The Role of Othering in the German Plenary Debates on the Afghanistan Missions

Justifying military force? – The role of Othering in the German plenary debates on the Afghanistan missions

Master Thesis Author: Juliane Itta Student number: S1792946 10.01.2021

Supervisor: Dr. G.M. van Buuren Second reader: Dr. T. Abbas Leiden University- Campus The Hague Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs Master’s Program: Crisis and Security Management

Content List of abbreviations ...... II List of figures ...... III 1. Introduction ...... 1 a) Subject of the research ...... 2 b) Research questions and structure ...... 3 c) Research goal ...... 4 d) Academic and societal relevance ...... 4 2. Theoretical framework ...... 6 a) State-building and its criticism ...... 6 b) Othering ...... 12 3. Methodology ...... 16 a) The Bundestag as the decision-making body on the deployment of the Bundeswehr ...... 17 b) Computer-assisted qualitative content analysis ...... 18 4. Contextual Information ...... 23 a) German military deployment to Afghanistan ...... 23 b) Germany’s political parties ...... 26 5. Analysis ...... 29 a) Portrayed image of Afghanistan ...... 29 1) Over time ...... 29 2) By political parties ...... 36 b) Justification of the deployment ...... 39 1) Over time ...... 39 2) By political party ...... 44 c) Afghans as reason for failure ...... 47 1) Over time ...... 47 2) By political party ...... 47 d) Disclosure of Othering ...... 49 1) Over time ...... 49 2) By political party ...... 51 6. Conclusion ...... 52 References ...... 57 Annex ...... IV A) State of research on Bundestag debates on the Afghanistan deployment ...... IV B) Security and defence policy making in Germany ...... VII I

C) Chronology of the Bundeswehr deployment to Afghanistan ...... X D) Overview on examined plenary debates ...... XX E) Coding scheme ...... XXIII F) Coding sheets ...... XXVIII G) Example of a coded plenary debate ...... XXX

List of abbreviations

AdF Alternative for Germany AWACS Airborne Early Warning and Control System CDU Christian Democratic Union of Germany CSU Christian Social Union in Bavaria EU European Union FDP Free Democratic Party ISAF International Security Assistance Force MdB Member of the Bundestag NBC Nuclear Biological Chemical OEF Operation Enduring Freedom PDS Party of Democratic Socialism PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team RSM Resolute Support Mission SED Socialist Unity Party of Germany SPD Social Democratic Party of Germany UN United Nations

List of figures Figure 1: Quality criteria of this research, based on Mayring, 2016, pp.144ff...... 22 Figure 2: Image of Afghanistan over time ...... 29 Figure 3: "Backwardness of Afghanistan" over time ...... 31 Figure 4: Diverse Image of Afghanistan" over time ...... 34 Figure 5: Image of Afghanistan and party affiliation ...... 37 Figure 6: "Backwardness of Afghanistan" and party affiliation ...... 38 Figure 7: Diverse image of Afghanistan and party affiliation ...... 39 Figure 8: Justifications based on Othering over time ...... 40 Figure 9: Different justifications over time ...... 41 Figure 10: Justifications based on Othering and party affiliation ...... 44 Figure 11: Different justifications and party affiliation ...... 45 Figure 12: Blaming Afghans for failure of the missions over time ...... 47 Figure 13: Blaming Afghans for failure of the missions and party affiliation ...... 48 Figure 14: Disclosure of Othering over time ...... 49 Figure 15: Disclosure of Othering and party affiliation ...... 51 Figure 16: Speaking times of the political groups in the different legislative periods (Deutscher Bundestag, 2020)...... IX Figure 17: Overview of relevant German federal politics in the observation period ...... X Figure 18: Timeline Afghanistan missions ...... XII Figure 19: Overview on examined plenary debates ...... XXII Figure 20: Coding scheme ...... XXVII Figure 21: Coding sheet (party affiliation) ...... XXVIII Figure 22: Coding sheet (time) ...... XXIX

III

1. Introduction

Given the historical context of Germany's role in the two world wars and the atrocities of Nazi- Germany, the use of military force is controversial in Germany and is intensely debated upon. To convince a majority, it is not enough to justify the military engagement of the German armed forces – the Bundeswehr- with economic or geostrategic interests; the intervention rather requires a beneficence component: an urge to care for the situation of the Other (Buckley-Zistel, 2015, p.12). Like no other mission, the German commitment in Afghanistan testifies to the belief that desired political and social results can be achieved by intervening in the Other's situation. Internationally, too, the intervention in Afghanistan marks the zenith of state-building as a form of military intervention (Goodhand & Sedra, 2013, p.239).

In scientific literature, there is increasingly a fundamental criticism of state-building regarding the distorted picture drawn in the West over the Global South. The inspiration for this thesis was the work of Kieschnick. He analysed that the German government's debate about the Bundeswehr's deployment to Afghanistan is pervaded by what Edward Said calls Othering. Using reasoning such as building a real state where previously clans and warlords have ruled, defending the Western world, and building schools from oppressed Afghan girls, Afghans are defined as a homogenous Other. This Other is portrayed as weak, backward, and unable to provide for its own security and hence seen as a danger to itself and the Western world (2015). The construction of the Other is connected to Edward Said's studies on Orientalism. Said illustrates how in the construction and representation of the Other, cultural dominance structures are institutionalised (Buckley-Zistel, 2015, p.14).

While Kieschnick examined the government’s discourse, there has not yet been research on the role of Othering in the German national parliament (the Bundestag). With most Germans opposing the deployment (Thurau, 2018), the high costs of the deployment, and the difficult historical connotation of German military force, it is important to examine these missions' framing in the parliamentary debates.

Due to the relevance of the Bundestag plenary debates on the Bundeswehr deployment to Afghanistan to academia and society, they have been subject to multiply research projects (see chapter A in the Annex). Findings have shown that different parties have focused on different justifications for the intervention: The CDU/CSU and FDP emphasise German interests and power. Greens, SPD, and the Left emphasise promoting democracy, international law, and universal values (Müller and Wolf, 2011). Further research has disclosed that while at the beginning of the Afghanistan mission in 2001, alliance- based arguments clearly dominated the justifications, they lost significance over the years. The

Members of the Bundestag (MdBs) increasingly used self-centred arguments, such as protecting the own population from terrorist attacks, the security of German aid-workers and soldiers in Afghanistan, and increasingly conditionalized German aid to the fulfilment of Western government standards (Harnisch, 2011). Over time the politicians’ rhetoric also gradually changed from framing Germany’s role as a peacekeeping mission towards embracing a more aggressive combat role (Newnham, 2017).

Othering has been linked to populist and far-right parties (Giovanna Campani and Gabriella Lazaridis, p.1) and right extremism and racism (Attia, 2014, p.9). It has also been linked to islamophobia, anti- genderism, and antimuslim racism in the AfD (Apenburg, 2015, Hogrefe, 2018).

This suggests that the role of Othering could differ between the political parties and change over time. Therefore, in this research project, it is examined if and how the role of Othering changes over time, along with the modifications of the mandate and the changes in the operational reality. Moreover, differences in the role of Othering between the different political parties are analysed.

By applying the theoretical notions of Othering to the analysis of German plenary debates, this thesis adds a different dimension to research, as not only the government’s parties’ framing but the framing of all parties represented in the Bundestag are considered. The findings should also lead to further conclusions about the role of Othering in the general justification of Western interventions in the form of state-building missions.

a) Subject of the research

The presented research proposal aims at exploring the role of Othering in the framing of the Bundeswehr mission in Afghanistan by the members of the German federal parliament (MdBs). Therefore, it is analysed which arguments -related to Othering- are used by the politicians and how often they are used to justify the use of military force in Afghanistan.

With the German commitment in Afghanistan within the ISAF mission and later the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) being one of the longest deployment of the Bundeswehr since its establishment and being by far the most expensive and the most bloody deployment of German forces since the end of WW2, it has been most influential on shaping the German debate on the use of military force. The main argument used by politicians to justify the start of the German engagement in Afghanistan was, on the one hand, the War on Terror, culminating in the often-quoted sentence "The security of Germany is also defended at the Hindukush"1 by Minister of Defence Peter Struck (Eckert, 2002). On the other hand, a main argument for military force in Afghanistan was the ambitious state-building

1 All German quotes are translated by the researcher herself, who is a native German speaker. 2

approach, emphasising the humanitarian aspect of the mission, and peaking in the misrepresentation, that German soldiers' main task in Afghanistan was to construct wells and build schools for Afghan girls. Almost two decades after the deployment of the Bundeswehr to Afghanistan was adopted by the Bundestag for the first time, there is still a significant number of German soldiers deployed in Afghanistan, and similar justifications for the mission in Afghanistan are being used in the parliament. However, in the meantime, many people, from the public over journalists to policymakers, view the mission in Afghanistan as failed (e.g., Bauer, 2018; Schmidt, 2018), and the scientific community is becoming increasingly sceptical towards the concept of state-building (e.g., Miller, 2013; Verkoren & Kamphuis, 2013; Goodhand & Sedra, 2013; Visoka & Richmond, 2017).

This makes it even more important to critically evaluate the arguments which were and which still are used to justify the use of military force in the state-building mission and how the MdBs frame their Other in Afghanistan.

This research aims to examine whether the Other's construction has changed throughout the mandates and in correlation to changes of the environment of the mission and security incidents, and how the arguments -connected to Othering- are differently used depending on the party affiliation. Given the central role of political parties in a representational democracy and considering how they transform social opinions, attitudes, and interests, and shape politics in parliaments and governments (Höhne, 2015, p.207), it is interesting to look at the differences between the parties, and examine whether different approaches to foreign and security policy and divergent positions regarding the state-building mission in Afghanistan lead to differences in the role of Othering in their respective speeches.

In a single case study of the German Bundestag's debates, the politicians' speeches are analysed with the method of qualitative content analysis.

b) Research questions and structure

Research question: To what extent do the arguments in reference to Othering in the Bundestag debates on the deployment to Afghanistan differ between political parties, and to what extent does Othering change over time?

In chapter two, the theoretical framework will give an overview of the concept of state-building and critical literature on the topic. Secondly, the concept of Othering will be introduced, which will help to operationalise the research. In the third chapter, the methodology will be elaborated on, and the choice for a computer-based content analysis will be explained. In that chapter, the coding variables will also be operationalised, and the reasons for choosing the plenary speeches as data will be given.

In chapter 4, important contextual information on the timeline of the Afghanistan mission and the political parties in Germany is provided, which are important for the following empirical chapter.

In the analysis (chapter 5), the findings are presented and elaborated on. Thereby the empirical data will also be set in connection with the chronological sequence of the deployment in Afghanistan, examining how the Othering arguments not only changed over time but possibly linked to changes in the mission (e.g., taking over the management responsibility for the northern region of ISAF in 2006; change from ISAF to RSM in 2014) and major security incidents (e.g., fighting of 2nd April 2010, when in an eight-hour-long battle between German soldiers and an ambush three Germans died).

In a concluding chapter, the research question is answered, and its meaning for future research is allocated.

c) Research goal

Due to its significance for Germany's understanding of its role as a global security actor and the high costs (monetary and human lives) of the deployment to Afghanistan, there is extensive research on the deployment itself available. As the Afghanistan missions mark a peek of the popularity of the state- building concept, they are very well suited to be a case study on the discourse of state-building itself (Goodhand & Sedra, 2013, p.239). Moreover, while there has been criticism on the distorted picture that is drawn in the state-building approach in the West over the Global South, and research has shown that also the German government's discourse on the Afghanistan mandates is full of Othering, there has not yet been published research on how Othering is related to political party affiliation or on how Othering can change regarding changing characteristics of the state-building deployment. This research aims at closing this gap by analysing if the role of Othering has changed throughout the mandates and in correlation to changes of the environment of the mission and security incidents, and how the arguments -connected to Othering- are differently used depending on the party affiliation. As the disclosure of Othering has never been examined in any political framing of state-building missions, this thesis briefly includes an analysis of how MdBs disclose Othering in the plenary debates.

d) Academic and societal relevance

Since the attacks of 9/11, fragile states such as Afghanistan are high on the international community's agenda. Unlike before, fragile states are no longer seen as a predominantly regional problem but as a serious threat to international security. The main threat often no longer is seen as being posed by strong military neighbours. On the contrary, in our changing security environment, our Western governments are more concerned about asymmetrical conflicts and global challenges such as

terrorism. Hence, fragile, or even failed states are seen as a central threat to international security and are categorised as requiring international intervention.

The international community's answer towards the perceived threat of a fragile Afghanistan was the export of democracy via military intervention and state-building measures. Almost twenty years after starting the international deployment to Afghanistan, it is now time to evaluate. With the missions in Afghanistan being the biggest and most expensive military mission in the history of the young German Federal Republic, an analysis of this deployment's justification is of utter relevance to society and the scientific community. It is important, as the disclosure of Othering in the German political debate could be a base for examining the role of Othering in other Western interventions and should contribute to the scientific debate on the state-building approach's fundamental legitimacy.

With the research focusing on the political discourse on an international military deployment and examining policymakers' justifications, the topic is linked to Crisis and Security Management.

2. Theoretical framework a) State-building and its criticism

The concept of state-building has experienced a significant boom since the beginning of the 1990s, both in scientific literature and in practice, and "was the dominant framework for the international regulation of non-Western states in the 2000s" (Chandler, 2017, p.69). Different scholars and policymakers have since advanced different versions of what state-building means (Podder, 2014, p.1616). In general, state-building can be defined as a bundle of targeted measures aimed at ending conflicts and improving the capacity, institutions, and legitimacy of a state, thereby establishing effective political processes for negotiation between state actors and social groups. For this, norms, resources, and methods are transferred to model the Global North's constitutional structures (Podder, 2014, p.1616). A characteristic of state-building is that these measures are working comprehensively and are supporting each other. Goodhand and Sedra describe a reform of the security sector, the formulation of a constitution, implementation of good governance and rule of law, macro-economic reforms, economic reconstruction, and rural development as key elements in state-building (2013, p.240).

After WW2, state-building emerged as a new form of international engagement, referring to the building of states in Europe after the war (Tilly, 1975). Back then, the focus was on endorsing a state's sovereignty and power regarding its population and society. Until today the strengthening of state institutions and the (re)establishment of the state monopoly of force have been central to state- building. Daxner observes that the concept of state-building since 2001 has come hand in hand with international troops' deployment. He specifies that the military interventions thereby perceive a legitimacy to interfere in the local community and how the military plays a big role, without aiming at a (permanent) military occupation (2010, p.83).

With state-building having developed into an integral part of operations of the international community and being the chosen strategy to address a series of conflicts and fragile states, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Palestine, and Afghanistan, the number of scientific literature on the topic of state-building has been rapidly growing within the last two decades. Increasingly, there is also a critical view of the concept.

In 2009, in her research on the international intervention in Bosnia Herzegovina, Bliesemann de Guevera established a differentiation between a "problem-solving oriented approach" and a "critical approach" in the literature on international interventionism. This distinction is based on Cox's work on International Relations Theory. In this publication, Cox demonstrates that "theory can serve two 6

distinct purposes. One is a simple, direct response: to be a guide to help solve the problems posed within the terms of the perspective, which was the point of departure. The other is more reflective upon the process of theorising itself: to become clearly aware of the perspective which gives rise to theorising […] and to open up the possibility of choosing a different valid perspective from which the problematic becomes one of creating an alternative world" (Cox, 1981, p.128). He names the two approaches “problem-solving theory” and “critical theory” (p.128f.). In Bliesemann de Guevera’s work, she resumes, that most literature on international interventionism can be defined as a "problem- solving oriented approach" and only a few authors were questioning the liberal foundations and hence tried to transcend the dominant contemporary perspective (2009, p.29). In 2015, Kieschnick established the same differentiation between a "problem-solving oriented approach” and a “critical approach” (p.27ff.) on the literature on the concept of state-building. These two approaches towards a critical debate on the concept of state-building differ: The first one criticises individual parts of the concept and aims to improve it, whether the latter is fundamentally critical towards the concept itself and the hegemonic interpretations and practices underlying it. Therefore, the critical approach demasks the problem-solving-oriented approach on state-building as “politicised” or rather “political” (Kieschnick, 2015, p.32).

As for this research, the critical approach is relevant, a literature review on it follows. This approach's biggest common denominators are questioning the legitimacy of the international operations within the state-building framework, focusing on the power relations between Western and non-Western states, and scrutinizing the liberal paradigm.

For example, Hagmann and Péclard elaborate on how the concept of state-building is built on the ideal of liberal democracy and a Western constitutional state. States (namely in the Global South) that do not match these ideals are described as "fragile" and "weak," and the international community denounces their legitimacy and administrative capacity (2010, p.540). Hagmann and Péclard further note that a more detailed view on the Global South's political order, not exclusively focussing on state institutions and military and political elites, would lead to a much more differentiated view (p.546).

An important scholar in the field of the “critical approach” on state-building is Chandler. By examining interventions and state-building missions of Western actors, he studied how power asymmetries reproduce. He further demonstrates that by intervening on the global periphery under the pretence of "doing good", Western states expand their respective spheres of political and economic influence (Kieschnick, 2015, p.30). He focuses on the justification discourses of the interveners. In 2017, Chandler concluded that "these policies [i.e., state-building policies] did not work [...] The policy agenda focused on bureaucratic, administrative mechanisms, which institutionalised divisions between the West and the non-West and were unable to overcome the social and political divisions of post-conflict states" 7

(p.71f.). He further suggests that state-building "had less to do with the desire for strong non-Western states, or a newfound conﬁdence in non-Western governing elites, than a desire on behalf of Western states to avoid direct accountability for peace-building interventions” (p.74) and that the Western intervenes did not want the non-Western states whose capacities they were building to have the traditional “right to do what they want within their own borders” (ibid.). More blatantly expressed, he calls it an “irony that states were alleged to be 'built' at the same time as they increasingly lost the traditional attribute of sovereignty: self-government” (p.76).

Another important scholar in this field is Duffield. In his research on power strategies in state-building, he analysed the subjective practices of external actors in intervened societies. He establishes the thesis that despite statements to the contrary, Western state-building does not empower the global periphery populations but instead works towards containing them (2007, p.16). Shinka agrees with this notion, analysing that external actors' intervention in the name of peace, security, and development turns into reinscribing hegemonic structures of domination, exclusion, and marginalisation (Shinka, 2007, p.488).

One joining component of many authors of the critical approach is the usage of the concept of liberal peace (Exo, 2017, pp.91ff.). They demonstrate that peace in the intervening discourse is primarily interpreted liberally, requiring the implication of liberal characteristics of statehood, such as good governance, state monopoly on the use of force, and liberal market economy (Kieschnick, 2015, p.47). Liberal peace thereby “sets a standard by which ‘failed states’ and ‘bad civil societies’ are judged according to ethical, spatial and temporal markers” (Heathershaw, 2008, p.597). Richmond argues that the peace concept's controversy and instability would be hidden by the contemporary hegemonic discourses of liberal peace, propagated by Western actors (2007). Chandler analysed in 2010 that some authors explain the lack of success in international state-building efforts through the critical discourse of this concept, assuming that "'liberal' Western interests and assumptions have influenced policymaking, leading to "counterproductive results" (p.137). Despite the concept of liberal peace being contestable and filled with tensions, this paradigm was "universally exported and applied through an extensive and intrusive 'expert' network of force, governance, conditional assistance and civil society projects in post-conflict environments” (Sabaratnam, 2007, p.169). Besides practical criticism on the concept, such as the tension between excessive international involvement and development of local political responsibility and capacity for government, Richmond identifies “darker orientalist overtones of the discourse that restrict the ‘knowing’ of peace to those operating within the liberal peace paradigm”, prohibiting emancipatory approaches (Sabaratnam, 2007, p.170).

More recent literature applying the critical approach to state-building include the work of Njeri, who with her study on the international intervention in Somaliland emphasises the importance of a critical 8

engagement with liberalist international interventions, as “a critical review of such activities would offer a more nuanced and broader critique but most importantly, it will highlight the limitations and challenges of interventions in fragile contexts” (Njeri, 2018, p.2). She observes that peace-building (a term she conflates with the term state-building) is “viewed by critics as a form of neo-colonial or neo- imperial control of the Global South by the North/West whereby outsiders seek to shape the structures of these weaker societies into their own prevailing notions of ‘good’ or ‘civilised governance’" (p.3f.).

In her 2020 published paper, Cebeci analyses how the ideal constructions of the EU's past, present, and future selves continue the (re-)production of boundaries between the peaceful EU and its conflictual Others, legitimising its actorness in state-building today (Cebeci, 2020, p.294). She critically notes that “the EU’s statebuilding efforts have remained confined to a liberal peace logic so far, which is top-down and pays little attention to the everyday needs of the locals" (p.295). The discourse on the EU, as "representing peace", manifests the boundaries and differences from a "dangerous and conflictual outside", legitimising the EU's exertion of power on other regions in the form of state- building (p.295). She criticises the EU’s approach to state-building as "imposed in a top-down manner, without fully grasping the specific socio-economic dynamics of the target societies" (p.307). She further analyses that the EU-Europeans' knowledge about the target societies would portray the locals as a "problem" (ibid.).

In reference to state-building in Afghanistan, the most significant authors with a critical approach are Surke and Kieschnick. In a fundamental critic of the mission, Surke outlays the different, often contradicting logics of the actors involved in the Afghanistan mission and unmasks the Western presentation of their alleged successes. She argues that the lacklustre performance of the intervention (despite some achievements) "was not the result of a difficult context or insufficient resources" but rather caused by "the very nature of the international project, embedded in UN and other donor’s ideas about the processes of state-building and peace-building” (Paczynska, 2012, p.168). She further analyses that “the heavy and primarily Western nature of the foreign presence weakened the legitimacy of the government, thereby eroding a main pillar of the state and enabling the armed opposition to appropriate the traditional sources of legitimacy: Islam and nationalism” (Suhrke, 2013, p.271). Moreover, she formulates tensions based upon the approach of state-building in Afghanistan, namely that the aid economy with "easy money" would discourage the Afghan government from building local capacity and would slow down the development of sustainable, Afghan-owned order. Secondly, she identifies the tension between 'ownership' and 'control', which was produced by the Afghan dependence on external financial, military, and technocratic resources (p.71). Thirdly, tension would also be created by the "conflicting imperatives of simultaneously waging war and building

peace", which was increased when the number of foreign troops significantly increased over time and "started to behave and look like an occupation force" (p.72).

