Once Upon a Time a Historian Named Antony Beevor, Bemused by a Diary, Novel and Telegram, Built an Ingenious Labyrinth of Speculation About the Evacuation of Crete

CHAPTER 5 CRETAN LABYRINTH: THE WAY OUT Once upon a time a historian named Antony Beevor, bemused by a diary, novel and telegram, built an ingenious labyrinth of speculation about the evacuation of Crete. Outdoing Theseus, he pursued not one, but two, Minotaurs, Colonel Robert Laycock and Captain Evelyn Waugh. But he became lost in the maze of his own creation. Literary scholars, dazzled by the clever historian, followed him deep into the labyrinth in pursuit of the mythic monsters and became even more lost than the Master. And all the while, sadly ignored, Ariadne’s little string of plain fact was there to lead them out into the light of common day. Matters for judgement In May 1941 Colonel (and Brigade Commander) Robert Laycock was Officer Commanding Layforce, a Brigade made up of a headquarters and four Commandos (also called “A”, “B”, “C”, and “D” Battalions), then stationed in Egypt. When German airborne troops invaded Crete, Layforce Headquarters and “A” and “D” Battalions were sent to assist. But the battle had been lost before the Commandos arrived, and the Allied armies in the north-west of the island were in retreat towards the south coast, where they hoped to be evacuated. On landing at Suda Bay, Layforce was ordered to provide a rearguard for the retiring troops. In collaboration with larger Australian and New Zealand units, Layforce carried out its task well. The troops, who were retreating away from their base and their only supplies of food, water, and ammunition, were arduously making for Sphakia, a small fishing village forty miles distant across the rugged mountain range that divides Crete. From there they hoped to be evacuated by the Royal Navy, but overwhelming German air superiority and the heavy losses of ships already incurred meant that the Navy could come on only four nights, and then only between 11.30 p.m. and 3.00 a.m. Clearly not all 174 In the Picture of the 20,000-odd British and Commonwealth troops on Crete could be taken off, let alone their Greek and Cretan allies. Painful choices had to be made as to who could go and in what order. The main priorities were wounded, staff at Brigade level and above, and “fighting forces”, that is, British and Commonwealth Infantry still organized to fight. Layforce, a scheduled “fighting force”, was ordered to act as the final rearguard on the last night of the evacuation, Saturday 31 July / Sunday 1 June. After shielding the withdrawal of its fellow rearguard units, it would itself disengage after receiving a message from Creforce staff, then embark. But, unknown to the officers remaining on the island, every member of Creforce staff flew off in a Sunderland at 11.50 p.m. without having sent the message to Layforce or having appointed replacements who might do so. By midnight on that final night, 1500 men of 5 NZ Brigade, the largest rearguard unit, had already embarked and 2/8 Australian Battalion was loading; 2/7 Australian Battalion and the Royal Marine battalion were on the path directly leading to the Sphakia beach. Laycock, knowing that time was running out for his men, had been desperately searching for a staff officer who could authorize the withdrawal of Layforce, then forming a wide perimeter around Sphakia. In the event, he ordered his men to withdraw to Sphakia without having received that message. Around midnight, with three hours of the evacuation still to run, the New Zealand cordons that had successfully protected the beach and enabled half the rearguard to embark, withdrew. Chaos followed. Aggressive, panic-stricken stragglers prevented the Australian and Royal Marine rearguard battalions, then on the path to the beach, from reaching it until the evacuation was ending. Most failed to board. However, Commandos who had been positioned to the west of Sphakia ran onto the beach from that direction and 120 of them found a place on the last landing craft, then on the point of departure. The Commandos had lower priority than the Australian and Marine rearguard troops who were left behind. And a final point, on the afternoon of 31 May, the last day of the campaign, before news arrived that the number to be picked up that night had been doubled, and when there was no possibility of Layforce leaving, General Weston asked Colonel Laycock to conduct the surrender next morning. Laycock refused and nominated in his place Lt Colonel Colvin, who had suffered shell shock. .

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