Introduction After Strasbourg and Mulhouse had been liberated, the capitulation of the Colmar Pocket was believed to be close behind. Unfortunately, the facts would decide otherwise. Fighting was fierce and the strategies adopted were sometimes vague. Once Dijon had been liberated, the pace of the advance slowed and the towns of Belfort and Mulhouse would not fall until two months later. General Leclerc liberated Strasbourg at the same time, allowing him to fulfil the oath he had made at Kufra. With good reason, observers hoped that the liberation of the whole of Alsace would only be a matter of a few days, or, failing that, of a few weeks. It would, however, remain at the heart of communiqués for more than two months, filled as they were with new developments, suffering and loss of life. The Americans made strategic choices in this worldwide conflict, and Alsace was only one challenge among many others. General Eisenhower held the upper hand in all armed action. He had to reconcile the plans and requests of well-known leaders such as Bradley, Patton and Montgomery; Leclerc and de Lattre were merely direct subordinates of the head of SHAEF. General Leclerc was only a divisional commander and General de Lattre, for his part, had to make his requirements and plans known to General Devers, head of the 6th Army Group, who then submitted them to Eisenhower. Although the politicians had decision-making authority within this alliance, General de Gaulle hardly had the same influence over Roosevelt as Churchill. Luckily, Churchill supported his troublesome partner at decisive moments. In December 1944, Eisenhower decided that Devers’s army group should primarily focus their efforts on the north. General Patch and his 7th Army consequently left the burden of most of Alsace to the French First Army. The 2nd AD, as well as the 36th and the 3rd US IDs, then both passed under his command. However, the First Army was forced to give up a part of the 1st DFL, which had been recalled in order to overcome pockets of resistance in the Atlantic. It was a question of choking the Colmar Pocket along the Rhine and of clearing the valleys of the Vosges. The 9th Colonial ID continued to the south as far as Kembs, while the 2nd AD was halted by the floods at Rhinau. Only the paratroopers of the 1st RCP took Witternheim. Béthouart launched the 2nd Moroccan ID to the south, in order to support members of the 5th AD in the Thur Valley, as they were fatigued from long mountain marches. The 36th US ID, as well as members of the 5th AD to the north of Colmar, scored points at Sigolsheim, Lapoutroie and Orbey. However, they had to cope with a German counterattack that prevented the Allies from continuing their advance. The Tunisian Tirailleurs were massacred on the ridges in the ruins of the Honeck Hotel, which had been weakened by dynamite before being attacked by Panzerfaust and flamethrowers. These were difficult times for the First Army. Its fighting capacities were impaired both by a lack of material resources as by wear and tear on the men. In fact, the French, favouring their participation in the fighting, had nothing like the effective logistical support of the Americans. They relied on the hardiness of their fighters, although their limits were quickly reached during this, one of the harshest winters of the century De Lattre was well aware of the breaking points, although De Gaulle promised him reinforcements. Devers charged him with not leading the offensive with sufficient vigour and determination, and demanded that he put an end to it by 1 January 1945. Despite the bitter and relentless fighting in the Vosges and the distant vineyards eight kilometres to the north of Colmar, the town seemed out of reach (as did the Rhine). Against this detrimental backdrop came news of the Ardennes Offensive. Aware that he did not have enough strategic reserves available to counter a German fight back, Eisenhower preferred to sacrifice Alsace. Although this offensive was swiftly thwarted, the Germans unleashed another to the north of Alsace, where the Americans had reduced their presence. The Germans descended as far as the River Moder and to the gates of Haguenau. Abandoning Strasbourg was out of the question for the French. Churchill, more inclined to consider history than tactics, convinced Eisenhower to give up on a pure and simple retreat of troops on 3 January 1945. Two other offensives were added to that of the Moder. The Germans established a bridgehead at Gambsheim by crossing the Rhine and launched the offensive from the Colmar Pocket before continuing on to Krafft. The city of Strasbourg was directly within their