The most significant scholar and inspiration for this thesis is Kieschnick. Being deeply impressed by the confident handling of colonial crimes and the uncovering of ongoing racist asymmetries in Portuguese migration policy and the thereby application of post-colonial theoretical approaches in the analysis of everyday political and social practices, Kieschnick came to the recognition that discourses and speech acts were inherently connected to asymmetries of power and that these asymmetries were consolidated in the discourses and speech acts (2015, p.17). As Kieschnick had felt an "unease" (p.16) with the primacy of state-building in Afghanistan and the self-image of German Afghanistan policies, he sought a mechanism to translate this discomfort into a critical analysis.

Kieschnick focused his critical approach towards state-building on the intervention's subject and how it is framed in the Western world and on the power relations between the intervener and the intervention's subject (Kieschnick, 2015, p.32). He establishes that in Western policymaking, the diagnosis of weak or failed statehood would lead to the discursive creation of seemingly "ungovernable spaces", legitimising international intervention in the name of humanitarian values and the context of security and self-defence (p.39). State-building hence is an attempt of Western actors to make ungoverned spaces controllable. In his theoretical chapter, he analyses how the identity of the subject of the intervention is often established concerning their perspective position towards statehood, establishing a separation between 'civilised' and 'barbarians' (p.37) and describing the population groups outside of the influence of the state with stigmata as "lagging behind", as predatory gangs, premodern tribes, savages, or barbarians (p.38). He states that while often security concerns such as establishing border security or wiping out resistance nests were a pretext for intervention, far more often, the supposed backwardness, unculture, and simple barbarism among the population, are starting points for state intervention under the banner of Christianisation and civilisation (p.38). As another aspect of the framing of the intervention's subject, Kieschnick identifies the presentation of deficiencies, such as the lack of development and the lack of security. The presence of these deficiencies not only justifies the external engagement to overcome these lacks but also constitutes the Western self as "the flawless who has set out to universalise himself" (p.44). Kieschnick analyses that even though in the transition period of the international state-building mission in 2008-2012, agency and responsibility were transferred away from the international community to the Afghan, the Afghan still had a marginal existence in the discourse of the German government and "therefore seems to have little active influence on the German agendas in Afghanistan" (p.67).

In contrast, the Afghan is perceived as an entity to be influenced, as a neutral manoeuvring mass or a predictable recipient of the respective policies (p.68). He further observes that when the government 10

speaks about Afghans, they differ between "the normal Afghan as a willing, but incapable agent of the intervention", being supportive and affirmative towards the state-building mission (p.68), and the opposition groups, which opponent the Western Afghan project (p.72) and react to liberal democracy, statehood, and human rights with rejection and violence (p.68). He analyses that the "good" Afghans mainly receive attention in the discourse, not because of their needs and abilities, but because of their supposed shortcomings and structural constraints that block a development towards liberal- democratic modernity, such as lack of education, lack of knowledge, illiteracy, corruption, tradition, susceptibility to propaganda, misogyny, Islam, human rights violations, etc. (p.70f.) and personal issues such as mindset, discipline, and dedication (p.72). The opposition entity, the "bad Afghans," are portrayed as radicalised, and their actions are criminalised and considered illegitimate, justifying the combat against them with military or police force (p.85).

As last author, Exo is included in this segment. She criticises that in Eurocentric thinking, the knowledge of grassroots political organisations and their analyses, experiences, and future plains are "invisible" (Exo, 2017, p.11). She further presents four grassroots organisations and analyses that those grassroots political organisations work towards democracy, women's rights, peace, and economic development but reject the international intervention with its military aspects and the Western approach to building the state (ibid.). They call the legitimisation of the mission in the name of women's liberation, human rights, and democracy "a lie" and categorise the practice of the intervention as "destructive and colonial" (ibid.). In a decolonial approach, Exo presents their visions for a different peace and different constructions of society, illustrating the existing controversy and alternatives. Western-dominated concepts such as good governance, responsibility-to-protect, and liberal peace thereby are “brought out of depoliticization and turned back into ideas that require conflict and that are controversial" (p.13).

This links the "critical approach" to postcolonialism. Scientists of the post-colonial school try to reflect in their research the power structures and regimes of truths and central assumptions of the liberal paradigm and question the neutrality of the various actors (Kieschnick, 2015, p.29). They ward off the assumption (which is inherent in the concept of state-building) that the reason for Western intervention is a "weak state" and the desire to create stability for local people and the world community. On the contrary, Duffield argues that state-building is a means for the West to control the global periphery indirectly (2007).

b) Othering

The concept of Othering is used in this thesis to critically analyse the plenary speeches and decode 'Western-centric' understandings.

That Western scientists and journalists are not objectively observing and assessing a situation, but often reflect a colonialist approach and hence live up to the existing power structures between (former) colonisers and (former) colonised is the main argument of Said's political theory of Orientalism. When Said developed this theory in the late 70s / early 80s, it marked a starting point of the analysis of coloniality in the Western representation of the non-Western world (Exo, 2017, p.29). He was one of the first authors who showed that research on the (formerly) colonised part of the world was creating constructs that promote the controllability of these areas and societies by the West (Exo, 2017, p.17). Even though Said did not address postcolonialism in its original 1979 edition, today Said's Orientalism is seen as a key element of post-colonial theory, which is concerning itself with the continuities and discontinuities of new modes and forms of the old colonialist practices (Mishra & Hodge, 2005, p.375). Despite the original focus of Said's work on colonial Europe, many post-colonial scholars, including international relations scholars, have noted that his work is relevant and applicable beyond the historical colonial context (Khalid, 2011, p.17).

Orientalism thereby can be defined as a framework for dealing with the Orient, as a mindset, based on ontological and epistemological distinctions made between “the Orient” and “the Occident” (Said, 1981, p.9) and as “a western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient” (Said, 1978, p.3; quoted after Burney, 2012, p.23). In his main publication on the topic, Said describes how dominant (Western) cultures present so-called "other cultures" and thus create both the dominant and the "Other" solely in the discourse. With Foucault's discourse analysis method, he traced how the colonial discourse produces the colonised subjects and colonisers alike and how the Orient is created and then essentialised by self-proclaimed Orient experts (Castro Verela & Dhawan, 2020, p.103). These representations of the East would not necessarily resemble reality. However, over time this type of "knowledge" led to the "construction of a tradition which then consistently influenced all further learning and knowledge about the Orient – much like a self-sustaining myth" (Khalid, 2011, p.17). Said further describes how the West has shaped a systematic discourse, in which Western culture not only produced the Orient as such but directed it militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively, too (1981, p.10). According to Said, the supposed knowledge about the Orient would not serve to exercise power directly but to legitimise violence and (military) force (Castro Verela & Dhawan, 2020, p.103).

To explain this discourse of the West, Said established the term Othering. With this term, he describes how our language is built on the description of differences. In the description of groups, many times, a particular "Us" is compared to an unspecific, absent "Other" (Hadley, 2013). In short, Othering can be defined as a process “whereby a dominant group defines into existence an inferior group” (Schwalbe, et al., 2000, p.422). The concept of Othering is applied to decode the depiction of non- Western subjects by Westerners. Said elaborates how in the West's discourse, the language is based on power strategies and how there is a general categorisation of people from the non-West into "the Other", referring to all states and societies outside of the Western world (2014, p.17). The construction of this "Other" thereby is intricately linked to a positive description of the Western "Us" and helps define the self and affirm identity. Castro Varela and Dhawan formulate that “the violent representation of Others as immovably different was a necessary part of the construction of a sovereign, superior European Self” (Castro Verela & Dhawan, 2020, p.30).

Said observes that the Global South is not only described as "backward, degenerate, uncivilised and belated", but also brought into connection with groups that are traditionally seen as pitiful in Western society, such as females, the poor, and the mentally ill (1981, p.232). He alarms that this form of Othering led to a debate in which the societies and countries of the Global South are not seen as peoples equal to Western peoples but as problems to be solved (ibid).

Stoffers describes the underlying questions of powers, as the Other is perceived and described as "inferior" (2019, p.290). She further analyses that the Other's construction was made through stereotypical, essentialising, and marginalising attributions (ibid). While studies on Postcolonialism, Orientalism, and Othering were mainly developed in literary studies and cultural studies, there are "isolated studies" with political, social, and Islamic references, analysing discourses, and practices towards the (re-)production of essential images and counter images (Attia, 2009, p.56).

In the recent past, Othering was used by a variety of scholars as a conceptual lens for analysing political decision-making on issues of migration and refugees. Musiol analysed in 2016 how with the growing number of refugees coming to Germany since the beginning of the war in Syria, Othering increasingly became evident with the nation defining itself as "We" and the refugee as "the Other". Neef scrutinises that the Othering of refugees, in general, is present in two forms: either as a humanitarian version, establishing refugees as "victims" or in a securitisation version, emphasising refugees as potential threats to public security and the welfare state (Neef, 2016). In her research on the Bundestag and European Commission's political debates, Hannah von Grönheim analyses power structures in the debates on the topic of flight. Based on the theoretical notion of Said's concept of Othering, she thereby examined the construction of difference (p.79). One of her findings is that some political actors

use Othering to manifest the dichotomy between "us" and the "criminal refugees", establishing threatening scenarios for the audience's need for security (p.85).

Kieschnick connected Othering and the interventionistic concept of state-building through research on the Afghanistan missions. His research shows how Afghans themselves have increasingly been used to explain Western intervention's failure and how this is anchored in the discourse of liberal state-building (2015, p.21). Cebeci made another connection between Othering and state-building. She analyses that also in academic literature, the EU is represented "as the ideal, superior, desirable —as representing peace— vis-à-vis the conflictual/modern/uncivilised others” (Cebeci, 2020, p.300). This representation as a peaceful project dissociates the EU from negative connotations of Europe's violent past, full of conflict and colonialism. In geopolitical terms, the dominant narrative of the EU leads to the "logic, that only the EU can help the target societies achieve peace and political reform; constructing the EU's others as incapable of achieving peace and building democratic state structures by themselves" (p.302). This would lead to asymmetrical and patronising behaviour of the EU towards the intervened societies (p.308). She further observed, that when the EU's liberal peace efforts are not successful, often the "backward, corrupt, conflictual nature of the target countries/societies which is not open to change" is blamed (p.302).

In his research on souvenirs brought home from conﬂict professionals working in Kabul in the ﬁnal years of ISAF, Kühn examined how those souvenirs can illustrate the worldview towards the country of intervention (2016). He analysed that souvenirs are “highly charged with Orientalist assumptions” and “continue to represent Afghanistan within the frame of looking at the culture and character of these ‘rude unlettered people’” (quoting Forster 1808) (Kühn, 2016, p.99). He further describes the underlying Othering in the dichotomic categorisation of civilisation vs. savagery and modern vs. traditional or tribal (p.100).

Fluri argues that while the international intervention in Afghanistan focused on women and their public participation, they "did not address, or did not understand, the complexities of Afghan gender roles and relations", and hence ignored the importance of domestic spaces of family and household, which vary considerably depending on region, education level and religious affiliation (Fluri, 2011, p.521). For example, she demonstrates how women's power and decision-making may change significantly over their life circle. The reduction of women's treatment and their lack of rights to (cultural) patriarchy would thus not reflect the topic's complexity and ignore the caustic effects of poverty and insecurity (ibid). Feminist scholars hence criticise the intervention's link between "saving women", militarism and "western modernity" (p.522).

In her research, Khalid analyses how gendered and orientalist logic in War on Terror discourses deploys the "Other" representations to justify military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq. As binary counterparts in the discourse, differentiating the "West" from the "East", she names "good vs. evil", "civilised vs. barbaric”, “rational vs. irrational”, “progressive vs. backward” (Khalid, 2011, p.15) and the description of the East as "exotic, despotic and lazy" while the West is portrayed as "moral and Christian" (p.17). She argues that "Other" women are portrayed as "voiceless victims of a barbaric (male) 'Other' enemy", while the USA is portrayed as enlightened and civilised, justifying its military interventions (p.16). Thereby the "image of victimised and subjugated women" for whom the 'civilising mission' of the intervention "would spell freedom and liberation" is created (p.18). Khalid uncovers the women's rights rhetoric as a central part of the War on Terror discourse, in US media and by US officials and US-based liberal feminists, "whereby concerns for the genuine abuses of women's rights in Afghanistan and Iraq become co-opted into a discourse that is deployed to justify military violence" (p.19). In particular, the names the image of "the veiled oppressed Muslim woman" as used to establish the superiority of "a benevolent and enlightened USA, protecting of women" in comparison to the "backward, barbaric and uncontrolled masculinity of the 'Other'" (p.16). The burqa is established as symbol of the Other and "the danger this 'Other' poses to liberal democratic notions of society, and to 'our' civilisation, where freedom and gender equality is valued" (p.21). As another critical feature of Othering, she names the perception of Islam as a “problem” and an “insurmountable obstacle” (p.18).

She analyses how in the discourse, the USA placed itself in the role of "defender of the free world and liberator of the oppressed", linking the Other with fundamentalist Islam (p.20). She further unveils that justifications in the War on Terror depend on binaries based on Othering, as the world was divided into 'civilised' and 'barbaric' (p.20). The "irrational violence and misogyny, intrinsic to 'their' world" [Afghanistan and Iraq], made the Western interventions "necessary to bring civilisation, democracy, and equality to the oppressed and to discipline the barbaric enemy” (ibid.).

Applying a gendered orientalist logic, Khalid examined how different masculinities and femininities are constructed and ascribed to men and women according to race. This would lead to the dehumanised male 'enemy' as "embodying a dangerous masculinity that is irrational and expresses itself in acts of barbarism" (p.20). It would lead to the construction of Afghan men as "barbaric, backward and a threat to be contained" (p.23) who are ascribed with "primitiveness, ineptness and a certain amount of weakness" (p.26). The 'Other' women are infantilised and ascribed with "feminine traits that deny them any agency and require their liberation" (p.21). The narrative of saving women in Afghanistan is interesting, as the international intervention has led to "increasingly worse situations, as war exacerbates existing economic and social problems, and creates new ones”, and hence the intervention has ultimately harmed these women (p.28).

3. Methodology

This research project is designed as a single-case study. A case study, portraying "an intensive study of an individual unit of interest” (Stewart, 2014, p.145), is chosen as a research method, as it is “an effective methodology to investigate and understand complex issues in real-world settings” (ibid.), constitutes a "pragmatic, flexible research approach" (Harrison et al., 2017, Art.1) and provides "an in- depth picture of the unit of study" (Stewart, 2014, p.145). While definitions of case studies vary across the scientific literature, one of the most common descriptions and definitions is the one made by Yin (Harrison et al., 2017, Art.12). Yin defines case studies as "an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon [the 'case'] in-depth and within its real-world context" (Yin, 2014, p.16). The main criticism of case studies is an ascribed inability to support generalisation and hence obstacles with validity and value as a research design (Stewart, 2014, p.147). However, Stewart argues that this criticism is based on a “common misconception", discounting the benefits of in-depth understanding (ibid.). Referencing Yin's work from 2003, she explains that "the traditional meaning of generalisability is restricted to ‘scaling up’ from a small sample to a larger population, whereas the case study is generalisable to the extent that it can provide a clear illustration of the generalisability of a theoretical construct" (ibid.), which often gives case studies an exploratory character.

This research project also uses an exploratory approach, exploring the role of Othering in the Bundestag debates on the military engagement in Afghanistan and exploring party affiliation and time as potential factors affecting the role of Othering. The research focuses on a single case: the German Bundestag’s debates on ISAF and RSM. While Germany also took part in the third mission in Afghanistan (OEF, see chapter 4), the debates on OEF are not included as OEF was not a state-building mission and as Germany only participated in OEF in Afghanistan in a minimal scope. This case is selected, as the German perspective, on the one hand, is very feasible due to the familiarity of the researcher with the German political system, party landscape, and language. It is also feasible as all the debates and protocols are publicly available, facilitating the data collection. On the other hand, the German perspective is exciting as -due to Germany's history- the country is practising military restraint. International deployment is particularly contested and therefore intensely debated in the parliament. The debates on the Afghanistan missions were chosen based on the importance of this engagement to German security and defence policy: it has been the most extensive international deployment for nearly two decades and has been the most costly (both regarding expenses and concerning German soldiers being killed) deployment of German armed forces since WW2. However, the focus on Afghanistan is also exciting, as this international intervention has marked the zenith of state-building

missions (Goodhand & Sedra, 2013, p.251), and the experiences in Afghanistan have shaped security policy about state-building (p.239).

The data on which this research is built are the individual speeches in the Bundestag's debates on the Afghanistan missions. Why they are relevant data for research on Othering is demonstrated in chapter 3a. The data is then analysed with computer-assisted qualitative content analysis. This method and the reasons for its choice are described in chapter 3b. In Annex E, the coding scheme of this research can be found. a) The Bundestag as the decision-making body on the deployment of the Bundeswehr

The individual speeches of the parliamentary debate on the Afghanistan mandates are chosen for this research, as in Germany, massive parts of the political communication on the deployment of the Bundeswehr happen in the Bundestag. In political sciences, the Bundestag often is described as a showcase parliament, as the actual decisions usually are reached in the relevant committees, and the controversial plenary debates serve to reason these decisions (Plitsch, 2014, p.40). Burkhardt defines the Bundestag as a parliament "in whose plenary political decisions are publicly and controversially debated, and the actual decision-making rituals are carried out, but hardly any actual discussion with the goal of mutual conviction takes place" (2003, p.6). Hence it serves to bundle the different points of view and arguments, which can then be used by the political parties to advocate in public and media debate. The plenary debates' main aim is not to persuade the other participants of the debate but rather the public (Klein, 1995, p.18). Due to this, but also because the protocols of the not-public committee meetings, in which the details of the mandates are debated more extensively, are not publicly available, in this research, the plenary debates in the Bundestag are analysed.

A more detailed description of the interplay between the legislative, executive, and judicative in German defence policymaking and particularly on the relevant processes and procedures in the Bundestag can be found in Annex B.

For this analysis, the ISAF- and RSM-mandates' debates are selected from 2001 until 2020 (44 debates). Because not all the mandates had the same duration, there are more debates to analyse for some years than for others. When there were multiple mandates debated in one year, this is marked as e.g., 2007/1 and 2007/2. From 2001 to 2005, the Bundestag had agreed upon a simplified procedure. Thereby, MdBs had agreed inter-fractionally to transfer the federal government's initiative directly to the relevant committees and only had one plenary debate before the votes. This explains why there is only one plenary session per mandate in the first years of the observation period.

The 44 debates lead to 503 plenary speeches to be analysed (see chapter D in the Annex). This research's scope is limited to the plenary debates on the mandates - plenary debates on other topics, such as the general development of the situation in Afghanistan, requests of the opposition parties to immediately wholly withdraw from Afghanistan, and debates in the context of government declarations are excluded. Furthermore, only the speeches from the official speaking list and short interventions are examined. The rules of procedure of the Bundestag stipulate that at the end of the debate, each MdB can make a verbal statement or produce a short, written statement, which must be included in the plenary minutes (§30 and §31 rules of procedure, Deutscher Bundestag). As these options are only used sporadically, they do not reflect the division of seats in the Bundestag. Also, most times, these statements refer to personal reasons regarding the member's voting decision and not necessarily their party's position. Due to these reasons, the statements after the end of the debate are not included in this research project. b) Computer-assisted qualitative content analysis

For this research, a qualitative approach, namely the qualitative content analysis developed by Mayring, was chosen. It consists of a bundle of technics for the systematic analysis of texts and can be applied to analyse any form of data from a communication context (Mayring, 2010, p.11). This form of qualitative content analysis is “an approach of empirical, methodological controlled analysis of texts within their context of communication, following content analytical rules and step by step models, without rash quantification” (Mayring, 2000, paragraph 5). The approach was chosen, as the qualitative approach offers the opportunity to examine the latent level of the material and evaluate the underlying argumentation of material, as it goes further than counting words (Neuendorf K. A., 2002, p.23). Mayring describes the main idea of his procedure of analysis as "to preserve the advantages of quantitative content analysis […] and further develop them to qualitative-interpretative steps of analysis" (2000, paragraph 2), thereby combining the advantages both of a quantitative method and more qualitative text interpretation.

Qualitative content analysis techniques were developed at the end of the 1970s when researchers were refining quantitative content analysis methods with rule-based systematic analytical procedures, adding qualitative procedures “that did not exclude quantitative analyses (category frequencies) for a variety of qualitative text analysis tasks (summarising, explication, structuring of text material)" (Mayring, 2019, paragraph 1). Mayring firstly presented this method in 1983, and it was referred to by different names, such as "mixed methods" or "hybrid approach" (Hussy, Schreier, & Echterhoff, 2010). Mayring himself considers the name "qualitatively orientated category-based content analysis" as most appropriate, as this form of analysis focuses on the qualitative step of assigning categories to the

text passages (Mayring, 2019, paragraph 1). Therefore, the fundament of categories is the distinguishing feature of this method. Categories thereby refer to specific aspects within the text and help put the meaning of the text's meaning in a nutshell. Categories are formed based on the research questions and are carefully founded and revised within the analysis process. In a feedback loop, the categories can then be enhanced with regard to the experience with the material. If needed, new categories can be created, categories can be altered or merged, or anchor phrases adapted. The chosen category system then functions as a base for the text evaluation. It is crucial to keep in mind that the evaluation is restricted to the selected category system. Text contents that are not included in the category system will not be considered in the evaluation (Mayring, 2019, paragraph 3). For this research project, this means that justifications used in the debate, but are not related to Othering, such as solidarity towards alliances, are not put in the category system, not "coded" in the text, and therefore not part of the analysis.

The fact that this research method's procedure is oriented on the research questions and that the category system is built on the research project aims differentiates this method from entirely open methods such as grounded theory (Mayring, 2019, paragraph 3). Mayring also emphasises the systematicity and the strict rule management, which are characteristics of his method, and he accentuates three principles for the qualitative content analysis (Mayring, 2000, p.471):

• The communication situation from which the material was collected must be considered. • The analysis's goal is that different content analysts come to similar results when examining the material (intercoder reliability). • The analysis follows a particular system. Rules and theory guide it; the material is broken down by forming categories (coding).

He also proposes a step by step procedure for qualitative content analysis (Mayring, 2015, pp.54ff.):

Step 1 aims at defining which material is chosen for the analysis, and Mayring recommends that this body of material should only be altered or expanded "under certain justifiable necessities" (2015, p.54f.). Following this advice, the material is defined in chapter 3a and presented in Annex D.

