Changing Discourse on Collective Self-Defense

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國際學碩士學位論文

Shifting Discourses on

Japanese Collective Self-Defense and

Political Competition after 2000s

2000년대 이후

집단적 자위권의 담론 변화와 정치 경쟁

2014年 8月

서울大學校國際大學院國際學科國際地域學專攻李信愛

Shifting Discourses on Japanese Collective Self-Defense and Political Competition after 2000s

A thesis presented by Lee Shin ae To

International Studies International Area Studies Program In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master in International Studies

Graduate School of International Studies Seoul National University Seoul, Korea August 2014

Abstract

Shifting Discourses on Japanese Collective Self-Defense and Political Competition after 2000s

Lee Shin ae International Area Studies Graduate School of International Studies Seoul National University

Japan possesses the rights to both individual and collective self-defense under article 51 of the UN Charter but cannot exercise the latter right due to Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution. However, Japan has already practiced de facto collective self-defense since 1990s. Furthermore, the Japanese government has made preparations to convert de facto collective self-defense into de jure collective self-defense. Regarding this contentious changes, some scholars point out external factors: the U.S. and regional security environment as fundamental causes of the change.

However, this paper aims to explore the internal factors that have influenced the developments in the discourse on collective self-defense. To achieve the goals, qualitative methodology is employed, including (1) examining number of newspaper articles related to collective self-defense from January of

i 2000 to May of 2014 in Asahi Shimbun and Yomiuri Shimbun, Japanese major newspapers; and (2) matching incidents affecting collective self-defense with the graphs showing level of the discourse.

On these empirical grounds, this paper argues, first, the level of the discourse on collective self-defense is not constantly developed rather it ascends and descends; second, the regime change is a significant factor affecting the changes in discourse. Under the DPJ government, the level of the discourse is generally low while it comparatively increases under the LDP; and third, intra- party competition also plays an important role in the changing discourse on collective self-defense. Strengthening power of groups supporting exercise the right to collective self-defense within the political party promotes the discourse.

Keywords: Collective self-defense, Constitutional revision, Political competition, Abe administration Student ID: 2012-23855

ii Table of Contents

Ⅰ. Introduction……………………………………………………………...1

Ⅱ. Theoretical Framework…………………………………………………..4

2-1. Existing Literature…………………………………………………4 2-2. Argument…………………………………………………………..6 2-3. Methodology……………………………………………………….7

Ⅲ. Changing Discourse on Collective Self-Defense……………………….10

3-1. Process of the Development……………………………………... 10 3-2. Ebb and Flow of the Discourse on Collective Self-Defense……...13 3-3. Correlations with the External Factors……………………………15

Ⅳ. Inter-Party Competition…………………………………………………19

4-1. The Importance of Regime Change ……………………………...19 4-2. The effect of Political Reform on Inter-Party Competition………22 4-3. Inter-Party Competition and collective self-defense……………...24

Ⅴ. Intra-Party Competition…………………………………………………28

5-1. Intra-Party Competition in the DPJ……………………………….28 5-2. Intra-Party Competition in the LDP………………………………33

Ⅵ. Conclusion………………………………………………………………40

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List of Figures

Figure 1. Number of newspaper articles on Collective self-defense Figure 2. Regional Security Environment and Collective Self-Defense Figure 3. The U.S. and Collective Self-Defense Figure 4. External Factors and Collective Self-Defense Figure 5. Monthly number of articles of collective self-defense Figure 6. Results of Lower House Election Figure 7. Results of Upper House Election Figure 8. Foreign policy under the Hatoyama administration Figure 9. Comparing between 1st and 2nd Abe Administration Figure 10. Major Factions in the LDP in 2006 and 2014

I. Introduction

In 1973, the official interpretation of the Constitution, made by the cabinet’s Legal

Bureau, was that Japan possesses the rights to both individual and collective self- defense under article 51 of the UN Charter but cannot exercise the latter right due to the constitutional constraint. Japan adopted a pacifist constitution in 1946 after

World War II and, - Chapter 2 of article 9 states as follows:

‘Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

‘In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be organized.’

(Chapter 2 of Article 9 of Japan's Constitution)

Chapter 2 of article 9 clearly renounces the war. At its heart, Japan forever renounces the use of war to settle international disputes. Therefore, it prohibits exercising the right to collective self-defense which conducts military power outside of Japanese territory and includes the possibility of being involving war. However,

Japan has already practiced de facto collective self-defense since 1990s. Japanese

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government has become more aware about growing dangers, and has been aware national security arrangements are looking out of date. Threats have come from

North Korea, whose engineers have developed nuclear bombs and missile technology to carry them. Also China is another potential threat, since China has been building its military power and positioning itself in East China Sea disputes.

Therefore, the Japanese government has made preparations to convert de facto collective self-defense into de jure collective self-defense. This will significantly widen Japan's military options by ending the ban on exercising collective self- defense. It will also loosen the limits on activities in U.N.-led peace-keeping operations and grey zone incidents short of full-scale war. However, this change raises concerns from its neighboring countries, especially an increasingly assertive

China, whose ties with Japan has become complicated due to the maritime row, mutual mistrust, and the different interpretation of Japan's past military aggression, however Japan’s preparations for greater self-defense is welcomed by Tokyo's ally

Washington, which has long urged Japan to become a more equal partner in the alliance.

Collective self-defense, a controversial issue in East Asia as s turning point of Japanese defense that has lasted more than almost 60 years, possesses the risk of provoking instability among neighbors. Therefore, it is important to clearly

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understand the concept of collective self-defense and the chief causes of developing collective self-defense.

Therefore, in this thesis, I will trace changes of discourse on collective self- defense and analyze what drives the escalation and de-escalation of discourse on collective self-defense to address what is the main factor for developing collective self-defense. In order to achieve these goals, this research will focus on the time period from 2000 to May 2014.

This paper begins with a chapter that briefly reviews the existing arguments and offers a new analysis of the research question. Through the next chapters, empirical evidence is offered to strengthen the main argument of this thesis. Based on these analyses, this paper is expected to achieve three main analytical findings.

First, the discourse on collective self-defense does not constantly increase, but actually escalates in select specific period of time. Second, domestic factors are fundamental causes for the development, especially regime change. Third, not only is the change of the ruling political party important, but also, intra-party competition is also the significant cause for the change.

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Ⅱ. Theoretical Framework

2-1. Existing Literature

The majority of scholarly articles on collective self-defense note the importance of external factors that triggers development of exercising the right of collective self- defense.

Firstly, researchers argue that changes in regional security environment such as the North Korea nuclear threat and rising China have fundamental influences on

Japanese security policy discourses. Christopher W. Huges insists in his work

‘Super-sizing the DPRK threat: Japan’s Evolving Military Posture and North Korea’ that Japan’s reemergence as a normal military power has been accelerated by the

North’s military threat.1 Furthermore, Ellis S. Krauss and T. J. Pempel points out that changes in the geopolitical context have altered the U.S.-Japan relationship and

Japan security policy in their work ‘Beyond Bilateralism: U.S.-Japan Relations in

1 Christopher W. Hughes, "Super-Sizing the DPRK Threat: Japan's Evolving Military Posture and North Korea”, Asian Survey Vol. 49, No. 2, (University of California Press, 2009): 291-311

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the New Asia-Pacific.’2 In the same way, Kenneth B. Pyle suggests in ‘Japan Rising’ that Japanese elites have built national security policy by adapting to changes of external environments in the pragmatic pursuit of national wealth and power.3

Secondly, some scholars insist that the U.S. has been a driving force for

Japan’s collective self-defense development. Japan needs to depend more on its alliance with the U.S due to dire security environment. In this regard, collective self- defense is developed by American demands that, Japan would strengthen the alliance so that Japan could induce the U.S. commitment to Japan’s defense. Also in the current climate, the U.S. almost automatically necessitates Japanese participation alongside America in regional and global conflict. U.S. expectations and demands of

Japan for exercising the right on collective self-defense are higher than the past.

