Pragmatism As American Exceptionalism
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
Libertarianism, Culture, and Personal Predispositions
Undergraduate Journal of Psychology 22 Libertarianism, Culture, and Personal Predispositions Ida Hepsø, Scarlet Hernandez, Shir Offsey, & Katherine White Kennesaw State University Abstract The United States has exhibited two potentially connected trends – increasing individualism and increasing interest in libertarian ideology. Previous research on libertarian ideology found higher levels of individualism among libertarians, and cross-cultural research has tied greater individualism to making dispositional attributions and lower altruistic tendencies. Given this, we expected to observe positive correlations between the following variables in the present research: individualism and endorsement of libertarianism, individualism and dispositional attributions, and endorsement of libertarianism and dispositional attributions. We also expected to observe negative correlations between libertarianism and altruism, dispositional attributions and altruism, and individualism and altruism. Survey results from 252 participants confirmed a positive correlation between individualism and libertarianism, a marginally significant positive correlation between libertarianism and dispositional attributions, and a negative correlation between individualism and altruism. These results confirm the connection between libertarianism and individualism observed in previous research and present several intriguing questions for future research on libertarian ideology. Key Words: Libertarianism, individualism, altruism, attributions individualistic, made apparent -
On Becoming a Pragmatic Researcher: the Importance of Combining Quantitative and Qualitative Research Methodologies
DOCUMENT RESUME ED 482 462 TM 035 389 AUTHOR Onwuegbuzie, Anthony J.; Leech, Nancy L. TITLE On Becoming a Pragmatic Researcher: The Importance of Combining Quantitative and Qualitative Research Methodologies. PUB DATE 2003-11-00 NOTE 25p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Mid-South Educational Research Association (Biloxi, MS, November 5-7, 2003). PUB TYPE Reports Descriptive (141) Speeches/Meeting Papers (150) EDRS PRICE EDRS Price MF01/PCO2 Plus Postage. DESCRIPTORS *Pragmatics; *Qualitative Research; *Research Methodology; *Researchers ABSTRACT The last 100 years have witnessed a fervent debate in the United States about quantitative and qualitative research paradigms. Unfortunately, this has led to a great divide between quantitative and qualitative researchers, who often view themselves in competition with each other. Clearly, this polarization has promoted purists, i.e., researchers who restrict themselves exclusively to either quantitative or qualitative research methods. Mono-method research is the biggest threat to the advancement of the social sciences. As long as researchers stay polarized in research they cannot expect stakeholders who rely on their research findings to take their work seriously. The purpose of this paper is to explore how the debate between quantitative and qualitative is divisive, and thus counterproductive for advancing the social and behavioral science field. This paper advocates that all graduate students learn to use and appreciate both quantitative and qualitative research. In so doing, students will develop into what is termed "pragmatic researchers." (Contains 41 references.) (Author/SLD) Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made from the original document. On Becoming a Pragmatic Researcher 1 Running head: ON BECOMING A PRAGMATIC RESEARCHER U.S. -
What We Know About Growth Mindset from Scientific Research by Carissa Romero
What We Know About Growth Mindset from Scientific Research by carissa romero july 2015 Growth Mindset: What is It? A growth mindset is the belief that intelligence can be developed. Students with a growth mindset understand they can get smarter through hard work, the use of effective strategies, and help from others when needed. It is contrasted with a fixed mindset: the belief that intelligence is a fixed trait that is set in stone at birth. Why Does It Matter? about proving their ability or avoiding “looking dumb.” Students’ beliefs about intelligence have important This can lead students to avoid challenges and give up consequences for how they experience school when they struggle. But when students hold a growth and how they respond to setbacks and adversity. mindset, they may experience school as an exciting When students hold a fixed mindset, school can be place to grow, embracing challenges as opportunities a threatening place because they may be worried to develop mastery.1 FIXED MINDSET GROWTH MINDSET Belief that ability is a fixed trait that Belief that ability is malleable and can Definition cannot change be developed Effort is bad; if you’re smart, you Interpretation of effort Effort is good; it’s how you get better shouldn’t have to work hard What matters is looking smart, so you What matters is learning, so you can Motivation in school can prove your ability improve your ability Resilience; setback is a sign that you Behavioral response to Helplessness; setback is a sign that need to work harder or try academic setbacks you don’t have what it takes a new strategy Failure is the end of the story: time to Failure is the beginning of the story: time Meaning of failure give up to try again SOURCE: MASTER, A. -
Do Diffusion Protocols Govern Cascade Growth?