For step 2, the situation and conditions under which the material was produced need to be disclosed (p.55). The role of the parliamentary speeches, in particular in regards to military missions, is analysed in chapter 3a and the contextual information in chapter 4 help to get a better understanding of the relevant discourse in society, politics, and media in regards to the Bundeswehr deployment and an provide an overview on the political parties in Germany.

In step 3, the form of the material needs to be described. Generally, for context analysis, there is a need for a written text to be analysed, and often this text is based on information delivered in spoken 19

language. In these situations, the written word has to be transcribed with concrete and fixed transcription rules, which need to be disclosed in this step (p.55). As described in chapter 3a, the Bundestag publishes a stenographic report of every plenary session so that for this research, no own transcriptions had to be made. The only important thing to note for this step is that the speakers can check the stenographic report before publication and make corrections (Plitsch, 2014, p.48). However, in the event of corrections, the meaning of the speech or its parts may not be changed (Deutscher Bundestag, n.d.).

Before the researcher can start working on the analysis, they must first determine which aspects of the available material will be used. This is step 4 of Mayring's procedure. The research questions set the analysing approach. As described in chapter 1, this research focuses on the role of Othering in the German plenary debates on the military deployment in Afghanistan and possible relationships between Othering and time and party membership. The analysis approach of this research, therefore, is to conclude by analysing underlying messages.

As mentioned above, Mayring's approach to content analysis is characterised by two main features: the rule-based approach and the theoretical guide-reading of the interpretation. In step 5, the scientific theory needs to be connected to the research questions, and the connection with prior research on the matter needs to be made clear (p.59f.). In this research, this is done via the theory chapter, namely the segment on state-building and its criticism and with the segment on Othering. These theoretic notions also form a basis for establishing the deductive categories for the "coding" procedure.

In step 6, the researcher needs to decide on the most suitable technique(s) for analysis. Mayring thereby proposes three different techniques: Summariatison, explication, and structuring (p.67). The structuring analysis technique is most suitable to answer this thesis's research questions and hence is applied. Structuring aims at filtering out a particular structure from the material, laying a cross-section through the material according to predetermined order criteria, or assessing the material based on specific criteria (ibid). The technique's central element is the classification of each part of the material into a grid of predefined categories. For this classification, Mayring proposes the following three procedures (p.97):

• Definition of categories: Exact definition of which text components fall under a category. • Anchor examples: Listing specific text passages that fall under each category and serve as examples for this category. • Coding rules: Rules are formulated to enable a straightforward assignment to the categories.

This classification procedure leads to a coding scheme (Annex E).

Next, step 7 – the determination of the analysis units - follows. For this step, the coding units, context units, and evaluation units need to be determined. In this research project, the coding unit- determining the smallest material component that can be evaluated- is sentences and parts of sentences. The largest material unit that could be evaluated -the context unit- in this research is a whole plenary speech from one MdB. For the evaluation units -the order in which the material is evaluated- in this research, the approach is chronological.

Steps 8 and 9 are the actual analysis procedures, during which the material is categorised, and the categories are re-examined based on the material and theory. For this research, the first set of deductive categories is developed based on the findings from the theoretical framework. In a first material run (pilot), it is checked to what extend those previously defined category definitions are suitable for the analysis, anchor examples and coding rules are determined, and inductive categories can be added. For this first trial run of material, a sample of the material is chosen. For the sampling, a purposive sampling technique is used, identifying plenary debates based on the information from chapter 4. Concretely, the plenary debates from 22.12.2001, 14.06.2002 and 20.12.2002 (beginning of the ISAF deployment), the plenary debates from 21.09.2006, 28.09.2006, 20.09.2007 and 12.10.2007 (leadership responsibility North, employment of tornados, escalation of conflict with Taliban); from 15.12.2011, 26.01.2012, 13.12.2012 and 31.01.2013 (troop surges, discussion about withdrawal); from 13.02.2014 and 20.02.2014 (end of ISAF mission); from 05.12.2015 and 18.12.2015 (beginning of RSM mission); and the debates from the 04.03.2020 and 13.03.2020 (most recent, decisive role of AfD) are chosen. The selection of a proportionally extensive sample (209 out of 503 speeches included in the pilot) increases the suitability and validity of the developed category system, especially since due to this work's limitations, only one further run of material and one feedback loop were implemented.

After "coding" the material into categories, it becomes clear at which points the category system has to be modified and adapted in order to work out an adequate material structure for the final research. In the next step, the central passage through the entire material begins. The final coding sheets showing the amount of times the different codes were found, are available in Annex F.

Step 10, aiming at answering the research questions via the interpretation of the results from the analysis, is implemented in chapter 5. The final step in Mayring's proposed procedure is applying the content analytical quality criteria (step 11). Mayring establishes that every qualitative content analysis needs to be tested on quality criteria to determine whether it is scientific or not (p.123). Mayring proposes six concrete overarching quality criteria to evaluate research executed using his approach to qualitative content analysis, shown below in Figure 1. In the figure is also listed how the quality criteria have been implemented in this research.

Quality criteria Definition Application in this research Documentation Very detailed documentation Overall, the documentation of the method is of method of the method selection, sufficiently available in this research project. methodological procedure, This methodology chapter describes the data collection, and decisions made in planning and conducting the evaluation. Intersubjective research, and the analysis in chapter 5 is done verifiability of the research in small steps. All documents related to the process. research, such as coding sheets, the category system, and an example of a coded plenary speech, can be found in the Annex. Interpretation Interpretations must be Is applied in the analysis chapter. safeguards documented in such a way that intersubjective follow-up is guaranteed. Rule- A systematic approach, The rule-boundedness is closely followed in Boundedness adhering to procedural rules. this research and is well documented. Proximity to the Participants need to be Not applicable for this research project, as the object explored in their natural research does not base on interviews or environment to reduce bias. observational research. Communicative Feedback of the interpretation Not applicable for this research project, as the validation to the researched, ensuring research does not base on interviews or that they find themselves in observational research. the results of the research work. Triangulation Using many different methods, Within this research project's limited scope, it theoretical approaches, or was not feasible to use triangulation to a data sources. sufficient extent. Therefore, further studies on The use of different this topic with different data sets (e.g., the perspectives increases the analysis of publications from German parties quality of the results since regarding the missions in Afghanistan or the several levels are considered. analysis of the speeches from MdBs in TV debates) would be interesting. Figure 1: Quality criteria of this research, based on Mayring, 2016, pp.144ff.

As this form of content analysis after Mayring has a very systematic procedure, it is very suitable for implementing with help of a software. In the last decades, PC programs that are easy to use have become more and more popular and often used to assist this form of analysis. In this research, the software MAXQDA is used for categorising the material. This software's primary functions include facilitating the assignment of text sections from the material to categories ("coding") and then assisting in preparing the contents in various forms to present the results. Besides, the software offers a wide range of instruments for quantification. It is important to emphasise that the software does not automatically code the material and therefore does not enable automatic analysis, but rather is a tool for the researcher for the systematic organisation and contextualisation of categories during the process of coding and facilitates visualisation of the results of the analysis.

4. Contextual Information a) German military deployment to Afghanistan

To understand and analyse the arguments justifying the German missions in Afghanistan and the image that is created of the Afghan Other, it is essential to put them into context with the deployment's temporal development, the different phases of the missions, and major incidents and changes. Therefore, in this chapter, an overview of the chronology of the missions is given.

Firstly, some general facts: The German deployment in Afghanistan from 2001 until today has happened in the framework of three mandates – Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and Resolute Support Mission (RSM). As of April 2020, the mission in Afghanistan still is by far the largest international mission of the Bundeswehr, with 1101 soldiers deployed to Afghanistan (Statista, 2020). Currently, the end of the mandate period will be 31st March 2021 (Einsatzführungskommando der Bundeswehr - Presse- und Informationszentrum, 2020). As of spring 2019, the Bundeswehr deployment's total costs were 11,9 billion euros - not including extra expenses for the foreign ministry, development cooperation, intelligence services (Buchsteiner R., 2019). 59 German soldiers lost their lives in Afghanistan, making this deployment the one with the heaviest losses of the Bundeswehr (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2019), not considering the soldiers who returned wounded and with post-traumatic stress disorder.

To examine the plenary speeches on the deployment of the Bundeswehr in Afghanistan, it is crucial to understand the international mission's background, the chronological sequence of the German engagement, and the public and political perception. For this reason, an extensive chapter in Annex C provides a timeline of the engagement and outlines the chronology of the deployment. Due to the limits of this work, here, only an overview is given. The reader is strongly advised to read the more comprehensive Annex C instead.

The international engagement in Afghanistan was a response to the 11th September attacks on the USA in 2001. Militant Islamic terrorist Group Al-Qaeda's leader Osama bin Laden claimed responsibility for these acts of terror (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 2004). Responding to 9/11, the USA launched the War on Terror, leading to global military interventions to defeat terrorists such as bin Laden and to destroy their organisations and networks.

Being in shock by these significant terrorist attacks, the German government immediately offered "unrestricted solidarity" to the USA (Deutscher Bundestag, 12.09.2001, p.18293), and the UN Security Council condemned the attacks and recognised the “inherent right of individual or collective self-

defence” (United Nations, Security Council, 2001). NATO made use of this right and -for the first time- called for a case of NATO mutual defence according to Art. 5 of the NATO treaty (NATO, Statement by the North Atlantic Council, 2001)2

Despite being governed by a coalition of the SPD and Greens, both parties with large pacifistic fractions, Germany joined OEF, which focused on the destruction of the Al-Qaeda network and overthrowing the Taliban regime, using massive airstrikes, and deploying special forces. This decision was intensely debated in the Bundestag and finally linked to a vote of confidence3 (Deutscher Bundestag, 16.11.2001, p.19893).

After the UN Security Council had passed resolution 1386, giving the second mission in Afghanistan (ISAF) a mandate based on chapter VII UN-Charta, the German participation in ISAF was debated in the Bundestag on 22nd December 2001. This deployment's mission was "to support the provisional state organs of Afghanistan in maintaining security in Kabul and its surrounding” (Deutscher Bundestag, 21.12.2001, p.3). In contrast to OEF, this mission did not focus on offensive combat operations but emphasised Afghan ownership on the reconstruction, stabilisation, and pacification of their country. Due to the "more civil power-friendly character of the mission" (Heitmann-Kroning, 2015, p.138), the Bundestag voted with a vast majority from all parties except the PDS in favour of the German participation in ISAF (Deutscher Bundestag, 22.12.2001, p.20852).

The following months were dominated by a period of stabilisation in Afghanistan. The quick success in overthrowing the Taliban regime and the country's political and institutional reconstruction led to a positive impression of many Germans on the deployment, and optimism regarding the estimation of the deployment's length and success prevailed (Heitmann-Kroning, 2015, pp.146ff.).

To preserve achievements and counter a slow and gradual worsening of the security conditions, the number of international (and German) troops during the first years of the mission and their mandates were steadily expanded. Germany was soon taking over more responsibility in the ISAF mission but withdrawing from OEF in Afghanistan (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, n.d.).

By 2006, the Bundeswehr had established two Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), taken over ISAF command in the region “North”4 (Weiland, 2011, p.7) and established Camp Marmal in Mazar-i-Sharif in June 2006, making it the largest Bundeswehr military camp abroad (p.9). In this year, for the first

2 In this first press statement, the casus foederis was still conditional, but it was confirmed in October 2001, when the USA proved an attack from outside of the country. 3 A vote of confidence is a parliamentary motion used to measure the stability of the government. The Chancellor can call for a vote of confidence whenever the backing of the majority is in doubt. Such a motion is usually applied to tighten up stray coalition members by putting pressure on them to side with the ruling party or face being forced out (Deutsche Welle, 2001). 4 Afghanistan was divided into five regional commands, North, West, South, East, and Kabul. 24

time, six German soldiers came under heavy fire from insurgents and needed to be saved via air support from the USA. This incident, along with the publication of shocking pictures of Bundeswehr soldiers macabrely posing with human remains (DER SPIEGEL (online), 2006), led to a shift of the perception of the deployment in Afghanistan in the German public and gave a glimpse into the reality of the warlike character of the mission.

With the security continuously deteriorating, the number of German casualties the number of German soldiers increased in the following years. After a German commander ordered the bombing of two tank lorries, killing more than 90 Afghans (mostly civilians and many children) in 2009 (Baum, 2019), the situation in the country was described as "warlike" for the first time in 2010 by Minister of Defence Guttenberg (CSU), and Chancellor Merkel soon used the same formulation (Widmann, 2010).

At that time, the new US government introduced a new Afghanistan strategy, which included a significant increase of troops deployed to Afghanistan to stop the downward spiral of the country's security conditions and a troop withdrawal starting in July 2011 (Obama, 2009). Germany followed this strategy (Heitmann-Kroning, 2015, p.212). With an additional international military presence in the country, the Afghan government and military should be empowered to take over responsibility gradually. This period was characterised by the temporary troop surge, the gradual transfer of responsibility for security to the Afghan government, and the beginning of the international troop withdrawal.

At the NATO-summit in 2012, NATO and the Afghan government agreed that their partnership should continue beyond the end of the ISAF mission in 2014 and hence the follow-on, NATO-led non-combat mission "Resolute Support" was developed, which should -with a drastically reduced size of troops- continue to train, advise, and assist the Afghan security forces after the withdrawal of ISAF (NATO, 2020). In April 2013, Germany declared that it was willing to participate with a contingent of 600 to 800 soldiers at a follow-up mission to ISAF, before the UN mandate for ISAF, as well as the German mandate for the Bundeswehr participation at ISAF ultimately expired at the end of 2014 and the NATO- mission ISAF was transferred to the training mission Resolute Support (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, n.d.).

The Bundestag agreed in December 2014 to participate with 850 soldiers in this mission, and it was emphasised that RSM was “not a combat operation and does not have the task of participating directly in the fight against terrorism or drugs” (Deutscher Bundestag, 19.11.2014, p.5).

In the meantime, in February 2020, the US and the Taliban have signed a landmark peace agreement, and consequently, the USA has decided to withdraw from Afghanistan until 2021 (Graham-Harrison et al., 2020). In March 2020, Germany decided to decrease Afghanistan's presence, which "unspoken

marks the beginning of the end of the Bundeswehr's most extensive and longest foreign mission" (Matthay, 2020). Matthay also concludes that “the mission, once highly controversial, has no longer been topic of interest to Germans for a long time" (ibid.). b) Germany’s political parties

In this segment, a very brief overview of the landscape of today's political parties in Germany and their positions on foreign and security policies and military intervention is given. The political party system in Germany is "surprisingly stable", and the only shock to the party system in the observation period was the so-called "Refugee Crisis of 2015", which catapulted the far-right AfD into the Bundestag (Kluth, 2019).

The CDU/CSU, unofficially called the Union parties, is an alliance of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) and the Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU). In terms of ideology, the alliance can be put in liberalism, conservatism, pro-Europeanism, and social-Catholicism, and the political position is centre-right (Decker, Die Programmatik der CDU, 2018). The Union became “the most dominant political force in the post-war era” (Deutsche Welle, 2019). Regarding foreign and defence policies5, the Union emphasises multilateral cooperation in NATO, EU, UN, and OSCE and wants Germany to take responsibility towards achieving a permanently peaceful, stable, and just order of the world (CDU/CSU, 2017, p.63). The Bundeswehr participation in the Afghanistan missions has had consistent and broad support from the CDU/CSU.

The Social Democratic Party -the SPD- has traditionally been the party of trade unions and the working classes and is Germany's oldest political party. In terms of ideology, the party can be categorised as social-democratic, progressive, and pro-European, and the political position is centre-left (BBC, 2015). In terms of foreign and defence policies, the SPD emphasises the reconciliation of interests and negotiation solutions as a basis, setting the goal of a peaceful and just international order with fixed rules (SPD, 2017, p.102). They focus more on diplomacy and civilian crisis prevention and disarmament treaties (p.102f.). The Bundeswehr should only be deployed armed with a UN mandate, based on international law (p.105). The Bundeswehr participation in the Afghanistan missions has had consistent and broad support from the SPD MdBs but with more rejections and abstentions than the Union, and it was more controversial within the party.

The Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) rely heavily on the well-educated, urban demographic for their voters' base (Deutsche Welle, 2019). The party grew out of social protest movements of the 1980s and

5 As the parties‘ security and defence policies remained pretty constant over the observation period, for this segment, only the information from each party's election program of 2017 is considered. 26

has pacifistic roots (Göring-Eckardt, 2014). In terms of ideology, it fits into the categories of Green politics, pro-Europeanism, and social liberalism, and the political position is centre-left (Aydin-Düzgit, 2012, p.18). In foreign and defence policies, they emphasise the importance of human rights and women's rights. Their political goal is to intensify multilateral cooperation and civilian crisis prevention and strengthen international law (BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, 2017, pp.79ff.). While the party supports EU and UN peace missions, they accept the use of military force only "as an extreme means" (p.85) in certain situations and within a system of collective security. The Greens "stand for a culture of military restraint and the primacy of the civil" (p.86). While the Greens generally have supported the missions in Afghanistan, it was intensely debated within the party, and in the opposition role, the Green MdBs sometimes abstained from the vote.

The Free Democratic Party (FDP) is “the party of neo-liberal free enterprise” (Deutsche Welle, 2019). The party's ideology is based on liberalism, economic liberalism, and European federalism, and the party is positioned as centre (Zur, 2019, p.1) or centre-right (Hornsteiner & Saalfeld, 2014, p.80). They were a permanent fixture in the Bundestag from the Federal Republic's early days, "kingmaker" both to the CDU/CSU and the SPD. However, the party suffered significant election losses in 2013, failing to pass the 5% hurdle to the Bundestag, and the party "has struggled for relevance ever since" (Deutsche Welle, 2019), even though after the 2017 federal election, the party moved back into the Bundestag. In foreign and defence policies, the FDP stands for "change through trade", emphasising the premise of diplomacy and trade over military interventions, but pushing for Germany to take over more responsibility internationally -also in the form of military contributions (FDP, 2017, p.99). Like the Greens, they have generally supported the missions in Afghanistan but sometimes abstained from the vote in the opposition role.

The Left party (Die Linke) “is still considered a direct descendant of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) that ruled the East German GDR until reunification with the West in 1990” (Deutsche Welle, 2019). The party’s strongholds remain the “new German states” of the former GDR and protest voters, disenchanted with the established parties (ibid.). The party can be categorised as democratic socialist, antimilitaristic, and anticapitalistic (Decker, Die Programmatik der LINKEN, 2018). The political position is left-wing (Spier & Klein, 2015, p.85) or far-left (Hill, 2014). Some researchers and scholars have named the party left-populistic (e.g., Mayer, 2008, p.15; Hartleb, 2011, p.117). The German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution had observed the Left since its foundation. While the party as a whole and its MdBs no longer being observed by the secret service, some of the internal factions are still under observation. Some scientific and journalistic observers still consider the party to be extremist (Decker, Die Programmatik der LINKEN, 2018). The party was formed in 2007 out of a merger of the SED successor PDS and a movement of trade unionists and disaffected SPD members. As in the

observation period, both the PDS and the Left party were part of the Bundestag; they are all treated as "the Left" in the analysis. In regards to foreign and defence policies, the parties claim a programmatic unique selling point: continually standing up for the principle of nonviolence - calling for international disarmament and ruling out any form of involvement of the Bundeswehr outside of Germany, even under a UN mandate (DIE LINKE, 2017, p.93ff.). The Left/PDS fraction continuously argued against the Bundeswehr’s deployment to Afghanistan and always voted unanimously against it.

The youngest political party, represented in the Bundestag, is the Alternative for Germany (AfD), founded in 2013 as a euro-sceptical party, created by neo-liberal academics as a protest against the single European currency (Deutsche Welle, 2019). Over the next years, the agenda developed towards being overtly nationalist, anti-immigrant, and anti-Islam (ibid.). Today the AfD is the largest opposition party in the Bundestag. The party's ideology is categorised as German nationalism, ultranationalism, right-wing populism, and Euroscepticism (Decker, Die Programmatik der AfD, 2018), and the political position is far-right (Donahue, 2020). The other parties in the Bundestag swore off any cooperation with the AfD, and parts of the party were classified as "right-wing extremist endeavour against the free democratic basic order” by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and placed under intelligence surveillance in March 2020 (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, 2020). The party's foreign and security policy advocates an exclusive focus on German national interests and follows the principle of non-interference in states' internal affairs (AfD, 2017, p.18). They want to strengthen the European influence in NATO and improve the capacities and readiness of the Bundeswehr (p.19). The party opposed the German participation in the Afghanistan mission and voted against the renewal of the mandates.

5. Analysis a) Portrayed image of Afghanistan 1) Over time

Whether arguing in favour of the military engagement or reasoning against it – in the debates, an image of Afghanistan and the Afghan population was created. In this first section of the analysis, this image of the country and its population is examined. It is categorised whether the portrayed image shows Afghanistan as a backward, degenerated, uncivilised and violent country which is inhabited by poor and piteous people and oppressed women, fitting Said’s description of Othering (Said, 1981, p.232) or whether a diverse image of the country is created, acknowledging the multi-ethnic, multifaceted population, displaying Afghans as strong and active people and Afghanistan as a country rich in natural resources and natural beauty with a long -and not always violent- history.

Figure 2 shows that during the research period, significantly more often, a negative, backward image of Afghanistan was drawn. However, over time the cliff between a backward image and the diverse image shrank. In the debates of two mandates, the diverse and more positive image of the country even surpassed the backward image: In 2014, when the first mandate for RSM was debated and voted upon, and in 2019 when the end of the RSM came into sight.

Figure 2: Image of Afghanistan over time

While the "backward image" was portrayed in many more speeches in total, it should be noted that the curves of both categories share a similar shape. Both shared the first peak in late 2002 when the ISAF mission was still in its early stages, but it became apparent that this was not only an engagement for a few months but several years and, therefore, a closer look was taken and an analysis of the country and its people was made. When a stabilisation of Afghanistan was achieved in the following few years, new state institutions were established, a new constitution was passed, and elections were held, Afghanistan was less portrayed as a backward country. Though when the security situation deteriorated and the conflict with the Taliban escalated in 2006, the number of times a backward image of the country was portrayed increased again. Both curves also share common low points, namely in the more technical debates on the deployment of Tornados and AWACs in 2007/1 and on AWACs in 2011/2.