However, according to those arguments focusing on the importance of external factors, developments of the discourse should be incremental and consistent since external factors provoking changes have occurred constantly. In this regard, some scholars considering external factors are likely to overlook the importance of internal factors. For this reason, this thesis focuses on domestic political factors:

2 Ellis S. Krauss; T. J. Pempel, “Beyond Bilateralism: U.S.-Japan Relations in the New Asia-Pacific”, Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 31, No. 2 (The Society for Japanese Studies, 2005): 399-403 3 Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose(PublicAffairs, 2008)

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Inter- and Intra- party politics.

In addition, according to Coalition theory, intra-party politics have no impact on coalition and they are considered as unitary actors.4 However, it is not only inter- party politics that affect collective self-defense, but also the distribution of power within political party that seems to decide the level of the discourse.

Therefore, this paper aims to answer a puzzling question toward collective self-defense: when and why does the discourse on collective self-defense escalate and de-escalate? Why does the discourse develop at some times and not at other times? Lastly, is there any other fundamental factor to explain the ups and downs of the collective self-defense discourse?

2-2. Argument

This thesis suggests that the shift in discourses on collective self-defense is mostly led by domestic inter- and intra-party competition. Winning of pro-exercising collective self-defense and weakening of anti-exercising collective self-defense both in inter- and intra- party made the development of the discourse possible.

4 William A. Gamson, “A Theory of Coalition Formation”, American Sociological Review Vol. 26, No. 3 (American Sociological Association, 1961): 373-382

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There are several hypotheses to be proved through this thesis. First, discourses of collective self-defense have not constantly developed. They escalate at specific times. Second, regime change is a significant factor that politicized the discourse on collective self-defense. Third, under the same ruling party, even though there is similar external threats and demands, levels of the discourse on collective self-defense are different. Proving the hypotheses mentioned above is expected to strengthen the main argument of this thesis.

2-3. Methodology

This paper employs qualitative analysis to examine the arguments. First, in order to insist that the level of discourses on collective self-defense varies, this paper counts number of newspaper articles related to collective self-defense by dividing the first and the second half of the year. Sources of newspaper articles are from major

Japanese newspapers including liberal Asahi Shimbun and conservative Yomiuri

Shimbun respectively. The thesis limits the discourse to political discourse. Political discourse is identified by its actors or authors, viz., politicians, and is regarding the text and talk of professional politicians or political institutions.5 Therefore, issues

5 TA Van Dij, What is political discourse analysis, (Belgian journal of linguistics, 1997)

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on the discussion of collective self-defense in the political sense are only considered as discourse in this research. The author gathered the data by searching a keyword:

Collective self-defense (集団的自衛権) to find discourse directly concerned with politics from January of 2000 to May of 2014. Then, this research matches incidents affecting collective self-defense regarding U.S. and regional security environment, related to actions of China and North Korea, with the graphs showing level of the discourse in order to find relations among the level and those factors. In the chapter

4, to test the regime change factor, I compare the levels between the governments of the LDP(Liberal Democratic Party of Japan) and the DPJ (Democratic Party of

Japan) respectively. In the next chapter, to strengthen the importance of intra-party competition, the author compares the levels of the discourse within the DPJ regime.

More importantly, a comparison between the 1st and 2nd Abe administration is conducted and examined for an analysis of differences.

There are two reasons for using newspaper articles as the indicator of the changes of the discourse. First, newspapers are useful resources to analyze the overall changes since they provide constant and credible data over a long period of time. Second, newspapers are the main resources rapidly presenting political discourse on the issues. In case of collective self-defense, newspapers sensitively report changes in the discourse since they are one of the most up to date about

Japanese social and political issues.

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Also, there are several reasons to conduct research after 2000. First, externally, it is the moment that U.S. security policies made visible changes. The shock of 9/11, as a turning point, the U.S. government consolidated different security policies with increased interventions and war on terrorism.6 Under new security policies, Japan is required to construct a more active international security role. Also, in East Asia, security environments have gradually transformed with rising China and North Korea. Internally, during 2000s, there was a regime change from the LDP to DPJ in Japanese politics. The DPJ gained power after 2009 general election. The DPJ surpassed the 241 seats it needed to win a majority in the 480-seat lower house and ousted the incumbent LDP from power.7 It is of importance to analyze the year Shinzo Abe returned to office again in 2012 after his resignation in

2007, since he is the first former Prime Minister to return to the office since Shigeru

Yoshida in 1948. Therefore, these time periods make effective comparisons for external and internal factors possible and will clarify which factor is the most significant to effect the change of political discourse.

6 U.S. Department of State, U.S. National Security Strategy: Transform America's National Security Institutions To Meet the Challenges and Opportunities of the 21st Century, September 20 2001, Accessed May 1 2014. http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ei/wh/15430.htm 7 The House of Representatives, Syugiin no ugoki vol. 17(衆衆衆の動き第 17 号), 2009, Accessed May 10, 2014 http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_annai.nsf/html/statics/ugoki/ugoki.htm

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Ⅲ. Changing Discourse on Collective Self-Defense

3-1. Process of the Development

To examine the process of development, this chapter traces the events that initiate changes in collective self-defense discourse. Since 2000, changes of discourses on collective self-defense have accelerated. Before 2000s, American demands for Japan to make several legislations related to the right had developed. In early 2000s, this trend is also apparent. The U.S. War on terror by 9/11 required active participations to its allies. Thus, on October 2001, the Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law was enacted. However, the application of the Law is limited to the area where combat is not taking place or not expected to take place, and these measures strongly prohibit constituting the threat or use of force8. In July 2003, the Special Measures Law on

Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance was enacted and the ground Self

Defense Forces (SDF) was dispatched to non-combat zone in Iraq.9 In June 2004,

8 Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, October 2001, Accessed April 25 2014, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/policy/2001/anti- terrorism/1029terohougaiyou_e.html 9 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, The Outline of the Basic Plan regarding Response Measures Based on the Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and

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the Seven Contingency Laws, a law to improve national security mobilization by authorizing the SDF to take over transportation systems or to automatically counteract a sudden missile attack, was passed to offer greater maneuverability to the SDF.10 In July of same year, for the first time, Japanese government White

Paper mentioned the view insisting the necessities of exercising collective self- defense and re-examining an exclusive defense oriented policy.11 In 2004, the LDP

Policy Affairs Research Council issued a report recommending amendment of article 9 to recognize the JSDF as national armed forces for national territorial defense and the support of international security and to possess the rights of both individual and collective self-defense.12 In November 2005, the LDP Constitution

Research Association presented a draft for amendment of constitution. The proposed changes cover the preamble, article 9, and the lifting of the prohibition on exercising the right of collective self-defense.13 In March 2007, the SDF also began developing

Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq , 2003 Accessed April 15 2014, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/iraq/issue2003/law_o.html 10 The Japan Times. July 20, 2004 11 Ministry of Defense, Annual White Paper, 2004, Accessed April 15 2014, http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2004/2004/colindex.html 12 Defense policy studies subcommittee, National Defense Division, Policy Research Council, Liberal Democratic Party, Recommendation on Japan’s New Defense Division- Towards a Safer and More Secure Japan and the World, March 30, 2004, Accessed May 1 2014. http://www.jimin.jp 13 The LDP, Shinkempo Hoan, Accessed April 15 2014, www.jimin.jp.