sights. This clearly indicated that, in addition to the Colmar Pocket, the fate of the town, as well as the safety of Strasbourg, was at stake. Devers granted the requested reinforcements. De Lattre obtained the return of the 2nd AD, the 28th and 75th US IDs, the 12th US AD, and members of the 21st US AC, thus numbering 400,000 men including 100,000 Americans. On 20 January 1945, the 1st AC launched the offensive. On 2 February, after two weeks of harsh fighting, the 1st AC was behind schedule and failing to make headway outside Pulversheim and Ensisheim. General Montsabert launched the offensive of the 2nd AC in the night between 23 and 24 January with the 1st DFL, which had been recalled from the Atlantic, and a magnificent American unit, the 3rd US ID, nicknamed the Marne Division after distinguishing itself there in 1918. The tanks of the 5th AD were in support, as well as the legionnaires, the paratroopers of the 1st RCP and Gambiez’s Shock commandos; the 2nd AD and the American reinforcements of the 28th US ID were able to intervene. Montsabert’s attack stretched along a 12-kilometre front in order to cross the Ill at Saint Hippolyte, Guémar and Ostheim. They then needed to control the Colmar and Rhône-Rhine canals, which presented numerous obstacles, on the Neuf-Brisach route. The Germans remained entrenched in the villages, supported by their formidable Jagdpanthers, which caused great difficulties for the Shermans and tank destroyers of the 5th AD. The Germans fought with a faultless determination and sustained heavy losses. The Battle of Jebsheim, which began on 22 January at 9.30 pm did not come to an end until the 30 January, after the Germans’ withdrawal from the Forêt de la Hardt to the edge of the village. This confrontation caused significant losses to the Shock Battalion, to its legionnaires and to its tanks. The Battle of Jebsheim, and those that unfolded in other villages across the plain, allowed for the liberation of Colmar with limited losses. The villages along the Neuf-Brisach route fell one after the other. Colmar was overwhelmed to the east, ready to face the final assault. The task fell to the 28th US ID, supported by the members of the 5th AD who were still fit, those under Colonel Schlesser. Colonel Rudder of the 109th US IR had the civility to let the French be the first to enter the town on 2 February 1945. Only sporadic gunfire was heard, quickly giving way to a joyous welcome on the part of the inhabitants. The important thing now was to establish a connection with the 1st AC, which still found itself in difficulty along the Rhine. Control of Colmar allowed for the detachment of the 12th US AD, assigned to the First Army, towards Rouffach where it had made contact with the Moroccan Spahis (reconnaissance troops) on 5 February. The villages of Vogelgrun, Neuf-Brisach and Chalampé were liberated. On 9 February, there were no longer any Germans in the Colmar Pocket. The 10th ID and the 4th DMM, positioned on the ridges, reduced the final isolated enemy units in the Vosges valleys. General de Gaulle came to Colmar on 10 February to decorate those who had masterminded the victory. However, despite this joy, two points needed to be addressed: the Germans were not dislodged from the north of Alsace until 19 March, while the Germans from the Colmar Pocket succeeded in crossing back over the Rhine. Approximately 45,000 men, as well as vehicles, tanks and guns were able to save themselves from this disaster. The First Army caught up with them en route in April. For the French, the priority remained participation in the final assault in order to add the mingled waters of the Rhine and the Danube to the coat of arms of Colmar. 9 The shock wave; General de Lattre postpones the armoured offensive Why the shock wave? It was a result of De Lattre’s decision of 29 November 1944 to cancel the armoured offensive when all elements were ready for combat. What was the exact cause of this about-turn and the complete change of manoeuvre instigated by the army command post, which went on to break the enthusiastic momentum towards victory for a long time to come? Why did General de Lattre go back on his decision? This shock wave struck far and wide, even overcoming the backdrop of silence imposed by military discipline. It spread from staff headquarters, only to fuel discussion at troop level, before extending as far as Eisenhower’s HQ. Like a mine that could not be diffused, the question exploded: Why? The question was posed by Colonel Comiot, who had witnessed the despair of a tank commander on receiving the order to retreat to the south when there were no obstacles ahead of him.