I I ))I The U.S.S Mie. Po side ie. I)ae o pho ogrp nnon( HOW THE BATTLESHIP MAINE WAS DESTROYED by H. G. RICKOVER NAVAL HISTORY DIVISION DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1976 LC Card 76-600007 © Copyright 1976, H. G. Rickover All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying or recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the author. For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $5.70 Stock Number 008-046-00085-9 Foreword The sinking of the U.S.S. Maine in Havana Harbor, Cuba, early in 1898, It was of special was one of the more notable events in American history. ensuing Spanish-American significance because of its relationship to the territory, and the War, the acquisition by the United States of overseas the Navy had little emergence of the nation as a world power. In 1898, familiarity with explosive effects on the steel ships introduced only recently that into the Fleet. Naval officers advanced various theories. Some believed Others the cause had been an underwater explosion external to the ship. believed that a more likely source was an explosion within the hull, either The accidental or as the result of a surreptitiously placed explosive device. matter has been the subject of recurring debate ever since. In this work, Admiral H. G. Rickover makes a unique contribution by studying the loss of the Maine in the light of modern technical knowledge. in- That knowledge has been derived from theoretical and experimental of vestigations of explosives, explosive effects, and the dynamic response hull structures, as well as from the Navy's extensive wartime experience and testing programs of recent years. With characteristic thoroughness, Admiral Rickover also undertook ex- tensive research in archival materials to explore events associated with the loss of the Maine and to place it in historical perspective. The result is this volume which presents significant new insights in an important event of American history. I should like to acknowledge the valued advice of two distinguished mem- bers of the Secretary of the Navy's Advisory Committee on Navy History, Dr. Richard W. Leopold and Dr. Caryl P. Haskins, who generously reviewed this manuscript prior to the decision to undertake its publication. EDWIN B. HOOPER Vice Admiral, USN (Ret.) Director of Naval History Preface In recent years, students of American history have given increasing atten- tion to the Spanish-American War. There is good reason for this interest, for from this brief conflict the United States emerged with possession of the Philippines and became a major power in the Far East. At that time the European nations-Great Britain, France, Russia, and Germany-were competing among themselves for spheres of influence. Asia was awakening: Japan was becoming a major power and China was standing on the brink of a revolution which was to last for decades and which was to transform profoundly the Far East. Because of the acquisition of the Philippines, the United States could not avoid involvement in these events. The role of the United States in the Far East is one of the deepest concerns of all thoughtful Americans. My own interest in the Spanish-American War goes back many years, for I recognized it as a turning point in American history. In 1974, the Washington Star-News published an article by John M. Taylor, "Returning to the Riddle of the Explosion that Sunk the Maine," which aroused my curiosity. Mr. Taylor observed that no one had yet determined whether the Maine had been destroyed by a mine or an accidental explosion. That I knew. But Taylor also remarked that Charles D. Sigsbee, commanding officer of the Maine and therefore an interested party, was allowed to attend sessions of the Navy's court of inquiry and even to question witnesses. Furthermore, Taylor pointed out that Rear Admiral George W. Melville, Chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering, had said that the cause of the disaster was a magazine explosion. However, he was not asked to testify, although he occupied an official position which required professional com- petence. These points raised in my mind questions as to how the Navy had investigated the event which had played a major part in bringing about the war with Spain. Most historians had considered the despatch of the Maine to Havana from the aspect of diplomacy, and the report of the court of inquiry as a major factor in the origins of the war. How the court was selected and how it carried out its assignment had never been given serious consideration. Ex- amination of these issues unexpectedly led to related subjects and these have dictated the organization of the book. Chapter 1 describes the Maine and its commanding officer. Chapter 2 summarizes the historical background of American-Cuban rela- tions and the possibility of war as considered by some naval officers. Chapter 3 relates the development of President McKinley's policy toward Cuba; the size and organization of the Navy which would have to carry out that policy; and the selection of the Maine as the ship to be held in readi- ness to go to Havana. Chapter 4 deals with President McKinley's decision to send the Maine to Havana; the arrival at the Cuban capital; and the ship's destruction. Chapter 5 covers the selection of the court of inquiry; the regulations under which it operated; and the warlike atmosphere in Washington. Chapter 6 follows the investigation of the court of inquiry; the drawing up of its report; its receipt in Washington; and the outbreak of war. Chapter 7 recounts the investigation made by the Navy in 1911 when the ship was raised; and summarizes the engineering analysis completed in 1975 which reexamines the loss of the Maine. This analysis is a technical appraisal of the evidence; it reaches a new conclusion on the cause of the disaster. Chapter 8 assesses the impact of the Maine upon American history. Three appendices follow: the text of the 1975 engineering analysis; a sur- vey of international law in 1898 as it related to the Maine; and a brief sum- mary, useful as a comparison, of the way the French conducted their investi- gation of the loss of a battleship by an accidental magazine explosion. In my belief, a study of the destruction of the Maine throws important new light upon the men and institutions which fought the war with Spain and left us a legacy that still influences our nation. Acknowledgments the contributions This monograph would not have been possible without of inquiry which in- of several people. When questions about the naval court the matter over vestigated the loss of the Maine crossed my mind, I talked Research and De- with Dr. Francis Duncan, Associate Historian, Energy history. velopment Administration. He and I had frequently discussed naval He was at once interested and volunteered to investigate the historical sources, he could do outside of his provided he could limit his assistance to whatever Mr. regular assignments. His help was invaluable. His research assistant, Mr. Wegner's Dana M. Wegner, learned of the project and became interested. He agreed to work in special field is the Union Navy during the Civil War. in his- his spare time with Dr. Duncan. Mr. Wegner not only did research torical materials, but he made most of the plans and drawings. a mine Because of the controversy over the sinking of the Maine-whether or an accident had destroyed the vessel-I decided to ask for information At- from foreign naval archives. Captain Adolfo Gregorio, Spanish Naval tache, obtained several documents from the naval archives of his government; had these show clearly that the Spanish authorities in Madrid and in Havana not expected a visit from the Maine. Rear Admiral L. R. Bell Davies, RN, Commander of the British Naval Staff in Washington, obtained informa- tion on the experience of the Royal Navy with shipboard explosions during the the general period of the Maine disaster. Rear Admiral Emile J. Chaline, French Naval Attache, obtained similar information from the French archives. The information that these three officers provided was very helpful. For certain background on American naval experience and procedures, I turned to Vice Admiral Edwin B. Hooper. USN (Ret.), Director of Naval History, and Dr. Dean C. Allard, head of the operational archives branch of the Naval History Division. Vice Admiral Julien J. LeBourgeois, USN, President of the Naval War College, obtained for me the college's plans in the event of a war with Spain. Because of my interest in the international law aspects of the disaster, Admiral LeBourgeois asked Professor William T. Mallison of the George Washington University Law School, then holding the Charles H. Stockton Chair of International Law, and Mrs. Sally V. Mal- lison to investigate certain questions. Rear Admiral B. R. Inman, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, had the Spanish and French documents translated. Rear Admiral Jon L. Boyes, USN, Director, Naval Telecom- munications, and Lieutenant General Lewis Allen, Jr., USA, Director, Na- tional Security Agency/Central Security Services, and Richard A. von Doenhoff, National Archives and Records Service, were able to locate de- ciphered versions of messages that had been sent in cipher from the American naval attache in Madrid just before the outbreak of the war in 1898. Certain individuals graciously made available to me papers in their pos- session: Mr. Philip L.