Proceedings of the Twelfth International AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media (ICWSM 2018) Do Diffusion Protocols Govern Cascade Growth? Justin Cheng,1 Jon Kleinberg,2 Jure Leskovec,3 David Liben-Nowell,4 Bogdan State,1 Karthik Subbian,1 Lada Adamic1 [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] 1Facebook, 2Cornell University, 3Stanford University, 4Carleton College Abstract Large cascades can develop in online social networks as peo- ple share information with one another. Though simple re- share cascades have been studied extensively, the full range of cascading behaviors on social media is much more di- verse. Here we study how diffusion protocols, or the social ex- changes that enable information transmission, affect cascade growth, analogous to the way communication protocols de- fine how information is transmitted from one point to another. Studying 98 of the largest information cascades on Facebook, we find a wide range of diffusion protocols – from cascading reshares of images, which use a simple protocol of tapping a single button for propagation, to the ALS Ice Bucket Chal- lenge, whose diffusion protocol involved individuals creating and posting a video, and then nominating specific others to do the same. We find recurring classes of diffusion protocols, and identify two key counterbalancing factors in the con- struction of these protocols, with implications for a cascade’s growth: the effort required to participate in the cascade, and Figure 1: The diffusion tree of a cascade with a volunteer the social cost of staying on the sidelines. -
Reflections on Social Norms and Human Rights
The Psychology of Social Norms and the Promotion of Human Rights Deborah A. Prentice Princeton University Chapter to appear in R. Goodman, D. Jinks, & A. K. Woods (Eds.), Understanding social action, promoting human rights. New York: Oxford University Press. This chapter was written while I was Visiting Faculty in the School of Social Sciences at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, NJ. I would like to thank Jeremy Adelman, JoAnne Gowa, Bob Keohane, Eric Maskin, Dale Miller, Catherine Ross, Teemu Ruskola, Rick Shweder, and Eric Weitz for helpful discussions and comments on earlier drafts of the chapter. Please direct correspondence to: Deborah Prentice Department of Psychology Princeton University Green Hall Princeton, NJ 08540 [email protected] 1 Promoting human rights means changing behavior: Changing the behavior of governments that mistreat suspected criminals, opponents of their policies, supporters of their political rivals, and members of particular gender, ethnic, or religious groups; changing the behavior of corporations that mistreat their workers, damage the environment, and produce unsafe products; and changing the behavior of citizens who mistreat their spouses, children, and neighbors. In this chapter, I consider what an understanding of how social norms function psychologically has to contribute to this very worthy project. Social norms have proven to be an effective mechanism for changing health-related and environmental behaviors, so there is good reason to think that they might be helpful in the human-rights domain as well. In the social sciences, social norms are defined as socially shared and enforced attitudes specifying what to do and what not to do in a given situation (see Elster, 1990; Sunstein, 1997). -
Beyond Skepticism Foundationalism and the New Fuzziness: the Role of Wide Reflective Equilibrium in Legal Theory Robert Justin Lipkin
Cornell Law Review Volume 75 Article 2 Issue 4 May 1990 Beyond Skepticism Foundationalism and the New Fuzziness: The Role of Wide Reflective Equilibrium in Legal Theory Robert Justin Lipkin Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Robert Justin Lipkin, Beyond Skepticism Foundationalism and the New Fuzziness: The Role of Wide Reflective Equilibrium in Legal Theory , 75 Cornell L. Rev. 810 (1990) Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol75/iss4/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. BEYOND SKEPTICISM, FOUNDATIONALISM AND THE NEW FUZZINESS: THE ROLE OF WIDE REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM IN LEGAL THEORY Robert Justin Liphint TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION .............................................. 812 I. FOUNDATIONALISM AND SKEPTICISM ..................... 816 A. The Problem of Skepticism ........................ 816 B. Skepticism and Nihilism ........................... 819 1. Theoretical and PracticalSkepticism ................ 820 2. Subjectivism and Relativism ....................... 821 3. Epistemic and Conceptual Skepticism ................ 821 4. Radical Skepticism ............................... 822 C. Modified Skepticism ............................... 824 II. NEW FOUNDATIONALISM -
There Is No Pure Empirical Reasoning