The comparison of the two curves shows that while the security situation continued to deteriorate after 2007 and the engagement got a more and more warlike character, the backward image of the country never reached the same peak as in the early years of the mission or during the first escalation in 2006, when on average once in every speech more than once Afghanistan or its people were portrayed as backward. In contrast, over time, the more diverse view on the country became more prominent in the debates. An interesting observation is that significant incidents like when German soldiers came under heavy fire by insurgence in October 2006 (shortly after the analysed debate of 2006), or when under German command tank lorries were bombed in 2009, leading to dozens of Afghan casualties do not have implications for the portrayed image of Afghanistan. Instead, long-term processes like the transition period, during which Afghanistan gradually took over responsibility, affected the image of Afghanistan - it became more diverse.

However, what exactly does the depiction of backwardness or the diverse image of the country look like? In the following segment, firstly, the categories of "backwardness of Afghanistan" and "diverse image of Afghanistan" are broken down.

For this step, it was first analysed how often the parliamentarians emphasised the complete lack of civil structures, highlight the violent past of the county, portray the Afghans as piteous, criticise the bad governance in the country, bemoan poverty, stress the oppression of women, compare the situation in Afghanistan with Western past or stamp Afghanistan as overall backward (see Figure 3).

Figure 3: "Backwardness of Afghanistan" over time

Thereby, some trends are noticeable: While “Afghans as piteous people” is most often found in total (in 14,5% of the speeches6), it was particularly often found in the early speeches in 2001 and 2002 and then continues to fade in relevance until it had another small peak in 2011 when the transition period commenced, and the international troop withdrawal began. In this subcode, very often, the word "battered" is used to describe Afghans. While in most speeches the way they are maltreated is not elaborated on, the narrative of the battered people is often used as a legitimation of the deployment, such as "Today it is a matter of opening up a perspective of peace and stability for Afghanistan and its people, who have been battered for decades.” (Friedrich Merz, CDU, 22.12.2001). An explanation for the curve's progression could be that while at the beginning, the international mission justified with humanitarian reasons, over time, that changed an more self-centred justifications were used, such as the security of German aid-workers and soldiers in Afghanistan (Harnisch, 2011, p.244).

The second-most-often found code is "bad governance" (in 12,1% of the speeches). In contrast to "Afghans as piteous people," the relevance of this code increased over time. From 2011 to 2018, it was the argument most often found within the category of "backwardness of Afghanistan". Thereby, this argument's growing significance goes alongside the start of the international troop withdrawal in 2011, which was characterised by a gradual transfer of security responsibility to the Afghan government. With Afghanistan taking over more responsibility, the government's decision-making, corruption, and a lack of transparency were more widely criticised. In contrast to that, in earlier debates, "bad

6 The percentages are calculated based on average. As in some speeches, the code might be found more than once, percentages of more than 100% are possible. 31

Government” is characterised as “absence of democratically legitimised authority” (Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, SPD, 22.12.2001) and a "weakness of the Afghan state institutions" (Winfried Nachtwey, the Greens, 30.09.2004). Therefore, while in earlier debates, the bad governance was framed as a reason for the need for an international engagement to Afghanistan, it was later framed as a reason for this engagement's failures (see also 5c).

Almost as often as “bad governance”, the “violent past of the country” is emphasised in the parliamentary speeches (in 10,9%). This code is also significantly more often found in the early years of the mission when it was used to support the narrative of a need for international intervention. The mission was framed as "the only chance to help this tormented country, destroyed by war and civil war, on its way to internal peace" (Joseph Fischer, the Greens, 22.12.2001). A withdrawal of the troops would lead to "the people in Afghanistan being without having a chance again after 24 years of war" (Hildebrecht Braun, FDP, 17.06.2002). Later, the "violent past" was used to explain why the mission is so complicated and why such an extensive engagement is needed: "Given the difficult historical background, which includes more than two decades of civil war, all of this [the different aspects of statebuilding] is not minor" (Gernot Erler, SPD, 21.09.2006) and why the mission needs to run over a more extended period: “There have been more than 30 years of war, destruction, disregard for human dignity, disregard for the basic rules of human coexistence […] An ambitious task has been set to ensure, within the framework of the international community, that the grievances are abolished and that reconstruction is advanced. Who can, please, guarantee that this task will be successfully completed in six, seven or eight years?" (Christoph Strässer, SPD, 20.09.2007). In the last years of the observation period, the "violent past of the country" is used both to explain the (still) lacking success of the mission: "These 15 years, which seem like an eternity to us, are not enough for a country that has been in a gruelling state of war and violence since the Soviet invasion in 1979" (Florian Hahn, CSU, 01.12.2016) and to emphasise that not the West started the war in Afghanistan, but intervened in a country already at war: “The war did not start with the Bundeswehr coming to Afghanistan, but the latest with the invasion of the Red Army in the 70s” (Omid Nouripour, Greens, 13.03.2020).

Less often, the "oppression of women" and "poverty" are used to highlight the alleged backwardness of Afghanistan (7,4% and 7,1% of speeches). Both these codes are found throughout the years of the mandates without any dramatic changes in the frequency. The oppression of women and the lack of women’s rights are often linked to the justification of the mission (see chapter 5b) and to emphasise that the situation for females has improved through the Western intervention: “Let’s take another look back at the time of the Taliban […]: Women had no rights, they had to veil their bodies. Women only received medical treatment when accompanied by men and only by female doctors […] So basically, they could not be treated at all, as women were not allowed to work. Women were only allowed to

leave the house if accompanied by male relatives.” (Karl-Theodor Freiherr zu Guttenberg, CSU, 28.02.2007). "Poverty" is used to emphasise the backwardness of the country and the resulting need for Western intervention, but also to critically evaluate the mission and its success and failures. Opponents of the military engagement specify the persistent poverty in Afghanistan as proof that the mission has failed.

“Overall backwardness” is also coded regularly throughout the debates (7,0% of the speeches), with a slight peak in 2015. An example for this code is a statement by the Green Foreign Minister Joseph Fischer who reported: "But we were able to convince ourselves -we were with a delegation in Afghanistan- that the country is still far away from a condition that could even with the greatest optimism be called something like normality" (20.12.2002), stressing the need for a continuous international engagement in the country. A remarkable statement was made by the CDU MdB Wolfgang Schäuble, who created an apparent distinction between "Us" and "Them" by saying, "We will […] have to respect and accept that a country like Afghanistan will not develop according to our ideas of a state organisation in Europe. The level of development, cultural experiences, and origins are completely different. Anyone who thinks that -no matter how much effort- Afghanistan can be turned into a country that corresponds to our ideas of a country in Europe will fail; because that will not work in Afghanistan" (24.10.2003). The distinction that "a country like Afghanistan" can never be brought to the same level as a European state is later repeated by politicians from other parties, such as Rainer Stinner, who said one needed to be realistic and accept that “We will never make a Switzerland out of Afghanistan” (FDP, 21.09.2006).

Another code in the category is the code “comparison with the Western past” (2,6% of speeches). Afghanistan before the Western intervention thereby is either compared to the European Middle Ages (e.g., Hildebrecht Braun, FDP, 17.06.2002), to the Enlightenment Period (Christoph Strässer, SPD, 20.09.2007), to the 30-years war (e.g., Eckart von Klaeden, CDU, 28.09.2006), to Germany in 1945 (Dr. Friedbert Pflüger, CDU, 20.12.2002), or the post-war years in Berlin (Detlef Dzembritzki, SPD, 12.10.2007). Nevertheless, these comparisons are not made to show similarities and to invoke compassion and understanding. They instead emphasise the portrayed backwardness of Afghanistan and reinforce the need for Western intervention. An interesting observation is that the comparisons with the Western past were mainly made in those years when there were significant changes in the mandate, and the engagement was therefore intensely debated: At the beginning of the mission, during the escalation of the conflict with the Taliban (2006/07), and at the end of ISAF and beginning of RSM in 2015.

The code “lack of civil structures” is the rarest code of the category "backwardness of Afghanistan". On average, only in 1,4% of the speeches, the complete lack of civil structures is mentioned, and after 33

2010, it is not found in any speeches anymore. Even the finding in 2010 refers to the state of Afghanistan of 2001: "Back then there was nothing but poverty and chaos. There was no state. There were no schools, especially not for girls. There was no health care available, almost no infrastructure, and of course no freedom of expression." (Dr. Christian Ruck, CSU, 10.02.2010). A peak of this code curve (see Figure 3) is in the second debate in 2002 when in 27% of the speeches, the complete lack of civil structures was mentioned. This drastic change of frequency can be explained by the fact that the international mission, without a doubt, achieved significant successes in the first years of the engagement, establishing civil structures in the country.

However, Afghanistan and its people are not only portrayed as "backwards", but as Figure 2 shows, increasingly also a diverse image of the country is created. Within the category of "Diverse Afghanistan", several codes are distinguished. Most often coded is "Afghans as strong and active people," which on average can be found in 13,5% of the plenary speeches.

Diverse image of Afghanistan 40%

20%

Overall diverse image Diverse, multiethnic population Separation Taliban/terrorists/general population Afghans as strong and active people Natural resources Beautiful Afghanistan Peaceful past

Figure 4: Diverse Image of Afghanistan" over time

As Figure 4 demonstrates, this code is not found continuously throughout the observation period but less often at the beginning of the mission. There is a peak in the debate on the second mandate in 2007, shortly after the Bundestag had made the controversial decision to significantly increase their troops and send reconnaissance aircraft to the country, as in the regional command, the Taliban- attacks drastically increase. This can be explained by the fact that at that time, German soldiers' deployment to Afghanistan was seen as particularly difficult by the German public. The MdBs both emphasise that "impressive [Afghan] personalities" fight for the future of their country and stability – along with their international allies (e.g., Eckart von Klaeden, CDU, 12.10.2007), but also how the

strong Afghans with their "resistance to the occupation by the Soviet Union ensured that the Soviet Union could no longer sustain their hegemonic claim in Central and Eastern Europe" and therefore "the fight of the Afghans against the occupation had led to the possibility of a German reunification and a European unity", underlining that Germany “has significantly benefitted from what the Afghans have achieved in the past” (also Eckart von Klaeden, CDU, 12.10.2007) and urging the Germans to now assist those strong Afghans in building their state and therefore fulfil the German responsibility.

Once the international troop reduction started in 2011, and gradually Afghanistan took over security responsibility, the Afghan people were even more often portrayed as strong and active and the presence of civil society was emphasised.

Also, quite often, the fact that there are not "the" Afghan people, but rather a diverse and multi-ethnic population in Afghanistan, is recognised in the speeches (in 5,8%). This code is particularly often found at the beginning of the mission but rarely during the years of escalation of conflict between 2006 and 2010. In the early years, it is emphasised that “all ethnic groups” must be included to help rebuild the country (Peter Zumkley, SPD, 14.06.2002). In the later years, the multi-ethnic population was listed as a reason previous endeavours had not been successful: "The heterogeneity of the country needs to lead to us finding differentiated approaches for the region" (Lars Klingbeil, SPD, 26.02.2010), and it was recognised that without an "intra-Afghan peace process" no peace in Afghanistan would be possible (Michael Roth, SPD, 01.12.2016).

Alongside the "diverse, multi-ethnic population", the separation between the Taliban, terrorists, and the majority of the Afghan population can be found in some of the speeches, though irregularly and sparely (in 2,8%). Already in 2002, Dr. Friedbert Pflüger (CDU) stressed, "We must never lump these extremist Taliban forces and these Al-Qaeda forces together with the Quran as a whole. They are very different things. It is essential to record this in our further fight against the terrorist threat" (20.12.2002). And -contrary to the notions from the theoretical framework on Othering- in the plenary speeches, Islam indeed never is perceived as "problem" or an "insurmountable obstacle" (Khalid, 2011, p.18).

While earlier it was elaborated how comparisons with the Western past were not made to emphasise similarities, but rather to reinforce the gap between the modern, sophisticated “Us” and the backward “Other", in individual cases, similarities between the people in Afghanistan and the West are stressed. The first time this occurred in 2011 when Dr. Guido Westerwelle (FDP), after visiting Kabul, reported: "The children there play exactly the same way, children play everywhere in the world" (15.12.2011). Young people are also mentioned by Omid Nouripour (Greens), who reported from his visit to Afghanistan that the young people there have the same wishes and hopes as "all other young people

everywhere in the world" (05.12.2014). Other similarities drawn are the increased use of social media (Gabi Weber, SPD, 03.12.2015 and Heiko Maas, SPD, 21.02.2019) and the love of football (Omid Nouripour, the Greens, 13.12.2012 and Henning Otte, CDU, 05.12.2014).

Even less often, the codes "beautiful Afghanistan" (found in five plenary speeches) and the presence of "natural resources" (found in three speeches) are assigned. The first time the beauty of Afghanistan was mentioned in the plenary debates was in 2007, and then from then on, it was sparely mentioned over the rest of the observation period. Natural resources were only mentioned in 2011 and 2014 when the country's resource-richness was praised.

Most drastically is the difference between the codes "violent past of the country" and "peaceful past of the country". While "violent past" was found 55 times within the examined debates, only three times the "peaceful past" was referenced. E.g., when Niels Annen (SPD) plead to remember that “Afghanistan -it is hard to believe- was once a peaceful and livable country” (18.12.2014). Furthermore, three times the overall diversity of the country is emphasised in the plenary speeches: in 2009, 2011 and 2014, all three times by Socialdemocratic MdBs. A good example is when Rainer Arnold alerted that “Afghanistan is a very complicated and differentiated country” (15.12.2011). All three times, this display of an overall diverse Afghanistan is connected to the disclosure of Othering (see chapter 6d).

2) By political parties

Throughout the years, the military mission of the Bundeswehr in Afghanistan and the respective mandates had broad support from most political fractions, particularly the Union and the SPD. While the Greens and the FDP, generally supported the military engagement, they abstained at the votes on some of the mandates (when in opposition) and criticised the respective mandate's design. The PDS/Left and later also the AfD solely criticised the presence of German troops in Afghanistan and unanimously voted against the mandates.

While chapter 6a demonstrated how the portrayed image of Afghanistan changed over time, the differences between the political parties are even more explicit. This distinguishability is analysed in the following segment. When analysing the differences between the political parties, it is essential to keep in mind that due to the small number of analysed plenary speeches from the AfD, their portrayed percentages in this analysis figures have significantly less validity than those from the other parties.7

7 Due to the small number of speeches from independent MdBs and the fact that they come from different ends of the political spectrum, the plenary speeches from independent politicians do factor in the analysis of the development over time, but not in the analysis of differences by party affiliation. 36

Figure 5: Image of Afghanistan and party affiliation

Figure 5 demonstrates that all political fractions significantly more often portray Afghanistan as backward than establish a diverse image of the country. Proportionally most often, the SPD painted a picture of Afghanistan as a backward country (in 93,7% of their plenary speeches), followed by the Union (69%) and the AfD (62,5%). The Left (46,6%), Greens (45%), and FDP (41%) significantly less often use the narrative of a backward Afghanistan. As elaborated upon in chapter 6a1, Afghanistan's alleged backwardness was used to underscore the need for international intervention by proponents of the mission. Therefore, it is interesting that the AfD and Left -opposing the intervention- paint similar pictures of the country. However, the reasoning differs as the Left does not argue that the alleged backwardness of Afghanistan requires a military engagement, but rather development cooperation and humanitarian aid and backwardness sometimes is emphasised to outline the lack of achievements of the West: "We now know that under the power of the warlords and, in a sense, under the care of the Karzai government, girls are still viewed as barter for cars and dogs. It is still the case that 80 per cent of the jurisdiction is exercised by the tribal chiefs. They treat women just as awfully and badly as the Taliban.” (Monika Knoche, the Left, 20.09.2007). The AfD uses the country's alleged backwardness to argue that Western intervention has failed and hence should not be continued.

The image of Afghanistan established by the SPD is fascinating, as SPD MdBs most frequently portray Afghanistan as backward and most often highlight a diverse image of the country. Second -most often the Greens portray a diverse image of Afghanistan (28,8%), followed by CDU/CSU (25,3%), the Left (16,4%), and FDP (15,0%). The AfD brought up the rear with only establishing a diverse Afghanistan image once (12,5% of their speeches).

The fact that the SPD most frequently painted a picture of Afghanistan as a backward country and most frequently established a diverse image of the country is puzzling. Therefore, it is important to investigate which subcodes were used by which parties in the categories.

Backwardness of Afghanistan and party affiliation

Bad Governance

Poverty

Afghans as pitious people

Violent past of the country

Oppression of women

Comparison with Western Past

Lack of civil structures

Overall backwardness

0,0% 10,0% 20,0% 30,0% 40,0% 50,0% 60,0%

AfD PDS/Left FDP CDU/CSU Greens SPD

Figure 6: "Backwardness of Afghanistan" and party affiliation

As shown in Figure 6, the SPD and Greens particularly often portray Afghans as piteous people and emphasise the country's violent past while the conservatives highlight bad governance and oppression of women. The AfD also stresses bad governance and the overall backwardness of Afghanistan. Therefore, the left parties portray Afghans more as poor and weak people, as victims who have suffered and needed rescuing (see next chapter). In contrast, the conservatives portray them as "bad" actors who are corrupt, make wrong governing decisions, and oppress women. While portraying different versions of Afghans, both these narratives have aspects of Othering.

Nevertheless, there is also a diverse image of Afghanistan conveyed in the parliamentary debates. The Greens and the SPD especially emphasise that Afghans are strong and active people (see Figure 7).

Figure 7: Diverse image of Afghanistan and party affiliation

The beauty of Afghanistan and similarities to the West are also exclusively outlined by the SPD and the Greens. The SPD is the only party that established an overall diverse image of the country. The Left dominates the separation between Taliban, terrorists, and the general population, stressing the presence of "democratic and peace-oriented forces" (Christine Buchholz, 15.12.2011) in the country and urging for non-military solutions. In terms of percentage, the AfD most frequently acknowledges the diverse, multi-ethnic population of Afghanistan. However, the small sample of only 8 examined speeches from the party needs to be considered. In absolute numbers, the AfD only addressed this argument once and used it to criticise the state-building approach in Afghanistan as unfit in its attempt to unify and centralise "the different ethnic groups" (Armin-Paulus Hampel, 21.02.2019). b) Justification of the deployment 1) Over time

Previous research has identified a variety of arguments used in the Bundestag debates to justify the military intervention in Afghanistan: The fight against terrorism, solidarity with the USA, responsibility towards the allies, the international legal order and democratic values, and the promise of a better Afghanistan (Plitsch, 2014; Leithner A., 2006). In this research, only justifications based on Othering are analysed. The examination of the plenary debates has revealed that the Afghan Other in the debates is either constructed as a threat to the West, which forces the peaceful West to self-defence, or constructed as an inferior, chaotic, and unable victim, unable to provide security and stability in its own country, and needing rescue by the superior West. Furthermore, in the binary discourse, the

Afghan Other's barbaric nature is emphasised and contrasted with the ideal, enlightened, and civilised West. Lastly, the international missions are justified as an intervention for women to rescue the voiceless Other females from the barbaric Other males. In this segment, the different justifications that were found in the examined plenary debates are analysed.

Figure 8 demonstrates how these justifications with an Othering reference have developed over time. On average, the justifications were found in 119,3% of the speeches. However, at the beginning of ISAF, these justifications were used on average twice in every plenary speech, and the percentage further drastically increased over the first year of the mission. By December 2002, the amount of time these justifications were used reached an all-time peak. After that, the percentage drastically decreases until the escalation of the conflict with the Taliban in 2006/2007 when Germany took over the responsibility for the North, and the number of justifications increased again but considerably dropped after that. The two low points at 2009/1 and 2011/2 can be explained by the fact that these debates were both on the deployment of AWACs, and the arguments focused more on the technical details of these mandates. Apart from those two low points, after 2008, the number of times the justifications were used evened out at between roughly 50% and 135%.

Figure 8: Justifications based on Othering over time

This curve can be interpreted based on the international mission's process: Similar to the curve of the category "backwardness of Afghanistan", the curve starts at a high point but then drastically climbs during the first year and then significantly drops after 2002. The decline of justifications between 2003 and 2005 can be explained by the state-building mission's successes in establishing Afghan institutions and a new constitution and securing national elections. With the escalation of the conflict with the

Taliban in 2006 and 2007, the number of justifications based on Othering increased again, as the deployment was particulary controversially debated, before they dropped to a more steady level.

With the variety of different justifications based on Othering, it is interesting to see how the individual justifications have developed over time. As Figure 9 shows, different arguments have been more prominent at different times of the engagement.

Figure 9: Different justifications over time

In total, most often, the Bundeswehr deployment to Afghanistan has been justified with a rescue narrative (in 37,6% of the speeches). An example is when in the very first debate on the international mission in Afghanistan Friedrich Merz (CDU) explained: "We agree [to the deployment of the Bundeswehr] because we want to help the Afghan people, the persons and especially the hundreds of thousands of children in this country and give them a perspective" (22.12.2001). In a benevolent and patronising way, the ideal Western "Us" provides help and hope to the otherwise helpless and pitiable Other. While it was the second-most prominent justification at the beginning of the German engagement in Afghanistan, it increased its prominence in the military mission's first year. It reached its peak in December 2002 (90% of speeches). Like the curve of Figure 8, the frequency then significantly decreases but rises again in 2006/2007 before it drops to a low level from 2008 till 2011. In 2012 the rescue narrative became the most apparent justification of the international mission based on Othering (65% of speeches). Remarkable thereby is the frequent formulation of "not forsaking the people in Afghanistan", which is used to argue in favour of a continuous German engagement in Afghanistan despite the beginning of the international troop withdrawal (e.g., "Afghanistan needs our support and clear promise and message: We will not withdraw from our responsibility. We will not 41

forsake Afghanistan and the people there" (Stefan Rebmann, SPD, 31.01.2013). The justification of the mission by the narrative of the German “US” rescuing the helpless Other remained the most frequent justification throughout the final yeas of ISAF and the beginning of RSM but lost relevance after that.

The second-most frequent justification based on Othering throughout the observation period is "Afghanistan as a threat to the West", which is on average found in 35,4% of the examined speeches. This code includes the justification with the War on Terror and 9/11 references. While it was not the most frequent justification in the year of 9/11, when the international mission began, this justification became most prominent in 2002, when it was found in 118,2% of the speeches. An example is when Dr. Friedbert Pflüger (CDU) elaborated on the need for the state-building mission in Afghanistan: "The fight against terrorism […] must always be done in two ways. It must be done by military, police, and intelligence means, but also by taking away the breeding ground for terror. It is about the breeding ground of injustice, need, indignity, and ignorance. Fighting this breeding ground is in our security interest here in Germany" (20.12.2002). While this justification's frequency decreased from 2003 to 2007, it remained the most often used justification until 2006. From then on, the stressing of Afghanistan posing a threat to the West remained a frequent justification but without significant peaks. Even almost two decades after 9/11, these attacks were still frequently used to justify the use of military force in Afghanistan (e.g., “It is a matter of Afghanistan no longer posing a threat, also not to our country. Ladies and gentlemen, the training and deployment began in 2001 […]. World peace was threatened. I remind you of the attacks in the United States.” (Henning Otte, CDU, 04.03.2020).

