Chapter 11 Self-Respect, Positive Power, and Stoic Pragmatism: Rawls, Dewey, and Lachs on Justice and Happiness
Eric Thomas Weber
It is easier to build strong children than to fix broken men. frederick douglass (edelman 2009, 67) ∵
In this paper, I argue that democratic liberty for all depends upon a shared, public, cultural obligation that individuals and institutions must strive to fulfill with an attitude of stoic pragmatism. The obligation is to establish the cultural conditions necessary for all to develop self-respect and a meaningful sense of their own positive power. This thesis addresses deficiencies in modern liberal and libertarian theories of justice, which fail to appreciate cultural obligations necessary for justice. At the same time, the ideal of a culture of justice is best approached with a stoic recognition that it may never be met, yet is worth fight- ing for, even if progress can only ever be partial or incremental. Since some of the conditions necessary for justice require taxation, libertarians are often op- ponents of such measures. At the same time, the defense or the advancement of liberty depends upon self-respect and individuals’ sense of their own posi- tive power in society. Therefore, to expect all to have self-respect and a sense of their own positive power to pursue meaningful life plans requires first that the conditions have been established for all to develop such character traits upon which the expectations of liberty rest. In what follows, I will begin with a brief contrast between ancient and mod- ern outlooks on justice, before noting the crucial role of self-respect in modern theories of justice. In the tradition, however, there are disagreements about whether self-respect is an individual or a shared obligation. I present the con- cept of self-respect in terms of what John Dewey called having a sense of one’s own positive power. The latter concept helps to clarify the sense in which the obligations for a just culture are shared. I next present contexts which chal- lenge the overly individualistic conception of self-respect, to demonstrate
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Justice, Old and New
On one reading, you might say that the most important virtue in Plato’s Republic is wisdom, as it should guide all of the other virtues, on the great phi- losopher’s account. The central question of the text, however, concerns the nature of justice. Arguably it is the more important virtue, since justice is hav- ing each part of society, and each of the other three virtues (wisdom, courage, and moderation) do its part as it should. It means having the proper balance of each role in society and in virtue function as it is meant to do. For Plato’s Socrates, furthermore, justice is so important that it can even justify dishon- esty, in a few select and vitally important matters, so long as it is wisely guided and aimed at profound social benefit. To the modern ear, trust in leadership to the extent that Plato advocated for seems foolish. We have witnessed far too many terrible leaders. We have also behind us the experience of what happens when societies take seriously what the great philosopher suggested in terms of eugenics, which we tragically still find at work today in ethnic cleansings. In the modern era we prize freedom, furthermore, something that Plato worried about, given the threat that it poses to order and the pursuit of social virtues. We sacrifice a significant degree of control over vice for the priority of freedom and the consent of the governed. Today, we have some remarkable advocates for liberty, such as John Lachs, who present important challenges for those concerned about injustice. Justice is not the only important social virtue, they argue, and sometimes advocacy for it runs too far afield and in fact results in injustice. Philosophers like Robert Nozick and Lachs are right to think that any dreams of equality of incomes or of lives could only be realized through extensive and intrusive imposition from government, contrary to living in a free society. While some grand effort for achieving equality of that kind for citizens is too far-reaching, less radical aims are both more justifiable and more feasible, such as the aim of ensuring for all a set of conditions that are necessary for developing as persons, not starving, and pursuing meaningful life plans. The advocate for freedom is reasonably concerned about incursions on lib- erty. It is true that if you ensure that all will have enough to eat and a place to