There Is No Pure Empirical Reasoning 1. Empiricism and the Question of Empirical Reasons Empiricism may be defined as the view there is no a priori justification for any synthetic claim. Critics object that empiricism cannot account for all the kinds of knowledge we seem to possess, such as moral knowledge, metaphysical knowledge, mathematical knowledge, and modal knowledge.1 In some cases, empiricists try to account for these types of knowledge; in other cases, they shrug off the objections, happily concluding, for example, that there is no moral knowledge, or that there is no metaphysical knowledge.2 But empiricism cannot shrug off just any type of knowledge; to be minimally plausible, empiricism must, for example, at least be able to account for paradigm instances of empirical knowledge, including especially scientific knowledge. Empirical knowledge can be divided into three categories: (a) knowledge by direct observation; (b) knowledge that is deductively inferred from observations; and (c) knowledge that is non-deductively inferred from observations, including knowledge arrived at by induction and inference to the best explanation. Category (c) includes all scientific knowledge. This category is of particular import to empiricists, many of whom take scientific knowledge as a sort of paradigm for knowledge in general; indeed, this forms a central source of motivation for empiricism.3 Thus, if there is any kind of knowledge that empiricists need to be able to account for, it is knowledge of type (c). I use the term “empirical reasoning” to refer to the reasoning involved in acquiring this type of knowledge – that is, to any instance of reasoning in which (i) the premises are justified directly by observation, (ii) the reasoning is non- deductive, and (iii) the reasoning provides adequate justification for the conclusion. -
Conservatism and Pragmatism in Law, Politics and Ethics
TOWARDS PRAGMATIC CONSERVATISM: A REVIEW OF SETH VANNATTA’S CONSERVATISM AND PRAGMATISM IN LAW, POLITICS, AND ETHICS Allen Mendenhall* At some point all writers come across a book they wish they had written. Several such books line my bookcases; the latest of which is Seth Vannatta’s Conservativism and Pragmatism in Law, Politics, and Ethics.1 The two words conservatism and pragmatism circulate widely and with apparent ease, as if their import were immediately clear and uncontroversial. But if you press strangers for concise definitions, you will likely find that the signification of these words differs from person to person.2 Maybe it’s not just that people are unwilling to update their understanding of conservatism and pragmatism—maybe it’s that they cling passionately to their understanding (or misunderstanding), fearing that their operative paradigms and working notions of 20th century history and philosophy will collapse if conservatism and pragmatism differ from some developed expectation or ingrained supposition. I began to immerse myself in pragmatism in graduate school when I discovered that its central tenets aligned rather cleanly with those of Edmund Burke, David Hume, F. A. Hayek, Michael Oakeshott, and Russell Kirk, men widely considered to be on the right end of the political spectrum even if their ideas diverge in key areas.3 In fact, I came to believe that pragmatism reconciled these thinkers, that whatever their marked intellectual differences, these men believed certain things that could be synthesized and organized in terms of pragmatism.4 I reached this conclusion from the same premise adopted by Vannatta: “Conservatism and pragmatism[] . -
Arguments Vs. Explanations
Arguments vs. Explanations Arguments and explanations share a lot of common features. In fact, it can be hard to tell the difference between them if you look just at the structure. Sometimes, the exact same structure can function as an argument or as an explanation depending on the context. At the same time, arguments are very different in terms of what they try to accomplish. Explaining and arguing are very different activities even though they use the same types of structures. In a similar vein, building something and taking it apart are two very different activities, but we typically use the same tools for both. Arguments and explanations both have a single sentence as their primary focus. In an argument, we call that sentence the “conclusion”, it’s what’s being argued for. In an explanation, that sentence is called the “explanandum”, it’s what’s being explained. All of the other sentences in an argument or explanation are focused on the conclusion or explanandum. In an argument, these other sentences are called “premises” and they provide basic reasons for thinking that the conclusion is true. In an explanation, these other sentences are called the “explanans” and provide information about how or why the explanandum is true. So in both cases we have a bunch of sentences all focused on one single sentence. That’s why it’s easy to confuse arguments and explanations, they have a similar structure. Premises/Explanans Conclusion/Explanandum What is an argument? An argument is an attempt to provide support for a claim. One useful way of thinking about this is that an argument is, at least potentially, something that could be used to persuade someone about the truth of the argument’s conclusion. -
Comment Fundamentalism and Science