Another frequent justification is made by linking the deployment to Afghanistan with a fundamental conflict between civilisation and barbarism. This form of Othering has in state-building also been identified by Kühn (2016, p.100) and Khalid (2011, pp.15ff.), and the separation between the civilised Us and the barbarian Other has been observed as German pretext for intervention in Afghanistan by Kieschnick (2015, p.37f.). Indeed, while found in 27,0% of the examined speeches, it was the most often used justification to start the Bundeswehr deployment in 2001 (81,3% of speeches). Already in the very first speech on the first Afghanistan mandate, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (SPD) made the separation between the civilised – and democratically legitimised – West and the barbaric, violent - and pseudo-religiously legitimised- Other: “For many, it is one of the bitter truths of this time, that peace in Afghanistan has only come closer through war. One of the lessons of recent German history, which we have all experienced together, is that pseudo-religiously legitimised and motivated violence had to be overridden and overcome by democratically legitimised counter-violence.” (22.12.2001). Further by calling the Other opponent “fanatics” (Friedrich Merz, CDU, 22.12.2001), “murderers, criminals, mafiosi and warlords” (Gert Weisskirchen, SPD, 20.12.2002), or “marauding gangs” (Urlich Irmer, FDP, 22.12.2001) and emphasising the “reign of terror of the Taliban” (Rezzo Schlauch, Greens,

22.12.2001), the Other opponent is characterised as evil, chaotic and barbaric. The justification of the civilised West teaching the barbaric Other that “peace is worthwile” while “so far in the last decades they have only learned from the warlords that violence is worthwile” (Heidemarie-Wieczorek-Zeul, SPD, 22.10.2001), and the portrayal of Germans as "helpers, as a protective force against chaos, but also against terror and lack of freedom" and as "pioneer for positive development" (Hildebrecht Braun, FDP, 17.06.2002) even increased in frequency in 2002 (90,9% of speeches). The number of times this justification was used in the debates drastically decreased in 2003 but inclined again along with the conflict's escalation in 2006/2007. From then on, the justifications are not found frequently in the debates anymore, except for a small increase during the final mandate of ISAF and another increase in 2020.

Less often, the justification of an "intervention for women" (in 10,3% of the plenary speeches) and "Afghans unable to provide security" (8,6%) are found in debates. Both argumentation lines are found quite consistently throughout the observation period, except for 2003-2005 when -during the years of rapid successes of the state-building mission- neither of them are found (see Figure 9).

The justification of the military mission as an intervention for women includes the emphasis that the mission aims at strengthening women’s rights and gender equality (e.g., Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, SPD, 22.12.2001), is creating educational opportunities for girls and women (e.g., Joseph Fischer, Greens, 14.06.2002), or more generally “mainly help[s] women and children” (Heidemarie Wieczorek- Zeul, SPD, 09.03.2007). The role of women in society is reduced to a lack of rights, and the discourse does not reflect the complexities of gender roles. Instead, an image of oppressed, victimised women is created and used to reinforce the superiority of the enlightened "Us", saving women.

The justification that “Afghans are unable to provide security” is based on Othering as it constructs the Afghan people as weak and unable to govern themselves. The narrative is that without international troops in Afghanistan, "there will be no security possible and therefore, reconstruction will not be possible either" (Joseph Fischer, the Greens, 14.06.2002). In contrast to the unable Afghan, the Western soldiers patrol Kabul and "through the presence and courageous intervention protect the transitional government's work" (Günther Friedrich Nolting, FDP, 20.12.2002). While the goals of Afghan autonomy and Afghanistan taking over security responsibility are accentuated, it is emphasised that at the moment, the Afghan people and institutions are not able to do so but need to be "put in the position to do so" (Dr. Franz Josef Jung, CDU, 20.09.2007), by the Western “Us” that is presented as superior and courageous.

2) By political party

The previous segment has demonstrated that the frequency of justifications based on Othering has changed throughout the observation period and that with different justifications, different images of Afghanistan and its people are constructed. However, how do the justifications differ between the political parties?

Justifications based on Othering and party affiliation

Justification based on Othering

0,0% 20,0% 40,0% 60,0% 80,0% 100,0%120,0%140,0%160,0%180,0%200,0%

AfD PDS/Left FDP CDU/CSU Greens SPD

Figure 10: Justifications based on Othering and party affiliation

Figure 10 reveals that the SPD and CDU/CSU rely most on these justifications (found in 182,0% and 154,4% of the plenary speeches). In the speeches from FDP politicians, justifications based on Othering are found frequently, too (in 126,5%), while the Greens only use these justifications in 56,3% of the speeches. Despite both the Left and the AfD continuously opposing the military intervention in Afghanistan, they both used related narratives (AfD in 83,3% of the speeches, the Left only in 27,4%).

However, as Figure 11 shows, the members of different political parties use different justifications and therefore portray different images of Afghanistan.

Most striking is how frequently the SPD uses the rescue narrative. It was found on average in 75,7% of their plenary speeches, contrasting to only 43,7% in the CDU/CSU's speeches, 36,7% of the FDP, 15,0% of the Greens, and only 2,7% of the Left and not at all in the speeches from the AfD. Despite the Left arguing against the state-building mission, in total two times they use the narrative of a weak and helpless Afghanistan that needs to be rescued by the West, but conclude from this image of Afghanistan a need for "economic programs, employment, reconstruction aid and social support"

rather than an intervention in the form of a state-building mission (Monika Knoche, the Left, 21.09.2006).

The image of a weak and helpless Afghanistan, needing assistance and help from the outside, is also portrayed by the justification of "Afghans unable to provide security". However, this argument is most often made by the CDU/CSU (15,8%), and the SPD only used it in 11,7% of their speeches. In the speeches from the FDP, this justification is found in 8,3% of the speeches and from the Greens only in 2,5%. Neither the Left nor AfD has used this justification in the plenary debates of the observation period.

Figure 11: Different justifications and party affiliation

While the SPD significantly more often created an image of a weak and unable Other, needing rescue and assistance from the West, the MdBs from the CDU/CSU most frequently established a dangerous Other by emphasising the threat that the failing or failed state of Afghanistan posed for the West and people in Germany (57,0%). Also, in the speeches from the FDP, the perceived threat to the West is the most often used justification based on Othering (found in 45,0% of the speeches). Despite arguing against the military missions, Afghanistan is portrayed as a threat to the West by the Left (16,4%) and AfD (12,5%). The Left starts to use this argument in 2007 when the conflict with the Taliban had escalated and warned that through the state-building mission, "the threat of a terror attack in Germany has been increased" (Oskar Lafontaine, the Left, 09.03.2007). They reason that through the international mission, innocent people in Afghanistan are killed, which "armed jihadists use as a justification to bring the terror to us" (Paul Schäfer, the Left, 28.02.2007). The AfD, on the other hand, blames "the Americans" for the threat to the West that is arising from Afghanistan, as they were

"breeding pure hate" against the West in their prisons in Afghanistan (Armin-Paulus Hampel, AfD, 04.03.2020).

The AfD is the party that most frequently uses the narrative of “civilisation vs. barbarism" in the examined plenary debates (in half of their speeches) but does not conclude the need for international intervention from this narrative. In contrast, they use this narrative to frame the international missions as doomed to be unsuccessful. The narrative of, e.g., the German soldiers establishing traffic regulations in Afghanistan and following the rules themselves, while the uncivilised and chaotic Afghan Other fails to obey basic traffic rules (Armin-Paulus Hampel, AfD, 21.02.2019), is used to demonstrate that the Other either does not want to or is not able to overcome its barbaric nature and therefore the international engagement is futile. The narrative of “civilisation vs. barbarism" can also be found in some of the Left party's speeches (6,9%). However, they make the argument that by working together with barbaric actors such as "warlords and drug kinds" (Monika Knoche, the Left, 28.09.2006), by collaborating with actors with a "misanthropic world view" (Dr. Lothar Bisky, the Left, 12.10.2007), the West would morally fail in Afghanistan. The other parties use the "civilisation vs. barbarism" narrative to justify the deployment of the Bundeswehr to Afghanistan - most frequently, the SPD (39,6% of their speeches), followed by the Union (31,8%) and FDP (28,3%). Nevertheless, also the Greens use this justification in 18,8% of their plenary speeches, making it their most frequent justification related to Othering. By underlining the “criminal and terrorist” (Jürgen Trittin, Greens, 21.11.2017), and misogynist ideology (Kerstin Müller, Greens, 07.10.2008) of the Taliban regime and contrasting them with the Western engagement for human rights and in particular women rights, the Greens use the narrative of “civilisation vs. barbarism" like in the same way as the other parties that are generally supporting the international missions in Afghanistan – to justify it.

The final justification based on Othering is the "intervention for women", to rescue the voiceless Other females from the barbaric Other males (Khalid, 2011, p.16). Most frequently, this justification is found in the speeches from the SPD (23,4%), followed by the FDP (13,3%) and the Greens (8,8%). The CDU/CSU only used this narrative in 6.3% of their plenary speeches. In the Left's speeches, the argument is only found once (1,4% of the speeches). The Left uses the narrative of "saving women" to argue for a civil intervention while opposing the military missions (Dr. Gregor Gysi, the Left, 28.01.2011).

c) Afghans as reason for failure 1) Over time

The theoretical framework has revealed that Afghans themselves have frequently been used to explain Western intervention's failure (Kieschnick, 2015, p.21; Cebeci, 2020, p.302). Figure 12 demonstrates that this is also true in the German parliamentary debates.

Figure 12: Blaming Afghans for failure of the missions over time

While in the early years, this narrative was hardly found in the examined speeches, the frequency drastically peaked in 2006 (31,6% of speeches), when Germany took over more responsibility in ISAF, and the conflict with the Taliban escalated. Besides, the number of times Afghans were blamed for the international mission failures increased again in late 2011 when the withdrawal period commenced. The absolute peak is reached in 2015, at the first extension of the RSM mandate (62,5%), when it became clear that RSM would develop to be a long-term commitment. From then on, the narrative lost its significance in the plenary debates.

2) By political party

Not all parties evaluated Afghans as reason for failure in the same amount. Figure 13 discloses that the narrative is most frequently used by the CDU/CSU (26,0% of speeches). They blame the Afghan government and authorities for the failures in the fight against drugs and corruption and emphasise that more pressure needs to be put on them: "Many things need to be increased and improved […] in particular concerning the work of the Afghan persons in charge […] Thus, the international community

must pressure President Karzai to crack down” (Dr. Christian Ruck, CSU, 28.09.2006). Further, they are calling the persons with whom they “had to cooperate in any form” “extremely shady”, commiserating that “we are not in the position to establish someone from our own ranks as Afghan president” (Philipp Mißfelder, CDU, 13.02.2014) and criticise a lack of reforms from the Afghan government (e.g., Dr. Ursula von der Leyen, CDU,17.12.2015).

Blaming Afghans for failure of the missions and party affiliation

Afghans as reason for failure

0,0% 5,0% 10,0% 15,0% 20,0% 25,0% 30,0%

AfD PDS/Left FDP CDU/CSU Greens SPD

Figure 13: Blaming Afghans for failure of the missions and party affiliation

The SPD also frequently used the narrative of Afghans as reason for shortcomings of the international missions (in 20,7% of their speeches). They highlight “a sometimes incompetent and corrupt administration” and the “sometimes catastrophic personnel policy of the president, which rewards clan interests rather than skills” (Gernot Erler, SPD, 21.09.2006). Like the CDU/CSU, the SPD criticises the “lack of efficiency and the raging corruption” (Hans-Ulrich Klose, SPD, 03.12.2009) and the “limited desire to support reforms” (Johannes Pflug, SPD, 15.12.2011).

Though less frequent, the FDP and Greens also display the Afghan government as corrupt and incapable or unwilling to implement reforms. The FDP further criticises “power struggles” between “regional rulers” that are “hampering the important integrity processes in Afghanistan” (Harald Leibrecht, FDP, 20.12.2002). Moreover, the Greens complain that "instead of finally building a better state, the [Afghan] actors continue to play the old game of power struggles, clientele policy, and corruption. This form of bad governance has been one of the central problems for decades and is a reason why the situation is that dire today" (Agnieszka Brugger, Greens, 17.12.2015).

The way the Left and AfD, both opposing the state-building mission, blame the Afghans for the mission's failure differ from the other parties. While the Left blames the Afghan army – trained by I.A. 48

the Bundeswehr- for escalating conflict with their brutal practices (Christine Buchholz, the Left, 17.12.2015), the AfD scolds “the wealthy Afghans that have profited from this conflict”, “found a safe home” in the Gulf region and have built “villas, that were financed with our money” (Armin-Paulus Hampel, AfD, 04.03.2020). d) Disclosure of Othering 1) Over time

Not only Othering is found in the justifications of the Bundeswehr's deployment and the image created of Afghanistan and its people, but also the disclosure of Othering. Figure 14 demonstrates how the frequency of these disclosures changed over time.

Figure 14: Disclosure of Othering over time

Already in the very first debate in 2001, Othering was disclosed: "I am one of those who justified the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan [in 1979]. However, I did this with the same bad arguments as you do today. At that time, I, too, talked about the nonsense of fighting terrorism and bandit groups and about promoting cultural progress. Those arguments were bad then and they have not gotten better today." (Wolfgang Gehrke, PDS, 22.12.2001). Arguing in favour for ending the war in Aghanistan and critising the narrative of “civilisation vs. barbarism”, Gehrke disclosed how the Western intervenors in 2001 used the same “logic of war” that the Sowjet intervenors used in 1979 and in particular condemmed the leading role of the UK in ISAF and OEF. He reasons that due to its colonial past in Afghanistan the UK was a biased and disputed actor in the region. During the years of stabilisation in Afghanistan, from 2003 to 2005, no disclosure of Othering was found. When the conflict with the

Taliban excalated in 2006 the frequency of disclosure of Othering in the plenary speeches skyrocketed and was on average found in more than 2/3 of the speeches. These disclosures were less explicit than the ones from the opposition of the international intervention in 2001 and 2002 and more critical towards the “often ruthless dealing with the traditions and values of the locals” (Winfried Nachtwei, Greens, 21.09.2006). They go along with the realisation that there is a need to correct aspects of the statebuilding and a need for a “consideration of the sociocultural circumstances in the county” (Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, SPD, 28.09.2006), as it was observed during the first years of the international missions that “if there is no condiseration shown to the feelings and traditions of the people, we must not be surprised if the opponents of the stabilisation process gain more and more support” (Rainer Arnold, SPD, 28.09.2006).

After this peak in 2006, disclosure of Othering was still found in the debates of most missions, though never again to the same extend. The aspects of the disclosure thereby vary over time. In 2007 Monika Knoche disclosed the justification of "intervention for women" as "hypocrisy": "I am outraged that the situation of women is used as a reason to legitimise war. This is an abuse of women in this instrumental relationship. None of those who today justify the continued military presence in Afghanistan with the situation of women paid attention to the situation of women under the Taliban […] before the 11th September" (The Left, 20.09.2007).

In 2010 there was a second peak of the disclosure of Othering when the governing parties of CDU/CSU and FDP reprocessed the errors that were made in the ISAF mission and apologised for the "own half- heartedness or naivety with which we often overlooked the huge cultural differences and contradicting interests" (Dr. Christian Ruck, CSU, 10.02.2010). The governing parties emphasised that from now on, the mission of the Bundeswehr "much more clearly than previously is orienting itself towards the traditional values and established structures of the Afghans themselves" (Helmut Königshaus, FDP, 10.02.2010). Also, the oppositional SPD argued that “the heterogeneity of the country must lead us to finding differentiated approaches for the region” and that “we have to involve the Afghans much more closely in our commitment and take their concerns seriously on an equal footing” (Lars Klingbeil, SPD, 26.02.2010).

A further peak can be observed in the first debate on the RSM in 2014 when Dr. Hans-Peter Bartels cautioned: "It is important to me that we are a bit careful with the popular sweeping judgments, such as the false claim that Afghanistan has always been a terrible country, with the haughty belief that our fellow humans are, if they are Afghans and living in Afghanistan, incapable of democracy, or with the discouraging verdict that nothing is good in Afghanistan" (SPD, 05.12.2014). While this message is directed to the opponents of the engagement of the Bundeswehr, the opposition also discloses Othering in the narratives of the proponents: "The whole time you have been talking about building 50

wells, about reconstruction and girls' schools, but nobody has said a word about war, about all the dead and the suffering." (Jan van Aken, the Left, 18.12.2014). Since then, disclosure of Othering was only found in the plenary debates in 2019 (in 12,5% of the speeches). On the one hand, Dr. Ursula von der Leyen sharply criticised the AfD's "gloomy view of Afghanistan, which denies this country any form of development and is oozing with ignorance and prejudice" (CDU, 21.02.2019). On the other hand, the FDP, a general proponent of ISAF and RSM, criticised that the entire deployment of the Bundeswehr to Afghanistan has never been evaluated and questioned, whether the government had “ever questioned critically whether our Western ideas of cultural values and the rule of law – diverse societies, equal rights, yes, including access to education- are benchmarks for the people in Afghanistan?” (Dr. Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, FDP, 21.02.2019). The governing parties did not answer the question.

2) By political party

As d1 has shown, the different political parties disclose different forms of Othering in the Afghanistan missions' debates. While the Left MdBs and individual MdBs from the Greens and FDP question the rhetoric behind the justifications of the intervention, the members from the Union, SPD and partly from the FDP and Greens condemn the black-and-white image of Afghanistan that is constructed in the discourse of the opponents of the intervention, but also critically review that not enough attention has been paid to the Afghan cultures and values and that greater importance needs to be attached to the wishes and goals of the Afghan population.

Figure 15: Disclosure of Othering and party affiliation

As Figure 15 demonstrates, most often, a form of disclosure of Othering was found in the speeches of Social Democratic MdBs (in 10,8% of the plenary speeches), followed by members of the Left (9,6%). The FDP and the Greens also disclose Othering (respectively in average in 6,7% and 6,3%), while the disclosure is hardly found in the speeches of CDU/CSU (3,2%) and not at all in the examined speeches of the AfD.

6. Conclusion

This research explored the role of Othering in the German plenary debates on the state-building missions in Afghanistan. It has been examined to what extent arguments, related to Othering, differ between the political parties, and change over time.

The findings revealed that Othering is found in different forms throughout the plenary debates. One form of Othering is the construction of Afghanistan as a backward country, which is linked to the portrayal of Afghans as poor and piteous people, and to the emphasis on oppressed women and bad governance. The second form of Othering is found in the justification of the state-building missions: Afghanistan is constructed as a threat to the West, against whom the peaceful West must defend itself. Afghans are also constructed as inferior and unable victims, needing rescue and support from the superior West, and the intervention is framed as rescue of the oppressed and voiceless females in Afghanistan. Further in the narrative of civilisation vs. barbarism, the allegedly barbaric and chaotic nature of the Afghan Other is highlighted and contrasted to the enlightened and civilised West. The third form of Othering that was found is blaming Afghans for failures of the mission. However, the research has also shown that -though less frequent- a diverse image of the country and its people has been constructed, and disclosures of Othering were found.

The research has shown that the amount of Othering in its different forms change over time but is present in every debate.

While at the beginning of the state-building efforts, the image of a backward Afghanistan drastically prevailed over a more diverse image, over time the frequency of both images of the country converged. When the ISAF troop withdrawal started in 2011 and Afghanistan gradually took over responsibility, the more diverse image of the country became prominent in the plenary speeches. At the first debates on RSM in 2014, and when the end of RSM was firstly discussed in 2019, the more positive, diverse image of the country even surpassed the backward image of Afghanistan. Further, it was discovered that throughout the examination period from 2001 to 2020, different aspects of this alleged backwardness were most frequently used. While at the beginning of the examination period the portrayal of Afghans as piteous people, of poverty, and of the country’s violent past were

paramount, since the beginning of the troop withdrawal in 2011 the emphasise of bad governance has been the most prominent way of creating a backward image of the country.

Justifications of the international interventions linked to Othering were found throughout the observation period, but particularly often at the beginning of the mission. The research has found that most frequently the rescue narrative is used to justify the deployment to Afghanistan, especially in the early years of the state-building and during the years of the ISAF troop withdrawal and the beginning of RSM. Almost as often, the threat Afghanistan would pose for the West is emphasised, and 9/11 is referred to - even 19 years after these attacks. While the dichotomy of civilisation vs. barbarism was often found at the beginning of the state-building endeavour, this justification was not as frequently found in the later debates. The justification of the mission as an intervention for women and the justification, that Afghanistan is unable to provide security itself were consistently found throughout the examination period – except from 2003 to 2005 when during the successes of the state-building they were not found in the speeches.

The third form of Othering, blaming Afghans for failures in the state-building, was often found in 2006, along with the escalation of the conflict with the Taliban, when the politicians blamed the lack of efforts from the Afghan government and the bad governance for the lacklustre results of the mission and the deteriorating security environment. This form of Othering further increased when the international troop withdrawal began in 2011 and Afghan institutions gradually took over responsibility. This form of Othering peaked in 2015 when it became clear that the RSM would not be concluded within a short period of time but stretch over many years – a circumstance for which the Afghans were widely blamed.

When examining the role of Othering, it is important to also include the disclosure of it. This research has demonstrated, that already in the first debate, a disclosure of Othering was found. However, the absolute peak of it was in 2006, when the politicians critically noted that in the state-building mission, not enough attention had been paid to the wishes and goals, traditions, and customs of the Afghan Other. Further peaks of the disclosure of Othering were found in 2010, when after the Afghanistan conference, a plan for the end of ISAF had been agreed with the Afghan government, in 2014, when the beginning of the German contribution to RSM was debated, and in 2019 when the end of RSM was for the first time discussed.

The research not only focussed on the role of Othering over time, but also on differences between the political parties. It was shown that all political parties use Othering in the examined plenary debates but in different amounts and different forms.