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a special anti-terrorism force, Special Forces Group, which became a brigade-sized central quick response team.14

In May 2007, there was a significant change in collective self-defense due to founding of Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security under Abe administration. The panel submitted a report of recommendations about collective self-defense to then-Prime Minister Fukuda in June 2008.15 In April 2012, the LDP announced a draft for revising the constitution admitting exercising collective self-defense16 and in December of the same year, the LDP, pledged revision of Article 96 of the constitution, won the lower house election. Advisory

Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security resumed in February 2013, and in July, the LDP won upper house election but failed to obtain a two-thirds majority. In the following December, Abe led establishment of a National Security

Council. On May 15 2014, the Advisory Panel submitted a report that called on the government to change its constitutional interpretation and allow exercising the right to collective self-defense.17 Also the explicit statement from the White

14 The China Post. April 7, 2007. 15 Ministry of Defense, The Constitution and the Right of Self-Defense , 2013, Accessed on May 1 2004 http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2013/22_Part2_Chapter1_Sec2.pdf 16 The Japan Times, April 29, 2012 17 The Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security, Report of the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security, May 15, 2014, Accessed May 25, 2014 http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/anzenhosyou2/dai7/houkoku_en.pdf

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House supported Abe’s move to reinterpret Japan’s pacifist constitution to allow the exercise of collective self-defense.18 In May, Abe proposed six conditions for exercising collective self-defense.19

In conclusion, collective self-defense used to be exercised by special legislation however incremental reinterpretation of the constitution is preferred to pull Japan toward a more proactive security role including exercise the right.20 It would be easier for Japanese government to re-interpret the constitution rather than amend, since an amendment requires a two-thirds majority in both houses of parliament, and in addition to popular referendum. In sum, Japan has incrementally moving away from de facto collective self-defense to de jure collective self-defense.

3-2. Ebb and Flow of the Discourse on Collective Self-Defense

Figure 1 shows the changes in the number of newspaper articles related to collective self-defense in the Japanese newspaper Asahi Shimbun and Yomiuri from 2000 to

May 2014.

18 The straits Times, July 3 2014 19 The conditional requirements include: 1) A close Japanese ally is under attack; 2) A grave threat to Japanese security exists if force is withheld; and 3) Another country under attack asks Japan for offensive military assistance. The procedural requirements are: 1) The Prime Minister decides to use force; 2) The Diet approves the Prime Minister’s decision; and 3) A third country grants Japan permission to move troops through its territory en route to a conflict. The Diplomat, May 15 2014 20 J. Partrick Boyd and Richard J. Samuels, Nine Lives? The Politics of Constitutional Reform in Japan, Policy Studies 19 (Washington: East-West, 2005):17-19

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Figure 1. Number of newspaper articles on Collective self- df 1000 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 2000-01 2000-02 2001-01 2001-02 2002-01 2002-02 2003-01 2003-02 2004-01 2004-02 2005-01 2005-02 2006-01 2006-02 2007-01 2007-02 2008-01 2008-02 2009-01 2009-02 2010-01 2010-02 2011-01 2011-02 2012-01 2012-02 2013-01 2013-02 2014-01 Asahi Yomiuri

Source: Asahi Shimbun and Yomiuri Shimbun (Accessed 20 May 2014)

Articles related to the topic sometimes suddenly increase or decline. The data reveals that the controversies regarding collective self-defense, which are usually constant, sometimes are triggered by a particular factor as a source of contentious issue for a certain period of time. Analyzing the number of articles specifies the periods of escalation, de-escalation and non-escalation. In sum, this figure reveals that discourses on collective self-defense have exhibited significant ebb and flow.

Discourses of collective self-defense have not constantly developed. They escalate at

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some times. It means discourses on collective self-defense were problematic at certain period of times, and other specific periods constrained.

3-3. Correlations with the External Factors

Figure2. Regional Security Environment and Collective Self-Defense 1000

900 2 n C N d h K N 800 i a N K k n d N a A 700 n m N m N K N D i u n i K K N o I t c u s n 600 K . Z t l c s u m n 2 e e l l c i u 500 d a e e l s c e a r a e s l c b r t a 400 i e n d c t e r l a o u r e s t e r m 300 c i s t e t t y t s t s e e i i t 200 s s o s t t n 100 Senkaku disputes

0 2000-01 2000-02 2001-01 2001-02 2002-01 2002-02 2003-01 2003-02 2004-01 2004-02 2005-01 2005-02 2006-01 2006-02 2007-01 2007-02 2008-01 2008-02 2009-01 2009-02 2010-01 2010-02 2011-01 2011-02 2012-01 2012-02 2013-01 2013-02 2014-01 Asahi Yomiuri

Source: Asahi Shimbun and Yomiuri Shimbun (Accessed 20 May 2014)

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In order to find correlations among external factors and the changes on discourses, the author adds significant external factors for Japanese security into Figure 1.

Figure 2 shows combined results between the discourse and security environment changes in East Asia especially China and North Korea. After 2nd

North Korea nuclear crisis, North Korea continued nuclear experiments in 2006,

2009, and 2013. However, in addition to the nuclear tests, North Korea’s test- launches of missiles have incrementally accelerated regional instability. Regardless of repeated threats, graphs showing number of articles do not consistently follow the threats. Therefore, regional security environmental factors and collective self- defense merely show correlations. Especially, it is notable that in 2010, there were significant conflicts between Japan and China toward Senkaku islands which China claims as Diaoyudao. On 7 September 2010, a Chinese fishing trawler collided with two Japanese Coast Guard patrol boats in disputed waters near the islands and

Japanese sailors boarded the Chinese vessel and arrested the captain Zhan Qixiong.21

Each country blamed the other for the collision and after this collision disputes toward Senkaku/Diaoyu keep escalating. The most direct confrontation to date between the countries' official vessels occurred in September 2012 in which

Taiwanese Coast Guard ships clashed with Japanese Coast Guard ships. Both sides fired water cannons at each other and used LED lights and loudspeakers to announce

21 East Asia Forum. September, 30 2010

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their respective claims to the islands.22 However, in Figure 2 is that from 2010 to

2012 that even though disputes on the islands extremely escalated, collective self- defense is merely politicized with recording the lowest number of articles about collective self-defense.

Figure 3. The U.S. and Collective Self-Defense

1000

900 A n S S t C p 800 i C A e - r c t C A m 700 i e o r i S a r m m t c l 600 A r m i a c M r o o t g m e e n a e r P 500 i s a o g R . O i t t s b e e L b v a a u j R p 400 a a o g b r e e o m t e l e c p r a t 300 R i s t o t a o e s L i r d A p h a v t 200 m s o e w e i i r d s n 100 t a

Source: Asahi Shimbun and Yomiuri Shimbun (Accessed 20 May 2014)

22 Reuters. September 25, 2012

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Next, Figure 3 shows the combined result of significant incidents in US-

Japan alliance. Similar to changing regional security environment, the U.S. factors have constantly occurred. However, correlations between U.S. factors and collective self-defense are hardly found. Some U.S. factors such as the Anti-terrorism Special

Measures Law and Armitage Report in 2012 which demands Japan to exercise the right definitely escalated the discourse while other incidents did not raise the level.

