Moral Obligation, Evidence, and Belief
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
MORAL OBLIGATION, EVIDENCE, AND BELIEF by JONATHAN TREVOR SPELMAN B.A., Ashland University, 2008 M.A., University of Missouri–St. Louis, 2010 A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Colorado in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy 2017 This dissertation entitled: Moral Obligation, Evidence, and Belief written by Jonathan Trevor Spelman has been approved for the Department of Philosophy Chris Heathwood David Boonin Alastair Norcross Graham Oddie Date The final copy of this dissertation has been examined by the signatories, and we find that both the content and the form meet acceptable presentation standards of scholarly work in the above mentioned discipline. ABSTRACT Spelman, Jonathan (Ph.D., Philosophy) Moral Obligation, Evidence, and Belief Dissertation directed by Associate Professor Chris Heathwood Objectivism about moral obligation is the view that an agent’s moral obligations do not depend on her beliefs or her evidence. The three leading theories in normative ethics (viz., consequentialism, Kantianism, and virtue ethics) have all traditionally been formulated as versions of objectivism. (For example, the traditional formulation of consequentialism requires agents to maximize value, not to do what they believe maximizes value or to do what their evidence suggests maximizes value.) In my dissertation, I argue that if we pay closer attention to how we use the phrase “moral obligation” and reflect more carefully on the nature of obligation more generally, we will find ourselves with good reasons to reject objectivism. Furthermore, I contend that our reasons for rejecting objectivism also speak against prospectivism, the view that an agent’s moral obligations depend on her evidence, and in favor of subjectivism, the view that an agent’s moral obligations depend on her beliefs. Finally, I argue that none of the most common objections to subjectivism are successful. Thus, we have most reason to be subjectivists about moral obligation. A number of significant implications follow from this. For example, if we accept subjectivism about moral obligation, as well as the standard view that moral rightness and wrongness can be defined in terms of moral obligation, then we must also accept subjectivism about moral rightness and wrongness. And if we accept subjectivism about moral rightness and wrongness, then given some additional plausible assumptions, we must also accept (i) that an agent’s act is morally iii wrong if and only if she is blameworthy for performing that act, (ii) that agents rarely act morally wrongly, (iii) that we are rarely justified in believing that others have acted morally wrongly, and (iv) that we are rarely justified in saying that others have acted morally wrongly. Even if we can somehow resist these claims, however, the fact that we have most reason to accept subjectivism about moral obligation forces us to rethink not only how our moral concepts fit together but also how to talk about the morality of one another’s acts. iv DEDICATION To my parents, Jeff and Jody, for their support and encouragement all these years, to my wife, Anne Marie, for her love and companionship, and to our children, Junia and Aquinas v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS There are many people whose support over the years has enabled me to write this dissertation. That list includes my parents (Jeff and Jody), my brother (Jordan), and my best friend (Joe D’Andrea). It also includes my undergraduate philosophy professors (Louis Mancha, Jeffrey Tiel, and William Vaughn), my undergraduate thesis committee (Kyle Fedler, David Foster, and Louis Mancha), and my master’s thesis committee (Berit Brogaard, John Brunero, and Eric Wiland). I also want to thank CU Boulder’s philosophy department for its generous financial support, including a semester-long fellowship that allowed me to focus on my research, and my dissertation committee (David Boonin, Elinor Mason, Alastair Norcross, and Graham Oddie). I cannot thank my committee members enough for their helpful feedback along the way. I am especially grateful to my wife, Anne Marie, for the support she has given me these past six years. While I may have completed the dissertation even if I hadn’t met her, it wouldn’t have been as good, and it surely would have taken a greater toll on my mental health. Finally, I want to extend special thanks to my dissertation advisor, Chris Heathwood, for his help and encouragement these past seven years. I could not have asked for a better mentor. vi CONTENTS INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................................................1 CHAPTER 1. THE MORAL ‘OUGHT’ AND MORAL OBLIGATION ........................................6 1.0 Introduction ..........................................................................................................6 1.1 Objectivism and Its Competitors ..........................................................................8 1.2 The Drug Example and Jackson’s Argument against Objectivism ......................8 1.3 Objections to Jackson’s Argument against Objectivism .....................................10 1.4 My Jackson-Style Argument against Objectivism ...............................................13 1.5 Objections to My Jackson-Style Argument against Objectivism ........................17 1.6 Other Responses to My Jackson-Style Argument against Objectivism ..............19 1.6.1 The Argument from Objective Moral Obligations ................................19 1.6.2 The Argument from Wrongness .............................................................21 1.6.3 The Argument from Advice ....................................................................21 1.6.4 The Argument from Moral Advice .........................................................27 1.6.5 The Argument from Moral Monsters .....................................................28 1.7 Conclusion ..........................................................................................................34 2. MORAL OBLIGATION AND PUNISHMENT ......................................................36 2.0 Introduction ........................................................................................................36 2.1 An Argument against Objectivism ......................................................................38 2.2 An Argument for (7) ............................................................................................40 2.2.1 An Argument for (8) ................................................................................41 2.2.2 In Defense of (8) ......................................................................................44 2.2.3 An Argument for (9) ................................................................................48 2.3 Objections to the Argument for (2) .....................................................................50 2.4 Conclusion ..........................................................................................................51 3. AGAINST OBJECTIVISM ABOUT MORAL OBLIGATION .............................53 3.0 Introduction ........................................................................................................53 3.1 The Simple Argument against Objectivism ........................................................54 3.2 Graham’s Objection and a Response .................................................................55 3.3 Graham’s Argument from New Information .....................................................61 3.4 A Response .........................................................................................................62 3.5 Graham’s Argument from Promise ......................................................................... 63 3.6 Graham’s Argument from Promise* ....................................................................... 65 vii 3.7 The Moral Obligation to Keep One’s Promises .................................................66 3.8 The Moral Obligation to Track the Time ..........................................................69 3.9 The Moral Obligation to Play It Safe .................................................................70 3.10 Conclusion ..........................................................................................................73 4. IN DEFENSE OF SUBJECTIVISM ABOUT MORAL OBLIGATION ................74 4.0 Introduction ........................................................................................................74 4.1 Motivating Subjectivism .....................................................................................74 4.2 Does “Ought” Imply “Can”? ..............................................................................79 4.3 Did Hitler Act Wrongly? .....................................................................................81 4.4 Could One Avoid Wrongdoing by Failing to Attend to One’s Situation? .........85 4.5 Could One Be Morally Infallible? .......................................................................86 4.6 Conclusion ..........................................................................................................88 5. IS THERE BLAMELESS WRONGDOING? ..........................................................90 5.0 Introduction ........................................................................................................90 5.1 Blameworthiness .................................................................................................91