The most interesting finding is the role of Othering in the speeches from the SPD. The SPD is the party that most frequently establishes Afghanistan as backwards, but also most frequently portrays a diverse image of the country. Particularly often, they frame Afghans as piteous people and emphasise the country's violent past, but they almost as often emphasise that Afghans are strong and active people. The SPD also is the party that most frequently uses justifications based on Othering, in particular, the rescue narrative and the framing of the missions as an intervention for women. While the SPD also blames Afghans for the state-building failures, the SPD MdBs do it less frequently than the CDU/CSU. The SPD further is the party which most frequently discloses Othering.

To explain these contradictions, further analysis of the role of Othering in the SPD is recommended, especially examining whether the image the SPD constructs of the Afghan Other changes over time. Due to the limited scope, this could not be done within the framework of this thesis. One explanation could be, that due to the big pacifist movements within the party, and the parties’ focus on peace policy, the party focussed more on justifying the mission with humanitarian reasons, which are more likely to include Othering than justification based on security cooperation, solidarity, or interest, which are more frequently used by the conservatives. Despite the amount of Othering in the speeches of the SPD, one could argue, that the left parties are more aware of concepts like Othering and therefore also emphasise a diverse image of Afghanistan, disclose Othering and critically process the approach of state-building.

Along with the SPD, the CDU/CSU frequently uses Othering in all forms. However, their portrayal of Afghanistan focusses more on Afghans as chaotic and bad actors, emphasising bad governance and oppression of women more than the narrative of Afghans as piteous people. They also are the parties that second most often use justifications based on Othering – mainly the framing of Afghanistan as a threat to the West. The CDU/CSU further are the parties that most frequently blame Afghans for failures in the mission. This shows, that while the SPD mainly othered by establishing Afghans as piteous and weak, and victimised them, the Union portrays their Other more as threatening, corrupt and oppressive. Furthermore, they hardly disclose any Othering in the plenary debates and less often create a diverse image of the country than the SPD and Greens.

While the FDP is the party that least often portrays Afghanistan as backward, they frequently use justifications based on Othering. They often emphasise the threat Afghanistan would pose, but also frequently use the rescue narrative and the dichotomy between civilisation and barbarism. In some of their speeches, they also frame Afghans as reason for failure, but considerably less than SPD and CDU/CSU. While the FDP also disclose Othering (twice as frequent as the CDU/CSU), they are, after the AfD, the party that least often establishes a diverse image of Afghanistan.

The Greens then again are the party that second most often paints an image of a diverse Afghanistan and has the smallest gap between a portrayal of a backward Afghanistan and a diverse image. Most remarkable is that they construct their Other as strong and active people in 20% of their speeches – the highest frequency of any diverse image of the country. They also least often use justifications based on Othering from all parties that generally support the state-building, and only sporadically frame Afghans as reason for failure. The Greens are midrange in their frequency of disclosure of Othering.

An interesting finding from this research is that also those parties that categorically oppose the Bundeswehr's deployment to Afghanistan -the Left and AfD- use Othering in the plenary debates. The Left also significantly more often paints a picture of a backward Afghanistan than a diverse image, emphasising the poverty and categorising Afghans as piteous people. While significantly less than the parties that support the missions, the Left uses justifications based on Othering. However, the Left does not conclude from the alleged backwardness a need for international intervention in the form of state-building, but for non-military measures. They frame the continuous backwardness as proof, that the state-building attempt has failed. While using the same narrative of "Afghanistan as a threat to the West", they use this Othering to argue that the threat had increased due to the failures of the missions. The Left hardly blames Afghans for failures of the mission and is -after the SPD- leading in the disclosure of Othering.

As from the AfD only 8 speeches were examined, these analyses are less conclusive than the ones from the other parties. In the examined speeches, the AfD frequently emphasises Afghanistan's backwardness, stressing bad governance in 50% of their speeches. They are the party that least often presents a diverse image of Afghanistan and never disclose Othering. However, they use the same arguments that the other parties use to justify the missions, particularly the narrative of civilisation vs. barbarism. In percentage, the AfD is the party that uses this narrative the most. Nevertheless, they do not use it to justify the deployment, but to portray the state-building approach as doomed to fail, as the barbarism could never be overcome.

The findings of this research have proven that the research design was suitable for answering the research questions. Building on previous critical research on state-building and on the role of Othering in the political discourse on state-building, this thesis showed that different forms of Othering and different arguments related to it were used in the German plenary debates. While Kieschnick in 2015 demonstrated that the German government’s discourse is full of Othering and further research of Western state-building has disclosed patronising behaviours, dichotomic categorisations of civilisation vs. barbarism, and the reduction of complex gender roles to the narrative of “saving women”, this research adds a new dimension by examining long timeframe and by focussing on differences between all political parties, that were represented in the Bundestag. 55

Thereby this research has shown that long-term developments such as changes in the security environment or the host nation gradually taking over responsibility, affect the arguments based on Othering. While Othering was found consistently throughout the examination period, it was demonstrated that a more backward image of Afghanistan had been established at the beginning of the mission. In contrast, later, a more diverse image was portrayed, but once the Afghans took over more responsibility, they were also frequently blamed for failures of the mission. The analysis of Othering in the different parties has revealed that while all parties used Othering, it was most frequently found in the speeches from SPD, CDU/CSU, and AFD. Greens and the Left least often used Othering.

This research differs from other research projects on the role of Othering in the political discourse, as it contrasts Othering with more diverse images of Afghanistan and with the disclosure of Othering. Puzzling thereby is the role of Othering in the speeches from the SPD. This research does not give an explanation to the contradiction of the SPD most frequently portraying Afghanistan as backwards, and most frequently constructing a diverse image of the country and disclosing Othering. Further research on the topic is therefore recommended.

A limitation of this research is the small amount of data that was collected from the AfD. This limits the validity of conclusions about the role of Othering in this party. Besides, the research design has emerged as not very suitable to examine the impact of security incidents on the role of Othering. As generally the mission’s mandates are only debated at one point during each year, it was impossible to interpret whether the role of Othering was influenced by the security incidents or rather by other events, such as elections, international conferences, or changes in the mandate. Research, that examines data from talk shows or interviews directly after incidents and contrasts them with data from other time points, might be better suited to analyse the impact of security incidents. It would also be interesting to research the plenary debates of another country and compare the findings based on party membership. This way, more generalisable conclusions about the role of Othering in different party families could be drawn.

With the Afghanistan missions coming to an end and the state-building efforts' lacklustre outcomes, it is important to take research on the topic seriously and have a forward-looking view. This research has shown that the use of military force in Afghanistan was massively connected to attribution of negative and inferior characteristics to the Afghan people. The problematic premises of the concept of state- building have only rarely been questioned in the Bundestag. A critical reconditioning of the role Othering in the political discourse on military interventions is necessary, to minimise the risk of similar arguments being used again to justify military force in the future.

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Annex

A) State of research on Bundestag debates on the Afghanistan deployment

Due to the demonstrated relevance of the Bundestag plenary debates on the Bundeswehr deployment to Afghanistan to academia and society, they have been subject to multiply research projects: The Bundestag debates from 2001 on the Afghanistan mission were analysed in a discourse analysis by Leithner (2009). She concluded that Germany's participation in OEF was mainly justified with arguments related to responsibility (towards the allies, the international legal order, and democratic values) and solidarity with the attacked USA (Leithner A., 2009, pp.51-84). Building on this research, she later used a discourse analysis to research German war rhetoric in the 21st century. One part of this research project was the analysis of the transcript of Bundestag debates on the deployment to Afghanistan. She thereby analysed the most important themes (democracy, gratitude, responsibility, freedom, etc.) and their frequencies (in total and in reference to political party, gender, and age). She discovered that "interests" and their defence were used as argument by all parties, but most often by the CDU (38,6%) and the SPD (30,1%) and least often by the PDS (3,6%) (Leithner A., 2006, p.61). She also found that the government coalition (SPD and Greens) focused their argumentation more on the mission's legality than the opposition (p.161). The difference between the themes addressed by the different genders turned out to be difficult to analyse, as only 7,3% of the speakers were female. Most of them were representing the Greens and the PDS, which are "both known for their pacifist tendencies" (p.164), making the finding that they focus more on the legality and legitimacy of the intervention, on humanitarian aid and human rights and their preference for a non-violent solution (p.165) not surprising.

In a qualitative content analysis, Müller and Wolf analysed the Bundestag debates on the Afghanistan mandates between 2001 and 2011, examining whether the military deployment in Afghanistan was justified by the dogma of a "democratic war", by reasons specific to democracy and/or liberalism. They conclude that "arguments that positively relate to the promotion of democracy run through all debates" (2011, p.207) and evaluate that the German government was early moving away from the originally propagated democratic ideals (p.217). They categorise the arguments used in the debates into thematic clusters, and "promotion of democracy", "universal values", "national interests/power" are most often used (in this order). They also evaluate the arguments used by the different political parties and conclude that arguments in the cluster "national interests/power" are mainly used by members from the CDU/CSU. This cluster is also the most often used argumentative cluster from the IV

FDP. In contrast, SPD members most often use the category "promotion of democracy" and "universal values," and the Greens most often use arguments in the clusters "promotion of democracy," "international law," and "state-building" (in this order). The central topics of the speeches from the Left were "promotion of democracy," "universal values," and "international law" (in this order) (p.208f.).

Different security policy positions from political parties were also the subject of Keller's research project. Keller examined in a qualitative content analysis of the plenary debates to what extent worldviews can explain the degree of consensus of the parliamentary fractions of CDU/CSU and SPD on the Bundeswehr’s deployment to Afghanistan. He found that a large part of the Bundestag members from the SPD are attached to the world view "foreign policy as peace policy", while most of the Union tend towards the world view "foreign policy as cooperation policy" (Keller, 2011, pp.89-101).

Based on the plenary debates on the military deployment to Afghanistan, Feth analysed the construction of gender in the Bundestag. She thereby examined the role of “women’s’ rights” as a part of German identity, the construction of the German soldier as an actor of pure male gender and the construction of the male counterpart as “the terrorist” = “pathological criminal”, “the Taliban” =“brutal fanatic”, “the street gang” = “no parliamentary army”, and “the Afghan” = “no women friend”, as well as the construction of the female counterpart as “the Afghan” = “passive victim of male violence” and “the Afghan” = “peaceful in nature” (Feth, 2004).

Gender also played a role in Schoenes’ research on female rights' role in legitimising the Bundeswehr deployment to Afghanistan. By analysing the plenary debates on the mission between 2001 and 2009 in a discourse analysis, Schoenes demonstrates that certain images of Afghan women are constructed to legitimise the war in Afghanistan as a "war for women" (Schoenes, 2011, p.79). Her research finds that at the beginning and end of the investigation period, a rescue narrative dominates the debates in the Bundestag, emphasizing the violence of the Taliban and making all efforts to confront the regime with means other than military appear naïve. Furthermore, the atrocities attributed to the Taliban put the brutality of the war in Afghanistan into perspective, as the situation on the people (particularly women) in the debates is portrayed as so catastrophic that further deterioration seems impossible (p.82). Towards the end of the investigation period, the rescue narrative is linked to the fragility of the "successes," and it is emphasised that the women could only be helped with military assistance (p.84). Between these two phases of the domination of the rescue narrative, Afghan women and the new opportunities they had in their country were staged as symbols for the democratisation of the Afghan society, for progress and modernisation, for the military power of the west, and as a proof, that the engagement in Afghanistan was successful (p.83).

Harnisch examined the importance of the "foreign policy role" of the Federal Republic of Germany for its Afghanistan policy in the years 2001-2011 (OEF and ISAF) and part of his research was a mixed quantitative and qualitative content analysis of the speeches of the parliamentary debates with a focus on the legitimisation of Germany's interventionist role. He found that increased state-building dilemmas reshaped the argumentation patterns from expansive civilian power towards more ego- related, self-restrained argumentation (Harnisch, 2011, p.223f.). While at the beginning of the Afghanistan mission in 2001, alliance-based arguments clearly dominated the justifications (p.241), they lost significance over the years, and the MdBs increasingly used self-centred arguments, such as the protection of the own population from terrorist attacks, the security of German aid-workers and soldiers in Afghanistan, and increasingly conditionalized German aid to the fulfilment of Western government standards (p.244).

The different arguments by the MdBs were also subject of Plitsch’s linguistic analysis of the plenary debates from 2001 to 2012. Using quantitative and qualitative methods, he examined the formulations used in the plenary speeches and their reformulation in the media. He analysed keywords, metaphors, and communication lines. To examine the different arguments portrayed in the debates, he divided the material into different argumentation categories. He found that (alliance) solidarity, security, and self-protection, as well as arguments related to international law and the legitimacy of military force based on it, dominated the debate (Plitsch, 2014, pp.137ff.).

In a detailed analysis of the Bundestag's debates between 2003 and 2012, Hilpert examined how German MdBs present Germany's military role in Afghanistan. She shows that at the start of the examination period, they framed Germany's role as a peacekeeping mission but gradually changed the rhetoric and embraced a more aggressive combat role (Newnham, 2017, p.125).

As none of these research projects focussed on the role of Othering and none of them observed the deployment over a long period of time, this thesis aims at filling a gap of knowledge by examining aspects of the plenary debates on the Afghanistan missions regarding the concept of Othering and the critical literature on state-building. The analysis method with a qualitative content analysis of the plenary debates has proven its worth in most of the presented research projects.

B) Security and defence policy making in Germany

A comprehensive security approach characterises the German defence policy. A complex domestic policy process is multilaterally integrated into the international system. Domestically, the executive, legislative, and judicative work together, whereby the executive -the Federal Government- has a priority (Kaim, 2015). The Federal Government and the Bundeswehr leadership develop the details of the German military missions (ibid.). Besides the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs plays a big role in defence and security policy, and the Federal Chancellery has a coordination role, especially as in a defence situation the Chancellor has command over the armed forces (Art. 115a Grundgesetz). In peace times, the command is held by the Minister for Defence (Art. 65a Grundgesetz). The German Bundestag, as legislative, can determine the financial framework of the ministries and the procurement of the Bundeswehr. He also has a right to participate in defence policy decisions by approving or rejecting executive proposals and initiatives. The judicative in the form of the Federal Constitutional Court is the legal supervisory body for German security and defence policy (Kaim, 2015). Through its interpretations of the Grundgesetz (the German basic constitutional law), it has a significant influence on the decisions and regulatory processes of policies.

In the Grundgesetz, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and state-building missions of the Bundeswehr "out of area", meaning outside of the NATO territory, are not covered. In Article 87a, "defence" is named as the sole reason for the establishment of armed force. However, a Federal Constitutional Court's decision from 1994 is allowing "out of area" deployment of the Bundeswehr outside of a case of defence or a NATO alliance case, with three "crash barriers" for the. The first condition is a resolution from the UN Security Council according to chapter VII, Article 42 of the UN-Charta, or an invitation from the government of the affected country, according to chapter VII, Article 51. The second condition is a multilateral framework for the military mission, thereby excluding German militarily acting solo and ensuring the close liaison with either the UN or international organisations such as the EU or NATO. The third requirement given by the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court is the so-called parliamentary reservation, which is linking the use of military force to the consent of the sovereign, i.e., the people -represented by the German Bundestag-, making the Bundeswehr a so-called parliamentary army (Kaim, 2015).

For more than a decade, the parliamentary reservation was applied without a legal basis. For example, the Bundestag voted in favour of the NATO use of German fighter jets in the Kosovo war in 1998, which was extremely controversial as there was no UN-mandate. In 2005 the parliamentary reservation was cast into law with the Parliamentary Participation Act of 18th March (Bundeszentrale für politische

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Bildung, 2019). This act states today: “The deployment of armed8 German armed forces outside the scope of the Grundgesetz, requires the approval of the Bundestag" (§1 paragraph 2). The act furthermore specifies the procedure of the deployment of armed forces. This procedure requires that the Federal Government has the right of initiative, with the Federal Ministry of Defence in charge and formulating the mandate in close cooperation with the Federal Chancellery and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Before this initiative is brought into parliament, a cabinet decision on the aim, scope, and costs of the Bundeswehr's participation in international military operations is required. After the mandate is proposed to the Bundestag, it normally is debated for a first time in the plenary, then given to the responsible committees -the Committee on Foreign Affairs (taking the lead), the Committee on Defence, and other committees such as the Committee on Internal Affairs and Community, the Committee on Legal Affairs and Consumer Protection, the Committee on Defence, the Committee on Human Rights and Humanitarian Aid, the Committee on Economic Cooperation and Development, and the Budget Committee (e.g. Deutscher Bundestag, 26.11.2009, p.384). In cooperation with the other committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs then presents a recommendation for decision and the initiative is debated again and voted upon in the plenary session. Thereby it is not possible for the parliament to make any amendments or modifications to the mandate; the MdBs can only vote in favour or against the government's motion. Kolanoski analysed that there is a parliamentary process already before the mandate is proposed to the Bundestag, as there are informal discussions between members of the government and the responsible rapporteurs of the political groups (2010, p.36). She also raises the question of whether the equal participation of all political groups is guaranteed, as an essential part of the procedure on the mandate of the Bundeswehr mission takes place on an informal basis (p.37f.). Kolanoski quotes Niels Annen, member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (SPD), who criticised the preliminary procedure as “not transparent” (p.38).

The debates in the plenary sessions of the Bundestag follow fixed rules laid down in the rules of procedure of the German Bundestag. The plenary sessions are public, and the meetings' dates and agendas are normally agreed upon by the Council of Elders or decided in advance by the Bundestag (Deutscher Bundestag, n.d.). Generally, the discussion is opened on each agenda item, and -with the expectation of interjections- members do not rise to speak but receive permission to speak from the President of the Bundestag. According to the Rules of Procedure, the President determines the speakers' order, but in everyday life, the parliamentary directors of the political groups agree on the order (ibid.). The practice is to agree on the total time for the treatment of an agenda item and then distribute this total time to the individual fractions in approximate proportion to their strength. The

8 The “armed“ is added, as this act does not include deployment in the form of humanitarian aid, where weapons are only carried for self-defence. VIII

number of speakers in each debate hence depends on the size of the fraction. The bigger the fraction, the more speaking time the political group gets, and the more members can get permission to speak. Hence, the speaking times for each fraction differ in each legislative period, as a fixed distribution key is agreed upon at the beginning of each election period.

Legislative Time Political Min. Political Min. Political Min. Political Min Political Min. Political Political Period Group Group Group Group Group Group Group

1998- 68 SPD & 35 CDU/CSU 21 FDP 7 PDS 5 2002 min Greens 2002- 62 SPD & 32 CDU/CSU 24 FDP 6 2005 min Greens 2005- 60 CDU/CSU 19 SPD 19 FDP 8 The 7 Greens 7 2009 min Left 2009- 60 CDU/CSU 23 FDP 9 SPD 14 The 7 Greens 7 2013 min Left 2013- 60 CDU/CSU 27 SPD 17 The 8 The 8 2017 min Left Greens 2017- 60 CDU/CSU 21 SPD 13 AfD 7 FDP 7 The 4 Greens 6 2021 min Left

Figure 16: Speaking times of the political groups in the different legislative periods (Deutscher Bundestag, 2020).

C) Chronology of the Bundeswehr deployment to Afghanistan

The international engagement in Afghanistan was a response to the 11th September attacks in 2001. The so-called 9/11 was a series of four coordinated terrorist attacks against the USA, killing almost 3000 persons. Responding to 9/11, the USA launched the War on Terror, leading to global military interventions to defeat terrorists such as bin Laden and to destroy their organisations and networks. Less than one month after 9/11, the war in Afghanistan began with airstrikes at Taliban and Al-Qaeda training camps and targets, and on 19th -20th October 2001, the ground war began with special forces striking in Kandahar (History.com Editors, 2019).

Since 1998 Germany had been governed for the first time by a coalition of SPD and Greens. Both parties have had (and still have) large pacifist groups and traditionally were very sceptical regarding the international deployment of the Bundeswehr. In 1991 however, the "never again" movement, desperately aiming at "never again war, never again Auschwitz" had regained momentum in connection to the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo (Heitmann-Kroning, 2015, p.127). Based on the “never again Auschwitz” principle, Foreign Minister Fischer justified German employment in Kosovo, as the fight for Human Rights and the prevention of genocide would outweigh the reluctance against war (SWR2, 1999).

Figure 17: Overview of relevant German federal politics in the observation period

The ground stone for the German participation in the War on Terror was already laid one day after the 9/11 attacks when Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (SPD) in his government declaration publicly and X

media-effectively emphasised that "the people of Germany are firmly on the side of the United States of America in these difficult times" and promised the USA "unrestricted solidarity" (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001). In her publication on the German deployment to Afghanistan, Heitmann-Kroning analyses that many of the leading politicians from different parties (such as Gerhard Schröder (SPD), Friedrich Merz (CDU), Peter Struck (SPD), Wolfgang Gerhardt (FDP), Rezzo Schlauch (the Greens)) responded so emotionally to the 9/11 attacks and promptly offered solidarity, as they interpreted the attacks "not only as an attack on the USA but to the entire 'civilised' word" (2015, p.122).

The international community swiftly reacted to these terrorist attacks, too. Already on 12th September, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1368, condemning the attacks and recognising the "inherent right of individual or collective self-defence" (United Nations, Security Council, 2001). On the same day, NATO made use of this right and -for the first time- called for a NATO case of alliance according to Art. 5 of the NATO treaty (NATO, Statement by the North Atlantic Council, 2001).

The overall willingness of the Bundestag to contribute “appropriate military capacities” (Deutscher Bundestag, 19.09.2001, p.2) was already made clear in a resolution proposal on 19th September 2001, which was passed with overwhelming support from all fractions except the PDS (the left party) (Deutscher Bundestag, 19.09.2001, pp. 18337ff.).

The first mission in Afghanistan, OEF, had its focus on the destruction of the Al-Qaeda network and the overthrowing of the Taliban regime and was using massive airstrikes and special forces. In contrast, the second international mission ISAF, which was deployed only shortly after OEF, had a different character: the reconstruction of the Afghan state and peace consolidation (Heitmann-Kroning, 2015, p.126). In 2001, Germany hence had to decide whether to join those two different international military missions.

The first debate in the Bundestag on the German participation at OEF was held in November 2001, following the German government's proposal to deploy up to 3900 soldiers for a 12-month mandate. The proposed contingent of this deployment (1800 naval forces, 800 NBC defence, 500 air transport assets, 450 support staff, 250 medics and 100 special forces (Deutscher Bundestag, 07.11.2001) along with the order to "eliminate terrorist leadership and training facilities, combat, capture and bring terrorists to justice, and permanently prevent third parties from supporting terrorist activities" (Deutscher Bundestag, 07.11.2001, p.3) demonstrate the focus on the OEF mission: the use of military force. The Bundestag intensely discussed this proposal on 8th and 16th November.