For instance, the Armitage Report of 2000 stated that “Japan’s prohibition against collective self-defense is a constraint on alliance cooperation. Lifting this prohibition would allow for close and more efficient security cooperation,”23 did not raise the level of the discourse. Even though, there are repeated demands from

American politicians to exercise the right which is expected to normalize U.S.-Japan alliance, Figure 3 reveals that the U.S. is not a fundamental cause for promoting the discourse.

23 Institute for National Strategies Studies, The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership, INSS Special Report (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 2000)

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Ⅳ. Inter-Party Competition

Japanese politics has depolarized over security issues from the collapse of the LDP dominated 1955 political system. The collapse of the 1955 system weakened opposition from the Left to security issues such as constitutional revision, especially loss of the SDPJ(The Social Democratic Party) as the main opposition party. For the moment, the DPJ, splinter groups from the SDPJ and smaller parties split from the

LDP, replaces the position of the SDPJ as the main opposition party.

4-1. The Importance of Regime Change

Figure 4 includes all external factors and which political party rules the government.

It should be notated that from 2009 to 2012 when collective self-defense was least politicized, the DPJ got power as the ruling party in parliament. Regime change from the LDP to the DPJ clearly made differences in number of articles related to collective self-defense regardless of similar external variables. It implicates that compared to the LDP administration discourses on collective self-defense that of the

DPJ government are less politicized and developed. Therefore, which political party takes control of the government has significant impacts on the level of the discourse.

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Figure 4. External Factors and Collective Self-Defense

1000 A n 900 t S i N S C A - r 800 K p C a t e m e d C C i c A h N A 700 r m N o t i r i K D r S i K m N a t a m n P I o K g N A c t l m i a i m Z 600 n n K r r c e o N t N v i e u M u N n . e d n K a o o s R m c e c K u L s a o . s e 500 i l a l g n t c a b m O 2 l p t t e s b e e u t l d i e a w a a j a R b c o o e u u s e 400 g b r e r e a l A r a c r s c t l c t m e s t r e t e i p n e i c t e a a t R i s l o o i s 300 r s r e e s o i e r a m a t i L t t s h n v t t d y p s a e t 200 o e i w e e m s r d s s s i t t t n 100 Senkaku disputes

Source: Asahi Shimbun and Yomiuri Shimbun (Accessed May 20, 2014)

However, in the second half of 2012, the level rises sharply. In December

2012, Abe returned to the office as a Prime Minister. Figure 4 clarifies that inter- party competition is the most significant factor to change the discourse on collective

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self-defense. In addition, Figure 5 presents the detailed number of articles regarding collective self-defense in every month of 2012.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Number 1 7 2 5 4 7 20 4 41 15 36 131 of Articles

Figure 5. Monthly number of articles of collective self-defense Source: Asahi Shimbun (Accessed June 5, 2014)

According to the figure, the number of articles increases from July. In July, this could be due to Yoshihiko Noda, who at the time, presented the necessities of exercise the right to collective self-defense. In September, Toru Hashimoto touted collective self-defense as his election campaign promise of Japan Restoration

Party.24 Most notably, in December, after Abe and his LDP won the election, the number of articles rapidly increases. Revealed intention of the LDP to make exercise the right to collective self-defense possible by revising the interpretation of the

Constitution heightened national attention. In this regard, the LDP is one of the most critical factors raising the level of the discourse.

24 Asahi Shimbun. September 14, 2012

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4-2. The Effect of Political Reform on Inter-Party Competition

There are several reasons for the clarified political influences on collective self- defense. The DPJ Policy Agenda exactly presented that proactive foreign policy with greater independence from the United States through deeper engagement with

Asia and a more United Nations-oriented diplomacy:

1. Adopting a more “assertive” foreign policy and enhancing Japan’s defense

capabilities to better defend against outside threats.

2. Maintaining the U.S.-Japan alliance as the center of Japan’s national security

policy while aiming to achieve a more “mature” alliance partnership with the

United States.

3. Maintaining constitutional restrictions on collective self-defense while

expanding contributions to international security through UN-sanctioned

peacekeeping operations.

4. Improving Japan’s relations with Asian countries by reconciling historical and

territorial disputes, as well as actively promoting regional economic integration

through economic partnership agreements (EPA) and free trade agreements(FTA).

5. Supporting the global common good through overseas economic development,

environmental conservation, nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament,

humanitarian relief, and other measures.

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(DPJ Manifesto for August 2009 Lower House Election)

The DPJ Policy Agenda is completely different from LDP’s one. The LDP supported the reinforcement of the US-Japan alliance through maintaining supply support to the Indian Ocean, and revising basis law regarding international cooperation for overseas dispatch of Self Defense Forces.25 It is obvious that the

DPJ and the LDP shows completely different polices toward the US and Asian countries. Especially, in terms of collective self-defense, the DPJ policy agenda clearly specifies that the government will sustain constitutional restrictions on collective self-defense.

The political Reform in 1994 is pointed as one of significant causes for those differences between two political parties. Before 1994, Japanese politics maintained multi-member district system. Under the system, politicians sought to gain or maintain a legislative majority to run multiple candidates in most districts. Therefore, it was an effective strategy for political candidates to appeal to narrow groups of voters based on personal familiarity and pecuniary favors of various kinds. The most desirable LDP committees were those associated with regulatory or budgetary favors to dispense in home districts: agriculture, construction, and commerce. On the other

25 The Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, 第 45 回衆議院議員選挙政権公約, 2009, Accessed May 15, 2014. https://www.jimin.jp/policy/manifest/

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hand, foreign policy and defense debates were absent or lacking in national election campaigns.

However, the trends changed after the 1994 political reform. With the new system, consisting of 300 small member districts and 180 party representatives, a candidate who gains more support than the next candidates wins the seat, placing a premium on candidates who can present voters with broadly appealing policy platforms. 26 Also parties win seats on proportional representation lists according to how well they convince voters of the merits of their policies for advancing Japan’s security and welfare. Therefore, politicians endorsed the issues and committees with jurisdiction over national policy such as foreign affairs and defense. For these reasons, the DPJ took up a different agenda in security, including collective self- defense, in order to muster support from public who have the same security view while stabilizing its power in the political arena.

4-3. Inter-Party Competition and the LDP

Figure 6 shows that the results of Lower House Elections in each of 2005 and 2012.

Compared to 2005, in 2012 election, number of politicians in parties supporting

26 Ellis S. Krauss, Robert J. Pekkanen , The Rise and Fall of Japan's LDP (Cornell University Press, 2010)

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exercising collective self-defense increased. On the other hand, a smaller number of politicians in parties opposing exercising the right for collective self-defense was elected in 2012 than in 2005.

