sign in sign up
<<
Home , 19th Army (Wehrmacht), Colmar, Colmar Pocket, Doller (river), Jebsheim, Vogelgrun

Introduction

After and had been liberated, the capitulation of the Pocket was believed to be close behind. Unfortunately, the facts would decide otherwise. Fighting was fierce and the strategies adopted were sometimes vague. Once had been liberated, the pace of the advance slowed and the towns of and Mulhouse would not fall until two months later. General Leclerc liberated Strasbourg at the same time, allowing him to fulfil the oath he had made at Kufra. With good reason, observers hoped that the liberation of the whole of would only be a matter of a few days, or, failing that, of a few weeks. It would, however, remain at the heart of communiqués for more than two months, filled as they were with new developments, suffering and loss of life. The Americans made strategic choices in this worldwide conflict, and Alsace was only one challenge among many others. General Eisenhower held the upper hand in all armed action. He had to reconcile the plans and requests of well-known leaders such as Bradley, Patton and Montgomery; Leclerc and de Lattre were merely direct subordinates of the head of SHAEF. General Leclerc was only a divisional commander and General de Lattre, for his part, had to make his requirements and plans known to General Devers, head of the Group, who then submitted them to Eisenhower. Although the politicians had decision-making authority within this alliance, General de Gaulle hardly had the same influence over Roosevelt as Churchill. Luckily, Churchill supported his troublesome partner at decisive moments.