While there was a broad consensus supporting this proposal, especially in the CDU/CSU and FDP, many Members of the Bundestag were extremely critical of the German participation in the OEF mission, not only from the PES but also from the governing coalition of SPD and the Greens. With this decision being

so essentially for German foreign policy, Schröder wanted to have the broad support of the governing coalition, which is why he decided to link the vote to a vote of confidence9.

Figure 18: Timeline Afghanistan missions

Despite supporting the German participation at OEF, CDU/CSU and FDP refused to express confidence in the Chancellor and therefore voted against the related proposal. All SPD members and most of the Greens voted for the motion. Those eight Greens, who originally wanted to vote against the Bundeswehr mission, divided their votes into four “yes” and four “no” votes. This way, they wanted to express the ambivalence of their vote: On the one hand, they supported the overall policies of the coalition; on the other hand, they were against the deployment of the Bundeswehr. Because of this

9 A vote of confidence is a parliamentary motion used to measure the stability of the government. The Chancellor can call for a vote of confidence whenever the backing of the majority is in doubt. Such a motion is usually applied to tighten up stray coalition members by putting pressure on them to side with the ruling party or face being forced out. (Deutsche Welle, 2001) XII

division, the Chancellor's proposal received a total of 336 approving and 326 opposing (Deutscher Bundestag, 16.11.2001, p.19893).

Heitmann-Kröning analyses how, days after the Bundestag's decision to participate at OEF, the German government was engaging intensely in diplomatic activities, mainly in the framework of the Petersberger conference. Four delegations of different Afghan groups were developing a plan to transfer power to a democratically legitimised government after the Taliban was disempowered. At the conference, the deployment of an International Security Assistance Force, ISAF, was agreed upon (Heitmann-Kroning, 2015, p.138). Following this agreement, the UN-Security Council passed Resolution 1386, giving ISAF an UN-Mandate based on chapter VII UN-Charta.

The Bundestag's debates on the German participation at ISAF were less controversial, which can be linked to the "more civil power-friendly character of the mission" (Heitmann-Kroning, 2015, p.138). The first debate in the Bundestag on a Bundeswehr participation at ISAF was held on 22nd December 2001. There, the government's proposal included a maximum of 1200 soldiers, including infantry forces, air transport, and helicopter forces, for a deployment period of six months. This deployment's mission was "to support the provisional state organs of Afghanistan in maintaining security in Kabul and its surrounding" (Deutscher Bundestag, 21.12.2001, p.3). In contrast to OEF, this mission did not focus on offensive combat operations but emphasised Afghan ownership on the reconstruction, stabilisation, and pacification of their country. In her research on the German mission in Afghanistan, Heitmann-Kroning analyses that the decision-making on this mission was easier for Germany because it could easier find itself in a role as a civil power in ISAF than in OEF. Further, she argues, the strong role of the UN, the clear mandate under international law, and the political-diplomatic processes, played major roles (2015, p.142). She also argues that the Federal Government aimed to make a strict separation between the participation at OEF and ISAF, not only by maintaining separate chains of commands for the two deployments but also in public display, emphasising the peacebuilding character of ISAF (ibid.). These arguments convinced the MdBs, and on 22nd December, 538 members voted in favour of the proposed German contribution with only eight abstentions and 35 members opposing (Deutscher Bundestag, 22.12.2001, p.20852).

The first German soldiers in the ISAF framework arrived in Kabul on 2nd January 2002, and the first patrols through the city were established only a few days later (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, n.d.).

The following months were dominated by a period of Afghanistan's stabilisation. The quick success in overthrowing the Taliban regime and the country's political and institutional reconstruction led to a positive impression of many Germans on the deployment, and optimism regarding the estimation of

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the length and success of the deployment prevailed (Heitmann-Kroning, 2015, pp.146ff.). This outlook was not diminished when the first two Bundeswehr soldiers were killed in March 2002, trying to defuse a Russian Surface-to-Air-Missile, or when in December 2002 seven Bundeswehr soldiers died in a helicopter crash close to Kabul (Frankfurter Rundschau, 2009). These were the first German soldiers dying in Afghanistan, with three more to follow the next months due to accidents, mines, and suicide bombings. It was not until a suicide bombing on a bus in June 2003, which was on its way to Kabul airport to return soldiers home to Germany, that the killings of German soldiers in Afghanistan were widely discussed in the German public, media and politics and the outlook on the deployment to Afghanistan changed (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2003). This attack killed four soldiers and wounded 29 more (Goos, 2008). At this time, Germany, alongside the Netherlands, had taken over command of the entire ISAF mission before the command of ISAF was handed over to NATO in August 2003 (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, n.d.). The gradual worsening of the security situation in Afghanistan led to the decision to extend the mandate of the ISAF mission over Kabul's borders and deploy ISAF forces to other regions of the country. Heitmann-Kroning describes that with the extension of the ISAF mandate and the accompanying increase of troops, the international community's footprint in Afghanistan enlarged, and the previous concept of "Afghan ownership" was slowly replaced (2015, p.149).

When the ISAF-expansion was debated in Germany in October 2003, the country was still ruled by a coalition of the SPD and Greens, after they had barely won the federal elections in 2002. After in 2002 the German mandate for both OEF and ISAF had been extended with the vast majority of the Bundestag, the debates in 2003 were more controversial, with members of oppositional being sceptical regarding the feasibility of the plan to establish Provincial Reconstruction Teams10 and worrying about the security of the soldiers (Deutscher Bundestag, 24.10.2003). Nevertheless, a broad majority of members from the governing SPD and Greens, and the CDU/CSU passed the mandate's extension and expansion. In the new mandate, Germany assumed responsibility for its own PRT in the comparatively secure region Kunduz, in which it was to disarm militia (Deutscher Bundestag, 15.10.2003, p.3). Schmunk argues that Germany chose the PRT in Kunduz Province, as in this secure province in the north of the county, Germany was able to demonstrate military restraint and focus on the role of a soldier as an "armed development worker" (Schmunk, 2005, pp.26 ff.) and on its approach of Civil-Military Cooperation.

While the number of German soldiers in ISAF increased, the participation in OEF drastically decreased after 2002, from 1800 soldiers in 2002 to 250-300 soldiers in 2004 (Heitmann-Kroning, 2015, p.151),

10 PRTs are civil-military regional reconstruction teams, aiming at strengthening the influence of the central government and at enabling stabilisation and reconstruction measures (Weiland, 2011, p.5). XIV

making ISAF the main focus of the German deployment in Afghanistan. In September 2004, Germany established its second PRT in Feyzabad in the north-east of the country (Weiland, 2011, p.6).

New state institutions' establishment came to completion when a new Afghan constitution was passed in 2004, and presidential and parliamentary elections were held in 2004 and 2005. Despite these efforts, the security situation in Afghanistan kept on deteriorating. Alongside an increase of the number of German soldiers in Afghanistan, Germany thus extended its military engagement by taking over ISAF command in the region "North"11 in July 2005 (Weiland, 2011, p.7) and by establishing Camp Marmal in Mazar-i-Sharif in June 2006, making it the biggest Bundeswehr military camp abroad (p.9). In the debate in the Bundestag on 8th September 2005, the members agreed to extend the mandate so that German ISAF soldiers could also -limited in time and scope- be deployed to other regions of the country (Deutscher Bundestag, 21.09.2005, p.3; Deutscher Bundestag, 28.09.2005, p.17586).

On a conference early in 2006, a new phase of cooperation between the international community and the new Afghan government was heralded, including new commitments such as the dissolution of all illegal armed groups, concrete measures for reforms of the public sector, and the fight against corruption (The London Conference on Afghanistan, 2006). Nevertheless, despite these advancements, there were still major obstacles in enforcing state authority in the country, and the security situation became more and more challenging, with a stronger insurgency in particular in the south and east, leading to a stepwise increase of the ISAF use of military force. In October 2006, for the first time, six German soldiers came under heavy fire from insurgents and needed to be saved via air support from the USA. In the same month, shocking pictures of Bundeswehr soldiers macabrely posing with human remains were discovered (DER SPIEGEL (online), 2006). These two incidents led to a shift in the German public's perception of the deployment and gave a glimpse into the reality of the mission's warlike character.

With the intensification of the military mission in Afghanistan, as a display of their solidarity with the alliance and as reaction to the increase in the amount and extent of Taliban attacks in the area of the regional command North, the Bundestag -after long and controversial debates- decided on 9th March 2007, to give the mandate to deploy 500 additional soldiers along with six reconnaissance aircraft ("Tornados") to Afghanistan (Deutscher Bundestag, 09.03.2007, p.8711). Tornados are combat aircraft used for reconnaissance and surveillance, and the deployment of the tornadoes was controversial in Germany since the aircraft recordings could be used for bombings from US or British combat planes in southern Afghanistan. Proponents of the deployment argued that the images gained through the tornadoes could be used to prevent suicide attacks and, therefore, increase the security of the ISAF

11 Afghanistan was divided into five regional commands, North, West, South, East, and Kabul. XV

soldiers and development workers and improve the country's overall security situation. Even though a majority in favour of this mandate was found, with 405 proponents, 157 opponents, and 11 abstentions, it was the first time the Bundestag passed a mandate for the Bundeswehr with this many opponents (except for the first OEF mandate in 2001) (Deutscher Bundestag, 09.03.2007, p.8711).

In October 2007, the Bundestag extended the ISAF mission for another 12 months and thereby agreed to merge the -until then- separate ISAF mandate and Tornado mandate (Deutscher Bundestag, 12.10.2007, p.12373).

While the German participation constantly increased, there was factual German nonparticipation at the OEF in Afghanistan after 2006 (Heitmann-Kroning, 2015, p.185), and in October 2008, Germany decided to continue deployment within the framework of OEF, but only outside of Afghanistan12 (Deutscher Bundestag, 29.10.2008, p.4).

The security situation in Afghanistan continued to deteriorate. The number of security-related incidents in the North increased drastically, leading to an increase of German casualties in this mission (see Figure 18). In a personal interview with Heitmann-Kroning, the then PRT-Commander explained how "from 2007/2008 the Bundeswehr was less and less able to fulfil its mandate to ensure a safe environment within the framework of ISAF” (2015, p.191). Moreover, Heitmann-Kroning demonstrates that there were "significant differences" (ibid.) between the perception of this reality in Kunduz and Berlin: While the Federal Government continued to talk about ISAF being a stabilisation mission and maintained the narrative of the peaceful state-building troops, it suppressed the more and more dangerous environment of the deployed soldiers.

Germany and the other ISAF allies continued to stock up their troop sizes to react to the more hostile situation. Moreover, Germany took over responsibility for a Quick Reaction Force in July 2008, sending a battle group that was mandated for combat missions, and in July 2009, the Bundestag agreed to the participation of German forces in the deployment of NATO-AWACS within the framework of ISAF (Deutscher Bundestag, 17.06.2009) (Deutscher Bundestag, 02.07.2009, p.25751). These NATO aircraft were intended to coordinate all military air traffic (taking civil usage into account) and fulfil various tasks to support air operations (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2009). However, the mandate expired in December of the same year without the German aircraft ever being deployed to Afghanistan. The deployment failed due to the lack of stationing agreements or overflight permits (Gebauer & Demmer, 2010).

12 German soldiers have been deployed for OEF mainly to the Horn of Africa region (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, n.d.). XVI

Heitmann-Kroning analyses that in 2009 there was a total "disillusion" (2015, p.189) in the German public on the mission in Afghanistan, when in September a bombardment on two tanker lorries, which were kidnapped by Taliban, was ordered by the German commander. This bombardment killed more than 90 Afghans, almost all of them civilians and amongst them many children (Baum, 2019); some sources speak of up to 142 casualties (Weiland, 2011, p.14). There was a huge outrage in the German public and media about this incident, and a failed information management by the Federal Ministry of Defence led to the resignation of responsible Minister Jung (CDU)13 (Baum, 2019). With this incident, the mission's whole reality became clear, and Heitmann-Kroning quotes Inspector General Schneiderman, who postulated that “Germany had lost its innocence” with this attack (2015, p.189). She views this incident as a turning-point of the engagement in Afghanistan, as it drastically changed towards more honest communication regarding the deployment. While previously the German government had always framed the deployment as "peacekeeping missions", for the first time, a German minister of defence called the situation in Afghanistan "warlike" (ZEIT ONLINE, 2009). Simultaneously, the average amount of Bundeswehr soldiers deployed to Afghanistan was increasing from year to year. While until 2005, the annual average stayed below 2000 soldiers, the contingent significantly increased to 2708 soldiers in 2006 and 4 311 in 2009 (Deutscher Bundestag, 27.10.2009, p.53). This intense period for German security policy needs to be put in the context of national politics. At the federal elections in September 2009, the "big coalition" of CDU/CSU and SPD was dismissed, and a new coalition under Merkel with CDU/CSU and FDP was established. Therefore, the parties who started the German military deployment in 2001 -SPD and the Greens- were both in the opposition for the first time (see Figure 17). The recent security incident and the so significantly worsened security situation in the Bundeswehr's deployment region in Afghanistan and the change of communication made Germany realise that they were in a war. The world "war" was thereby used for the first time in spring 2010 by Minister of Defence Guttenberg (CSU), and Chancellor Merkel soon used the same formulation (Widmann, 2010).

The new government of the USA under Obama in 2009 developed a new strategy for Afghanistan which included a significant increase of 30 000 troops deployed to Afghanistan to stop the downward spiral of the security conditions in the country by combatting the insurgency movement, protecting the population, and training the Afghan security forces. The strategy also included a troop withdrawal starting in July 2011, and he asked for the American commitment to be joined by contributions from the allies (Obama, 2009). The allies followed him, stocking up the troops from 55 000 at the beginning

13 Jung was Minister of Defence while the bombardment was commanded, but at his time of resignation in November 2009, he was Federal Minister of Labour. XVII

of 2009 to 130 000 at the end of 2010; Germany alone increased their troops from 3300 to 4800 (Heitmann-Kroning, 2015, p.212).

With Germany proceeding to accept the new and changed reality in Afghanistan and adapting its deployment towards a stronger focus on combat actions, the German people became more outspoken in articulating their wish to remove the German troops from Afghanistan, and a realistic perspective of withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan was developed (Heitmann-Kroning, 2015, p.207).

An important cornerstone thereby was the Afghanistan conference in London in January 2010, during which questions about troop surges and plans for withdrawal were debated (Koenigs, 2010, p.266). With an additional international military presence in the country, the Afghan government and military should be empowered to gradually take over responsibility for security in the individual provinces. In connection to this conference, the debate in the Bundestag on the ISAF mandate heated up. In February 2010, the Bundestag agreed to extend the ISAF mandate for another year. Besides the mentioned increase of troops -particularly for the training of the Afghan National Security Forces-, it included a plan for a reduction of troops from 2011 on and a transition phase for the withdrawal of five years (Deutscher Bundestag, 09.02.2010). As a part of the concept to first increase the military presence, before starting a withdrawal, the Bundestag on 25th March 2011 decided to deploy up to 300 soldiers and AWACS for the coordination of military and civilian air traffic and to take over tasks in support of ISAF ground forces (Deutscher Bundestag, 25.03.2011, p.11492).

With the increase of insurgent attacks, the number of casualties in ISAF troops increased. Germany too, had to mourn soldiers killed in Afghanistan continuously. A particular day was Good Friday in April 2010: German soldiers were attacked during a patrol close to PRT Kunduz, and three German soldiers were shot, eight more were -partly severely- injured (Widmann, 2010). In the same month, four more Bundeswehr soldiers died in combat, and the deployment got extremely negative media coverage when German soldiers mistakenly killed six Afghan soldiers (Weiland, 2011, p.17).

Starting in 2011, the transition period of the Afghanistan deployment commenced. This period was characterised by the temporary troop surge, the gradual transfer of responsibility for security to the Afghan government, and the beginning of the international troop withdrawal. In the meantime, demonstrations and protests against the international presence continued to increase. In May 2011, violent protestors and demonstrators attacked the Bundeswehr field camp in Taloqan, injuring three Bundeswehr soldiers and resulting in three Afghan protestors shot by the Bundeswehr (Weiland, 2011, p.23).

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On 23rd July 2011, the German commanded regional command North began with the transfer of responsibility for security to the Afghan National Security Forces by handing over responsibility for Masar-i-Sharif (FOCUS Online, 2011). In January 2012, Afghanistan assumed security responsibility for Faizabad, and several districts in Badakhshan Province were also given Afghan responsibility (ntv, 2012). Due to violent anti-west protests, the Bundeswehr left their outpost base Taloqan ahead of schedule in February 2012 (Buchsteiner & Löwenstein, 2012).

An important milestone for the development of the international engagement in Afghanistan was the NATO-summit in 2012, during which NATO and the Afghan government agreed that the partnership between NATO and Afghanistan should continue beyond the end of the ISAF mission in 2014. Hence the follow-on, NATO-led non-combat mission "Resolute Support" was developed, which should -with a much-reduced size of troops- continue to train, advise, and assist the Afghan security forces after the withdrawal of ISAF (NATO, 2020).

In analogy to the ISAF allies, Germany slowly decreased its troop sizes from about 4900 in 2011 to 4600 at the end of 2012. Simultaneously, the Afghan National Security Forces were intensely developed (Heitmann-Kroning, 2015, p.230). In October 2013, the Bundeswehr completed its withdrawal from the Kunduz field camp, the second-largest German camp in Afghanistan, by handing it over to the Afghan forces. This marked the official end to the deployment of German soldiers "in the most dangerous region of Northern Afghanistan" (DER SPIEGEL (online), 2013). In April 2013, Germany declared that it was willing to participate with a contingent of 600 to 800 soldiers at a follow-up mission to ISAF, before the UN mandate for ISAF, as well as the German mandate for the Bundeswehr participation at ISAF, expired at the end of 2014 and the NATO-mission ISAF was transferred to the training mission Resolute Support (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, n.d.).

The follow-up mission RSM has been significantly smaller than ISAF. While ISAF at its peak in late 2010 counted 130 000 international soldiers, at the beginning of RSM in January 2015, only 12 000 NATO soldiers were assigned to train, advise, and support the Afghan security forces (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2014). This mission's legal basis is provided by a Status of Forces Agreement, which was signed on 30th September 2014 by the Afghan President and NATO's Senior Civilian Representative to Afghanistan, and later ratified by the Afghan parliament on 27th November 2014 (NATO, 2020). In this agreement, the terms and conditions under which NATO forces were to be deployed to Afghanistan and the planned activities of these international troops were defined.

This bilateral agreement, establishing a new mission in Afghanistan, was also welcomed by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2189 in December 2014 (United Nations, 2014).

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The Bundestag agreed on 18th December 2014 to participate with 850 soldiers in this mission. The Federal Government emphasised that RSM was "not a combat operation and does not have the task of participating directly in the fight against terrorism or drugs" (Deutscher Bundestag, 19.11.2014, p.5).

The mission is led from the RSM Headquarters in Kabul (under US American command) and divided into six Train Advise Assist Commands: Air (with HQ close to Kabul Airport), Capital (Kabul and Kabul Province), East, South, West, and North (each equivalent to the former ISAF Regional Command). Germany thereby took over leadership for the Train Advise Assist Command North, which is led by a German brigade general and is based in Camp Marmal in Masar-i-Sharif (Einsatzführungskommando der Bundeswehr - Presse- und Informationszentrum, 2020). Germany took over further responsibility by providing the RSM Deputy Commander between January and July 2015 (the commander has always been US American) (NATO, 2015) and by providing the RSM Chief of Staff since June 2015 (NATO, n.d.).

The mission was agreed to be sustained by the foreign ministers' meeting of NATO allies and their RSM partners in December 2015 and May 2016. At a meeting of the defence ministers in November 2017, RSM troop-contributing nations confirmed that the number of troops deployed would increase to around 16,000 troops, and in 2018, "Allies committed to sustaining the mission until conditions indicate a change is appropriate" (NATO, 2020).

In the meantime, in February 2020, the USA and the Taliban have signed a landmark peace agreement, and consequently, the USA has decided to withdraw from Afghanistan until 2021 (Graham-Harrison, Sabbagh, Makkoi, & Borger, 2020). In March 2020, Germany announced to decrease its presence in Afghanistan, which "unspoken marks the beginning of the end of the Bundeswehr's most extensive and longest foreign mission" (Matthay, 2020). The journalist Matthay also concludes that “the mission, once highly controversial, has no longer been topic of interest to Germans for a long time” (ibid.).