Figure 6. Results of Lower House Election

450 400 350 300 support parties 250 non-support parties 200 150 100 50 0 2005 2012

Source: The House of Representatives (Accessed 10 May 2014)

In addition, among the winner of the election, proponents of constitutional reform have reached 89%. Also advocates exercise of the right to collective self- defense accounted for 79%.27

27 Asahi Shimbun. December 18, 2012.

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Figure 7. Results of Upper House Election

180 160 140 120 100 support parties

80 non-support parties 60 40 20 0 2004 2007 2013

Source: The House of Councillors (Accessed 10 May 2014)

The same phenomenon is seen in the upper house elections. Figure 7 presents that elected number of politicians in parties that supporting change in the right increased in 2013 while elected politicians in parties against exercising the right decreased. The results of elections in both houses strengthened the voice of exercising the right to collective self-defense since there was a lack of opposing power to counter exercising the right. Therefore, it is one of explanations why the

2nd administration of Abe could more actively promote the discourse than ever.

Abe won the election for the upper house of the Diet in 2013. Even after he returned in December 2012 to hand victory to his party, the LDP, voters did not

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have a strong fondness for his administration. However, with Abe’s strong leadership, in 2013 election, the LDP and its partner surpassed themselves, together winning 76 seats, to add to the 59 seats that they lost in 2010. This gave them a total of 135 seats for the next three years; a stable majority.28 By winning in inter-party competition, Abe’s government could enjoy a dominant position over the legislative process in both houses, right down to appointing the chairmen of lawmaking committees. Therefore, Abe got an opportunity to more actively support exercising the right than his 1st administration. On the other hand, in 2007 election of upper house, due to non- support parties, such as the DPJ controlling the majority of seats in the parliament, discourses on collective self-defense did not develop.

In addition, not only the LDP, but a good performance by two other, smaller parties, the JRP(Japan Restoration Party), and Your Party, an up-and-coming urban- oriented party, accelerates Abe goal of changing the post-war constitution laid down by the U.S. government in 1946, to be realized. The JRP and Your Party broadly favor constitutional revision and exercising the right on collective self-defense. In conclusion, winning of inter-party competition of conservative parties supporting exercise the right made the shift of discourse on collective self-defense.

28 The House of Councillors, List of the Members, 2014, Accessed May 15. 2014 http://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/joho1/kousei/eng/members/index.htm

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Ⅴ. Intra-Party Competition

Inter-party politics is not the only factor that affects the discourse on collective self- defense. Intra-party politics, distribution of power within political parties is also influential on decision-making of political party. This means that intra-party competition has a significant impact on the level of the discourse on collective self- defense. Therefore, in this chapter, influences of intra-party competition in both the

LDP and the DPJ on collective self-defense are analyzed.

5-1. Intra-Party Competition in the DPJ

The DPJ has some political factions or groups, but they are not as factionalized as the LDP. For this reason, tracing political inclinations of party leader and cabinet members seem effective for understanding the influence of intra-party competition in the DPJ.

Figure 8 shows changing foreign policy under the Hatoyama administration from the LDP. According to the original policy draft of the US-Japan alliance for the new era, it mainly suggests a more equal relationship with the U.S., cooperation with its Asian neighbors, and responsibility of international cooperation through UN

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peacekeeping operation. Especially, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama ended an eight-year refueling mission in Afghanistan, a highly symbolic political move because the mission had long been criticized for violating the nation's pacifist

Constitution.29

Conflicts with Asian neighbors

Equal relationship Strengthening

with the US US-Japan alliance

Cooperation with Asian neighbors

Figure 8. Foreign policy under the Hatoyama administration Source: Park Cheol Hee, 2011, p.4330

Hatoyama appointed Katsuya Okada as a Minister of Foreign Affair, a member of Japan-Korea Parliamentarians’ Union and Pro-Nuclear-Free world.31

29 New York Times. January 15, 2010. 30 Park Cheol Hee, “Democratic Party of Japan’s Shifting Policy Ideas and Unstable Party”, International Area Review(Gukge JIyeok Yeongu), Vol.20 No.1 (2011):31~59 31 The Democratic Party of Japan, Member, Accessed May 15, 2014. http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/member/10/Katsuya-OKADA

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Also, Toshimi Kitazawa nominated as a Defense Minister by Hatoyama, presented that it is not necessary for Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defense.32

However, after Hatoyama’s resignation due to the failure of relocation

Futenma Air Force, Naoto Kan took office as the Prime Minister in June 2010. From the beginning, his government declared that they will take a more practical stance than Hatoyama policies33. Kan’s policy puts more importance on US-Japan alliance which is affected by escalated Sino-Japanese tensions due to the territorial disputes between over Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in September 2010. The change in the DPJ’s foreign policy direction was clearly shown by Kan’s appointment of Seiji Maehara as a new Minister of Foreign Affairs after reshuffling the cabinet.34 Seiji Maehara is a well-known supporter of US-Japan alliance and China threat theory. Even he called for Japan to review the present policy of prohibiting arms exports. Most of all,

Maehara reiterated a willingness to see the war-renouncing Article 9 of the

Constitution revised so Japan can exercise the right of collective self-defense in a

32 Asked by a reporter “Would I be right in understanding your position to be that at the present time you do not find any scenario for which there is a pressing need to consider use of the right to collective self-defense?” Kitazawa replied “That is correct. During the talks between the ruling parties they started to realize the same thing, so I think that is why they stopped considering the fifteen scenarios and suddenly focused on the debate of the “three conditions”. It is as if they are hastening forward without any scenario that will provide grounds [for their argument.]” The Democratic Party of Japan, DPJ General Research Committees hammer out party’s position on government’s fifteen scenarios, June 27 2014, Accessed May 20, 2014 http://www.dpj.or.jp/english///news/?num=20825 33 Reuters. July 9, 2010. 34 Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, List of Minister, September 17 2010, Accessed May 20, 2014 http://japan.kantei.go.jp/kan/meibo/daijin/20100917/daijin/index_e2.html

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limited way.35 Although, Kan did not abolish the main manifesto of the DPJ which claimed an equal relation with the US, some articles were revised under Kan’s leadership regarding the US-Japan alliance and foreign relations for the 2010 Upper

House election. It suggested that deepening of the Japan-U.S. alliance by strengthening bilateral ties in the areas of comprehensive national security, economics, and culture and the like. However, although policy direction under the

Kan administration turned into the direction of strengthening the US-Japan alliance, however at the same time the DPJ tried to maintain its original agenda making good relationship with Asian countries, especially with China and Korea.

From the Noda administration, the direction of the DPJ’s foreign policy became very similar to that of the LDP. Noda, a hawk in the DPJ, stressed the importance of the US-Japan alliance.36 Most of all, Noda expressed his willingness to allow Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defense, saying that one opinion holds that the minimum right of self-defense includes elements of the right of collective self-defense, adding that he would like to deepen discussion on the

35 Kyodo News. September 19, 2005 36 “I want to highlight Operation Tomodachi of the United States in particular. This Operation again proved the true importance of the Japan-US Alliance in a tangible way. Viewed from a security perspective, the world continues to be in an unstable state. Japan must maintain a strong commitment to protecting its own security and the security of the world by continuing forward with foreign policy based on the Japan-US Alliance.” Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, Press Conference by Prime Minister Naoto Kan, August 26 2011, Accessed May 10, 2014 http://japan.kantei.go.jp/kan/statement/201108/26kaiken_e.html

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issue within the Government.37 Also he appointed Koichiro Kenba as a Minister of

Foreign Affairs who supports re-interpretation of the constitution with Japan holding the right to exercise the right for collective self-defense. Furthermore, Yasuo

Ichikawa, nominated as Defense Minister by Noda, said, even under the current constitution, it is possible for Japan to exercise the right, and interpretation should be changed. However, Noda faced difficulty to form a consensus within the DPJ and change the interpretation since many ruling party lawmakers were opposed to expanding the Self-Defense Forces’ overseas activities. Therefore, after Noda became Prime Minister in September, he maintained that the government has no plans to change the interpretation, but is an issue that is up for discussion. Thus, political inclinations of leader and cabinet member affect political decision making of the party.

