Before the Federal Communications Commission Washington, D.C. 20554 In the Matter of ) ) Advanced Methods to Target and Eliminate ) CG Docket No. 17-59 Unlawful Robocalls ) ) Call Authentication Trust Anchor ) WC Docket No. 17-97 COMMENTS OF NCTA – THE INTERNET & TELEVISION ASSOCIATION NCTA – The Internet & Television Association (“NCTA”) submits these comments in response to the Public Notice in the above-captioned dockets seeking input for a Commission staff report on call blocking measures.1 NCTA applauds the Commission’s recent efforts to promote the deployment of call authentication and call blocking technologies and is pleased to report on the considerable action its members have taken to protect consumers. To further empower voice providers to combat illegal and unwanted robocalls, the Commission should also (i) adopt a broad call blocking safe harbor and (ii) establish a centrally compiled and maintained Critical Calls List. I. Cable Operators Work Diligently to Protect Their Customers from Illegal and Unwanted Robocalls As leading providers of state-of-the-art competitive voice service, cable operators share the Commission’s and the public’s deep concern about harmful and illegal robocalls. NCTA’s members understand that these calls are more than just a nuisance, and they have devoted significant time and resources to developing and implementing solutions to combat them. 1 Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau Seeks Input for Report on Call Blocking, Public Notice, CG Docket No. 17-59, WC Docket No. 17-97, DA 19-1312 (rel. Dec. 20, 2019) (“Public Notice”). NCTA’s larger members, for instance, have taken a leading role in developing and deploying robocall solutions. Charter, Cox, and Comcast each implemented the SHAKEN/STIR call authentication framework on their networks by year-end 2019, in keeping with Chairman Pai’s call to action. Indeed, these three companies have gone a step further and are already exchanging SHAKEN/STIR signed and authenticated customer call traffic with one or more other providers. The cable industry has also helped establish a SHAKEN/STIR Policy Administrator—which launched in December 2019 and is now accepting registrations from providers—and continues to be deeply involved in the development and progress of SHAKEN/STIR call authentication. As NCTA has detailed, SHAKEN/STIR’s potential to reduce the efficacy of Caller ID spoofing and thereby curb illegal robocalls will only continue to grow as additional providers implement the framework and begin to exchange signed traffic.2 NCTA’s members are also developing and deploying other tools to fight illegal and unwanted robocalls. For example, Charter, Comcast, and Cox offer residential voice subscribers access to free call blocking tools through Nomorobo, as well as the ability to block specific callers and callers who prevent their Caller ID from displaying. Comcast and Cox conduct network-level blocking of calls that appear to originate from numbers on the industry Do-Not- Originate (“DNO”) list or from invalid or unallocated numbers, and Charter also blocks calls that appear to originate from numbers on the DNO list at the network level. In addition, call blocking tools are not just being deployed by larger providers. NCTA members Midco, Mediacom, and GCI also offer residential customers the ability to block specific callers and callers who prevent 2 See Comments of NCTA – The Internet & Television Association, CG Docket No. 17-59, WC Docket No. 17- 97, at 5-6 (filed July 24, 2019) (“NCTA Comments”). 2 their Caller ID from displaying, and Midco provides many subscribers access to robocall blocking through its Terminating Call Manager feature. NCTA’s members—larger and smaller—also anticipate adopting additional call blocking solutions going forward. For instance, Mediacom, Midco, and GCI all are exploring options for adding SHAKEN/STIR call authentication and call analytics to their networks. With respect to opt-out call blocking, Comcast plans to activate its Anonymous Call Rejection feature on a default basis, starting with new residential subscribers, early in the second quarter of 2020; Charter plans to offer free opt-out call blocking for residential subscribers by year-end 2020; and Cox is also exploring options for providing opt-out call blocking to subscribers. The Commission should support these and other robocall mitigation efforts and, as discussed in more detail below, take further action in this proceeding to encourage deployment of call blocking solutions. II. A Broad Call Blocking Safe Harbor Is Necessary to Promote Robust Deployment of Call Blocking Programs Congress recently mandated that the Commission promulgate rules to establish a safe harbor from liability for voice providers for unintended or inadvertent call blocking or unintended or inadvertent misidentification of the level of trust for individual calls based in whole or in part on call authentication information.3 In effectuating this statutory mandate, the Commission should adopt a safe harbor that not only covers calls blocked or misidentified based on call authentication information, but that also covers a wider range of reasonable, good faith call blocking and labeling initiatives.4 3 Pallone-Thune TRACED Act, Pub. L. No. 116-105, § 4(c)(1) (2019). 