In December 1944, Eisenhower decided that Devers’s army group should primarily focus their efforts on the north. General Patch and his consequently left the burden of most of Alsace to the French First Army. The 2nd AD, as well as the 36th and the 3rd US IDs, then both passed under his command. However, the First Army was forced to give up a part of the 1st DFL, which had been recalled in order to overcome pockets of resistance in the Atlantic. It was a question of choking the along the and of clearing the valleys of the . The 9th Colonial ID continued to the south as far as , while the 2nd AD was halted by the floods at Rhinau. Only the paratroopers of the 1st RCP took Witternheim. Béthouart launched the 2nd Moroccan ID to the south, in order to support members of the 5th AD in the Thur Valley, as they were fatigued from long mountain marches. The 36th US ID, as well as members of the 5th AD to the north of Colmar, scored points at Sigolsheim, and . However, they had to cope with a German counterattack that prevented the Allies from continuing their advance. The Tunisian Tirailleurs were massacred on the ridges in the ruins of the Honeck Hotel, which had been weakened by dynamite before being attacked by Panzerfaust and flamethrowers. These were difficult times for the First Army. Its fighting capacities were impaired both by a lack of material resources as by wear and tear on the men. In fact, the French, favouring their participation in the fighting, had nothing like the effective logistical support of the Americans. They relied on the hardiness of their fighters, although their limits were quickly reached during this, one of the harshest winters of the century De Lattre was well aware of the breaking points, although De Gaulle promised him reinforcements. Devers charged him with not leading the offensive with sufficient vigour and determination, and demanded that he put an end to it by 1 January 1945. Despite the bitter and relentless fighting in the Vosges and the distant vineyards eight kilometres to the north of Colmar, the town seemed out of reach (as did the Rhine). Against this detrimental backdrop came news of the Offensive. Aware that he did not have enough strategic reserves available to counter a German fight back, Eisenhower preferred to sacrifice Alsace. Although this offensive was swiftly thwarted, the Germans unleashed another to the north of Alsace, where the Americans had reduced their presence. The Germans descended as far as the River Moder and to the gates of . Abandoning Strasbourg was out of the question for the French. Churchill, more inclined to consider history than tactics, convinced Eisenhower to give up on a pure and simple retreat of troops on 3 January 1945. Two other offensives were added to that of the Moder. The Germans established a bridgehead at Gambsheim by crossing the Rhine and launched the offensive from the Colmar Pocket before continuing on to Krafft. The city of Strasbourg was directly within their sights. This clearly indicated that, in addition to the Colmar Pocket, the fate of the town, as well as the safety of Strasbourg, was at stake. Devers granted the requested reinforcements. De Lattre obtained the return of the 2nd AD, the 28th and 75th US IDs, the 12th US AD, and members of the 21st US AC, thus numbering 400,000 men including 100,000 Americans. On 20 January 1945, the 1st AC launched the offensive. On 2 February, after two weeks of harsh fighting, the 1st AC was behind schedule and failing to make headway outside and . General Montsabert launched the offensive of the 2nd AC in the night between 23 and 24 January with the 1st DFL, which had been recalled from the Atlantic, and a magnificent American unit, the 3rd US ID, nicknamed the Division after distinguishing itself there in 1918. The tanks of the 5th AD were in support, as well as the legionnaires, the paratroopers of the 1st RCP and Gambiez’s Shock commandos; the 2nd AD and the American reinforcements of the 28th US ID were able to intervene. Montsabert’s attack stretched along a 12-kilometre front in order to cross the at Saint Hippolyte, Guémar and Ostheim. They then needed to control the Colmar and Rhône-Rhine , which presented numerous obstacles, on the Neuf-Brisach route. The Germans remained entrenched in the villages, supported by their formidable , which caused great difficulties for the Shermans and tank destroyers of the 5th AD. The Germans fought with a faultless determination and sustained heavy losses. The Battle of , which began on 22 January at 9.30 pm did not come to an end until the 30 January, after the Germans’ withdrawal from the Forêt de la Hardt to the edge of the village. This confrontation caused significant losses to the Shock Battalion, to its legionnaires and to its tanks. The Battle of Jebsheim, and those that unfolded in other villages across the plain, allowed for the liberation of Colmar with limited losses. The villages along the Neuf-Brisach route fell one after the other. Colmar was overwhelmed to the east, ready to face the final assault. The task fell to the 28th US ID, supported by the members of the 5th AD who were still fit, those under Colonel Schlesser. Colonel Rudder of the 109th US IR had the civility to let the French be the first to enter the town on 2 February 1945. Only sporadic gunfire was heard, quickly giving way to a joyous welcome on the part of the inhabitants. The important thing now was to establish a connection with the 1st AC, which still found itself in difficulty along the Rhine. Control of Colmar allowed for the detachment of the 12th US AD, assigned to the First Army, towards where it had made contact with the Moroccan (reconnaissance troops) on 5 February. The villages of , Neuf-Brisach and Chalampé were liberated. On 9 February, there were no longer any Germans in the Colmar Pocket. The 10th ID and the 4th DMM, positioned on the ridges, reduced the final isolated enemy units in the Vosges valleys. General de Gaulle came to Colmar on 10 February to decorate those who had masterminded the victory. However, despite this joy, two points needed to be addressed: the Germans were not dislodged from the north of Alsace until 19 March, while the Germans from the Colmar Pocket succeeded in crossing back over the Rhine. Approximately 45,000 men, as well as vehicles, tanks and guns were able to save themselves from this disaster. The First Army caught up with them en route in April. For the French, the priority remained participation in the final assault in order to add the mingled waters of the Rhine and the Danube to the coat of arms of Colmar.

9 The shock wave; General de Lattre postpones the armoured offensive

Why the shock wave? It was a result of De Lattre’s decision of 29 November 1944 to cancel the armoured offensive when all elements were ready for combat. What was the exact cause of this about-turn and the complete change of manoeuvre instigated by the army command post, which went on to break the enthusiastic momentum towards victory for a long time to come? Why did General de Lattre go back on his decision?