In conclusion, even though intra-party politics affects some policies, in the

DPJ, it was not strong enough to change chief agenda of the party. In DPJ’s election manifesto for the 2010 election, the party called for “adhering to pacifism”.38 The fact that the DPJ did not change its stance toward collective self-defense, implicates that it is hard for political party to change its original position which would weaken

37 Yomiuri Shimbun. July 17, 2012. 38 The Democratic Party of Japan, DPJ Manifesto for June 2010 Upper House Election, 2010, Accessed May 10, 2014. http://www.dpj.or.jp/english///manifesto/manifesto2010.html

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its political support. Therefore, under the DPJ as a ruling party, collective self- defense maintained the status quo. However, intra-party competition within the DPJ shows that even the DPJ has gradually became conservative and no longer serves as the effective opposing political party against conservative LDP.

5-2. Intra-Party Competition in the LDP

It is more effective to find the influences of intra-party politics within the LDP since factionalism is more developed. Previous constitutional revision attempts in the late

1950s and early 1960s induced internal division between the pragmatist and revisionist groups.39 However, since the collapse of the 1955 system, the pragmatists became weaker while the revisionists took effective control of the party.

Also by analyzing the LDP, comparing two administrations under the same leader is possible. It is questionable why under the same Prime Minister and his consistent will to exercise the right, the 2nd administration has more actively developed collective self-defense.

39 Robert ward, “The Commission on the Constitution”, The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 24, no.3, 1965, p.422

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Figure 9. Comparing between 1st and 2nd Abe Administration

1000 900 800 700 600

500 Asahi 400 Yomiuri 300 200 100 0

Source: Asahi Shimbun and Yomiuri Shimbun (Accessed 20 May 2014)

Figure 9 clarifies the difference between each of 1st and 2nd Abe administrations. Both time periods, similar external factors occurred. Therefore, considering two administrations are under same ruling party, the LDP, and Prime

Minister Abe, those differences are influenced by how members of the LDP compose the parliament in addition to which political party takes control of the government.

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2006 2014

Seiwa Seisaku Kenkyūkai 86 92 (清和和和研究会) Ikōkai(為公会) 11 37

Kochikai(宏池会) 6340 45

Heisei Kenkyūkai(平成研究会) 75 52

Shisuikai (志帥会) 4641 31

Banchō Seisaku Kenkyūjo 15 12 (番町和和研究究) Kinmirai Seiji Kenkyūkai 36 13 (近未来和政研究会) Figure 10. Major Factions in the LDP in 2006 and 2014 Source: House of Councillors/ House of Representatives (Accessed 5 June 2014)

Even though factionalism weakened after political reform in 1994, there are various influential factions in the LDP with their own unique characteristics. For this reason, the factions and their level of involvement in the parliament have critical impacts on the government’s decision makings.

40 In 2006, Kochikai was divided into Niwa-Koga(丹丹‧古古古) and Tanigaki(谷垣派) 41 In 2006, Shisuikai was divided into Ibuki(伊吹) and Nikai(二階)

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Figure 10 shows a number of faction members in each faction took seats in parliament during 1st and 2nd Abe administration respectively. Seiwa Seisaku

Kenkyūkai(清和和和研究会), the faction Abe belongs to, takes largest number of seats among other LDP factions in 2006 and 2014 respectively. It is a pro-classical economics, nationalist and conservative faction.42 Abe’s father Shintaro Abe was an ex-leader of this faction and previous-Prime Ministers Junichiro Koizumi and

Yoshirō Mori also formerly led the faction. It continues to trail in total number of members in both houses combined. This hawkish faction has supported Abe’s policies including collective self-defense. Therefore, increasing number of members in parliament empowers Abe to develop the discourse. In addition, Ikōkai (為公会) represented as Taro Aso, presents rising number of members in both houses. This fa ction supported Abe in the LDP presidential election and served as the driving force in winning of Abe. With the launch of the 2nd Abe cabinet, Aso joined the cabinet as a deputy Prime Minister and a Finance Minister. Aso insisted that Japanese government should reinterpret constitution 9 so as to exercise the right of collective self-defense in 2008 when he visited America as a Prime Minister.43 Ikōkai has gained a lot of backbenchers and increased its influence within the LDP , thereby

42 Patrick Köllner, “Factionalism in Japanese political parties revisited or how do factions in the LDP and the DPJ differ?” Japan Forum Volume 16, Issue 1, (2004): 87-109 43 The Japan Times. October 2, 2008

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strengthening Abe’s security policy. Shisuikai(志帥会) is a strong hawk in the LDP, which supports revision of the Constitution, takes a hard line against North Korea.

Furthermore, Banchō Seisaku Kenkyūjo(番町和和研究究), used to be known as the leftist faction and pro-China, has turned a more conservative faction. Masahiko

Komura, vice president of the LDP and belonging to Banchō Seisaku Kenkyūjo, said at the negotiation among Japan’s ruling coalitions partners that the standards in the

Constitution that allow for Japan to defend itself also allow for collective self- defense44. Kinmirai Seiji Kenkyūkai (近未来和政研究会), led by Ishihara

Nobuteru Abe’s very close supporter, also was on Abe’s side.

On the other hand, there are only two dove factions opposing Abe, Heisei

Kenkyūkai(平成研究会) and Kochikai (宏池会). Heisei Kenkyūkai, right-liberal and pro-China faction, has incrementally decreased number of members in parliament.

Heisei Kenkyūkai has opposed to Abe’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine, and his economic policies including Abenomics and the TPP. A member of this faction, the secretary-general of the LDP Masashi Waki presented that the government is too rush on collective self-defense and the issue needs to be properly discussed to slow down the government on the issue.45 However, the faction members in parliament decreased from 75 in 2006 to 52 in 2014. In addition, Kochikai known as doves in

44 The Japan Times. May 22, 2014 45 Asahi Shimbun. March 8, 2014

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the LDP, also lost its power. Especially, Koichi Kato of the Liberal Democratic

Party retired from politics following his loss in the House of Representatives election in December of 2012. He used to insist that Japan should possess minimum level of military capability. Also Makoto Koga, a leader of the faction and former secretary-general, argued that Article 9, which renounces war and the use of force, as a world heritage and Japan has continued with economic development until today after rebuilding itself from the war-ravaged and barren land that existed at the end of World War II. He insists that once the first paragraph of

Article 9 is frayed, there is the possibility that another foolish war may be fought.

He also emphasized to his party that they should take the role as an opposition party within the LDP in order to contain Abe and to sustain Japan as peaceful nation.46

However, Figure 10 shows that number of members of Kochikai in parliament decreased from 63 to 43 in 2012.

In sum, Figure 10 clarifies strengthening of conservative factions supporting Abe, while weakening of factions opposing Abe in the 2nd administration.

As a result of this intra-party competition, Abe achieves more power to promote exercising the right of collective self-defense. Overall, more factions in the LDP have had moved toward conservatism while liberal factions lost their ground. The

46 Asahi Shimbun, July 22. 2013

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analysis shows that intra-party power relations have a significant impact on the coalition behavior of the LDP toward collective self-defense. The LDP with comparatively unconstrained negotiators tend to participate more actively in changing discourse on collective self-defense.