4 As NCTA previously explained, the Commission has the legal authority necessary to adopt a broad safe harbor pursuant to its plenary authority over telephone numbering under Section 251(e). See 47 U.S.C. § 251(e); Reply Comments of NCTA – The Internet & Television Association, CG Docket No. 17-59, WC Docket No. 17- 97, at 4 (filed Aug. 23, 2019) (“NCTA Reply Comments”). Section 4 of the TRACED Act does not restrict this broad 3 As NCTA has explained, a broad, express safe harbor is essential to ensuring robust deployment of call blocking solutions.5 The Commission has taken significant and laudable action in recent years to enable voice providers to block calls in a variety of circumstances and protect their subscribers from illegal or unwanted robocalls.6 Establishing a safe harbor that covers only a subset of these circumstances may leave providers uncertain as to the scope of liability they could face for calls they erroneously, but in good faith, block as illegal or unwanted. Without certainty that they will be protected from liability for these blocked calls, providers may be less willing to undertake the expense and risk associated with further development of rigorous call blocking tools, or they may be overly conservative in their approach to blocking, the result being that consumers will not reap the benefit of an even greater reduction in the number of illegal and unwanted calls. The Commission should therefore adopt a broad safe harbor that shields providers from liability should they unintentionally or inadvertently block, mislabel, or misidentify the level of trust for a call, if at the time the provider blocked or mislabeled the call or misidentified the call’s level of trust: 1. The blocking, labeling, or identification was initiated by the provider at the network level or was pursuant to tools offered to consumers on an opt-in or opt-out basis and was in connection with an event that the provider had a good-faith reason to believe was an illegal or unwanted robocall event because the provider took one or more reasonable action(s) including, but not limited to, the following: authority; rather, it clarifies the Commission’s authority only as it relates to calls blocked on the basis of call authentication frameworks. 5 See NCTA Reply Comments at 3-4; NCTA Comments at 8-10. 6 See Advanced Methods to Target and Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls; Call Authentication Trust Anchor, Declaratory Ruling and Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 34 FCC Rcd. 4876 (2019) (clarifying that voice service providers may offer call blocking services on an opt-out basis based on any reasonable analytics designed to identify unwanted calls); Advanced Methods to Target and Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 32 FCC Rcd. 9706 (2017) (authorizing providers to block calls from unassigned, unallocated, or invalid numbers, as well as calls purporting to originate from numbers that are not used by their subscribers to originate calls). 4 a. Performed research on the phone number to reasonably determine the call was highly likely to be an illegal robocall; b. Implemented reasonable procedures to block calls in a manner consistent with the Commission’s rules; or c. Utilized reasonable analytics, which may include information provided by call authentication frameworks. 2. The provider had procedures in place for blocking, labeling, or identification that were reasonably likely to confirm that calls blocked, labeled, or identified were limited to illegal or unwanted robocalls and the provider followed these procedures; 3. The provider had procedures in place to address reported incidents of unintentional or inadvertent blocking, mislabeling, or misidentification of such calls; and 4. The provider made reasonable efforts to avoid blocking, mislabeling, or misidentifying emergency public safety calls.7 This proposed safe harbor strikes the appropriate balance between encouraging robust use of call blocking tools by voice providers and protecting the interests of callers in the completion of legitimate calls. III. The Commission Should Establish a Critical Calls List and an Accompanying Safe Harbor NCTA’s members agree that it is vital that consumers continue to receive public safety calls, and voice providers are working to ensure that calls from public safety numbers are not inadvertently blocked. The Commission can and should assist these efforts by facilitating the creation of a centrally compiled and maintained Critical Calls List.8 A Critical Calls List would serve as an important backstop to the analytics tools deployed by voice providers and their vendors, lessening the possibility that an emergency number could 7 This safe harbor language is consistent with a proposal supported by NCTA, USTelecom, and CTIA, which will be filed in this proceeding on or before January 31, 2020.