This shock wave struck far and wide, even overcoming the backdrop of silence imposed by military discipline. It spread from staff headquarters, only to fuel discussion at troop level, before extending as far as Eisenhower’s HQ. Like a mine that could not be diffused, the question exploded: Why? The question was posed by Colonel Comiot, who had witnessed the despair of a tank commander on receiving the order to retreat to the south when there were no obstacles ahead of him. Colonel Goutard, while trying to understand General de Lattre’s obscure reasoning for suddenly passing the operation itinerary from the 5th AD to the 2nd Moroccan ID, wrote the following: “Yes, all of Alsace could have been liberated and should have been on 3 December 1944. Your demonstration undoubtedly provides clear evidence that does not require a response, because there is no response to the truth.” The same question was asked by General du Breuil, Commander of the 1st Cuirassiers. General Béthouart, former Commander of the 1st AC, wrote: “When success became apparent, de Lattre wanted to make it an army issue and removed the left hand side of my Army Corps, including a part of the 5th AD.” For his part, General Carpentier wondered: “Why did General de Lattre decide otherwise? This mystery will probably never be solved.” The question was also asked by General de Monsabert, while General Gribus, in search of an answer, noted the following: “The incomprehensible slowing down of the considerable forces at General de Lattre’s disposal to charge into Cernay and Colmar.” The very same question was asked by General Descour, Colonel de Brothonne and General Vallux. General Langlade wrote: “The liberation of the whole of Alsace could have and should have been carried out in three days. This was not the case because: 1- General de Lattre did not want to decouple his armoured divisions to hold out a hand to Leclerc. 2- He did not want a different corps from the one he had designated to cross the Aspach Bridge and to then carry out the operation. 3- He did not want this because, like it or not, he was never able to adapt to the use of armoured divisions.” For the reasons mentioned above, Eisenhower demanded that he be relieved of his command, but General de Gaulle refused. The issue left a bitter taste in the mouth of General Leclerc, who despaired of not having seen his case heard by the First Army (especially the reinforcement of three infantry regiments for three days). He tried his luck at attempting to carry out the manoeuvre alone and with his own means, but was not able to reach Obenheim or Sélestat. His only alternative was to give up. “Why would a regrouped armoured division, ready to carry out a victory on the plains of Alsace on 29 November 1944, alongside the 1st AD and ready to meet the 2nd AD only 60 km away, be placed on army reserve? What threat, however serious, justified this sudden decision? There was no threat, it seems.” This was the question asked by General de Vernejoul, Commander of the 5th AD. General de Monsabert, in his operation order n° 75 to the 3rd Algerian ID, perhaps holds the key: “There was a moral interest in the First French Army being the first to enter Colmar. I think I remember hearing de Lattre express himself as follows: ‘Leclerc liberated and Strasbourg. It will be the First French Army that liberates Colmar. It will do so as soon as it has descended from the Vosges directly on Colmar.’” This question was also formulated by the Allies. At the HQ of the 6th Army Group in Phalsbourg, General Devers passed this on to General in Chief Eisenhower via the SHAEF at Reims and Versailles. They thought that the First French Army had deliberately ignored their instructions after 30 November. General Devers, in his letter of instruction n° 18, demonstrated the degree of tension against De Lattre: “The extent of the exhaustion of your forces cannot, in my opinion, be any different to that of the divisions currently engaged with the Germans in other sections along the front. I note, however, that the Allies’ gains have occurred elsewhere. There should be no further delay.” The SHAEF vainly requested the promotion of General de Lattre to the head of the First Army, according to the statement made by General de Langlade. The final “why” comes from the questioning carried out in the mess halls of the command post, as well as of the HQ of the German 19th, which were surprised, yet relieved all the same, by the lack of mobility of the First French Army. The German army was preparing itself to receive the fatal blow from a victorious adversary. General Wiese wrote: “In late November 1944, we were surprised not to see the armoured offensive we had rightly feared unleashed over the Doller, to the west of Mulhouse.” The reaction of General Shack, Commander of the 63rd Armee-Korps of the , was the same. Why? Only the head of the First Army, General de Lattre, could provide a response. Although many questions still remained, responses were motivated by the reasoning of those involved, or the reasoning that they wish to impose in order to avoid damaging or tarnishing the aura of a military feat or figure.

The Colmar Pocket cost the soldiers dear and the poor weather conditions added names to the list of casualties killed during the fighting. The 6th Army Group calculated the number of casualties (dead, injured and sick). More than 8,000 for the Americans and approximately 16,000 for the French. On the German side, the estimates reached more than 22,000 casualties and 16,438 prisoners.

Glossary

AC (US): Army Corps (American) RCA: African “Chasseurs” Regiment AD (US): Armoured Division (American) (tank unit) 1re DFL: RCP: “Chasseurs” parachute ID: Infantry Division (A) Algerian, Regiment (light infantry) (C) Colonial, (M) Moroccan, IR (US): Infantry Regiment (US) American (American) DMM: Moroccan Mountain Division SHAEF: Supreme Headquarters Allied FFI: French Forces of the Interior Expeditionary Forces