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Ⅵ. Conclusion

Since 2000, Japanese discourses on collective self-defense have made critical developments. Analyzing escalation and de-escalation of these discourses, this paper presents major three findings regarding collective self-defense.

First, this paper explicates that the discourse on collective self-defense do escalate and de-escalate. The level of the discourse keeps changing. Discourse on collective self-defense developed at specific time period. They have not constantly escalated.

Second, the regime change is a significant factor affecting the changes in discourse. The data in the research show that there is a linkage between a political party and collective self-defense discourse. Under the DPJ government, the level of the discourse is generally low and the discourse rarely gets noticed. On the other hand, the level of the discourse comparatively increases under the LDP administration which implicates that inter-party politics affects the constantly changing discourse on collective self-defense.

Third, intra-party competition plays an important role in the changing discourse on collective self-defense by affecting party’s decision making. Even under the same ruling power, the LDP, levels of discourses are not consistent.

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Which groups get more power in the party affect the party’s policies including security. Therefore, strengthening conservatism in the LDP has promoted the argument supporting exercising the right on collective self-defense.

In conclusion, rather than external factors, internal factors; intra- and inter- party competitions have more influences on deciding the level of discourses. The shift in discourse on collective self-defense is led by domestic intra- and inter-party competition. Winning of pro-exercising collective self-defense both in inter- and intra- party while losing power of opposing groups also affects the discourse.

This thesis finds the trend in domestic politics that the entire Japanese political spectrum has shifted toward more conservatism along with the weakening of the left. For example, the foundation of the Japan Restoration Party, strongly nationalist political party, reveals this trend. This political shift to the right has contributed to the development of discourse on collective self-defense. The ambitions for national prestige and more security have intensified in Japan since the end of the Cold War. Enthusiastic nationalists are embracing more aggressive attitudes regarding collective self-defense. Even in intra-party competition, moderate conservative and liberal groups have weakened. Therefore, there is less power to hold back revisionist Abe’s plan for collective self-defense.

Then why has conservatism become more powerful in Japanese politics?

There are external and internal reasons. Firstly, in terms of external factors,

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changing security environment in East Asia, due to strengthening China and un- expectable North Korea increase threats to Japan. Therefore, for the moment, normal

Japanese feel more necessities for strong Japanese national security. Regard of internal causes, after lost against the DPJ, the LDP stressed its political position as the conservative party in order to gain stronger supports from public with strong conservative inclination.

Revisionist politicians get momentum to push the discourse the way scholars want due to the confluence of international and domestic pressures. Holding back revisionist and maintaining the status quo in security are merely tenable for the feeble oppositions with the rise of new threats and alliance demands. It is not that fast, but the path of Normal state is already taking place.

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Appendices

Appendix 1. Number of newspaper articles in Asahi Shimbun and Yomiuri Shimbun on collective self-defense, from January 2000 to May 2014.

Asahi Yomiuri Asahi Yomiuri 2000-01 47 35 2007-02 170 94 2000-02 54 62 2008-01 26 20 2001-01 206 136 2008-02 39 27 2001-02 361 218 2009-01 33 31 2002-01 57 67 2009-02 54 41 2002-02 88 71 2010-01 33 71 2003-01 67 69 2010-02 28 18 2003-02 100 62 2011-01 6 4 2004-01 136 107 2011-02 14 12 2004-02 111 75 2012-01 26 27 2005-01 71 67 2012-02 247 156 2005-02 123 56 2013-01 146 90 2006-01 44 30 2013-02 491 283 2006-02 122 118 2014-01 931 395 2007-01 165 132

Appendix 2 Strength of Political Groups in the House of Representatives and Strength of the Political Groups in the House of Councillors as of June 2014.

Liberal Democratic Party 294 Democratic Party of Japan and Club of Independents 55 Japan Restoration Party and Unity Party 41

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New Komeito 31 Party for Future Generations 19 Your Party 9 Japanese Communist Party 8 People's Life Party 7 Social Democratic Party 2 Independents 14

INCUMBENTS 480 Vacancies 0 MEMBERSHIP 480 Strength of Political Groups in the House of Representatives

Liberal Democratic Party 114 Democratic Party of Japan and The Shin-Ryokufukai (新緑風会) 58 Japan Restoration Party and Unity Party 14 New Komeito 20 Your Party 13 Japanese Communist Party 11 People's Life Party 2 Social Democratic Party 3 New Renaissance Party and Group of Independents 3 Independents 4

INCUMBENTS 242 Vacancies 0 MEMBERSHIP 242

Strength of the Political Groups in the House of Councillors

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Appendix 3. Conclusion of Report of the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security in 2008

Security provides the basis for a nation’s existence. Without security, the nation cannot implement economic, social or other policies. As described in Part I of this report, the security environment surrounding Japan in the 21st century is far different from that in the middle of the 20th century, when the Constitution of Japan was enacted; the situation is also different from that in the Cold War era, when various interpretations were presented by the Government regarding Japan’s right of collective self-defense and other issues. The present security environment is also different from that immediately after the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, national security policies must be formulated and implemented by the state based on the rule of law, with the Constitution being the supreme law. This legal basis, however, should also be reexamined constantly in light of the stark realities of the security environment. The Panel, based on this basic understanding, has examined the four cases in question and made the above recommendations to change the interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan. The Panel believes it is necessary and possible for Japan to expeditiously implement these recommendations to ensure its security in the dramatically changing security environment of the 21st century. As described in Part I, Japan’s basic security strategy is (1) to maintain effective defense capability through its own efforts; (2) to maintain and enhance the Japan-U.S. alliance based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty; and, (3) to contribute to the joint efforts of the international community to settle disputes in various parts of the world and maintain and restore international peace and security as Japan’s responsibility toward the international community and as a means to improve its own security environment. The Panel believes that the recommendations made in this report will certainly contribute to Japan’s own security in this sense without imposing an extra burden on Japan. Finally, it is the Panel’s expectation that the

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recommendations on the use of weapons in international peace operations and those on logistics support will be realized in the process of enacting the so called Comprehensive Law currently under consideration by the government and the ruling parties.

Appendix 4. Conclusion of Report of the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security in 2014

The Constitution of Japan affirms in the preamble of the Constitution, the “right to live in peace,” and stipulates in Article 13 the “right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” of the people. These are rights which essentially form the foundation of other basic human rights and in order to protect these, ensuring the survival of the sovereign people and the survival of the state are the precondition. Furthermore, the Constitution also expresses the principle of international cooperation. Peace is what people aspire towards. Pacifism of the Constitution of Japan, which is a presumption of the principle of international cooperation, should continue to be firmly maintained in the future. Meanwhile, the lives of the sovereign people and the survival of the state must not be placed at risk even from the perspective of such Constitution. The security environment surrounding Japan has become ever more severe, due to various factors including technological progress, expansion of cross- border threats, and changes in the inter-state power balance. In addition, the deepened Japan-U.S. alliance and the broadening of regional security cooperation mechanisms, together with the increasing number of cases that ought to be addressed by the whole international community, Japan needs to fulfill an even greater role in a host of areas. Considering the remarkable scale and speed of the changes occurring in the security environment, Japan is now facing a situation where adequate responses can no longer be taken under the