D) Overview on examined plenary debates

Date Code Manda Government Comment Num year te ber of spee ches 22.12. 2001 ISAF SPD/Greens Vote 16 2001 Beginning of ISAF 14.06. 2002/ ISAF SPD/Greens Vote 9 2002 1 Beginning of ISAF 20.12. 2002/ ISAF SPD/Greens Vote 11 2002 2 Beginning of ISAF 24.10. 2003 ISAF SPD/Greens Vote 11 2003

30.09. 2004 ISAF SPD/Greens Vote 10 2004 28.09. 2005 ISAF SPD/Greens Vote 10 2005 21.09. 2006 ISAF CDU/CSU/SPD leadership responsibility North, employment 7 2006 of tornados, escalation of conflict with Taliban 28.09. 2006 ISAF CDU/CSU/SPD Vote 12 2006 leadership responsibility North, employment of tornados, escalation of conflict with Taliban 28.02. 2007/ ISAF CDU/CSU/SPD leadership responsibility North, employment 17 2007 1 of tornados, escalation of conflict with Taliban RECCE-Tornados und AWACS 09.03. 2007/ ISAF CDU/CSU/SPD leadership responsibility North, employment 17 2007 1 of tornados, escalation of conflict with Taliban, RECCE-Tornados und AWACS Vote 20.09. 2007/ ISAF CDU/CSU/SPD leadership responsibility North, employment 17 2007 2 of tornados, escalation of conflict with Taliban 12.10. 2007/ ISAF CDU/CSU/SPD Vote 16 2007 2 leadership responsibility North, employment of tornados, escalation of conflict with Taliban 07.10. 2008 ISAF CDU/CSU/SPD 12 2008 16.10. 2008 ISAF CDU/CSU/SPD Vote 19 2008 17.06. 2009/ ISAF CDU/CSU/SPD AWACS 7 2009 1 02.07. 2009/ ISAF CDU/CSU/SPD AWACS, Vote 7 2009 1 26.11. 2009/ ISAF CDU/CSU/FDP 17 2009 2 03.12. 2009/ ISAF CDU/CSU/FDP Vote 21 2009 2 10.02. 2010 ISAF CDU/CSU/FDP London Afghanistan Conference 9 2010 26.02. 2010 ISAF CDU/CSU/FDP Vote 12 2010 21.01. 2011/ ISAF CDU/CSU/FDP Debate on civil reconstruction of Afghanistan 11 2011 1 28.01. 2011/ ISAF CDU/CSU/FDP vote 11 2011 1 23.03. 2011/ ISAF CDU/CSU/FDP AWACS 6 2011 2 25.03. 2011/ ISAF CDU/CSU/FDP AWACS vote 14 2011 2 15.12. 2011/ ISAF CDU/CSU/FDP troop surges, discussion about withdrawal 19 2011 3

XXI

26.01. 2011/ ISAF CDU/CSU/FDP troop surges, discussion about withdrawal 12 2012 314 Vote 13.12. 2012 ISAF CDU/CSU/FDP troop surges, discussion about withdrawal 9 2012 31.01. 2012 ISAF CDU/CSU/FDP troop surges, discussion about withdrawal 11 2013 Vote 13.02. 2014/ ISAF CDU/CSU/SPD End of ISAF 12 2014 1 20.02. 2014/ ISAF CDU/CSU/SPD Vote, End of ISAF 18 2014 1 05.12. 2014/ RSM CDU/CSU/SPD Begin of RSM 14 2014 2 18.12. 2014/ RSM CDU/CSU/SPD Vote, Begin of RSM 8 2014 2 03.12. 2015 RSM CDU/CSU/SPD 9 2015 17.12. 2015 RSM CDU/CSU/SPD Vote 7 2015 01.12. 2016 RSM CDU/CSU/SPD 6 2016 15.12. 2016 RSM CDU/CSU/SPD Vote 9 2016 21.11. 2017 RSM CDU/CSU/SPD First debate with the AfD in the Bundestag 9 2017 12.12. 2017 RSM CDU/CSU/SPD Vote 7 2017 15.03. 2018 RSM CDU/CSU/SPD 11 2018 22.03. 2018 RSM CDU/CSU/SPD Vote 9 2018 21.02. 2019 RSM CDU/CSU/SPD 7 2019 21.03. 2019 RSM CDU/CSU/SPD Vote 9 2019 04.03. 2020 RSM CDU/CSU/SPD Peace agreement with Taliban 8 2020 13.03. 2020 RSM CDU/CSU/SPD Vote 10 2020 Total 503 Figure 19: Overview on examined plenary debates

14 When the first debate took place at the end of a year and the second one on the beginning of the next year, both debates were categorised as the year of the first debate (as the mandate was formulated prior to the first debate). XXII

E) Coding scheme

Category Code Subcode Coding rules Anchor coding

Image of Backwardness Overall Afghanistan as a Afghanistan of backwardness backward country / The West must finally free Afghanistan Afghans as a itself from the illusion of backward society. wanting to modernise This code was used, Afghanistan along western when the other lines and believe that it can subcodes did not overcome cultural match. Afghanistan differences as well as make as a country, that up for 100 years of has been excluded technological deficit. from development (Peter Bayer CDU/CSU for decades, 20.02.2014). Afghanistan as a wasteland, emphasise on how hard / impossible it will be, to establish standards like in the West. Lack of civil Emphasis on lack of The soldiers are needed in structures civil structures, Kabul because there are no institutions, and civil structures there. infrastructure in (Gerd Höfer SPD Afghanistan 20.12.2002) Poverty Portray of Afghanistan is one of the Afghanistan as an poorest countries in the economically poor world. (Bernd Schmidbauer country, mentioning CDU/CSU 21.09.2006) of famines Oppression of Afghan women as We now know that under women oppressed and the power of the warlords muted, emphasis on and, in a sense, under the girls not being care of the Karzai allowed to go to government, girls are still school, image of viewed as barter for cars “veiled women”. and dogs. It is still the case that 80 per cent of the jurisdiction is exercised by the tribal chiefs. They treat women just as awfully and badly as the Taliban (Monika Knoche, the Left, 20.09.2007) Bad Emphasis on lack of We are working to ensure governance good governance, that good governance has a lack of democracy, chance in this country. And XXIII

lack of rule of law, that is the only reason why corrupt government. we intervened militarily - to get room for it again. (Philipp Mißfelder, CDU/CSU 13.02.2014) Afghans as Presentation of Look at the catalogue of piteous Afghans as prohibitions that, in a persons maltreated, cynical and inhuman way, suffering, piteous. have basically made life in Afghans as being Kabul impossible since the oppressed and Taliban moved in. hopeless, lacking Something that deserves the human rights and name "life" was not left. human dignity. Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier (SPD) 20.09.2007

Comparison to Comparison of the For a comparison to Western/ situation in Germany, the destruction of German past Afghanistan to a Germany and Europe after situation in Western the Second World War is past. not appropriate. We must Comparison with make a comparison with the Germany after state of Europe after the WW2, comparison Thirty Years' War in 1648. with Germany in (Eckart von Klaeden, medieval times, CDU/CSU, 28.09.2006) comparison with Germany during the 30-years- war. Diverse image Overall Portrayal of Regarding Afghanistan, one of diverse image Afghanistan as a should always be aware that Afghanistan diverse county, with it is not just a country in the rich culture, civil war, but also a country different interest, with a long history and a etc. rich culture. Dr. Rolf Mützenich, SPD, 20.02.2014

Diverse, multi- Addressing regional In terms of freedom of ethnic differences in movement in this country population Afghanistan, and in diversity of the acknowledging population in this country, diverse ethnic the situation is extremely groups. fragmented. There are many weapons in this country. There are also many different interests and peoples there. (Christian Schmidt CDU/CSU20.12.2002) National Mentioning of The natural resource sector resources natural resources in particular has great XXIV

present in potential and can make Afghanistan. Afghanistan more independent from international cash donations in the long-term. The Afghan natural resource deposits have so far hardly been used. Dr. Guido Westerwelle, FDP, 15.12.2011

Beautiful Addressing the They are fantastic pictures Afghanistan beauty of Afghan of magnificent landscapes. landscapes and Ursula Mogg, SPD, nature, 12.10.2007 Portraying cities as thriving and liveable. Peaceful past Emphasising Afghanistan - one can hardly peaceful times in believe it - was once a Afghan past. peaceful and liveable country. Niels Annen, SPD, 18.12.2014

Afghans as Portraying Afghans But there is also another strong and as strong and active reality that a lot of people in active persons actors, with own this room know: young, interest, hopes and motivated people who are wishes. ready to take their future Mentioning of civil into their own hands and society. bring their country forward. I had the pleasure of getting to know ten young Afghan women, all around 20, who are studying law in Balkh and are determined to continue to campaign for the rights of women and their country in the future. It is touching to see the future vigour and determination with which these young women appear. Dr. Ursula von der Leyen, CDU/CSU, 18.12.2014 Similarities to Portrayal of When you talk to young the West similarities of the people in Afghanistan and wishes and interests ask them what their desires of Afghan people and hopes are, you will hear and people in that they have the same as Germany / the West. all other young people around the world. XXV

Omid Nouripour, the Greens, 05.12.2014

Justification Intervention Framing the The German armed forces for women Western and our allies fought for a intervention as democratic Afghanistan, for necessary to protect, equality between men and save or support women in Afghanistan, for a females in free and safe country. Afghanistan. Bijan Djir-Sarai, FDP, Description of the 31.01.2013 situation of women before the intervention. Afghans as Afghans Afghans portrayed The Bundeswehr must and willing, but unable to as overwhelmed by will remain until Afghan incapable provide the challenges in security forces themselves actors security their country. can ensure the security of Afghans not able to the Afghans and ensure that run their own Afghan territory no longer country. Afghan poses a threat to us and the security forces and international community. government as not Ruprecht Polenz, CDU / CSU, being able to control 12.10.2007 the whole country and provide security. Afghanistan government cannot protect its own people from terror and cannot ensure that there is no threat towards the West. Rescue Intervention is But we have made it narrative rescuing Afghans possible for many people from their misery, and especially women and protecting Afghans, girls in Afghanistan to live a is giving them hope halfway humane life again. and perspectives for Dr. Johann David Wadephul, their future, is CDU/CSU 13.03.2020 helping Afghanistan to become viable. Germans are not abandoning Afghans. Civilisation vs. Emphasis on the Marauding gangs, raids, barbarism cruel regime of resistance nests of terror, inhumane dispersed Taliban, ideas of the Taliban, submerged Al-Qaeda examples of fighters are part of the civilisational Afghan reality. In addition, XXVI

achievements that individual tribal chiefs still were only possible control parts of the country through the as warlords. - This highlights intervention. the risks the country and all Dichotomy between those who are trying to Afghan fanatics, support the country warlords, gangs, and internationally, face. drug bosses on the Rudolf Sharping, SPD, one hand and the 17.06.2002 cultured intervener on the other hand. Disclosure Critical view on We all should avoid of Othering Western image of arrogance in the discussion. Afghanistan, Some talk shows feature questioning the people who portray legitimisation of the Afghanistan as medieval and intervention via the claim that the situation is construction of an just the way it is, and that Other. Afghanistan is failed. No, we Emphasising that must trust that the Afghan Afghan culture and society is ready for change customs need to be and able to take control of valued and the fate of its country. I see considered. a chance that she [the Afghan society] will. Rainer Arnold, SPD, 15.12.2011 Evaluation Afghans as Incapacity or The political leadership in reason for unwillingness of Afghanistan must also stand failure Afghans as reasons behind the fight against for failure in the drugs. This also applies to intervention. personnel policy, right down Bad governance, to President Karzai. His corruption in state recent personnel decisions, structures, criticism both in the fight against of warlords. drugs and in the filling of the highest positions in the police force, have not created trust, also not amongst the population. Dr. Christian Ruck, CDU/CSU, 28.09.2006

Figure 20: Coding scheme

XXVII

F) Coding sheets

1 (12,5%) 1

5 (83,3%) 5

4 (50%) 4

1 (12,5%) 1

5 (62,5%) 5

4 (50%) 4

1 (12,5%) 1

AfD

1 (1,4%) 1

7 (9,6%) 7

20 (27,4%) 20

5 (6,9%) 5

12 (16,4%) 12

2 (2,7%) 2

1 (1,4%) 1

34 (46,6%) 34

6 (8,2%) 6

9 (12,3%) 9

4 (5,5%) 4

5 (6,8%) 5

1 (1,4%) 1

PDS/Left

5 (8,3%) 5

4 (6,7%) 4

79 (126,5%) 79

17 (28,3%) 17

27 (45%) 27

22 (36,7%) 22

5 (8,33%) 5

8 (13,3%) 8

25 (41%) 25

4 (6,7%) 4

3 (5%)3

7 (11,7%) 7

4 (6,7%) 4

1 (1,7%) 1

4 (6,7%) 4

FDP

158

41 (26,0%) 41

4 (3,2%) 4

244 (154,4%) 244

50 (31,7%) 50

90 (57%) 90

69 (43,7%) 69

25 (15,8%) 25

10 (6,3%) 10

109 (69,0%) 109

27 (17,1%) 27

13 (8,2%) 13

16 (10,1%) 16

15 (9,5%) 15

17 (10,8%) 17

6 (3,8%) 6

3 (1,9%) 3

12 (7,6%) 12

CDU/CSU

5 (6,3%) 5

45 (56,3%) 45

15 (18,8%) 15

9 (11,3%) 9

12 (15%) 12

2 (2,5%) 2

7 (8,8%) 7

36 (45%) 36

6 (7,5%) 6

1 (1,3%) 1

10 (12,5%) 10

12 (15%) 12

4 (5%)4

3 (3,8%) 3

Greens

111

23 (20,7%) 23

12 (10,8%) 12

202 (182%) 202

44 (39,6%) 44

35 (31,5%) 35

84 (75,7%) 84

13 (11,7%) 13

26 (23,4%) 26

104 (93,7%) 104

14 (12,6%) 14

10 (9,0%) 10

29 (26,1%) 29

20 (18,0%) 20

10 (9,0%) 10

6 (5,4%) 6

3 (2,7%) 3

12 (10,8%) 12

SPD

Afghans as reason for failure

Disclosure of Othering

Total

Civilisation vs. barbarism

Afghanistan as a threat the to West

Rescue narrativ

Afghans unable to provide security

Intervention for women

Total

Bad governance

Poverty

Afghans as piteous people

Violent pastViolent of the country

Oppression of women

Comparison with Western past

Lack of structuresLack civil Overall backwardness Number of speeches Figure 21: Coding sheet (party affiliation)

XXVIII

1 (5,6%) 1

2 (10%)2

3 (18,8%) 3

6 (40%)6

10 (62,5%) 10

4 (18,2%) 4

8 (26,7%) 8

6 (30%)6

8 (25,8%) 8

2 (9,1%) 2

2 (9,5%) 2

9 (23,7%) 9

5 (16,1%) 5

2 (6,1%) 2

6 (31,6%) 6

1 (10%)1

1 (9,1%) 1

failure

for

as reason

Afghans

2 (12,5%) 2

4 (18,2%) 4

1 (3,3%) 1

3 (9,7%) 3

4 (19,0%) 4

2 (5,3%) 2

1 (7,1%) 1

4 (12,1%) 4

2 (5,8%) 2

7 (36,8%) 7

1 (9,1%) 1

1 (11,1%) 1

1 (6,3%) 1

Othering

e of

Disclosur

23 (127,8%) 23

14 (87,5%) 14

9 (45%)9

15 (93,8%) 15

10 (66,7%) 10

21 (131,6%) 21

30 (136,4%) 30

33 (110%) 33

23 (115%) 23

35 (112,9%) 35

1 (5%)1

16 (72,7%) 16

21 (100%) 21

24 (63,2%) 24

6 (42,9%) 6

23 (74,2%) 23

74 (224,2%) 74

52 (152,9%) 52

29 (152,6%) 29

12 (120%) 12

15 (150%) 15

19 (172,7%) 19

39 (354,6%) 39

20 (222,2%) 20

35 (218,8%) 35

ons

Justificati

Total

7 (38,9%) 7

2 (12,5%) 2

2 (10%)2

1 (6,3%) 1

3 (18,6%) 3

5 (22,7%) 5

10 (33,3%) 10

4 (20%)4

6 (19,3%) 6

1 (4,6%) 1

6 (28,6%) 6

2 (5,3%) 2

2 (14,3%) 2

6 (19,4%) 6

18 (54,6%) 18

16 (47,1%) 16

6 (31,6%) 6

3 (30%)3

2 (20%)2

3 (27,3%) 3

10 (90,9%) 10

7 (77,8%) 7

13 (81,3%) 13

barbaris

n vs.

Civilisatio

9 (50%)9

6 (37,6%) 6

4 (20%)4

8 (50%)8

4 (26,7%) 4

3 (18,6%) 3

7 (31,8%) 7

8 (26,7%) 8

3 (15%)3

13 (41,9%) 13

6 (27,3%) 6

8 (38,1%) 8

8 (21,1%) 8

1 (7,1%) 1

6 (19,4%) 6

20 (60,6%) 20

9 (26,5%) 9

8 (42,1%) 8

6 (60%)6

7 (70%)7

9 (81,8%) 9

13 (118,2%) 13

5 (55,6%) 5

7 (43,8%) 7

the west

Threat to

5 (27,8%) 5

3 (18,6%) 3

2 (10%)2

2 (12,5%) 2

6 (40%)6

9 (56,3%) 9

12 (54,6%) 12

11 (36,7%) 11

13 (65%) 13

11 (35,5%) 11

5 (22,7%) 5

3 (14,3%) 3

10 (26,3%) 10

8 (25,8%) 8

21 (63,6%) 21

20 (58,8%) 20

7 (36,8%) 7

3 (30%)3

6 (60%)6

7 (63,6%) 7

10 (90,9%) 10

4 (44,4%) 4

11 (68,8%) 11

narrative

Rescue

2 (12,5%) 2

1 (5%)1

3 (18,6%) 3

6 (37,5%) 6

3 (13,64%) 3

1 (3,3%) 1

2 (6,5%) 2

1 (5%)1

1 (4,8%) 1

2 (5,3%) 2

3 (21,4%) 3

2 (6,5%) 2

7 (21,2%) 7

5 (14,7%) 5

2 (10,5%) 2

2 (18,2%) 2

2 (22,2%) 2

security

provide

Unable

2 (11,1%) 2

1 (6,3%) 1

3 (13,64%) 3

3 (10%)3

3 (15%)3

3 (9,7%) 3

4 (18,2%) 4

3 (14,3%) 3

2 (5,3%) 2

1 (3,2%) 1

8 (24,2%) 8

2 (5,9%) 2

6 (31,6%) 6

4 (36,4%) 4

2 (22,2%) 2

4 (25%)4

women

ion for

Intervent

5 (28%)5

7 (44%)7

3 (15%)3

3 (18,8%) 3

8 (53,3%) 8

7 (44%)7

16 (73%) 16

9 (30%)9

8 (40%)8

15 (48%) 15

4 (18%)4

7 (33,3%) 7

3 (8%)3

1 (7%)1

2 (6%)2

9 (27%)9

2 (5,9%) 2

2 (11%)2

1 (10%)1

1 (10%=1

5 (45%)5

2 (22%)2

5 (31%)5

image

Diverse

Total:

1 (6%)1

2 (9%)2

1 (5%)1

1 (3%)1

West

es to the

Similariti

1 (5%)1

1 (4,8%) 1

past

Peaceful

1 (6%)1

1 (3%)1

1 (5%)1

1 (3%)1

Afghanist

Beautiful

2 (9%)2

1 (3%)1

resource

Natural

2 (11%)2

3 (19%)3

2 (10%)2

3 (18,8%) 3

5 (38%)5

4 (25%)4

8 (36%)8

8 (26,7%) 8

5 (25%)5

4 (13%)4

1 (5%)1

1 (4,8%) 1

1 (3%)1

5 (16,1%) 5

8 (24%)8

1 (2,9%) 1

2 (11%)2

1 (10%)1

2 (18%)2

2 (13%)2

people

active active

and

as strong

Afghans

1 (5%)1

1 (6,7%) 1

2 (13%)2

3 (10%)3

1 (5%)1

2 (9,5%) 2

1(7%)

2 (6%)2

1 (9%)1

populatio

general

errorists/

Taliban/t

Separatio

3 (17%)3

2 (13%)2

2 (13,3%) 2

3 (14%)3

1 (5%)1

5 (16%)5

2 (9%)2

3 (14,3%) 3

1 (2,9%) 1

1 (10%)1

2 (18%)2

2 (22%)2

3 (19%)3

populatio

ethnic

multi-

Diverse,

1 (3%)1

Afghanist

image of

Diverse

12 (67%) 12

3 (19%)3

8 (40%)8

5 (31,3%) 5

13 (86,7%) 13

11 (69%) 11

9 (41%)9

23 (77%) 23

11 (55%) 11

21 (68%) 21

9 (41%)9

11 (52,4%) 11

14 (37%) 14

4 (29%)4

22 (71%) 22

29 (88%) 29

13 (38,2%) 13

24 (126%) 24

8 (80%)8

6 (60%)6

8 (72,7%) 8

21 (191%) 21

14 (156%) 14

18 (113%) 18

dness

Backwar

Total:

1 (6%)1

2 (13%)2

1 (5%)1

4 (12%)4

1 (2,9%) 1

1 (5%)1

2 (18%)2

1 (11%)1

past

Western

on with

Comparis

2 (11%)2

2 (10%)2

1 (6,7%) 1

1 (5%)1

3 (10%)3

1 (5%)1

7 (23%)7

2 (9%)2

1 (4,8%) 1

3 (8%)3

2 (14%)2

5 (16%)5

7 (21%)7

4 (11%)4

5 (26%)5

3 (30%)3

2 (18,2%) 2

8 (73%)8

2 (22%)2

9 (56%)9

people

piteous

Afghans

2 (11%)2

1 (5%)1

2 (9%)2

4 (13%)4

1 (5%)1

2 (9%)2

2 (9,5%) 2

2 (5%)2

4 (12%)4

6 (18%)6

3 (8,6%) 3

3 (16%)3

2 (18%)2

2 (22%)2

1 (6%)1

women

on of

Oppressi

2 (11%)2

2 (13%)2

2 (10%)2

4 (26,7%) 4

1 (6%)1

1 (5%)1

6 (20%)6

1 (5%)1

1 (3%)1

1 (5%)1

1 (4,8%) 1

2 (5%)2

1(7%)

4 (12%)4

2 (5,9%) 2

4 (21%)4

1 (10%)1

3 (27.3%)3

3 (27%)3

4 (44%)4

4 (25%)4

past

Violent Violent

1 (6%)1

1 (6,2%) 1

2 (13,3%) 2

1 (5%)1

1 (3%)1

3 (15%)3

2 (6%)2

1 (5%)1

2 (9,5%) 2

2 (5%)2

3 (10%)3

4 (12%)4

4 (21%)4

1 (10%)1

1 (9%)1

3 (33%)3

1 (6%)1

Poverty

1 (4,8%) 1

2 (6%)2

1 (5%)1

3 (27%)3

structure

civil civil

Lack ofLack

3 (17%)3

3 (15%)3

4 (25%)4

5 (33,3%) 5

4 (25%)4

3 (14%)3

5 (17%)5

4 (20%)4

10 (32%) 10

3 (14%)3

1 (4,8%) 1

4 (11%)4

1 (7%)1

3 (10%)3

2 (11%)2

2 (20%)2

1 (10%)1

3 (19%)3

governan

Bad

1 (6%)1

1 (6,7%) 1

4 (25%)4

4 (13%)4

1 (5%)1

1 (3%)1

3 (14,3%) 3

1 (3%)1

3 (10%)3

2 (6%)2

3 (8,6%) 3

4 (21%)4

1 (10%)1

2 (18,2%) 2

2 (18%)2

2 (22%)2

dness

backwar

Overall

ches

spee

ber

Num

2020

2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014/2

2014/1

2012

2011/3

2011/2

2011/1

2010

2009/2

2009/1

2008

2007/2

2007/1

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002/2

2002/1 2001 Year

Figure 22: Coding sheet (time) XXIX

G) Example of a coded plenary debate

XXX

XXXI

XXXII

XXXIII

XXXIV

XXXV

XXXVI

XXXVII

XXXVIII

XXXIX