitimacy of the Mubarak regime since alternative model of party development is the early 1990s (see Shahin, 2005). It is interesting to note required in order for democracy to take hold in in this regard that these pressures for reform do not the eastern and southern neighbourhood of the primarily emanate from the legalised political opposition EU. which, being co-opted into the regime, carries little pressure potential to challenge the established order. Instead – and this is a new phenomena in Egyptian Madalena Resende is a Gulbenkian Research Fellow politics – they emanate from a rising number of grass- at CEPS, who has recently obtained a Ph.D. in roots reform movements and a more assertive and politics from the London School of Economics. emboldened Muslim Brotherhood. Being united in their Hendrik Kraetzschmar is Assistant Professor in the demands for immediate political reforms, these Department of Political Science at the American movements have in fact managed to challenge the University in Cairo. His main area of expertise is the authorities by mobilising a seemingly apolitical public government and politics of the Middle East and North and by organising a vast number of rallies and Africa. demonstrations across the entire country. Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (http://www.ceps.be) © CEPS 2005 2 | RESENDE & KRAETZSCHMAR Despite these differences between the two countries in the parliament is no longer guaranteed. Facilitating the pace of reform, there is little doubt that the success or formation of crushing majorities in parliament, ruling failure of democratic change in Egypt and Ukraine will parties hence serve to sustain the political hegemony of largely hinge on the capacity of the political elites to shed the ruling elite in parliament and government. the legacy of parties of power. In Ukraine this implies that Despite their instrumental value within the political the pro-Yushchenko coalition must go beyond creating a system, and possibly even because of that, there is little vote-winning coalition by laying the foundations of a interest on the part of the ruling elites to develop these centre-right party. In fact, if the current elite in power parties of power into fully institutionalised organisations takes seriously the task of building an independent, with a clear ideological profile. The dependency of the centre-right party before the next election, Ukrainian party on the state would be broken by the formation of a democracy seems to have a chance. Otherwise, the ruling party with a will and a power base of its own. The patronage system set up by Kuchma could be reproduced oxygen of these parties of power is hence their again. relationship with the state. In fact, being an exceptionally For Egypt, this means that the authorities ought to do two weak institution, such parties will most likely disintegrate things. First, they need to abolish all legal restrictions that once deprived of their connection with the state. have hitherto stifled the autonomy of political parties and And herein lies the paradox. A truly competitive multi- their development into programmatic mass-based party system cannot emerge within a system of parties of organisations. Second, and setting an example for other power, which unbalances the electoral game in favour of parties in the country, the Egyptian authorities must also single party or a set of political parties that thrive on the cut the lifeline with the National Democratic Party spoils of the state. For democracy to take hold, these (NDP), enabling the party to mutate into a truly parties must be de-linked from the state and put on equal autonomous and programmatic political force that can par with the other political forces in the country. In survive under competitive conditions. concrete terms, this means that political leaders have to Surely, from the regime’s perspective, both of these yield to a different logic of party-building that undercuts measures are highly problematic, as they shake the very dependency on the state and creates links with civil foundations on which the authoritarian system has been society through programmatic choices (see Randall & built. With rising domestic and international pressures for Svasand, 2002). At the same time they ought to facilitate reform, however, it is all too clear that the logic of the development of parties based on distinct ideological repression and patronage, so successfully employed by profiles to undercut existing patronage patterns and to the Egyptian authorities during the 1980s and 1990s, will facilitate electoral competition around clear programmatic in the end have to give way to a logic of pluralism and alternatives. Only once these preconditions are met will competition. Consequentially, there are two ways forward parties make the transition to a different model and for the NDP: it can either strive for greater autonomy contribute to a further democratisation of the political from the state and stand a chance of survival, or, on system. failing to do so, crumble with the authoritarian regime that it has sustained over the past 20 years. Yushchenko’s Ukraine The failure to consolidate democracy in Ukraine during The Concept of ‘Parties of Power’ Kuchma’s period in office owed much to the system of Parties of power develop from a ruling elite’s drive to parties of power, characterised by a strong alliance of the maintain control over the state by means other than political elites with common economic interests, who programmatic competition, normally in situations of increasingly took control of political power in Ukraine unconsolidated democracy or of limited pluralism. Being during the 1990s (see Kubicek, 2001). With few created from above, these parties are not meant to become exceptions, political parties in Ukraine represented autonomous political forces in their own right, but are networks of economic client-patron relations rather than utilised by the ruling elites as instruments of co-optation, expressing wider social and economic options for ruling sometimes even coercion and political hegemony. To the country. begin with, they simply serve the regime to sustain a After the election of Kuchma to the presidency in 1994, network of patronage relationships with the major socio- the strengthening of the grip of several economic groups political, economic and administrative actors of the over the legislative, executive and judicial branches country. By using the patronage networks, in fact, the accelerated. Kuchma’s ruling Party of the Regions was regime seeks to ensure its very survival by granting these little else than an assembly of clans and oligarchs who actors access to the spoils system of the state in return for used state structures to further their vested interests. In their complacency concerning the existing order. What is parallel, the 1996 Constitutional Amendments pursued by more, such ruling parties also serve to provide regime- Kuchma strengthened the presidency by transferring supportive majorities in the major elected institutions of political powers to the office from the parliament. The the state.
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