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constitutional interpretation to date in order to maintain the peace and security of Japan and realize peace and stability in the region and in the international community. The interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution has been established as a result of many years of discussion. There are opinions that any changes to it would not be permissible and that if changes are required, it will be necessary to amend the Constitution. However, the method of constitutional interpretation of this Panel has been derived from a literal interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution. In other words, the provision of paragraph 1 of Article 9 should be interpreted as prohibiting the threat or the use of force as means of settling international disputes to which Japan is a party. The provisions should be interpreted as not prohibiting the use of force for the purpose of self- defense, nor imposing any constitutional restrictions on activities that are consistent with international law. The provision of the paragraph 2 of Article 9 should be interpreted as stipulating that “in order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph,” war potential will never be maintained. The paragraph should therefore be interpreted as not prohibiting the maintenance of force for other purposes, namely self-defense or so-called international contributions to international efforts. Even from the view of the Government to date that “these measures (necessary for self-defense) should be limited to the minimum extent necessary,” the interpretation which excluded the right of collective self-defense from “the minimum extent necessary,” while including the right of individual self-defense is inappropriate as it attempts to formally draw a line on “the minimum extent necessary” by an abstract legal principle, and it should be interpreted that the exercise of the right of collective self-defense is also included in “the minimum extent necessary.” With regard to views on the right of individual self-defense, as long as the three requirements are fulfilled, there are no restrictions on the right of individual self-defense, but its actual exercise requires a decision based on careful and speedy judgment on necessity and proportionality. With regard to the

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right of collective self-defense, when a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan comes under an armed attack and if such a situation could pose a serious impact on the security of Japan, Japan should be able to participate in operations to repel such an attack by using force to the minimum extent necessary, having obtained an explicit request or consent from the country under attack, and thus to make a contribution to the maintenance and restoration of international peace and safety, even if Japan itself is not directly attacked. With regard to whether a certain situation would fall under such a case, the Government should take responsibility for making a decision, taking the following points into consideration comprehensively whether there is a high possibility the situation could lead to a direct attack against Japan, whether not taking action could significantly undermine trust in the Japan-U.S. alliance, thus leading to a significant loss of deterrence, whether the international order itself could be significantly affected, whether the lives and rights of Japanese nationals could be harmed severely and whether there could otherwise be serious effects on Japan. In the case that Japan would pass through the territory of a third country when exercising the right of collective self-defense, the Government should make it a policy to obtain the consent of that third country. The exercise of the right of collective self-defense should require the approval, either prior or ex post facto, of the Diet. The exercise of the right of collective self-defense by Japan should be discussed and approved by the National Security Council under the leadership of the Prime Minister, and the Cabinet is required to make the decision in the form of a Cabinet Decision. However, given that the right of collective self-defense is a right and not an obligation, it is obvious that after a comprehensive assessment, a policy decision not to exercise it could be made. In terms of participation in collective security measures of the U.N. which entail military measures, such measures would not constitute the “use of force” as means of settling international disputes to which Japan is a party and they should therefore be interpreted as not being subject to constitutional restrictions.

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Naturally, participation in such measures should be decided carefully, based on comprehensive examination on each individual case, and participation in collective security measures of the U.N. entailing military measures should require approval, either prior or ex post facto, by the Diet. The theory of so-called “‘Ittaika’ with the use of force” has presented significant obstacles to actual security-related operations; and thus the concept itself should be discontinued, and it should be dealt with a matter of policy appropriateness. With regard to U.N. PKOs, the protection and rescue of Japanese nationals abroad, and international security cooperation , none of these constitute the “use of force” as prohibited under Article 9 and therefore the use of weapons in the course of such activities for the purpose of coming to the aid of geographically distant unit or personnel under attack (so-called “kaketsuke- keigo”) or removing obstructive attempts against its missions should be interpreted as not being restricted constitutionally. In addition, with regard to response to infringements that do not amount to an armed attack, even in the case of an infringement in which a determination cannot be made about the “organized and planned use of force,” action to the minimum extent necessary by the SDF to repel such an infringement should be permitted under the Constitution. Furthermore, with regard to the actions of the Self-Defense Forces, as there is a possibility that gaps arise in authority or time between peacetime and situations where respective actions are taken or a Defense Operation Order is issued, it is therefore necessary to take comprehensive measures for the SDF Law to ensure a seamless response. In order to give actual meaning to the new concepts stated above, it is essential to develop corresponding domestic legislation. Looking back, it can be seen that the Constitution makes no express provisions with regard to the right of individual self-defense or the right of collective self-defense. The exercise of the right of individual self-defense has also in the past been recognized, not by the Government’s amendment of the Constitution, but by the adjustment of constitutional interpretations.

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In view of these facts it should also be possible, by the Government setting out a new interpretation in an appropriate manner, to make a decision recognizing that the exercise of the right of self-defense to the minimum extent necessary encompasses the right of collective self-defense in addition to the right of individual self-defense. The observation that the amendment of the Constitution is necessary therefore does not apply. Similarly, with regard to Japan’s participation in collective security measures of the U.N., this also could be enabled by clarification of a new interpretation of the Constitution by the Government in an appropriate way. The above represents the recommendations of the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security. It goes without saying that it is the Government that will ultimately decide on how these recommendations are treated and what specific measures will be taken with regard to the reconstruction of the legal basis for security. It is, nonetheless, the strong expectation of the Panel that the Government will consider this report earnestly and proceed to take necessary legislative measures.

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국문초록

2000년대 이후

집단적 자위권의 담론 변화와 정치 경쟁

이신애 국제지역학 서울대학교 국제대학원

일본은 UN 헌장 51 조에 집단적자위권의 권리를 보유하고는 있으나 일본의 헌법 9 조로 이러한 권리의 행사는 제한되어 왔다. 하지만 일본은 1990 년대부터 사실상의 집단적 자위권을 행사하여 왔고, 점차적으로 법률적 집단적 자위권 행사를 가능하게 하기 위한 노력들이 진행중이다. 이러한 변화에 대해서 미일 동맹에 의한 요구 또는 지역 안보 환경의 변화 등의 외부적 요인이 원인으로 지목하는 학자들의 의견도 있으나 본 논문은 일본 정치 경쟁에 집중해 변화의 근본적인 원인을 찾고자 한다. 이를 위해 본 연구는 집단적 자위권과 관련된 정치 담론을 분석하고자 일본 주요 신문인 아사히와 요미우리의 집단적자위권과 관련된 신문 기사 수의 분석하고 이를 2000 년부터 2014 년 5 월까지 집단적자위권과 관련된 사건들과 연결 시켰다. 이러한 분석을 바탕으로 본 논문은 집단적 자위권에 대해 다음과 같이 설명하고자 한다. ① 집단적 자위권의 담론은 발전을 지속하지 않았으며 특정 시기에 한해 발전의 모습을 보였다. ② 정권 교체는 집단적 자위권 담론 변화에 가장 주된 원인이다. 자민당 정권과 민주당 정권 하에서 담론의 발전 정도는 큰 차이를 보인다. ③

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정당 내 경쟁 또한 집단적 자위권 담론 변화에 변화를 야기한다. 상대적으로 더 많은 권력을 가지는 정치적 성향의 집단에 따라 담론은 변화한다.

Keywords: 집단적 자위권, 헌법 개정, 정치 경쟁, 아베 정권 Student ID: 2012-23855

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