SISSA – International School for Advanced Studies Journal of Science Communication ISSN 1824 – 2049 http://jcom.sissa.it/ Comment Fundamentalism and science Massimo Pigliucci The many facets of fundamentalism. There has been much talk about fundamentalism of late. While most people's thought on the topic go to the 9/11 attacks against the United States, or to the ongoing war in Iraq, fundamentalism is affecting science and its relationship to society in a way that may have dire long-term consequences. Of course, religious fundamentalism has always had a history of antagonism with science, and – before the birth of modern science – with philosophy, the age-old vehicle of the human attempt to exercise critical thinking and rationality to solve problems and pursue knowledge. “Fundamentalism” is defined by the Oxford Dictionary of the Social Sciences 1 as “A movement that asserts the primacy of religious values in social and political life and calls for a return to a 'fundamental' or pure form of religion.” In its broadest sense, however, fundamentalism is a form of ideological intransigence which is not limited to religion, but includes political positions as well (for example, in the case of some extreme forms of “environmentalism”). In the United States, the main version of the modern conflict between science and religious fundamentalism is epitomized by the infamous Scopes trial that occurred in 1925 in Tennessee, when the teaching of evolution was challenged for the first time 2,3. That battle is still being fought, for example in Dover, Pennsylvania, where at the time of this writing a court of law is considering the legitimacy of teaching “intelligent design” (a form of creationism) in public schools. -
Philosophy (PHIL) 1
Philosophy (PHIL) 1 Philosophy (PHIL) Courses PHIL 5210. Special Topics in Philosophy. 3 Credit Hours. Arranged each semester. Please consult the instructor. Level Registration Restrictions: Must be enrolled in one of the following Levels: Graduate. Repeatability: This course may be repeated for additional credit. PHIL 5211. Intermediate Logic. 3 Credit Hours. This course will go through the soundness and completeness proofs for a first-order deductive system (i.e., the kind used in intro logic). The main goal of the course will be to deepen the students' understanding of logic by acquainting them with these formal results. But we'll also try to spend a little time on some philosophical issues (e.g., what, if anything, does logic have to do with reasoning). Level Registration Restrictions: Must be enrolled in one of the following Levels: Graduate. Repeatability: This course may not be repeated for additional credits. PHIL 5216. Philosophy of Science. 3 Credit Hours. Basic issues in the current philosophy of science, and particularly various accounts of such key notations of science as hypotheses, confirmation, laws, causation, explanation, and theories. Level Registration Restrictions: Must be enrolled in one of the following Levels: Graduate. Repeatability: This course may not be repeated for additional credits. PHIL 5217. Feminist Epistemology and the Philosophy of Science. 3 Credit Hours. This course explores the effects of gender on scientific creativity, method and decision making. Thomas Kuhn, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), was one of the first to show that political, social and psychological factors affect scientific change. Feminist criticisms of science, developed over the last thirty years, are one way in which his views have been developed. -
Philosophy 1
Philosophy 1 for an Advanced Placement score of 4 or 5 in any discipline recognized PHILOSOPHY by the College. One unit of credit is awarded for a score of 6 or 7 on a Higher Level International Baccalaureate Examination in a liberal arts Philosophy is concerned with fundamental questions about the nature subject. One unit of credit is awarded for a score of A/A* or B on an A- of reality; the foundations of science, ethics and art; and the nature Level exam in a liberal arts subject. The College does not award credit and scope of human knowledge. Philosophy is actually the meeting for the IB Standard Exam or the AS-Level Exam. AP, IB, and A-Level credit place for all disciplines, for any discipline becomes philosophical once may be used to satisfy deficiencies and common area requirements. it begins seriously to examine its own methodology and fundamental Each academic department has its own policy regarding the use of presuppositions. Ultimately, philosophy is much more than the AP or IB credit for placement in courses and progress in the major. acquisition of a certain kind of knowledge. It is the ability to think The Department Chair must also review the A-Level score to determine reflectively and to raise questions about problems that lie at the root placement in courses and progress in the major. See departmental of what might appear self-evident. The study of philosophy is therefore descriptions for further information. recommended to all students, regardless of their major. Jeffrey A. Bernstein, Ph.D., Professor and Chair Philosophy involves both systematic forms of inquiry and a prolonged reflection upon its own history.